Indo-Pacific Maritime Security in the 21St Century
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South China Sea Overview
‹ Countries South China Sea Last Updated: February 7, 2013 (Notes) full report Overview The South China Sea is a critical world trade route and a potential source of hydrocarbons, particularly natural gas, with competing claims of ownership over the sea and its resources. Stretching from Singapore and the Strait of Malacca in the southwest to the Strait of Taiwan in the northeast, the South China Sea is one of the most important trade routes in the world. The sea is rich in resources and holds significant strategic and political importance. The area includes several hundred small islands, rocks, and reefs, with the majority located in the Paracel and Spratly Island chains. Many of these islands are partially submerged land masses unsuitable for habitation and are little more than shipping hazards. For example, the total land area of the Spratly Islands encompasses less than 3 square miles. Several of the countries bordering the sea declare ownership of the islands to claim the surrounding sea and its resources. The Gulf of Thailand borders the South China Sea, and although technically not part of it, disputes surround ownership of that Gulf and its resources as well. Asia's robust economic growth boosts demand for energy in the region. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) projects total liquid fuels consumption in Asian countries outside the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to rise at an annual growth rate of 2.6 percent, growing from around 20 percent of world consumption in 2008 to over 30 percent of world consumption by 2035. Similarly, non-OECD Asia natural gas consumption grows by 3.9 percent annually, from 10 percent of world gas consumption in 2008 to 19 percent by 2035. -
A Move from the Himalayas to the High Seas?
India-China conflict: A move from the Himalayas to the high seas? A risky naval blockade in the Indian Ocean is touted by some as a way to pressure China’s vital energy routes. By Dr David Brewster Last month’s clash between Indian and Chinese troops in Ladakh was the most significant conflict between the two countries since 1967. Despite signs of a partial tactical pullback in some places, there is considerable risk of further confrontations and even escalation along the disputed border. Some have been urging the Indian government to respond to China’s moves in the Himalayas by placing pressure on Beijing in the Indian Ocean. What are India’s options and how likely is it to take such actions? The Indian Ocean holds a particular place in the India-China strategic relationship. In almost every dimension, whether it be economic, nuclear or the conventional strategic balance along the Line of Actual Control in the Himalayas, India is probably at a considerable strategic disadvantage to China. Only in the Indian Ocean, which includes China’s vital energy routes from the Persian Gulf and Africa, does India have the upper hand. This has important implications for the strategy dynamic. Decades ago, prominent US Sinologist John Garver argued that in the event of a conflict between the two countries, India might be tempted to escalate from the land dimension, where it may suffer reverses, to the maritime dimension, where it enjoys substantial advantages, and employ those advantages to restrict China’s vital Indian Ocean trade. In strategic jargon, the Indian Ocean represents “interior lines” for India – where the Indian Navy is close to its own bases and logistics – and “exterior lines” for China, where its navy is operating with limited logistical support, away from home. -
Is India Ready for the Indo- Pacific?
Harsh V. Pant and Abhijnan Rej Is India Ready for the Indo- Pacific? One of the key geopolitical developments in 2017 was the first-ever formal enshrinement of the “Indo-Pacific” as a unified strategic theater in the U.S. National Security Strategy.1 Subsequently, the U.S. National Defense Strat- egy also adopted this terminology, suggesting buy-in across the Executive Branch.2 The development was arguably the result of the growing realization in Washing- ton, D.C., and other capitals that it cannot be business-as-usual going forward with China, given its increasingly assertive foreign policy since 2013. As analysts have noted, it is hardly an accident that this new term was introduced in the same document that officially termed China as a “revisionist” power for the first time.3 The idea of the Indo-Pacific received further validation when the quadrilateral security dialogue (colloquially, the quad)—involving the United States, Australia, Japan, and India—reconvened for the first time in a decade in Manila in Novem- ber 2017. Most significantly, in June 2018, the U.S. Pacific Command—one of the oldest and largest unified combatant commands—was renamed the U.S. Indo- Pacific Command while its area of responsibility remained the same. The normative significance of the formal adoption of this nomenclature for India cannot be overstated. The moniker firmly and officially situates India in U.S. grand strategy. The expansive maritime space that is the Indo-Pacific, per the U.S. definition, includes the Pacific and part of the Indian Ocean, up to India’s western coastline. -
China Versus Vietnam: an Analysis of the Competing Claims in the South China Sea Raul (Pete) Pedrozo
A CNA Occasional Paper China versus Vietnam: An Analysis of the Competing Claims in the South China Sea Raul (Pete) Pedrozo With a Foreword by CNA Senior Fellow Michael McDevitt August 2014 Unlimited distribution Distribution unlimited. for public release This document contains the best opinion of the authors at the time of issue. It does not necessarily represent the opinion of the sponsor. Cover Photo: South China Sea Claims and Agreements. Source: U.S. Department of Defense’s Annual Report on China to Congress, 2012. Distribution Distribution unlimited. Specific authority contracting number: E13PC00009. Copyright © 2014 CNA This work was created in the performance of Contract Number 2013-9114. Any copyright in this work is subject to the Government's Unlimited Rights license as defined in FAR 52-227.14. The reproduction of this work for commercial purposes is strictly prohibited. Nongovernmental users may copy and distribute this document in any medium, either commercially or noncommercially, provided that this copyright notice is reproduced in all copies. Nongovernmental users may not use technical measures to obstruct or control the reading or further copying of the copies they make or distribute. Nongovernmental users may not accept compensation of any manner in exchange for copies. All other rights reserved. This project was made possible by a generous grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation Approved by: August 2014 Ken E. Gause, Director International Affairs Group Center for Strategic Studies Copyright © 2014 CNA FOREWORD This legal analysis was commissioned as part of a project entitled, “U.S. policy options in the South China Sea.” The objective in asking experienced U.S international lawyers, such as Captain Raul “Pete” Pedrozo, USN, Judge Advocate Corps (ret.),1 the author of this analysis, is to provide U.S. -
The Strait of Malacca (Malaysia) with Its Role in the Network of Maritime Trade in Asia and East – West Cultural Exchange in the Middle Ages Pjaee, 17 (4) (2020)
THE STRAIT OF MALACCA (MALAYSIA) WITH ITS ROLE IN THE NETWORK OF MARITIME TRADE IN ASIA AND EAST – WEST CULTURAL EXCHANGE IN THE MIDDLE AGES PJAEE, 17 (4) (2020) THE STRAIT OF MALACCA (MALAYSIA) WITH ITS ROLE IN THE NETWORK OF MARITIME TRADE IN ASIA AND EAST – WEST CULTURAL EXCHANGE IN THE MIDDLE AGES Tran Xuan Hiep1, Nguyen Tuan Binh2 1Institute of Socio-Economic Research, Duy Tan University, Da Nang 550000, Vietnam 2 Department of History, University of Education, Hue University, Vietnam [email protected]@gmail.com Tran Xuan Hiep, Nguyen Tuan Binh. The Strait Of Malacca (Malaysia) With Its Role In The Network Of Maritime Trade In Asia And East – West Cultural Exchange In The Middle Ages-- Palarch’s Journal Of Archaeology Of Egypt/Egyptology 17(4), 84- 92. ISSN 1567-214x ABSTRACT Founded around 1404, as the oldest city in Malaysia, Malacca (Malay: Melaka) is a bustling gathering place for traders from China, India, Arab and European countries. With its geostrategic location as it lies on an important maritime route from Europe, Africa, South Asia, the Middle East to East Asia, Malacca has become one of the region’s largest international trading ports of Southeast Asia region in particular and the world in general. This commercial port held a golden position in the East - West-trading system in the middle ages. Besides the favorable economic conditions, this is also the place that carries many imprints of cultural interference, the place of exchange between the Eastern and Western civilizations. The multicultural imprints has clearly shown in the life, architecture and religion in Malacca city from the past to the present. -
The Combined Maritime Forces Approach to Security Challenges in the Middle East and Indian Ocean
The Combined Maritime Forces Approach To Security Challenges In The Middle East And Indian Ocean Commodore Will Warrender RN Deputy Commander CMF Combined Maritime Forces Ready Together UNCLASSIFIED 1 Scope • Background • Strategic Context • Task Organisation and Missions • Recent Success • CMF Challenges Combined Maritime Forces Ready Together UNCLASSIFIED 2 Combined Maritime Forces The Coalition has grown and evolved to encompass and address commonly perceived threats to the member states and their values. 2015 CMF – Combined Maritime Forces CMFC: Combined Maritime Forces Central (+ maritime & joint) CNFC: Combined Naval Forces Central (reduced security enclave) GCTF: Global Counter Terrorism Force – Maritime (post 9/11) Coalition of states formed in response to the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 Combined Maritime Forces Ready Together UNCLASSIFIED 3 COMMANDER’S VISION A global maritime partnership aligned in common purpose To conduct Maritime Security Operations (MSO) To provide security and stability in the maritime environment To remain scalable, flexible and responsive to a changing environment Nations will never be asked a to do more than what national mandate allows MISSION STATEMENT Improve overall security and stability in the area of operations. Non-State Threat Focused Assist in the development of maritime capacity Intelligence-Driven building to help counter terrorist and piracy threats in the maritime area, Enduring If requested, respond to environmental and humanitarian crises. Combined Maritime Forces -
Bulletin No. 91 The
Bulletin No. 91 Law of the Sea Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea Office of Legal Affairs United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea Office of Legal Affairs Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 91 United Nations New York, 2017 NOTE The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the ex- pression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The texts of treaties and national legislation contained in the Bulletin are reproduced as submitted to the Secretariat, without formal editing. Furthermore, publication in the Bulletin of information concerning developments relating to the law of the sea emanating from actions and decisions taken by States does not imply recognition by the United Na- tions of the validity of the actions and decisions in question. IF ANY MATERIAL CONTAINED IN THE BULLETIN IS REPRODUCED IN PART OR IN WHOLE, DUE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT SHOULD BE GIVEN. United Nations Publication ISBN 978-92-1-133855-3 Copyright © United Nations, 2017 All rights reserved Printed at the United Nations, New York ContentS Page I. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, of the Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the Convention and of the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the Convention relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 1. -
Lessons for the Canadian Forces in the Effects-Based Operations Era
ESPACE l 'S BATT y TODA DND photo AR2006-G068-0009 by Master Corporal Yves Gemus. An M177 artillery piece of 2 Royal Canadian Horse Artillery (2 RCHA) at sunset at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Sperwan Gar, Afghanistan, 14 December 2006. BEiNg Effective iN SnakE fighTiNg – Lessons fOr ThE Canadian Forces iN ThE Effects-Based Operations ErA by Peter J. Williams Introduction the “Comprehensive Approach.” Within Canada, such a multi- faceted method is being increasingly referred to as a “Whole hen General Rick Hillier took over as Chief of Government (WoG) approach.”2 of the Defence Staff (CDS) in early 2005, he very quickly put into effect the most Currently, Canada finds itself engaged in a counterinsur- dramatic transformation the Canadian gency (COIN) campaign in Afghanistan, having also recently Forces (CF) has experienced in its history. filled a major leadership role while commanding the multina- WCentral to his vision was the thesis that future conflicts would tional maritime Combined Task Force 150 (CTF) in the be characterized more by violence within or around failed Arabian Sea areas.3 At the operational level, EBO, with a states, and against non-state actors (the ‘snakes’), than by wars tailored WoG approach, is being applied to each theatre, against such previous opponents as the now-defunct Soviet where there are plenty of ‘snakes’ to be dealt with. Assuming Union (the ‘bears’). that these are the kinds of interventions in which the CF is likely to find itself engaged for the foreseeable future, what At the same time, the concept of Effects-Based Operations lessons might be learned from our contemporary military (EBO) began to emerge.1 Under this doctrine, what was important was the wider (and not necessarily the immediate) Colonel P. -
Al-Qaeda –Mombassa Attacks 28 November 2002 by Jonathan Fighel1
The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center June 16, 2011 Al-Qaeda –Mombassa Attacks 28 November 2002 By Jonathan Fighel1 On June 11, 2011 Somali police reported that Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, one of Africa's most wanted al-Qaeda operatives, was killed in the capital of the Horn of Africa. Mohammed was reputed to be the head of al-Qaeda in east Africa, operated in Somalia and is accused of playing a lead role in the 1998 embassy attacks in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, which killed 240 people. Mohammed is also believed to have masterminded the suicide attack on an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombassa, Kenya in November 2002 that killed 15 people, including three Israeli tourists. Introduction On the morning of November 28, 2002, Al-Qaeda launched coordinated attacks in Mombassa, Kenya against the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel and an Israeli passenger jet.2 The near simultaneous attacks involved Al-Qaeda operatives supported by a local infrastructure. In the first attack, the terrorists fired two SA-7 surface-to-air missiles at a departing Israeli Arkia charter Boeing 757 passenger aircraft, carrying 261 passengers and crew, both missiles missed. The second occurred twenty minutes later, when an explosives- laden vehicle driven by two suicide attackers, blew up in front of the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel. The attack was timed just as the hotel’s Israeli guests arrived—having traveled aboard the same Arkia plane that had embarked on the return flight to Israel. As a result of the 1 The author is a senior researcher scholar at The International Institute for Counter Terrorism -Herzliya -Israel (ICT).First published on ICT web site http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/942/currentpage/1/Default.aspx 2 CNN, “Israeli Report Links Kenya Terrorist to Al Qaeda” , 29 November 2002. -
Indian Ocean : a New Vision
2013 (2) ISSN 2277 – 2464 FPRC Journal ________________________________________________________ (a Quarterly research journal devoted to studies on Indian Foreign Policy) ________________________________________________________________ Focus : Indian Ocean : A New Vision Responses, Articles ________________________________________________________ Foreign Policy Research Centre NEW DELHI (INDIA) ________________________________________________________ FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision Preface Indian Ocean has the unique distinction of being the only ocean named after a country. For extra‐regional powers, the Indian Ocean has for decades fulfilled the role of an important transit corridor But Sardar KM Pannikar rightly said, “While to other countries, the Indian Ocean is only one of the important oceanic areas, to India it is a vital sea. Her lifelines are concentrated in that area, her freedom is dependent on the freedom of that water surface. No industrial development, no commercial growth, no stable political structure is possible for her unless her shores are protected...” Therefore, there is a realisation across the spectrum that the challenges, opportunities and roles the Indian Ocean provides, need to be discussed seriously in the light of the fragile security environment in the region. It is very heartening to note that a wide galaxy of writers have focused on important themes and other related issues in their writings and comments, for this special issue of FPRC Journal on Indian Ocean. We express our heart-felt thanks to our contributors who have shared our sentiments and accepted our invitation to enrich the contents of the Journal.They are always our source of strength. Mahendra Gaur Indira Gaur Director Mg. Editor Foreign Policy Research Centre New Delhi 1 FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision FPRC Journal Focus : Indian Ocean : A New Vision Contributors : RESPONSES 1. -
Maritime Issues in the East and South China Seas
Maritime Issues in the East and South China Seas Summary of a Conference Held January 12–13, 2016 Volume Editors: Rafiq Dossani, Scott Warren Harold Contributing Authors: Michael S. Chase, Chun-i Chen, Tetsuo Kotani, Cheng-yi Lin, Chunhao Lou, Mira Rapp-Hooper, Yann-huei Song, Joanna Yu Taylor C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/CF358 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2016 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover image: Detailed look at Eastern China and Taiwan (Anton Balazh/Fotolia). Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface Disputes over land features and maritime zones in the East China Sea and South China Sea have been growing in prominence over the past decade and could lead to serious conflict among the claimant countries. -
US-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas
U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress Updated September 8, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R42784 U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas Summary Over the past several years, the South China Sea (SCS) has emerged as an arena of U.S.-China strategic competition. China’s actions in the SCS—including extensive island-building and base- construction activities at sites that it occupies in the Spratly Islands, as well as actions by its maritime forces to assert China’s claims against competing claims by regional neighbors such as the Philippines and Vietnam—have heightened concerns among U.S. observers that China is gaining effective control of the SCS, an area of strategic, political, and economic importance to the United States and its allies and partners. Actions by China’s maritime forces at the Japan- administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (ECS) are another concern for U.S. observers. Chinese domination of China’s near-seas region—meaning the SCS and ECS, along with the Yellow Sea—could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere. Potential general U.S. goals for U.S.-China strategic competition in the SCS and ECS include but are not necessarily limited to the following: fulfilling U.S. security commitments in the Western Pacific, including treaty commitments to Japan and the Philippines; maintaining and enhancing the U.S.-led security architecture in the Western Pacific, including U.S.