Threat Convergence Transnational Security Threats in the Straits of Malacca

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The Fund for Peace Transnational Threats

Threat Convergence Report Series Editor Patricia Taft

Report Written by Felipe Umaña

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www.fundforpeace.org 2 The Fund for Peace The Straits of Malacca Overview

Introduction & Contents

The Straits of Malacca consist of a Indeed, in the area around the Straits of narrow but lengthy waterway that extends Malacca, porous borders and poorly Definition of Malacca Straits 4 more than 500 miles from the eastern limits monitored ports allow these threats to Why the Straits of Malacca Matter 5 of the Andaman Sea to the South China Sea in infiltrate the coastal nations. A lack of strong

Southeast Asia. Straddling the sea route government control pervades in certain Maritime Piracy and Armed Robbery 7 between the Indonesian island of Sumatra, pockets and gives rise to corruption. In this the Thai-Malay Peninsula, and the small city- governmental blind spot, crimes burgeon and Littoral, User and state of Singapore, the Straits of Malacca are flourish, and due to economic Non-State Security Capacity 10 known globally for their economic, political, marginalization, individuals frequently turn Indonesia 10 environmental, and strategic importance. The to a life of crime, fueling hidden, black Straits themselves link the Indian Ocean to market economies. In addition, a number of Malaysia 12 some of Asia’s most powerful economies, as separatist organizations and terrorist cells Singapore 13 well as many other trade-influential occupy land far from the control of User Countries 14 countries, like the United States, Germany, governments, adding to the already high and Russia. levels of state insecurity. To add to this slew Non-State Shipping Actors 15 of security threats, the South China Sea’s Security Measures and Initiatives 16 More than 60,000 vessels traverse the critical contested territorial disputes compound the chokepoint per year, carrying more than a stress and tension surrounding the Straits of Terrorist Organizations 1 third of global trade. Due to the amount of Malacca. and Other Insurgencies 18 traffic, the region is also home to some of the busiest ports in the world, particularly in Needless to say, the Straits of Malacca face Black Market Activities Singapore. 2 The Straits attract foreign multiple security issues that affect the three and Other Crimes 21 investment with the amount of commerce littoral states and the Straits’ user nations. In Recommendations 23 and trade it supports. The Straits are also the fact, its geographical position makes it not focal point of legal and political issues, such only valuable to the states that border the Conclusion 25 as the sovereignty of territorial waters and waterway, but also an intensely critical region the responsibility to secure the waterway. for foreign countries dependent on trade Endnotes 26 Likewise, the waterway is a source of passing between the Pacific and Indian environmental concern for the littoral Oceans. Security of these sea-lanes is About The Fund for Peace 30 countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, and therefore of paramount importance for state Singapore. The maintenance of the actors and should be galvanized on numerous environment is important to all three states levels. in order to not deter tourism or development projects in the area, both of which can in turn Firstly, it is essential for Indonesia, Malaysia, influence the economic and political sectors and Singapore to gather national and directly. Finally, the Straits are crucial for international resources and implement ways worldwide communication and resource to combat the multitude of threats facing the exchange, making them internationally Straits of Malacca. Secondly, extra-regional significant. actors should cooperate with nations in the region in various capacities to ensure that Unfortunately, however, the Malacca Straits global trade is not adversely affected. have become notorious for maritime robbery Similarly, extra-regional actors can play a role and pirate attacks, as well as for being a in ensuring that the root causes of these transit hub for myriad black markets and a problems are treated effectively. Lastly, haven for belligerent non-state actors. shipping companies, non-governmental

www.fundforpeace.org 3 The Fund for Peace Introduction

organizations, and other non-state actors can be done to secure the Straits of Malacca. fluctuate with the passing of history and with a stake in the Straits should band Though incidences of piracy and prominent time. Thus, a leveling off does not signal a together and assist their home governments terrorist activity have largely diminished in complete and total disappearance. Therefore, in fostering greater security. the past few years, it is still important to security in the Malacca Straits must remain acknowledge their persistence and decide on the radar of global actors in order to Although state capacities differ greatly in upon ways to combat these and other properly and efficiently protect this very some respects, it is still crucial for all actors security problems directly. Transnational important waterway. involved to come together and discuss what threat trends like these are organic and

Definition of Malacca Straits

T H A I L A N D Straits of Geopolitically, the Straits of Malacca fall However, in contemporary times, under a number of different territorial and governments and non-governmental Phuket Malacca maritime jurisdictions. Primarily, the Straits organizations around the world have altered are defined as falling between Peninsular that definition to also include the Banda Aceh S t r a i t s o f M a l a c c a Malaysia (with a small portion of southern commercially significant Singapore Straits George Thailand) and the island of Sumatra with east and Singapore in its totality. 4 Still other Town M A L A Y S I A and west limits bordering Singaporean and definitions enlarge the geographical expanse Indian (the Andaman and Nicobar Island of the Malacca Straits to include the eastern chain) territorial waters. The International limits of the Andaman and Nicobar island Medan Kuala Lumpur Hydrographic Organization, the non- chain, which is controlled by India. This governmental body in charge of documenting definition is usually used in reference to I N D O N E S I A Singapore hydrographic and maritime limitations, has maritime piracy, and highlights the defined the Straits of Malacca as the geographical vastness the waterway has in following: terms of extended accountability and

• On the West: From the northernmost point government responsibility. Padang of Sumatra (Pedropunt) and Lem Voalan on the southern extremity of Phuket Island, For purposes of this report, the definition of Thailand the Straits of Malacca will include the territorial waters of India, Indonesia, • On the East: From Tanjong Piai on the Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. The term Malaysian Peninsula and Klein Karimoen, “littoral states,” however, will solely refer to Indonesia Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, as the • On the North: The Southwestern coast of Straits fall under these states’ primary the Malay Peninsula authority. • On the South: The northwestern coast of Sumatra to the eastward city of Tanjung Kedabu to Klein Karimoen, Indonesia 3

www.fundforpeace.org 4 The Fund for Peace The Straits of Malacca Why the Straits of Malacca Matter

The Straits of Malacca are a critical responsibility of the three states – Indonesia, Commercial traffic through this important global trade artery, with some of the heaviest Malaysia, and Singapore. User nations and waterway is bidirectional: raw materials and traffic of any maritime choke point smaller non-governmental actors also have other imports from Europe, Africa, and the worldwide. Between 60,000 5 to 94,000 6 stakes in the region, but for international Middle East are shipped in vast quantities on shipping vessels pass through the Straits legal reasons, they have minimal direct tankers and bulk carriers through the Persian annually, carrying about a third of global influence. In very specific situations, India Gulf and the Indian Ocean to destination trade. 7 Indeed, the Straits see three times and Thailand are accountable for maritime countries in the Pacific Rim. Trade from East more general traffic than the Panama Canal security, as their territorial waters share a and Southeast Asia reciprocates this and twice as much as the Suez Canal. 8 more abbreviated overlap than the exchange, and container ships with finished aforementioned three countries. The three consumer products navigate the seas to In terms of energy transport, more than two- littoral states have the right to prescribe Western Asia, as well as to European and East thirds of the world’s liquefied oil and natural regulations for transit through the Straits, African nations, among other regions. Raw gas passes through the busy sea-lanes. This is including any security and transit safety materials such as coal and iron ore are three times more than the oil and gas cargo considerations, laws against marine pollution, common cargo in the Straits of Malacca, and passing through the Suez Canal and fifteen traffic management, and other similar are hugely important for developing centers times more than the fuel traffic transported domains. Treaties, like the International in East and Southeast Asia. 13 By far the most via the Panama Canal. The Malacca Straits are Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea valued cargo transported through the Straits also the “energy lifeline” for economic and the United Nations Convention on the is petroleum. powerhouses like China, Japan, South Korea Law of the Sea, protect the states’ and Taiwan, as more than 80 percent of sovereignty and permit the littoral states to Because of the various kinds of freighted energy imports and exports pass through the control the territorial waters surrounding goods that pass through the Straits, a number Straits of Malacca and transit north through their state territory. of different types of vessels traverse the the South China Sea to reach their Straits. These ships vary in size, shape, and destinations in East Asia. 9 Countries like In terms of responsibility, user nations come function. Heavier shipments, like oil barrels Japan, for example, which imports more than second to the littoral states, consisting of and vehicle parts, are carried on very large 98% of the crude oil it consumes, are wholly foreign countries that depend highly on sea- crude carriers, mainline tankers, liquefied dependent on the Straits, since most ships based imports and exports. China, Germany, natural gas (LNG) carriers, bulk carrier that deliver the essential petroleum from the Japan, and the United States all figure vessels, container ships, supertankers, or Middle East and Western Asia pass through prominently as observer and user nations. vehicle carriers, 14 while less valuable or them. So important are the Malacca Straits for This is because the trade of heavy user states regional trade cargo is carried on small energy transport that the U.S. Energy is contingent on the security of the Straits of vessels, fishing ships, and wooden cargo Information Administration estimates that Malacca, and therefore critical for their boats. The term Malaccamax is used to approximately 13.6 million barrels of economies. denote the naval architecture of shipping petroleum per day alone pass through the vessels that are able to traverse the Straits of waterway, 10 and possibly half of all seaborne Lastly are the shipping companies, essentially Malacca’s rather shallow depths. Ships that oil shipments as well. 11 Japan’s Ministry of those in charge of managing the sea vessels are not fitted for standards matching that of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism and crew directly. They have the lowest stake the Maccamax face longer alternative routes; believes that the Straits will serve 114,000 in determining the security of the region (as other possible avenues, like the Lombok or ships annually by the year 2020. 12 they are non-state actors and are obliged to Ombai Straits, mean going around Indonesia’s observe national laws), but are nonetheless largest island – Sumatra – and through the Despite the heavy international traffic from valuable in establishing safety on the farther south Indonesian island chains. This major trading nations, the safety and security shipping vessels themselves. longer voyage incurs greater cost for of the Straits of Malacca is primarily the shipping companies, and increases exposure

www.fundforpeace.org 5 The Fund for Peace Why the Straits of Malacca Matter

to the risk of armed robbery at sea, making it original path through the Straits of Malacca. 15 US$2,500 for each passage through the less attractive than traversing the Straits of At this time, however, no progress has been Straits. Premiums for supertankers that same Malacca directly. made to create the canal. year rose to about US$63,000, with a US$12,600 transit fee per transit through the The ever-increasing amount of traffic through Threats on land also negatively affect the Straits of Malacca. 17 As of March 2012, the the Straits creates a number of challenges for governments of the littoral states. Unbridled northeastern coast of Sumatra, between 5º the three littoral states in charge of smuggling and destabilizing non-state actors, 40' N and 0º 48' N, is listed on the Joint War maintaining security in the region. At its like separatist rebels, already dominate the Committee’s Hull War, Piracy, Terrorism, and narrowest point, the southern mouth is only political discourse and aggravate the capacity Related Perils list, 18 demonstrating both a about one kilometer in length, making the issues faced by the littoral governments. simultaneous movement in a positive Straits susceptible to collisions and These transnational issues have adversely direction and a necessity to still resolve the bottlenecking. Moreover, the shallow depth affected the perception of security in the insecurity situation in the Malacca Straits. increases the chances for inexperienced region and have led to increased insurance captains to run aground. Despite this, reports premiums. In 2005, for instance, the Joint Although conditions have improved of major problems have remained low in War Committee, comprised of individuals somewhat since piracy attacks peaked in the number over the years. The remarkable from Lloyd’s Market Association, an early 2000s 19 , the possibility of a “low concentration of cargo traffic in the Straits influential British insurance conglomerate, probability, high impact scenario” 20 – for has forced the region to adapt to the high and the International Underwriting example, the detonation of a bomb near the traffic. Nodes of intricate shipping networks Association of London, classified the Straits narrowest bit of the Straits of Malacca – is have arisen due to the complexity of the of Malacca, Singapore, and several associated frightening to consider. Analysts have cargo traffic, therefore easing navigation ports in Indonesia as “operating in a war considered bottlenecking incidents in the through the narrow stretch of the Straits. Its zone.” By doing this, the Joint War Committee event of a terrorist attack, large-scale pirate proximity to the South China Sea and the gave the region the same ranking as Iraq and assault, big ship collisions, or even serious contested Spratly and Paracel Islands adds to other areas under actual wartime conditions. groundings. The governments of Indonesia, the security intricacies of this fragile region. These risk assessments highlighted the Malaysia, and Singapore have attempted to or elevated risk of a terrorist attack, and have implemented numerous measures to In order to reduce the amount of traffic that included in their evaluation accounts of create a more secure atmosphere in the passes through the Malacca Straits, the intensification and increased sophistication Straits of Malacca. These plans – ranging from government of Thailand has considered the of pirate attack techniques. 16 regional-only to those including extra- idea of forming a canal across the Isthmus of regional partners – have varied in success, Kra – the thin land strip that borders the In the years after the 2005 classification, war with many failing before actual Straits’ northwestern limits and connects premiums have risen dramatically, translating implementation. southern Thailand with the rest of Peninsular to an augmented premium of US$12,500 for Malaysia. If it were constructed, the new sea a small 1,100 twenty-foot equivalent unit route would cut about 620 miles off of the (TEU) container feeder vessel and a fee of

www.fundforpeace.org 6 The Fund for Peace The Straits of Malacca Maritime Piracy and Armed Robbery

Maritime piracy has tested the “against a ship, aircraft, persons or property piracy thusly are two distinct crimes by authority of governments in the area, in a place outside the jurisdiction of any definition. For clarification, the term complicating the sovereignty conditions of State” constitutes piracy. However, most of “piracy ” will be used in this report to refer the three littoral states and putting the lives the instances of piracy are reported to occur broadly to non-politically motivated attacks of hundreds of crewmembers and sailors at in one the three seazones that fall under the in international waters, as well as to acts of risk. Through either violent assaults or sovereign control of the littoral states (i.e. armed robbery and hijacking within territorial bloodless incidences of robbery, these cases territorial waters, contiguous zone, and the seas. of crime over open water have demonstrated exclusive economic zone) and not the practical limitations of international law international waters. Therefore, armed Despite the distinctions in definitions, all and exposed the lack of capacity of countries robberies that occur within the Straits of criminal activities out at sea continue to in the region. Aside from the financial and Malacca do not technically qualify as disrupt international trade practices, their sea human costs, piracy also complicates the instances of piracy, using this definition. The routes, and the security of the region. already vexing questions of territorial International Maritime Organization’s Maritime piracy in the Straits of Malacca cost sovereignty. definition, however, does not make any Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore an mention of international waters outside of estimated US$30 to $50 billion in 2003, Before expounding on the dangerous and state jurisdiction, defining piracy as follows: though hard statistics are difficult to come costly activity, it is important to note the lack by. Although Indonesia and Malaysia suffer of consensus in the definition of “maritime “Any unlawful act of violence or greatly from these crimes, Singapore is the piracy.” According to Article 101 of the 1982 detention or any act of depredation, or most adversely affected, as it is a major hub United Nations Convention on the Law of the threat thereof, other than an act of for shipping and cargo exchange and an Sea (UNCLOS): ‘piracy,’ directed against a ship or important oil refinery location. 23 “(a) Any illegal acts of violence or against persons or property on board detention, or any act of depredation, such a ship, within a State’s jurisdiction The main reason behind maritime piracy is committed for private ends by the crew over such offences.” 22 poverty. When asked about the reasons for or the passengers of a private ship or a becoming a pirate, an individual from a poor private aircraft, and directed: The distinction here is that this definition Indonesian village near Singapore simply (i) On the high seas, against another refers to “piracy” as falling within a State’s stated that he “became a pirate…to earn a ship or aircraft, or against persons jurisdiction, which contradicts the definition living. Singapore was rich; we were poor. So, or property on board such ship or delineated under UNCLOS. The lack of we went to pillage the areas [around] aircraft; agreement on the definition of “piracy” Singapore.” 24 Citizens living on the coast of (ii) Against a ship, aircraft, persons complicates initiatives taken by actors in the the Straits of Malacca (excluding Singapore) or property in a place outside the international community. Also important to tend to live on low and fixed wages or jurisdiction of any State; note is the differentiation between piracy receive a meager percentage cut of the gains (b) Any act of voluntary participation in and maritime terrorism. Pirate attacks are of their trade. 25 The disenfranchisement the operation of a ship or of an aircraft perpetrated by a variety of different actors caused by poor economic performance, with knowledge of facts making it a wholly for pecuniary gain. Any attachment to particularly in Indonesia, and the common pirate ship or aircraft; political or ideological inclinations affects occurrence of natural disasters has afflicted (c) Any act of inciting or of intentionally the definition, however. Indeed, scholars and the most vulnerable people – low-level facilitating an act described in researchers refer to attacks committed by workers such as traders, fishermen, and subparagraph (a) or (b).” 21 actors seeking political or ideological change village artisans. In fact, many academics as maritime terrorism, seeing as there is more believe that one of the main triggers that The UNCLOS definition specifically states to the criminality than just the acquisition of caused the rise of seaborne piracy in the late that any illegal acts of violence committed money and property. Maritime terrorism and 1990s was the 1997 Asian financial crisis.

www.fundforpeace.org 7 The Fund for Peace Maritime Piracy and Armed Robbery

The disastrous effects of the economic crisis and detailed planning… [which] typically stolen. Likewise, the cargo can be unloaded hurt the entire region, and gave rise to involves a mother ship from which to launch at a port selected by the pirates or political instability that peaked before the attacks, a supply of automatic weapons, transferred to another ship after hijacking. 32 Indonesian President Suharto’s resignation in false identity papers for the crew and the After the cargo is secured on land, the 1998. 26 vessel, fake cargo documents, and a broken hijacked ships can be sold to other nefarious network to sell the stolen goods illegally.” individuals or repainted and used towards The political vacuum caused by Suharto’s Mukundan concluded that individual subsequent attacks. resignation, in turn, preoccupied the criminals lack these resources and therefore Indonesian government and created an it is likely that larger groups, such as Because of the complexity of some of these opportunity for people to find ways to organized criminal networks, are involved. 29 attacks, experts organize piracy into three generate income illegally. Attention to the groups, each with a distinct pattern and political destabilization originating from the Pirate attacks vary in sophistication and objective: robbery, hijacking, and ransom financial downturn created a huge planning. An armed attack out at sea, for kidnapping attacks. The most common and governmental blind spot; instability on land example, can involve a variety of weapons, typically successful of the three types is forced all the attention away from maritime ranging from firearms, like smuggled AK-47s, robbery. Robbery can either be armed or threats, furthering the rise in offshore to small explosives and similar equipment, simply coerced, without the use of firearms attacks. 27 Although maritime piracy has like grenades and grenade launchers, or other weapons. Robbery can occur against existed well before the early 1990s, it was although small fishing knives, parangs, berthed ships at ports and harbors in the not until 1997 when the issue became more goloks, and bolos (Southeast Asian variations Straits of Malacca, but this kind of criminal than just a nuisance for littoral states. After of the machete) are also utilized. Gangs activity does not directly affect vessel traffic. the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on usually operate in groups of four or five 30 and According to one study, approximately 77% the United States, regional and extra-regional attack while it is dark, most often between of all reported robbery attacks in 2002 governments began to seriously consider the 1am and 6am. In order to board ships, well- occurred on ships stationed in harbors. 33 implications of transportation security for the equipped criminals use grappling hooks to future. climb onto medium-sized vessels. From The hijacking of a naval vessel is another there, pirates quickly neutralize the crew form of piracy that occurs in the Straits of Impoverished fishermen, petty criminals, ex- (either by murdering those on board, holding Malacca. Successful hijackings are less members of the armed forces, organized them hostage, or setting them adrift – common than simple robbery as it requires crime syndicates, or simply civilians seeking depending on the scale of the attack), and if careful planning to carry out a complete some form of quick cash subsequently turn to successful, take any cash and valuables from seizure without alerting the authorities. After maritime crime for sustenance. In some cases, the crew themselves and the ship’s safe. Any boarding the vessel and neutralizing the more experienced criminals, such as those high-tech navigation equipment or other crew, pirates dispose of the cargo – usually members of larger criminal organizations, useful instruments and weapons are also securing it with a middleman or safeguarding tend to be better equipped than even certain seized. It is reported that appropriated cash it at a pirate post – and inspect the vessel. If regional naval authorities. 28 In addition, the and items on average value range from deemed fit for future pirate operations, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) has US$10,000 to US$20,000, rarely more. ship is repainted to conceal any identifying stated that a rise in pirate-related attacks in Incidents can take from a half hour, which is marks that the police can use to spot the ship the early 2000s was exacerbated by the usual amount of time if it is a small boat, and later rerouted to a new port under a fake increased involvement of organized crime to a few hours for larger vessels, though the name and falsified documents. This process networks. Pottengal Mukundan, Director of risk of police engagement increases as time transforms the old ship into a “phantom the ICC’s Commercial Crime Services, has passes in the event that a large vessel is vessel”, as the ship now exists apart from its stated that “hijacking a whole ship and the attacked. 31 If kept for longer periods of time, previous identity. 34 Tugboats are common resale of its cargo requires huge resources the cargo could be breached and the contents targets of hijackings due to their size and

www.fundforpeace.org 8 The Fund for Peace Maritime Piracy and Armed Robbery

powerful engines. They lack Automatic negotiations, receive a much smaller portion forcefully removed from the ship Identification System instruments and thus (actual ransom money given to pirates falls • The value of the property stolen, such as are unable to send and receive information, below US$20,000). Hostages are usually the entire cargo in extreme cases, personal such as identity, position, course, speed, and released unharmed after the ransom is paid. valuables or cash, or everyday objects cargo data, to and from other receivers on It is thought that money garnered from (such as mooring rope or a can of paint) land, sea, or air. 35 Lastly, their low freeboards kidnapping-for-ransom attacks goes towards • The level of threat of maritime navigation, allow easy access, and in addition to fewer financing future operations, including the specifically if busy sea-lanes are crewmembers, allow for easier hijacking. furnishing of firearms and other weapons. 36 obstructed in the event of pirate attacks

and if the attack poses a threat to other The third variety of maritime piracy involves Incidences of piracy can also be categorized ships in the area 37 attacks with the objective to kidnap for by the seriousness of the attacks, as ransom. These types of attacks involve suggested by Robert C. Beckman, a legal Classifying these attacks out at sea helps abducting two or three senior crew members scholar at the National University of state actors organize their efforts in after the rest of the crew is abandoned, set Singapore. Dr. Beckman organizes pirate combating violent crime in and around the adrift, or slain. Kidnapping for ransom attacks in the Southeast Asia by: Straits of Malacca. However, the success of attracts the most attention of the three kinds • The types of weapons employed (if any such initiatives depends primarily on the of pirate attacks because of the drawn out used), taking into account the power of state capacities of Indonesia, Malaysia, and negotiations between the abductors and host said weapons and the degree of risk to the Singapore. governments or shipping companies. Pirates life of crew members demand between US$100,000 and • The treatment of crew members, whether US$200,000 for ransom, on average, but after they are taken hostage, injured, killed, or

www.fundforpeace.org 9 The Fund for Peace The Straits of Malacca Littoral, User and Non- State Security Capacity

The numerous initiatives taken over greatly due to economic discrepancies and between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. the years to fight maritime piracy differ differences in governmental capacity

Indonesia

T H A I L A N D Straits of Indonesia, as the largest of the three approximately 11,000 cases of serious Malacca littoral states, continues to struggle with the assaults occurred on land – meaning less than implementation of successful anti-piracy 0.05% of its total reported crimes were initiatives. In spite of some positive economic pirate attacks. 39 Of course, reported crimes S t r a i t s o f M a l a c c a growth in recent years, Indonesia still suffers do not equate to actual incidents, but it is not

M A L A Y S I A from a lack of consistent governmental hard to note the reasons why anti-piracy authority. Because of its breadth – its entire initiatives have, in general, received less coastline is twice the circumference of the attention and funding in the last decade. earth – the control of the state does not reach Another reason Indonesia focused less on the all locations. This weakness, coupled with Malacca Straits is the fact that the Lombok

I N D O N E S I A active Islamic fundamentalist groups, and Sunda Straits handle most of its trade. separatist movements, and a flourishing Finally, as a growing regional power of its underground economy, has put pressure on own, Indonesia is not amenable to its security the government’s already shaky capacities to problems being handled by other nations. combat maritime piracy and other threats. The Indonesian government has specifically Jakarta has placed less attention to maritime repudiated any foreign military presence in piracy than in its desire to bolster economic its waters, even if extra-regional powers offer development, increase environmental to help secure the adjacent Straits of Malacca. protection, promulgate greater political The government in Jakarta has even been reform, defend national borders and resolve distrustful of initiatives proposed by Malaysia outstanding territorial disputes, and improve and Singapore, as it views both nations as its burgeoning tourism industry. Indonesia direct economic competitors perhaps more may view pirate attacks as a nuisance for so than strategic partners. international ships only and thus place greater importance on land-based security In terms of state capacity, Indonesia does not concerns like those mentioned above. possess the adequate naval training, Predictably, Indonesia waters are reported to equipment, and funding to handle its serious have suffered the most incidents of piracy in maritime piracy problems. The navy, for the 2000s. 38 instance, lacks many of the estimated 262 patrol ships needed to efficiently guard Indeed, Indonesia may already have a lot on Indonesian territorial waters. In fact, it is its hands regarding internal security. Placing believed that only one-fourth of the it into perspective, the International Maritime Indonesian Navy’s 114 vessels are Bureau (IMB) received only 103 incidents of serviceable at any given time, impeding any piracy in 2002. On the other hand, 1,687 progress from the security apparatus. murders, 9,000 cases of violent theft, and Additionally, only 20 patrol boats were

www.fundforpeace.org 10 The Fund for Peace Littoral, User and Non-State Security Capacity

“seaworthy” in 2004. 40 Moreover, seven ports countries and to communicate between occurred without some hurdles, Indonesia failed to comply with the International Ship national entities themselves. The nine has worked towards improving relations with and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), maritime agencies in charge of naval and extra-regional powers. This includes holding which is a security instrument of the ocean security in Indonesia, for instance, do a biannual maritime patrol with India since International Maritime Organization. The ISPS not share their intelligence or resources as September 2002 and expanding relations Code delineates “a set of measures designed often as would be necessary to develop a with neighbors, like Australia and Japan. It to enhance the security of ships and port coordinated anti-piracy effort. 43 Singaporean has also improved its security relationship facilities made mandatory under the partners have complained about the with the United States, with which it has International Convention for the Safety of incompetence; sailors from Singapore have revived a couple of defense exercises, most Life at Sea”, which Indonesia has agreed to stated that when they relay information to notably the annual Cooperation Afloat observe. 41 Indonesia has also had significant the intelligence agencies in Indonesia, “it Readiness and Training (CARAT) model. 45 problems in securing funding for maritime disappears into a black hole.” 44 Over the last decade, Indonesia has agreed to security initiatives in the Straits of Malacca. cooperate more with neighboring nations. Immediately after the Asian Financial Crisis in Despite some shortcomings, the government However, incentives for more participation 1997, only 25-30% of military expenditures of Indonesia has implemented several need to be addressed as Jakarta continues to were covered by Jakarta’s military budget. It national programs to help improve security in focus on other sovereignty threats more than has been widely speculated that budget its waters. Over the years, it has begun to maritime piracy. shortfalls were in part filled through illicit receive more financial assistance from activities. 42 foreign countries, which has prompted more action on its own part to ensure security for Intelligence agencies in Indonesia have international vessels passing through the likewise failed to properly relay security Straits of Malacca. Although coordinated information to naval authorities in other efforts with Malaysia and Singapore have not

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Malaysia

T H A I L A N D Straits of Unlike its neighbor Indonesia, limit the internationalization of the Straits, Malacca Malaysia has much more at stake in the Malaysia saw its piracy problem worsen in Straits of Malacca and has begun to show the late 1990s and early 2000s. some interest and flexibility in anti-piracy S t r a i t s o f M a l a c c a initiatives. Malaysia’s most populous region – Despite the gradual acceptance of external

M A L A Y S I A Peninsular Malaysia – forms the entire assistance, Malaysia maintains that piracy is a northeastern border of the Straits of Malacca. national problem and should be dealt with by Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia’s capital and one of the littoral states. Malaysia’s Maritime Southeast Asia’s most important financial Enforcement Agency, launched in 2006 after centers, is only about 20 km away from the merging five maritime agencies in 2004,

I N D O N E S I A Straits and depends substantially on the boasts 70 patrol craft and six helicopters that cargo from those ports. Competition for it can use for arrests and safeguarding the resources, particularly fish and oil, push Straits. The Coast Guard-like organization has Malaysia to improve its security standing. established a string of radar tracking stations Black markets, however, encumber any focus along the Malaysian coastline where it can on piracy, and like Indonesia, the government monitor vessel traffic. Similarly, the of Malaysia tends to focus more on terrestrial Malaysian Marine Police has increased its threats. patrols of the high-traffic waterway. In 2005, the Marine Police foiled several attempted Malaysia has warmed to the idea of burden- attacks, including one case that led to the sharing procedures to counteract the levels prosecution of the would-be perpetrators. 46 of maritime piracy. Like Indonesia, Malaysia With an improving technological sector and depends on its strong fishing industry, which increased assistance from extra-regional is impacted by piracy. Government proposals, powers, Malaysia now admits that burden- however, are primarily focused on the sharing schemes could help improve security environmental or economic side of the trade standards in the Malacca Straits and benefit more than the security aspects, similar to the country and region as a whole. Indonesia’s policies. Coupled with a desire to

www.fundforpeace.org 12 The Fund for Peace Littoral, User and Non-State Security Capacity

Singapore

Known to be one of the economically the most organized and technologically ad- T H A I L A N D Straits of powerful Asian Tigers, Singapore is one of the vanced out of the three littoral states. It is Malacca world’s most important centers of commerce. one of the 20 foreign ports listed on the Con- Singaporean ports are amongst some of the tainer Security Initiative, a U.S.-led program busiest in the world, and have sustained that that fosters intelligence-sharing in order to S t r a i t s o f M a l a c c a 47 title for decades. Its closeness with other help partners identify potentially dangerous M A L A Y S I A economic powers, especially other Western or suspicious cargo, improve detection meth- nations, has helped the tiny nation-state ac- ods, and enhance container security overall. 50 quire powerful instruments to guard its ports Additionally, Singapore’s ports also possess from seaborne attacks. Despite these pros, state-of-the-art vessel tracking systems de- the country is still plagued by maritime crime signed to track the paths of 70,000 ships I N D O N E S I A and has sought desperately to inspire coop- simultaneously. erative measures between the three littoral SINGAPORE states. As the region’s best performing econ- Aside from strong technological capabilities, omy, Singapore has much to lose to maritime Singapore has also established numerous piracy and its effects. formidable national initiatives to improve maritime security in the Straits of Malacca. Singapore’s government has been very will- The Interagency Maritime and Port Security ing to cooperate on both regional and extra- Working Group, for instance, invovles three regional levels. Such enthusiasm to work with nautical agencies – the coast guard, navy, and other nations has benefited the island both port authority – to keep an eye on vessel economically and strategically. So strong was traffic and ship movement near the sea- its desire to bring in outside help that then ports. 51 Individually, nonetheless, the navy deputy prime minister, Tony Tan, said at a and police coast guard have proven very 2004 conference on maritime security: “It is effective against threats out at sea. The navy not realistic to unilaterally confine such pa- is reported to be able to monitor up to 5,000 trols only to countries in this part of the ships at one time, while also employing extra world … We can do more if we galvanize the features like electronic navigational displays resources of extra-regional players!” 48 By and data recordings. Similarly, in early 2007, 2011, the Information Fusion Center – a mul- Singapore announced that it was going to tinational collaborative effort organized by construct a command and control center that the Singaporean Navy – had already deployed would house the Singapore Maritime Security International Liaison Officers from ten differ- Center, an Information Fusion Center, and a ent countries, including Australia, India, Ma- Multinational Operations and Exercise Cen- laysia, the United States, and Vietnam. No- ter. These organizations provide information ticeably absent from this effort, however, is sharing framework and an infrastructure Indonesia. 49 through which multinational exercises and security operations out at sea could be more In terms of state capacity, Singapore is by far efficiently organized. 52

www.fundforpeace.org 13 The Fund for Peace Littoral, User and Non-State Security Capacity

User Countries

Countries like China, India, Japan, other nearby nations – like Thailand – for development) has worked with and and the United States have a vested interest over five years. 55 It is estimated that over donated money to the Malacca Straits in protecting the valuable trade sea-lanes of 40% of India’s imports come through the Council. The Nippon Foundation estimates the Straits of Malacca. Straits of Malacca. In order to secure transit that piracy costs Japan around US$10-15 heading towards South Asia, India uses its million per annum. 60 • China: As the second largest energy Far East Command in the Andaman and consumer in the world, China depends on Nicobar Islands to study shipping threat • United States: The U.S. has stated its 56 57 the Malacca Straits for 85% of its trends. On June 30, 2012, India opened interest in helping secure the waterway, imports, 53 including 80% of its energy a key naval station, named the INS Baaz, but has met a lot of resistance from imports. 54 Beijing has primarily provided aimed at enhancing the country’s ability to Indonesian and Malaysian authorities. Both financial assistance to the littoral monitor the chokepoint and also extending countries believe that an overstated 58 countries. Wary of a minimized regional its strategic reach in the region. presence would raise sovereignty concerns presence, China has rejected greater Indian and could threaten the “regional balance and Japanese security involvement, going • Japan: 80% of Japan’s petroleum imports of powers.” China has also been a vocal as far as rejecting propositions for security and 60% of its imported foodstuffs pass opponent to greater American patrols from Japan. through the Malacca Straits, making Japan intervention. 61 Although American patrols one of the most dependent user nations. 59 and rapid-response units have been • India: India is the external (non-littoral Japan has invested millions of dollars in immediately rejected by Indonesia and state) power with the longest involvement enforcing security in the Malacca Straits Malaysia, both nations have agreed to in the Straits. The Indian Navy, for instance, due to its significance to the Japanese accept assistance in the form of advice, 62 has carried out joint anti-piracy exercises economy. The Nippon Foundation (a equipment, and training. with its Singaporean counterpart for more Japanese non-profit focused on than ten years, and with Indonesia and humanitarian work and maritime

www.fundforpeace.org 14 The Fund for Peace Littoral, User and Non-State Security Capacity

Non-State Shipping Actors

Aside from state actors, ship owners electrified (and non-lethal) protective and current military personnel trained to and shipping companies have also played a measures, like Secure-Ship. 65 The company protect, or in cases of escalation, defend small – but significant – role in promoting Secure A Ship even offers a private team of shipping vessels. These guards can be on greater security at sea. As the primary actors “ex-Special Forces and specialist UK military board or accompany the vessel on in charge of improving the overall security of teams to accompany” ships in elevated threat speedboats on either side. In order to alert privately owned shipping vessels and related areas like the Straits of Malacca. 66 regional law enforcement of their presence, equipment, shipping companies are guard boats are clearly marked. However, responsible for adopting efficient security Private military companies, such as Singapore Indonesia and Malaysia, as well as some non- measures. Reinforced “safe rooms” and -based Asia Risk Solutions, also offer special governmental organizations like the secret compartments are common services for ships transiting the Malacca International Maritime Bureau, generally inexpensive additions, as is the installation of Straits. However, the presence of these oppose private military companies because tougher locks and bolts on cargo holds, traveling bands of armed individuals creates of their armed nature. Treaties like UNCLOS security lights, and powerful hoses used legal complications for the littoral states and liken private guards to “vigilantes” if they against pirates attempting to board ships. the origin countries. engage with pirates in territorial waters. 67 Finally, improved global positioning devices Singapore, however, does allow private are becoming customary, if not absolutely When faced with the possibility of passing military contractors to operate in its land and necessary, for safer and more efficient through dangerous locations, shipping sea jurisdiction under certain legal navigation. 63 Manufacturers have also companies and even governments can conditions. 68 positively impacted the security market, request armed escort services for valuable offering tracking technology like ShipLoc 64 or cargo. These escort services involve ex-police

www.fundforpeace.org 15 The Fund for Peace The Straits of Malacca Security Measures and Initiatives

Bilateral and trilateral agreements recent years and have improved the non-exhaustive, chronological list of have been implemented over the years to effectiveness of responses to incidents, numerous initiatives that have influenced or combat maritime crime with varying degrees helping to usher in the gradual decline in have been specifically introduced to help of success. Multinational efforts and burden- piracy incidences that the Straits have secure the Straits of Malacca: sharing initiatives have also increased in experienced since the late 2000s. Below is a

The Five Power Defense Agreement (1971)

Conceived in 1971 to improve security including the Straits of Malacca. Member Singapore, and the United Kingdom; Indonesia measures for Malaysian and Singapore ports, parties are Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, is not a member of this agreement. 69

The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988)

Meant to bring together countries wary of Malaysia and Indonesia have not ratified this countries with few land disputes. 70 maritime crime so as to create a non-binding agreement, as the agreement’s specific framework to promulgate security ideals. territorial definitions make it viable only for

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982)

Although not specific to the Straits of Malacca Numerous problems arise with the necessity of there being “violence, or Southeast Asia in general, UNCLOS is a observation of UNCLOS. For instance, depredation, and detention”, which is not significant historical benchmark for maritime governments consider the Straits of Malacca always the case in actual attacks. Lastly are security. Piracy in the Straits of Malacca an “international sea-lane” to which they the drawbacks that exist while in pursuit of technically does not qualify as “piracy”, have a right to use, 72 under Part III of criminal actors. Any pursuit of pirates by one under the definition espoused by UNCLOS; UNCLOS. The littoral governments, however, of the littoral states has to end as soon as the under the convention, these attacks are are wary of the internationalization of the individuals enter another country’s territorial actually the responsibility of the littoral Straits and view passage as transit through waters, due to strict sovereignty laws. 73 states in question, since the attacks fall in territorial waters. Another problem is the territorial waters. 71 definition of pirate attacks, particularly the

Japan-proposed Regional Coast Guards (1999)

Forces for the patrols were intended to come Japan to “extend its security role…and powerful countries that have large stakes in from China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, contain Chinese maritime interests.” 74 75 The the Straits, as well as resulting competition Singapore, and South Korea, but China failure of this extra-regional initiative and spheres of influence. rejected the idea, accusing it as a way for highlights the existing problems with

The Shangri-La Dialogue (2002)

Organized by the International Institute for It has enhanced diplomatic and strategic Chile, France, Germany, India, Russia, and the Strategic Studies in Singapore, the Shangri-La multilateral efforts and brings together not United States. 76 77 Dialogue is an annual forum attended by over only countries near the Straits of Malacca, but 25 countries invested in securing the region. also countries that use the sea-lanes, such as

www.fundforpeace.org 16 The Fund for Peace Security Measures and Initiatives

MALSINDO & the Eye in the Sky Initiative (2004/2005)

MALSINDO (which is an amalgamation of the re-branded MALSINDO and introduced the individuals from other nations, if deemed first few letters of each of the three littoral Eye in the Sky initiative, which permits necessary. states) involved a cooperative effort between aircraft to fly up to three nautical miles into the countries’ navies. Its main flaw was its the territorial waters of the littoral states. The tours, however, have been criticized as failure to include provisions regulating cross- This marked a significant change in flexibility being superficial and inefficient. Seventy border pursuits, as such laws were largely for the three countries, as they were willing sorties per week were supposed to be held, viewed as infringing upon each country’s to put sovereignty issues aside in order to but only eight took place in that period of sovereignty, even if they involved the improve maritime security. 78 The program time. Furthermore, few patrol vessels have chasing of fugitive pirates. also fosters trust and cooperation within the investigated and interdicted targets triumvirate. On board the aircraft are identified by the air patrols. 79 In 2005, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore representatives from each country, as well as

The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) (2006)

Touted as the “first regional government-to- Member countries include all ASEAN nations, unwillingness of some member parties to government agreement to promote and and several South and East Asian countries. share intelligence. Malaysia and Indonesia enhance” collaborative efforts against piracy However, the agreement does not include have not ratified the agreement, but and armed robbery, ReCAAP is one of the Australia or New Zealand, which is viewed as cooperate on an operational level. 80 81 only initiatives to differentiate between a slight setback as both nations have a lot of maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea. security resources. Another issue is the

* * *

These few examples underline both a Straits today, there is a lot of room for the three littoral nations to treat the problem positive movement towards cooperative improvement with these and other initiatives. alone. With open communication and efforts of different varieties and the It is important for influential and capable diplomacy, outside help could be utilized to seriousness surrounding the issue of security actors (both foreign powers and relevant non improve security measures for all actors in the Malacca Straits. As evidenced by the -state actors) to coordinate measures to curb involved. sophistication of pirate incidents in the this destabilizing threat. It is impossible for

www.fundforpeace.org 17 The Fund for Peace The Straits of Malacca Terrorist Organizations and Other Insurgencies

The fact that a large-scale terrorist Movement, has also been reported to trick means that, in order to report on the event, attack of devastating proportions has not yet and hijack ships. Moreover, both benefit from media outlets must have access to the scene, occurred in the Straits of Malacca is the illicit trades throughout the region as in order to report on it. If the attack occurs somewhat surprising, given the importance ways to finance pirate expeditions and out at sea, it would have to be carried out of this natural chokepoint to worldwide trade terrorist activities. close enough to land, thus limiting the and especially to Western nations. To be sure, “theatre of operations” in which the attack security efforts over a variety of different Fear of a successful terrorist attack in the can occur. Furthermore, carrying out an attack transnational issues have received increased Straits of Malacca has been so great that the at sea offers little cover, making it easy for attention and funding after the September Bush Administration branded the Straits as pursuing parties – primarily littoral state law 11, 2001 attacks. However, as seen with the “second front” in the “Global War on enforcement patrols – to scope the region maritime piracy efforts, the state capacities Terrorism.” 86 Indeed, the waterways are a and initiate pursuit. Small islands could of the littoral states are not consistent very attractive region for terrorist provide cover, but their size offers nothing throughout and gaps continue to exist. In organizations for a number of reasons. Firstly, more than a short-term solution for evasion. spite of such drawbacks, evidence shows that governmental control in Indonesia and Lastly is the difficulty in actually executing an some of the initiatives implemented have at Malaysia is stretched quite thin in some attack on water. Precision is crucial for least helped deter acts of violence and terror. areas. In these places, black markets and terrorist attacks. Now that regional and other criminal activities flourish. In many foreign vessels are both improving their Terrorism and maritime piracy have many cases, terrorist organizations are behind security rapidly due to the heightened risk commonalities; however some evidence these shadow economies, utilizing their perception in the region, it is becoming shows that there is no true pirate-terrorist garnered capital to finance operational harder for maritime terrorist attacks to be nexus, as their end goals tend to be at odds planning and the purchase of equipment. executed without complications. 88 with each other. 82 83 As previously explained, Indonesia and Malaysia have non-urbanized piracy is primarily motivated by financial gain terrain that is difficult to monitor, providing Seaborne terrorism is uncommon in the through robbery and other means. Planning, ample hideouts. Rainforests provide tree Straits of Malacca, though it is hardly unheard if any, is not extensive or detailed. Terrorism, cover and make it an attractive command of in Southeast Asia. In 2004, the Philippine- on the other hand, focuses on sending a center for criminal groups and terrorists alike. based Islamist terrorist group Abu Sayyaf political or ideological message and it is not Similarly, coastal waters are lengthy and detonated an eight pound TNT bomb aboard inherently influenced by money. poorly protected. The Aruah, Sinaboi, Rupat the passenger vessel SuperFerry 14, resulting Consequently, terrorist attacks are Bengkalis, and Karimun Besar Islands off the in 116 deaths. This attack remains the world’s scrupulously arranged, and in cases of failure, coast of Sumatra are perfect examples of deadliest terrorist attack at sea. 89 Three years the organization demonstrates stoicism and places with minimal law enforcement prior to the Abu Sayyaf attack in the patience when planning future attacks. 84 presence. 87 In these areas, individuals could Philippines, a video tracking the movement evade arrest and hide from the authorities. of Malaysian navy ships navigating through Other facts point to terrorism and piracy the Straits of Malacca was found in merging together to take advantage of the It is possible that actually perpetrating a Afghanistan, hinting that terrorists were financial benefits and strategic tactics of successful terrorist attack out at sea is not as considering the Straits for a future attack. In attacks out at sea. Groups like the Jema’ah simple as imagined. In reality, terrorist actors two other cases, Singaporean authorities Islamiyah, according to the Indonesian state encounter numerous impediments that arrested terrorist suspects who confessed to intelligence, have admitted to considering hinder the success of a seaborne attack. First planning an attack on American vessels in the employing maritime piracy methods to of all, terrorists seek to disseminate a area, while in a hijacking in 2004, a chemical disrupt vessel traffic in the Straits of message through widespread media tanker was seized in the Straits, but Malacca. 85 The now disbanded separatist and coverage of any attack they execute, so as to abandoned an hour later. Singaporean radical Islamist Group, the Free Aceh spread fear throughout the population. This authorities hypothesized that pirates

www.fundforpeace.org 18 The Fund for Peace Terrorist Organizations and Other Insurgencies

hijacked the tanker in order to use the tanker- attractive ideological target to attack. Indeed, Aceh separatist movement, known regionally turned-phantom ship as a dummy for a in a broadcast on October 2002, the as the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM. The forthcoming bomb attack. 90 Cases like these successor of Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda group was headquartered in the Aceh demonstrate that the absence of a successful leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, warned that al- province on the northwestern tip of Sumatra, terrorist attack does not mean that the threat Qaeda “would target the nodes of your [the bordering the northern mouth of the Straits does not exist. On the contrary, these events West’s] economy.” 91 Governments should not of Malacca. On 16 July 2005, a peace demonstrate that the desire to perpetrate an doubt that among these nodes are the critical agreement was signed by Indonesia and the terrorist acts in the area continues to exist. Malacca Straits. movement’s leader, Malik Mahmud, ending a thirty-year long insurgency that threatened Al-Qaeda has sought to improve its seaborne Unmistakably, the rise in Islamic secession and destabilization on both capabilities by reaching out to global fundamentalism and other radical ideologies Indonesia and the Straits it borders. 96 affiliates for assistance in training. The now has triggered a rise in terrorist organizations defunct Sri Lankan separatist group known as in Southeast Asia. One of the largest and Prior to this peace agreement, however, the the Tamil Tigers was reported to have trained most notorious terrorism organizations is al- Free Aceh Movement was a powerful and al-Qaeda operatives in maritime terror Qaeda, which has been known to have a belligerent separatist movement that techniques. 92 Some sources already depict al- presence in the area, both physically and employed terrorist tactics aimed at Qaeda as adept in illegal activities out at sea strategically. Despite a decrease in high- weakening Jakarta’s control over Aceh. It was with a well-established record of maritime profile attacks in recent years, al-Qaeda still reported to trick ships into trusting the terror activity. 93 shows interest in the region. In 2000, an al- organization by requiring seafarers to report

Qaeda operative, Khallad bin Attash, Al-Qaeda is also known to have close ties to information on vessels passing the advocated bombing American naval vessels other regional affiliates, even going as far as “territorial waters” of the autonomous Aceh in Port Klang, Malaysia, after reviewing an planning attacks with their commanders. One region. If the vessels refused to comply, unsuccessful attack on the USS Sullivan. of al-Qaeda’s strongest collaborators is the members of GAM warned that attacks by Further evidence shows the persistence of al- Jema’ah Islamiyah, a regional associate that pirates were common in the area and that the Qaeda initiatives. Two years later, in 2002, a enjoyed some slight resurgence in the late Free Aceh Movement could not provide senior al-Qaeda liaison of Iraqi descent active 2000s. It has been touted as a major threat to protection to those who chose that route. In in Indonesia, Omar al-Faruq, was arrested and the security of the Malacca Straits (it is best- truth, the organization would perpetrate said interrogated on the organization’s future known as the party responsible for the 2002 pirate attacks, using the warnings as an alibi plans. During his questioning, al-Faruq Bali bombings, which remains the deadliest with which to protect itself from direct divulged that al-Qaeda had been scheming to act of terrorism in the history of Indonesia 94 ). blame. Individuals claiming to be part of GAM attack U.S. naval vessels in the crowded port Although its capability at sea is less are said to have attacked three chemical of Surabaya, some 14,000 km away in East developed than its abilities on land, the tankers and an oil shipping vessel in 2003. Java, Indonesia. However, the group was Jema’ah Islamiyah maintains a strong interest Despite these problems, the Free Aceh unable to recruit enough personnel for the in seaborne terrorist attacks in the Straits. For Movement no longer threatens the stability operation, resulting in its cancellation. In still instance, reports state that the organization or security of the region and has benefitted another instance, another operative was has targeted the Changi Naval Base in significantly from reintegration into intercepted en route to Southeast Asia with a Singapore in the past, unsuccessfully. 95 Indonesian politics and civil society. 180-page dossier listing out maritime targets Jema’ah Islamiyah is expected to improve its in the area. The commercial importance of maritime competences with the help of al- Other belligerent groups have committed the Straits, coupled with the region’s Qaeda’s expertise, and thus it remains a acts of violence in the regions near the Straits improving economic standards (particularly major destabilizing factor in the region. of Malacca in the last decade, employing Singapore’s economic openness and stalwart Another insurgent group that has affected the terrorist tactics to proliferate fear. Among global performance), makes the waterway an security of the Straits of Malacca was the Free these organizations is the Kumpulan

www.fundforpeace.org 19 The Fund for Peace Terrorist Organizations and Other Insurgencies

Mujahideen (or Militan) Malaysia, which the southern, predominantly Muslim, parts of region’s major rebellious movements. In operates in Kuala Lumpur and the Thailand (as was suggested to them by their addition to these groups, the Barisan Revolusi surrounding districts, as well as in the affiliate, Jema’ah Islamiyah). 98 It is thought Natsonal (the National Revolutionary Front) provinces of Johor, Kedah, Kelantan, Perak, that the operatives self-finance their and the Patani United Liberation Selangor, and Terengganu. 97 This radical operations, likely through illicit economies. 99 Organization, 100 both based from Patani, group seeks to create a pan-Islamic state Abu Sayyaf, based out of the majority-Muslim Thailand, boast some capabilities at sea. 101 composed of provinces from Malaysia, southern province of Mindanao in the Indonesia, and the Philippines, in addition to Philippines, also has close connections to the

www.fundforpeace.org 20 The Fund for Peace The Straits of Malacca Black Market Activities and Other Crimes

Pirates and terrorist organizations do Smuggling has become a major issue in Stolen Shipping Vessels not operate alone. These groups raise money recent years, reaching a seven-year high in through their connections to the black Singapore in 2010. Products like cigarettes, Black market items, such as drugs or other market. As is common in many hotspots security paraphernalia (i.e. knives, firearms, consumer electronics, are typically small around the world, black markets flourish and nightsticks), and even wildlife topped the enough to be easily concealed. Phantom where there is an inadequate law list, with over 20,000 reported cases in all ships, however, do not fit this category. These enforcement capacity. The Straits of Malacca three categories . 104 Other items known to be ships are sold into the black market after they is no exception to this rule. Black markets smuggled into the region include: are procured illegally, usually after successful divert funds from legitimate avenues and • Crude oil – particularly difficult to monitor pirate attacks and seizures. A new coat of hurt legally functioning businesses, both as a big percentage of trade through the paint is applied in order to alter the ship’s nationally and internationally. Malacca Straits is crude oil. 105 exterior, so as to minimize identification and Havocscope.com, a black market statistics to conceal its unique seven-digit • Elephant ivory – Singapore has some of and information aggregator, estimates that International Maritime Organization the largest reported seizures of elephant Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore’s black registration number, typically found on the ivory in the world. 106 market values stand at US$18.85 billion, hull of ships that carry over 100 gross tons • Weapons – smuggled in multiple US$2.92 billion, and US$247.3 million, (however, these numbers are not placed on respectively. Out of the 91 countries ranked capacities, for armed groups like the now fishing boats, yachts, wooden ships, or any by Havocscope.com, Indonesia places 14th, defunct Free Aceh Movement and the Thai similar non-merchant vessels). 115 After the terrorist group, the Pattani United Malaysia is 40th, and Singapore ranks 66th in ship is sold, falsified certificates are bought 107 the world. 102 Liberation Organization. to help hide the ship’s tracks. These • Human kidneys – Singapore has one of the registration documents and safety As one of the most heavily transited highest rates of kidney failure (fifth in the inspections are not difficult to secure. In fact, waterways in the world with some of the world), driving a strong demand for human they can be inexpensive and quick in more 108 busiest ports in Asia, the Straits of Malacca kidneys. than a few jurisdictions. 116 region is an important center for illicit economies – particularly general smuggling. Drug Smuggling In order to blur the tracks even further, Smuggling is very common at ports in the brokers register their newly acquired vessels region, due to lax controls and the chaotic Among the most commonly smuggled items under another country’s flag. Reports state atmosphere that accompanies the loading are drugs, which are perhaps the most serious that most of the phantom ships are registered and unloading process. Smuggled items are of the black markets in the Straits of Malacca under either Panamanian or Honduran flags. usually moved surreptitiously while goods region. Drug use has seen a spike in all three In fact, one survey alleges that out of twelve are being unloaded off ships. Around this littoral states, prompting widespread health phantom ships that were known to be in use 109 110 111 time, hired movers – colluding criminals – concerns . Indonesians are amongst in Southeast Asia at one time, all but one was quickly move the desired cargo and put it off the most active traffickers in the region. registered in these two Central American to the side to await transport to warehouses Malaysia arrested 305 Indonesian citizens for countries. 117 Cambodia has also become a 112 nearby; these items are eventually delivered drug trafficking offenses in 2010. Iran and registry haven for ships in Southeast Asia. It to their destination or are prepared for public West Africa are popular points of origin for is believed that al-Qaeda registered several consumption in the immediate area. Hard drugs like heroin, methamphetamines, and ships under the Cambodian flag of 113 currency is used to pay for these shipments, opiates. The goods typically follow the convenience; the So San, the ship intercepted making them even more difficult to track. East Asian drug corridor, which passes by Spanish forces carrying North Korean This same environment is also perfect for through China, the Philippines, and down into missiles to Yemen in 2002, was noted for its 114 money laundering, as money laundering Southeast Asia. Cambodian registration numbers. 118 depends on quick monetary transactions. 103

www.fundforpeace.org 21 The Fund for Peace Littoral, User and Non-State Security Capacity

Human Trafficking not far from Singapore. 121 Moreover, the the other littoral states. In a sense, prices of babies continue to rise as demand unregistered fishermen “pirate” the seas in Lastly, another robust underground trade in continues to increase. Infants are said to cost order to fish without a permit, and oftentimes and around the Straits of Malacca is human upwards of 20,000 ringgit 122 (US$6,300) in do so in foreign waters. 126 Illegal logging is trafficking. The trafficking of men, women, Malaysia, depending on the “level of another serious problem in the region. This and children trafficked brings traders in the perfection” and skin tone. 123 underground activity contributes to marine littoral states substantial pecuniary gains. pollution and destroys the rainforest regions Victims are typically women and children, Because of the difficulty of concealing live lining the Straits. Indeed, the rising market of and more often than not, they come from human bodies, traffickers utilize phantom ramin timber – the trade name for several poor economic backgrounds. Many are ships to smuggle their victims into nearby endangered species of tropical hardwood, tricked with promises of work across borders, regions. 124 Problematically, Malaysia and which some say is a “better [trade] than drug or with the allure of Singapore’s wealth. Singapore are both popular destinations for smuggling” – is driven by a high demand in Instead of paying jobs, however, female human trafficking. According to the United the black market. However, the destruction of victims are forced to prostitute themselves or Nations Interagency on Human Trafficking, these ramin forests are putting a number of endure other forms of sexual exploitation, Malaysia is the third most common endangered priority species, such as the are sold into domestic servitude, or are destination for trafficked victims, a ranking orangutan and the Sumatran tigers, in danger coerced into forced labor. The United Nations mirrored by the Burmese government, with of extinction. 127 The underground wood trade estimates that between 200,000-250,000 Singapore coming in as the fourth. 125 is linked to the “timber mafia”, which is women are trafficked through the general composed of organized criminals that region annually, many of whom are moved Environmental Crime monopolize the illegal cutting down and through the Straits. 119 Estimates for children movement of ramin logs. 128 are also alarming. The End Child Prostitution, Other criminal pursuits are also common. Child Pornography, and Trafficking of Environmental crime is a frequent activity in Poverty and economic inequality are being Children for Sexual Purposes organization the waters of the littoral states, especially in driven by black market and other illegal estimates that around 40,000 and 70,000 the form of illegal fishing. Because it activities. In order to improve security children are trafficked in the region per depletes the fishing populations controlled conditions in the Straits of Malacca, there year. 120 Children – both boys and girls – are by government intervention, fishing without these underlying issues should be addressed. abducted from coastal towns near the border government permission has also created of Malaysia and Batam, Indonesia, both places indirect competition with coastal denizens in

www.fundforpeace.org 22 The Fund for Peace The Straits of Malacca Recommendations

Below are some recommendations to help counter some of the issues faced by the littoral states in the Straits of Malacca:

Altering the Flags of Convenience Statutes

It is not difficult for individuals – like pirates, countries to come together and find ways to improve accountability) or to require a six- terrorists, and criminals – to register any limit the ease of registration without month wait period for new registrants, so as large ships acquired under the flag of another adversely affecting maritime trade. One to maximize background checking. More country. Because of the threat of a large- solution could be to implement more accountability should come from national scale attack by terrorists, it is important for identification requirements for registrants (to registration entities.

Multinational Cooperation & Extra-Regional Collaborators

A major problem plaguing the littoral states Malaysia, and Singapore to secure the security apparatus in the region. Finally, and the Straits of Malacca revolves around Malacca Straits and nearby waters because greater communication should be supported the inability for Indonesia and Malaysia, the volume of traffic that passes through between the littoral nations, including specifically, to collaborate efficiently with benefits them. Whether or not direct intelligence sharing initiatives. Additionally, each other and Singapore. Furthermore, presence is warranted, the three littoral user nations should consider coming together Indonesia and Malaysia have sought to states should make their demands for foreign and forming some sort of association through restrict any international presence or direct assistance clear in order to form new which these countries can allocate intervention, unlike Singapore’s desire to partnerships that can develop more efficient responsibilities and help develop a greater open the dialogue to foreign powers. security policies. Greater burden-sharing security apparatus. However, while the sovereignty concerns are initiatives and foreign training exercises are legitimate, it is important for Indonesia, effective ways to improve the existing

Ransom Payments & Anti-Piracy Measures

Many analysts agree that ransom payments groups are more likely to attack a country or international agreements, but ultimately, it is should be the last measure taken in cases of shipping company that gives in to the the decision of the governments in the region kidnapping out at sea. Evidence shows that monetary demands. 129 In order to avoid to decide whether such personal protection ransom payments trickle down and fund not paying ransom statements, a robust security measures fall in line with the region’s stances only the pirates themselves, but also the apparatus has to be put in place that is able towards maritime crime. Governments should financiers behind the attacks. This money is to act swiftly and efficiently. Arming therefore move swiftly to determine the best also used to purchase weapons and crewmembers could be a dangerous avenues to combat these threats. ammunition for later raids. Moreover, pirate precedent and is unlikely to be supported by

www.fundforpeace.org 23 The Fund for Peace Recommendations

Resolving Border Disputes

Land and sea border disputes exacerbate the permission to cross the border into sovereign the littoral states’ governments to initiate complex security problems facing the Straits territory is unlikely, the implementation of a movements to mirror such a mentality – to a of Malacca. The best way to implement seamless cross-border initiative may prove to certain extent – under an established legal regional security programs is to resolve any be very valuable for security of the overall framework. Laxer laws for law enforcement outstanding border disputes. Although a legal region. Because pirates, terrorists, and other authorities from neighboring countries and framework that gives the authorities of rogue actors do not observe or respect guaranteed inter-governmental cooperation neighboring littoral countries total territorial lines, it would be very fruitful for at times of pursuit are possible options.

Supporting Economic Development & the Enhancement of Social Programs

Economic development should be involvement in crime (including piracy) by Similarly, civil society can play an important encouraged in the coastal communities of alleviating joblessness and improving the role in improving economic standards in Indonesia and Malaysia in order to dissuade livelihoods of the population. Nations that communities and creating a set of norms that people from turning to illegal activities as a heavily depend on the Straits of Malacca for dissuade community members from means to procure money. Greater economic trade can also contribute through foreign aid partaking in illicit activities. opportunities are said to bring down programs targeting these coastal areas.

The United States’ Purview on the Straits of Malacca

As one of the major countries dependent on cooperative measures. Any forceful the area. 130 The United States already has a the sea-lanes in the Straits of Malacca, the initiatives – military or regime-building – few programs aimed at offering technical United States can play an important part in should be abandoned. In lieu of these assistance to the states in the region. The keeping the natural chokepoint secure. avenues, the United States should focus on Indonesian National Armed Forces, for Firstly, the United States should maintain a establishing good will and humanitarian aid, instance, has received US$6.7-$8 million neutral and limited position and tailor its especially for coastal communities, as from the U.S. through the International policies so as to not over-step its bounds as a discussed before. A soft law approach and Criminal Investigative Training Assistance foreign actor. With a careful approach, it is greater positive diplomatic ties can show the Program, while the Indonesian Navy is set to possible that the littoral states could begin to littoral states that the United States wishes to receive US$6 million over a five year appreciate better the assistance offered by help, while still respecting the fact that these period. 131 the U.S. and welcome greater extra-regional issues affect the sovereignty of countries in

www.fundforpeace.org 24 The Fund for Peace The Straits of Malacca Conclusion

It is critical for researchers and Ultimately, however, it is up to these three Ultimately, Indonesia, Malaysia, and governments to understand the foundations littoral states to devise ways to fight piracy, Singapore have a ways to go to combat the of the transnational issues that unfavorably terrorism, and the illicit economies. Yet, much effects of these problematic transnational affect the security environment of the Straits is to be done and these countries could threats. Multinational dialogues geared of Malacca. Pirate attacks have brought benefit from greater extra-regional toward reforming the flag of convenience negative attention to the region, to the point assistance, even in limited amounts. statutes or solving border disputes are crucial that the Straits have become associated with for the littoral nations to consider in order to armed robbery the way that Somalia’s Despite the many setbacks that Indonesia, increase future security cooperation. security reputation has been marred by Malaysia, and Singapore have experienced Moreover, introducing more effective burden maritime crime. Likewise, separatist over the years, the threat seems to have -sharing projects and opening up the region movements and other problematic groups lessened overall. Piracy, for instance, peaked to limited foreign assistance could be with links to global terrorist networks ignite in the early 2000s. The number of incidents effective long-term solutions to treat these internal unrest and destabilize the region. reported in and around the Straits has since issues. However, economic development Lastly, underground economies debase decreased. Governments have also dealt with should remain the main priority in the fight legitimate markets and proliferate a whole terrorism more effectively, with improved against piracy. As the root cause for many range of issues, from health problems to intelligence-sharing partnerships and greater criminal pursuits, inequality and poverty prodigious financial losses in all consumer technology. Lastly, positive incentives are should be targeted by the governments in the product sectors. The three littoral states of pushing governments to act and capture region and ways to alleviate these conditions Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have criminals, enhancing both state capacity and should be summarily introduced. With a more introduced unilateral, bilateral, trilateral, and the will to stop crime. Notwithstanding, it is prosperous population, fewer people would extra-regional initiatives to combat these important that state actors continue their turn to maritime piracy and illegal activities threats. Some of these had success, and have effort to combat these hazards to prevent a to earn money. minimized the dangers of these three major resurgence. As mentioned before, the perils. Other programs, however, have stalled absence of a direct problem does not signify due to pre-existing conditions that hinder any its cessation. progress towards increased security.

www.fundforpeace.org 25 The Fund for Peace References Endnotes

Introduction

1. Simon, Sheldon W., Safety and Security in the Malacca Strait: The Limits of id=653455&lang=en Collaboration . Rep. 24th ed. Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: U.S., 3. International Hydrographic Organization. Limits of Oceans and Seas . Rep. Japanese, Regional, and Industry Strategies . The National Bureau of Asian 3rd ed. Vol. 28. Monaco, 1953. Print. Research. 4. URL located at: http://www.iho.int/iho_pubs/standard/S-23/ 2. URL located at: http://maritime.bernama.com/news.php? S23_Ed3_Sheet_3_Small.jpg

Why the Straits of Malacca Matter

5. URL located at: http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm? 13. Ibid. fips=WOTC 14. Bateman, Sam, Catherine Z. Raymond, and Joshua Ho. Safety and Security in 6. URL located at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia- the Malacca and Singapore Straits . Rep. Singapore: Institute of Defence and pacific/2009/08/200981993714453320.html Strategic Studies, 2006. 7. Simon, Sheldon W., Safety and Security in the Malacca Strait: The Limits of 15. URL located at: http://www.economist.com/node/2752802? Collaboration . story_id=2752802 8. URL located at: http://www.aspirasi-ndp.com/en/archive/ 16. URL located at: http://development.asia/issue03/cover-05.asp ThestrategicvalueoftheStraitofMalacca.pdf 17. URL located at: http://www.japanfocus.org/-Nazery-Khalid/2042 9. Koh, Tommy. Rep. . JWC/Joint_War.aspx 10. URL located at: http://205.254.135.7/countries/regions-topics.cfm? 19. URL located at: http://www.bts.gov/publications/ fips=WOTC special_reports_and_issue_briefs/special_report/2010_04_22/html/ 11. URL located at: http://www.economist.com/node/2752802? entire.html story_id=2752802 20. Bateman, Sam, et. al. Safety and Security in the Malacca and Singapore 12. Simon, Sheldon W., Safety and Security in the Malacca Strait: The Limits of Straits . Collaboration .

Maritime Piracy and Armed Robbery

21. URL located at: http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/ 28. Emmers, Ralf. "The Threat of Transnational Crime in Southeast Asia: Drug texts/unclos/part7.htm Trafficking, Human Smuggling and Trafficking and Sea Piracy". UNISCI 22. International Maritime Organization, Draft Code of Practice for the Discussion Papers 2 (2003): 1-11. Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, 29. Dali, Alex. Piracy Attacks in the Malacca Strait . Rep. Web. MSC/Circ.984 (20 December 2000). . 23. Dela Pena, Joyce. "Maritime Crime in the Strait of Malacca: Balancing 30. Liss, Carolin. Oceans of Crime: Maritime Piracy and Transnational Security in Regional and Extra-Regional Concerns." Stanford Journal for International Southeast Asia and Bangladesh . Relations 10.2 (2009): Print. 31. Raymond, Catherine Z. "Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Malacca Strait: A 24. Frécon, Eric, “Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea along the Malacca Straits,” in Problem Solved?" Naval War College Review 62.3 (2009). Print. Piracy, ed. Ong-Webb, p. 71. 32. Ibid. 25. Liss, Carolin. Oceans of Crime: Maritime Piracy and Transnational Security in 33. Rosenberg, David. "The Political Economy of Piracy in the South China Sea." Southeast Asia and Bangladesh . Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Naval War College Review 62.3 (2009). Print. Studies, 2011. Print. 34. Raymond, Catherine Z. "Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Malacca Strait: A 26. Suharto was the second president of Indonesia, in power from 1967 to Problem Solved?" 1998. Although he enjoyed widespread support throughout his 31 years as 35. Rosenberg, David. "The Political Economy of Piracy in the South China Sea." president, allegations of corruption and peculation while in office, in 36. Raymond, Catherine Z. "Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Malacca Strait: A tandem with the consequences of the Asian Financial Crisis, led to his Problem Solved?" resignation two months after reelection in March 1998. 37. Beckman, Robert C. "Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in 27. Kang, Harnit K. Gulf of Aden vs Malacca Strait: Piracy and Counter-piracy Southeast Asia: The Way Forward." Ocean Development & International Law. Efforts . Issue brief. Vol. 135. New Delhi: Southeast Asia Research 33 (2002). Print . Programme, 2009. Print.

www.fundforpeace.org 26 The Fund for Peace Endnotes

Littoral, User, and Non-State Security Capacity

38. Sittnick, Tammy I. "State Responsibility and Maritime Terrorism in the Strait 52. Singapore Ministry of Defence. "The Information Fusion Centre: Challenges of Malacca: Persuading Indonesia and Malaysia to Take Additional Steps to and Perspectives." Secure the Strait." Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal Association 14.3 (2005): 53. Simon, Sheldon W., Safety and Security in the Malacca Strait: The Limits of Print. Collaboration . 39. Rosenberg, David. "The Political Economy of Piracy in the South China Sea." 54. Dela Pena, Joyce . "Maritime Crime in the Strait of Malacca: Balancing 40. URL located at: http://www.economist.com/node/2752802? Regional and Extra-Regional Concerns." story_id=2752802 55. URL located at: http://naval.review.cfps.dal.ca/archive/7345817-2223651/ 41. Raymond, Catherine Z. "Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Malacca Strait: A vol4num1art4.pdf Problem Solved?" 56. Sawhney, Rajeev. Redefining the Limits of the Straits: A Composite Malacca 42. Liss, Carolin, “The Challenges of Piracy in Southeast Asia and the Role of Straits Security System . Rep. Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Australia,” Austral Policy Forum, 07-19A, Global Collaborative, 25 October Stud, 2006. Print. 2007, www.globalcollab.org. 57. URL located at: http://southasiajournal.net/2012/03/indian-strategy- 43. Simon, Sheldon W., Safety and Security in the Malacca Strait: The Limits of towards-the-strait-of-malacca/ Collaboration . 58. URL located at: http://www.firstpost.com/india/india-gets-hawk-eye-over- 44. URL located at: http://www.economist.com/node/2752802? strait-of-malacca-396918.html story_id=2752802 59. Simon, Sheldon W., Safety and Security in the Malacca Strait: The Limits of 45. URL located at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc? Collaboration . Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA51923 60. URL located at: http://naval.review.cfps.dal.ca/archive/7345817-2223651/ 46. URL located at: http://www.japanfocus.org/-Nazery-Khalid/2042 vol4num1art4.pdf 47. Pillai, Jayarethanam S. Historical Assessment of the Port of Singapore 61. Dela Pena, Joyce. "Maritime Crime in the Strait of Malacca: Balancing Authority and Its Progression Towards a ‘High-Tech Port’ . N.p.: Australian Regional and Extra-Regional Concerns." National University, Print. 62. URL located at: http://www.economist.com/node/2752802?URL located at: 48. “Singapore Seeks Joint Patrols of Malacca Straits, involving Japan,” Asian story_id=2752802 Political News, May 2004. 63. Rosenberg, David. "The Political Economy of Piracy in the South China Sea." 49. Singapore Ministry of Defence. "The Information Fusion Centre: Challenges 64. URL located at: http://www.shiploc.com/web/en/49-aboutshiploc.php and Perspectives." POINTER: Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces (2011). 65. URL located at: http://www.secure-marine.com/ship/index.shtml Print. 66. URL located at: http://www.secureaship.com/ 50. URL located at: http://www.jamestown.org/single/? 67. United Nations. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea . Rep. New no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=26471 York: UN, 1982. Print. 51. Simon, Sheldon W., Safety and Security in the Malacca Strait: The Limits of 68. URL located at: http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=27534 Collaboration .

Security Measures and Initiatives

69. URL located at: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers11% 76. URL located at: http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/ 5Cpaper1033.html about/ 70. URL located at: http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/ 77. URL located at: http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/ suppression1988.html shangri-la-dialogue-2008/participating-countries/ 71. United Nations. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea . 78. Raymond, Catherine Z. "Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Malacca Strait: A 72. URL located at: http://www.japanfocus.org/-Nazery-Khalid/2042 Problem Solved?" 73. Kang, Harnit K. Gulf of Aden vs Malacca Strait: Piracy and Counter-piracy 79. URL located at: http://www.japanfocus.org/-Nazery-Khalid/2042 Efforts . 80. URL located at: http://naval.review.cfps.dal.ca/archive/7345817-2223651/ 74. Dela Pena, Joyce. "Maritime Crime in the Strait of Malacca: Balancing vol4num1art4.pdf Regional and Extra-Regional Concerns." 81. Chan, Leng S. Regional Cooperation on Piracy in the Straits of Malacca . Rep. 75. Huang, Victor. "Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia." Naval War Singapore: Ang & Partners, 2007. Print. College Review 61.1 (2008). Print.

www.fundforpeace.org 27 The Fund for Peace Endnotes

Terrorist Organizations and Other Insurgent Movements

82. Dela Pena, Joyce. "Maritime Crime in the Strait of Malacca: Balancing 91. URL located at: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews Regional and Extra-Regional Concerns." [tt_news]=396 83. URL located at: http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews 92. URL located at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ [tt_news]=670&tx_ttnews[backPid]=181&no_cache=1 articleshow/780319387.cms 84. URL located at: http://maritimesecuritycouncil.wordpress.com/2011/05/ 93. Percival, Bronson, "Indonesia and the United States: Shared Interests in 24/attacks-on-the-energy-industry-important-differences-between- Maritime Security," terrorism-and-piracy/ 94. URL located at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2778923.stm 85. URL located at: http://www.cfr.org/world/terrorism-goes-sea/p7545 95. URL located at: http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews 86. Percival, Bronson, "Indonesia and the United States: Shared Interests in [tt_news]=670&tx_ttnews[backPid]=181&no_cache=1 Maritime Security," United States-Indonesia Society, June 2005, 4. 96. URL located at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4690293.stm 87. URL located at: http://www.turkishweekly.net/op-ed/2646/the-Straits-of- 97. U.S. State Department. Appendix C: Background Information on Other malacca-under-the-threat-of-a-maritime-terrorist-attack.html Terrorist Groups . Rep. Print. 88. URL located at: http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews 98. URL located at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ [tt_news]=670&tx_ttnews[backPid]=181&no_cache=1 kmm.htm 89. URL located at: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/25/world/asia/25iht- 99. Ibid. pirates.1.18133159.html?_r=1 100. URL located at: http://www.puloinfo.net/ 90. URL located at: http://www.economist.com/node/2752802? 101. URL located at: http://www.turkishweekly.net/op-ed/2646/the-Straits-of- story_id=2752802 malacca-under-the-threat-of-a-maritime-terrorist-attack.html

Black Market Activities and Other Crimes

102. URL located at: http://www.havocscope.com/countries/ranking/ 116. Rosenberg, David. "The Political Economy of Piracy in the South China Sea." 103. Rosenberg, David. "The Political Economy of Piracy in the South China Sea." 117. Kvashny, Karen, “Modern Maritime Piracy in Asia: A Case Study of 104. URL located at: http://news.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne%2BNews/ Transnational Organized Crime” (dissertation, University of California, Singapore/Story/A1Story20100806-230756.html Irvine, 2003), p. 70. 105. URL located at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 118. URL located at: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews discussion/2008/12/03/DI2008120301868.html [tt_news]=26471 106. URL located at: http://www.victoriafalls-guide.net/ivory-black-market- 119. UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women. Women's threatens-the-african-elephant.html Human Rights in the ASEAN Region: Trafficking Women. Rep. Bangkok. Print. 107. Dillon, Dana R. Southeast Asia and the Brotherhood of Terrorism . Rep. No. 86. 120. URL located at: http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95250/INDONESIA-Missing Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2004. Print. -children-raise-trafficking-concerns 108. URL located at: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news? 121. Ibid. pid=newsarchive&sid=a0vvBzm2UVzg&refer=asia 122. The ringgit (formerly the Malaysian dollar) is the national currency of 109. URL located at: http://www.apaic.org/index.php? Malaysia. option=com_content&view=article&id=58&Itemid=71 123. URL located at: http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2012/2/15/ 110. URL located at: http://www.apaic.org/index.php? nation/20120215135624&sec=nation option=com_content&view=article&id=131&Itemid=139 124. Emmers, Ralf. "The Threat of Transnational Crime in Southeast Asia: Drug 111. URL located at: http://www.apaic.org/index.php? Trafficking, Human Smuggling and Trafficking and Sea Piracy". option=com_content&view=article&id=130&Itemid=138 125. URL located at: http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/endangered_species/ 112. URL located at: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/01/02/ ramin/ hundreds-indonesians-overseas-jailed-drugs.html 126. URL located at: http://www.irinnews.org/Report/89319/MYANMAR-Tricked- 113. URL located at: http://www.apaic.org/index.php? by-traffickers option=com_content&view=article&id=130&Itemid=138 127. Rosenberg, David. "The Political Economy of Piracy in the South China Sea." 114. URL located at: http://news.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne%2BNews/ 128. Environmental Investigation Agency. Environmental Crime: A Threat to Our Singapore/Story/A1Story20111207-314831.html Future . Rep. London, 2008. Print. 115. URL located at: http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Safety/Implementation/ Pages/IMO-identification-number-scheme.aspx

www.fundforpeace.org 28 The Fund for Peace Endnotes

Recommendations

129. URL located at: http://www.oecd.org/document/51/0,3746,en_32250379_ 131. Percival, Bronson, "Indonesia and the United States: Shared Interests in 32237202_48426547_1_1_1_1,00.html Maritime Security," 130. Dela Pena, Joyce. "Maritime Crime in the Strait of Malacca: Balancing Regional and Extra-Regional Concerns."

www.fundforpeace.org 29 The Fund for Peace About The Fund for Peace

Conflict Early Warning Transnational Sustainable Development, and Assessment Threats Sustainable Security

The Fund for Peace is an The Fund for Peace offers a wide range of independent, nonpartisan, 501(c)(3) non- initiatives focused on our central objective: profit research and educational organization to promote sustainable security and the that works to prevent violent conflict and ability of a state to solve its own problems promote sustainable security. 55th Anniversary 1957-2012 peacefully without an external military or administrative presence. Our programs fall We promote sustainable security through A leader in the conflict assessment and early into three primary thematic areas: research, training and education, engagement warning field, the Fund for Peace focuses on • Conflict Early Warning and Assessment; of civil society, building bridges across the problems of weak and failing states. Our • Transnational Threats; and diverse sectors, and developing innovative objective is to create practical tools and • Sustainable Development, Sustainable technologies and tools for policy makers. approaches for conflict mitigation that are Security. useful to decision-makers.

About Threat Convergence

After three years of project work, in January • explore how these regions may serve as fresh approaches to the issue by convening 2009, The Fund for Peace established its enabling environments for nuclear experts, performing extensive field research program on Threat Convergence to explore terrorism; in some of the world’s most difficult the linkages among the three biggest threats environments, and by partnering with • promote more coherent and strategic to global security: fragile states, the international and regional organizations to policy approaches to nuclear terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction explore how the threat of catastrophic illicit nuclear trafficking; and (WMD), and terrorism. The program aims to: terrorism emanating from weak and failing • become a hub for threat convergence- • raise the profile of the challenges in states can be prevented. related analysis. vulnerable, fragile and ungoverned regions The program encourages innovative and on the nonproliferation agenda; www. fund for peace .org /tc

The Fund for Peace Transnational Threats www. fund for peace .org

FFP : TTCVR1213