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Averting Conflict in the South China Sea: Steps to Restore Rules and Restraint

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Averting Conflict in the South China Sea: Steps to Restore Rules and Restraint AVERTING CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: STEPS TO RESTORE RULES AND RESTRAINT SUSAN THORNTON EXECUTIVE SUMMARY before and could do so again with good will and cool-headed pragmatism. Chinese military advancements and increasing capabilities in the South China Sea, as well as the country’s bullying enforcement of its disputed THE PROBLEM maritime claims, threaten to undermine U.S. China’s continuing aggressive assertions of its interests in the Asia-Pacific region, including unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea have preserving freedom of navigation, access to inflamed regional tensions, harmed the interests the global commons, and a credible security of regional claimants, undermined the Law of the umbrella for allies and partners. The U.S. will find Sea treaty and international law more broadly, and it increasingly difficult, however, to successfully violated China’s commitments under the Declaration defend the positions of allies and partners who on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC).1 seek to exploit maritime resources or to exercise A Chinese coastguard ship sank a Vietnamese fishing sovereignty in areas of overlapping or disputed boat in April leading to a flurry of diplomatic protests claims in the South China Sea through displays from around the region. Chinese military exercises, of military presence as deterrence. The U.S. patrols, and construction in the South China Sea have administration has recently announced that it will increased, while China’s aggressive enforcement of deploy U.S. Coast Guard cutters to the Philippines its sweeping claims to all resources in the South China to aid in patrolling such disputed areas, which only Sea prevents other claimants from duly exploiting makes this dilemma more urgent. resources in their lawful EEZs (exclusive economic zones) and threatens commercial rights and activities Rather than continue to test the limits of the in the region, including freedom of navigation, fishing, current approach in a situation where failure will and other maritime actions. China’s reclamation and be gravely damaging to U.S. interests, the U.S. militarization of land features it occupies has clearly should change tack and seek a modus vivendi with made the disputes more complicated and violated China that can return the emphasis to international the 2002 DOC principles. law, clear communication of expectations and, eventually, agreements on resource exploitation So far, attempts by the international community and preservation. It would behoove China and to shape or counter Chinese behavior in the the U.S., together with ASEAN South China Sea South China Sea have not been successful. claimants, to work together before a crisis occurs to These include attempts at diplomatic isolation, pursue a cooperation spiral that could restore trust negotiation of mutual withdrawals (the 2012 and reestablish law, rules, and restraint in this vital incident at Scarborough Shoal); international and heavily-trafficked waterway. Southeast Asian dispute resolution; negotiation of a binding Code partners are loath to see a Sino-American clash of Conduct with other claimants; and increased in these waters and would welcome a reduction military pressure against Chinese claims in the form of military tensions in the shipping lanes, provided of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance their interests could be addressed. While this aim (ISR) and bomber overflights and “freedom of will be extremely difficult to achieve in the current navigation operations” (FONOPs); as well as other diplomatic atmosphere and given the recent history presence operations. Despite high infrastructure of the South China Sea issue, U.S. and Chinese costs, relative diplomatic losses, damage to China’s diplomats have made progress on challenges international reputation, and the imposition of 1 AVERTING CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: STEPS TO RESTORE RULES AND RESTRAINT U.S. sanctions on companies conducting South U.S. interests in the South China Sea spring from China Sea construction, China’s position has not the U.S. security umbrella that has maintained retreated and, indeed, has hardened. In the face peace in the region since the end of the Vietnam of international pressure to bring its claims into War and the normalization of relations with China. conformance with international law, China has This includes maintaining the credibility of U.S. expanded the territory of the South China Sea alliance commitments, monitoring and balancing features it claims to over 3,200 acres of reclaimed China’s growing military power, deterring aggression, land, built significant and permanent civilian keeping important sea lanes open and orderly, and military installations on those features, and and safeguarding freedom of navigation under declared civilian jurisdiction over the Paracel and international law.4 While there is an ongoing debate Spratly Islands. It also rejected the findings of the in the U.S. about whether U.S. military dominance International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) of the western Pacific is necessary (or realistic) in 2016 with respect to the status of features in going forward, traditional U.S. responsibilities the South China Sea and their relevance for lawful and relationships with allies and partners in the maritime claims, claiming that reservations China region will inevitably pull the U.S. into any serious made at the time of its UNCLOS ratification allow crisis or conflict, and a number of these events the country to opt out of arbitration. The tribunal are just waiting to happen.5 For example, the specifically rejected this claim in the case. China’s Philippine Sierra Madre tank landing ship perched disregard of international legal proceedings, on Second Thomas Shoal, a low-tide elevation, is international condemnation, and other sanctions perpetually unstable and could touch off a crisis. for this behavior have contributed to frustration and Conflicts between Chinese and Philippine ships at alarm on the part of the international community Scarborough Shoal could again escalate. Indonesia, and caused it to question China’s longer-term Malaysia, and Vietnam have all engaged in standoffs intentions and likelihood of conformance to with China over resource rights during the last year. international regimes as its power grows. And the possibility of accidents in this very crowded air and sea space, between both civilian and military China’s claims in the South China Sea have vessels, is not trivial, as has been proven in recent assumed increasing prominence in the last 10 years. Given the potential seriousness of any of these years, as China’s economic and military power scenarios escalating, it is certainly in the interests of has grown along with its interests. China views both China and the U.S. to dial down the possibility the South China Sea firstly as part of its periphery of such incidents erupting. that is increasingly important to defend against perceived external threats. These perceived One problem in addressing this serious situation has threats include U.S. intervention in a Taiwan been the impenetrable nature of the South China scenario, potential for interference with important Sea narratives in each country, with the result that shipping lanes relied upon by China, especially for the U.S.-China discussion of the South China Sea has shipments of crude oil through the Malacca Straits, become a dialogue of the deaf. The Chinese narrative and threats to the security and stealth of China’s is that the South China Sea is China’s historical second-strike nuclear deterrent as provided by its patrimony; that no Chinese leader can compromise submarine-launched ballistic missile force.2 The on Chinese claims; that China was the last claimant latter figures increasingly in the calculus, as China to establish “defensive” installations on its occupied feels more vulnerable to a possible U.S. first-strike features; that other claimants have been duplicitous, nuclear attack than at any time since normalization and China must prevent encroachments; that of diplomatic relations. These security interests China has an interest and responsibility to protect in the South China Sea have become more acute South China Sea shipping and resource extraction; from China’s perspective in the last decade. China that parties to the claim disputes can resolve their also sees the South China Sea as crucial for its issues without interference from those outside the continued economic growth and development, as region; and that China is not beholden to the ITLOS a transport corridor for Chinese cargo shipments tribunal’s ruling and interprets UNCLOS differently. to global customers, as a major resource base for This narrative is viewed in the U.S. as a smoke screen fishing, and, potentially, as a new source of offshore for China’s preponderant but unstated interests: hydrocarbon resources.3 keeping U.S. forces from intervening in a Taiwan or 2 AVERTING CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: STEPS TO RESTORE RULES AND RESTRAINT other regional contingency, degrading U.S. credibility Sea features (rocks) are likely to continue to lose and relations with its allies in the region, upgrading ground in the South China Sea to de facto beefed-up its nuclear deterrent with triad SLBM capabilities, Chinese presence and capabilities. Some American and securing the lion’s share of sea and seabed security specialists have said that the U.S. should resources for itself. not pursue a goal of reducing tension and avoiding conflict
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