Indian Ocean : a New Vision

Home , AllAfrica, Combined Task Force 150, Commodore (India), Devendra Kumar Joshi, Hindustan Samachar, INS Baaz

2013 (2) ISSN 2277 – 2464

FPRC Journal

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(a Quarterly research journal devoted to studies on Indian Foreign Policy) ______

Focus : Indian Ocean : A New Vision

Responses, Articles ______Foreign Policy Research Centre

NEW DELHI (INDIA)

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FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

Preface

Indian Ocean has the unique distinction of being the only ocean named after a country. For extra‐regional powers, the Indian Ocean has for decades fulfilled the role of an important transit corridor But Sardar KM Pannikar rightly said, “While to other countries, the Indian Ocean is only one of the important oceanic areas, to India it is a vital sea. Her lifelines are concentrated in that area, her freedom is dependent on the freedom of that water surface. No industrial development, no commercial growth, no stable political structure is possible for her unless her shores are protected...” Therefore, there is a realisation across the spectrum that the challenges, opportunities and roles the Indian Ocean provides, need to be discussed seriously in the light of the fragile security environment in the region.

It is very heartening to note that a wide galaxy of writers have focused on important themes and other related issues in their writings and comments, for this special issue of FPRC Journal on Indian Ocean.

We express our heart-felt thanks to our contributors who have shared our sentiments and accepted our invitation to enrich the contents of the Journal.They are always our source of strength.

Mahendra Gaur Indira Gaur

Director Mg. Editor Foreign Policy Research Centre New Delhi

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

FPRC Journal Focus : Indian Ocean : A New Vision Contributors :

RESPONSES

1. Admiral Arun Prakash, Indian Navy (Retd)

2. Vice Admiral (Retd) M.K. Roy, PVSM, AVSM

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

3. Vice Admiral Harinder Singh PVSM, AVSM ( Retd)

4. Vice Admiral (Retired) Arun Kumar Singh

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

5. Dr. Toshi Yoshihara John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies Professor of Strategy,Strategy and Policy Department & an affiliate member of the China Maritime Studies Institute U.S. Naval War College

6. Dr.Timothy D. Hoyt

Professor of Strategy and Policy and John Nicholas Brown Chair of Counterterrorism Studies, US Naval War College

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

7. Dr. David Brewster

Visiting Fellow, Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, School of International, Political & Strategic Studies, Australian National University

8. Dr Peter Lehr Lecturer in Terrorism Studies CSTPV, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. Visiting Lecturer at the South Asia Institute, University of Heidelberg, Germany

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

9. Leighton G. Luke

Manager of the Indian Ocean Research Programme at Future Directions International, Perth, Western Australia

Articles

1. Lee Cordner AM Indo-Pacific Governance Research Centre (IPGRC) School of History & Politics The University of Adelaide,Adelaide ,SA 5005,Australia

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

2. Francis A. Kornegay, Jr Senior Fellow on emerging powers at the Institute of Global Dialogue in South Africa

Dr. Priya Chacko Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Adelaide

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

3. Commodore R SeshadriVasan, Indian Navy(Retd) Head, Strategy and Security Studies,Centre for Asia Studies, India, Director, Asian Secretariat World Boderpol

4. Dr. Christian Bouchard Full Professor, Department of Environmental Studies, Laurentian University

& Dr. William W. Crumplin Associate Professor, Department of Environmental Studies, Laurentian University

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

5. Abhijit Singh Senior Research Fellow , National Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Delhi

6. Dr. Amita Agarwal Senior Fellow of the ICSSR, New Delhi

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

7. Prof. Paul Musili Wambua University Of Nairobi School of Law

8. Summar Rao Editor of Weekly Pulse

9. Sayoni Choudhuri Assistant Professor, Loreto College, Kolkata

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

10. Saloni Salil Visiting Fellow Indian Ocean Research Program at Future Directions International, Australia

11. Maria Ayub Researcher Fatima Jinnah Women University Rawalpindi Pakistan

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

Responses : (pp. 13 -58)

1. Admiral Arun Prakash, Indian Navy (Retd)

2. Vice Admiral (Retd) M.K. Roy, PVSM, AVSM

3. Vice Admiral Harinder Singh , PVSM, AVSM ( Retd)

4. Vice Admiral (Retired) Arun Kumar Singh

5. Dr. Toshi Yoshihara

6. Dr.Timothy D. Hoyt

7. Dr. David Brewster

8. Dr Peter Lehr

9. Leighton G. Luke

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

1. Admiral Arun Prakash Indian Navy (Retd)

(Admiral Arun Prakash retired as India’s 20th Naval Chief and Chairman Chiefs of Staff in end-2006. Commissioned into the Executive Branch in 1966, he specialized as an aviator and has logged 2500 hours; flying fighters from aircraft-carriers and patrol-aircraft and helicopters from ashore.

During a career spanning over 40 years, he commanded four warships, including the aircraft-carrier Viraat, two naval air squadrons and a naval air station. In flag rank he commanded India’s Eastern Fleet, the National Defence Academy, the Andaman & Nicobar Joint Command, and the Western Naval Command. In staff assignments he served as head of the navy’s Aviation and Personnel branches and as the Vice Chief of Naval Staff.

During his tenure as Chief, the Indian Navy saw many initiatives being launched in the fields of doctrine, strategy, transformation and foreign maritime cooperation. The 2004 tsunami saw the IN earn plaudits for mounting an effective disaster-relief operation, not only on India’s eastern seaboard, but also for reaching out to neighbouring Sri Lanka, Maldives and Indonesia. A graduate of the IAF Test Pilots School, the Defence Services Staff College and the US Naval War College, he was awarded the Vir Chakra for gallantry during the 1971 Indo-Pak war, while flying with an Indian Air Force fighter-bomber squadron.

Post-retirement, he writes and speaks on strategic and defence related topics. He has published a compendium of speeches and writings on maritime and other issues entitled: From the Crow’s Nest. He was the Chairman of the National Maritime Foundation and recently concluded a 4-year term as member of India’s National Security Advisory Board.)

Interview with Admiral Arun Prakash

1. How do you assess the Indian Strategic Thinking Vis-À-Vis Indian Ocean?

As in many other areas with a crucial bearing on national security, India‟s strategic thinking and planning vis-a-vis the Indian Ocean has remained tentative, inchoate and disjointed. For many years after independence, India‟s decision-makers remained trapped in a „continental mindset‟ and persevered in the conventional belief that all threats to national security emanated from Himalayan mountain passes. Thus, a combination of „sea-blindness‟, the absence of a strategic culture and the detachment of the political establishment from national security issues has created a hiatus as far as the Indian Ocean is concerned.

Had any of them read Sardar KM Panikkar‟s, remarkably prescient, 1945 monograph titled „India and the Indian Ocean‟ they would have been struck by three of his observations; still valid 68 years on. Firstly; that the Indian Ocean is a vital area for India, because her lifelines are concentrated here and her freedom depends on the security of the sea-lanes. Secondly; that China intended to embark on a “policy of large scale naval expansion” and that a “movement towards the south will be reflected in the naval policy of a resurgent China.” And

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

thirdly; that “only on the basis of a regional organization, of which India will be the firm foundation, can the safety of the Indian Ocean be assured.”

The Indian peninsula juts out over 1000 miles into the Indian Ocean, and its geo-physical configuration makes India as dependant on the seas as any island nation. This predicates the profound influence that this ocean, the only one named after a country, will have on India‟s security environment. It is against the background of that the senior leadership of the Indian Navy has, for decades, pursued a vision of „maritime India‟. With patience and perseverance, and mostly without the benefit of higher political direction, the Navy assiduously acquired hardware and capability, while simultaneously undertaking the creation of a doctrinal and strategic framework for employment of maritime forces in peace and in war. Within this matrix, the navy has given the highest priority to „foreign maritime cooperation‟ as a prime peacetime commitment.

In pursuit of this objective the Navy has, from time to time, presented to the MEA and MoD time-bound road-maps which pinpoint specific actions in terms of providing material assistance, training or services to Indian Ocean island states such as Sri Lanka, Maldives, Seychelles and Mauritius. Rarely have these proposals found ready approval; and this lack of synergy tells a tale of missed opportunities, while China goes ahead with its „string of pearls‟ strategy.

2. One aspect where India is learning is to integrate maritime considerations into foreign policy decision-making. Has India been able to do so in the last few years?

While a beginning has certainly been made in this regard, there is a considerable room for forward thinking, planning and action. For this, there are two pre-requisites. Firstly we need to evolve a vision of India‟s stature in regional and world affairs, 25-30 years from now, and the kind of regional environment that we need to shape for this purpose; with special reference to our IOR neighbourhood. Secondly, we need to evolve a long-term foreign-policy action plan to enable the attainment of this objective.

However, in order that „maritime considerations‟ are integrated into foreign policy, there must be appreciation that the Indian Navy, far from being a threat to MEA, is a most useful instrument of state/foreign policy, which needs to be meshed into policy planning as far as the Indian Ocean is concerned. This can only happen if there is institutional synergy and consultation and trust between the MEA, MoD and Naval HQs.

Far from advocating gunboat diplomacy, one is tempted to quote, as an example of synergy, from a note sent by the British Foreign Office to the Admiralty in 1906. The First Sea Lord having proposed cuts in the strength of Royal Navy‟s smaller warships, the Foreign Office complained: “If the number of ships is to be reduced to such an extent that the navy will be

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

unable to give the foreign policy of the country such support as the Foreign Office has come to expect, the only conclusion will be that British interests are being sacrificed .....”

3. India’s new Indian Ocean Policy is one of establishing a consensual, rules-based maritime order that all stakeholders can share. The maritime security framework India envisions for the Indian Ocean would be built on the cooperation of “all the stakeholders who have a legitimate presence in the region”. How the other stake holders view this statement?

I am not aware of the existence of a „new Indian Ocean Policy‟ or the provenance of the line quoted in your question above. However, there is no doubt that there ought to be such a policy which envisages a tension-free, peaceful and stable Indian Ocean Region (IOR) through which international shipping carrying trade, energy and commerce can transit without fear of interference by littoral states or by non-state actors. Moreover, it is also necessary to ensure that equitable access to seabed resources is available to all IOR states. In this context, it is necessary to remember that land-locked States, too, have been accorded right of access to and from the sea for the purpose of exercising the rights provided for in the UN Convention for Law of the Seas 1982, including those relating to the freedom of the high seas and the „common heritage of mankind‟ on the seabed.

It is obvious that the cooperation of, and contribution from all Indian Ocean littoral states would be necessary for the success of such a policy initiative which must be inclusive and non-discriminatory. The reference to „legitimate presence‟, above, is superfluous, since the right to freedom of navigation exists in international (and even in territorial) waters, and, therefore all trading nations whose shipping traffic plies passes through the IOR can claim to have a „legitimate‟ interest in the IOR.

It is obvious that all stake-holders would welcome any dispensation which ensures peace, stability, equity and enables them to pursue maritime trade and commerce peacefully. However, India must bear in mind that smaller nations are always wary of domination and any insensitivity on this account can be counter-productive – as has often happened in the past.

4. The big question is about the meaning and consequences of a power transition in the Indian Ocean. What are the challenges that it poses for India’s foreign and security policies?

The last „power transition‟ that took place in the IOR, consequent to Britain‟s withdrawal from East of Suez in the 1960s, was relatively smooth because the baton was passed by the Royal Navy to its ally, the US Navy. Ever since, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific and IOR has been underwritten by US presence and its network of alliances. However, the

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

putative „rise of the East‟ and concurrent decline of US power, both economic and military, has heralded the commencement of a power-shift. As Asia is about to demand its rightful place on the high table there is a distinct possibility that we may be on the threshold of an era of balance of power politics, with China, India, Japan, Australia and the US competing for influence. Faced with difficult policy choices between power-balancing, band-wagoning and hedging, many smaller nations of the region remain undecided on the future course of action. Under such circumstances, the „power transition‟, this time, may not be as smooth.

Historically, the rise of a new power has, inevitably, been associated with struggle and conflict before the emergence of a new and stable balance. In the current context there are not one but two powers, China and India, rising in close proximity and within the same strategic space. Although at different stages in the socio-economic developmental cycle, neither India nor China can afford a regional conflict with attendant turbulence, political instability and deleterious economic consequences. There is also a view that world-wide economic inter-linkages are so strong, and the stakes so high, that they will either supersede conflict or render it counter-productive. However the irony is that the growing demands for energy and resources, much of them on the seabed, can arouse tensions between nations such as India and China; and economic reasons could themselves become a casus belli.

The challenge for Indian foreign policy would be to buy time, for the country to build its economic and military muscle, by checkmating China‟s growing clout through diplomatic means. On a parallel track, initiatives must be taken to bring nations like China, India, Japan and the USA together for a common cause and substitute power-play with cooperation. We may be able to evolve a concord of Asian nations with organs and institutions that can pre-empt conflict and protect Asia‟s interests.

5. Do you agree with the view that after a period of mounting concern over non-state security threats following the 9-11 terrorist attacks a decade ago, international security is returning to the realm of traditional inter-state security issues.? The lasting threat to the maritime domain in Asia will likely emanate from traditional, state-to- state rivalries fuelled by the growing interest of major regional powers.

In the heady euphoria that followed the end of the Cold War in 1989, political-scientist, Francis Fukuyama had earned instant fame by offering the „end of history‟ thesis, which predicted “the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” It turned out to be a rash forecast and Fukuyama had to recant.

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

Similarly, in the aftermath of 9/11, strategic pundits in the West, hastily, predicted that mass-casualty attacks by non-state entities would replace conventional state Vs state conflict. The reasons were not far to see. At a juncture when America saw itself as the world‟s sole super-power, this was the first major attack on continental USA. Moreover, this was their first experience of a terrorist strike at close quarters – something that India had been experiencing for over a decade. The situation has, however, changed since 2001, and the Coalition campaigns have not just inflicted substantive attrition on terrorist organizations, but also eroded their financial and organizational capability to attempt long-range strikes.

On the other hand, the decline of US power and end of the 60 year old pax Americana may just coincide with the emergence of multiple power-centres in our part of the world; and this would certainly enhance the chances of inter-state conflict. While the international system does pose impediments to the use of violence as a policy-tool, in an environment where strategic competitions revolve around dwindling resources, trade and energy security, arms races and maritime/territorial expansion, inter-state conflict cannot be ruled out.

6. Is Regional Initiatives the answer to challenges in Indian Ocean? And the big question is whether India can provide the leadership to transform the IOR-ARC into an effective forum?

The end of Cold War bipolarity has offered tremendous opportunities for regional initiatives, especially in the context of globalization. Since economic prosperity has a direct linkage with safety of sea-lanes and maintenance of good order on the high seas, the maritime domain assumes considerable importance for seeking cooperation. Whether it is piracy, maritime terrorism, proliferation or inter-state tensions, the seas are rife with hazards and uncertainties, and the scope of responsibility is so vast that it cannot possibly be shouldered by any single nation. Collective action is certainly warranted and the imperatives of interdependence will, hopefully, bring nations together and help defuse tensions.

Regional initiatives can certainly provide many of the answers by creating structures and organizations spanning the IOR to respond to multiple challenges. It is, however, a moot point whether IOR-ARC would be an effective forum for this purpose. Set up in 1997, the organization was restrictive in its membership (the exclusion of Pakistan caused much heartburn and led to the constitution of rival bodies) and focused, primarily, on economic cooperation. While the IOR-ARC has failed to make a significant impact, India‟s leadership, too, has been shown up as lackluster. The Association is badly in need of reinvigoration.

In a related context, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) was initiated by the Indian Navy in 2008 as an organization to increase maritime co-operation among navies of the littoral states of the IOR. After languishing for a few years, largely, due to a distinct lack of

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

support from the MEA and MoD, it may pick up momentum under South African or Australian chairmanship.

7. How effective have been the steps, so far, to combat security challenges -like piracy ,terrorism cyber security - from Non-State actors in the Indian Ocean? What more can be done in this respect?

While a mutually beneficial nexus seems to have been established between Somalian pirates and terrorist organizations such as Al-Shabaab (an affiliate of al-Qaeda), there are no indications that there has been any cyber-security related impact in the maritime domain.

Piracy off the coast of Somalia remained a serious threat to international shipping during the early part of the last decade, impeding the safe passage of trade and commerce, and causing alarm in the seafaring world. An interlocked world economy, heavily dependent on seaborne trade and energy supplies, is extremely sensitive to any perturbations at sea. The threat of piracy has already caused insurance rates to rise steeply, and as shipping companies implement anti-piracy measures, including the deployment of armed guards, and re-routing of ships to avoid piracy-infested waters, operating expenses have skyrocketed.

From 2005 onwards the pirates progressively gained in audacity as well as range and scale of their depredations; progressively extending their range right into the Indian EEZ. The amount of ransom, too, rose from a few hundred-thousand to a few million US dollars per ship and crew. Warships, of more than 25 nations, either individually or as part of joint task-forces, have been deployed in the Gulf of Aden, off the Horn of Africa, and in the Somali Basin to deter pirate attacks on merchant ships. The UN General Assembly passed a number of resolutions authorizing the pursuit of pirates into Somali waters and their prosecution. These international efforts have, at last, borne fruit and 2012 saw a marked drop in incidents of piracy off the East coast of Africa. However, there has been a simultaneous rise in piracy off the west coast of Africa in the Gulf of Guinea.

In general terms, the reasons that piracy assumed such menacing proportions between 2005 and 2012 included the inadequacy of naval forces, lack of multi-national coordination, and the inadequacy of existing laws to deal comprehensively with captured pirates. Given India‟s central location in the Indian Ocean and the fact that the Indian Navy and coast guard represent a maritime capability unmatched in this part of the world, this situation presented a rare opportunity for India to demonstrate that it can act resolutely, not only in its own interests, but also for the common weal. To this end, New Delhi should have convened a meeting of Indian Ocean and other maritime nations to discuss a substantive multi-national initiative to combat piracy simultaneously on three fronts: at sea, in the Somalian homeland and in specially constituted courts.

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

8. Maritime experts in India and the West, now worry about Chinese forays into the Indian Ocean. The present debate about Chinese assertions in the South China Sea could at a later stage lead to similar assertions in the Indian Ocean .Do you share the apprehensions that encroachment of space in Indian Ocean by China will be at the cost of India, which at the moment is the only littoral regional power? What is the best way out for India?

In the Sino-Indian strategic equation, the maritime dimension is a relatively new factor, and is linked directly to the reliance of both growing economies on seaborne trade and energy resources. Since an overwhelming proportion of China‟s trade and energy transits via Indian Ocean sea lanes, it has a deep sense of vulnerability in this regard which underpins its quest for footholds in this region - the so called „string of pearls‟.

With improving technology, the seabed is seen, more and more, as a potential cornucopia of energy and mineral wealth; thus creating bones of territorial contention in exclusive economic zones. In the 1980s, India had signed an agreement with Hanoi for joint hydrocarbon exploration in Vietnamese waters. Last year when an Indian oil company attempted to invoke this agreement and commenced exploration it evoked a very aggressive response from Beijing. This issue could become yet another flashpoint in Sino-Indian relations, and add to the complexity of a situation in which China and India have overlapping maritime interests in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea respectively.

India and China have a 50-year old history of conflict, but bilateral trade and diplomacy are, currently, keeping tensions under check. However, the fact that the Sino-Indian military and nuclear equation is heavily tilted in China‟s favour, and that the Sino-Pakistan politico- military nexus has a pronounced anti-India slant is a matter of concern. China‟s recent aggressive posturing over claims on Indian Territory, Tibet and the South China Sea has served to heighten this concern.

However, India‟s geographic location at the median between key choke-points of Hormuz and Bab el Mandeb on one side, and Malacca on the other, permits domination of the Indian Ocean trade and energy traffic. This is an opportune juncture to pay heed to KM Panikkar‟s sage advice and to craft a coherent, long-term Indian Ocean policy while providing fiscal support for a robust naval build-up, bearing in mind that India‟s maritime superiority would provide a useful quid pro quo for intimidation on the Himalayan heights, in the South China Sea or anywhere else. ***********

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

2. Vice Admiral (Retd) M.K. Roy PVSM, AVSM

Former Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief Eastern Naval Command, former Secretary, Department and Science and Technology

(Vice Admiral Mihir Roy was commissioned from the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth in Britain which included a short exchange programme at the US Naval Academy, Annapolis. His early sea service was in Battleships, Cruisers and Minesweepers of the Royal Navy on the Murmansk route prior to independence before transferring to the Fleet Air Arm. Admiral Roy has a Masters Degree with honours in Economics and Political Science and is a graduate of the Defence Services Staff College as also the Royal College of Defence Studies, London. He had a years stint in Kings Colleges, London with Sir Lawerence Martin for his doctorate which he had to abandon on his appointment to command the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant and thereafter promotion to Flag Rank. He was Secretary to Government in the Ministry of Defence from 1984-1988 as Director General of Advanced Technological Vessel project for the introduction of nuclear propulsion in the Indian Navy. He is currently the Editor of the Indian Ocean Journal as also on the Council for Disaster Management and safer seas. A Senior Directing Staff of the National Defence College, Delhi, Mihir Roy is the Editor of the Journal of Indian Ocean Studies and Life Associate of the National Institute of Advanced Studies as also on the Board of the Management of the Research Center of the United Services Institute at Delhi. He was on the Major Ports Reforms Committee, Captain Commandant of the Indian Navy, a Ford Foundation visiting scholar at University of Illinois and President of the Navy League. Vice Admiral Roy was the first service officer to be selected for the prestigious Jawaharlal Nehru National Fellowship in 1989-90.

He is the author of the best seller “War in the Indian Ocean”. His other major publications include South Asia after the “Cold War” and “Regional Co-operation in the Indian Ocean”. He is an avid contributor to a spectrum of professional journals and is on several think tanks / committees such as Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, United Services Institute, and Defence Watch. The South African Institute of International Affairs and Centre for International Strategic Analysis of Australia, Institute for International Policy Studies, Tokyo, SLOC studies of Taiwan, Institute of East and West Studies and China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, Beijing have recently invited Mihir Roy for seminars on the Indian Ocean. His operational sea commands include two air squadrons, destroyer Godavari and frigate Bhrahmaputra and the aircraft carrier Vikrant before being promoted to Flag rank to command the Eastern Fleet. He retired after 40 years of naval service as the Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command and had the privilege of taking part in almost all the major conflicts in the Indian Ocean. He completed a further tenure of four years as Director-General for Advance Technology in the Ministry of Defence for the introduction of nuclear propulsion in the Indian Navy. He was twice decorated by the President of India for ‘distinguished services of the most exceptional order’ with President Venkataraman’s remarks that “Admiral Roy is a scholar – sailor – an unique combination of dissimilar talents”.)

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

Response to QUESTIONNAIRE

1.Do you agree with the statement that today India stands poised to play a leading role in the Indian Ocean?

India has developed five major shipyards both public and private on the West Coast together with a large network of repair and modernization infrastructure.

India the largest practicing democracy in this region which is seeking a permanent seat in the U.N. Security

Council has also developed four major ship design and construction yards on the East Coast together with repair and modernization infrastructure to facilitate the move of 80,000 ships per year through well defined choke points which has assisted China and India to expand their financial and exports status, employment as also GDP which is essential for India, China and now Japan to finance their expansion.

India has two aircraft carriers with MIG29K interceptor fighters as also Sea Harriers, helicopters with 16 modern conventional submarines along with 2 to 3 nuclear submarines, fast replenishment tankers, amphibious squadrons with helicopters and above all Boeing long range interceptor aircraft with precision guided missiles which can attack and destroy targets in the Indian Ocean from the air within hours as required.

Besides the Second World War where R.I.N was mostly officer manned by British officers, India has gathered operational maritime experience since partition commencing with Junagadh (12947), Indo-Pak (1947-48), Goa

(1961), Kutch (1965), Indo-Pak (1965), Indo-Pak (1971), Sri Lanka (1987-90), Maldives (1988), Kargil (1990),

Parakram (2001-02) and UNPRO for maritime peace keeping.

Hence India stands poised to play a leading role in the Indian Ocean with the support of Mr. Abe‟s Japanese policy to remove the „self defence‟ operational radius with U.S., Australia, Japan and ASEAN giving their full support to ensure the free and risk free movement of ships, energy and material in this ice free ocean.

Delhi has not taken the services in full confidence such as in 1947 not clearing the valley of tribals in two additional days but going to UN which is festering issue. Similarly with Lahore under the Indian Artillery, India succumbed to the Soviets going to Tashkent and both claimed victories! Similarly after all the prisoners were released after Bangladesh which resulted the hanging of Bhutto. Lastly Pakistan soldiers were allowed to depart from Indian soil after Kargil by brokerage by USA.

2.How do you assess the Indian Strategic Thinking Vis-À-Vis Indian Ocean?

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

Asia spans two oceans: the Indian and the Pacific whose sea lanes transport trade and energy which are the life blood of their economics. The term „Asia-Pacific‟, however, tends to focus mainly on the Western Pacific. Hence there is a need to create a stronger Pan-Asian linkage between ASEAN, India and Japan, Australia, which line on either side of the Malacca Straits. Hence „Indo-Pacific‟ which gives an inclusive name to an entity which has recently been defined by the former Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton as a „key driver of global politics. Indo-

Pacific has become a key strategic area in the 21st century. The Indo-Pacific represents the centre of gravity of the world‟s economic and strategic interests. The Indo-pacific maritime region is an organized and integrated strategic entity which together contains close to half the world‟s population which include the dynamic sub-regions of Northeast and Southeast Asia and the resource rich countries in the Middle East and Africa.

The boon is due to the modernization of maritime infrastructure which has heightened the strategic significance of the Indo-Pacific which has generated greater commercial traffic. And with the fast expanding hubs of India, Sri

Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Vietnam and Thailand, the use of the straits will continue to expand which calls for good governance and the need for greater coherence in regional efforts to establish a better community for multilateral cooperation and confidence building among the stake holder.

3. One aspect where India is learning is to integrate maritime considerations into foreign policy decision-making. Has India been able to do so in the last few years ?

Several books on maritime strategy have been written by Admiral Arun Prakash, Cmde. Uday Bhasker, Dr. Raja Mohan and others. The person who was, however, the Prime Minister‟s National Security Advisor, with the exception of one officer, have been diplomats served in China, Pakistan and USA. Hence the integration of maritime considerations into-foreign policy decision making has not been India‟s strong point.

With the movement of US forces from Euro Atlantic to Asia-Pacific has been a major move but India has not moved any force to Vietnam and ASEAN countries. In addition, China sent hospital ships to Indian Ocean states as also to East African countries. Hence India is considered a comparative weak state which reacts rather than take independent action. India with so much of advantage of “Soft Sea Power” has not sent any hospital ships to poorer countries nor reserved seats in medical, engineering or technical institutes in India. While China has located refueling harbours in Indian Ocean as also developed Quador Port in Pakistan, India has made no move to set up operational bases in Indian Ocean and East African States. France in addition to reunion has established an operational base in Mogadishu. U.S. has set base facilities in

Bahrain. India is still contemplating having an operational base in East African States.

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

4. India‟s new Indian Ocean Policy is one of establishing a consensual, rules-based maritime order that all stakeholders can share. The maritime security framework India envisions for the Indian Ocean would be built on the cooperation of “all the stakeholders who have a legitimate presence in the region”. How the other stake holders view this statement?

India is keen to establish a consensual, rules-based maritime order that all stakeholders can share. BRICS is one such framework which brings China and India to meet as both countries require ten years peace. Nonetheless India and U.S.A. have greater cooperation.

5. The big question is about the meaning and consequences of a power transition in the Indian Ocean. What are the challenges that it poses for India‟s foreign and security policies?

The U.S. National Intelligence Council‟s assessment of future trends predicts that by 2030, the era of hegemonic power will end and the ongoing diffusion of power will restore Asia‟s weight in the global economy. As a consequence, the Indo-Pacific region appears likely emerge as the new “strategic centre of gravity” in global politics and not surprising that the US is re-balancing towards Asia.

In words of former Defence Secretary Robert Gates, America has played several roles, as an ally, partner and friend assisting democracies.

China is likely to exceed the US in military spending over the next two decades. China‟s assertion of maritime territorial claims and escalatory actions in the East Asian security.

In this region China, India, Japan, Australia and US leads to greater development has also, GDP. Hence the region is more cohesive to be termed as Indo-Pacific with India taking the lead in IOR-ARC and ASEAN.

India has stepped up its Look East Policy and ahs called for intensified cooperation with ASEAN for maritime security and safety, for freedom of navigation and for peaceful settlement of maritime disputes in accordance with International law.

India‟s hi-tech naval base “Project Varsha” located near Rambilli, about 50 kms. from ENC Headquarters at Vishakhapatnam, will include underground berths for INS Arihant and nuke missiles armed stations. This may be reaction to China‟s massive underground nuclear Station base Yalong on the Southern most tip of Hunan Island which houses SSN‟s, the Jin-class SSBNs with long range nuclear missiles.

6. Do you agree with the view that after a period of mounting concern over non-state security threats following the 9-11 terrorist attacks a decade ago, international security is returning to the realm of traditional inter-state security issues.? The lasting threat to the maritime domain in

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

Asia will likely emanate from traditional, state-to-state rivalries fuelled by the growing interest of major regional powers.

The electronic media inform us about the rising graph of sea piracy, terrorism, drug smuggling , gun running, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, human smuggling, climate change, global warming, natural disasters. Further, Organized crime has significant strategic dimensions in which political movements and insurgent groups turn to crime to finance their operations.

States too have acknowledged the need for collective and coordinated to addressing threats and challenges and a number of multilateral agreements and arrangements have been conceptualized and put into operations.

7. Is Regional Initiatives the answer to challenges in Indian Ocean? And the big question is whether India can provide the leadership to transform the IOR-ARC into an effective forum?

There is a need for greater regional cooperation amongst the Indo-Pacific community. There is a range of multilateral organizations in the IOR-ARC, IONS, SAARC and Bimstec have been working with other grouping such as ASEAN, ARF and East Asia Summit for greater coherence in regional efforts to establish a community of stake holders which would reduce tensions between littoral states.

The earlier slow progress of SAARC and cooling of the ASEAN, the current Region and Regionalism are rising geo-political aspects in the context of economic globalisaiton. The Indo-Pacific entity is woven by trade routes and safety of major sea lanes of communications.

Hence the Indian Ocean Rim Association of Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) is a unique exercise in regionalism bring countries from three continents within its realm with a large degree of variation in the economic development among the stake holders.

The grouping enables member countries to understand the geo-political subtleties and complexities for building closer network. It also provides an opportunity for economic and cultural leadership as also in unleashing a new vitality into the IOR-ARC where India‟s leadership gives it a meaningful direction to its member states.

8 How effective have been the steps, so far,to combat security challenges -like piracy , terrorism cyber security - from Non-State actors in the Indian Ocean? What more can be done in this respect?

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Cyber security has ratched up the ladder of real threats in Asia more than other parts of the world. The number of attacks with politico-military objectives is on the rise, even as rules of the road in cyberspace are virtually non- existent, leading to a state of cyber insecurity.

Cyber insecurity prevails for a number of reasons. In the first instance, many of the current hotspots in the world are located in Asia. There has been a concomitant increase in cyber attacks in the respective areas where these hotspots are located. The attractiveness of using cyber as a means of bloodless attacks have led to powers both with and outside the region using these means to achieve politico-military objectives, which is leading to an ongoing cycle of retaliation and counter-retaliation. Thus, a combination of existing fault lines and the easy access to cyberspace as a new means of perpetrating conflict is leading to increasing cyber insecurity in the region.

9. Maritime experts in India and the West, now worry about Chinese forays into the Indian Ocean. The present debate about Chinese assertions in the South China Sea could at a later stage lead to similar assertions in the Indian Ocean .Do you share the apprehensions that encroachment of space in Indian Ocean by China will be at the cost of India, which at the moment is the only littoral regional power? What is the best way out for India ?

India has 50 ships in Eastern Naval Command. China made forays in the Indian Ocean and make its presence felt. She has also challenges.

10. The US will like India to play a greater role in the region as well as in the Indian Ocean. As Robert Kaplan put it : „India cannot dominate the Indian Ocean. It will be decades before it can possibly do that. I think what India's strategists hope, is that the Indian navy, with the unspoken confluence of the United States navy, will dominate the Indian Ocean and therefore, help to peacefully manage the rise of China, over the maritime sphere.‟ How far do you agree with this viewpoint ?

US will continue to make its presence in the Indian Ocean, We hope that Indian Navy and US will peacefully manage the rise of China over the maritime sphere and need 15 years of peace to expand economic viability.

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FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

3. Vice Admiral Harinder Singh

PVSM, AVSM ( Retd)

(Vice Admiral Harinder Singh retired as CinC Southern Naval Command in 2002.

He is an alumni of the DSSC and NDC and has commanded various front line units including the Eastern Fleet. He has held important assignments in DGDPS, as Jt Sec Military, Asstt Chief of Personnel and as FORTAN. He was the DCNS at the time of Kargil and oversaw naval operations. He is now in the Finance field and a Director on some finance cos including Delhi Stock Exchange.)

RESPONSE to QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Do you agree with the statement that today India stands poised to play a leading role in the Indian Ocean?

With a burgeoning economy and a competent and well structured Naval Fleet there are good reasons to conclude that India has the potential to play a leading role in the Indian Ocean region but there are several caveats flowing from the way the national security institutions are structured and run. There is a wide gap between the national aspirations and governmental performance and it is only widening and this is underwritten by the sheer lack of governance, absence of sound political leadership or a leader with a vision. There is also a total trust deficit between the political leaders and the led and there is little formal or informal interaction, dialogue or inputs between the two at the higher levels of government For, starters the Government is expected to outline a national defence and security strategy after identifying core national interests, identifying threats to those interests and then deciding on development of specific policy instruments including the military capabilities essential to meet those threats. There is no articulated document in the public domain. George Tanham, the American security analyst has rightly concluded that India has no strategic doctrine and formulates strategy on an adhoc basis. To conclude, it would be fair to add that costs are being imposed on Indian security policy because of the drift in domestic polity. A government that is unable to settle economic and domestic turmoil cannot effectively deal with a variety of challenges facing us on the internal and external security fronts.

The only instrument designed to safeguard our interests in the Indian Ocean (IO) and is well structured, is the Navy, which has a well articulated strategy. The acquisition program has the requisite approvals but still essentially depends upon imported equipment and a fatally flawed acquisition process. Due to the tortuous acquisition and procurement procedures including for spares where you buy the cheapest, the operationally availability of weapons and sensors tends to be abysmally poor. The operational readiness and shortages of guns, ammunition, missiles and spares was found to exceed 50% for most categories across the military, during a review at the start of Kargil operations, Navy had to resort to emergency procurements and fortunately the services were not fully tested. The indigenization of ship construction is a myth as almost no weapons or sensors of consequence, except sonars and AIO are indigenously designed and manufactured and therefore we need continuing foreign support for spares and maintenance leading to dependence on a particular source and being subjected to formal or informal embargoes. Lack of indigenization and having weapons from every country has

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lead to dependence on almost every supplier and country in the world, with attendant problems of inventory management. These shortcomings directly impinge on deployments.

Issues articulated earlier could inhibit the optimum development and consummation of an active role in IO, but our strength and stature of the economy, technological and manufacturing base, besides the military are plus points. I may venture to conclude that the growth of India’s soft and military power on the world stage has been more due to our unshackled economy rather than military prowess or enlightened political leadership and this state appears destined to continue. National power is something that aggregates military capabilities, economic strength and particularly the nations will to use that power in furtherance of its national objectives. I have reservations whether we have the political will, the capability or any intention to effectively use power in the maritime arena (except for nuclear deterrence) and therefore our capabilities to play a meaningful role must be assessed to be currently suboptimal and will remain suboptimal in the medium term due to a dysfunctional national polity and security system. 2. How do you asses Indian Strategic Thinking vis- a- vis the Indian Ocean?

There is a desire of extra regional powers to dominate the regional energy resources, the movement of energy to the West towards Europe in particular and to the east through the Malacca and Lombok straits to East Asia. As energy supplies dwindle and become even more essential to fuel world economies, the struggle to gain influence in our area is inevitable. This desire for energy security is likely to be exacerbated by the quest for seabed mineral resources that the growing economies will demand as the resources on land dwindle and become scarcer. The SLOCs and maritime routes carrying 94% of India’s trade, the bulk of energy resources between the producing and energy consuming countries and substantial other trade from East Asia, South East Asia and destined to satisfy the need of the fund flush energy producing countries in the Gulf and west Indian Ocean will only grow with time. It will be fair to conclude that as we move forward our economic prosperity and security will be increasingly linked to the sea.

Firstly we needed to get the diagnosis of the security conundrum right, identifying the core issues then working a force structure to meet those challenges and then forming programs towards those strategic directions. Towards this the IN has formulated a sound, if ambitious plan of force projection capability, built around multiple carrier based groups, conventional and nuclear submarines with land and nuclear strike capability, amphibious assault groups around LPDs, adequate blue water surface forces, adequate surveillance capabilities and of course strategic bases. Whilst some of these capabilities exist, but these are inadequate for our current needs whilst others may take another decade or more to fructify. More importantly, our force structure is not being designed with any one country in mind but as a generic solution to take care of all possible and foreseen security scenarios in mind. The future fleet should be capable of patrolling areas and lanes of interest to us, to defend coercion and if the necessity arose to coerce a recalcitrant.

We can have no objection to Chinese vessels operating in IOR, we also have the right to operate where our interests take us including the South China Sea and else where. As the DCND and Operational head of the Navy, I had planned and organized naval exercises’ centered on the South China Sea in 2001 with aircraft carrier Viraat with Sea harriers, other frigates and destroyers, a Submarine and with aircraft staging out of Singapore and offered the littoral countries the option to participate. They all accepted the offer, some for exercises bilaterally with us and others for the planned three dimensional multilateral exercises. There were mild Chinese objections but we reiterated our rights and nothing came of it and did not even make it to the Press. For some reasons, in the following years, we backtracked and lost an opportunity to continue with similar exercises and assert our international rights in area of interest to us. We may not be able to exercise this right again, in the near future.There is some obvious underlying fear of taking on the Chinese in India’s security establishment, probably

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

because of the propensity of China to flex its military muscle and use force and this certainly and adversely inhibits our actions. There are good grounds to conclude that we are defensive, risk averse and over cautious in our thoughts and actions as far as the Chinese are concerned 3. India’s new Indian Ocean Policy is one of establishing a consensual, rule based maritime order that all stake holders can share. The maritime security framework India envisions for the Indian Ocean would be built on the cooperation of “all the stake holders who have legitimate presence in the Indian Ocean. How the other stakeholders view this statement?

There is no official policy that has been articulated by India for the IO but we do have policies articulated by the Navy and think tanks of various descriptions that masquerade as India policy. So I accept that this is Indian policy. It is contentious, as to who are the genuine ‘stake holders’ as both US and China are not indigenous to the area but they both have definite maritime interests in the area. But, by the same logic Russia and the European Union can claim interest too. The projected continuing rise of world trade across our region, the economic rise of India, South Africa and Indonesia and the ASEAN power house will only increase interest and importance in this area. There are also African nations in particular, whose economies are beginning to boom and as they progress, so will their maritime forces and desire to ensure freedom of movement in our region. As articulated earlier, our fate is inextricably linked with that of IO and because of our size, location, size of our maritime forces and burgeoning economy, we have little choice but to take a lead in ensuring peace and tranquility in the maritime domain. It is obvious that the numerous stake holders having distinct and often agnostic interests inter nation and multination disputes in this area and beyond, having differing and often irreconcilable strategic perceptions. There is general consensus that our aims should be to ensure a stable and benign security environment, ability to avail of and fulfill economic opportunities, have complete freedom of navigation, and a framework for peaceful resolution of disputes. In view of the wide variety of security and strategic interests a formal organization to develop and cement relationships and defend our mutual interests is not feasible and we may pursue a consensual approach. We should not be carried away by ASEAN support and their desire for us to play a more forceful role because most of these countries have out of area, border disputes with China.

4. The big question is about the meaning and consequences of a power transition in the Indian Ocean. What are the challenges that it poses for India’s foreign and Security policies?

Of all the countries of particular interest to us and whose actions or response is not always predictable is an energized China, because of its rising defence expenditure which already well exceeds US$ 120 billion and growing in double figures, though still under 2% of GDP. Body language also indicate that they have a well structured program to strengthen their maritime power in every facet including carrier battle groups, satellites and space capabilities, long range surveillance and cyber attack capabilities. SLOCs in western Pacific and through the South China Sea have several potential flashpoints emanating from Chinese territorial claims against many of the littorals. To this has now been added their claims to a major part of the area as its EEZ. Similarly, Iran’s quest for nuclear capability and Israeli plans to deny it the same at any cost, if taken to the logical conclusion will result in a spill over of the consequences in to the Gulf and nearer home, particularly the movement of trade and fossil fuels to the entire world. There is also a potential of conflict because of regional choke points, with high economic and strategic importance and include the Straits of Hormuz, Malacca Straits and the Lombok Straits and these will always remain potential flash points. Conflict, particularly with a Chinese content will conflict with US interests and those of its formal and informal allies and could turn unpleasant. I believe that a formal security set up is neither feasible nor desirable in our area due to inherent contradictions and no single power could possibly maintain peace and tranquility or enforce its will and we will require

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multilateral efforts for conflict avoidance and conflict management besides ensuring safety of the seas for unimpeded movement of trade. What we need to do and what is possible has been spelled out by me in the reply to the previous question.

5. Do you agree with the view that after a period of mounting concern over non state security threats following the 9-11 terrorist attacks a decade ago, international security is returning to the realm of traditional inter-state security issues? The lasting threat to the maritime domain in Asia will likely emanate from traditional, state-to-state rivalries fuelled by the growing interest of major regional powers.

There is no doubt that what was a mounting concern about the activities of non state actors has abated, primarily because they have received a body blow, but they are by no means vanquished. There still remain areas of major concern emanating from the future of Afghanistan, the happenings in Syria and the Arab spring coming to a logical conclusion and if these are not handled well , could in the long term, give a shot in the arm to the waning strength of the non state actors. In the threat to the maritime domain from state rivalries also lies the antidote; that threats and conflict upsets peace and tranquility and that’s not in the interest of any nation. I believe that even the Chinese are seized of this paradigm but they may not fully subscribe to it in areas bordering them. I believe that most responsible nations see power and paths to power through their economies rather than military strength as in the past. Weak and failing states such as Pakistan perhaps represent some of our most significant threats. I do not foresee any greater danger to regional order in the fore seeable r future than that exists today.

6. Is regional initiatives the answer to challenges in Indian Ocean? And the big question is whether India can provide the leadership to transform the IOR-ARC into an effective form?

India’s continuing economic progress, military prowess and expanding engagement particularly in the Asia Pacific, with US and to a lesser extent in Africa and the Gulf has caused attention to be focused on our military moves in the region but militarily we are not equipped for any out of area operations. Democracy that makes us a show piece also, as practiced in India and the quality of our political leader ship preclude leadership roles of any nature. We work slowly building a consensus and we are shy of confrontation and asserting our rights and therefore it’s better to try for consensual approach. We have an interest in strengthening and building relationship with partners who can tackle their own security problems at home and in their neighborhoods, and building a mutually trustable relationship. The raising of India-ASEAN ties to a strategic partnership and the conclusion of the negotiations on FTA in Services and Investments will inevitably lead to a closer relationship. Needless to add improvements of relations with Pakistan have been and will remain hampered by the obtaining trust deficit. With China our relationship has and will continue to have components of competition and cooperation and the ongoing dialogues and structured discussions are good bases for optimism.

7. How effective have been the steps so far, to combat security challenges – like piracy, terrorism, cyber security – from non state actors in the Indian Ocean? What can be done in this respect?

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

The concerns about piracy, particularly around the horn of Africa have considerably abated and it seems to be coming to a manageable level. The response from the important stake holders has been generally commendable. Chinese support against piracy near the horn of Africa, to my mind is an important green shoot, of a more understanding, mature and considered response by a maturing economic and military power with vested interest in maritime peace, tranquility and stability in our area. It bodes well for the region and beyond. In my view the role of maritime terrorism is somewhat diminished and that of, cyber security, drug and human trafficking, pollution and accidents have limited security ramifications and will get diminished as more stake holders chip in with more forces. Cyber security I feel has now actually graduated to a threat by state actors.

8. Maritime experts in India and the West worry about the Chinese forays in to the Indian Ocean. The present debate about Chinese assertions in the South China Sea could at a later stage lead to similar assertions in the Indian Ocean. Do you share the apprehension that encroachment of space in the Indian Ocean. Do you share the apprehensions that encroachments’ of space in the Indian Ocean by China will be at the cost of India, which at the moment is the only littoral regional power? What is the best way out for India?

China's remarkable four decades of economic reform and growth have catapulted it to wealth and power -- China is a semi-global power, with near global interests. They, therefore have a legitimate and biding interest in being present and ensuring that the SLOCS are kept open and peace reigns. They have also been credited with the ‘string of pearls’ theory in the IOR and which looked at from their purely strategic point of view makes sense, is logical and its implied aim ‘to encircle India’ is a common but debatable conclusion. Chinese need friendly countries that will assist them by supplying raw material and provide a market for finished goods and all fair means of exerting soft power or providing funds and support are fair. It’s also similar for us except that we are indigenous to the area but our needs and efforts are very similar. I do not believe that in today’s world, barring Pakistan, any country will give the Chinese or any one else, rights to any ports or bases for military deployments, in China’s case for the PLA. The ‘presence’ of Chinese or their listening post on Coco’s Island is a myth spread by interested parties and is factually incorrect and imaginary. I can personally vouch for it.

Development of a port, airport or supply of weapons has economic benefits for the recipients and does not adversely affect their sovereignty. We also attempt to influence countries of interest to us and have sold weapons, gifted ships and aircraft and provided financial support. It’s the failure of our foreign and other policies that Chinese get better treatment even in otherwise friendly countries for the want of an Indian grand strategy and reluctance to foot the financial bill. There are good reasons for us to keep our hands off the happenings in our neighboring countries and to cultivate good relations with them. It’s unfortunate that even the regional satraps in India are attempting to drive foreign policy to appease baser domestic requirements because of the fractured nature of our polity and this unfortunate situation is not likely to improve in a hurry and can adversely affect our interests.

I also believe that we have come a long way; in our capabilities since 1961 though there is an unaddressed asymmetry in Chinese and our capabilities across the land border but there is little probability of a hot war as there are no obvious gains for the Chinese. Whilst the border may not have been demarcated and arguments over its delineation may continue, there are reasons to believe that we also hold trumps in the form Chinese SLOCs through the Indian Ocean. The Chinese have very limited resources that can currently be deployed in our area and are not likely to have them in a decade or more. I also believe that the ongoing Sino-Indian diplomatic,

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security and other dialogues and engagements’ will only improve the atmospherics going forward, hopefully aided by the change of guard in China.

To conclude, I feel that we should see China’s rise as an opportunity for better relations rather than a threat and accept that that China’s acquiescence to and play by the obtaining maritime rules has allowed Asia to become a key driver of their economy as well as that of the world and they would not like to upset this equilibrium.

9. The US would like India to play a greater role in the region as well as in the Indian Ocean. As Robert Kaplan puts it ‘India cannot dominate the Indian Ocean. It will be decades before it can possibly do that. I think what India’s strategists’ hope, is that the Indian Navy, with the unspoken confluence of the US Navy, will dominate the Indian Ocean and therefore, help to peacefully manage the rise of China, over the maritime sphere’. How do you agree with this view point?

What is inevitable is the rise of China, with China’s economy competing head on with the US economy in the next decade, its extra regional dependence on the where withal to fuel its economy and to trade and therefore its interest in our region. Our economy is also expected to continue to grow and in the not too distant future we will be the third largest economy and that will only further reinforce our dependence on the seas. At the same time, the US will soon withdraw from AF-PAK region, its leverage with the energy producing countries in the mid east will progressively decrease as the continental US becomes more self sufficient in energy. US therefore has a vested interest in finding a capable and willing partner to support there aims and objectives in the area. They also have an interest to check the growing influence of the Chinese economic power house. It’s a moot point whether our larger interests are served by alignment or a new version of non-alignment, this time tilted in favor of US. It is not clear to me whether politically we have decided to align with the US or the texture of the future security and strategic relationship between us but I suspect it will be ‘non-alignment’ once again, for good reasons. We need a balanced relationship with China and not an adversarial one whilst we work for our place in the sun.

In the current security scenario I would doubt that there is any country, including the US that can dominate the IOR in the near future. At best the US can sustain only a limited permanent presence in this region whilst retaining its presence in other areas of importance. China will not be a threat at least for a decade and more, as its primary area of interest remains the Western Pacific Ocean because of territorial disputes with its neighbors’, fuelled by its search for resources.

10. Pakistan has been critical of the role of India in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan has always said that Indian role in the region has always been detrimental to the interest of neighboring countries and it did not qualify as a major player in the region. Do you share this viewpoint? .

Pakistan long ago disappeared from the IN’s calculations of threat perceptions and the required force structure. At least since 1971, Pakistani Navy has rightly feared IN and during Kargil Ops, PN Fleet was essentially confined to harbor defenses along its coast added to its existing inferiority complex. PN has also suffered from benign neglect because the country has been under Army rule for extended durations and has had no choice but to rely on inferior Chinese wherewithal. Unfortunately, as far as the land border is concerned the vexatious relationship

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with Pakistan still dominates the thinking of our military, political and some in the intelligentsia. The main danger to us today is not from Pakistan but the ‘failed state’ of Pakistan, protected by the nuclear umbrella, supporting export of jihadis. There are good reasons to believe that India is now not necessarily viewed as the primary enemy but internal jihadism, religious and sectarian divide leading to extremism and even ethnic cleansing, and centripetal regional tendencies are increasingly being seen as primary threats. The earlier they begin to tackle these, it will be better for us and the region. Our standing in the region as explained earlier is being supported and encouraged by the littoral powers. In a world where power is measured by the size of the economic gun they are likely to slip even further in their standing in the league of nations and will have had no standing but for the worry about its nuclear weapons. I would not pay any heed to Pakistani protestations against us, that in any case are hardly shared by any other country.

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FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

4. Vice Admiral (Retired) ARUN KUMAR SINGH

P-215, Jalvayu Towers, Sector 56, Gurgaon – 122003, Haryana. (India)

Tele +91 9971286622, E-mail – [email protected]

Vice Admiral Arun Kumar Singh retired in 2007, after 40 years service in the Indian Navy. During his service career he was a nuclear submariner who, commanded various warships, submarines, submarine bases and submarine squadrons. He held the following important posts -

As Rear Admiral

- (a) Flag Officer Submarines - (b) Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Submarines) - (c) Flag Officer Commanding Eastern Fleet. In this capacity he exercised with various Navies including the Navies of Japan, South Korea and China. As Vice Admiral

(a) Director General of the Indian Coast Guard. In this capacity he signed the Hotline Agreement in 2005, with the Maritime Security Agency of Pakistan, and also exercised with the Coast Guards of Japan, South Korea and Maldives. He also commanded the Indian Coast Guard rescue and relief operations in India, Sri Lanka and Maldives, after the Tsunami disaster of 26 December 2004. (b) Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Andaman & Nicobar Command. (c) Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Eastern Naval Command (this was his final appointment before retirement). 2. Post retirement, Vice Admiral Arun Kumar Singh is a life member of various think tanks. He is also a prolific writer and speaker on issues maritime, nuclear, international affairs, and is an internationally respected strategic analyst. He has addressed various military institutions, universities, think tanks and symposiums in India and abroad.

RESPONSE to Questionnaire

1.Do you agree with the statement that today India stands poised to play a leading role in the Indian Ocean?

A 1. India needs to look beyond the Indian Ocean region (IOR). About 97 % of our international trade goes by sea on merchant ships. 50 % of this trade goes/ comes from westwards to Europe and beyond and 50 % goes/comes from the Asia Pacific Region (APR). Over 70% of our energy imports come from the middle east. The

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

IOR and APR are now strategically referred to as one region ie IPR (Indo-Pacifc Region). Hence while India does stand poised to play an important role in the TOR, it needs to build a naval capability to safe guard our national interests in the IPR by 2030, because that is the time when the Chinese Navy will begin prolonged deployments in the IOR.

2.How do you assess the Indian Strategic Thinking Vis-À-Vis Indian Ocean?

A 2. As I have mentioned in answer to Q1, above, the global and Indian strategic communities are now referring to the IPR which encompasses the IOR and APR, as one strategic region.

3. India‟s new Indian Ocean Policy is one of establishing a consensual, rules-based maritime order that all stakeholders can share. The maritime security framework India envisions for the Indian Ocean would be built on the cooperation of “all the stakeholders who have a legitimate presence in the region”. How the other stake holders view this statement?

A 3. India is adopting a sensible policy in the IOR. All the other stake holders can have no quarrel with our policy, but they will try to push forward their national interests also eg China's "string of pearls" policy of encircling India with bases funded and built by China in Sri Lanka (Hambantotha port), Bangladesh (new terminals in Chittagong port and the new Sonaadiya port), and the 01 February 2013 decision of the Pakistan Government to hand over management of the Chinese funded and built Gwadar port to China. In addition, the Chinese have moved rapidly into Maldives by offering "security assistance".

4. The big question is about the meaning and consequences of a power transition in the Indian Ocean. What are the challenges that it poses for India‟s foreign and security policies?

A 4. I have answered this partly in reply to Q3 above. Chinese moves in the IOR need to be countered, by alliances with like minded maritime nations of the IPR and we should accept the Vietnamese offer of a naval base in Vietnam, where ONGC is interested in drilling for oil at sea in Vietnamese waters. The Chinese have a new policy "marching west" as a reaction to the American policy of "Pivot Asia" ie China wants to increse its presence in South Asia, central Asia and the Middle East. India needs to invest in creating a blue water navy which can safe guard its interests in the IPR.

5. Do you agree with the view that after a period of mounting concern over non-state security threats following the 9-11 terrorist attacks a decade ago, international security is returning to the realm of traditional inter-state security issues.? The lasting threat to the maritime domain in Asia will likely emanate from traditional, state-to-state rivalries fuelled by the growing interest of major regional powers.

A 5. The situation is not so simple. The lasting threat in the maritime domain will continue to come from a combination of diverse sources which may act independently or together. These threats, apart from the traditional state to state rivalries (including extra regional powers), would include maritime terror (including state sponsored maritime terror like 26/11), piracy etc.

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

6. Is Regional Initiatives the answer to challenges in Indian Ocean?

And the big question is whether India can provide the leadership to transform the IOR-ARC into an effective forum?

A 6. India has been a part of various regional initiatives . These include the 2004 Tokyo Agreement on ReCAAP (Regional Co-operation Agreement on Combating Armed Robbery and Piracy in Asia), came into force in 2006, which has 18 nations (including India, China, Japan, South Korea, Indoneasia, Malayasia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Mynmmar, Thailand, Phillipines etc) as members and co-ordinates the activities of the respective Coast Guards from its headquarters in Singapore (known as "Information Sharing Centre"). The ReCAAP meets every year (it last met in New Delhi in October 2012. The Indian Government has nominated the Indian Coast Guard as the nodal agency to participate in ReCAAP activities.

In addition, the Indian Prime Minister inaugerated in New Delhi in February 2008, the Indian Navy initiative known as IONS (Indian Ocean Naval Symposium) which was attended by heads of 30 Indian Ocean navies and Coast Guards . The IONS meets every two years to discuss safety at sea against piracy, terror and also for search and rescue. It has met in Abu Dhabi (2010), Johaneesburg (2012) and in 2014 will meet in Canberrs.

India can definitely provide leadership to transform the IOR-ARC, into an effective body, but first it needs to focus on improving its economy and enhancing its sea power.

7. How effective have been the steps,so far,to combat security challenges -like piracy ,terrorism cyber security - from Non-State actors in the Indian Ocean? What more can be done in this respect?

A 7. I have already answered most of this in my earlier replies. India, since 2008 has a ship on anti-piracy missions in the distant gulf of Aden. in 2011, the Indian Navy and Indian Coast Guard in combined operations wiped out the threat of Somalian piracy from 400 miles off India's west coast when they sank four pirate mother ships and captured two pirate mother ships along with 111 Somalian pirates who had come within 400 miles off our south west coast.

8. Maritime experts in India and the West, now worry about Chinese forays into the Indian Ocean.The present debate about Chinese assertions in the South China Sea could at a later stage lead to similar assertions in the Indian Ocean .Do you share the apprehensions that encroachment of space in Indian Ocean by China will be at the cost of India, which at the moment is the only littoral regional power? What is the best way out for India ?

A 8. I have answered most of this in my response to earlier questions. India needs to invest more on creating a blue water navy, which can protect its national interests in the IPR.

9.The US will like India to play a greater role in the region as well as in the Indian Ocean. As Robert Kaplan put it : „India cannot dominate the Indian Ocean. It will be decades before it can possibly do that. I think what India's strategists hope, is that the Indian navy, with the unspoken confluence of the United States navy, will dominate the Indian Ocean and therefore, help to

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

peacefully manage the rise of China, over the maritime sphere.‟ How far do you agree with this viewpoint ?

A 9. I agree, but this would require strong and decisive political will and a huge increase of the budget of a balanced Indian Navy, so that it can meet the challenges to our national interests in the IPR. To give an idea of the costs inolved, India would need to invest heavily in acquiring ( in addition to other items) six to 12, tactical nuclear submarines (like the INS Chakra), and such submarines cost over two billion USDs each. Hence

10. Pakistan has been critical of the role of India in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan has always said that Indian role in the region had always been detrimental to the interests of neighboring countries and it did not qualify as a major player in the region. Do you share this viewpoint?

A 10. I do not agree. Pakistan (like North Korea) is a nuclear armed proxy of India's primary rival China. In any case, India needs to think well beyond Pakistan because of our size, population and growing economy. By 2030, India will be the third largest economy in the world, and our footprint would need to go well beyond South Asia.

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FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

5. Dr.Toshi Yoshihara

John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies Professor of Strategy,Strategy and Policy Department & an affiliate member of the China Maritime Studies Institute U.S. Naval War College Email: [email protected]

(Toshi Yoshihara holds the John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies and is an affiliate member of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College. Previously, he was a visiting professor in the Strategy Department at the Air War College. Dr. Yoshihara has also served as an analyst at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, RAND, and the American Enterprise Institute. He holds a Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, an M.A. from the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, and a B.S.F.S. from the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. Dr. Yoshihara is the co-author of Red Star over the Pacific: China's Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy (Naval Institute Press, 2010), Indian Naval Strategy in the Twenty-first Century (Routledge, 2009), and Chinese Naval Strategy in the Twenty-first Century: The Turn to Mahan (Routledge, 2008). He is the co-editor of Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon (Georgetown University Press, 2012) and Asia Looks Seaward: Power and Maritime Strategy (Praeger Security International, 2008).

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1. Do you agree with the statement that today India stands poised to play a leading role in the Indian Ocean?

I agree. By many measures of national power, India is a natural leader in the Indian Ocean. India’s remarkable economic rise since the 1990s has transformed it into a heavyweight on the world stage. Wealth has in turn provided the resources for developing seapower. Indeed, India’s ongoing naval modernization has furnished New Delhi the wherewithal to wield significant influence across the region. The Indian Navy already boasts a relatively well-balanced force structure that enables its leaders to defend the nation’s vital security interests in the Indian Ocean region. Geographically, India occupies a commanding, central position in the Indian Ocean, boasting long coastlines with direct and easy access to the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. Moreover, New Delhi has long viewed itself as the preeminent power in the region. Indian strategists unabashedly proclaim their nation’s blue-water aspirations. In short, power, geography, and ambition have positioned India to play a prominent leadership role in the Indian Ocean.

2. India’s new Indian Ocean Policy is one of establishing a consensual, rules-based maritime order that all stakeholders can share. The maritime security framework India envisions for the Indian Ocean would be built on the cooperation of “all the stakeholders who have a legitimate presence in the region.” How do the other stake holders view this statement?

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

I believe that India’s international standing draws invaluable strength from this rules-based approach to the seas. The prevailing norm—a consensus upon which the open global architecture rests—treats the oceans as an international public good that is accessible to all. Consequently, countries large and small have benefited enormously from unfettered access to the maritime commons, the medium through which goods and the services flow freely between nations. New Delhi has in essence pledged to keep the Indian Ocean open to all players that accept the prevailing rules of the road. By implication, it will resist those inside and outside the region that seek to undermine the foundations of the current order. By adopting such a principle of openness, India has positioned itself as a key defender of the status quo. In theory, all countries that depend on seaborne commerce for their economic well-being should have no objections to New Delhi’s self-appointed role. The United States, which has done much to underwrite this postwar global order, certainly welcomes India’s ocean policy.

3. The big question is about the meaning and consequences of a power transition in the Indian Ocean. What are the challenges that it poses for India’s foreign and security policies?

Several great power transitions are at play in the Indian Ocean. India is clearly looking seaward. China, too, is preparing for a more sustained presence in South Asian waters. At the same time, senior U.S. policymakers and strategists have begun to depict American interests in maritime Asia in Indo-Pacific terms as the Obama administration pivots to Asia. Australia, which rightly sees itself as an Indian Ocean player, has been paying much closer attention to developments on its western maritime flank. In the meantime, European and Japanese naval forces maintain routine patrols in the Indian Ocean. In other words, maritime South Asia is witnessing the simultaneous convergence of several extra-regional powers. Not since the Soviet entry into the Indian Ocean in the 1970s has this body of water attracted so much strategic attention. How New Delhi adapts to this complex interplay of multiple geostrategic trends will be the policy challenge of the first order.

4. Do you agree with the view that after a period of mounting concern over non-state security threats following the 9-11 terrorist attacks a decade ago, international security is returning to the realm of traditional inter-state security issues? The lasting threat to the maritime domain in Asia will likely emanate from traditional, state-to-state rivalries fuelled by the growing interest of major regional powers.

Interstate competition and great power rivalries never went away. The 911 terrorist attacks and the subsequent global war on terror temporarily obscured the larger geopolitical trends that have been underway for well over a decade. Consider the types of plausible great power wars that could upend the equilibrium in the Indian Ocean region. A Sino-Indian land war over the contested 4,000-kilometer border could escalate horizontally, spilling over into Indian Ocean waters. Beijing could cross one of New Delhi’s “redlines” for conflict—say, by forward-deploying nuclear-powered attack submarines in the region. The United States could mount a distant blockade of Chinese shipping west of the Malacca Strait during a Taiwan conflict or some other East Asian contingency. Another maritime terrorist assault like the 2008 Mumbai

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

attacks or any number of similar events could trigger larger-scale combat on the subcontinent. We could then see a replay of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war during which major military engagements transpired at sea. Third-party interventions are conceivable in all of these potential conflicts, complicating the geometry of deterrence, crisis stability, and warfighting. While none of the scenarios are especially likely individually, they add up to a significant possibility of instability, crisis, or war.

5. Maritime experts in India and the West, now worry about Chinese forays into the Indian Ocean. The present debate about Chinese assertions in the South China Sea could at a later stage lead to similar assertions in the Indian Ocean. Do you share the apprehensions that encroachment of space in Indian Ocean by China will be at the cost of India, which at the moment is the only littoral regional power? What is the best way out for India?

This is not just about China’s entry into the Indian Ocean. The larger strategic phenomenon is the concurrent rise of India and China in maritime Asia. Specifically, as New Delhi and Beijing look seaward, both powers will jostle for influence and advantage across the entire Indo-Pacific maritime theater. China’s energy insecurity will beckon its attention toward the South China Sea and Indian Ocean, through which the vast majority of the nation’s oil and other seaborne goods must pass while India’s "Look East" policy and blue-water ambitions will draw it into the Western Pacific. The convergence and perhaps collision of these two powers at sea will likely unfold at critical junctures of the Indian and Pacific Oceans such as the waters around the Malacca Strait. It is not surprising, then, that the Chinese closely monitor India's military presence on the Andaman-Nicobar joint base because it sits athwart critical sea lanes just west of the Malacca Strait that are essential to China's economic well-being. Similarly, India's strategic community views with ambivalence China's growing presence in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. Mutual suspicions will continue to characterize Sino-Indian maritime relations. Indeed, conspiracy theories animate the strategic discourses in both capitals. If expectations of rivalry—and the analytical assumptions that underlie them—prevail in Beijing and New Delhi, then more assertive naval postures in the Indian Ocean could prod both sides towards escalating cycles of competition. Such an outcome would certainly bode ill for Indian Ocean security.

6. The US will like India to play a greater role in the region as well as in the Indian Ocean. As Robert Kaplan put it: ‘India cannot dominate the Indian Ocean. It will be decades before it can possibly do that. I think what India's strategists hope, is that the Indian navy, with the unspoken confluence of the United States navy, will dominate the Indian Ocean and therefore, help to peacefully manage the rise of China, over the maritime sphere.’ How far do you agree with this viewpoint? I agree with Kaplan. India and the United States recognize that the vastness and the complex strategic geography of the Indian Ocean defy strategies of domination. As noted above, both believe that keeping open the global maritime order is an objective of paramount importance. Washington and New Delhi also concur that hard naval power is the ultimate arbiter of peace and good order at sea. These common understandings provide a sound basis for a collaborative approach to maintaining stability in the Indian Ocean region. At present, the U.S. Navy, the dominant force in the region, continues to roam freely across the Indian Ocean, posing little threat while providing an array of public goods. India seems content at the

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

moment to count on American guarantees to keep the sea lanes open to all nations. But, both sides also share expectations of a more prominent Indian role. Notably, successive U.S. policy documents, including the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, have explicitly called on India to serve as a “provider of security” in the Indian Ocean. In other words, Washington will increasingly look to India to police its own region, relieving the U.S. Navy of much of the burden for Indian Ocean maritime security. Mutual accommodation will thus likely be a central feature of future Indo-American maritime relations.

7. Japan is a maritime nation depending on the Indian Ocean for its basic resources and external trade. And the maintenance of order in the JIA Japan-India-Arabian Sea Route merits consideration. What role Japan and India can play in countering the threats to maritime security and commerce in Indian Ocean region?

Japan is an Indian Ocean power of long standing. Over a decade ago, Tokyo deployed Japanese warships to the Arabian Sea in support of the U.S.-led combat operations in Afghanistan. Japan then joined the fight against Indian Ocean piracy in 2009. Since then, Japanese naval escorts and aviation units have patrolled the anarchic Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea alongside US, NATO, and European Union naval forces, as well as flotillas from individual nations such as India, Russia, and China. Bilateral maritime security relations between India and Japan have also deepened in recent years. In 2006, Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh and Shinzo Abe issued a joint statement promising a “Strategic and Global Partnership” that endorsed a range of defense cooperation activities in the maritime domain. The 2008 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation identified sea lane security as a common interest. Since 2007, Japan and India have participated in bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral naval exercises across the Indo-Pacific region. Notably, in June 2012, Japan’s maritime service engaged in the first joint naval exercise with the Indian navy in Sagami Bay. This emerging maritime partnership, in conjunction with other stakeholders, should serve as another important security provider in the Indian Ocean.

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FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

6. Dr.Timothy D. Hoyt

Professor of Strategy and Policy and John Nicholas Brown Chair of Counterterrorism Studies, US Naval War College

(Timothy D. Hoytis Professor of Strategy and Policy at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, and was recently named the John Nicholas Brown Chair of Counterterrorism Studies. Dr. Hoyt earned his undergraduate degrees from SwarthmoreCollege and his Ph.D. in International Relations and Strategic Studies fromThe Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of AdvancedInternational Studies in 1997. Before joining the Naval War College, he taught at Georgetown University's School of ForeignService.Dr. Hoyt is the author of Military Industries and Regional Defense Policy: India, Iraq and Israel, and over 40 articles and chapters oninternational security and military affairs. Recent publications include chapters and articles on the war onterrorism in South Asia, the limits of military force in the global war onterrorism, the impact of culture on military doctrine and strategy, militaryinnovation and warfare in the developing world, U.S.–Pakistan relations, the impact of nuclearweapons on recent crises in South Asia, and the strategic effectiveness of terrorism. Dr. Hoyt served previously as Co-Chairman of the Indian Ocean Regional Studies Group at the Naval WarCollege. He is currently working on a multi-volume study of thestrategy of the Irish Republican Army from 1913-2005, a series of projectsexamining U.S. relations with India and Pakistan, and analyses of irregularwarfare and terrorism in South Asia.)

NOTE: The views expressed below are my own, and do not represent the policy of the US Navy, Department of Defense, or any other institution of the US Government.

Response to FPRC Journal 14 Questionnaire

Q 1. Do you agree with the statement that today India stands poised to play a leading role in the Indian Ocean? 1. Yes, I would agree that India is poised to play a leading role in the Indian Ocean. There are three primary reasons for this: first, India’s geographic location in the center of the region; second, the emergence of India as a leading economic power and its increased role in regional and global trade; and third, India’s excellent and very professional naval services.

Q 2. India‟s new Indian Ocean Policy is one of establishing a consensual, rules-based maritime order that all stakeholders can share. The maritime security framework India envisions for the Indian Ocean would be built on the cooperation of “all the stakeholders who have a legitimate presence in the region”. How the other stake holders view this statement?

2. There is a range of responses to India’s policy. Some of India’s nearer neighbors, particularly Pakistan, have a complex history with the modern Indian state. Pakistan is almost certainly suspicious of any maritime order designed by India and led by India, and is also increasingly suspicious of the United States. It will therefore view India’s proposals as a veiled effort to create maritime dominance for India, and is unlikely to cooperate except for specific tasks. Some of India’s other neighbors may have concerns about an Indian-led regime, and will be slow to respond to Indian initiatives. The further a state is located from India, the less likely it will be to have concerns about Indian security intentions, and as a result those states will be more amenable to diplomatic approaches and to a region-wide maritime order.

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

Q 3. The big question is about the meaning and consequences of a power transition in the Indian Ocean. What are the challenges that it poses for India‟s foreign and security policies?

3. This question is very broad. What power transition does it refer to? It is almost certain that US forces “on the ground” will decrease in the region, but major US policy documents declare a long-term US commitment in at least parts of the Indian Ocean. US analysts have begun discussing broader approaches to conceptualizing the region, which is currently divided into three separate Combatant Commands (four, if one counts the Israeli port of Eilat as part of the Indian Ocean periphery) by the Department of Defense. This might suggest a prolonged US maritime presence in the region. The growth of Indian economic power has already begun to affect the region, and India’s demand for energy from the Gulf continues to expand. Converting these trends into a much greater role in the region will be a complicated task. First, of course, Indo-Pakistani tensions will continue to impact India’s relations with the Islamic world, and particularly with the Gulf and Middle East. Second, the possibility of conflict between India and China – which relies on the Indian Ocean as the delivery route for its massive energy demands – will make states across the region very sensitive to anything that looks like “tilting” or choosing sides. Third, the role of the US in the region, and the continuing evolution of US-Indian ties, will create suspicion in parts of the region and within India itself – if the US supports an idea, that support will be viewed by some Indians as an indicator that the idea must not be in India’s interests (I suspect this is a generational phenomenon, and that reflexive suspicion will diminish as the Cold War becomes ever more distant). Fourth, the region remains relatively unconnected economically (outside of energy flows). If India can encourage and facilitate intraregional trade, that would be an asset in helping to create a region-wide maritime order.

Q 4. Do you agree with the view that after a period of mounting concern over non-state security threats following the 9-11 terrorist attacks a decade ago, international security is returning to the realm of traditional inter-state security issues.? The lasting threat to the maritime domain in Asia will likely emanate from traditional, state-to-state rivalries fuelled by the growing interest of major regional powers.

4. Non-state actors will remain a major concern for India and others – 9/11, the attack on India’s parliament on 13 December 2001, and Mumbai all demonstrate that non-state actors can launch attacks that have significant strategic consequences. That said, non-state actors have not been a critical factor in the maritime environment. Even the piracy problem, which receives a great deal of press attention, does not seriously threaten maritime commerce. Maritime threats, because of the complexity of the maritime environment and the high costs of ships and associated military capability, remain the realm of the state. Emerging naval capabilities in various states is not a sufficient indicator of war, however. It is only when the combination of capability and intent coincide – a state that wishes to redress outstanding political issues, or to assert regional dominance, or to carve out a greater position in influencing the international system through force – that the maritime domain and international security are truly endangered.

Q 5. Is Regional Initiatives the answer to challenges in Indian Ocean? And the big question is whether India can provide the leadership to transform the IOR-ARC into an effective forum?

5. It is probably premature to expect regional initiatives to “answer the challenges in the Indian Ocean.” The region as a whole is profoundly under-institutionalized, and those institutions which do exist have

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

traditionally been reluctant to engage issues of security. Building institutional strength and confidence takes time. India’s leadership – as noted above – might be problematic for many states. Given the often-glacial pace of Indian decisionmaking, India also may lack the institutional capacity and political consensus to take a leadership position in the near term. What, exactly, would India be leading? To what end? Expecting a rapid transition to broad regional order may be optimistic.

Q 6. How effective have been the steps,so far,to combat security challenges -like piracy ,terrorism cyber security - from Non-State actors in the Indian Ocean? What more can be done in this respect?

6. Counter-piracy efforts have been adequate – as evidenced by the fact that maritime firms are not clamouring for greater action. Counter-piracy operations could be made much more productive with greater coordination and cooperation, but many participants (including India) are reluctant to formally commit to those efforts, and political tensions and suspicions between some of the states engaged are a barrier. Cooperation on counter-terrorism suffers similar problems – the definition of terrorism remains quite vague and politicized, and cooperation on particular threats does not guarantee common views of the broader threat. Discussing all threats in the region in the context of Al Qaeda – a view many Americans take – distorts the regional and global threat they may actually pose. Reluctance to confront state-sponsored terrorism remains a major problem throughout the region.

Q 7. Maritime experts in India and the West, now worry about Chinese forays into the Indian Ocean.The present debate about Chinese assertions in the South China Sea could at a later stage lead to similar assertions in the Indian Ocean .Do you share the apprehensions that encroachment of space in Indian Ocean by China will be at the cost of India, which at the moment is the only littoral regional power? What is the best way out for India ?

7. China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea are not matched by similar claims in the Indian Ocean region. The comparison, therefore, is somewhat inapt. China’s emergence in the Indian Ocean is inevitable – the bulk of China’s energy requirements sail across the Indian Ocean, and great powers generally want to have a presence to ensure vital interests. It is not clear that this will be “at the cost of India” – since the seas are, in fact, a commons. It is possible that China will enlarge its current infrastructure in the region, creating naval bases where it currently has port access or small trading facilities, but acquiring bases tends to come at the cost of making long-term political and security commitments – something China has been reluctant to do. Increased Chinese presence in the region is certain – but whether it “encroaches” on space is much more difficult predict. The “string of pearls” debate has obscured the most important issue surrounding Chinese territorial presence in the Indian Ocean – the fact that other states must permit that presence, and have a choice in how much of a military presence they are willing to allow and support.

Q 8.The US will like India to play a greater role in the region as well as in the Indian Ocean. As Robert Kaplan put it : „India cannot dominate the Indian Ocean. It will be decades before it can possibly do that. I think what India's strategists hope, is that the Indian navy, with the unspoken confluence of the United

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

States navy, will dominate the Indian Ocean and therefore, help to peacefully manage the rise of China, over the maritime sphere.‟ How far do you agree with this viewpoint ? 8. I think the use of the word “dominate” is inappropriate. States “dominate” oceans in war time by asserting sea control through maritime operations and, perhaps, eventually gaining command of the sea by destroying or containing enemy naval assets. In peace time, “domination” is threatening – and what most states really seek is stability. The US does not seek to dominate the Indian Ocean – which is literally on the other side of the globe. It seeks to ensure the passage of commerce in the maritime commons. India seeks the same thing, and is developing greater capability to participate in that task. Both states view China with some concern, but India is very sensitive to accusations that it is trying to “manage” (or contain) China’s rise.

Q 9. Pakistan has been critical of the role of India in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan has always said that Indian role in the region had always been detrimental to the interests of neighboring countries and it did not qualify as a major player in the region. Do you share this viewpoint?

9. I do not agree with Pakistan’s position. Pakistan has, however, suffered a naval blockade in wartime (1971), so its concern about Indian naval roles and missions is understandable. This is, in part, a function of the perspective of Pakistani elites, who believe Pakistan is permanently engaged in an existential conflict with India, and therefore cannot easily distinguish between the wartime and peacetime role of navies. Also, Pakistan is less connected to and competitive in the global economy, and may perceive Indian efforts as a zero-sum game aimed at marginalizing Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan has a great deal to gain from stable maritime commerce and greater participation in global, regional, and cross-border trade – so India’s modest proposals on maritime cooperation could be seen as more beneficial than threatening. Comments like Robert Kaplan’s will have the unfortunate impact of confirming Pakistan’s worst suspicions.

Q 10.Japan is a maritime nation depending on the Indian Ocean for its basic resources and external trade. And the maintenance of order in the JIA Japan-India-Arabian Sea Route merits consideration. What role Japan and India can play in countering the threats to maritime security and commerce in Indian Ocean region?

10. This is a difficult question to answer, and an area of enormous potential impact. Japan is dependent on Indian Ocean trade routes. Japan’s constitution and domestic politics constrain (but do not absolutely prevent) Japanese military involvement in areas far beyond its immediate borders. Both Japan and other regional states have very negative memories of Japan’s expansion in the twentieth century. For these reasons, I do not anticipate a major role for Japan in Indian Ocean security. In addition, Japan is faced at the moment with more immediate concerns in the South China Sea, which will further constrain its capabilities and desire to take a role in another region. There is room for cooperation between India and Japan, but anticipating a significant Japanese presence is premature if not unrealistic.

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FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

7. Dr. David Brewster

BEc (Sydney), LLB Hons (Sydney), LLM (Columbia), PhD (ANU) Visiting Fellow, Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, School of International, Political & Strategic Studies, Australian National University

Email: [email protected] David Brewster is a former corporate lawyer, specialising in complex cross border acquisitions and financing. He has practised in Sydney, Washington D.C., New York, London and Paris. He joined the SDSC in 2007 and completed a doctorate in Indian strategic affairs in 2010. Research interests David Brewster's research interests focus on Indian strategic affairs and especially on India's strategic relationships throughout the Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean regions.

Key publications

India’s Ocean: The story of India’s bid for regional leadership (forthcoming). India as an Asia Pacific Power (London: Routledge, 2012). “India and Australia in Indo-Pacific Security,” in Dennis Rumley (ed.), The Indian Ocean Region: Security, Stability and Sustainability in the 21st Century - Report of the Australia India Institute Task Force on Indian Ocean Security (Melbourne: Australia India Institute, 2013). “Operation Lal Dora: India’s aborted military intervention in Mauritius,” Asian Security, Vol.9, No.1 (2013), pp.1-12 (co- authored with Commodore Ranjit Rai). "Indian strategic thinking about East Asia," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 36, No. 6 (2011), pp.825-852. "The relationship between India and Indonesia," Asian Survey Vol. 51, No. 2 (March/April 2011), pp.221-244. "Flowers Are Blooming: the story of the India Navy's secret operation in the Seychelles," The Naval Review, Vol.99, No.1 (2011), pp.58-62. (co-authored with Commodore Ranjit Rai). "An Indian sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean?" Security Challenges, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Spring 2010), pp. 1-20. "Australia and India: the Indian Ocean and the limits of strategic convergence," Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.64, No.5 (2010) pp.549-565. "The India – Japan Security Declaration: an enduring security partnership?"Asian Security, Vol.6, No. 2 (2010), pp.95-120. "Developments in India's strategic relations with South Korea: a useful friend in East Asia?" Asian Survey, Vol. 50, No.2 (2010), pp.407-425. "The Australia – India Security Declaration: the Quadrilateral redux?" Security Challenges, Vol.6, No.1 (Autumn 2010), pp.1-9. "India's Security Partnership with Singapore," Pacific Review, Vol. 22, Issue 5 (December 2009), pp. 597 – 618. "The strategic relationship between India and Vietnam: The search for a diamond on the South China Sea?" Asian Security, Vol. 5, No. 1 (January 2009), pp. 24 - 44.

Response to QUESTIONNAIRE

1.Do you agree with the statement that today India stands poised to play a leading role in the Indian Ocean? A: I am not sure whether “poised” is the right word, but certainly India is now much closer to realising its ambitions to play a leading strategic role in the Indian Ocean than was the case previously. Although India‟s capabilities to project military power throughout the region are growing, India will need to overcome quite a few obstacles before it can play a leading role. These include:

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

Demonstrating a capability and willingness to act as a public provider of maritime security through projecting power throughout the region where appropriate. Cooperating with key extra-regional states such as the United States and China to provide security. Demonstrating leadership with the important middle powers of the region, which include South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. Overcoming ideological constraints that restrict India‟s ability to engage in security cooperation (including joint operations) with other states.

2. India‟s new Indian Ocean Policy is one of establishing a consensual, rules-based maritime order that all stakeholders can share. The maritime security framework India envisions for the Indian Ocean would be built on the cooperation of “all the stakeholders who have a legitimate presence in the region”. How the other stake holders view this statement?

A: Many other stakeholders would agree with India‟s stated policy of establishing a consensual, rules-based maritime order. However, there is little understanding of what this means in practice and the how consensus could be achieved in such a huge and diverse region. Some would argue that India could demonstrate leadership in cooperating with other major powers such as the United States and even China to provide maritime security in the Indian Ocean.

3. The big question is about the meaning and consequences of a power transition in the Indian Ocean. What are the challenges that it poses for India‟s foreign and security policies?

A: The first point is that any power transition in the Indian Ocean is unlikely to occur soon – the United States is likely to remain the predominant power in the region for many years to come. However, India does have the opportunity to take a growing security role in the region in cooperation with the United States. Whether and how it might exploit that opportunity is another question in light of India‟s internal and external constraints. India may need to move beyond many of its traditional strategic preconceptions if it is to maximise its influence in the region.

4. Do you agree with the view that after a period of mounting concern over non-state security threats following the 9-11 terrorist attacks a decade ago, international security is returning to the realm of traditional inter-state security issues.? The lasting threat to the maritime domain in Asia will likely emanate from traditional, state-to-state rivalries fuelled by the growing interest of major regional powers.

A: Non-state security threats are likely to remain a significant issue in the Indian Ocean region for many years to come. The killing of Osama Bin Laden and the reduction in the effectiveness of organisations such as Al Qaeda are contributing to a reduced focus on Islamic extremism in the Indian Ocean region. However other extremist groupings could well take its place. The

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

threat from other non-state actors such as Somali-based pirates has also grown. While the region may witness growing rivalry between India and China, it seems most likely that New Delhi and Beijing will work to keep any rivalry within acceptable limits.

5. Is Regional Initiatives the answer to challenges in Indian Ocean? And the big question is whether India can provide the leadership to transform the IOR-ARC into an effective forum?

A: There are hopes that the IOR-ARC can be made effective and there are some initial signs that the grouping can be brought out of its moribund state. While the IOR-ARC could become a useful talk shop, there continues to be considerable scepticism that it can be developed into an effective regional grouping that is capable of achieving material economic or political objectives.

6. How effective have been the steps,so far,to combat security challenges -like piracy ,terrorism cyber security - from Non-State actors in the Indian Ocean? What more can be done in this respect?

A: There have been some important gains in recent times against Somali-based piracy. However, piracy is likely to be a significant problem in the region for many years to come and an effective and cost efficient long-term solution is still a long way off. Piracy ultimately needs to be addressed on land, and few states will be willing to undertake the job of nation-building in Somalia. Terrorism is also likely to be a continuing issue and instability in Pakistan, Afghanisan and other states could lead to increased threats in this respect.

7. Maritime experts in India and the West, now worry about Chinese forays into the Indian Ocean.The present debate about Chinese assertions in the South China Sea could at a later stage lead to similar assertions in the Indian Ocean .Do you share the apprehensions that encroachment of space in Indian Ocean by China will be at the cost of India, which at the moment is the only littoral regional power? What is the best way out for India ?

A: China does not make any territorial claims in the Indian Ocean as it has in the South China Sea and, as a result, there is no reason to believe that it will make similar assertions there. However, China has considerable interests in the Indian Ocean, not least because it depends on the Indian Ocean for the transit of much of its energy requirements and much of its merchandise trade. China‟s influence and presence in the Indian Ocean would be expected to continue to grow as part of its rise as a major economic and military power. It would be a mistake for India to see this as a zero-sum game. India needs to come to terms with China‟s interests in the Indian Ocean and it should not be assumed, as some do, that any Chinese presence is directed at India.

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

8.The US will like India to play a greater role in the region as well as in the Indian Ocean. As Robert Kaplan put it : „India cannot dominate the Indian Ocean. It will be decades before it can possibly do that. I think what India's strategists hope, is that the Indian navy, with the unspoken confluence of the United States navy, will dominate the Indian Ocean and therefore, help to peacefully manage the rise of China, over the maritime sphere.‟ How far do you agree with this viewpoint ?

A: India‟s ambitions to become the leading power in the Indian Ocean will take decades to achieve if they can be achieved at all. Many, particularly in the Indian Navy, understand that long-term and close cooperation with the United States will be an essential part of extending India‟s regional influence. However, security cooperation with the United States remains a significant political problem in New Delhi, particularly for those who are transfixed with ideas of nonalignment and strategic autonomy. As a result, the expansion of Indian influence in the region may occur in a slower and more ad hoc manner than would otherwise be the case.

9. Pakistan has been critical of the role of India in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan has always said that Indian role in the region had always been detrimental to the interests of neighboring countries and it did not qualify as a major player in the region. Do you share this viewpoint?

A: Pakistan has always been highly sensitive to India‟s claims to have a special security role in South Asia. India‟s rise as an economic and military power is now allowing it to transcend many of the limitations arising from its dispute with Pakistan in South Asia and in the broader region. Pakistan is no longer a major factor in much of the Indian Ocean region, except in the northwest, where Pakistan‟s security relationships are likely to continue to limit India‟s regional role.

10.Of the littoral countries, Australia views India as a potential regional partner.Can India- Australia co-operation usher in an era of maritime security and prosperity in the Indian Ocean Region?

A: Over the last few years Australia has come to regard India as a potentially important regional partner that could complement Australia‟s security relationship with the United States and other allies throughout the Indo-Pacific. Recently India has also begun recognising Australia as a potential partner. However, there are considerable differences in strategic cultures and history which may mean that it will take time for the strategic relationship to mature. There are many potential opportunities for strategic cooperation, including in maritime security, but Australia and India are only beginning to explore them.

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FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

8. Dr Peter Lehr Lecturer in Terrorism Studies CSTPV, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, Scotland/UK Visiting Lecturer at the South Asia Institute, University of Heidelberg, Germany

(Dr Peter Lehr is lecturer in terrorism studies at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV), University of St. Andrews, Scotland/UK. Being a regional specialist on the Indo-Pacific, he has published on political Islam in South/Southeast Asia and on Indian Ocean maritime security issues, including Somali piracy. He is the editor of Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism (New York: Routledge 2007), and the co-editor (together with Rupert Herbert-Burns and Sam Bateman) of Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security (Boca Raton: Taylor & Francis 2009). Currently, he is working on a book manuscript on piracy from ancient to modern times, to be published by Yale University Press in Autumn 2013. He earned his PhD (Dr. rer. pol.) from the University of Heidelberg, Germany.)

Response to Questionnaire for FPRC Journal 14

1. Do you agree with the statement that today India stands poised to play a leading role in the Indian Ocean?

India, jutting out like a dagger into the Indian Ocean as KR Singh once said, has always been a maritime nation – how could it not be, having a coast line of more than 7000 kilometres and depending on foreign trade, more than ninety percent of which comes by sea? Hence, one could say that it is about time that India starts playing a leading role in an ocean that carries its name, after all (if we disregard the historical origin of that name for a moment). The Indian Navy is growing, and expects to have “over 150 ships and close to 500 aircraft and helicopters” at the end of the third decade of this century. A convincing naval doctrine with Mahanian undertones plus an Indian Ocean Policy that aims at establishing a consensual system of maritime governance further support the impression that Indian Ocean matters are taken seriously now, and thatNew Delhi’s traditional sea blindness has been finally shrugged off.

However, one needs to add a caveat: although India has an impressive 7,000 kilometres of coast line, it also has an even more impressive 14,500 kilometres of land borders – and this is where the real security problems with neighbours lurk ever since independence. Hence, it is not surprising in the least that the Indian Ocean remained a side-show for about five decades, and that similar expectations in the 1980s that India would be a major sea power before the end of the 20th century turned out to be short-lived. At the moment, all economic indicators are favourable for a sustained naval growth. However, as the case of the Soviet/Russian navy shows, it can be prohibitively expensive for nations with extensive and contested land borders to afford to be both a land and a sea power if the socio-economic environment ceases to be favourable. Although at the moment this is not in the cards, there might be a future scenario where a blue water navy could be seen as a luxury again.

2. The maritime framework India envisions for the Indian Ocean would be built on the cooperation of ‘all the stakeholders who have a legitimate presence in the region.’ How do other stakeholders view this statement?

I cannot possibly speak for those other stakeholders, but I would argue that this begs the question of how India defines the criterion of ‘legitimate presence.’ For example, is the presence of PLAN warships currently engaged in counter-piracy operations a ‘legitimate’ one in India’s eyes? What about, for that matter, various western task

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

forces? In itself however, the new Indian Ocean Policy seems to be an inclusive, not an exclusive, vehicle for the furtherance of maritime governance, and that is a very positive thing in the sense that it could forestall a naval arms race between India and various extra-regional powers. Also, in the light of the caveat above, it makes managing the maritime environment more affordable for India as well.

3. The big question is about the meaning and consequences of a power transition in the Indian Ocean. What are the challenges that it poses for India’s foreign and security policies?

Until the end of the Cold War, the Indian Ocean was dominated by the fleets of the two superpowers, with everybody else’s navies being relegated to the side lines. The 1990s saw a power vacuum in the Indian Ocean that India as the regional great power was not (yet) prepared to fill on its own. Nowadays, at least two extra- regional great powers have re-discovered the Indian Ocean as one of the most important strategic arenas of the 21st century: the USA,for which it now forms part of a strategic region named ‘Indo-Pacific’; and PR China,because of its energy security. It is an undeniable fact that some of the world’s most important sea lines of communication (SLOCs) run through the Indian Ocean – from Beijing’s and Tokyo’s perspective for example, the sea routes from the Persian Gulf/Strait of Hormuz/Gulf of Oman complex via the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal to the Straits of Malacca and further to the South China/East China Seas. The US Navy plus Western navies in general however are shrinking, at the same time that the Chinese and Indian navies are growing. As mentioned above, the Indian Navy expects to acquire full blue water status at the end of the third decade, while the PLAN expects the same at some time during the 2030s.Also, the PLAN aims at establishing a permanent presence in the Indian Ocean – for the first time since Cheng He’s epic voyages in the early 15th century.

With regard to the maritime/naval sphere, this means that both nations seem to be embroiled in an accelerating arms race – especially (but not only) a naval one. For both China and India, this is not only about national prestige: both nations are nuclear powers now, which probably equals a blue-water-navy status at the end of the 19th century. Rather, both nations pursue some realpolitik objectives that amongst others all but force them to build up high-sea fleets: ensuring and safeguarding the free and uninterrupted flow of energy (both China and India have invested billions of US dollar in Iranian oil and gas fields, for example)is a sine qua non for their uninterrupted economic growth – which translates into the imperative of protecting their sea lines of communication (SLOCs). In the case of China, those are far more extended and vulnerable than India’s – hence their ‘String of Pearls’ strategy to protect their extended SLOCs.In order to avoid the famous ‘security dilemma’ and a zero-sum game, India’s main challenge will be to ‘entangle’ China in a network of consensual, rule-based, multilateral initiatives aiming at maritime governance – exactly what the Indian Ocean Policy envisions.

4. Do you agree with the view that after a period of mounting concern over non-state security threats following the 9/11 attacks a decade ago, international security is returning to the realm of traditional inter- state security issues?

Yes, very much so. Even the fight against Somali pirates in the Somali Basin seems to be a diversion only – although the anti-piracy operations are well used by certain extra-regional navies to show the flag, to learn the art of replenishing at sea, or to generally get a grip on the conditions in the Arabian Sea. The issue of state-to- state rivalries I already covered in the previous question. However, I would like to add the (probably highly provocative) argument that while for the largely ‘post-modern’ Western nations, a regular, conventional war seems somehow to be politically incorrect and a thing of the past, this may not necessarily be the case for ‘modern states’ – such as India and China… Which again makes it imperative to steer clear from zero-sum games – be the naval or other.

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

5. Are regional initiatives the answer to challenges in the Indian Ocean? And the big question is whether India can provide the leadership to transform the IOR-ARC into an effective forum?

Well, regionalization seems to have been en vogue basically everywhere – except in the Indian Ocean, where several failed attempts litter the seascape like ‘sandbanks of lost hope.’ There are many explanations for that, but in my opinion, the most powerful of them is that until very recently, none of the great powers in the Indian Ocean had an interest in taking the lead: India was busy with its land borders, Australia was (and still is) far more interested in Pacific affairs since the Pacific coast is where the bulk of Australians live, and South Africa was (and still is) much more interested in Southern Africa or in the South Atlantic. Furthermore, those three powers were not exactly singing from the same proverbial hymn sheet when IOR-ARC was inaugurated with much fanfare. Whether it can be rejuvenated after having been left in limbo for so many years really is the big question: does India have the political will to do so? Please keep in mind that rejuvenating such a forum goes far beyond sending the usual suspects or envoys to meet and greet each other at nice destinations: who will fund this endeavour, for example?

6. How effective have been the steps, so far, to combat security challenges from non-state actors in the Indian Ocean? What more can be done in this respect?

With regard to piracy and terrorism as far as it concerns the sea, the steps taken to combat those maritime irregular activities (MIA) have been fairly successful. The Somali pirate action groups’ are much less successful than they have been throughout 2008 and 2009, for example. However, in my opinion this is largely due to extra-regional efforts – just take a look at EU Operation Atalanta or NATO Operation Ocean Shield. Regional initiatives are much talked about, but when it comes to action, there is less than meets the eye. Whether the Djibouti Code of Conduct can be translated from a paper initiative to a ‘real life’, working one such as Malsindo in the Straits of Malacca remains to be seen. Again, the crucial question here is who is willing to fund it? If India really is poised to play a leading role in the Indian Ocean, well, why not get more active on the MIA front for starters?

7. Maritime experts now worry about Chinese forays into the Indian Ocean.. Do you share the apprehensions…?

Well, as I indicated in question 3, it could boil down to a zero sum game – both in the Indian Ocean, and in the South China Sea where both the Indian Navy and PLAN seem to indulge in playing tit-for-tat. Apart from that, please see my answer to question 3.

8. The US will like India to play a greater role in the region as well as in the Indian Ocean … to help peacefully manage the rise of China

By and large, I do agree with that statement. Whether the USN likes it or not, it will continue to shrink over the next decades due to financial constraints, while the Indian Navy will continue to grow– but not fast enough to ‘go it alone’ any time soon. Hence, both powers depend on each other to defend their interests in a kind of a tacit alliance, or ‘unspoken confluence.’ However, experience shows that Washington’s regional interests can be rather fickle, especially in a time of economic crisis, and assuming that New Delhi’s and Washington’s interests are exactly the same would be a bit too hasty as well. Hence, it may well emerge that at the beginning of the third decade of the 21stcentury, three major powers will keep an uneasy balance in the Indian Ocean: a Western alliance focused on the Persian Gulf mainly, China, and India – with Russia possibly playing a role as the ‘wild card.’

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

9. Pakistan has been critical of the role of India in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan has always said that the Indian role in the Indian Ocean had always been detrimental to the interests of neighbouring states and that it did not qualify as a major player in the region. Do you share this viewpoint?

That India’s rise to (naval) power is seen very critically in Islamabad is no surprise given the Indo-Pakistani conflict history. Whether India’s activities in the Indian Ocean have always been detrimental to the interests of its neighbours other than Pakistan is debatable – I don’t think so. Also, I cannot see why India should not qualify as a major player in the region – rather, I think this is inescapable for India given its sheer size as compared to its neighbours. In the end, getting Pakistan aboard of a system of maritime governance would be important for many a reason – and not exactly ‘mission impossible’ either: there are already some forms of maritime cooperation in place between India and Pakistan, which could be extended.

10. What role can Japan and India play in countering the threats to maritime security in the Indian Ocean region?

First of all, what looks like a Japan-India-Arabian Sea Route to Tokyo looks like a China-India-Arabian Sea Route to Beijing. Which means, China has an interest in the security of these sea lanes as well, for exactly the same reasons as Japan. Having said that, the Japanese navy (or Maritime Self-Defense Force, JMSDF) as still the second-most powerful navy in the Pacific would be a very powerful ally for the Indian Navy, given New Delhi’s and Tokyo’s similar foreign and security policy interests with regard to China. How far the JMSDF is prepared to remain engaged in the Indian Ocean now that the threat posed by Somali piracy seems to be in decline remains to be seen.

11. Can Indo-Australian co-operation usher in an era of maritime security and prosperity in the Indian Ocean?

Very much so – if the residual distrust between the two nations, as expressed in military and political terms, can finally be overcome, that is… Also, it depends on the political will in Canberra: as I stated above, the bulk of the Australian population is situated along the shores of the Pacific, which is why they are far more interested in Pacific affairs than in the Indian Ocean. But there’s always hope…

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FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

9. Leighton G. Luke

Manager of the Indian Ocean Research Programme at Future Directions International, Perth, Western Australia

(Leighton G. Luke (BA, MA,MPhil) is Manager of the Indian Ocean Research Programme at Future Directions International, a research institute based in Perth, Western Australia. He has a Master of Philosophy (Defence and Strategic Studies) from Massey University and a Master of Arts (Translation and Linguistics) from the University of Western Sydney. He has a Bachelor of Arts (Language Studies) and was awarded a place on the Faculty Honour Roll at Edith Cowan University. He is a member of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs and the Golden Key International Honour Society. Mr Luke also has a diploma in French language studies (the Diplôme d'Études en Langue Française, issued by the French Government) and has studied Spanish and Portuguese. His particular research interests in the Indian Ocean Region are eastern and southern Africa and the Indian Ocean islands.)

RESPONSE to QUESTIONNAIRE: FPRC Journal-14-Indian Ocean: A New Vision

1. Do you agree with the statement that today India stands poised to play a leading role in the Indian Ocean?

Yes, certainly. By dint of its geographical location astride major sea lines of communication; its position as the leading power of South Asia; its close relations with other Indian Ocean states, such as Australia, South Africa, Mauritius, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates; as an emerging world economy (one of the so-called BRICS countries); as one of the key drivers of regional organisations, including the Indian Ocean Rim AssociationforRegionalCo-operation (IOR-ARC), of which it is currently Chair; India is indeed poised to play a leading role in the Indian Ocean region. It does indeed appear that here is a growing interest within policy circles, analysts and the commentariat more generally for India to play a greater role in the region and that is very positive.

2. India’s new Indian Ocean Policy is one of establishing a consensual, rules-based maritime order that all stakeholders can share. The maritime security framework India envisions for the Indian Ocean would be built on the co-operation of “all the stakeholders who have a legitimate presence in the region”. How the other stake holders view this statement?

I suggest that, overall, it should – and would – be viewed positively. One possible source of difficulty could result from the qualification “legitimate presence”. Clearly, extra-regional countries such as China, Japan, Taiwan or South Korea all have an abiding interest in the Indian Ocean region as it is a key source of their energy imports. Given the importance, however, of the Indian Ocean region to global trade and energy flows, the list of stakeholders does not stop there, but a rules-based maritime security framework that underpins the security of the Indian Ocean’s vital sea lines of communication thus meshes very neatly with such interests.Perhaps the most obvious example of a legitimate extra-regional stakeholder is the United States. In addition to sourcing much of its energy requirements from the region, the fact remains thatit is the US that has underwritten the security of the global commons upon which the prosperity of countries such as the so-called “Asian Tigers” and, now, China, is predicated. As an aside, it is perhaps worth considering which other countries, if any, would be willing to shoulder the not inconsiderable burden of providing such security, as the US has done. While I would

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not wish to put Washington’s commitment to the global commons down to altruism, I do suggest few others would have an appetite for it on the scale required.

In any event, the biggest difficulty perhaps arises in terms of defining what constitutes a “legitimate presence”. Such constructions, when defined and imposed unilaterally have the potential to be exclusionary. That is to say, others may view or, at least, perceive, them to be exclusionary and, thus, inimical to their own interests.This highlights the need for an inclusive approach that involves – as India’s policy says – the co-operation of all the region’s stakeholders. That will require openness and willingness from all parties involved – even those that may have longstanding disagreements – to work together to achieve a workable security framework for the benefit of all.

3. The big question is about the meaning and consequences of a power transition in the Indian Ocean. What are the challenges that it poses for India’s foreign and security policies?

In short, the greatest challenge for India’s foreign and security policies will be accepting a greater Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean region. There is nothing inherently problematic about that presence, but one complication could be how to manage the implications of any deepening in the relationship between Beijing and Islamabad, not to mention China’s growing relations with littoral states such as Oman, the Seychelles, Mauritius and Sri Lanka,all of which, I should imagine, would leave policymakers in India quite concerned at having a greater Chinese presence in both the continental and maritime theatres.

Continuing the relationship with the US will no doubt be viewed as an attractive option for India and one of the best ways of countering both Pakistan and China. While it will have utility for both countries and will help to guarantee the continuingsecurity of the global commons, I still would not see the US-India relationship deepening to the level of that enjoyed by the US with Australia, Japan or South Korea, for instance. Without wishing to promote such notions as the containment of China or to revisit the proposed – and failed – US-India- Japan-Australia quadrilateral, it does make sense for like-minded democracies to work together more closely on matters of regional security.

Again, a key challenge will be fostering a truly inclusive, consensual and rules-based regional architecture, whether that be a modified version of the exisiting IOR-ARC structure or something perhaps more akin to the East Asia Summit will need to be established, but it would offer India a valuable avenue for managing its relations with China and Pakistan while giving New Delhi another opportunity to showcase its leadership credentials.

Across the Indian Ocean region, and even the more broadly defined Indo-Pacific, the activities of various non- state actors will continue to pose security risks, given the nature and locations of their activities. For example, within the maritime domain, the Indian Ocean region sees such activities as piracy off the coast of Somalia and

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in the archipelagic waters of South-East Asia, trafficking of people and weaponry, especially across the Gulf of Aden between Yemen and Somalia and the Red Sea between Yemen and Eritrea, not to mention the continuing – if not growing – occurrence of illegal and unreported fishing and transnational crime, to name just a few.

That is not to say that non-state actors will not to continue to pose a threat to states – they certainly will, and to India possibly more so thanmany others – but, in the maritime domain, I do concur that the more significant, longer-term security threats will come traditional rivalries between states. Further seaborne terrorist attacks, such as Mumbai, cannot be ruled out by any means, but overall, as a maritime strategic theatre with one superpower and two rising new powers active within it, not to mention other regional powers that are also enhancing their naval capabilities, it will be the interrelationship between those powers that shapes the nature of regional security concerns over the longer term.

5. Are Regional Initiatives the answer to challenges in Indian Ocean? And the big question is whether India can provide the leadership to transform the IOR-ARC into an effective forum?

Yes, regional initives are absolutely an answer to the challenges that are present in the Indian Ocean region. Bringing together all the states within the region and key extraregional stakeholders in one forum to address regional challenges – maritime security is an obvious one – offers the best chance of getting a consensus and a viable plan of action. I will note, however, that there is still a place for arrangements that are bilateral or which involve a small grouping of states coming together to address problems that of immediate importance in their sub-region. Given the sheer size and diversity of the Indian Ocean region and the inertia that occurs in larger, pan-regional bodies, such approaches will not only be valuable, they will also be very necessary. The various joint anti-piracy patrols and naval training initiatives between South Africa, France, Mozambique and Tanzania, which were launched in 2011 to combat the southwards expansion of Somali piracy into the Mozambique Channel, are one particularly good examplesolely involving regional states.

Ultimately, the two approaches – pan-regional and sub-regional – are complementary.

On the second point, I profess to being rather more uncertain, but I do think that India is one of a very small number of IOR-ARC members – along with Australia and Indonesia – that have the inclination and the resources to attempt to tackle that challenge (South Africa could find the resources, but I am not certain at this juncture whether it has the inclination. Also, unlike the other three countries, it is not in line for an IOR-ARC leadership role, but hopefully that will change in the future.)

Certainly, in its time as IOR-ARC Chair so far, India has attempted to inject a greater sense of energy and purpose into the organisation and that is to the credit of both India and IOR-ARC.Not to take anything away from previous Chairs – simply keeping such a large and disparate grouping of states alive can be an achievement in itself – but the rejoining of the Seychelles and the accession of the Comoros as members and the United States as a dialogue partner highlights the fact that regional actors are again viewing IOR-ARC as a worthwhile organisation, rather than the largely moribund grouping that it had become prior to 2011.

Bringing the UnitedStates on board as a dialogue partner, despite objections from Iran, was an important achievement; it corrected a serious gap and complements the presence of the other dialogue partners: China,

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

Egypt, France, Japan and the United Kingdom.The other obvious omission is, of course, Pakistan, but that is a fraught topic. Bringing in Pakistan would complete the organisation’s membership, but I am not sure how much appetite there would be for such a move, either in Islamabad or New Delhi.

Getting IOR-ARC states to work more closely on such issues as maritime security and piracy, trade and investment facilitation, fisheries management and disaster management, first given at Bangalore in 2011 and then at Gurgaon in 2012, is highly appropriate and will, if implemented successfully, enhance the organisation’s utility.

In the end, though, it is not the desire to see IOR-ARC transformed into a more effective organisation that is the issue, it is more the scale of the undertaking. As a regional organisation, IOR-ARC has underperformed for so long that rejuvenating it is no small task.

6. How effective have been the steps, so far, to combat security challenges -like piracy, terrorism cyber security - from Non-State actors in the Indian Ocean? What more can be done in this respect?

In terms of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the western Indian Ocean, the concerted efforts of many key stakeholders, including India, China, the United States, Australia and the European Union, to counter such activities are bearing fruit, as figures from the International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre confirm. For instance, as of March, there have been four attempted hijackings – all unsuccessful – in that area. Obviously, we are only part of the way into the year, but it is nonetheless a positive development and is a continuation of the trend seen over the previous two years, in which attacks, both successful and unsuccessful, dropped from 265 in 2011 to 89 in 2012. It is probably fair to say that the presence of armed guards on commercial shipping in these waters has also contributed to that reduction.

But that is, of course, only part of the equation. The process of bringing suspected pirates to trial and imprisioning those found guilty has been streamlined, in recognition of the burden that it places on regional states such as Kenya and the Seychelles, and the UK has been working very closely with the Seychellois Government on that issue of late.

The bigger issue that needs to be addressed, though, is the situation in Somalia. As long as there are instability and a lack of governance and economic opportunity on land, there will be a powerful motivation for piracy. While the risks faced by pirates have grown and its attractiveness has waned, it did offer a very successful business model and the challenge is to ensure that the gains that have been made in Somalia over the last year can be maintained and expanded. It is only an end to the anarchy that has plagued Somalia for more than twenty years that can ultimately bring an end to piracy in that area.

As regards counter-terrorism, the situation has improved; organisations such as the core al-Qaida grouping, the Lord’s Resistance Army, al-Shabaab and Lashkar-e-Taiba have all been substantially weakened. On the other hand, though, all are still in existance and the renaissance of some or all of them cannot be ruled out. The very fluid situation in countries such as Somalia, Afghanistan and Yemen (where al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula continues to enjoy a safe haven) continues to lend itself to such organisations.

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

Cyber security is a concern that is only going to grow in the years ahead and states across the region and beyond really will need to pay even greater attention to it than what they already do. If recent events are any guide, questions certainly surround China’s involvement in hacking and the like and that will need to be managed, with Beijing effectively brought into the fold, as it were. As with other regional concerns such as terrorism and transnational crime, continued and, indeed, increased co-operation and information sharing among law enforcement agencies will be paramount .

7. Maritime experts in India and the West, now worry about Chinese forays into the Indian Ocean. The present debate about Chinese assertions in the South China Sea could at a later stage lead to similar assertions in the Indian Ocean.Do you share the apprehensions that encroachment of space in Indian Ocean by China will be at the cost of India, which at the moment is the only littoral regional power? What is the best way out for India?

I would have to suggest that that is a very zero-sum game viewpoint. Having said that, I can understand the concerns – China’s conduct in the South China Sea, for instance, leaves much to be desired in terms of demonstrating a “peaceful rise” and I would not wish to see such conduct brought into the Indian Ocean.

Thus far, at least, China’s naval presence in the Indian Ocean has been benign and China liaises well with US and other navies that are undertaking anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean, even to the extent of undertaking a joint anti-piracy exercise. Also, at this stage at least, China’s presence in the Indian Ocean is very much related to maintaining the security of its vital energy flows – just as India and the US would be reluctant to entirely trust the security of their energy importsto the goodwill of others, so too, is Beijing reluctant to do so, particularly when the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party is effectively predicated on the continuinggrowth of the energy-hungry Chinese economy.

So I don’t see a Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean as necessarily being an encroachment or at the expense of India, which sits astride key shipping lanes – a point that Beijing will be only too aware of. While India will not be able to dominate the Indian Ocean for some time, if at all, it will nevertheless be one of the pre- emininent regional powers – working in closer concert with the United States, Australia, Indonesia and, yes, even China, to fashion and enforce a more inclusive maritime security framework would go a long way towards managing the presence of China in the Indian Ocean and hopefully preventing the sort of behaviour that has been seen in the South China Sea.

8. The US will like India to play a greater role in the region as well as in the Indian Ocean. As Robert Kaplan put it: ‘India cannot dominate the Indian Ocean. It will be decades before it can possibly do that. I think what India's strategists hope, is that the Indian navy, with the unspoken confluence of the United States navy, will dominate the Indian Ocean and therefore, help to peacefully manage the rise of China, over the maritime sphere.’ How far do you agree with this viewpoint?

From a perspective of “managing” China’s expansion beyond its traditional maritime domains and out into the Indian Ocean – which is completely understandandable from an energy security point-of-view, given the importance of reliable energy supplies to the Chinese economy and, hence, the Chinese Communist Party –some sort of “Neo-Nixon Doctrine”as described by Walter C. Ladwig III, in which the Indian Navy takes the lead role in maintaining maritime security in its sub-region (and with Indonesia, Australia and South Africa doing likewise in

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their respective sub-regions) is not without its attractions – for both India and the US. Washington is relieved of some the burden of underwriting regional security by (presumably) likeminded partners, New Delhi gets to solidify its position as the leading state of South Asia – the regional hegemon, if you will – and its forces benefit from their closer relations with the US Navy.

Certainly, such an arrangement sounds like a formidable array and is reminiscient of the failed attempt at an India-Japan-Australia-US quadrilateral. For the exactly those reasons, of course, China would be sure to take a dim view of any such architecture. While such arrangements would have their utility and I can only see benefits in closer co-operation between the US and Indian Navies, it is also important to avoid laying the foundations for some future zero-sum game. Much better would be working towards creating a rules-based, consensual maritime order that brings the region’s stakeholders together and it would be only reasonable to expect the Indian Navy to play a central role in that.

9. Pakistan’s decision to hand over strategic Gwadar port to China is a matter of “serious concern” for India. Do you believe it would make India’s western frontiers more vulnerable?

To those who subscribe to the so-called “String of Pearls” theory, it must certainly be raising hackles, but for now, at least,Gwadar is intended to be a commercial port, albeit one hampered by the remoteness and instability of Baluchistan, not a naval facility. On the other hand, it is those very aspects that contribute to its unattractiveness as a commercial venture and which bolster suspicions that it must have a naval aspect to it.

If, in the future, geostrategic circumstances were such that India and China found themselves on the brink of a conflict, then, yes, under those circumstances, the Chinese management of Gwadar could very well represent a vulnerabilty for India. But that would be in the future and it presumes a conflict that both New Delhi and Beijing would prefer to avoid.

10. Of the littoral countries, Australia views India as a potential regional partner. Can India-Australia cooperation usher in an era of maritime security and prosperity in the Indian Ocean Region?

Certainly extra-regional states, such as the US and China, would have the greatest ability to shape the Indian Ocean as a “zone of peace”, so to speak, but among the littoralcountries of the Indian Ocean, it is Australia and India that have the greatest ability to work together to ensure that, in the coming decades, the India Ocean Region is indeed a model of maritime security and prosperity.

Some practical avenues in which India and Australia might co-operate to achieve the goal of maritime security and prosperity include bilateral anti-piracy operations (given the reluctance of India to participate in US-led initiatives such as CTF-150 and 151), more regular strategic dialogues at all levels, the reinvigoration of IOR-ARC (although this would best be done in partnership with other regional stakeholders), and alongside such countries as South Africa, France, Indonesia, Australia and the US in an Indian Ocean version of the successful FRANZ trilateral disaster relief arrangements conducted in the Pacific by France, Australia and New Zealand. *****

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

Articles (60-174)

1. Lee Cordner AM Indo-Pacific Governance Research Centre (IPGRC),School of History & Politics The University of Adelaide,Adelaide ,SA 5005,Australia Indian Ocean maritime security cooperation : dealing with non-traditional risks(pp.60-69) 2. Francis A. Kornegay, Jr Senior Fellow on emerging powers at the Institute of Global Dialogue in South Africa & Dr. Priya Chacko Lecturer in International Politics, at the University of Adelaide TOWARD A DELHI DECLARATION? India, IBSA and the Indo-Pacific (pp.70-78) 3. Commodore R SeshadriVasan, Indian Navy(Retd) Head, Strategy and Security Studies,Centre for Asia Studies, India, Director, Asian Secretariat World Boderpol The challenges for India in creating, maintaining and utilizing a Blue water Navy in the current century (pp.79-87) 4. Dr. Christian Bouchard Full Professor, Department of Environmental Studies, Laurentian University & Dr. William W. Crumplin Associate Professor, Department of Environmental Studies, Laurentian University France as a Pertinent and Significant Indian Ocean Player (pp.88-100) 5. Abhijit Singh Senior Research Fellow , National Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Delhi India-China Maritime Cooperation – Untying a ‘Gordian’ Knot (pp.101-105) 6. Dr. Amita Agarwal Senior Fellow of the ICSSR, New Delhi Piracy and the Hazard of Marine Pollution in the Malacca Straits: The Potential Impact of Oil Spills (pp.106-114) 7. Prof. Paul Musili Wambua University Of Nairobi School of Law MARITIME SECURITY ARCHITECTURE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION (IOR): THE ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS (pp.115-133) 8. Summar Rao Editor of Weekly Pulse Indian Ocean: New Vision New Challenges (pp.134-137) 9. Sayoni Choudhuri Assistant Professor, Loreto College, Kolkata India In Indian Ocean (pp.138-147) 10. Saloni Salil, Visiting Fellow ,Indian Ocean Research Program at Future Directions International, Australia Indian Strategic Thinking Vis-À-Vis Indian Ocean -TRADE, COMMERCE AND SECURITY CHALLENGES—From the Decision Makers Perspective (pp.148-153) 11. Maria Ayub Research Scholar,Fatima Jinnah Women University ,Rawalpindi Pakistan Maritime Piracy in Indian Ocean: Case Study of Somalia (pp.154-174)

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

Indian Ocean maritime security cooperation : dealing with non-traditional risks

Lee Cordner AM

Indo-Pacific Governance Research Centre (IPGRC) School of History & Politics The University of Adelaide Adelaide SA 5005 AUSTRALIA

(Lee Cordner is a strategic analyst who has worked as a policy adviser, consultant, practitioner, researcher and educator on maritime security and international security issues for many years. His interests include maritime security and strategy, international relations, policy analysis and development, risk management, strategic planning and organizational behaviour. Current projects include Indian Ocean maritime security governance and offshore oil and gas safety and security. Lee was co-chair of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) Study Group on offshore oil and gas safety and security in the Asia-Pacific and he is a member of the Indian Ocean Research Group (IORG). Lee is currently at the Indo-Pacific Governance Research Centre, University of Adelaide, Australia. He was a Principal Research Fellow at the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security, University of Wollongong, Australia; and formerly CEO of Future Directions International Pty Ltd, an independent strategic think-tank based in Perth, Australia. He served in the Royal Australian Navy for 33 years and commanded several warships; his last Navy position was Director General Navy Strategic Policy and Futures in the rank of Commodore. Email: [email protected] or [email protected] . Mobile (Cell): +61 (0) 427 333 034.)

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The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is moving to the centre of the global geostrategic agenda. Robert Kaplan observed that ‗more than just a geographic feature, the Indian Ocean is also an idea. It combines the centrality of Islam with global energy politics and the rise of India and China to reveal a multilayered, multipolar world.‘1 Resource competition and energy security, and environmental and economic issues, exacerbated by the foreshadowed impacts of climate change; combined with the involvement of external powers, including the United States and China, and the emergence of regional powers, like India, underscore a heightened need for attention to this region. Concomitantly, Indian

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

Ocean sea lines of communication are becoming increasingly important to global and regional commerce. In the IOR, a range of largely non-traditional regional security challenges converge in the maritime domain.2 A critical question for regional and extra-regional nation-states and other actors engaged in the Indian Ocean, given the evolving maritime security strategic context, is how to move from loose maritime security coordination, as evinced in the anti-piracy work off the Horn of Africa, to effective cooperation and eventually real collaboration necessary to address collective and shared risks to common interests? Three convergent themes are considered in this strategic analysis of Indian Ocean maritime security: the emerging strategic importance of the IOR as a centre for competition and, potentially, cooperation with regional and global implications; the nexus between globalisation and sea power evident in regional dynamics; and thirdly, the concept of a regional strategic community that could be defined by how it chooses to address shared and common risks – where risks are defined as uncertainties that impact the achievement of objectives that are vital to collective futures. The IOR is particularly noteworthy as an area of contrasts, a disparate and largely disaggregated region that hosts a variety of vibrant cultures, races and religions with some of the richest and many of the poorest countries in the world. The region has been appropriately described as ‗a complex puzzle of actors, each with their own vested interests ... a fuzzy and very open geopolitical system‘, which is more based upon a loose aggregation of mainly weak sub-regional systems than a coherent Indian Ocean-wide regional system.3 Today, the IOR is notable for its lack of homogeneity and lack of a common regional identity. Although, as Sugata Bose argues, that has not always been the case and that prior to colonization by the European powers the Indian Ocean was a significantly interconnected region. He presents the idea of a pre-colonial Indian Ocean being revisited as an ‗interregional arena‘ of common identity and destiny where peoples along the IO rim shared an ‗extraterritorial identity and universalist aspiration…bound in a strong symbiotic embrace‘, and where the sea provides the common medium. He optimistically suggests that this historical identity offers hope for ‗a new cosmopolitanism in a postcolonial setting…‘ 4 As we search for a constructivists agenda for the IOR, in contrast to Bose‘s primarily liberalists point of view, C. Raja Mohan offers a realists perspective of emerging great power competition between China, India and the United States.5He asserts that ‗…the unfolding maritime orientation of China and India is historic; it marks a fundamental shift in both countries away from the traditional obsession with controlling land frontiers‘ and notes that ‗both countries chose to embark on ambitious and costly naval expansion programs‘.6 Kaplan, also principally a realist, emphasizes the significance of this in noting that ‗Naval power will be as accurate an indicator of an increasingly complex global power arrangement as anything else.‘ He suggests that the rise of the Chinese Navy is legitimate and presents opportunities for cooperation with the United States (and presumably India) over the protection of common maritime interests, like energy trade flows.7 The informed musings of Mohan, Kaplan and Bose underscore the emerging strategic importance of the Indian Ocean as each suggests a range of alternative strategic futures. One perspective they share is the centrality of maritime related issues and therefore the importance of maritime security in these alternate IOR futures. Another common theme is abiding strategic uncertainty. Where uncertainty prevails there is inevitably risk, of particular interest in the IOR context where great powers, vulnerable circumstances and vulnerable peoples coincide. Risk management entails both addressing threats and embracing opportunities. The themes of maritime security imperatives and initiatives, followed by risk management approaches, are further explored below.

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

IOR Maritime Security Imperatives Geoffrey Till reminds us that ‗globalisation is the central fact of the strategic environment of the early twenty-first century‘ 8although he highlights the unevenness of this postmodern globalised phenomena, which ‗in effect misses out so many poor, newly independent, arguably pre-modern, countries‘. He notes that ‗Post-modernists conclude that globalisation ... will continue but that the sea-based trading system on which it depends will need to be defended against a variety of threats in a novel and unfamiliar world‘ and that ‗Seapower is at the heart of the globalisation process ... The protective function of naval activity will plainly be part of any defensive response because so many of (the) threats to the system ... take a maritime form or have important maritime consequences that require a maritime response‘.9 However, the nature of maritime security and therefore maritime strategy more broadly is modified because ‗In a globalised world... (it is) less a question of ‗securing‘ the sea...for one‘s own use, more of ‗making it secure‘ for everyone but the enemies of the system to use‘.10 These general pronouncements have particular resonance in the evolving IOR context. The strategic interests of states involved in the IOR, both regional and extra-regional states, significantly converge at sea. Effective cooperative maritime security governance is essential to address common security challenges to the interests of regional and extra-regional actors. This is now widely recognized in regional strategic discourse for example a report by an Australia India Institute Task Force on Indian Ocean Security launched in Canberra in March 2013 11 calls for ‗a broader and more interdependent concept of security...in order to maximise long-term regional security‘ and recognizes that ‗concepts of human security, economic and resource security, maritime security and environmental security are interrelated and critically important to 21st century state and regional stability.‘12 The report notes ‗that a new concept of maritime regionalism can be applied to a range of non-traditional security concerns in the Indian Ocean‘ and identifies the ‗need for a new regional maritime security regime‘.13 Non-traditional security challenges in the IOR, particularly those posed by climate change that present the dire prospect of massive coastal inundation and extreme droughts resulting from sea-level and sea- temperature rise, combined with more frequent and more intense extreme weather events that will impact millions of people, should be of alarming concern. The 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded that the evidence of warming of the global climate system is unequivocal; 14 noting that an updated report is due later in 2013. Climate change, environmental degradation and resource scarcity will have profound geostrategic implications in the IOR. The effects will transcend borders and will be felt predominantly in coastal areas and the maritime domain where vast populations live and derive their livelihoods.15 Many IOR states are extremely vulnerable and have very little capacity to mitigate, adapt and respond to the challenges that will beset them. The impacts from climate change present human, food, environmental and economic security concerns that will have profound maritime security implications in the medium to longer term. Further, the major maritime trade routes of the Indian Ocean are central to both extra-regional and intraregional trade essential to global and regional economic development. As the global economic and strategic balance swings toward Asia with India, Indonesia and other IOR states emerging; and as an increasingly powerful China looks south and west, so the maritime strategic focus on the Indian Ocean magnifies. The unfettered flow of maritime trade is a shared necessity; keeping seaborne trade flowing through the international straits at the northwest and northeast corners of the Indian Ocean is of vital strategic importance.

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

Threats to law and order at sea also often have transnational dimensions, for example: crime and illegal immigration, which require collective regional or subregional responses. In addition, the IOR also contains a large proportion of the world‘s failed and failing states, 16 which impacts regional stability. Non-traditional security challenges that present existential risks in the IOR posed by international terrorism and law and order at sea problems, combined with traditional security challenges including nuclear proliferation, sub-regional conflicts and failed states present compelling circumstances to encourage consideration of non-traditional approaches in order to generate and coordinate collective action. Recent IOR Maritime Security Initiatives The need for collective action to address IOR maritime security-related concerns on a region-wide basis is increasingly being recognized in a variety of ways. For example, regional collaboration in marine scientific research under the auspices of the Indian Ocean Global Ocean Observing System (IOGOOS) is reported as a positive development.17 In this vein, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 18 significantly and irreversibly altered the international discourse by, inter alia, defining States rights at sea and importantly, defining collective responsibilities to cooperate in the protection of the marine environment. The idea of the need to protect commonly held interests from shared risks in the maritime domain as a fundamental basis for cooperation among regional and extra- regional states is relatively new, still evolving and presents opportunities. Given the significant and evolving security challenges in the IOR, particularly but not solely those posed by non-traditional security risks, a key question is what maritime security governance options and mechanisms should be considered by regional and extra-regional political decision makers? The only national government-level, notionally (but not actually) region-wide cooperative dialogue regime currently in place in the IOR is the Indian Ocean Rim – Association for Regional Cooperation (IORARC). As is often the case with regional regimes the IORARC, launched in 1997, reflects the outcomes of a series of compromises and according to McPherson, suffered in effectiveness from its inception because ‗The real problem facing Indian Ocean regional cooperation has always been the absence of any clear vision of what such cooperation could and should entail and the relatively weak commitment to the concept of regional cooperation by the member states of IORARC.‘19 The IORARC was initially under-resourced with a weak secretariat and the relationships between the three groups: government, business and academic were not clearly defined. 20 The IORARC Charter is aimed primarily at economic development; it specifically does not encompass security dialogue. There is limited regional and extra-regional membership although the Charter states that ‗All sovereign States of the Indian Ocean Rim are eligible for membership‘.21 Several Indian Ocean rim states are not currently represented for example, Pakistan, Myanmar (Burma), Sudan, Djibouti and Tanzania. Notably, these states are all represented in the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) – see below. Pakistan, in particular, seems to be an unfortunate omission from IORARC although the long-standing antipathy with India remains a considerable obstacle. Pakistan‘s involvement would be valuable to the IORARC and to regional maritime security cooperation for several reasons: it occupies a strategically important location in the northwest Indian Ocean; along with many other IOR states it is very vulnerable to climate change and other maritime security-related risks; it contains a very significant regional population comprising a mix of races and religions; and, importantly, it has a sound maritime security capability by regional standards with a strong Navy that has been a proactive contributor to regional maritime security cooperation through, for example, participation in anti-piracy patrols off Somalia, and

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

hosting the biennial Aman series of naval exercises combined with the International Maritime Conferences.22 In the past, the effectiveness of the IORARC was subject to question, particularly by India.23 In recent years the IORARC has experienced resurgence with renewed commitment, particularly from India as the Chair 2011-12, followed by Australia 2013-14 and subsequently Indonesia, with strong support from other member states reported. 24 In 2012, Comoros was admitted to membership and the United States became a Dialogue Partner. Notably, funding and other support appears to have improved. A cooperative agenda with six priority areas was identified at the IORARC Ministerial meeting in Bengaluru, India in November 2011 25 and maritime security was identified as a core area of interest. Importantly for this analysis, several IORARC priority areas have maritime security significance, either directly or indirectly including: maritime security and piracy, disaster risk reduction, trade and investment facilitation, fisheries management, and academic and science and technology cooperation. The Communiqué from the November 2012 IORARC Ministerial meeting in Gurgaon, India cited progress with ‗cooperation in maritime security issues in the Indian Ocean and reaffirm the importance of maintaining freedom of navigation and safety and security of Sea Lanes of Communication in the Indian Ocean‘ primarily with the ‗fight against piracy‘ and directed ‗the IORARC seminar on maritime security scheduled for 2013 to consider concrete proposals of cooperation in this broad area‘. Developing legislative frameworks and sharing best practices in coastal security and regulation of fishing activities in coastal waters and ‗the importance of better preparedness to fight natural and other disasters in our maritime domain‘ and ‗cooperation in search and rescue and training in oil spill response‘ were also identified as relevant areas for the IORARC along with ‗regional disaster management strategies and operational processes‘.26 While it is too soon to make considered judgments on the effectiveness of the renewed IORARC vigour and the focus upon maritime security-related agendas, the signs are promising. Whether or not activity can be sustained including the allocation of sufficient resources to enable issues to be properly researched and developed, followed by commitment to cooperative action on agreed policies and mechanisms, remains to be seen. The other evolving maritime security regional cooperative entity is the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). IONS has a wider membership than IORARC and deals with maritime security, strategy, operational and technical matters at the Navy to Navy level. 27 IONS has only been in existence since 2008 and is at a nascent stage of development. 28 Similar to the IORARC, the signs are promising with strong support from numerous IOR states (and their Navies). There are prospects of IONS emerging as an important regional entity focussed upon enhancing naval cooperation. In addition to information exchanges and dialogue there may be prospects for regional maritime security exercises and training in the future. A key issue for consideration is the possibility of linkages between IORARC, a government and policy strategic dialogue forum on maritime security-related issues, and IONS an operational level entity. The benefits of such linkages are manifest for both regional maritime security policy development and operational level cooperation and development. Both IORARC and IONS, and the development of the regional maritime security cooperative agenda overall, would benefit from a viable and well supported Track 2/Track 1.5 body that brings together former senior officials and academics to research and discuss complex and often sensitive security issues in an unofficial forum. Recommendations could then be provided to the appropriate Track 1 forum:

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

either IORARC or IONS, and to individual national governments and officials. The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) 29 provides such a forum for the Asia-Pacific, and several Indian Ocean states are parties to CSCAP, but no similarly constituted entity currently exists for the IOR. In this vein, the Indian Ocean Research Group (IORG) 30 has recently been afforded Observer status by IORARC and provides the embryo of a Track 2 research and dialogue forum. IORG would need appropriate levels of participation and commitment, including funding, to enable it to perform an effective CSCAP-type role for the Indian Ocean. Given the nature of IOR security and the evolving IORARC and IONS agendas regional maritime security cooperation in all its forms, would appear to be an obvious area of focus for an expanded, energised and well supported IORG. Dealing with the Risks A key question is to what extent do the risks arising from ‗non-traditional‘ security concerns in the IOR present new imperatives that require collective risk mitigation initiatives, or at least cooperative approaches to tackle vulnerabilities? Would common perceptions of risk and vulnerability generate imperatives to take collective action, and who should act? During the Cold War, for example, the clear, compelling and immediate threat to the survival of Western Europe: the risks of Nuclear War drove the creation of formal cooperative security arrangements among the Western powers. How does a relatively slowly evolving crisis, like climate change, that is hard to precisely identify, quantify and predict and therefore represents the ultimate, incalculable uncertainty (i.e. risk) generate the urgency and commitment to collective action that the risk of nuclear annihilation did? Notably, the current IORARC six point priority agenda does not specifically address dealing with the forecast impacts of climate change, although they are to an extent inherent in the disaster risk reduction, maritime security, fishing and academic/S&T items. Many questions are raised by the impending risks from climate change. For example: how can disparate actors be persuaded to take action to address predicted impacts that may ultimately bring death and misery to millions of people, and inflict enormous environmental and economic damage? Will the realistic view prevail: collective action is only likely after a major disaster has occurred; for example, the responses to Cyclone Nargis 31 or the Asian Tsunami? Does this changing security risk landscape alter traditional security paradigms? What new or revised cooperative and coordination mechanisms are required, and possible? To what extent has the need for IOR maritime security become a key factor that can bind together requirements to protect the common interests of regional and extra-regional actors? Security issues like those arising from climate change, ocean resource availability and energy affect the common interests of peoples; they combine to present massive challenges that underscore the need for effective, collective security governance and policy responses. It may become easier for actors, like nation-states, to set aside differences and to surrender aspects of sovereignty to face mutual external threats. Reconceptionalizing the notion of what constitutes security,32 broadened to encompass such matters as human, environmental, economic, food and energy security, combined with perceptions of risk and vulnerability may open the way for new, or at least largely untested, ways of approaching IOR maritime security thinking and policy outcomes. The threats posed by the potential outcomes from climate change are insidious and the challenges are enormous. There is unlikely to be a single defining moment that will galvanize collective action—and herein lays a major difficulty. But unless regional and extra-regional leaders exercise vision and imagination and take early, proactive action, crises will inevitably arise of unmanageable proportions, and only highly inefficient, largely ineffective, and essentially inadequate reactive responses will be

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

available. Hard lessons will ultimately be learned by the international community, but it will be too late. Regrettably, it is difficult to avoid a pessimistic sense that late and ineffectual reaction is the most realistic and likely scenario; although recent initiatives through the IORARC give rise to some hope. The alternative outcomes will be costly—financially, environmentally, and morally, in terms of human misery and lives. Risk management approaches, in concert with other initiatives, offer potential solutions to defining the parameters for collective mitigation strategies – regional agendas for action. Risk management is fundamentally a structured approach to dealing with uncertainty.33 Risk management approaches are increasingly being embraced by regional governments, and industry, to deal with maritime security risks. Regional strategic risk analyses have for example, been proposed by CSCAP to deal with the risks posed to offshore oil and gas safety and security in the Asia Pacific. This proposal, and a related detailed Monograph, extends to offshore oil and gas facilities in South Asia and the northeast Indian Ocean.34 There is much uncertainty, and therefore unmitigated risks, in the IOR maritime security context. Many IOR states have little or no capacity to fulfil their responsibilities for effectively managing marine zones. Exploitation, pollution, and water-security infringements largely proceed unchecked in many national jurisdictions, and in the Indian Ocean high seas. Very few regional countries have the individual capacity to deal with massive human tragedies and environmental damage to coastal areas forecast to arise from repeated natural disasters. The lack of national capabilities is exacerbated by the lack of cooperative bodies to coordinate the use of sparse resources. There is suspicion and antipathy toward external powers among IOR states; understandable from states that are recently experiencing post-colonial independence. However, many extra-regional countries have significant and legitimate interests to protect in the IOR. They also have significant capacities and want to offer assistance. The involvement of US, Chinese, and various Asian, Middle Eastern and European navies in the antipiracy effort off Somalia, for example, is aimed at protecting common stakes in the free flow of maritime trade. A structured approach to managing the risks to IOR maritime security, controlled by the regional states in consultation with the external powers, through the medium of a regional cooperative regime, would seem to offer considerable benefits to all involved. Maritime security issues in the IOR could, if managed astutely and prudently, bind a diverse and largely disaggregated region. Indeed, this appears to be the intent and the potential outcome of the current IORARC approach if it is pursued assiduously. The maritime and marine context provides the opportunity for nations to cooperate to protect vulnerable common interests without significantly compromising territorial integrity or sovereignty, against a range of risks that no single state has the power to mitigate effectively. Dealing with them could catalyse habits of region-wide cooperation that might be applicable to harder and more sensitive security issues, like arms control and territorial, ethnic, ideological, and religious disputes ashore. Concluding Remarks and Recommendations

How to move forward? In the IOR, the concept of regionalism is not well developed. The disparate and disaggregated subregional IOR geography, lack of common region-wide historical integration and identity, and an absence of accepted regional leadership present considerable obstacles. Forging a way ahead is not going to be easy. There will be suspicion toward external powers in some quarters and a lack of willingness to engage with them; external powers will differ among themselves as to what cooperative IOR security arrangements should be supported. Options that represent the status quo could

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

be attractive to some parties — they could wait and do nothing. But waiting until crises emerge offers the lowest likelihood of mitigating the risks. Another and related option would be to continue to rely upon ad hoc ―coalitions of the willing‖ to deal with crises as they arise. Like the ―do nothing‖ option, it gives little hope of dealing effectively with the massive maritime security-related risks anticipated to beset the IOR in the future. Both options would ensure that attempts to prevent, respond to, and recover from the massive human and environmental tragedies of the kinds forecast would be suboptimal. They would also allow some regional states, and extra-regional states, to abrogate their responsibilities. Indian Ocean maritime security should be collective in character and based upon a concept of shared responsibility among regional and extra-regional actors. Sensitivities need to be respected and the interests of many parties need to be carefully balanced. There may be significant benefit in creating a fresh regional security forum, one that begins with recognition of the massive regional security challenges that lie ahead, without the burdens of association with the past, and focuses upon the major area of common IOR interest: maritime security. Such a suggestion may take greater political will and energy than is realistically evident in the IOR at this time. Based upon the analyses outlined in this paper the following actions are recommended: 1. Commission a multinational team of ―experts‖ (a research group) to conduct a regional all-risks strategic assessment, with a specific focus upon regional maritime security. This could comprise a combined IORARC/IONS initiative perhaps coordinated by IORG. 2. Expand the IORARC priority agenda to include the maritime-related impacts of climate change – to be combined with the current maritime security and disaster response agendas, and the fishing agenda. 3. IORARC create a task to develop proposals for enhanced IOR maritime security cooperation. IONS could be invited to participate in this. 4. Creating an informal Track 2/Track 1.5 IOR dialogue and policy discussion entity similar to CSCAP in concept. IORG could provide the foundation for such an entity, if appropriately supported and resourced. 5. Establish linkages between IORARC and IONS. 6. Expand IORARC membership to be more inclusive of IOR participating states. The IORARC may be the most appropriate vehicle for initiating these proposals. There is a compelling imperative to develop maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean region to address the massive non-traditional human, economic, environmental, and energy security risks of the future. The maritime domain is where the collective interests and common security concerns of regional and extra-regional states largely converge. Both regional and extra-regional countries, those with interests in the Indian Ocean and the capacity to assist, need to be included in security dialogue and cooperative arrangements. Risk-based approaches offer the key to moving these concerns forward.

Endnotes 1. Robert D. Kaplan, ―Center stage for the twenty-first century: power plays in the Indian Ocean‖, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, no. 2, March-April 2009, pp. 16-32. 2. See Lee Cordner, ―Rethinking maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region‖, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 6, No. 1, June 2010, pp. 67-85 for a comprehensive analysis of the evolving Indian Ocean maritime security strategic context. 3. See Christian Bouchard and William Crumplin, ―Neglected no longer: the Indian Ocean at the forefront of World geopolitics and global geostrategy‖, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 6, No. 1, June 2010, pp. 26-51. The

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

authors describe an Indian Ocean System that comprises several sub-regional systems including Southern Africa, Eastern Africa, Horn of Africa, South-west Indian Ocean Islands, Greater Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia and South Pacific (Oceania). 4. See Sugata Bose, A Hundred Horizons: the Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2006, pp. 6, 31 and 281-282. 5. C. Raja Mohan, Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 2012. 6. Ibid, pp. 2-3. 7. Robert D. Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Battle for Supremacy in the 21st Century, Random House, United States, 2010, p. 291. 8. Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, 2nd edn, Routledge, London and New York, 2009, p. 1. 9. Ibid, pp. 5-6. 10. Ibid, pp. 7-8. 11. See Dennis Rumley (ed), The Indian Ocean Region: Security, Stability and Sustainability in the 21st Century, Report by an Australia India Institute Task Force on Indian Ocean Security launched in Canberra in March 2013, available at http://www.aii.unimelb.edu.au/. 12. Ibid, p. 11. 13. Ibid. 14. IPPC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report (2007), Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf . 15. Ibid. 16. The IOR contains a major proportion of the world‘s failed and failing states including 11 of the top 20 states listed in the 2009 Failed State Index, Foreign Policy, available at www.foreignpolicy.com/. 17. Manoj Gupta, Indian Ocean Region: Maritime Regimes for Regional Cooperation, Springer, New York, 2010, pp. 266-270. 18. United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994. 19. Ken McPherson, ――There Once was an Ugly Duckling...,‖ or, The Sad History of the Good Ship IORARC‖, pp. 112-119, in Dennis Rumley and Sanjay Chaturvedi (eds), Geopolitical Orientations, Regionalism and Security in the Indian Ocean, South Asian Publishers, New Delhi, 2004. 20. Ibid, p. 115 and pp. 117-118. 21. See http://www.iorarc.org/. The Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation (IORARC) ―will facilitate and promote economic cooperation, bringing together representatives of government, business and academia. In a spirit of multilateralism, the Association seeks to build and expand understanding and mutually beneficial cooperation through a consensus-based, evolutionary and non-intrusive approach.‖ Members are Australia, Bangladesh, Comoros, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Seychelles, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. China, the United States, Egypt, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom are Dialogue Partners of the IORARC. The Indian Ocean Tourism Organization (IOTO) and Indian Ocean Research Group (IORG) have Observer status. 22. Exercise Aman 2013, held at Karachi in March 2013, involved 14 regional and extra-regional Navies in a series of maritime security forums and sea training primarily directed at dealing cooperatively with non-traditional maritime security threats. Navies from 48 countries were invited to provide units and/or to participate as observers. Navies who provided units/ships/special forces etc included (not a complete list): Australia, Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, Italy, France, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Turkey, UAE, United Kingdom and the United States. IMC 2013 was held in conjunction and included speakers from many countries including: Australia, Canada, China, Pakistan, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. 23. See ‗India seeks structural changes in IORARC‘ (2008), OneIndia News, available at http://www.news.oneindia.in/. At the 8th IORARC meeting in Iran the Indian Delegate was reported as stating that despite a decade-long existence of the IORARC, not much progress has been made in terms of concrete projects and the character of the organization needs to be reviewed. The Indian Minister of State for External Affairs, E. Ahamed, is reported to have stated: ‗Areas of common interest that bind the (IOR) countries, such as ocean bed exploration, hydrographic survey, disaster management and information sharing, shipping, coastal infrastructure, fisheries, weather forecasting, should be given priority‘.

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

24. See the series of statements by Ministerial representatives at the November 2012 IORARC meeting available at http://www.iorarc.org/ . 25. 11th Meeting of the Council of Ministers IORARC Bengaluru Communiqué, 15 November 2011 viewed at http://www.iorarc.org/media/60424/bengaluru_communiqu_.pdf identified six priority areas for the cooperation agenda: maritime security and piracy, disaster risk reduction, trade and investment facilitation, fisheries management, academic and S&T cooperation, and tourism and cultural exchanges. 26. 12th Meeting of the Council of Ministers of IORARC Gurgaon Communiqué, 2 November 2012 viewed at http://www.iorarc.org/media/82940/gurgaon_communiqu__2012.pdf , ‗IORARC at 15 – The Next Decade‘. 27. See www.indiannavy.nic.in/ for general information about IONS, it ―provides a regional forum through which the ‗Chiefs-of-Navy‘ of all the littoral states of the IOR can periodically meet to constructively engage one another through the creation and promotion of regionally relevant mechanisms, events, and activities.‖ The inaugural IONS seminar in February 2008 was hosted and chaired by India and comprised representatives from Australia, Brazil, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, France, Indonesia, Kuwait, Kenya, Malaysia, Malagasy, Maldives, Mauritius, Myanmar, Mozambique, Oman, Qatar, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, the United Arab Emirates, Singapore, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tanzania and Thailand. Notable absentees were Iran and Pakistan. IONS 2010 comprised senior maritime security officials (navy, coast guard or maritime police chief) from Australia, Bangladesh, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, France, India, Iran, Indonesia, Kenya, Kuwait, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, UAE and Yemen. The navies of Egypt, Oman and Pakistan were also represented at senior levels. Malaysia and Myanmar did not provide representatives. IONS 2012 was hosted by South Africa in Cape Town 10-13 April 2012 with the theme "Regional Maritime Security Initiatives aimed at reducing Modern Maritime Security Threats", see http://www.navy.mil.za/IONS_2011/index.html for further details. 28. See Lee Cordner, ‗Progressing Maritime Security Cooperation in the Indian Ocean‘, Naval War College Review, vol. 64, no. 4, 2011, pp. 68-88 for further information about IONS 2010, IORARC and related analyses about IO maritime security. 29. See www.cscap.org/. The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) ―provides an informal mechanism for scholars, officials and others in their private capacities to discuss political and security issues and challenges facing the region. It also provides policy recommendations to various inter-governmental bodies, convenes regional and international meetings and establishes linkages with institutions and organizations in other parts of the world to exchange information, insights and experiences in the area of regional political-security cooperation.‖ CSCAP has 21 full members (Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, Europe, India, Indonesia, Japan, DPR Korea, Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, USA and Vietnam) and one associate member (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat). 30. Indian Ocean Research Group (IORG), available at www.iorgroup.org/. 31. See United Nations, International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Recovery Status Report No. 3, Cyclone Nargis 2008: Rehabilitation in Myanmar, viewed http://www.unisdr.org/files/16776_cyclonenargis2008.pdf. 32. Dennis Rumley 2013, op cit. 33. See ISO 31000:2009 Risk management - Principles and guidelines published 13 November 2009. International Standard protocols and procedures on risk management are widely embraced by industry and increasingly by governments. The concepts are well tested and easy to follow. 34. See CSCAP Memorandum No. 16, Safety and Security of Offshore Oil and Gas Installations, January 2011 available at http://www.cscap.org/. See also Lee Cordner, Offshore Oil and Gas Safety and Security in the Asia Pacific: The Need for Regional Approaches to Managing Risks, RSIS monograph No. 26, 2013, available at http://www.rsis.edu.sg/ for a comprehensive analysis of this subject including the employment of risk management approaches.

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FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

TOWARD A DELHI DECLARATION? India, IBSA and the Indo-Pacific Francis A. Kornegay & PriyaChacko Francis A.Kornegay, Jr is a senior fellow on emerging powers at the Institute of Global Dialogue in South Africa and alumnus of the Woodrow Wilson International Center of Scholars (Smithsonian) in Washington, D.C. Has published several articles and an occasional paper on the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic relating to BRICS and IBSA. Was a visiting fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in 2011and led and co-led two South African delegations to BRICS think-tank symposia. Has organized international workshops on both IBSA and BRICS. He is lead co-editor of a forthcoming volume titled Laying the BRICS of a New Global Order which will be published by the Africa Institute of South Africa later in 2013.

Dr.Priya Chacko is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Adelaide and leads the Rising Powers program at the Indo-Pacific Governance Research Centre. She formerly held teaching/research positions at Victoria University of Wellington and the University of the Witwatersrand. Her current research focusses on the new geoeconomics of India’s foreign policy and centres on the link between foreign policy and state building. She is the author of Indian Foreign Policy: The Politics of Postcolonial Identity From 1947 to 2004 (Routledge, 2012).

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The India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Trilateral Dialogue Forum is set to have its 10th anniversary summit in New Delhi in October. This marks a critical conjuncture for both India and IBSA regarding the future of the international relations of the Indian Ocean. On the one hand, the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean inescapably intertwine with the dynamics of its eastern sector incorporating it into the ‘Indo-Pacific.’ This is a transitional zone merging into the maritime realm of tensions in play resulting from China’s bid to claim hegemony over the South and East China Seas while the US accelerates an Asia-Pacific ‘pivot’ strategy.

Washington’s agenda is widely seen as aimed at countering Beijing’s regional power bid by bolstering the Pacific leg of its contested global hegemony in what could be seen as a classic case of the laws of countervailing dynamics, the dialectical interplay of hegemony and counter- hegemony. As such, New Delhi seems to have reached a point of having to effect a complex balancing strategy; It might be characterized as one of avoidance in the indelibly ‘Indo-Pacific’ dynamic between China and America. At the same time it can advance what would seem to be its priority focus on its ‘sphere of interest’ in the immediate Indian Ocean vicinity of its Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs). This aim, in turn, converges with a not unrelated interest in assuring

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the survival of an IBSA being overshadowed by Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) forum.

The aim of this paper is to examine the potential for India to build on its IBSA initiatives with South Africa and Brazil as a means of initiating a new maritime security and cooperative ‘governance of the oceans’ architecture in the Indian Ocean against the backdrop of the geopolitics and geo-economics of the wider Indo-Pacific.It does so by elucidating the roles of the Indo-Pacific and IBSA in India’s foreign policy and by highlighting the IBSA initiatives that could further India’s aims in the Indian Ocean in particular.

The ‘Indo-Pacific’ in India’s foreign policy

After initiating a ‘Look East’ policy in the early 1990s that sought to embed India economically in the Asia-Pacific region, by the late 1990s, the term, ‘extended neighbourhood’, defined as comprising ‘countries in the ASEAN - Pacific region, Central Asia, the Gulf, West Asia and North Africa, and the Indian Ocean Rim’, increasingly began to appear in the foreign policy lexicon.1This shift in vocabulary reflected the expansion of India’s demand for energy, trade and investment and the search for a diversified range of partners and sources. For instance, between 2000 and 2010 India transitioned from being the world’s seventh largest energy consumer to the fourth largest energy consumer with a compound annual growth rate in primary energy consumption of 5.9 per cent, which was more than double the rate of global consumption.2

The majority of India’s top trading partners now lie in its ‘extended neighbourhood’ including the top two, China and the United Arab Emirates. India’s trade with Asia and North Africa makes up the bulk of India’s overall trade.3 Its bilateral trade with Africa has rapidly expanded, jumping from US$1 billion in 1990 to US$32 billion in 2010/11 and has been driven by the demand for resources as well as the promise of new commercial markets. North Africa, East Africa and South Africa accounts for the bulk of this trade.4

The emergence of this area of interdependence and interaction spanning the Indian and Pacific Oceans is also implicated in the transition of power from the United States (US) to China and has

1Government of India, "India's Foreign Relations, 1998-99," Embassy of India, Washington D.C., http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/Foreign_Policy/FP_1999/Introduction_FP_98-99.html. 2Ernst and Young, "Synergy for energy: Developing a robust natural gas market in India," Ernst and Young, http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Clear_roadmap_required_to_meet_energy_demands /$FILE/Synergy_for_energy.pdf. 3Export-Import Bank of India, "Catalysing India's Trade and Investment," Export-Import Bank of India http://www.eximbankindia.com/fore-trade.pdf. 4Habiba Ben Barka and Kupukile Mlambo, "India’s Economic Engagement with Africa," Africa Economic Bulletin 2, no. 6 (2011): 4.

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given rise to a political process of regional construction, in particular by the United States, in an effort to maintain its claims to global leadership.India was given a key role in this American-driven process of regional construction of the ‘Indo-Pacific’, as the region was termed by the former US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton termed it in a speech in 2011, in which she noted that:

…today, the stretch of sea from the Indian Ocean through to the Pacific contain the world’s most vibrant trade and energy roots linking economies and driving growth. The United States has always been a Pacific power because of our very great blessing of geography. And India straddling the waters from the Indian to the Pacific Ocean is, with us, a steward of these waterways.5

While the concept of the ‘Indo-Pacific’, spatially overlaps with India’s existing notion of its ‘extended neighbourhood’, the concept of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ has received a mixed response in India. Several Indian analysts and former diplomats, in particular those who want India to abandon its traditional non-aligned stance, have embraced this US script on the Indo-Pacific.6Other commentators have argued that adopting the ‘Indo-Pacific’ terminology is unnecessary, that it could align India too closely with American interests and that India’s strategic objectives are best met through engagement with countries in the region using forums such as the East Asia Summit and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), rather than new military partnerships.7

While government officials, in particular India’s Foreign Secretary, RajanMathai, and its Ambassador to the United States, NirupamaRao, have used the notion of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ when articulating India’s foreign policy interests, recent comments from the National Security Advisor, Shivshankar Menon, suggest that India remains cautious about adopting the term as a geostrategic category because ‘this space still consists of three distinct areas: the Indian Ocean, the western

5Hilary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century," Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century. 6Brahma Chellaney, "Asia's Natural Born Allies," Project Syndicate, http://www.project- syndicate.org/commentary/asia-s-natural-born-allies; Hemant K. Singh and Karl F. Inderfurth, "Issue Brief: An Indo-Pacific Triangle of Consequence," Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, http://www.icrier.org/icrier_wadhwani/Index_files/ICRIER_ISSUE_BRIEF_Dec.pdf; Shyam Saran, "Mapping the Indo-Pacific," Indian Express(2011), http://www.indianexpress.com/news/mapping-the-indopacific/867004/; C. Raja Mohan, "India and Australia: Maritime Partners in the Indo-Pacific," Asialink, http://www.asialink.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/505628/Maritime_Partners_in _the_Indo-Pacific.pdf. 7Rukmani Gupta, "India puts the Indo in 'Indo-Pacific'," Asia Times, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ML08Df03.html; D. Gnanagurunathan, "India and the idea of the ‘Indo-Pacific’," East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/10/20/india- and-the-idea-of-the-indo-pacific/.

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Pacific, and the seas near China, (namely, the South China Sea, the East Sea and the Sea of Japan)’ and ‘there is a danger of prescribing one medicine for the different security ailments that afflict’ these distinct areas. Menon went on to note while the Pacific has a hegemonic security provider (the US), the situation in the seas near China is complicated by maritime and territorial disputes.

The Indian Ocean is beginning to see the emergence of bilateral and multilateral regional cooperative ventures to address specific problems. Such initiatives have been identified by Menon as the best way to further the creation of an ‘overarching security architecture or paradigm within which new naval actors and states can conduct their activities and cooperate, mitigating competition and avoiding conflict’.8What role then, might IBSA play in fostering this security architecture? Before turning to this question, we need to briefly examine the emergence of IBSA and its role in India’s foreign policy.

India and IBSA

Processes of state transformation since India initiated economic reforms in 1991 have resulted in shifts in its dominant understandings of ‘security’ and ‘development.’ This has had significant consequences for India’s international behaviour. Where once the pathway to modernity for India rested on notions of territorialised citizenship, central planning and endogenous economic development, the adoption of policies of economic openness was both facilitated by, and has perpetuated, a shift toward an understanding of ‘security’ and ‘development’ as being dependent on economic openness andhigh rates of economic growth. Hence India’s foreign policy is now driven by a geoeconomic market logic that places emphasis on economic competitiveness and India’s position in the global economy.This shift in India’s state project is in turn re-shaping India’s foreign policy discourses, instruments and actors. What were once seen as issues of only of domestic policy have become internationalized. Domestic actors in the private sector andsub- national Indian governments have become international actors and domestic institutions have developed new international capacities. Moreover, ‘traditional’ foreign policy precepts such as non-alignment and Third World solidarity have been recast into concepts inflected by a market logic like ‘strategic autonomy’ and ‘South-South cooperation’ through selective coalitions, such as IBSA. As a former Foreign Secretary put it,

IBSA is a unique forum in that the three countries are large democracies pursuing economic growth and attendant betterment of their large populations in the era of globalisation. This partnership is an example of the innovative globalisation where the

8Shivshankar Menon, "India's NSA on Sino-Indian rivalry in the Indo- Pacific," Observer Research Foundation, http://www.orfonline.org/cms/export/orfonline/documents/Samudra-Manthan.pdf.

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three countries, despite the vast geographical distance between them, come together in a quest for greater autonomy’.9

The emphasis on IBSA’s democratic identity sets it apart from the BRICS coalition while maintaining India’s autonomy from the US. Washington often portrays itself as supreme leader of democratic forces in global politics.In doing so, IBSA furthers India’s ‘strategic autonomy’, a key plank of its foreign policy and helps to fulfill the government’s ‘soft power’ strategy. This aims toproject ‘India as open and inclusive and its rise in the global arena as “benign” and “non- threatening” by virtue of both a democratic and transparent system of governance and an economic model that is driven by domestic demand’, in contrast to China.10In addition, as we suggest below, IBSA could have a role to play in securing the Indian Ocean, one of the key maritime areas of the broader Indo-Pacific.

India, IBSA and the Indian Ocean: A Potential Role for IBSAMAR?

Securing access to essential resources in Africa and Asia and finding new commercial markets for Indian companies has become central to India’s economic growth strategy. As a result, maintaining stability in the Indian Ocean has become an essential part of India’s foreign policy. Thus far, India’s multilateral efforts for building cooperation and capacity among the countries of the Indian Ocean region have been channeled through the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IORARC), the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) initiative, and MILAN, a maritime cooperation initiative involving the countries of the Asia-Pacific.

Given India’s assumed interest in maintaining and strengthening the relevance of IBSA at a time when it is also a leading power in the IORARC, which it chairs until 2014 (the chair then passing to Australia), is it possible for New Delhi to coordinate a convergence in its IBSA and IORARC agendas? They appear to neatly come together in its trilateral naval initiative with South Africa and Brazil: India-Brazil-South Africa Maritime (IBSAMAR). Reinforcing this potential is the timely fact of South Africa’s current chairmanship of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). On top of this, Brazil’s Defence Minister (and former Foreign Minister under President Ignacio Lula da

9Shashank, "On the meeting of IBSA Dialogue Forum by Foreign Secretary Shri Shashank," Ministry of External Affairs, http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=53037624. 10Navdeep Suri, "Public Diplomacy in India's Foreign Policy,," Strategic Analysis 35, no. 2 (2011): 299, 301.

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Silva), CelsoAmorim, has acknowledged IBSAMAR as an important (if symbolic) element in the naval-maritime dimension of Brasilia’s defence strategy.11

The idea of a possible convergence in IBSA/IBSAMAR and IORARC agendas is not an idle one given the tenor of some of the geostrategic thinking coming out of some of Washington’s think-tanks like the Centre for a New American Security (CNAS) and the German Marshall Fund. In a recent report, intended to influence the re-elected Barack Obama administration in an anti-China containment direction, India and Brazil were anointed along with Indonesia and Turkey as emerging power ‘swing states’ for cultivating outside of these countries’ multilateral commitments. While BRICS is mentioned only once in passing with the clear focus being on China, IBSA is not referenced at all as South Africa is erased from a maritime proposal clearly aimed at ‘divide and conquer.’

This is very much in the tradition of Washington’s tendency toward a selective bilateralism in dealing with key state actors emerging as important contenders on the world scene, especially newly rising powers from the non-West. Thus, in the Moscow-Beijing BRICS calculus, if IBSA could be wished away, in Washington (think-tank Washington at least), neither BRICS nor IBSA seem worthy of acknowledgement. Thus, in the German Marshall Fund-Centre for a New American Security report, David M. Kliman and Richard Fontaine advocate separate bilateral engagements with Brazil and India on naval and maritime cooperation including separate Atlantic and Indian Ocean security dialogues accompanied by naval exercises and other forms of cooperation, exchanges and training programmes.12

There is no reason why Brazil and India along with South Africa should not elaborate IBSAMAR beyond bi-annual naval preparedness exercises into a more comprehensive programme of integrated maritime security and oceans governance. Such a deepening of cooperation could serve as a point of departure for an expanded multilateralism in the southern oceans joining the IORARC and the Zone of Peace and Security Cooperation in the South Atlantic under an IBSAMAR initiative that both the US and China (which are dialogue partners in the IORARC) would have little choice but to support.

11See the following cites regarding Brazil’s perspective: https://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/2012/Pronunciamentos/Ministro_defesa/outubro/discurso _insercao_estrategica_brasil_22_outubro_2012.pdf; https://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/2012/Pronunciamentos/Ministro_defesa/novembro/palest ra_defesa_nacional_pensamento_estrategico_27_novembro_2012.pdf. 12David M. Kliman& Richard Fontaine.Global Swing States: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Turkey and the Future of International Order. Washington, D.C. German Marshall Foundation and the Centre for a New American Security (CNAS), November 11, 2012. ‘Global swing states’ is a conceptual framework employed in a number of different thematic foreign policy-national security studies published by CNAS which indicates the extent to which a ‘selective bilateralist’ approach to emerging powers taken hold in the Washington think-tank community.

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The question is whether India and its partners in Brasilia and Tshwane-Pretoria have the capacity, political will and imagination to take such an initiative which, within the context of BRICS, would enhance their strategic autonomy and insure IBSA’s relevance. BRICS does not share IBSA’s global South strategic logic which, under, China and Russia’s co-leadership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (with India as an observer) is centered in the geopolitical-economics of northeast and central Eurasia. But while the Government of India is conscious of the imperative of having a credible naval and maritime force based on what is said to be a capability rather than a threat- based approach, it is not clear to what extent this calculus may include IBSAMAR.

One area in which IBSAMAR could contribute to security in the Indian Ocean is in anti-piracy. Because of New Delhi’s concerns over the security of its SLOCs, there has recently been heightened collaboration with other states to contain and deter piracy. This is said to include a discernible shift in international shipping lanes passing closer to Indian waters due to protection provided by the Indian navy and coast guard. This includes coordination off the coast of Africa with the navies and coast guards of China, Japan, South KoreaKenya, Madagascar and the Seychelles. From New Delhi’s perspective, the naval focus of IBSAMAR should naturally fit within this broader maritime security approach.

However, unlike piracy in Asia, piracy near Africa is viewed by Indian officials as a ‘non- traditional’ security issue fuelled byweak state capacity in parts of Africa. Consequently, India’s approach to security in the Indian Ocean has been tied into its development cooperation initiatives. For instance, India contributes financially to the African Union Mission for Somalia, it has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the East African Community in 2003 and the Indian Ministry of Finance, through its Multilateral Institutions Division, has partnered with the African Development Bank and New Partnership for Africa’s Development to facilitate an East African railways enhancement project. This will further the development of East Africa’s trade infrastructure which is aimed at reducing the cost of goods and services and thereby, at contributing to economic growth.

The importance of these East African investments by India is their geostrategic potential for transforming the Indian Ocean into an interregional economic community linking the African littoral to South and Southeast Asia. The Eastern and Southern African littoral and inland environs have emerged as a major avenue of African regional integration via the Grand Free Trade Area scheme. This initiative, in synergy with the North-South Corridor Infrastructure Initiative, links the overlapping regional economic communities ofthe Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the East African Community (EAC).

In a continent projected to have a population of 2 billion by 2050, this East-Southern African tripartite initiative, also dubbed ‘Cape to Cairo,’ will encompass a market of between 600 and 800

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million. It will constitute a demographically expanding market bordering the Indian Ocean in what has been described as a CHIMEA nexus encompassing commercial, trading and energy transshipmentsbetween China, India, the Middle East and Africa.13 As a 10th anniversary reflection on their achievements and what lies beyond, the IBSA countries meeting in Delhi might assess the future of the IBSA trust facility (managed by the UNDP’s Special Unit on South-South Cooperation) as a mechanism complimenting the more heavy-duty infrastructural financing already on tap and likely to be forthcoming from the BRICS development bank when it becomes operational.

Cooperating Partners in Oceans Governance?

Although the three countries have already been jointly engaged in supporting South Sudan’s post- independence and post-conflict development efforts, the IBSA fund may be much too symbolically tokenistic to make much of a developmental impact at its current nominal level of commitment by India, Brazil and South Africa. Individually, they are also gearing up their own development partnership agencies. The IBSA will therefore need to revisit the niche it wishes the trust fund to fill while retaining its current small-scale funding mandate.

One additional area which, illustratively, might be considered for programmatic engagement by the IBSA fund would be in maritime governance in the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean waters.14This could involve linking the IBSA fund to a joint IBSAMAR-IORARC effort at providing research, information and functional cooperation exchanges and networking toback-stop an oceans agenda of the three governments and other littoral states. It might encompassprotecting the maritime commons involving such areas as marine ecosystems and environmental management in regard to oceanic resources.

There is an already existing Indo-Pacific network that such an initiative could plug into and build on in a broader integrated strategy dovetailing maritime security with a governance-oriented global oceans agenda. The IORARC is at the centre of this network. Its research arm could play a major role in such an IBSA enterprise aimed at consolidating IBSA’s strategic niche in global South affairs.

Conclusion

The point of the forgoing is that in the year of its 10th anniversary, IBSA has much to take credit for on its own behalf in being an innovative pace-setter in two respects: in recasting Third World solidarity as South-South cooperation on the one hand, while presaging the consolidating of an

13 Martin Walker, ―Indian Ocean Nexus,‖ The Wilson Quarterly, Spring 2008, pp. 21-28. 14 Two recent ‗global oceans‘ initiatives include: the fledgling Hague-Delhi Initiative on Global Governance with an oceans governance component launched at a November 23-24, 2012 meeting in New Delhi co-convened by The Hague Institute for Global Justice and the Observer Research Foundation; the March 19, 2013 launch in London and Cape Town of the Global Oceans Commission co-chaired by South African planning minister Trevor Manuel, former UK foreign minister David Miliband and former Costa Rican president, Jose Maria Figueres.

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emerging powers bloc in BRICS, on the other. Launched in the Brasilia Declaration of 2003, IBSA had both terrains – the global South and emerging powers – pretty much to itself until the 2009 launching of BRICS six years later. Much has changed in the first IBSA decade. As it approaches the second, it has reached a crossroad where it must revisit its beginnings in light of the imperative of reflecting on its comparative strategic advantage and with it, the strategic autonomy of each of the three countries.

Maritime security and oceans governance via IBSAMAR (in partnership with the IORARC) may be just where a refocusing of the IBSA agenda can reap geopolitical-diplomatic benefits in influencing the international agenda at the current conjuncture in the global scenario. As such, this is also a major opportunity for India to show the kind of visionary leadership that propels it out of the constraints of its encircling geography into an expansive Indian Ocean future within an Indo- Pacific in transition.

In effect,we are witnessing a conjunctural convergence between India’s great power aspirations, the future of an IBSA with an enhanced Indian Ocean role and the evolving Indo-Pacific strategic landscape. This convergence represents one path (possibly the only one) toward a transition from the decade of the Brasilia Declaration to a new one ushering in an anticipated New Delhi Declaration. Herein may be revealedthe linked fate of India and the trilateral potential of IBSA as a key pole of engagement in the global South.

Bibliography

Barka, Habiba Ben , and Kupukile Mlambo. "India’s Economic Engagement with Africa." Africa Economic Bulletin 2, no. 6 (2011). Chellaney, Brahma. "Asia's Natural Born Allies." Project Syndicate, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/asia-s-natural-born- allies. Clinton, Hilary. "America's Pacific Century." Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century. Gnanagurunathan, D. "India and the Idea of the ‘Indo-Pacific’." East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/10/20/india-and- the-idea-of-the-indo-pacific/. Gupta, Rukmani. "India Puts the Indo in 'Indo-Pacific'." Asia Times, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ML08Df03.html. India, Export-Import Bank of. "Catalysing India's Trade and Investment." Export-Import Bank of India http://www.eximbankindia.com/fore-trade.pdf. India, Government of. "India's Foreign Relations, 1998-99." Embassy of India, Washington D.C., http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/Foreign_Policy/FP_1999/Introduction_FP_98-99.html. Menon, Shivshankar. "India's Nsa on Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo- Pacific." Observer Research Foundation, http://www.orfonline.org/cms/export/orfonline/documents/Samudra-Manthan.pdf. Mohan, C. Raja. "India and Australia: Maritime Partners in the Indo-Pacific." Asialink, http://www.asialink.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/505628/Maritime_Partners_in_the_Indo-Pacific.pdf. Saran, Shyam. "Mapping the Indo-Pacific." Indian Express (2011), http://www.indianexpress.com/news/mapping-the- indopacific/867004/. Shashank. "On the Meeting of Ibsa Dialogue Forum by Foreign Secretary Shri Shashank." Ministry of External Affairs, http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=53037624. Singh, Hemant K. , and Karl F. Inderfurth. "Issue Brief: An Indo-Pacific Triangle of Consequence." Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, http://www.icrier.org/icrier_wadhwani/Index_files/ICRIER_ISSUE_BRIEF_Dec.pdf. Suri, Navdeep "Public Diplomacy in India's Foreign Policy,." Strategic Analysis 35, no. 2 (2011): 297-303. Young, Ernst and. "Synergy for Energy: Developing a Robust Natural Gas Market in India." Ernst and Young, http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Clear_roadmap_required_to_meet_energy_demands/$FILE/Synergy_for_energy. pdf.

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FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

The challenges for India in creating, maintaining and utilizing

a Blue water Navy in the current century

Commodore R SeshadriVasan, Indian Navy(Retd) Head, Strategy and Security Studies,Centre for Asia Studies, India, Director, Asian Secretariat World Boderpol

(An alumnus of theDefence Services Staff College and the College of Naval Warfare, India, Commodore (Ret’d) Vasan has a distinguished career spanning over 34 years. His wide ranging appointments both at sea and ashore include Command of warships, appointment in carrier borne wing of INS Vikrant, command of long range Maritime Reconnaissance/ASW squadron, member examiner of the Aircrew Categorisation and Standardisation Board (AIRCATS), Chief Staff Officer (Operations) at Southern Naval Command and a Director at the Naval Aviation Staff at NHQ in charge of Air Ops and Training. He commissioned a major naval air station close to the east coast of India and commanded another air station on the west coast.He was on the faculty for over two years at the prestigious College of Naval Warfare that trains senior level officers from all the three services.

He was on deputation to the Indian Coast Guard from 2000 to 2003 as the Eastern Regional Commander with maritime jurisdiction in the Bay of Bengal including the Indo Bangladesh maritime border and the Indo Sri Lanka maritime boundary. He was charged with the task of I4SR,EEZ surveillance, anti-piracy, Search and Rescue, anti- poaching and marine pollution prevention.

Since his retirement he has been writing regularly for various magazines, newspapers and websites.. He has been conducting workshops and delivering talks for International delegates in many parts of the world on maritime issues, strategy, security and aviation issuesHe was selected for an International Visitor Leadership Programmeon ‘National Security and Media’ in US for three weeks in Aug-Sep 2009. He presented a paper at Chatham house in October2012 and also interacted in the British Parliament with the All Party Parliamentary group on Transatlantic and Asian Security. He was on a security panel at a Harvard University programme Taipei. He is scheduled to interact with international audience this year at many places including Seoul, Kunming, Singapore, Johannesburg and London.

In addition to being the Additional Director Projects and Development,he steered the Maritime Security Programme at the Observer Research Foundation, a major think tank in India. After three successful years in ORF, he joined the Center for Asia Studies as Head, Strategy and Security Studies in October 2008.Besides being the Director of the Asian Secretariat of the World Borderpol(WBO) and member Oceans beyond piracy(OBP),India,he is President, Navy Foundation Chennai chapter since May 2010.He is on the Board of Advisory Group at the Madras University and Stella Maris College; a visiting faculty at the Indian Maritime University,AMET the first private maritime university in India and the Great Lakes Institute of Management.He is also an executive member of the Chennai Center for China Studies a think tank that specializes in China affairs. ) ______

While the size, shape and the composition of the Indian Navy justifies it to be classified as a Blue water navy, there is a need to examine the contours of the present day challenges in the maritime domain. The maritime environment both in the immediate areas of influence and in distant areas of strategic interest are becoming complex and require thorough examination of the related issues and deft handling by the policy makers. What strikes the observer most is the fact that India though the most prominent and

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

powerfulnavy in the Indian Ocean is conceding strategic space in the immediate maritime neighbourhood to extra regional powers including China who has made deep inroads in the smaller nations around India by economic investments that would provide leverages for the future.This will have long term implications for India‘s national interests.

The developments in Sri Lanka post the defeat of the LTTE in May 2009 1 and the recent developments in Maldives are of great concern from the point of view of power politics and rivalry of the two Asian giants. The recent assessments suggest that China is gaining in the regional power matrix in India‘s backyard. The loss of significant influence in the traditional backyard of India is of great concern in the coming decades. China has gained in its economic and strategic clout both due to aggressive economic initiatives by China and lack of either well calibrated policies or a proactive approach on the part of India. India despite being a dominant Indian Ocean Power seems to be running out of ideas to keep the maritime balance in check in the areas of interest.Mere ownership of components of the blue water navy(BWN) does not make a nation powerful unless backed by long term vision and a clear political direction.

A peep at the past.Even a cursory look at India‘s maritime past clearly illustrates that the Choladynasty2 usedtheir maritimeassets albeit a sailing flotilla, as a blue water navy to challenge the Sri VijayaEmpire. The history records the expeditions of Raja RajendraChola through the South China Sea to establish trade and military contact with the kingdom in China. All the colonial rulers of India, whether Dutch, Portuguese, French and finally the British who used the sea routes effectively to establish their sovereignty in different parts of India3 undoubtedly qualify to be described as owners of blue water navy of that time to achieve national objectives and serve national interests in distant corners of the world.

The modern day definition4 of a BWN states"a maritime force capable of sustained operation across the deep waters of open oceans. A blue-water navy allows a country to project power far from the home country and usually includes one or more aircraft carriers. Smaller blue-water navies are able to dispatch fewer vessels abroad for shorter periods of time."

By description, only three navies have qualified to be described as BWNs. These are US, Britain and France. China, India and the South Korean navies have been clubbed together as the BWN in the making though this classification can be debated particularly in the back drop of missions undertaken by Indian Navy since 1971.Whether described as blue water navy or otherwise, an examination of the pastperformance of the Indian Navy will illustrate the effectiveness with which blue water missions including deployment of expeditionary forces were undertaken by the Indian Navy to serve national interests.

Starting with 1971 operations to create Bangladesh is a classic example of use of a Carrier Task Force on blue water missions for joint operations against the Pakistani forces then located in East Pakistan. Indian Navy again demonstrated its ability as a blue water navy by effectively intervening in Maldives

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

to thwart the attempt by Sri Lankan Tamilmercenaries to take over the Island. The fact that INS Godavari which was returning from a flag showing mission abroad was redeployed for this mission demonstrated the flexibility of a growing navy. The deployment in Sri Lanka as part of IPKF operations is again an example of exercising the national will in another country by using its armed forces. That it happened almost next door rendered the task of logistic support rather easy does not take away anything from another classic demonstration of use of navy for power projection. The tasks of a blue water navy have been undertaken with great vigour and have assisted the navy to grow from strength to strength.

A detailed discussion on the various naval operations conducted to deploy marineassets as an extension of national will to influence the course of events in the last four decades wouldbring out this aspect clearly. The discussions are contained in the succeeding paragraphs.

1971 Liberation of Bangladesh-5 This is a mile stone event that demonstrated that a navy could effectively aid the nation in accomplishing its strategic objective while assisting the persecuted population of then East Pakistan. Not only did the navy operate in both the theatres, but also dealt devastating blow to the Pakistan‘s naval citadel in Karachiin the war that ultimately led to the surrender of the Pakistani forces6 and creation of Bangladesh.

The aircraft carrier carried out its traditional role of power projection from the sea by using its naval air assets 7 The fact that it was only the Indian naval air assets that were capable of night flying from the deck of a carrier and launch attacks in the then east Pakistan amply demonstrated the skill and expertise of the Indian Navy that was using the carrier for the very first time since independence in an offensive mission . Geographically, while it can be argued that it was virtually in our neighbourhood in the Bay of Bengal the crux of the matter is that the Carrier was away from the home port of Mumbai and was sustained at sea for such extended durations to prepare and mount carrier borne attacks to facilitate the process of liberation. The operation of the Carrier was fraught with great danger as it was tracked and targeted by a Pakistani submarine PNZ Ghazi which finally was destroyed in the mouth of Visakahpatnam.

1983 ‘OpLal Dora’8 preventing coup in Mauritius, Not much was known about this operation till recently. As per the recent disclosures made it has been indicated that the Indian Navy played a vital role in preventing a coup in Mauritius some three decades ago. Apparently the meticulous plan to intervene using amphibious forces, and part of the Indian Naval fleet did not take place due to the differences about whether the Navy or the Army would be in charge of the operations.

1984 ‘Op Flowers are booming Seychelles 9 It has now been widely reported that the Indian Navy played a vital role in preventing a coup against President Rene in Seychelles in June 1986. This was achieved by positioning INS Vindhyagiri by some deft intelligent actionbehind the scene.The ship that was scheduled to participate in the Independence Day celebrations in Seychelles stayed put as if to sort out some technical problems on the ship. . The ship while staying in the Port ensured that it conveyed strong messages to the rebels that it was ready for intervening on behalf of the serving President of

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

Seychelles. The Sea king helicopter and the commando teams apparently engaged in public display of their capability in Port Victoria that finally ensured that the coup was averted.

1988 ‘Op Cactus’10 ntervention in Maldives. This is one operation that is well known and documented. This is even acknoweledged as the first occasion when India was able to play a regional role to assist the then Government of Gayoom. The Sri Lankan Tamil mercenaries apparently decided to take over the Islands by occupying vital positions. The Indian navy and the armed forces were quick to respond and ensured that the attack by the mercenaries was repealed. The flexibility of the Indian Navy was demonstrated when it utilized one of the indigenously built frigate, INS Godavari which was returning from an out of area assignment. The speed with which the armed forces came together to ward off the threat brought immediate acknowledgement of the capability and potential of the Indian Navy that was capable of shaping the events in the maritime neighbourhood of India.

1987-1990 Op Pawan’ Sri Lanka11 While not being an entirely naval operation, the fact that the navy was able to sustain patrol and surveillance missions to assist the Army which was operating in Sri Lanka against the LTTE brought out the ability of the navy to provide such support to the other arms of the service in pursuance of national objectives during the extended campaign in Sri Lanka. The results were mixed and the IPKF withdrew without completing the mission in toto.

Anti Piracy Operations.The anti-piracy operation that was jointly conducted by the Navy and the Coast Guard to capture MV AlondraRainbow12 in November 1999, put the Indian maritime forces on the global maritime map. The case in reference is about the Japanese vessel which was taken over and repainted with another name MV Megarama13 to mislead the surveillance platforms. The successful operation that culminated in the arrest and prosecution of the pirates on the Japanese ship paid rich dividends in terms of broadcasting to the rest of the world that Indian maritime forces do have the wherewithal to conduct such coordinated operations at sea to ensure that the global commons are protected and acts of piracy would not go without being challenged by law enforcement agencies. Unfortunately, the Law Enforcement Agencies did suffer from the absence of adequacy of then prevalent laws related to piracy. The fact that the anti-piracy bill14 was introduced in the Parliament on 25th April 2012 some 12 years after the MV Alondra Rainbow illustrates that the nation still has to do in terms of legal provisions to equip the maritime security agencies with the wherewithal to accomplish their missions.

The increased incidents of piracy off the Somali coast brought the presence of many navies including Indian and Chinese naval units which have maintained a sustained presence since 2008. The combined actions of all the navies have brought down the incidents.

Extending a helping hand.2004 Post tsunami intervention15 for HADR in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Male. The various operations conducted immediately after the Tsunami on the Black Monday in 2004 clearly brought out that the Indian Navy and the Coast Guard were not only capable of providing help and succor in our neighbourhood but also had the capacity to undertake missions in the immediate and

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

the extended maritime neighbourhood. Indian naval and coast guard ships were despatched to Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Maldives to provide immediate help to the affected in those countries. It is on record that Galle harbor16was cleared within 24 hours of many obstructions to ensure that the harbor was operational. This was done by employing Indian naval survey ships and divers who ensured that all the obstructions in the channel were located and removed in a timely manner.

The Indian Navy was also quick to realize that it needed a heavy lift capability which it lacked at that time for such missions. Immediately after the Tsunami on 26th December 2004, such a requirement was met by using destroyers and other war ships which were not suited for the task. The navy was quick to respond to this deficiency and bought an old American ship USS Trenton which was commissioned as Jalashwa17 to meet the short term needs while plans were set afoot to build such ships in our own yards.

The evacuation of Indians from Lebanon (Operation Sukhoon) in 2006and Libya (Operation Safehome coming) in 2011 has convincingly proved that the Indian navy has demonstrated capability of a blue water navy. The most demonstrated capacity and intention related to the deployment of the Indian Navy to render assistance post Tsunami in 2004 on many fronts simultaneously.

The happenings in the Indian Ocean and the illustrations above clearly brings out that application of maritime power in areas of our interest was timely and apt in all the examples above.India has also initiated many measures to secure its western and eastern flanks by commissioning INS Baaz in the Car Nicobar group of Islands administered by the Tri Services Command18 and in the Kavaratti Island respectively. The Indian Navy is now a dominant power in the Indian Ocean Region. Many nations in the region do look up to India for counter balancing the increasing naval capability of an assertive China which has displayed belligerent tendencies in South China Sea and the East China Sea.

The roles and missions of the Blue water navy of India would doubtlessly be influence by the happenings around the world in the maritime domain. The list of some of the important developments that would shape the responses of India and the Indian Navy are given below:-

a) The American recalibration of ‗pivot to Asia‘19 has reinforced the confidence of the smaller maritime neighbours of China and the traditional allies of USA namely Japan, Philliphines, South Korea and Australia. The withdrawal from Afghanistan and the recalibration would change the global security dynamics in the coming decades. The slant of US Policy to Asia Pacific is influenced by the growing power equations in that area and the diminishing importance in the west. US islikely tolose strategic interest in the MiddleEast due to its own predicted energy independence thus possibly creating a power vacuum in the foreseeable future. b) The rising tensions in the maritime neighbourhood of China have the potential to escalate depending on the responses of each involved nation. Unfortunately, the leadership of the nations involved hasincreasingly leaned towards Jingoism affecting bilateral and multilateral equations as never before.There is also definitely a sense of competition due to the growing economies of Asia which would like to take center stage.

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

c) India is not in a position to challenge China whose growth has been spectacular. Such a growth and the military might of China has alarmed its neighbours. Even this year, the defence budget20has been hiked by over 10 percent to take the budget to 117 billion US dollars. d) Energy security, SLOCs. The increasing needs of energy starved nations make them lean towards greater imports through the sea routes as they continue to scout for resources around the world. Both India and China are in a sense competing with each other to ensure their energy security. e) West Asia/Middle East developments. The Arab Spring and the subsequent developments in Libya, Syria has changed the strategic land scape in the region. This has impacted the security architecture as there is increasing efforts to effect leadership changes either by the active population or by external intervention of US led initiatives. f) Iran, Somalia and the issue of choke points. The efforts to weaponise the nuclear programme in Iran have been viewed seriously by US and the west. USA has categorically indicated that it would not allow a nuclear Iran. This would, in the worst case scenario will result in some military action and if Iran carries out its threat to block the Straits of Hormuz, it would impact the free flow of energy that moves to both India and China.

Time tested Constants which will also play out in the 21st century

Sequence of how nations play out their lines has not changed through the centuries. Commercial interests (National?). Add energy interests now; bring nations to different parts of the world to explore business opportunities. Nothing can be interpreted as purely commercial such transactions. These invariably are driven by grand strategies to acquire political, economic and strategic clout through trade and commerce.

Sea Lines of Communication(SLOCs) are the life lines or arteries of the world. Sea transportation is still the cheapest form to transport large volumes of goods..Without such movement …It has been suggested that ―Half the world will starve, the other half will freeze and many economies will collapse with the onset of Chaos and conflict‖. From this point of view, the might of Indian Navy would be committed to ensuring that the SLOCs and the choke points are not interfered with.

Search and Rescue21 and HADR. These roles are increasingly demanding greater attention of the maritime forces particularly after the Tsunami in 2004 and again the Tsunami of 2011 in Japan that caused untold misery and also led to nuclear contamination. India now has a responsibility of providing Search and Rescue services in an area of over 4 million square kilometers22 which is double the area of its Exclusive Economic Zone. This would take the maritime forces in to the areas which are under the purview of a BWN.

Sea based deterrence (SBD)23did not halt with the breakup of the Soviet Union.Resurgence of cold war at regional levels appears inevitable with emphasis on SBD. Mis- match between haves and have-nots of nuclear weapons will see attempts to bridge this gap by weapon programmes, delivery , command and

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

control systems – Iran, North Korea, Pakistan and other aspirants. The famous quote of ZA Bhutto, ―We will eat grass but will make a nuclear bomb‖- illustrates the point. While India experimented with the first nuclear propelled submarine by leasing a submarine from Russia in the late 80s (this was returned after gaining experience in operating and maintaining nuclear submarines), it is yet to operationalize its own indigenous INS Arihant24 which has some more time before it can achieve the objective of providing SBD. In the interim, India has again leased another Akula25 class nuclear submarine and is looking for one more to be leased as per last reports.

In the light of all the above one could easily identify some of the current day concerns which include Proliferation Security Concerns of WMD, Environmental concerns ,Traffic density with more vessels, greater risk of grounding , collision and spillage with long term impact on the fragile environment., piracy, Opening up of the Antarctic routes for navigation with inherent risks.

Legal Dimensions. The challenges in having a uniform code of conduct lies in different interpretations of the laws and conventions by thoseinvolved. The concept of Freedom of the seas has been challenged in different parts of the world. The United convention on the laws of the seas26 (UNCLOS) though has been ratified by the majority of the nation‘s still has one major super power who has chosen not to ratify the UNCLOS though it has signed the same.

Then there are issues of resolving the rules for limiting military intervention by international bodies. This requires better understanding and clear definition at the International, regional and national levels while acknowledging that International codes and agreed protocols need to be respected. There is also an immediate need tosynchronise national laws with laws promulgated by UN and IMO27particularly in the case of armed robbery and piracy.

In the light of the above, it is clear that the challenges for the IN have changed due to the nature and scale maritime developments in the new world .The new era has brought us back to revisit concerns on safety and security at sea, illegal immigration, environmental degradation, piracy, asymmetric threats, Proliferation and WMD which requires the application of sea-power.

The need for greater safe-guards, intelligent use of technology, Rules of Engagement, Best practices essential to prevent recurrences can hardly be overemphasized. An optimum utilisation of the Blue, Green and the Brown water maritime forces for a major maritime power in the making is inevitable.

The maritime challenges in the new era for a BWN in any part of the world are here to stay and requires coordinated, collaborative efforts by all nations to ensure maritime equilibrium .India has all the constituents to be a major maritime power but mere possession of a BWN without exercising its potential for achieving national goals and objectives is a serious matter.Not just the capability but the intention that flows from the politico military leadership will decide on the effectiveness of India as a maritime power.

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

Here are some quotes from the participants of Milan28some years ago which reinforces the belief that nations around the world do look up to India to provide that effective leadership in the region.India unfortunately despite all attributes of a major naval power in the Indian Ocean Region, continues to be a reluctant power . It does demonstrate the steely resolve once in a while as discussed above, but for Indian Navy to discharge its current century obligations in the areas of influence, it needs political backing and leadership that has not risen to the occasion.

―Indian Ocean is your (India‘s) ocean. You need to man it. We are always looking for opportunity for joint exercises with Indian Navy, which is big in size,‖ Commodore Ross Smith, Maritime Component Commander New Zealand.

"Milan- is a joint exercise. We are looking at a joint task force against piracy in the region in which all these nations can contribute ―CO of RNAS Glenelgs.

The fact that India is losing out its maritime strategic space and advantage even in Maldives and Sri Lanka is a matter of great concern. This cannot be achieved only with the military but also has a lot to do with the style of political leadership which seems to be staggering at the moment. Once the immediate neighbourhood is secured, India should simultaneoulsly set its eyes on cementing its maritime relations in the East and South East. The refrain is that India should not only look east but act east. With the geographic clout and the developing international relation, India should now aim to be a strong responsible player in the Indo Pacific region.

Having been invaded and subjugated to colonial rule through the sea routes, India should be aware of the pitfalls in not recognizing the need to not only have a Blue Water Navy but also to use this arm effectively as an instrument of national will and aspiration.The nation and the people should never forget that ―Those who do not learn from history or condemned to repeat it ―

ENDNOTES :

1. MaryseJayasuriya’Terror and Reconciliation: Sri Lankan Anglophone Literature, 1983-2009, Lexington 2012 p 6

2. National Maritime Foundation newsletter volume 3 no 2 excerpts from the speech of Vice Admiral AK Chopra Commander in Chief of the ENC on Navies and Nations

3. Biplab Das Gupta’ European Trade and Colonial Conquest: Vol. 1 Anthem Press 2005, pp221-227

4. According to the latest definition of Defence Security Service of USA

5. Hiranandani, Transition to Triumph 1965-75 Lancer 2000 p129

6. BinaD’costa , Nationbuilding, Gender and War Crimes in South Asia, Routledge 2011.p99

7. JA Khan, Air Power And Challenges To Iaf APH Publishing 2004,p168

8. http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/when-india-drew-top-secret-red-line-in-mauritius/article4493495.ece

9. http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/indian-navy/38974-how-indian-navy-averted-coup-seychelles.html

10. Admiral GM Hiranandani Transition to Eminence Lancer Publications 2005 p 183

11. ibid p 430

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

12. Peter Lehr ‘Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism’ Routledge 2007 pp29-30

13. Piracy Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits Graham Gerard Ong Webb ISEAS publishing 2006 p5-6

14. As reported by the National Bar Association of India http://www.nationalbarindia.org/news/64/piracy-bill-2012- introduced-in-lok-sabha/

15. Vijay Sakhuja Asian Maritime Power in the 21st Century Strategic Transactions, ISEAS Publishing 2011 p 197

16. Mahendra Gaur Foreign Policy Annual 2006,Kalpaaz publications p 47

17. Ashley Tellis ‘Asia Responds To Its Rising Powers: China and India” National Bureau of Asian Research 2011 p 113

18. Ibid p 113-114

19. Geoffry Till Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First CenturyRoutledge 2013 revised edition p 326

20. Mandip Singh IDSA Analysis carried on Mar 18,2013 vide http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ChinasDefenceBudget2013-14_msingh_180313

21. SPs Military year book Vol 37 p 211 Guide Publication India 2007

22. Indian Coast Guard has complete responsibility for Maritime SAR as highlighted in the link and also the map at http://www.indiancoastguard.nic.in/

23. George J. RefutoEvolution of the Us Sea-Based Deterrent: War Fighting CapabilitiesXlibris corporation USA p 281- 287

24. Indian Defence Review ,Jul-Sep 2012 Vol 27.3 p 53

25. Ibid p 54

26. Harm Dotinga, Barbara Kwiatkowska ‘International Organizations and the Law of the Sea: Documentary Yearbook .Kluver Law International p 17

27. P. Fabbri ‘Ocean Management in Global Change’ Elsavier Science Publishers Ltd 2005 pp315-317

28. Admiral ArunPrakash‘From the Crow’s nest ‘,Lancer India 2007 p 168

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FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

France as a Pertinent and Significant Indian Ocean Player

Christian BOUCHARD and William CRUMPLIN Laurentian University (Canada)

Dr. Christian Bouchard Full Professor, Department of Environmental Studies, Laurentian University PhD in Geography (Université Laval, Québec, Canada)

Dr. William W. Crumplin Associate Professor, Department of Environmental Studies, Laurentian University PhD in Geography (Queen’s University, Kingston, Canada)

Dr. Bouchard and Dr. Crumplin have been working together in the last few years on the Indian Ocean Geopolitics in general and on France in the Indian Ocean in particular. Among other contributions, see: - Bouchard C. and W. Crumplin (2010) « Neglected no longer: the Indian Ocean at the forefront of world geopolitics and global geostrategy », Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 6, No. 1, June 2010, pp. 27- 49; and - Bouchard C. and W. Crumplin (2011) « Two faces of France: ‘France of the Indian Ocean’/‘France in the Indian Ocean’ », Journal of the Indian Ocean Region (Taylor & Francis Group / Indian Ocean Research Group), vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 161-182. ______

France‘s strong relations with the Indian Ocean Region have developed over four centuries, and have evolved greatly during the second half of the 20th century when its role changed from being a traditional colonial power (metropole-colonies) to becoming a neocolonial and global power type (influence, interference, intervention). Today, France remains deeply involved in the Indian Ocean geopolitical arena where it positions itself as both a legitimate regional state (France of the Indian Ocean) and an external great power whose national interests and international commitments extend widely into the region (Bouchard and Crumplin 2011a).

In fact, France‘s presence and involvement in the Indian Ocean is even now taking on a new dimension in the wake of The French White Paper on Defence and National Security of 2008 (France, 2008) and of

FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

France‘s Southern Indian Ocean Blue Book of 2011 (France, 2011). However, as noted by de Paiva

(2011, p. 1), ―while current French tactics will increase France‘s influence in the Indian Ocean region in the short- and medium-terms, it is likely to lose influence over the longer term‖, as a result of growing presence and involvement from rising regional and foreign powers, especially India and China. This paper provides an overview of France‘s recent and current roles in the Indian Ocean Region and offers rationale for its continued and varied activities and responsibilities in the region.

France’s national interests and geostrategic considerations

France has national and strategic interests that extend globally due to many factors, including it being a rich nation which seeks to keep its high standard of living, a main economic and military European power, a nuclear power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, as well as a state expanding its national territory to many remote overseas territories. It is in this general and wider context that we have to consider France‘s involvement in the Indian Ocean. As pointed out by Boquérat

(2003, p. 244), ‗France does consider that it has a specific role to play in the Indian Ocean, not just due to its territorial possessions, but because it is an ocean strategically and economically important bordering unstable countries‘.

This was formally recognized in The French White Paper on Defence and National Security of 2008 which provides a global strategic analysis up to the 2025 horizon and defines a new national security and defence strategy. Military presence in the Indian Ocean is considered of prime national interest as part of the geostrategic axis where France intends to mainly position its forces abroad in the coming two decades. This axis runs from the Northeast Atlantic Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Northwest Indian Ocean (France, 2008, p. 72), from which some extensions of its military presence in Asia are possible. Following recent major evolutions in the world geopolitical and geostrategic context and acknowledging implications for France, the White Paper on Defence and

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National Security is under review; but in the light of the published preparatory document for the update of the White Paper (France 2012), it is clear that France‘s involvement in, and military commitment to the Indian Ocean should not be downscaled in the short term.

In terms of its military presence in the Indian Ocean Region, France is unique with its three regional commands, namely ALINDIEN1 which includes the French maritime forces in the Indian Ocean

Maritime Zone and the French forces in the United Arab Emirates (FFEAU)2, the COMFOR Djibouti3 for the French forces in Djibouti (FFDj)4, and the COMSUP FAZSOI5 for the French army forces in the

Southern Indian Ocean Zone (FAZSOI) that are based mostly in Réunion but also in Mayotte. In brief,

ALINDIEN and COMFOR Djibouti can definitively be seen as instruments of France as an external great power while the FAZSOI can be seen as more legitimate regional forces firstly serving and protecting the interests of ‗France of the Indian Ocean‘, even though it also contributes to serve and protect France‘s general interests in both the Region of Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian

Ocean (ESA-IO Region) and the Southern Indian Ocean. French forces are also greatly involved in military cooperation (such as with the military of the IOC and SADC state members) and collective military operations (such as the ongoing Operation Atalanta and the Combined Task Force 150 that are involved in fighting maritime piracy in the Northwest Indian Ocean). France is also committed through bilateral military agreements with Comoros (1978), Djibouti (1977, 1991, 2011), Kuwait (1992), Qatar

(1994, 1998), and United Arab Emirates (1995), and maintains other defence cooperative relationships with almost every other Indian Ocean Rim state (Burma and Iran being the exceptions).

France‘s very important military involvement in the Indian Ocean is a testament of its will to contribute significantly to peace, security and stability in the region (Dufourcq 2012); which France links to its international duties as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, but also largely originates from its own vested national interests and more generally those of Europe and the western developed world.

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Among other issues of great importance for France in the Indian Ocean are energy security (oil flow from the Persian Gulf), maritime security (piracy, terrorism), sales of weapons and military equipments/technologies (France is one of the main supplier to the region, including fighter jets, helicopters, ships and submarines), civil nuclear developments (uranium, technologies, management) and military nuclear issues (proliferation, safety).

In recent years, France has been deepening its relations with several Persian Gulf states (United Arab

Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait), African littoral and Islands states (bilateral and multilateral relations), Singapore and Australia, as well as being a major foreign player in Afghanistan since 2001 and strongly involved in the Iran nuclear issues as well as in maritime security in the Northwest Indian

Ocean (including the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf). In addition, France is also now developing its bilateral relationship with India, which has implications for its relations with Pakistan. In the new world geopolitical context of the 21st century, France and India both have an interest to deepen bilateral relations and build a longstanding friendly and wide-ranging relationship. As noted by Racine (2002, p.

161), ―India and France are not simply expanding bilateral ties, but pursuing a dialogue on global issues‖. This recent interest follows many decades of timid and limited relations which occurred prior to the 1998 strategic partnership deals concluded between the two states after which relations began to evolve drastically (Racine 2002, Boquérat 2004, Tripathi 2013). For France‘s relevance and influence in the Indian Ocean Region, India appears to be pivotal as it offers a great deal of economic and strategic opportunities. For India, France offers a credible strategic partner and ally in India‘s quest for regional and global power recognition, in addition to offering some balance of influence between the United

States and China as well as serving as a strategic partner in regards to its complex relations with

Pakistan. However, as noted by Tripathi (2013, p. 400), ―India‘s relationship with France is still uncertain and revolves around certain challenging issues such as [a comprehensive] nuclear deal, [a]

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Security Council permanent membership [for India] and terrorism relating to Pakistan‖, as well as

French sales of weapons and military equipments to Pakistan.

In sum, considering its prime geostrategic and geopolitical interests, France has made the choice to remain deeply involved in the Indian Ocean Region. Among other things, this means maintaining a credible permanent military presence in the Northwest Indian Ocean, participating in multilateral military operations, pursuing its commitment to peace, security and stability in the region, deepening and strengthening its relations with India, as well as developing the regional integration of its Indian

Ocean territories (France of the Indian Ocean).

France of the Indian Ocean and the Southern Indian Ocean Maritime Zone

The second leg of France‘s outreach in the Indian Ocean rests on its island territories (Figure 1 and

Table 1) and their regional integration to the Southwest Indian Ocean island community and to the

Region of Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean (Bouchard and Crumplin 2011b), as well as on its maritime ambitions in the Southwest and Southern Indian Ocean where the islands are located.

These island territories include Réunion and Mayotte (the only inhabited islands), respectively part of the Mascarene and Comoros archipelagos 6, the Crozet Islands, Kerguelen Islands and Saint-Paul &

Amsterdam Islands in the Southern Indian Ocean, as well as the Bassas da India atoll, the Glorioso

Islands, Juan de Nova, Europa Island and Tromelin Island which are located around Madagascar and known as the Scattered Islands (in French îles Éparses) 7 Altogether, these island territories serve as the heart of the emerging concept of ‗France of the Indian Ocean‘ (in French France de l’océan Indien)8

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Figure 1. French territories and the Southern Indian Ocean Maritime Zone (Figure first published in Bouchard and Crumplin, 2013)

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Table 1. French island territories in the Indian Ocean

Claimed Land area Population Territory Status TS+EEZ (sq km) (2011) (sq km) (a) One of the five districts No permanent Crozet 352 562 000 of the FSAL Population One of the five districts No permanent Kerguelen 7,215 547 000 of the FSAL Population Overseas department Mayotte 374 205,000 62 000 and region Overseas department Réunion 2,512 805,000 304 000 and region Saint-Paul and One of the five districts No permanent 62 506 000 Amsterdam of the FSAL Population Scattered Islands One of the five districts No permanent 44 692 000 (of the Indian Ocean) of the FSAL Population

(a) According to the Service hydrographique et océanographique de la marine (SHOM, 2013). FSAL: French Southern and Antarctic Lands (in French Terres australes et antarctiques françaises). The other district of the FSAL is Adélie Land (in French Terre Adélie) which corresponds to the French-claimed sector of Antarctica. TS: Territorial Sea. EEZ: Economic Exclusive Zone.

While these territories include a total population of one million people and 10,560 sq km in land area they, very importantly, result in France laying claim to more than 2.7 million sq km of exclusive economic zone9 as well as to some considerable extended continental shelf10. Despite its small size in population and land, as well as some sovereignty conflicts over Mayotte (with Comoros) and the

Scattered Islands (with Mauritius and Madagascar), this France of the Indian Ocean allows France (on behalf of its islands, especially Réunion Island, and often in conjunction with the European Union) to pursue an aggressive policy of regional integration and regional cooperation (bilateral and multilateral).

This is especially the case with its close island neighbors and the other African Indian Ocean coastal states within the Region of Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean (ESA-OI Region), in the context of the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) and the Southern African Development Community

(SADC), as well as at the ocean-wide level within the regional framework of the Indian Ocean Rim –

Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC).

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But France of the Indian Ocean is very much maritime in nature and the very importance of this maritime dimension has recently been recognized and formalized in the Southern Indian Ocean Blue

Book (France 2011), the French policy paper for maritime affairs in the south of the Indian Ocean which was realised in December 2011. The three main conceptual pillars for France of the Indian Ocean can be found in this document:

- first, the time has come for the different parts of this ‗France of the Indian Ocean‘ to think

collectively and to collaborate on regional issues;

- secondly, the sea and thus the maritime domain is the cement of this ‗France of the Indian Ocean‘;

and

- thirdly, maritime issues are at the heart of regional cooperation in the Southwest and Southern Indian

Ocean for both France (the state) and its island territories (France of the Indian Ocean), as is the

case within the framework of the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), the Nairobi Convention11 of

1985 and the Southwest Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission (SWIOFC), or by the way of specific

bilateral arrangements such as the case with Australia for the maritime areas adjacent to the French

southern island territories (Kerguelen, Crozet, and Saint-Paul and Amsterdam), Heard Island and

the McDonald Islands (Gullet and Schofield 2007, IEA 2007).

The Southern Indian Ocean Blue Book sets out France‘s vision for the next twenty years in what is defined by the French State as the Southern Indian Ocean Maritime Zone (SIOMZ, in French Zone maritime sud de l’océan Indien), an area of 22 million sq km extending from the Equator to the 60° latitude South (Figure 1). The Blue Book provides the basis for a number of mid and long-term initiatives planned by the French public authorities in this part of the world. These initiatives will cover maritime governance, economic development in the fishing and energy industries, education and protection of the natural marine environment, research and innovation in marine sciences, and

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government action to defend France‘s sovereign interests in the region. Some initiatives are achievable in the short to mid terms, such as the establishment of the Southern Indian Ocean Basin Overseas

Maritime Council (to manage and coordinate French actions in the SIOMZ) and the creation of a protected marine areas network in the French Indian Ocean Territories. Other initiatives will require more time to develop, such as the exploration of fossil and mineral resources or the development of renewable forms of marine energy.

Thus, in the Southwest and Southern Indian Ocean, France is now reaffirming its territorial presence and looks forward to a better political and economic regional integration of its islands, as well as further developing its maritime ambitions in the region. If the time when the Southwest Indian Ocean island community could be seen as a French pré-carré is past, these ongoing developments support France‘s position and significance in the Region of Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean (where it also serves as an active and valuable link between the regional states and regional multilateral institutions and the European Union). It is of great importance for France to adopt positions of influence and intervention in this part of the Indian Ocean as it protects and enhances its political, economic, cultural and territorial interests. This is particularly important and timely given the complexities that are developing in the region due to expanding interests from other great powers, such as India, China and the United States that are all fast expanding their relations with, and playing a larger role in, the area

(Pathak 2009, Brewster 2010, Pant 2013).

Conclusion

With its island territories and their adjacent waters (forming France of the Indian Ocean), France is a very unique case in the Indian Ocean being both a legitimate regional state and a very involved foreign great power. As a result, we find two different but complementary axes of its action in, and commitment to, the region. Firstly, France seeks to secure a strong regional presence and maintain some significant

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influence in the Southwest and Southern Indian Ocean, which means moving towards a better economic and political regional integration of its island as well as developing its maritime ambitions in the area

(including making a leading contribution to regional cooperation on maritime affairs). Secondly, France, as a great power pursuing its own national interests as well as assuming its international responsibilities as a UN Security Council permanent member, seeks to remain involved, influential and relevant in a volatile region of great economic and geostrategic significance (Rumley and Chaturvedi 2004, Rumley

2013), which can be achieved by keeping a credible military presence in the Northwest Indian Ocean and developing a strong relation with India.

Thus, France is willing and prepared to remain strongly engaged in the Indian Ocean, an ocean that

―already forms center-stage for the challenges of the twenty-first century‖ (Kaplan 2009, p. 17) and that is now at the forefront of world geopolitics and global strategy (Bouchard and Crumplin 2010). France might not be as powerful and influential in the Indian Ocean as other great powers such as the United

States, India, Australia and China, but as demonstrated in this paper, it is still today a pertinent and significant Indian Ocean player (especially active in the Southwest and Northwest Indian Ocean), and should remain so for some time.

References

Boquérat G. (2003), ‗French interests in Indian Ocean Region and the relevance of India‘, Journal of Indian Ocean Studies, Vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 234-246.

Bouchard C. and W. Crumplin (2010), ‗Neglected no longer: the Indian Ocean at the forefront of world geopolitics and global strategy‘, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 26-51.

Bouchard C. and W. Crumplin (2011a), ‗Two faces of France: France of the Indian Ocean / France in the Indian Ocean‘, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 161-182.

Bouchard C. and W. Crumplin (2011b), ‗Regionalism: the experience of the South-West Indian Ocean Islands‘ in Sakhuja V. (ed.), Reinvigorating IOR-ARC, New Delhi: Pentagon Press, pp. 27-59.

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Bouchard C. and W. Crumplin (2013), ‗The Marine nationale in the Southern Indian Ocean Maritime Zone‘, forthcoming in Forbes, A. (ed.) The Naval Contribution to National Security and Prosperity (Proceedings of the Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Conference 2012). Canberra (Australia): Sea Power Centre.

Brewster, D. (2010), ‗An Indian sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean?‘, Security Challenges, Vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 1-20. de Paiva, B. (2011), France: National Involvement in the Indian Ocean Region. West Perth (Australia): Future Directions International, Strategic Analysis Paper, 6 p.

Dufourcq, J. (2012), ‗La France et les enjeux stratégiques de l‘océan Indien‘ (Entretien avec l‘amiral Jean Duforucq), Hérodote, no. 145, p. 21-29.

France (2008), The French White Paper on Defence and National Security. New York and Paris: Odile Jacob Publishing Corporation and Documentation Française, 336 p.

France (2011), Livre bleu sud océan Indien. Paris: MEDDTL (Ministère de l‘écologie, du développement durable, des transports et de du logement) and MIOMCTI (Ministère de l‘intérieur, de l‘outre-mer, des collectivités territoriales et de l‘immigration), 99 p. [A simplified English version of this document exists and can be found online under the title of The Southern Indian Ocean Blue Book, 79 p., http://www.reunion.pref.gouv.fr, accessed March 22nd, 2013]

France (2012), The international and strategic evolutions faced by France: Preparation document for the update of the White Paper on Defence and National Security. Paris: secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale (SGDSN), 77 p.

Green, M. J. and A. Shearer (2012), ‗Defining U.S. Indian Ocean Strategy‘, The Washington Quarterly (Center for Strategic and International Studies), Vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 175-189.

Gullet, W. and C.H. Schofield (2007), ‗Pushing the Limits of the Law of the Sea Convention: Australian and French Cooperative Surveillance and Enforcement in the Southern Ocean‘. International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 22 (4), pp. 545-583

IEA (2007), ‗Agreement on Cooperative Enforcement of Fisheries Laws between the Government of Australia and the Government of the French Republic in the Maritime Areas Adjacent to the French Southern and Antarctic Territories, Heard Island and the McDonald Islands‘. International Environmental Agreements Database Project, available online at: http://iea.uoregon.edu/pages/view_treaty.php?t=2007- CoopEnforcementFisheriesAustraliaFrance.EN.txt&par=view_treaty_html (accessed March 25th, 2013)

Kaplan, R. D. (2009), ‗Center stage for the twenty-first century‘. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, Iss. 2 (Mar/Apr 2009), pp. 16-32.

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Pant, H. V. (2013), ‗Island Nations Play China, India: China‘s new ties with Maldives, Seychelles, Sri Lanka sink India‘s influence over Indian Ocean‘, YaleGlobal Online (Yale Center for the Study of Globalization), available online at: http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/island-nations-play-china-india (accessed March 26th, 2013).

Pathak, V. (2009), ‗China and Francophone Western Indian Ocean Region: Implications for Indian Interests‘, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol 3., no. 4., pp. 79-102.

Racine, J.-L. (2002), ‗The Indo-French Strategic Dialogue: Bilateralism and World Perceptions‘, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 25, no. 4, 157-191.

Rumley, D., ed. (2013), The Indian Ocean Region: Security, Stability and Sustainability in the 21st Century. Carlton (Melbourne, Australia): Australia India Institute, Task Force on Indian Ocean Security, 128 p.

Rumley, D. and S. Chaturvedi, eds. (2004), Geopolitical Orientations, Regionalism and Security in the Indian Ocean, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 336 p.

SHOM (2011), ‗Espaces maritimes sous juridiction française‘. Brest (France): Service hydrographique et océanographique de la marine, available online at: http://www.shom.fr/les- activites/projets/delimitations-maritimes/espaces-francais/ (accessed March 22nd, 2013).

Tripathi, A. (2011), ‗India-France relations during the UPA regime: Emerging trends, issues and challenges‘, FPRC Journal, Issue No. 13 (India-EU Relations), pp. 399-415.

Endnotes

1. Stands for ‘Amiral commandant la zone maritime de l'océan Indien’, in English ‘French Forces Joint Commander in the Indian Ocean’.

2. In French ‘Forces françaises aux Émirats arabes unis (FFEAU)'.

3. Stands for ‘Commandant des Forces françaises stationnées à Djibouti’, in English ‘French Forces Joint Commander in Djibouti’.

4. In French ‘Forces françaises stationnées à Djibouti (FFDj)’.

5. Stands for ‘Commandant supérieur (COMSUP) des forces armées dans la zone sud de l’océan Indien (FASZOI)’, in English ‘Commanding General French Army Forces in the Southern Indian Ocean Zone’.

6. The Mascarene Islands mainly comprise the three islands of Réunion, Mauritius and Rodrigues. The Comoros Islands mainly comprise the three larger islands of the Union of the Comoros, namely Ngazidja (in French Grande Comore), Ndzwani (in French Anjouan), and Mwali (in French Mohéli), as well as the French-administered island of Mayotte (or Maore).

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7. Officially the Scattered Islands in the Indian Ocean (in French Îles Éparses de l'océan Indien). This is the official name of the FSAL’s district established in 2007 by a decree from the Prefect High Commissioner of the FSAL (Arrêté 2007-18 bis du 23 février 2007 portant création du district des îles Éparses de l’océan Indien).

8. “This is not a new political status, and there is actually no plan to progress towards the fusion of Réunion, Mayotte, the Scattered Islands and the other parts of the FSAL into a unique territory. However, until now, these different island entities have mainly evolved separately, in isolated manners, and, as a result, there is a current and great need for more coordination and cooperation between them. This ‘France of the Indian Ocean’ is definitively part of the Indian Ocean Region, is a very significant stakeholder in the Southwest and Southern Indian Ocean’s affairs, and contributes greatly to France’s and even Europe’s influence in these regions.” (Bouchard and Crumplin, 2011a, page 162).

9. A claimed EEZ larger than that of India (2.3 million sq km), Seychelles (1.3 million sq km), Mauritius (1.3 million sq km) or Madagascar (1.2 million sq km).

10. In regards to extension of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in the south of Réunion, as well as around Crozet Is, Kerguelen Is and Saint-Paul & Amsterdam Is, official requests and documentation have been submitted, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (pursuant to article 76, paragraph 8, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982). (source: CLCS, “Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf Web Page ”, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm, accessed on 30 June 2011)

11. The Nairobi Convention for the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Eastern African Region.

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India-China Maritime Cooperation – Untying a ‘Gordian’ Knot

Abhijit Singh

Senior Research Fellow , National Maritime Foundation (NMF) New Delhi

(Abhijit Singh is a Senior Research Fellow at the National Maritime Foundation (NMF). He looks geopolitical developments in West Asia, littoral security in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and nuclear issues in South Asia. He has, through his commentaries and articles on the emerging geo-political dynamic in the Middle East and the rapidly deteriorating security situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan, carried out a measured assessment of the strategic threats for India. The thrust of his efforts has been in studying security from a maritime perspective. He has authored authoritative papers on “Iran’s Conventional and Unconventional Naval Forces”, "the Evolution of the Pakistan Navy” and "Pakistan navy's nuclear ambitions". His articles have been published in the IDSA’s Journal of Defence Studies and on the renowned international news and analyses web portal ‘World Politics Review’. Abhijit also assisted the erstwhile offical historian if the Indian Navy, late Vice Admiral GM Hiranandani (Retd), in the authorship of the third volume of Indian Naval History “Transition to Guardianship”)

______

At the end of the BRICS summit in New Delhi last year there were reports that India and China had decided to upgrade their maritime cooperation, and were even looking at starting a maritime dialogue1 In the months since then, the subject of naval outreach and maritime collaboration between the two countries has been much speculated and debated over. On the ground, both sides have made a tentative exploratory start in bringing about a maritime convergence. Yet, neither has been very successful in building the critical momentum required for creating meaningful nautical synergy.

Analysts wonder why this has been so, given the tremendous potential for cooperation between two of the biggest naval powers in the Indo-Pacific, and the vast correspondence of interest in the maritime realm. The answer, perhaps, lies in understanding each side‟s anxieties and dilemmas about the other‟s intent and ambition in the maritime realm - not because the divergences present insurmountable obstacles, but that without knowing the exact nature of the strategic dissonances, efforts at building a maritime partnership could prove futile.

China’s Presence in the Indian Ocean

Regional observers often point to the peculiar dynamic of India-China relations, with elements of both cooperation and competition. Nowhere is this truer, they aver, than in the maritime realm where mutual misgivings have hobbled initiatives meant to provide impetus to an essentially lukewarm relationship. Indeed, despite their obvious political differences, India and China have, for some time now, been trying to find ways to improve their maritime cooperation. Buoyed by collaboration between the Indian Navy and PLA (N) in fighting Somali piracy, senior Indian government functionaries have expressed optimism about expanding synergies on maritime matters.

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Leading the „optimists‟ is India‟s National Security Advisor, Shiv Shankar Menon, who at a recent book release function stated that “India-China maritime rivalry is not inevitable”2 Reacting to analysis presaging continuing conflict between the two Asian powers in the maritime realm, Menon remarked that he was convinced there was ample space and opportunity for the two nations to grow and collaborate together.

India‟s strategic community, however, isn‟t easily persuaded. New Delhi‟s maritime experts still haven‟t been able to come to terms with China‟s growing ambition and expanding influence in the Indian Ocean. The handover of the Gwadar port in Baluchistan has only served to confirm their suspicions about Beijing‟s intensions of establishing a permanent presence in the Indian Ocean3 - maybe even a naval base, going by the proclamations of the Pakistan Navy.

China‟s maritime cooperation with Pakistan continues to be strong. The Pakistan Navy has been receiving some of the best naval platforms from China, including the F 22 Ps (Zulfiqar class) ships and the Azmat class fast attack missile craft4. Beijing fielded one of the strongest contingents in Pakistan Navy‟s recent Aman-13 exercises. On its way to Somali waters for escort missions, the Chinese 14th convoy fleet participated in the Aman-13 maritime exercises - displaying unequivocally, the camaraderie and solidarity that China shares with Pakistan.

India‟s prime concern, however, is China increasing influence in the Indian Ocean Region. While Beijing's aggressiveness in the South China Sea does not directly affect India, PLA Navy‟s forays into the Indian Ocean do cause real anxiety, also lending credence to speculation that China would soon establish a permanent naval presence (if not an old-fashioned „naval base‟) in the Indian Ocean5 The realists point to the increasing size of China‟s anti-piracy maritime contingents deployed off Somalia and Beijing‟s purposeful endeavours to build port infrastructure in many Indian Ocean states. Their bleak prognosis is only vindicated by reports such as the one that recently revealed China‟s commitment of an astounding sum of $ 10 billion towards developing the Tanzanian port of Bagamayo6. China‟s recent economic and diplomatic thrust in Afghanistan only makes the China-domination theory more compelling, indicating a possibility of greater Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean.

China’s recent assertiveness in the South China Sea

For the Indian Navy, the new diplomatic initiative for greater maritime cooperation with China has come at a time when the security environment in the Western-Pacific has been deteriorating rapidly. Beijing is embroiled in a raging dispute with several Southeast Asian countries (Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan) over islands, atolls, reefs, and shoals in the South China Sea. A series of face-offs in the past two years involving China on the one hand, and Vietnam, Philippines and Japan on the other, have underscored China‟s touchiness over territoriality issues. But the sheer stridency of the Chinese response – especially in its stand-off with Japan over the Senkaku islands - also demonstrates the visceral nature of the maritime rivalry in the region.

Despite criticism, China has been unwilling to change its hard-line approach, shunning conciliation and any form of multilateral consensus; with the result that confrontation over maritime features in the South China Sea has been occurring with an almost predictable regularity. Following the bitter impasse over the Senkaku Islands, came news of the appearance of a Chinese navy flotilla at James Shoal, an island chain 1120 miles from the Chinese mainland7 The shoal is only 50 miles off the coast of Malaysia that also asserts claim over the feature. As a fully equipped PLA amphibious task force reached China's southernmost claimed possession in the South China Sea, it raised eyebrows across the region. Beijing‟s activities seem eerily familiar to its actions near the Scarborough shoal last year when a dispute with Philippines had erupted.

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The Chinese military drills in the southernmost part of the sea are also illustrative of Chinese wariness about the Obama administration's "Asia Pivot," which seeks to refocus U.S. defense assets from the Middle East to East Asia. But while China continues to cast a wary eye America‟s presence in the Pacific, it also uses the „rebalance‟ as a pretext for greater Chinese assertiveness in the Pacific and beyond. An „insecure‟ and uncompromising maritime giant with both regional and extra-regional ambitions is worrisome prospect for India that has watched the disputes in the South China Sea and East Asia play out from the sidelines with some trepidation.

Reorganization of Maritime Agencies

China‟s recent moves to tighten administrative and organizational control over territory and maritime agencies reorganization of maritime agencies have only added to regional concerns. The revamped command structure is aimed at merging four major maritime law enforcement forces - the China Marine Surveillance, the old Coast Guard of the Ministry of Public Security, the Fishery Administration of the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Maritime Anti-smuggling Police of the General Administration of Customs – into a unified China Coast Guard, to be placed under the State Oceanic Administration8

The new organ is responsible for the deliberation and coordination of China‟s maritime policy and will consist of senior officials across the political and military spectrum, including the State Oceanic Administration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Agriculture, and the PLA Navy. Chinese analysts have been at pains to depict the reorganization as an administrative measure meant solely to improve maritime law enforcement and better protect China‟s maritime rights and interests.

Regional states see the reorganization as another attempt to consolidate influence and radiate power in the maritime zones. For them, this is of a piece with the formation of the new Chinese military garrison9 at Sansha city in June 2012, and purposeful measures taken to assert administrative control over the South China Sea.

Chinese apprehensions

While some in India see China‟s gradual maritime advancement as eventually challenging its own dominant status in the Indian Ocean, Beijing has its own skeptics with misgivings about New Delhi‟s existing maritime partnership with Washington and its emerging ties with Tokyo. The doubters make much of India‟s JIMEX exercises10 with the Japan Maritime Self Defence Force (JMSDF) in June last year, as well as the India-Japan maritime dialogue held in February this year. While India has emphasized that much of its maritime cooperation with Japan and other naval powers is in the nature of non-traditional maritime exercises, China‟s hard-liners are not completely convinced. With the US describing India, a bit exaggeratedly, as a “lynchpin” of America‟s new maritime strategy for the Indo- Pacific11 Beijing‟s realists argue India must be seen as a key component of an emerging strategic maritime compact with the US and Japan12.

Then, there is also the matter of India‟s participation in oil and gas exploration activities off Vietnam in the South China Sea that China vehemently opposes. In Dec 2012, China cautioned India against any "unilateral" attempt to pursue oil exploration in the disputed South China Sea, saying that it was opposed „outside‟ nations intervening in the disputed area13. India‟s assurances that its activities were purely commercial in nature failed to impress the Chinese leadership. New Delhi‟s strategists express doubts if Beijing would ever countenance any Indian commercial activity or maritime outreach in the Western Pacific, even if India were to openly accept China as a legitimate stakeholder of security in the Indian Ocean.

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Towards Maritime Cooperation

Yet, there are many in India and China who see no other way but for the two nations to cooperate in the maritime realm – especially in the non-traditional domain14 While it may be unrealistic to expect India and China to come together expeditiously for joint protection of the SLOCs, there is definitely a case for cooperation on irregular security issues such as disaster relief, transnational crime, climate-induced migration and illegal fishing.

In 2012, when a flotilla of Indian ships visited a Shanghai as part of a visit to Southeast Asia it was warmly received. The Deputy Commander of the Chinese East Sea Fleet, Rear Admiral Gu Xiangping, called for “enhancing trust and understanding” between the militaries and navies of India and China, and increasing the frequency of interactions15. In what was described as a reflection of the importance China accorded to the visit of Indian naval ships, the PLA Navy sent the highest ranked official in charge of the East Sea fleet, Vice Admiral Su Zhiqian, to hold talks with Vice Admiral Anil Chopra, Flag Officer Commanding in Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, who came in from India only for the port calls in China and Japan. Impressed by Chinese warmth and earnest zeal for closer maritime relations, Admiral Chopra remarked he was enthused by the visit of Chinese training ship Zheng He to Kochi in May 201216and hoped more Chinese navy ships would visited India in the future.

Significantly, there is tacit acknowledgement in India – both at a political and military level - of the fact that China‟s push into the Indian Ocean may well be an inevitable consequence of its search for new resources and markets. India is also conscious that an increase in trade and economic interaction with China has seen the latter assume the role of an Indian suitor. But cooperative maritime relations also comports well with New Delhi‟s “Look East” and Beijing‟s new „March West‟ strategy that gives primacy to India and South Asia17

So far, the only area where India and China have been holding substantive cooperation is in combating pirates in the Indian Ocean. But with a positive momentum slowly building up in favour of greater interaction and cooperation, it may only be matter of time before which the two sides come together in the maritime domain for greater regional good.

END NOTES

1. “BRICS meet: India, China agree on maritime cooperation”, India Today, Mar 29, 2012 at: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/india-china-agree-on-maritime-cooperation/1/179945.html 2. India China Maritime Rivalry is not inevitable, Rediff News, at http://www.rediff.com/news/special/china-india- maritime-rivalry-is-not-inevitable/20130325.htm

3. “China‟s control of Gwadar will deter India”, Hindustan Times Report, Feb 22, 2013

4. “Pakistan Navy will be handed over fourth F 22 P frigate in April 2013”, Pak Tribune, Mar 20, 2013 at http://paktribune.com/news/Pakistan-Navy-will-be-handed-over-4th-F-22-P-Frigate-in-April-2013-258352.html

5. C Raja Mohan, Samudra Mantha - Sino-India Rivalry in the Indian Ocean”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012

6. C Raja Mohan, “Tanzanian Pearl”, C Raja Mohan at http://m.indianexpress.com/news/tanzanian-pearl/1093744/

7. PLA Navy amphibious task force reaches Malaysia to defend South China sea', South China Morning Post, April 3, 2013 at http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1200564/pla-navy-amphibious-task-force-reaches-james-shoal-near- malaysia

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8. “China signals with Coast Guard overhaul”, Asia Times Online, Apr 3, 2013, at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/ China/CHIN-02-030413.html 9. “China approves military garrison for disputed islands”, BBC News, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china- 18949941

10. “India Japan hold first naval exercise”, Zee News, June 09, 2012 http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/indo-japan- first-joint-naval-exercise-today_780682.html

11. “India linchpin of US maritime strategy in Indo-Pacific”, Asia Maritime Security, Oct 13, 2011 , at http://maritimesecurity.asia/free-2/maritime-security-asia/india-linchpin-in-us-strategy-in-asia-pacific-clinton/

12. “China FM responds to U.S.-India-Japan dialogue” People‟s Daily Online, Oct 31, 2012, at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/7997862.html

13. “China cautions India against oil exploration in South China Sea”, Times of India, Dec 05, 2012

14. Hong Nong, “Charting a Maritime Security Cooperation Mechanism in the Indian Ocean: Sharing Responsibilities among Littoral States and User States”, Strategic Analysis, Volume 36, Issue 3, May 2012

15. “Chinese Navy Calls for Trust building with India”, the Hindu, June 15, 2012, at http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/chinese-navy-calls-for-trust-building-with-india/article3529270.ece

16. “Chinese Navy Training Ship 'Zheng He' visits Kochi”, Press release. May 9, 2012, at http://indiannavy.nic.in/print/1324

17. “March West: China‟s Response to the U.S. Rebalancing”, Brookings Commentary, Jan 31. 2013

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Piracy and the Hazard of Marine Pollution in the Malacca Straits: The Potential Impact of Oil Spills

Amita Argawal

(Amita Agarwal has been teaching Political Science at the post graduate level for past 30 years in an affiliated college of the University of Rajasthan, Jaipur.

Currently she is on senior fellowship of the ICSSR, New Delhi.

Interested in Indian Ocean and Peace and Conflict resolution, over the years she has participated in many international conferences.

Her major publications include two books ( Indian Ocean and World Peace, and Indo - US Relations and Prospects of Peace in South West Indian Ocean) in addition to several research papers. She has participated in many national and international conferences within India and abroad.

Recipient of the Lee Hysan visiting Fellowship, Hong Kong she is working on editorial board of International Journal of Peace Education, Routledge,( ISSN 1740-0201) Taylor and Francis Group, UK. , US- CHINA Education Review ( ISSN1518-6613), David Publishing House, Illinois, USA and also has recently joined , Syllabus (ISSN 2163-31770), Journal of Rhodes Island College, USA, as a reviewer.)

______

The freedom of navigation is extremely important for international trade and the maintenance of this freedom is the duty of all sovereign states, notwithstanding their status as a maritime or user state. This freedom may be disrupted by the threats of piracy and maritime terrorism or by military action in times of conflict. The coastal as well as the user states have a common interest in the provision of services to ships that will improve the safety of navigation and reduce the incidence of marine casualties.

On balance, the statistics by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) show that the number of piratical attacks is increasing by the year. In particular, piracy at sea has become a serious problem especially at certain focal points around the world such as the Malacca Straits (which is flanked by Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore) in Southeast Asia. More than 50,000 ships pass through the strait each year, carrying 25 percent of the worlds trade goods and two-thirds of the worlds Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). Among other ships are oil tankers transporting a total of 11 million barrels per day or 14 percent of the world‘s daily needs.1 If the Straits were closed, nearly half the worlds fleet would be required to sail further generating substantial increase in the global demand for shipping and freight rates would increase immediately.

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Modern day piracy, in its various forms, has become a violent, bloody and ruthless practice and is made all the more fearsome by the knowledge on the part of victims that they are often alone and defenceless at sea, with little or no help waiting just round the corner. In the case of Southeast Asia, the IMB recorded 445 pirate attacks in 2003, the second highest since it began compiling data in 1992, and of these, about one third took place in Indonesian waters including the Malacca Straits. Though there has been a significant drop in reported piracy incidents in the region after patrolling began nonetheless this still remains an area infested with piracy accounting for 50 percent of all attacks. On top of stealing, maiming and killing, pirates endanger the safety of maritime navigation by leaving vessels—including fully laden tankers—without command when they board the vessel and apprehend the crew. This creates the potential for grounding or inter-ship collision that in turn, can lead to an environmental disaster. Potential environmental pollution in case of grounding or collision of oil tankers is a grave yet little emphasised and studied problem. Environmental pollution due to an oil spill may prove to be very difficult and expensive to manage after it actually happens. Despite the availability of sophisticated technologies in handling oil spillage, it may take a long time to restore the marine environment. In certain cases, it is even irreversible.

Notwithstanding certain past incidents of catastrophes at sea which have led to oil spills, the maritime community has been fortunate in general. However, the potential for a maritime ecological disaster can still turn into reality because on an average more than 100,000,000 tons of crude oil are shipped every month, often in huge tankers. As it is well known, there exists Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) or Ultra Large Crude Carriers (ULCCs) a few of which can hold as much as 500,000 tons of oil or liquefied natural gas (LNG). Indeed, tanker traffic has doubled in the past 15 years, an increase that in part reflects the rise in dependence of the United States on imported oil for 40 to 50 percent of its total consumption over the past two decades.2 With such heavy traffic there is always a risk of accidental spills (though such oil spillage from tankers are estimated only about five to ten percent of the total oil spills, natural and man-made that goes into the sea). The contamination of coastal areas is a common feature of past many spills that has lead to public disquiet as well as disruptions in business, tourist and recreational activities (as happened around Candolin beach in Goa, India).3

Oil and Marine Pollution Definitions The International Oceanographic Commission (IOC) for the United Nations Educational and Scientific Commission (UNESCO) defines marine pollution as:

[The] introduction by man directly or indirectly, of substances into the marine environment

(including estuaries) resulting in such deleterious effects such as harm to living resources, hazards

to human health or hindrance to marine activities.

The connotation of the above is that unless man introduces the pollutant, there is no pollution to speak of. Overall, ecological studies on marine pollution fall into three principal categories: (1) bio-geochemistry of pollutants; (2) marine eco-toxicology; and (3) biological principles of anti-pollution measures4 The bio- geochemistry of toxicants includes the investigations of the sources of pollutants, the pathways along which they

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enter the marine environment, patterns in accumulation with the biotic and antibiotic components of ecosystems, mechanisms and rates of migration of pollutants, their transformations and other processes which determine the fate of toxicants in the sea. An important, though not decisive stage in such investigations is the determination of the content of toxicants in marine organisms and communities. Marine eco-toxicology involves the study of biological effects and consequences of human interference with the composition of the marine environment. Such studies aim to yield an objective evaluation of present day ecological anomalies into the world‘s oceans and to make predictions of those likely to occur in the future. These studies could provide scientific foundation on which to base national and international efforts to preserve the seas from pollution. Anti-pollution measures could be based on the results of closely inter-linked eco-toxicological and bio-geochemical studies. In general, all pollutants could be divided in three basic categories: (1) the pathogenic; (2) the aesthetic; and (3) the ecomorphic.5 Pathogenic pollutants cause disease , which may be fatal if the pollutant contains certain toxins. In comparison, aesthetic pollutants cause a change in the environment displeasing to the human senses. Lastly, ecomorphic pollutants produce a change in the physical characteristics of the environment in such a way that there may be drastic changes in the structure on composition of the biosphere.

The Science of Oil and Marine Pollution

Oil spills into the ocean is one of the most destructive forms of marine pollution. Just thinking about oil pollution in the ocean conjures up images of massive tanker spills, oiled sea birds and shorelines covered with black oil. By simple definition, oil consists of an organic compound that is insoluble or not readily soluble in water. It could be either a petroleum-based product or a non-petroleum based one with both these categories comprising a number of different kinds of oil. However, here we are mainly concerned with two types of oil—crude oil and fuel oil—that can be spilled from the tankers. When spilled at sea, fuel oils normally wither away in a number of ways depending upon how persistent they are. Light products (such as kerosene) evaporate and dissipate quickly and naturally. Fuel oils generally do not need a clean up.In comparison, ‗persistent‘ oils such as crude oil need to be cleaned up from the ocean. The dissipation of oil depends on many factors such as amount and type of oil, the weather conditions and whether the spilled oil stays at sea or is washed ashore. In general, every time oil enters the sea a number of considerations decide the physical, chemical or biological degradation of the oil and potential environment damage of the spill or discharge, in that particular area: For example:

1. The composition and amount of oil discharged, 2. The quality and duration of the spill, 3. At which time of the year spill occurs, 4. The temperature of the air and the receiving water body, 5. The weather conditions, 6. The species composition in the affected area, 7. The properties of the shore line, 8. The amount of oil degrading microorganisms in the area, and 9. The supply of oxygen in the water.6

At the biochemical level, the dissipation of oil is a result of a number of chemical and physical processes that change the compounds initially constituting the oil when it was spilled. The processes are collectively known as weathering and are divided into eight parts:

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1. Spreading : As soon as oil is spilled, it starts to spread out over the sea surface, initially as a single slick. After a few hours the slick begins to break up and because of winds, wave action and water turbulence forms narrow bands or windrows parallel to the wind direction. The rate at which the oil spreads is also affected by the prevailing conditions such as temperature, water currents, tidal streams and wind speeds.

2. Evaporation: Lighter components of the oil evaporate into the atmosphere. The rate and amount of evaporation depends upon the volatility of the oil spilled. Oil with a higher percentage of light and volatile compound will evaporate more quickly than the one with a large amount of heavier compounds.

3. Dispersion: The speed at which an oil disperses is largely dependent upon the nature of the oil and the prevailing marine conditions; particularly, it occurs most quickly if the oil is light and of low viscosity, and if the sea is very rough.

4. Emulsification: An emulsion is formed when two liquids combine together, with one ending up suspended in the other. Emulsification of crude oils refers to the process whereby seawater droplets become suspended in the oil. The emulsion thus formed is usually very viscous and more persistent than the original oil. The formation of these emulsions causes the volume of pollutant to increase between three to four times and slows other processes that allow oil to dissipate.

5 Dissolution:

Water-soluble compounds in oil may dissolve into the surrounding water. This depends on the composition and state of the oil and occurs most quickly when the oil is finely dispersed in the water column.

6. Oxidation: Oils react chemically with oxygen either by breaking down into soluble products or by forming persistent compounds called tars. This processes is promoted by sunlight and the extent to which it occurs depends on the type of oil and the form in which it is exposed to the sunlight. This process is very slow. The formation of tars is caused by the oxidation of thick layer of high viscosity oils or emulsions. This process also forms an outer protective coating of heavy compounds, which results in the increased persistence of the oil as a whole.

7. Sedimentation: Some heavily refined products have densities greater than water and sink in fresh or brackish water. Sinking usually occurs due to the adhesion of particles of sediment or organic matter to the oil. Shallow waters are often laden with suspended solids providing favorable conditions for sedimentation. Oil stranded on sandy shorelines often becomes mixed with sand and other sediments. If this mixture is subsequently washed off the beach, back into the sea then it may sink. In addition, if the spilled oil catches fire, the residues that some times form can be sufficiently dense to sink.

8. Biodegradation:

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Seawater contains a range of micro-organisms or microbes that can partially or completely degrade oil to water-soluble compounds and eventually to carbon dioxide and water. Many types of microbes exist and each tends to degrade a particular group of compounds in crude oil.7

The main factors affecting the efficiency of bio-degradation are the amount of nutrients (nitrogen and phosphorus) available in the water, as well as the temperature and the level of oxygen present. As bio-degradation requires oxygen, this process can only take place at the oil-water interface since no oxygen is available within the oil itself. The creation of oil droplets either by natural or chemical dispersion increases the surface area of the oil and thus also increases the area available for bio-degradation to take place. The processes of spreading, evaporation, dispersion and dissolution are most important during the early stages of an oil spill whereas oxidation, sedimentation and biodegradation are more important later on and determine the ultimate fate of the oil spilled on the sea surfaces.

The effects of oil on marine life are caused by either the physical nature of the oil or by its chemical components.8 Marine life may also be affected by cleaning up operations or indirectly through physical damage to the habitats in which plants and animals live. In certain cases clean-up operations can prove to be more detrimental to the marine environment due to heavy use of chemicals that may have long-term.

The main threat posed to the surrounding ecosystem by the persistent residues of spilled oils and water in oil emulsions is one of physical smothering. The animals and plants most at risk are those that could come into contact with a contaminated sea surface. Marine mammals and reptiles, birds that feed by diving or from flocks on the sea, marine life on shorelines and animals and plants in meri-culture facilities.9A recent study has established that long-term effects of oil pollution are much more significant then earlier believed and it may take longer for the marine environment to recover from such disasters.10

Ability of individual marine organisms to reproduce, grow, feed or perform other functions can be impaired by prolonged exposure to a concentration of oil or oil components. Sedentary animals in shallow waters such as oysters, mussels and clams that routinely filter large volumes of sea water to extract food are specially likely to accumulate oil components. Whilst those components may not cause any immediate harm their presence may render such animals unfit for consumption. As a concern to the commercial fishing industry, an oil spill can directly damage the boats and gear used for catching or cultivating marine species.11 Floating equipment and fixed traps extending above the sea surface are more likely to become contaminated by floating oil whereas submerged nets, pots, lines and bottom trawls are usually well protected provided they are not lifted through an oily sea surface. Moreover an oil spill can cause loss of market confidence since the public may be unwilling to purchase marine products from the region irrespective of whether the sea food is tainted or not, thus resulting in a loss of revenue and the livelihood of small-scale fisherman.

The Rise of Oil Tankers

Two years after the discovery of America's ‗Black Gold‘ by Edwin Drake in 1861, a sailing ship, the Elizabeth Watt, full of barrels which seeped a tarry oil, crossed the Atlantic from Philadelphia to London, i. In 1873, the Tsar of Russia opened the oil fields of Caspian to prospectors. Later, a Swedish chemist named Alfred Noble—to which the Noble Prizes are named after today—began to use specially built ships to transport petroleum along the Volga and through the network of Russian rivers. In 1883, a railway began to carry oil from

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the Caspian to tankers on the Black Sea. In 1885, a steam ship christened the Glückauf was built in England for the specialized transport of mineral oils. It already had all the characteristic features of a modern tanker. The highly inflammable cargo was isolated both from the bow and engines by double iron buckheads; the hold was compartmentalised to avoid the uncontrolled movement of its liquid cargo. Pumps and flexible hoses were used to unload the oil in ports of destination.12

Overall, the rise of larger oil tankers has been geometric in scale. the oil tanker of 1900 seldom had a capacity of more than 5,000 tonnes. Towards the beginning of the first world war, they were able to reach a capacity of 10,000 tonnes The Emile Mugnet built in 1937 was considered a giant at 21,700 tonnes. Around 1945, the US constructed a series of 500 tankers of 16,000 tones each with pre-fabricated oil tanks, which was vital in sustaining it war effort against the Axis powers. From 28,000 tonnes in the 1950s, oil tankers have developed into their 130,000-tonne counterparts in 1960 and their 200,000-tonne brethren in 1969 (VLCC class), and now even to 300,000 tonnes (ULCC class) to meet the growing demand for oil supplies all over the world. The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 2000 report, ―Review of Maritime Transport‖, has noted that world sea-based trade recorded its fourteenth consecutive annual increase and Asia's Share of imports and exports was 26.1 and 18.8 percent respectively.13Given such trends, sea-based commerce offers a mood of great optimism but with this optimism are associated threats, both traditional and non-traditional as well as internal and external to SLOCs.14

The World Awakens to Maritime Oil Spills15 The world first woke up to the disastrous consequences of an oil spill when on 18 March 1967 the Liberian Tanker Tarry Canyon ran aground on the Southwest coast of Great Britain near the entrance to the English Channel, spilling 60,000 tonnes of crude oil into the sea. This spilled oil splattered onto 160 kilometres of coastline killing countless number of fish and birds. Similar accidents also occurred in:

Year Vessel Flag 1978 - Amico Cardiz - France

1989 - Exxon Valdez - US

1993 - The Braer - United Kingdom

1996 - The Sea Empress - United Kingdom

1999 - The Erica - France

In addition, the Indian coasts have also witnessed a few tanker disasters: 16

Year Vessel Flag 1973 - Cosmos Pioneer -Gujarat Coast, 3000 tonnes oil

spilled

1974 - Transhuron - Laccadives - 5,000 tonnes oil spilled

1989 - M.T. Puppy - 5,500 tonnes spilled, off Bombay

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The Geography of the Malacca Straits and the Potential Threat and Impact of Oil Spillage

The Malacca Straits stretches between the Indonesian island of Sumatra and Malaysia to the east and between the Riau Archipelago and Singapore to the South. The Straits separates the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian island of Sumatra and connects the Indian ocean with South China Sea.17 It is a sea link between Latitudes 6°N and 1°N from the Indian Ocean to the Singapore Strait and the South China Sea.18 The Malacca Straits is a funnel shaped waterway with extremely contrary physical features. On average, the southern part of the Straits could be said to have a width of about 30 miles across. North of it, the breadth is slightly wider at about 40 miles from shore to shore. The narrow part of the area between Medang and the Malayan shores varies between 20 and 25 miles in width over a distance of about 14 miles. To be more precise, its width varies from three nautical miles19at its narrowest passage near Singapore island (or 1.5 nautical miles near Phillip Channel or 2.5 nautical miles wide) to 300 nautical miles at its widest near the north western entrance between Sabang and the Kra Isthumas.20 The southern portion of the Straits are also quite narrow as the Channel is only 21 miles wide between Aruah Island (Latitude 2°53'N) and the coast of Sumatra. Further southward, it is about 20 miles between the adjacent islands of Medang and Rupat.21 Between Tanjong Tohor (latitude 1°51'N) on the Malayan coast and Tanjong Parit, the northeastern extreme of Bengkalis island off the Sumatra coast, the fairway narrows to a width of less than 26 miles over a distance of about 11 miles. The width is only 8.4 miles between Karimun island and Pulau Kukub at the southwestern tip of Malaysia.22 The Straits, at its narrowest passage near Singapore is only 3.2 miles wide. In comparison to its width, it is not possible to determine the exact length of the Straits; it could be anything between 300 nautical miles to 600 nautical miles. If we take its length from Ujong Massam Muka at the northwestern entrance to Tanjong Berakit at the southwestern entrance, then it covers a distance of over 600 nautical miles.23 The waterway would be 300 miles long if the length were taken from Singapore at the southern entrance to Telok Anson at the northern entrance. The Malacca Straits is quite shallow at some places. Reports from a hydrographic survey jointly conducted in 1970 by Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore noted that in the 330 square kilometres of the Philip channel surveyed, 37 points were found to be less than 23 metres deep.24 The Straits is up to 24 fathoms deep westward of the Aruah islands, but only between three and seven fathoms deep southward of these islands. Within about 13 miles of Aruah island the fairway has depths of 16 to 20 fathoms. Near the Aruah islands and at the southern end of North Sands there is a place called ‗One Fathom Bank‘.25 Southward, there is a dangerous 3¾ fathom patch. The width of the navigable channel here is about 4 miles. The Straits varies from 9½ to over 30 fathoms between Medang islands and Cape Rachado. There is, however, a dangerous shoal with 2½ fathoms of water over it near the middle.26 The depth once again varies from 13 to 26 fathoms between Tanjong Tohor on the Malayan coast, and Tanjong Parit, the north-eastern extreme of Bengkalis. Near the middle of the channel is long Bank, only about three fathoms deep. There are similar banks, some even shallower, between Long Bank and the islands close to Sumatra.

Commercially, the Straits of Malacca (and the Singapore Strait) is the second busiest waterways in the world used for international shipping too have seen four such reported incidents: 27

1. The grounding of Showa Maru in 1975 (3,3000 tons spilled); 2. The collision between Evoikos and Orapin Global in 1997 (28,500 tons spilled); 3. The grounding of Natuna Sea in 2000 (7,000 tons spilled); and 4. The collision between A.P. Moller's Maersk Navigator with a Japanese ship Sanko Honour outside the northern entrance to the Strait of Malacca in January 1993 in the channel between Sumatra and Nicobar islands.28

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Conclusion Every time a spill occurs one cannot hope to get lucky, find help ready at hand or the havoc caused due to collision or grounding may turn out to be uncontrollable. Future research into the impact of piracy in the Malacca Straits and elsewhere must delve deeply into questions surrounding the ecological impact upon the marine environment on top of security and economic considerations. ENDNOTES 1. ―Strait talk and a warning from strategic forecasting,‖ Global Angst, 3 June 2004, . (Accessed on 10 September2004); ―A Blot on the coast line‖, The Week (Kochi, Kerala, India), June 6, 2004 pp. 20-21. 4. Ravi Mishra, ed., Marine Environment, Vol.1, (New Delhi: Anmol publications, 2002), p. 230. 5. Ibid., p. 245. 6. Global Marine oil Pollution Information Gateway, what happens to oil in the water? http://www.oils-gpa- unep.org/facts/fate.html. (Accessed on 16 September2004). 7. ―Fate of Marine oil spills‖, http://www.ITOPF.com/fate.html. (Accessed on 16 September 2004). 8. ITOPF - Effects of Marine oil spills, Impact of oil on coastal activities . (Accessed on 10 September2004). 9. There is little correlation between the tonnage of spilled oil and its impact on the marine life and ecosystems. For example, a collision between two oil tankers in 1977 released 31,000 tons of oil and polluted 47 African Penguins but in 1994 when Apollo Sea Sank, spilling 2,000 tons of oil it impacted 10,000 penguins. When the Treasure sank on 23 June 2000, half this amount of oil threatened four times as many Penguins!!! In round figures, 20,000 penguins were oiled and 20,000 wre prevented from being oiled by removing them of their breeding colonies on Darsen and Robben islands. When in 1989, Exxon Valdez had spilled about 38,800 tons of crude oil into Alaska's Prince Williams sound, clean up crew had found the carcasses of more than 35,000 birds and 1,000 sea otters but believed most of sea animals' remains would have sunk. According to Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council estimates of dead wild life were 2,50,000 sea birds, 2,800 sea otters, 300 harbow seals, 250 bald eagles, around 22 killer whales and billions of salmon and herring eggs. The ecological consequences of an oil spill in Singapore waters were illustrated by the Collision between the Evoikos and Orapin Global in October 1997. With 25,000 tons of fuel oil spilling into the sea and http://www.wcmc.org.uk / latenews/emergency/~ main. ( Accessed on 18 September2004). 10. ―Long Term Effects of Oil Pollution More Significant Than Previously Believed,‖ Ocean Update < http://www.Seaweb.org/resources/74 update/oil.html> (accessed on 20 September 2004). 11. ―Effects of Marine oil spills, Impact of oil on coastal activities,‖ . (Accessed on 10 September2004). 12. Tavernier Bruno, Great Maritime Routes: An Illustrated History (London: MacDonald, 1972, pp. 269-270.

13. Vijay Sakhuja, ―Indian Ocean and the Safety of Sea Lines of Communication‖, Strategic Analysis Vol. XXV, No. 5 ( April 2001): p. 689. 14. A SLOC is a route taken by a ship to transit from point A to point B. In maritime and economic parlence it should be the shortest distance, economical and able to provide timely delivery of cargo, what is referred to as 'just in time services'. The SLOC's serve as umbilical cord of a states economy or arteries of a regions economy. So, protection of SLOC's for uninterrupted transport becomes a necessity specially in areas that are referred to as 'choke points' or 'hub ports'. For the purposes of this chapter, we are more concerned with the SLOC's in South East Asia and specially the straits of Malacca. The sea- lanes in the Eurasian maritime world can be roughly divided into three areas: (1) the Arabic Coastline-Indian Ocean-Southeast Asian Sea area, and the Northeast Asian sea area; (2) the Oceanian Sea area - Southeast Asian Sea area and Northeast Asian Sea area; and (3) the Africa-Indian Sea-

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Oceanian- Sea area - North east Asian sea area. In the open seas outside the port of departure, sea- lanes gradually become wider - than converge at bottlenecks such as straits. After passing through the bottlenecks, they diverge once more - before finally focusing in on other ports to collect cargo. The point of convergence and focus such as straits and other 'bottle necks' are sometimes described as 'choke points', while 'hub ports', which are used as distribution centers, that are linked to land and air transport are described as 'focal points'. As far as Eurasian maritime world is concerned there are five choke points (Malacca strait, Sunda Strait, Lombark and Macassar straits, South China Sea and East China Sea), and four hub ports (Singapore, Hong Kong, Kaohsing and Pusan. Kazumine Akimoto, ―Current state of Maritime security‖ Journal of Indian Ocean Studies Vo. 9, No. 3 ( December 2001) :p. 338. 15. Ravi Mishra, ed., Marine Environment, Vol.1, (New Delhi: Anmol publications, 2002), p 197. 16. bid., p.196. 17. Bhabani Sen Gupta, T.T.Poulose, and Hemlata Bhatia, The Malacca Straits and The Indian Ocean (Delhi: Macmillan, 1974), p.11. 18. Encyclopaedia Britannica Vol. 14, (London, 1971), p. 658. Also, according to the Collier's Encyclopedia, the Malacca Straits is located between 2° and 5°N latitudes. Collier's Encyclopedia (New York, 1963), Vol. 15, p. 255. 19. Bhabani Sen Gupta, T.T.Poulose, and Hemlata Bhatia, The Malacca Straits and The Indian Ocean (Delhi: Macmillan, 1974), p. 12. 20. ―Strait talk and a warning from strategic forecasting,‖ Global Angst, 3 June 2004,

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MARITIME SECURITY ARCHITECTURE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION (IOR):

THE ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS

Prof. Paul Musili Wambua

Associate Professor of Law University Of Nairobi School of Law

Prof. Paul Musili Wambua is an Associate Professor of Law at the University Of Nairobi School of Law where he currently holds the position of Associate Dean. He holds a Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) from the University of Nairobi, a Master of Laws (LL.M) from the University of London, a Master of Business Administration (MBA) from the United States International University (USIU) and a Doctor of Laws (PhD) in the Maritime Law and the Law of the Sea from Ghent University (Belgium). Currently he is studying for a Master of Arts (MA) in International Studies at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS) of the University of Nairobi.

Prof Wambua has also taught law in other Universities and Institutions of higher learning including USIU (1993-1996), The Kenya School of Law (1993-2008) Kabarak University School of Law (where he served as Dean between August 2011 and July 2012) and the National University of Rwanda. He has been a Visiting Research Fellow at the Max Plank Institute of Foreign and International Criminal Law, Freiburg, Germany where in 2010 he undertook in house research and published on piracy off the coast of Somalia. He is also a leading legal practitioner/consultant in commercial and maritime law in the city of Nairobi. Prof Wambua has held numerous key Public sector jobs in Kenya and has consulted for the Government of the Republic of Kenya, the African Union and Inter-Governmental Authority on Development IGAD. He has attended numerous international, regional and national conferences and seminars where he has presented papers on maritime law, piracy and the law of the sea. He has published widely in the area of maritime law, piracy and corporate governance .His latest book publication is Governance of Maritime Zones in Kenya; A critical Appraisal of the Policy, Legal and Institutional frameworks. ______

The word piracy has been applied to acts of murder, robbery, plunder, rape and other villainous deeds which have transpired over centuries of mankind’s history. In the latter half of the century, multilateral treaties have been the accepted vehicle utilized by states in order to embody these developments in express agreement fixing new legal norms. But it takes time and much patience for such agreements to be reached and brought into force.1 “Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia and this ocean is the key to the 7-seas.In the 21st Century, the destiny of the world will be decided on its waters” 2

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FPRC Journal 2013(2) Indian Ocean : A New Vision

Abstract

The 21st century brought with it unique geopolitical concerns in an international system that acquired an increasingly multi-polar disposition. This was occasioned by the rise of newly emergent military and economic powers, some of which are leading Third World regional hegemonies. The traditional thinking of security in terms of military capability has proved inadequate. It is now accepted that the concept of security ought to be broadened to incorporate the concept of human security and the environment in which states operate. Non state actors have threatened the security of the IOR by engaging in piracy and maritime terrorism. Although there has been controversy as what constitutes piracy and maritime terrorism, there is a thin line dividing the two. The dividing line is the motive behind the attack. There has also been discussion as to the nexus between the two maritime offences. It is against the context of the broadened concept of security that the paper examines the role of non state actors in the prevailing maritime security situation in the IOR and the legal frameworks which have been put in place to address the challenges of piracy and maritime terrorism perpetrated by non state actors.

Introduction

The first quotation captures the complexity of the process of the international community endeavoring to resolve the conflict between individual state sovereignty and the interests of the international community in dealing with the crime of piracy. The transnational and complex nature of maritime issues poses a major challenge to the international community in fighting piracy and maritime terrorism. In this regard maritime security threats cannot be addressed by one state but by the collective effort of the community of nations. However the diversity of the littoral states of IOR makes a common approach to the challenges posed by the governance of the maritime domain impossible. The second quotation underpins the strategic importance of the IOR in global geopolitics. Challenges posed by the recent upsurge of piracy and terrorism in the Horn of Africa are additional to the existing security challenges already facing the region. The Horn of Africa is one of the most volatile spots in the world. The states in the Horn including Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya and Sudan suffer from protracted political strife, arising from local and international grievances, identity politics and regional inter-state rivalries. For 150 years, the Horn has also been a theatre of strategic power struggles reflected by the British Empire‟s demand to control the Red Sea, Egypt‟s attempt to control the Nile Waters, and the Cold War confrontation in which each of the principal states of the Horn of Africa switched sides at crucial junctures.3 Experts on both security and environment had defined their respective fields in ways that did not recognize the nexus between the two. As such, security studies mainly focused on military strategy and military technical capability of states. Indeed the “state centric concept” of security did not encompass the role of non state actors. The end of the Cold War prompted

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scholars, policy makers and diplomats to rethink the concept of national security. One of the earliest proponents of a broadened concept of security was Richard Ullman who defined “a threat to national security as an action or sequence of events that threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for inhabitants of a state or threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government or to private, non governmental institutions”4. Ullman contended that defining national security merely (or even primarily) in military terms, conveys a profoundly false image of reality. The role non state actors play in international relations depends on the type of non state actor in question. Non state actors affect the international community in a multitude of ways. Some Non Governmental and Intergovernmental Organizations5 affect states foreign policy decisions and the international economy. Other non state actors like Al Qaeda threaten the sovereignty of states and the peace and order of the international community. This paper explores the challenges posed to maritime security by non state actors in the IOR, critiques the legal frameworks put in place to address these challenges and offers recommendations for possible policy reforms to address the challenges identified.

A Conceptual Framework In crafting a suitable conceptual framework for the discussion on the role of non state actors in the maritime security situation in the IOR, it is important to appreciate the broad concepts of “geopolitics” and “security”. Geopolitics refers to the interrelationship between politics, geography, and population distribution in or between countries6. Geopolitics seeks to explain how the geographical position of a state vis-à-vis other states influences its politics and social stability. It provides a framework within which various international relations issues can be analyzed. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries geopolitics was characterized by imperialist rivalries in Europe, particularly between Britain and Germany and colonial expansionism by European powers in Africa and Asia7. Mackinder8 argues that for the human race to realize an orderly international political system there was a great need to recognize these geographical realities and take steps to counter their influence. Since the beginning of the twenty first century, the term „security‟ was essentially contested and underwent tremendous redefinition. This redefinition was intended to capture two issues: the broadened concerns of the concept and the special security perspectives of Third World states9 The latter concern was particularly prompted by the fact that the traditional (western) understanding of what constituted security threats seemed not to match up to the challenges and realities facing developing states. The beginning of the twenty first century has also been faced with the realities of globalization in all its concomitant aspects10. Indeed it has been argued that the dark side of globalization has complicated the compelling story of the economic, ecological and security situation of the IOR11. Traditionally, security issues were considered to be purely the domain and concern of states. However, that state centric (realist) perspective has been changed drastically; it is now not contested that security is not just concerned with states and regimes, but also with individuals- and peoples12. This emerging dimension of human and societal security has been a central emerging thread in contemporary discourses about security. The movement away from the

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traditional concerns and understandings about security has further encouraged security analysis to move beyond the state, and to encompass the wider environments in which the state operates13. This enlarging of analysis has encouraged security to be seen within larger, regional contexts. The rationale for this is derived from the processes of internationalization (of national affairs, conflicts and politics), and those of interdependence, including contemporary complex interdependence14. The expanded meaning of security now encompasses the threats posed by non state actors to the peace and order of states and the international community.

Historical Context of Maritime Security in the IOR The great European maritime powers began to dominate the sea lanes in the Indian Ocean towards the end of the 15th Century. It was mainly their sea power which enabled them to colonize most of the countries in Asia and Africa. By the end of the 18th century the British gained singular command of the sea, and the Indian Ocean was transformed into a “British Lake”.15 With the gradual withdrawal of the British bases from the East of Suez during the post-Second World War period, there emerged a super-power naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean. It was in this context that Indian Ocean states felt that their newly gained independence would be imperiled by the super power naval rivalry and the growing militarization of the ocean. Sri Lanka‟s Prime Minister Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike submitted a proposal to the United Nations requesting that the Indian Ocean be converted into a zone of peace. The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2832 (XXVI) on Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, adopted on December 16, 1971, refers only to the naval forces of great powers. However, the original proposal submitted by Sri Lanka to the First Committee referred not only to the great powers but also to littoral powers. Under the pressure of powerful Indian Ocean states, however, Sri Lanka‟s proposal was later changed and targeted only the naval forces of the great powers16. It is worthy noting that Sri Lanka‟s proposal made no reference to non-state actors as a source of potential threat to the peace and stability of the IOR. This was understandable because there were no considerable threats emanating from non-state actors at the time. The conventional threats to maritime security such as major-power rivalries and inter-state conflicts still continue. However the conventional threats to peace and security have been further complicated by the emergence of non state actors in the IOR. Following these recent development the security situation in the IOR has been the subject of varied comments by many scholars in the 21st Century. In 1972 Nicholas Spykman warned that if a strong country emerged in Eurasia, it could disrupt the vital sea lanes of communication (SLOCs). As a solution he suggested that the US should work with the countries that formed the Rimland (the coastal areas of Eurasia) to prevent expansion of such force. In 2008 a senior Chinese naval officer vindicated Spykman‟s comments when he suggested to Admiral Keating (Commander, US Pacific Command) that China and the US should divide the Pacific Ocean; China to keep western half and the Indian Ocean and the US to keep the Eastern half from Hawaii17.

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In past few years numerous seminars, conferences and symposia on the security situation in the IOR have been held. In June 2010 at a seminar organised by the Japan Institutes for National Fundamentals ,the President of the Institute (Ms Yoshiko Sakurai) stated that the main objective of the seminar was to “discuss the situation of the [Indian] ocean, which is turning into a sea of conflict in the 21st Century”.Prof Brahma Chellancy of Centre for Policy Research, India(June 2010) stated that “in no part of the world is the security situation dynamic and in such a flux as in the Indian Ocean region…This region is also the centre of the challenges of the 21st Century world- from extremism and terrorism to piracy and safety of sea lines of communication”18

Cost of piracy in the IOR Geographically, the IOR is constituted by 29 states that border the Indian Ocean-from South Africa to the Australian continent, including the east coast of Africa, the horn of Africa, the Arabic peninsula, the gulf estates and south and Southeast Asia19.The Indian Ocean is a water body of tremendous significance. Home to 33 nations, it has a larger stake in their revenue generating ability, and has been central to their well being for centuries20.It is approximated that seventy (70) per cent of the earth is covered with water and twenty (20) per cent is taken by the Indian Ocean which is the third largest ocean in the world. In addition, an approximately ninety (90) per cent of international trade is carried over the oceans. Over ninety (90) per cent of international trade is carried by sea, and of that, over half traverses the Indian Ocean. The World Bank estimated that global sea borne trade was worth 21,450 billion tonne-miles in 1999 which was expected to rise to 41,800 billion tonne-miles by 2014 21 However due to the economic downturn in 2008-09, trade figures are estimated to have fallen by (one decimal four (1.4) per cent in 2009 and at two (2) per cent in 2010.Oil trade was expected to remain at the same level as in 2008.It is also estimated that 100,000 ships transit through the Indian Ocean annually with forty (40) per cent of the trade transiting through the Malacca straits. Every day fifteen decimal five (15.5) million barrels of crude oil or forty (40) per cent of the entire global oil passes through the Straits of Hormuz and eleven (11) million barrels of oil pass through the Malacca and Singapore Straits. The demand for energy from the “energy demand heartland of Asia” has enhanced sensitivity to the security of SLOCs and the choke points of the IOR. In monetary terms, over USD seven (7) trillion in international trade crosses the Indian Ocean every year on more than twenty three thousand (23,000) ships, accounting for fifty (50) per cent of all container traffic and a full seventy (70) per cent of global oil and gas exports. The bulk of this trade is sea borne with the Indian Ocean being the focal point of all major shipping routes. International shipping lanes crisscrossing the Indian Ocean carry most of the world‟s oil and especially the energy requirement of two Asian giants-China and Japan-through the straits of Mallaca, Sunda and Lombok.22 The cost of piracy and maritime terrorism in the IOR is reflected in the extra cost of rerouting ships to bypass the Gulf of Aden, the Suez Canal and the sea lanes off the coast of Somalia. This has occasioned higher insurance premiums and cost of hiring extra security personnel to escort merchant ships transiting through the dangerous spots. In its 2009 report UNCTAD

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estimated that the cost of rerouting thirty three (33) per cent of the cargo via the Cape would cost ship owners an additional USD seven decimal five (7.5) billion per annum. Ships that continued to traverse the Gulf of Aden and the Suez Canal had to purchase insurance cover at USD twenty thousand(20,000) per ship per voyage(excluding injury, liability and ransom coverage) compared to USD 500 required a few years ago before piracy attacks increased. Apart from the cost of rerouting there are other costs accruing directly from piracy and maritime terrorism. There is loss of life of crew, loss by destruction of property, reduction in the exploitation of sea resources and pollution of the marine environment. According to the report „The Human Cost of Somali Piracy‟ published by the One Earth Future Foundation, thousands of crew members suffer from severe stress due to fear of attack by the Somali pirates when their ships transit through the Gulf Aden.23 In his speech in March 2011, Andrew J. Shapiro, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs observed that „the attacks are more ruthless, more violent and wider ranging. Hostages have been tortured and used as human shields.‟24 It costs an estimated over USD one decimal three (1.3) million to deploy a frigate for surveillance for a month, and approximately USD two hundred to three hundred and fifty (200-350) million to sustain naval vessels in the Gulf of Aden annually25.Shippers travelling through such lanes have been forced to seek alternative routes avoiding shorter routes such as Gulf Aden and Horn Africa which are prone to piracy attacks, This re routing of ships has an effect of increasing transportation costs. Ships are also required to be fitted with specialized surveillance and protection equipment which are costly.

The Primary Challenges to Maritime Security in the IOR As noted in the preceding paragraphs, non-state actors have become a major source of insecurity in the IOR. Non state actors have threatened maritime security by engaging in piracy and maritime terrorism as the primary maritime crimes, with drug trafficking, human smuggling and gun running as adjunct crimes26. Piracy around the world has caused estimated worldwide losses of USD thirteen (13) to USD sixteen (16) billion per year. Ships have been attacked and hijacked particularly in the Gulf of Aden, along the east coast of Africa, the Bay of Bengal, and the Straits of Malacca. After piracy incidents in the Malacca straits were drastically reduced thanks to the coordinated anti-piracy patrols and multilateral initiatives like Re CAAP( Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea) the attention of the international community was focused on upsurge of piracy and maritime terrorism off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. Since 2006 piratical attacks on ships and crew off the coast of Somalia increased steadily reaching a peak in 2010 and then gradually dropping in 2012.According to the International Chamber of Commerce-International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Reports on Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships covering the period 2005 to 201127 there were: 276 incidents of piracy in 2005,239 in 2006,263 in 2007,293 in 2008, 410 in 2009, 445 in 2010 and 142 in 2011.Of these piracy incidents reported 35 occurred off the coast of Somalia in 2005,10 in 2006,31 in 2007,19 in 2008,80 in 2009,139 in 2010 and 85 in 2011.Gun use in pirate attacks went up to 176 cases from 76 in 2008.28 The Somali piracy has shocked the international community not just

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because of its sheer frequency and size in numbers, but also because of the manner in which it is executed. Large vessels (oil tankers) would be hijacked one thousand six hundred (1600) nautical miles (nm) off the Somalia coast and taken hostage within Somalia territorial waters. The vessels would only be released after payment of huge ransom to the criminal gangs behind the hijacking. The simple incident of hijacking of a fishing vessel which had illegally intruded into Somalia territorial waters turned into a lucrative industry in which criminal gangs would invest in piracy hoping to reap huge returns in the form of ransom. Other peculiar aspects of Somali piracy include the use of “mother ships”, high speed boats (skiffs) and sophisticated weaponry and communication gadgets to launch attacks against merchant ships in the high seas. It has been established that the Somali pirates have linkages with Al Qaeda based in Yemen and Al Shabaab based in Somalia mainly for logistical support. There are reports that the Somali pirates have been “hired” for raising a sea based wing of the Al Shabaab along the lines of the LTTE Tamil Tigers. Piracy has therefore become intertwined with maritime terrorism. The maritime dimension of terrorism was highlighted by the Mumbai attacks of 2008. Prior to this attack only two (2) to three (3) percent of terrorist attacks were linked directly to the sea and therefore maritime terrorism was not given prominence by governmental agencies and security experts. It became obvious that the seas could be used as supply routes to launch terrorist attacks both on mainland and at sea. Drug trafficking is another crime which facilitates maritime terrorism. Due to the huge profit margins involved drug trafficking has become the most lucrative way of generating funds to fuel terrorist activities, insurgencies and piracy in the IOR. Apart from the anticipated profits, drug cartels offer the pirates and terrorists the necessary logistical infrastructure to move resources to where they are required. The drug cartels provide the route not just for drugs but also for arms thus establishing a symbiotic relationship between the drug cartels, pirates and terrorists.

Definitional Complexities and Lack of a Nomenclature. Although piracy has existed for a very long time29 there is no clear definition of what constitutes piracy30. This definitional complexity partly stems from the fact that some scholars, such as Phillip De Souza31and Alfred Rubin, do not regard piracy as an international crime. Alfred Rubin views piracy as solely a municipal law crime; the only question of international law being the extent of a state‟s jurisdiction to apply its criminal law to an accused foreigner acting outside the territorial jurisdiction of the prescribing state32. In 1932, Harvard University legal researchers came up with a draft Convention on piracy (Harvard Draft Convention)33. The researchers gave a detailed historical analysis of piracy as a maritime crime and whether it constituted an international crime. The researchers concluded that piracy was not an international crime but was merely a basis for extraordinary jurisdiction in every state to prosecute suspected pirates. How far that extraordinary jurisdiction was used would depend on the municipal law of the state and not the law of nations. The Harvard Group based their conclusion partly on the prevailing “orthodox” view at the time that international law existed between states only. According to this view private persons were not

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regarded as legal persons under international law; that international law only defined duties, privileges and powers between states. The views of the Harvard Research Group influenced the work of the International Law Commission (ILC) in drafting the 1958 Convention on the High Seas34 and formed an essential theoretical foundation on which the ILC heavily relied in the preparation of the draft articles of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas. The ILC however modified the proposals of the Harvard Research Group for practical and political reasons. The most notable modification was the definition of the conditions under which a state would be conferred with jurisdiction over piracy. In providing that piracy could only occur in the high seas or at any place outside the jurisdiction of any state, the ILC effectively made piracy an international crime35. Article 101 of LOSC defines piracy as any of the following acts: (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b). There are three distinct characteristics that distinguish piracy from any other form of maritime offence: Firstly, Piracy must be committed in the High Seas outside the jurisdiction of any state. This sets piracy apart from the crime of armed robbery against ships that is committed in the territorial sea (and within the jurisdiction) of a coastal state. Secondly, piracy must be committed for private ends. This limits the crime of piracy to acts that are committed purely for personal/private gain. It excludes acts that are motivated by ideology, religion or politics. Thirdly, there must be two ships involved for a maritime crime to fulfill the definition set forth in article 101. This is often referred to as the “two ship rule.” Fourthly, piracy can only be committed by crew and passengers of a private ship thus excluding military and government owned ships or ships in government service (as per article 107 of LOSC). The international community has attempted to ameliorate the shortcomings in the piracy provisions of the LOSC by adopting other conventions. The most significant of these instruments is the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the safety of Maritime Navigation adopted on 10th march, 1988 (the SUA Convention). The SUA Convention does away with the “two ship rule” and creates a wide range of offences (listed in Article 3) that constitute maritime violence including terrorism. Article 5 obliges the states parties to criminalize the acts listed in article 3 in their domestic legislation. Article 6 however, requires that there must be a nexus between the alleged offence and the state establishing jurisdiction. The nexus is established if the ship flies the flag of the state ; if the offence is committed in the territory of the state or its territorial sea ; if the offence is committed by the national of that state ; if the offence is committed by a stateless person whose habitual residence is in that state ; if a national of that state is seized, threatened, injured or killed in the

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process of committing the offence ; or if the offence is committed to compel that state to do or abstain from doing any act. Article 11 of the SUA Convention provides that the acts set out in article 3 constitute extraditable offences under extradition treaties. This is to ensure that in case a state party is not willing to prosecute then the suspect can be extradited to a another state willing to prosecute. The restricted definition of piracy in article 101 of LOSC has been retained for historical reasons and to forestall the likelihood of opening LOSC for renegotiation as such a move may bring the entire architecture of LOSC to a rabble. On the other hand the expanded definition in the SUA Convention helps to mitigate the shortcomings in the LOSC definition in the face of the changing nature of transnational maritime crimes. The evolving nature of transnational organized crimes requires an equally flexible international legal framework which is able to respond efficiently and effectively to such crimes. Apart from the lack of unanimity on the definition of piracy, the distinction between “piracy” and “maritime terrorism” has now become increasingly blurred36 It has been noted that “there is transfusion from piracy to criminal activities to the terrorist direction”37. In the early years piracy was carried out by non-political actors mostly for personal benefits. However it is now generally agreed that terrorist groups such as Al Shabaab in Somalia, the Al Qaeda, The Liberation Tigers of Tamel Ealem (famed as the pioneers of maritime terrorism38),;the Indonesian based Free Aceh Movement/ Gerekan Aceh Meredeka (GAM)/ Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front( ASNLF), the Indonesian based Free Papua Movement/ Organisesi Papua Merdeka (OPM), the Malaysian based Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (MILF), and the Phillippine based Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) have resorted to piracy in order to finance their political organizations39 There is compelling evidence that these terrorist organizations are involved in drug-trafficking and human smuggling as it is a lucrative business to raise funds for the purchase of arms. Both pirates and terrorist groups are linked with organized crime syndicates. However, given the expanded definition of maritime offences in the SUA Convention, the distinction between piracy and maritime terrorism exists only in theory.

Piracy and Maritime Terrorism as Global Challenges. Piracy40 continues to pose challenge to maritime security in the IOR as it is estimated that one- third of the IOR is plagued by piracy.41 .Acts of piracy and maritime terrorism threaten maritime security by endangering the welfare of seafarers and the security of navigation and commerce. At times acts of maritime violence have resulted in loss of life, physical harm to crew or hostage-taking of seafarers, significant disruptions to commerce and navigation, financial loss to ship-owners, increased insurance premiums and cost of extra security for vessels, increased costs to consumers and producers, and damage to the marine environment. Piratical attacks have had widespread ramifications, including disruption of the flow of humanitarian assistance and increasing the costs of future shipments to the affected areas.42 The irony of the situation is that between 2005 and 2010 piratical attacks continued to occur in the high seas despite the heavy presence navies of leading maritime nations and the clear provisions of LOSC43,the SUA Convention and other IMO Conventions that impose

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obligations on all states to cooperate fully in suppressing piracy and to enact national legislation to create offences that punish suspected offenders in their national jurisdictions. . As result of the upsurge in piratical attacks on merchant shipping in the IOR in the past five years, most leading maritime nations deployed navies off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden to undertake counter piracy operations. The coast off Somalia and Gulf of Aden still remain the most dangerous parts of the IOR due to frequent attacks on merchant shipping. Due to the increased numbers of apprehended Somali pirates, navies of western maritime states resorted to „capture, disarm and release‟ policy as they were not willing to transfer the apprehended pirates to face trial in their respective national jurisdictions. This approach was not in tandem with the provisions of LOSC which require states to cooperate in suppressing piracy. Article 105 of LOSC grants universal jurisdiction to all states to arrest persons suspected of engaging in piracy on the high seas. However article 105 does not impose obligation on states apprehending suspected pirates to prosecute them in their national courts. The article clearly creates a dichotomy between the enforcement jurisdiction and adjudicative jurisdiction with the exercise of the latter jurisdiction being discretionary. In order to circumvent the gap in the provisions of article 105, western maritime states with navies undertaking counter piracy operations in the IOR entered into bilateral agreements with some of the East African states such as Kenya and Seychelles to undertake prosecutions of suspected pirates. Kenyan and Seychellois courts have undertaken trials of suspected pirates arrested by navies of the United States (US), the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) and handed over to the Kenyan and Seychellois authorities under the terms of bilateral agreements (Memoranda of Understanding -MOUs) between Kenya and Seychelles and the western maritime nations.44

The International Legal Framework on Piracy and Maritime Terrorism The key instruments of the international legal framework in the fight against Piracy and maritime terrorism in the IOR are the LOSC, the SUA Convention, the Djibouti Code of Conduct, the African Maritime Transport Charter45 and the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs).These instruments are supplemented by the national legislations of regional states especially those which have domesticated the provisions of the international instruments in their national jurisdictions. Kenya has domesticated the provisions of LOSC and the SUA Conventions46 through the Merchant Shipping Act of 2009. In the following paragraphs we outline the key provisions of each of these legal instruments.

Piracy under the LOSC LOSC (in particular articles 100 to 107 and 110) provides the framework for the repression of piracy under international law. The Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, as the secretariat LOSC, has a mandate to provide: (i) information and advice on the uniform and consistent application of the provisions of LOSC, including those relevant to the repression of piracy; and (ii) information on relevant developments in oceans and the law of the sea to the General Assembly, as well as to the Meeting of states parties to LOSC, in the annual reports of

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the Secretary-General on oceans and the law of the sea. These reports provide updated information on developments in respect of piracy and other crimes at sea. As noted above, LOSC obligates all states to cooperate to the fullest on the repression of piracy. Piracy falls under a category of peremptory norms in which no derogation is allowed under the international law regime. LOSC does not have provisions on maritime terrorism as the phenomena did not exist at the time the Convention was adopted in 1982.

Piracy and Maritime Terrorism under the SUA Convention The SUA Convention47contains provisions of addressing various maritime offences. As noted above the SUA Convention was adopted to address the shortcomings in the piracy provisions of LOSC following the Achille Lauro hijacking in October 199548.The SUA Convention expands the narrow definition of piracy in LOSC and lists in article 3 numerous acts of violence which constitute maritime offences. LOSC then requires states parties to create these offences with suitable sanctions in their national jurisdictions49.

The Djibouti Code of Conduct on Piracy The Djibouti Code of Conduct (the Djibouti Code) is an International Maritime Organization (IMO) sponsored regional agreement involving eight coastal states (including Kenya) and one hinterland state from the Western IOR, and other states from the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea areas which was adopted in Djibouti on 29th January 2009.50 The Djibouti Code is the culmination of a series of regional seminars and workshops sponsored by IMO convened pursuant to the decisions of the 100th and 101st sessions of the Council of IMO in relation to the vital shipping lanes and the threat of piracy and armed robbery against ships51.The Djibouti Code is not a binding agreement or treaty hence the adoption of the term “Code of Conduct” rather than “treaty”, “convention” or “agreement”.52 Perhaps this aspect of the Djibouti Code is reflective of its major weakness. The Djibouti Code has very progressive provisions in combating piracy and armed robbery against ships. It adopts the definition of piracy in Article 101 of LOSC53 but unlike LOSC further provides for the offence of armed robbery against ships by adopting the IMO definition such an offence.54 Also unlike LOSC, the Djibouti Code more specifically provides that where a state participant carries out a seizure, such a state participant may, “subject to its national laws, and in consultation with other interested parties, waive its primary right to exercise jurisdiction and authorize any other state participant to enforce its laws against the ship and or persons on board‟55. In order to give respect to the integrity of the territorial sea of a coastal state, the Djibouti Code preserves the jurisdiction and authority of the state participant where seizure takes place within the territorial sea of such a state participant56. In line with the SUA Convention, the Djibouti Code requires state participants to create the offences of piracy and armed robbery against ships and to establish jurisdiction for the prosecution or repatriation of offenders.57 To place the existing MOU framework into the purview of the Djibouti Code, Article 7 of the Code provides for embarkment of armed officials of state participants in the patrol ships and aircraft of another state participant58 and such embarked officials “may assist the host

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participant and conduct operations from the host participant‟s ship or aircraft if expressly requested to do so by the host participant.”59 This provision of the Djibouti Code aims at facilitating the subsequent exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction by the national courts of the state of the embarked officials thereby addressing the shortcomings in article 105 discussed above. The most progressive provisions of the Djibouti Code as far as counter piracy operations are concerned are Articles 11 and 14.The Code requires the state participants to undertake comprehensive review of national legislation to ensure that there are national laws in place to criminalize piracy and armed robbery against ships and “adequate guidelines for the exercise of jurisdiction, conduct of investigations and prosecution of alleged offenders.”60 The major weakness of lack of indemnity clause in the current MOU framework clause is cured by the provision in the code that any claim for damages, injury or loss resulting from an operation carried out under the Djibouti Code shall be handled by the state participant whose authorities conducted the operation in accordance with the national laws of that state61. This provision of the Code cushions a state participant which undertakes the prosecution of pirates against the risk of civil claims arising from the enforcement action in the high seas by other state participants.

The Piracy Provisions in the African Maritime Transport Charter The second African Union (AU) Conference of Ministers responsible for maritime transport met in Durban, South Africa and adopted the African Maritime Transport Charter and a resolution on maritime security, safety and protection of the marine environment.62 The charter has since been adopted by the AU heads of states summit and therefore is binding on the member states. The framework of the charter is to create harmonized policy, legal and institutional frameworks for the maritime sector in Africa.63 In particular the maritime charter calls for the member states to enact legislation to give full effect to the charter and all relevant international instruments, codes and regulations “in the area of maritime, port safety and security”64 and to adopt effective measures to combat piracy, armed robbery against ships and other unlawful acts against shipping through cooperation with other international bodies.65 Kenya as one of the states that has been greatly affected by piracy and maritime violence in the IOR has already implemented the provisions of the charter on combating piracy by the recent enactment of the Merchant Shipping Act 2009 which establishes a comprehensive legal framework for the prosecution of pirates. The Merchant Shipping Act 2009 also domesticates virtually all international conventions ratified by Kenya66. Kenya has also actively participated in the regional seminars and workshops on piracy and armed robbery against ships67. In a way therefore it would be reasonable to argue that Kenya has honored most, if not all, of the obligations of AU member states for combating piracy and other forms of maritime violence under the charter.

The Framework of the UNSCRs In 2008 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted no less than ten Chapter VII

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based Resolutions (UNSCRs)68 aimed at addressing the escalating threat of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia. This was followed by another four Resolutions in 200969, five in 2010, five in 2011, three in 2012 and at least one so far in 201370.The sheer number of the UNSCRs underlines the deep concern by the international community triggered by the escalation of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Of all UNSCRs on Somalia, it is Resolutions 1816, 1846 and 1851 adopted in 2008 which have generated intense academic debate and comment. This debate partly arises from the words used in the drafting of the UNSCRs. Much of the debate has everything to do with what the Security Council meant, or did not mean, by the words used in the Resolutions. Although the UNSC gave a wide discretion to the member states engaged in the repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships off the coast of Somalia, it tempered its language by invoking the framework of international law and restricting the extraordinary remedial measures to the unique situation then obtaining in Somalia. The words in UNSCRs 1816, 1846 and 1851 range from the generally permissive in Resolution1816, to the more discretionary language in Resolution 1846, to the more definite in Resolution 1851.Resolution 1816 permits states to enter the territorial waters of Somalia and to use “all the necessary means to repress piracy and armed robbery”71. The UNSC however added that such entry into Somalia‟s territorial waters was to be “consistent with such action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy and under relevant international law”72; and that it “applies only with regard to the situation in Somalia and shall not affect the rights or obligations or responsibilities of member states under international law”73. Resolution 1846 extends the initial six months mandate of resolution 1816 by further twelve months and generally adopts the words “use within the territorial waters….all necessary means”74 of Resolution 1816. It is the extent of the permission granted to member states to enter Somalia and to “undertake all necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia, for the purpose of suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea” in resolution 1851 75 that has generated most controversy. In interpreting these words, some commentators have adopted a liberal interpretation (to encompass every imaginable activity in the course of intervention) while others have adopted a restricted meaning to the words (to limit the activities to what is permissible under international law and relevant conventions). Whereas the UNSCRs extended the mandate of the states exercising enforcement jurisdiction against pirates and armed robbers at sea operating in Somalia‟s mainland, territorial waters and off the coast of Somalia, the Resolutions did not apply to the exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction. The words used in the various UNSCRs granting mandate to member states to enter Somalia territorial waters and “use all necessary means to repress piracy and armed robbery at sea” cannot be interpreted so as to impose a duty on member states to prosecute apprehended pirates. Whereas the right to exercise enforcement jurisdiction against pirates and pirate ships on the high seas is granted to member states under the universality principle, there is no obligation placed on member states to combat armed robbery at sea within the territorial waters of a member state or to prosecute apprehended pirates under the national laws of member states.76

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UNSCR 1851 specifically calls on member states to enter into “special agreements or arrangements with countries willing to take custody of the pirates in order to embark law enforcement officers (ship riders) from the latter countries.”77 The Resolution further calls on the states in the region to “facilitate investigation and prosecution of persons detained as a result of operations conducted under this resolution.”78 Such is not the language imposing an obligation on member states to prosecute apprehended pirates and armed robbers at sea. The spirit of the UNSCRs has been captured by the Djibouti Code which obligates member states to either prosecute or repatriate pirates and armed robbers at sea; to make arrangements and agreements for the prosecution of such pirates or armed robbers at sea; and to facilitate the use of embarked officials to apprehend pirates (so as to provide the missing link between enforcement jurisdiction and adjudicative jurisdiction where the jurisdictions are exercised by different states participants).79 As noted above, Kenya has overshot its obligations under the SUA Convention and the Djibouti Code by entering into MOUs to prosecute pirates apprehended on the high seas by navies of other state participants and further has reviewed its legislation to create extraterritorial jurisdiction for the prosecution of pirates and to create the offence of armed robbery against ships in its territorial waters. However what is in doubt is whether the expansive extra territorial jurisdiction under the Merchant Shipping Act 2009 can be used to prosecute armed robbers at sea caught in Somalia‟s territorial waters as the definition of piracy in the Act adopts the definition in Article 101 of LOSC.

Some Policy Reform Considerations Some scholars who have commented on the escalation of piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, have suggested that attention of the international community should shift from the sea to Somalia mainland where the root causes of piracy in are. It has also been suggested that what is required is a holistic approach aimed at creating political stability and economic reconstruction of Somalia. Most pirate networks in Somalia are controlled by the Hawiye and Darood clans, who have also proved to be effective allies in containing the Union of Islamic Courts. Any successful strategy to address the piracy menace off the coast of Somalia must reflect political-economy linkages in this very fragile state. The international community should specifically pay attention to the key issues discussed here below.

(i) Bolster sub-regional surveillance capacity There is need to work with Somalia‟s neighboring states to strengthen sub-regional capacity to police the sea and to effectively prosecute suspected pirates. Such an approach is not without precedence as a similar initiative by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has dramatically reduced piracy in and around the Straits of Malacca, the erstwhile global leader in piracy incidents. The US Navy is already working on multi-disciplinary initiatives like the Africa Partnership Station Concept, the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Communiqué and the East Africa and South West Indian Ocean program. Lessons from these initiatives could help address the threat of piracy and maritime terrorism off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden80.

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(ii) Adopt a balanced approach As discussed in the section on conceptual framework it is necessary to reconsider the concept of maritime security. Although interdiction of suspected pirates is absolutely essential in the war against piracy and maritime terrorism, it is now mandatory that strategies must shift from pure military intervention to the quest for improving the overall human development for the coastal communities living in the region. In this regard the human security concept must be expanded to address the political, social and economic well being of the communities living the littoral states of the IOR. A balance must be struck between the resources committed to naval surveillance and those committed to the human development of the communities in the littoral states.

(iii) Reform the maritime administrations of the states in the region. There is need to further strengthen the regional maritime capacities of the nine states which agreed to co-operate on counter piracy operations , maritime security and capability development following the adoption of the Djibouti Code in January 2009.The regional states like Kenya and Seychelles which are undertaking the prosecution of suspected pirates and armed robbers at sea should be supported to build capacity of their courts to prosecute by training personnel and offering financial support to cushion them against the cost of prosecution and imprisonment of the suspected pirates..

(iv) Restoring political stability in Somalia Since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, Somalia has not had any stable government. The vacuum left has provided fertile ground for growth of terrorist groups. Piracy has escalated partly due to lack of a functional government in Somalia. There is unanimity that any measures to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia which do not include steps to attain political stability in Somalia are bound to fail. This theory is vindicated by the sharp decline in piracy off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden following the incursion by Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) and AMISOM forces into Somalia in pursuit of Al Shabaab in October 201181.

Conclusion

The traditional “state centric” concept of security has shifted dramatically from pure military capability to an understanding of the environment in which states operate. The concept of security covers not just states but also includes individuals and societies. The challenges posed by non state actors to the maritime security in the IOR have complicated an already volatile situation in the Horn of Africa. Piracy and maritime terrorism remain the primary maritime crimes in the IOR with drug trafficking, gun running and human smuggling as adjunct crimes. Maritime insecurity has disrupted international trade, interrupted supply of humanitarian assistance and has led to loss of lives of crew and destruction of property. The cost to the international community has been enormous.

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Although the international community has maintained naval surveillance at sea and has created the necessary legal framework to counter piracy and maritime terrorism, these efforts have been hampered by failure by regional states to harmonize their domestic legislations with international treaties and conventions. The apprehension and prosecution of pirates and armed robbers at sea remain at the discretion of the navies of arresting states. Attention of the international community must also shift from the sea to the Somali mainland where the root causes of piracy and maritime terrorism are to be found. Political stability and economic reconstruction of Somalia remains the only sure way to stem the threat posed by non state actors to maritime security off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. ------

1. Barry H. Dubner, The Law Of International Sea Piracy 2nd edition The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff 1980 p.1 2. This statement is attributed to Alfred Thayer Mahan 3. See Crisis in the Horn of Africa available at http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org. Last accessed on 18th November 2011). 4. Richard Ullman (professor of International Relations at Princeton University); Redefining Security published in the International Security Journal 8(1), 1983. 5. For a detailed discussion on the different types of conventional non state actors see Bob Reinalda Non State Actors in the International System of states. Available at http://www.ashgate.com/pdf/SamplePages/Ashgate_Research_Companion_to_Non_State_Actors_Intr o.pdf .Last accessed on 5th April 2013.. 6. The concept is well examined by Francis P. Sempa, Geopolitics From the Cold War to the 21st Century, New Jersey, Transaction Publishers, 2009. Further, the term “geopolitics” was coined in 1899 by the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén, after which it quickly emerged as a systematic area of study. The three foremost geopolitical theorists in the key period from the Treaty of Versailles through to the Second World War, were Sir Halford Mackinder in Britain, Karl Haushofer in Germany, and Nicholas John Spykman in the United States. 7. Gearroid O Tuathail, Simon Dalby and Paul Routledge Geopolitics Reader, (2nd ed) London, Routledge 2006, p. 17. States employ Geopoliticians to assist in mapping out geostrategies for their expansion. In Germany, the most notable geopolitician was Karl Haushofer. Karl came up with the concept of lebensraum (living space) according to which he opined that the German population needed more living space and therefore the necessity to acquire more territory. In Britain, the foremost geopolitician was Sir Halford Mackinder. Considered, one of the pioneers in the field of Geopolitics, Mackinder argued that colonies in Africa and Asia constituted a safety valve for European society and that a closure of the world to European imperialist expansion would lead to unleashing of uncontrollable class struggles within the European society. 8. In his book, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction, London, Constable & Co. 1919. Sir Halford Mackinder wrote that the geopolitical reality (the differential abundance in natural wealth) favoured the growth of imperialism and in the course this growth there was bound to be war. This book followed the aftermath of the First World War and advocated for the formation of the League of Nations to safeguard the international political order and endure that there was justice among nations despite of the relative economic and military power. 9. Joshua Goldstein, International Relations San Francisco, Longman, 2003. 10. Sandra Destradi “Regional Powers and their Strategies: Empire, Hegemony and Leadership” in Review of International Studies 36, (4), October 2010, pp. 903-930. 11. See The Indian Ocean; Resource and Governance Challenges-Ellen Laipson and Amit Pandya (Ed) available at E:\PUBLICATIONS 2013\Indian_Ocean-Chapter_6_Laipson.pdf.htm. Last accessed on 28th March 2013. 12. Robert Jackson and George Seronsen, Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches (New York, Oxford University Press, 2003. 13. Narine Shaun, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, Boulder: Lynne Reinner 2002, pp. 139-159 14. Helen Milner, “International Theories of Cooperation among Nations, “World Politics, 44, (3), April 1992, pp. 466-480 15. For a detailed discussion see Professor Amal Jayawardane; Terrorism at Sea: Maritime Security Challenges in South Asia available at http://www.rsis-ntsasia.org/activities/conventions/2009- singapore/Amal%20Jayawardane.pdf. Last accessed on 4th April 2013. 16. See, Gamini Keerawella, Peace and Security of a Small State: Sri Lankan Responses to Superpower Naval Rivalry in the Indian Ocean, 1970-1977,” in Shelton U. Kodikara (ed.), South Asian Strategic Issues (New Delhi:Sage Publications, 1990), PP. 186-187.

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17. For details see Rivalry in the Indian Ocean: Grand Strategy of the 21st Century and the US-Japan Alliance available at http://en.jinf.jp/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/10.6.4-_E_JINF-Symposium-session-one- plus-two.pdf 18. Ibid 19. Veronique Roger-Lacan, Need for Security Architecture in the Indian Ocean Trade: Indian Ocean Challenges, A Quest For Cooperative Solutions (2013) at p .7 20. See Sureesh Mehta, The Centrality Of The Indian Ocean To Global Maritime Security: Indian Ocean Challenges, A Quest For Cooperative Solutions(2013) at p.3 21. For a detailed report on the symposium held at Waseda University Tokyo on 4th June 2010 visit http://www.observerindia.com/cms/export/orfonline/documents/other/st_issue3.pdf .Last accessed on 6th April 2013. Last accessed on 6th April 2013 22. Supra note 13 at p 3 23. The Human Cost of Somali Piracy, One Earth Future Foundation, June 6, 2011. 24. Andrew J. Shapiro, U.S. Approaches to Counter-Piracy, Remarks at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Washington, DC, March 30, 2011 25. John Knott, Somalia” Clan Rivalry, Military Conflict and the Financial and Human Cost of Piracy, 17th March 2009. Available at http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=76272 .Last accessed on 4th April 2013. 26. See Probal Ghosh ,Security Challenges from Non state actors in the Indian Ocean Strategic Trends Vol 1 Issue 3 December 2011 available at http://www.observerindia.com/cms/export/orfonline/documents/other/st_issue3.pdf last accessed on 6th April 2013. 27. Available at http//www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/requested-piracy-report Last accessedon 6th April 2013. 28. See definition of “Piracy,” at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/piracy. 29. See Phillip De Souza, Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World, Cambridge University press. 30. Rubin Alfred, The law of Piracy (2nd e.d) New York Transnational Publishers 1998. Rubin Identifies 6 different meanings of the word piracy ranging from the vernacular usage with no legal meaning to the international law meaning from treaties and meanings derived from domestic laws of individual states. 31. Ibid at p.10 . 32. Ibid. 33. Harvard Research in International law, Draft convention on Piracy with Comments (1932) 26 AJIL 749 as quoted in Mary Williamson‟s Terrorism, War and International Law: the Legality of the use of Force, available at http://books.google.co.ke/books?id=ZuJIPP9HfRsC&pg=PA95&dq=harvard+draft+convention+on+pir acy&hl=en&ei=27jRS7_fCMijOMjB9eYN&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CD8Q6AE wAQ#v=onepage&q=harvard%20draft%20convention%20on%20piracy&f=false . Las t accessed on 24th May 2010. 34. Barry H. Dubner, The Law of International Piracy , Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1980 35. Ibid at p. 15. 36. See Gal Luft and Annie Korin, Terrorism goes to sea, Foreign affairs, Nov/Dec 04.They argue that The scourge of piracy and terrorism at sea are increasingly intertwined, as piracy on the high seas is becoming a key tactic of maritime terrorist groups with either direct or proxy involvement of the non-state actors. Available at : http://www.ukessays.com/essays/military/role-of-non-state-actors-in-the-maritime- domain.php#ixzz2Pbmt0Aft Last accessed on 5th April 2013. 37. See Cdr Gurpreet S Khurana, Research Fellow, IDSA, Maritime Terrorism in Southern Asia Addressing the 'Precursors'' Published in Indian Defence Review, Vol 20(1), Jan-Mar 2005 issue, page 60. 38. See Arbinda Acharya and Nadeeka Prashadani Withana Groups with Maritime Terrorist Capabilities in the Indian Ocean Region, edited by VR Raghavan W Lawrence Prabhakar, Maritime Security in the IOR Critical Issues in Debate, Tata Mc Graw Hill, 2008 39. See Kazumine Akimoto, Maritime Terrorism and The Role of the Navy- A Sinster Shadow Lurking in The Sea Lane, Journal of Indian Ocean Studies, Vol 12 No.3 December 2004. 40. For a historical and legal overview of the law of piracy, see Michael Bahar, Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A Legal and Strategic Theory for Naval Anti-Piracy Operations, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 1, 2007, p. 32 and ff.; Douglas Guyldfoyle, Counter-Piracy Law Enforcement and Human Rights, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 19, 2010, pp. 142 and ff.; Malvina Halberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas: the Achille Lauro Piracy and the IMOConvention on Maritime Safety, America Journal of International Law, vol. 82, 1988, n. 2, pp. 272 and ff., Eugene Kontorovich, A Guantanamo on the Sea: The Difficulties of Prosecuting Pirates and Terrorists, California Law Review, vol. 98, February 2010, pp. 243 and ff.; Janice E. Thompson, Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994, p. 7 and ff. 41. Maritime Security Challenges in the Indian Ocean Region, Workshop Report, A Center for the National Interest and NMF, New Delhi, 23-24 Feb 2011, p.6 42. http://www.un.org/Depts/los/piracy/piracy.htm .Last accessed on 16th March 2013. 43. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea(LOSC), adopted on December 10, 1982 (1883 U.N.T.S.3). Article 100 of LOSC requires that all the states tol cooperate in the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state. 44. The first MOU was signed between Kenya and the UK in December 2008 and the second with the US on 16th January 2009.A third MOU was signed with the EU on 6th March 2009 with similar terms as the earlier two signed with the UK and the US. It is indicated that China and Sweden also may have signed MOUs with similar provisions as the three signed with the UK, the EU and the US. The key provisions of these agreements is that Kenya agrees to try in its national courts suspected pirates arrested in the high seas or off the coast of Somalia by the navies of the US, the UK, the EU, Sweden and China.(For the

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Kenya/EU MOU see Official Journal of the European Union L79/52 of 25th March 2009. Also see story tilted Leaders Question The Trial Of Somali Pirates In Kenyan Courts available at http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/610466/-/uk9mt7/-/index.html and House of Commons Report titled Kenya Piracy available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery- office.co.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090507/text/90507w0008.htm.The text of the MOU between Kenya and the US remains confidential and has not been made public and therefore not available online. 45. For the full text see http://www.africa union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/AFRICAN_MARITIME_TRANSPORT.pdf and also http://www.africa-union.org/root/ua/Conferences/2007/fevrier/IE/doc/Report_The_Experts_Meeting.pdf Last accessed 20th March 2013. 46. However, see Articles 2(6) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 which provides that any treaty ratified by Kenya shall form part of the laws of Kenya. There has been a lively debate on the exact effect of the provisions of article 2(6) with some arguing that the effect is to convert Kenya from a dualist state to a monist state. The author has taken the view that Kenya still remains a dualist state despite the provisions of article 2(6). 47. Convention for the Suppression of unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, adopted March 10th, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221. 48. For a detailed account of the hijacking of the Achille Lauro visit http://www.specialoperations.com/Images_Folder/library2/achille.html .Last accessed on 5th April 2013. 49. See Merchant Shipping Act 2009 and also how the provisions of section 369(i) create offences in line with the requirements of article 5 of the SUA Convention. 50. The Djibouti Code is available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf9/piracy-djibouti-meeting (Last accessed on 21st March 2013). The seventeen states which sent delegates to the Djibouti meeting were: Comoros,Djibouti,Egypt,Ethiopia,France,Jordan,Kenya,Madagascar,Maldives,Oman,Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, United Republic of Tanzania and Yemen. Twelve other states as well as nine intergovernmental organizations and two non governmental organizations participated as observers. (See details of participating states ibid at http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf9/piracy- djibouti-meeting (Last accessed on 21st March 2013). 51. The Djibouti meeting (held on 26th to 29th January 2009) was preceded by a sub-regional seminar on piracy and armed robbery against ships and maritime security held in Sana‟a, Yemen(9th-13th April 2005);sub-regional workshop on piracy and armed robbery against ships held in Muscat, Oman(14th -18th January 2006);and the sub-regional meeting on piracy and armed robbery against ships which also prepared the draft instrument of the code held in Dar-es-Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania (14th -18th April 2008). 52. Article 13 of the code provides that: “within two years of the effective date of this Code of Conduct and having designated the national focal points referred to in Article 8,the participants intend to consult, with the assistance of IMO, with the aim of arriving at a binding agreement”. 53. Supra note 50 , Article 1(1) of the Code. 54. Ibid, Article 1(2). 55. Ibid, Article 4(7). 56. Ibid, Articles 4(8) and 5(2). 57. Ibid, Article 2 and 4. 58. Ibid, Article 7(1), (2) and (3). 59. Ibid, Article 7(4). 60. Ibid, Article 11. 61. Ibid, Article 14. 62. The meeting was held on 15th and 16th October 2009 and was preceded by a preparatory meeting of experts which took place from 12th to 14th October 2009 at the same venue. For details see http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/AFRICAN_MARITIME_TRANSPORT.pdf and also http://www.africa-union.org/root/ua/Conferences/2007/fevrier/IE/doc/Report_The_Experts_Meeting.pdf (last accessed 1st December 2009). 63. See Article 3 and Art 23 of the Charter. 64. Ibid, Article 26(1). 65. Ibid, Article 26(2). 66. Supra, note 49 above. 67. See the discussion on the Djibouti Code in the preceding paragraphs. 68. The 2008 Resolutions are numbers 1801,1811,1814,1816,1831,1838,1844,1846,1851and 1853.See list and the full text at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions08.htm(Last accessed 21st March 2009).Chapter VII of the United Nations (UN) Charter authorizes the Security Council (Articles 41 and 42) to take enforcement action by air, land or sea in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. 69. The 2009 Resolutions are numbers 1863, 1872, 1897 and the most recent one passed on 30th November 2009 at the 6226th meeting of the UNSC. See the list and full text of Resolutions at: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions09.htm (last accessed 21st March 2009). 70. For details of the text of UNSCRs see http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/index.shtml.Last accessed on 6th April 2013. 71. Supra note 69 operative para 7. 72. Ibid, operative para 7(a) 73. Ibid, operative para 8 74. Ibid operative para 10(b) 75. Ibid operative para 6.

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76. See the discussion on this point in The Draft Convention on Piracy, Supplement Research in International Law Part IV-Piracy 26 AM. J. INT‟L. 739,751-760 where it is noted (at p. 760) that “piracy is not a crime by the law of nations. It is the basis of an extra ordinary jurisdiction in every state to seize and to prosecute and punish persons, and to seize and dispose of property, for factual offences which are committed outside the territorial and other ordinary jurisdiction of the prosecuting state”. 77. Supra note 68 operative para 3. 78. Ibid. 79. See the discussion on the Djibouti Code of Conduct above. 80. Raymond Gilpin, Counting the Costs of Somali Piracy United States Institute Of Peace – Working Paper( 22 June 2009). 81. See David Michel and Russel Sticklor, Indian Ocean Rising: Maritime Security In The Indian Ocean July 2012) P.12. ********************

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Indian Ocean: New Vision New Challenges

Summar Rao

(Summar Rao is an Editor of Weekly Pulse. He is also a visiting faculty at SPIR, QAU and Fatima Jinnah Women University, Rawalpindi. He can be reached at [email protected] )

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Indian Ocean is the third largest transit route for 70% of oil products, and also exploited by the resident power India for its 40% trade with littoral states. India‟s aspirations of building its “blue water” navy capable of assuring its „credible presence‟ from Straits of Hormuz to Straits of Malacca are encapsulations of Alfred Mahan, the staunch proponent of „sea power‟.

India is investing billions dollars to modernize its Navy for bolstering deterrence as an effective instrument of foreign policy. Ideas of „blue water‟ navy with strategic outreach aims were flaunted, which made India for allocate huge chunks of dollars to meet these desires, especially regional challenges from Pakistan and China. All this is part of New Delhi‟s game plan to proceed slowly towards a global power status and make Indian ocean „India‟s ocean‟ through proactive strategic vision. That‟s why Indian Navy set episodic displays as empathic bouts of power projection.

These are also decades‟ long pronouncements of defence academics and strategic pundits for bolstering Indian Navy and growing bureaucratic politics, all geared towards making indigenous ship-building industries match needs of supreme naval power for great power status. Such power projection displays too are an indication that with such might, India is at least a regional power, and that this Naval might could be used as a strategic as well as diplomatic instrument.

This article reviews a few questions whether Indian Navy is capable enough to guard Indian stakes in the region and pave its way to the status of Global power,

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or it is mere rhetoric to assuage its public and polity to keep flooring the coins for this naval supremacy quest.

Will India serve the US ‘counter-China’ strategy in Indian Ocean for nuclear facilitation and bigger share in Afghan solution?

Indo-US deepening ties are primarily seen in Indian Ocean to beat China‟s growing presence, connected to shared interests of both, but a chasm is visible due to divergent prisms to analyze the events. This contextual difference is causing problems in cooperation and famous US mantra of „do more‟ has made India skeptical. The convergence of interests does not guarantee to bring the forces on same page all the time. This may bring them closer for cooperation in greater good of both, but not in desired direction as witnessed in Indo-US strategic partnership. Preservation of its strategic autonomy and being independent actor are the biggest aims of India which may hinder further collaboration between the partners. It may too affect the Indo-Pacific aims to get materialized.

Indo-US strategic partnership established a great hype and even to some extent kept China at bay as well. In addition, it helped raise loft claims about Indian potential to guard the US interests and increase economic gains as well as multiplying its own capabilities in return for prominent role in global politics. US has tried, too, to exploit Indian aspirations of being a major power and tried to please it by declaring it the oldest democracy and a natural ally entitled to bigger role in this century. The US strategists were of the view that „rising India‟ will serve their interests and passing the baton to India may help guard stakes against China in the region.

The US did its part well too and inked Indo-US nuclear deal, besides imparting it a bigger share in Afghan cake. But India is too wise and pragmatic, and not yet ready to keep aside its regional preferences. India wishes to establish its own independent authority in Indian Ocean which is only possible by following a non- alignment policy. However, it might not be possible for India to ignore the US help in facilitating its nuclear energy requirements and offering bigger role in Afghanistan. Also India cannot let the Chinese to surpass, and especially when Pakistan has given Gwadar to China, it won‟t be easy for India to ignore the US proposals. On the bigger stage, Indo-Pacific project will enhance Indian capabilities which are too interrelated with this cooperation to materialize.

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Does India stand as a credible ‘security provider’ in the Indian Ocean?

Indian big naval ambitions can be well observed in saying of Admiral (Retd) Arun Prakash i,Chief of the Naval Staff in 2005: “As the pre-eminent maritime power in the Indian Ocean, we must possess and maintain a capability for sustained operations in our area of interest, including power projection”. Over the years, Indian military is the fast growing enterprise with acquisition of defence assets, gathering surveillance and shore-based arsenals, submarines and latest aircraft carriers with plans to revamp its naval forces which have built its maritime capability through garnering a piffling share of defence budget. Rationality paves way to assembling latest hi-tech weaponry alongside well-equipped and well- trained forces to combat piracy and guard the strategic interests, be it: security assurances to all littoral states or economic security of their unchecked flow of shipments.

But mere acquisition of sophisticated weaponry and big-budgeted military plans do not subscribe one as credible security provider. India, apart from its flamboyant episodic shows of military acquisitions, naval exercises and combating piracy drills etc., has yet to go a long way to obtain that capability. Issues such as defence acquisitions tainted by allegations of corruption, obscured defence doctrine as to what type of power it wants to be, failure to save its own home as reflected by 2008 Mumbai Blasts etc., further augment the case of India being a less capable security provider. Also Hillary Clinton quoted India as a strategic bet, which indicates that the US, too, is not considering India as a capable force to replace itself in Indian Ocean. Apart from orchestrated dialogues, lofty claims and rubbing shoulders, the US doesn‟t consider India as a capable security provider in the region.

Each littoral state is wary of its loss and maintains its own security, and does not rely completely on Indian forces. Indian naval force is yet to establish its supremacy in allowing uninterrupted continuation of the flow of trade through Indian Ocean, secured from piracy and land based challenges. India is mindful of such problems and making efforts like inking pacts such as one with Singapore in 2003 and one with Sultanate of Oman in 2005 to ensure global stability in this particular region.

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How far an efficient, well-equipped and modernized ‘Blue Water’ Navy is capable to harm Chinese strategic interests in the region and trouble Pakistan?

An empirical study reveals that the rise of China and emergence of India are the result of relative decline in the US power, and on this cusp of power transition, especially in Indian Ocean, India may be an imminent power being a US auxiliary. But on the other side, India is maintaining „diplomatic refrain‟ -- a deliberate avoidance from any direct confrontation -- through a formidable naval force and orchestrating cooperative naval diplomacy. This has been seen as balancing China with gradual and uninterrupted pace, which the US may mind, but India does have its own compulsions and constraints. Apparently, this cooperative naval security looks a win-win situation, unless Chinese honor this and Pakistan too considers it as a „positive‟ move as history is littered with so many misshapes, which don‟t subscribe any healthy response from each side. China is too keen and not ready to compromise its strategic interests. It is raising its naval capability and strategic outreach through Strings of Pearls. There is no match in Indo-China naval capabilities, yet hot pursuits of India with help of the US and Western states, is increasing Indian naval might, which one day might shake the balance, but that day is too far away yet.

„One‟s security is other‟s insecurity‟ is widely practiced in Indo-Pakistan situation where each side is wary of other‟s intentions, and considers it a threat that must be balanced with more power in terms of arms buildups. In this regard, such Indian capability may invite an arms race, but due to lesser stakes in Indian Ocean, Pakistan may not indulge in it; rather, its internal economic crisis may lead to adopting such postures. Also, giving Gwadar to China has brought both the states closer, which will help Pakistan invigorate its naval power and revamp its forces to be able to respond to any surprise move.

To sum up, India is too wise in manipulating the Sino-US rivalry to build its own capacity, not getting exploited for the US intentions to counter China in the region. Its pragmatic approach towards global affairs is a sign of its maturity to revamp its security apparatus to guard its strategic interests and avoid any direct confrontation for futile purposes.

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India In Indian Ocean

Sayoni Choudhuri

Assistant Professor, Loreto College, Kolkata [email protected]

Sayoni Choudhuri holds M.A, M.Phil (Political Science) degree from University of Calcutta.

Currently designated in the substantive post as Assistant Professor in Loreto College, Kolkata, in the Department of Political Science since November 2008. Served as Part-time lecturer at Barrackpore Rastraguru Surrendranath College between December, 2006 to September, 2008 and at Maharani Kasiswari College, Kolkata from July,2008 to September, 2008.

Areas Of Specialisation : Contemporary India and Public Administration Foreign Policy and Global Politics, Women Empowerment in Rural West Bengal.

Publications Paper entitled “Political Participation and Empowerment of Women” published by Look East –a journal of Centre for Development Sudies, Rishi Bankim Chandra Evening College, Naihati; Volume III 2009-2010. Paper entitled “State and Techno sphere” published by The Political science Review, West Bengal Political Science Association, Vol XIV. No.2, July December 2011. Paper entitled “Women under Howrah Zilla Parishad: A Case Study” is in the process of being published in a book entitled Political Economy of Rural Development: The Indian Experience. Editing the book entitled Indian Ocean: Geopolitical and Geostrategic Dimensions due to be published by July 2013

______India‘s claim, entitlement and stakes over Indian Ocean (IO) can be explained in the dominant paradigm of Indian foreign policy from Nehruvian Idealism to realpolitik of the 21st century where India beckons for her status as an emerging world power. The geo strategic importance of IO increased during the cold war period. But with the end of cold war the geopolitical importance of the area has multiplied with Asia replacing Europe as the new theatre of international politics and diversifying itself. The Indian Ocean is the world‘s largest water body with a surface covering nearly 70 million square kilometers, and flanked by about 45 littoral states in the 3 continents of Asia, Africa and Australia. The area of the Ocean is roughly equal to the size of Asia and Africa taken together. Unlike Atlantic or the Pacific it is surrounded by four continents- Africa, Asia, Australia and Antarctica. This accounts for its geopolitical and geostrategic importance. The littoral and hinterland states‘ surrounding the region presents a vast

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and varied kaleidoscope of political societies at different levels of development. The states in the region are rich in Oil, Uranium and Gold. About a quarter of the world‘s trade is handled in the Ports of the Indian Ocean. Since time immemorial the region has been the stepping1 After the Cold War, China in particular has expanded her naval power and has made her presence remarkable in the Indian Ocean to compete with other great powers. The presence of US,France, Japan have complicated the issue further. Already the world‘s preeminent energy and trade interstate seaway, the Indian Ocean will matter even more in the future. According to Robert Kaplan, this is iconic to the new century. In his own words, ―…the Greater Indian Ocean, stretching eastward from the Horn of Africa past the Arabian Peninsula, the Iranian Plateau, and the Indian subcontinent, all the way to the Indonesian archipelago and beyond, may comprise a map as iconic to the new century as Europe was to the last one.‖2. Moreover the relation of India with the littoral states like Sri Lanka, Indo-China states, South East Asian Countries along with the hinterland like Afghanistan can help understanding IO‘s importance for India.

The significance of IO for India can be summarized in terms of firstly, Trans Indian ocean routes which connect the countries of Europe in the West and the countries of East Asia which has helped India to encourage multilateralism through regional organizations like ASEAN, APEC, IOR-ARC, BIMSTEC, SAARC and EAS. Secondly, this puts India in the ideal place to establish to be able to trade with West Asia, Africa and Europe from the Western coast and with the Southeast and East Asia from the Eastern coast. Thirdly, the long coastline and the natural harbors calls for a proactive naval diplomacy in presence of militia groups. Fourthly, it has given India a distinct climate than the rest of the Asian Continent and has numerous ports of much distance due to which trade ships have to pass India which adds to her global strategic importance. Fifthly, the mutual perception of India and PRC will determine the future of IO. It is the stage of unfolding Asian drama and India is to choose whether it will play the role of protagonist or not. Sixthly, the emerging concern for India is with regard environmentalism (tsunami in 2004) and corporatism (ONGC Videsh exploration near Vietnam).

Thus a natural claim of India over IO is pragmatically unacceptable to the entire world and specifically PRC. So, is the nomenclatural claim often stands diametrically opposite to political realities. IO for India is no exception to this cliché. Thus India has to competitively establish her rightful role in the region.

Against this backdrop India‘s concern has proportionally expanded from economic to strategic and also combination of two. History stands witness to India‘s trade and cultural exchanges through IO to both

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the eastern and western hemisphere. But the 20th century world order made up the perception of IO from the standpoint of bipolar power politics. In the 1971 East Pakistan liberation war IO witnessed the intertwining USA-USSR and India-Pakistan interest in the region. The US naval deployment in the Bay of Bengal was the beginning of IO militarization which India perceived as a security threat and thus shifting her foreign relation in to accelerated pro-Soviet stance. US went ahead to build its high security naval base in the British island of IO in Diego Garcia against much of India dissatisfaction and concern. Thus at the very onset three constants can be established: Firstly IO had external involvement since South Asia‘s colonial past, than it was British followed by USA and USSR in post colonial era and now China (PRC). Secondly, IO was perceived in the early days after independence as important for India‘s security only. Thirdly, the role of non state actors like piracy, terrorist and militant groups have added to the problem of stability of the region. These constants determine contemporary Indian Foreign policy with respect to IO.

India‘s role in IO can therefore be contemplated through the following dimensions.

The history and culture are important determinants of Indian foreign policy (IFP). Indian claim on IO can be argued from the cultural perspective accordingly. Historically her influence in the region has been positive through the Vedic period to spread of Buddhism across the littorals of IO. Indian culture of Restrain 3 can help cultivate moderate climate of co-operation in the region against the stiff backdrop of Chinese hegemonism. The demographic profile of IO littorals and hinterland is also important for India particularly with the presence of Indian origin population in these countries. The diaspora has come to play an important role in determining India‘s bilateral relation with these states. Government of India (GOI) has extended special business opportunity and citizenship status to the diaspora. Thereby, enhancing India‘s investment and trade opportunities along with cultural ties.

Economic and trade dimension of Indian foreign policy has expanded in the post cold war era and specially with the acceptance of neo-liberal market economy in the 1990s. Economic diplomacy is accepted as much fundamental as political diplomacy by GOI, resultantly have come to investing in infrastructure along with trade with IO littorals especially with the small nations of South Asia and African state. In this regard the most important area is India‘s energy requirement which has pushed her to develop closer relation with the African states. While 70 percent of global traffic of petroleum product passes from IO. India‘s 97 percent of trade is sea borne including petroleum which obviously

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increases the importance of IO. It is predicted by the International Agency (IEA) that India‘s current growth rate will compel India to import 90 percent of petroleum by 2025 4. With the Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Deal still waiting for a comprehensive implementation the need for petroleum will only raise without strong alternatives. Moreover energy is now perceived by the policy makers a security issue. After independence Soviet Union was India‘s energy supplier now India foreign policy doesn‘t only intent to buy oil and gas from other countries but has started acquiring energy assets abroad through Oil and Natural Gas Corporation-Videsh Limited (OVL). The ―Hydrocarbon Vision 2025‖ and ―Integrated Energy Policy‖ of GOI noted that ―One route to energy is through the diversification of foreign suppliers and investment in oil and gas ventures overseas‖ 5. Thus Africa stands important for energy resources diversification and investment and IO is important for this consistent communication with the continent. African reserves and oil wells are located offshore which decreases transport cost, reduces impact of political instability and importance of Western IO. India can use the existing sea lanes to import oil without considering the problems of Suez Canal and expensive pipelines.

India‘s resource diplomacy has resulted in ONGC, Mittal Energy Ltd and Essar investing in establishing refinery, power plant and railway lines in Nigeria in return of Nigerian oil blocks. India is a signatory of UN Law of Exploration which gives her the legitimate claim for off and onshore exploration in consent with the host state.

ONGC has invested $2 billion in eight African states including Sudan, Libya , Egypt along with Nigeria. Indian Oil Corporation has invested $125million in Nigeria, Libya and Gabon. In 2006 India signed a MOU with Mauritius for exploration of hydrocarbon deposits offshore. In South Africa India is negotiating for setting up LPG logistics. India is also helping PetroSA for utilization of coal-to-liquid technology and other hydrocarbon sector. In Cote d‘Ivoire OVL is carrying out off shore drilling. While in Madagascar Essar has procured exploration and production blocks. India had to continue this resource diplomacy primarily driven by her national interest. But there is a concern of perception since China is equally competitive in acquiring oil wells, infrastructure building in the continent, there is a trending idea of perceiving this competition of emerging resource hungry economic power as colonial exploiters. Africa Union has made a similar observation sometime back. Thus India will have to act responsible with the states. In 2008 in the first ever summit with African states India offered $5 billion credit as help for development 6. India economic interest in the region is therefore supplemented by her development

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role as well specially against our foreign policy values and Nehruvian ideals of fighting for the African states independence to protesting the racism practices. It is as much continuity of engagement as it is remodeled on the basis of changed circumstances. IO here is as much the connecting thread with the continent as also, epitomizing historical links and geopolitical proximity than any other comparative powerful Asian state.

The small nations of South Asia like Maldives in the IO also require India‘s special attention. The recent cancellation of Indian contract(GMR) to build Maldives airport is been a cause of concern for many policy makers specially with China acquiring the contract. But the realities of business stand on the fact that most of Maldives is under development like many of its South Asian neighbours and India cannot provide cheap infrastructure which China can. But with regard to security infrastructure and surveillance the importance of India remains intact. India remains important from political and maritime assistance in the state as well New Delhi‘s influence has been underscored by former Maldives President Mohamed Nasheed‘s decision to seek refuge in the Indian High Commission in Male after a Maldivian court ordered his arrest. Moreover, India is connected to smaller countries in the region through entrenched ethnic and historical ties. President Mohamed Waheed has discussed Maldives‘ "preferential relationship‖ with India, and a former Maldivian foreign minister has stated that "nothing will change the fact that we are only 200 miles from Trivandrum,‖ referring to Maldives‘ proximity to the Indian city. India feels security obligations to regional states and has displayed its operational reach through campaigns in Sri Lanka and Maldives. The Indian Navy and Coast Guard frequently assist Seychelles, Maldives and Mauritius in maintaining security by providing maritime surveillance, hydrographic surveys, training, and maritime military equipment and repair, in addition to engaging these countries in exercises 7

India‘s neighborhood policy is also determined by her role in IO specially the littorals and countries in the Indo-China region like Myanmar and Vietnam respectively. China claims nearly all of the South China Sea as its own but Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Taiwan, Malaysia and Indonesia demarcate their own maritime boundaries in the waters that are the shortest distance between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The chief of the Association of South East Asian Nations (Asean), Surin Pitsuwan described the dispute over the waters as a potential ―Asian Palestine‖ that can destabilize a vast region. Thus India has to extend her interest in the region out of geopolitical compulsion as best understood by ―Look East‖

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policy. Her economic involvement in the region is also of paramount significance especially with the India-Asean Free Trade Agreement awaiting complete implementation. In terms of bilateral relations with countries of the region, India‘s take is ever so escalating like for example India has exploration and production-sharing agreements with Vietnam in three blocks off the Vietnamese coast. ONGC-Videsh, is engaged in two blocks spanning 955sqkm and 7,058sqkm. China says it owns a block for which it has invited global bids for exploration. It can be estimates for proven and undiscovered oil reserves in the South China Sea range as high as 213 billion barrels of oil, the US Energy Information Administration said in a 2008 report. That would surpass every country‘s proven oil reserves except Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, according to the BP Statistical Review.

Strategic dimension of IFP is a developing area in general. Politically strategic cooperation is post post cold war (post 9/11)8 development with USA being the primary partner. All the great powers of the contemporary world, actual and potential such as PRC, Japan, Russia and USA have presence in IO which seems to be the preference of the small littorals of the region. As there is no single coalition becomes dominant. But it also means that none of the countries can ever afford to be lenient with their naval and strategic plans. Back in 1992 Indian officials in Washington had appreciated the US military presence in Persian Gulf and Diego Garcia. Thus Io will be a theater of collaborative naval exercise is now an accepted fact of Indian naval diplomacy. However it also means otherwise for antagonistic state like PRC who perceives such joint naval exercise as anti China and Chinese interest in the region. India‘s recent two trillion rupees defense budget allocation for the financial year 2013-2014 is a consistent progress in naval diplomacy India can continue to play the role of the regional vigilante! This can be particularly explained in reference to Indian Navy Maritime Doctrine 2009. The doctrine developed particularly after the terrorist attack of 2008 which integrated national security and maritime security strongly. The government of India identifying Indian Navy (IN) as primarily in charge of coastal security. Simultaneously using the sister services for it operation instead of playing secondary role to Indian Army and Air force. Finally intelligence sharing 9 Indian Navy became part of the USA Marine ‗Malabar exercise‘ which was during cold war era the privilege of Pakistani Navy. IN will also have to take the role preventing non combatant security lapses for example Italian merchant vessel security officers involved in killing of the Indian fisherman off the coast of Kochi. IN under it Maritime Doctrine of 2009 has accepted the diplomatic function in protecting ONGC exploration in the Vietnam. Here IN has to assert its right to sail in international water against the Chinese enforcement of territorial

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claims which occurred on 22 July 2011 when INS Airavat was sailing in international water 45 nautical miles of Vietnam‘s Nha Trang port when it received warning of Airavat entering Chinese water. Thus such conflict will be regular indefinite future of IO 10 Strategically Indian ambition and resilience in IO needs a greater role for IN. Not that we expect to be in those waters very, very frequently. But when the requirement is there for situations where the country‘s interests are involved — for example, ONGC Videsh — we are there. Are we preparing for it? Are we having exercises of that nature? The short answer is: Yes,‖ Admiral Devendra Kumar Joshi said 11

Another important factor that can help her influence in the IO is security cooperation with Japan. The top leaders of both the countries emphasized upon security of IO. Since Japan is also the third highest importer of oil an IO sea lanes are of paramount significance to it. Since 2012 Japan‘s MSDF and IN is carrying out joint exercise involving routine passage exercises (PASSEX). It involved two destroyers, one maritime patrol aircraft and a helicopter of MSDF while INS Rana, INS Shivalik, INS Karmukh and fleet tanker INS Shakti also represented India off the coast of Tokyo12 In April 2011 Japan was to participate in the trilateral Malabar Exercise between India, USA and Japan but the Fukushima nuclear crisis forced her withdrawal. Japan‘s only multilateral naval exercise includes India. The China factor has been a catalyst to the whole effort is an obvious understanding. IN‘s sister services are also negotiating with Japan‘s Ground Self-Defense Force and Air Self-Defense Force. The coast guards of both the countries had conducted combined exercises of anti-piracy, rescue and search in 2000. In 2012 similar exercises are being renegotiated. Both the navies patrol the Malacca straits to counter piracy operations. They are enhancing cooperation in the Gulf of Aden with regular maritime dialogue. India referring to her ―Look East‖ policy is also strengthening the military ties with Japan by deploying warships in the region.

IN is also engaged in bilateral naval cooperation with South East Asian states. With South Korea India has a developing relation as both are supporters of democracy in Asia. South Korea is non judgmental of India‘s nuclear Status unlike Japan. India-South Korea Civilian Nuclear Cooperation agreement was signed during President Pratibha Sigh Patils state vist in 2011. India as a counter balancer in East Asia against China is largely accepted by South Korea. In strategic cooperation involve fighting terrorism, safety of sea lanes and peaceful resolution of maritime disputes. India‘s economic cooperation with

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South Korea dates back to the 1990‘s while strategic partnership is steadily growing, with India‘s commitment to maintain peace in South China sea is because of her naval strength in the IO region13.

India‘s military ties with postwar Sri Lanka are now deeper with the resumption of the SLINEX naval exercise in 2011, and the two countries began an annual dialogue between their defense secretaries in 2012. Beyond bilateral relationships, New Delhi is gradually assuming a greater leadership role in Indian Ocean institutions, such as the economic and diplomatic forum Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). Far from India‘s influence waning, all these measures reinforce the country‘s strong security relationships with Indian Ocean countries. India deputes a navy officer to manage the National Coast Guard of Mauritius, where two-thirds of the public is of Indian origin. In 2007, New Delhi built a monitoring station in Madagascar that relays intelligence back to Mumbai and Kochi. India is also installing a network of coastal radars in all 26 Maldivian atolls that feed back to India. The Indian Navy and Coast Guard frequently assist Seychelles, Maldives and Mauritius in maintaining security by providing maritime surveillance, hydrographic surveys, training, and maritime military equipment and repair, in addition to engaging these countries in exercises.

Humanitarian diplomacy has contributed in India‘s growing influence in the littorals of IO. IN was involved in the rescue and aid operation during 2004 tsunami. IN has conducted similar operation during the Nargis cyclone 2008 and evacuation of Indian, Nepalese and Sri Lankan during the 2006 Lebanon war 14. The Indian Air Force was the first to reach with medical-military mission landed in Colombo in 2009 as the war against LTTE. There was notable spark in Sino-India relations. More sorties by IAF followed. Political pressure at home further made GOI offer reconstruction package to Sri Lanka especially after her support to the war against LTTE. Rajapakshe Government had well informed India about its ultimate assault on LTTE and India had supported it even keeping the Tamil parties in control under coalition bargain. But the post war developing picture of human right violation an dwar crimes India will vote against Sri Lanka at United Nation Human Rights Council thereby going with US or not awaits 21st March 2013 date. It would be interesting to see India foreign policy resolve here as to weigh which side she will vote. Congress have come to criticized the reported incidents of war crime but was unwilling to support any organization like Tamil Elam Support Organization (TESO) as created by DMK unless it declared that it is not in favor of separate statehood. On the other hand China has already

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building the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, though after India declined but it was a strategic loss. Even in the postwar infrastructure reconstruction China is acquiring contracts randomly adding to India‘s worries with the pearl nation. The growing Human rights violation and war crime accusation against Sri Lanka have brought in both domestic and ethical pressure on India foreign policy decision maker. The fact that India has voted against Sri Lanka in the non binding resolution last year and even in the March 2013 the USA sponsored resolution in UNHRC received Indian vote ensures one political mileage, which is, that the resolution does not call for any independent investigation in the war crimes. Thus India has left her diplomatic doors open with Sri Lanka which might have temporary diplomatic stagnation. But on the other hand doesn‘t serve the country to completely side with China which was not even in the UNHRC this time and thereby the position of China visa ve the international pressure remains unmeasured. Thus India has to manage her human rights with political compulsion.China will continue to influence Sri Lanka specially since 70 percent of her oil is imported through IO and it will compete with India to maintain her control which leads to the Strait of Malacca where IN is heavily present with other navies of South East Asian States.

Conclusion

Thus IO has been traditionally important for India. But her assertion in the region is a newer orientation of IFP in the post cold war world order. The 1970‘s UN Resolution of IO as ‗Zone of Peace‘ is a lost call. It in the centre of Chinese competitive claim and her growing hegemonism. India has to be competitive without choice for multiple reasons. Firstly, the stability of Asia requires a stable balance of power strategy in IO for the benefit of all the Asian states. Here India can only counter China in IO and in Asia Pacific region with US and Japan. Secondly, countering China is important to control Pakistan. The China-Pakistan axis is India major domestic and external threat, her cross border security as well as maritime security is determined by the attitude of this to nations. 26/11 did not only prove coastline vulnerability but also redefined security priorities. India has to prevent Bay of Bengal from becoming the ‗Chinese lake‘ as feared because of her ‗Strings of Pearls‘ strategy which has resulted in Chinese involvement in Myanmar and building of the Chittagon port in Bangladesh. Thirdly, logically India cannot surrender her claim to IO resources for her own development and economic purposes. Finally, the energy requirement of India needs her to place IO at the priority list of foreign affair. Whether it is import of oil , petroleum product or her investments in oil rich state IO in the only line of

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communication with Western IO states. India is already monitoring and providing security to the merchant vessels moving out of Gulf of Aden. Thus, countering Somalian pirates in multiple occasions. These areas established Indian interest and influence in the IO, which should not lose assertiveness in near future.

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1. Kamal Kumar, Indian Ocean As a Zone of Peace: Problems and Prospects, A.P.H Publishing Corporation, New Delhi, 2000

2. Robert D Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power, New York, United States: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2011), xi

3. Prithvi Ram Mudiam, Regionalism in Europe and Asia in the Twenty-first Century, World Affairs, Vol 16, No.3, Autumn-July, 2012

4. Sanjay Kumar Pradhan, India and Africa: Quest for Oil and Gas, Indian Foreign Affair, Vol 7, No3, July-Sept 2012,pg 284 5. Sanjay Kumar Pradhan, India and Africa: Quest for Oil and Gas, Indian Foreign Affair, Vol 7, No3, July-Sept 2012, pg 285

6. Sanjay Kumar Pradhan, India and Africa: Quest for Oil and Gas, Indian Foreign Affair, Vol 7, No3, July-Sept 2012,pg 288

7. Nilanthi Samarayake, India: Still at the center of the Indian Ocean, www.yaleglobal.yale.edu, February 23,2013.

8. Richard Haass, Age of Nonpolarity, Foreign Affairs, Vol 87, No 3, May-June 2008, p.45 9. Indian Maritime Doctrine 2009.

10. Jaganath P.Panda, China, the South China Sea and Implications for India, Indian Foreign Affairs, Vol 7, No2, April- June 2012, pg 169

11. India sails in to South Asia whirlpool, Sujan Datta, The Telegraph, 3rd December,2012.

12. Rajaram Panda, India-Japan Defence Partnership, Indian Foreign Affairs,Vol7,No 3, July-September, 2012, pg 316.

13. R.Tayal and Sandip Kumar Mishra, India and Republic of Korea:A Growing Strategic Partnership,I ndian Foreign Affairs,Vol7,No 3, July-September, 2012, pg 325

14. Geethangani de Silva, ―Maritime Issues in South Asia‖, The Indian Ocean: Resource and Governance, edited by Ellen Laipson and Amit P

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Indian Strategic Thinking Vis-À-Vis Indian Ocean TRADE, COMMERCE AND SECURITY CHALLENGES— From the Decision Makers Perspective Saloni Salil

(Saloni Salil is a post-graduate research scholar. She completed her Post Graduation in (Master of Science) Geopolitics and International Relations from the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal University in 2012. During her Post Graduation, she interned at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) and has been contributing articles in the Journal of Defence Studies. She successfully completed a Non-Resident Fellowship at the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS), New Delhi, in 2011-2012 and had a monograph/book on China’s Strategy in the South China Sea: Role of United States and India published by the Centre for Airpower Studies. She is currently a Visiting Fellow with the Indian Ocean Research Program at Future Directions International, Australia and has been writing extensively on India-Australia relations and the Asia-Pacific. One of her paper, “Australia, China and the United States: Maintaining an Equilibrium in the Indo-Pacific” was well received and after being published by FDI, Australia, it has been re-published in an Australian Reference book, “Australia’s Engagement with Asia”, volume 350 by Spinney Press, Australia, 2013.She is also a contributor in“Asia-Pacific Security Magazine”, Australia. After graduating in Political Science Major from St. Xavier’s College, Mumbai in 2010, she joined MS Geopolitics and International Relations at Manipal University. She has attended several national and international seminars. Her areas of research interest lie in Maritime Affairs related to the Indian Ocean Region, South China Sea and Indo-Pacific Relations.) ______

Introduction

―India and the Indian Ocean are inseparable. In the midst of the third largest ocean in the world, India’s location is in many ways her destiny‖— Nirupama Rao(former Foreign Minister of India).1

This paper aims to highlight some ofthe important factors of India’s coastline and the current challenges it is facing in the wake of new and dynamic threats emanating from the sea. It is a modest attempt to examineIndian strategic vision of the Indian Ocean, based on its pivotal position and the role it needs to play in the changing security environment. The study analyses precedents and perspectives of

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some key decision makers of India, and explores the possibilities of devising new mechanisms in the face of foreign policy challengesfor an actionableway forward hinted on core Indian interests.

The Indian Strategic Thinking

The coastline of any country forms an important part of its national security. Apart from being an important source of economic activity in terms of trade and commerce opportunities; it also presents a country with certain security challenges. Such is the case for India; it has a long coastline of approximately 7,516 km including the Lakshadweep and Andaman and Nicobar Islands. India also has nine maritime states. India still has unresolved maritime borders with Pakistan and Myanmar, challenges of maritime asymmetric and irregular threats, and also has to deal and work closely with the presence of extra-regional navies in the Indian Ocean.

Although a strategic peninsula, India has generally perceived itself a continental power. The country‘s colonial subjugation and current economic resurgence are directly linked to her Ocean and the trade and communication routes crisscrossing it. ―Geographically, India lies astride the major Sea Lanes of Communication in the Indian Ocean-providing it with considerable strategic importance and potential. The vast proportion of our foreign trade – 97 percent in volume and 76 percent in value terms - is seaborne. In 1951, the first British Chief of post - Independent India‘s Navy, Vice Admiral Edward Parry, stated that India is "an island in that she is nearly inaccessible across her land frontiers".2 Despite this, for a long time India‘s coastlines lacked strategic attention,as focus was shifted to the troubled land borders with China and Pakistan. But withglobal trade accelerated and self-realizing geopolitical realities, India is compelled to pay a closer look atmaritime vulnerabilities and issues of national interest and security. The imperative for protection of wealth, and also wealth-generating sea-borne trade, has become central to Indian threat perceptions and risk assessments.

The country‘s pivotal position makes it even more challenging for its national security. Flanked by Pakistan on one side and Bangladesh on the other, hemmed in by China from the Himalayan watersheds, andwith a string of frail states in the vicinity, their presence has made India exceedingly alert of its surroundings and waters. The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is considered to be one of the most volatile in terms of the existence of belligerent and violent forces. One such example is the attack on India‘s financial capital, Mumbai on the 26th of November 2008; and posed a new form of security challenge—

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the event exposed the weaknesses and openings in the maritime security of the country. The fact spurreda re-think of in the strategic and intelligence community regarding maritime strategy, and to further enforce appropriate policies and initiatives, to safeguard the Indian heartland, and its interests in the region.

As iterated by India‘s first Prime Minster–Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru proclaimed the Indian Navy‘s raison d‘etre, ―To be secure on land, we must be Supreme at Sea...‖3 demonstrated leadership clarity on India‘s strategic imperatives and the geopolitical criticality of India‘s maritime space. Since this followed the great colonial humiliation of the country by naval forces, it was almost tantamount to a declaration of ‗Never Again‘, shall the country be left unguarded on it oceanic fronts. By understanding the geography and geopolitics of the Indian Ocean and India‘s pivotal position in it, one can understand the need for India to secure its national interests. Due to the increasing volatility in the region, India has been confronted with several challenges emanating from the sea by such traditional but vital security issues like maintaining of the freedom of the seas, and unrestrained access to and transport of vital energy supplies, etc., all add to the escalating strategic importance of the Indian Ocean. Additionally, spawning non-traditionalthreats infesting the region like piracy, maritime terrorism, even corporate sabotage, and the destabilizing impacts of climate change and stagnant growth due to bulging impoverished populations, are presenting major resource management problems on top of environmental, human, and food security challenges.

The Indian perspective suggests that, ―key security considerations include the accessibility of the Indian Ocean to the fleets of the world‘s most powerful states; the large Islamic populations on the shores of the ocean and in its hinterland; the oil wealth of the Persian Gulf; the proliferation of conventional military power and nuclear weapons among the region‘s states; the importance of key straits for India‘s maritime security; and the historical tendency of continental Asian powers to spill periodically out of Inner Asia in the direction of the Indian Ocean‖.4

Former Foreign Minister of India Nirupama Rao, in her speech at the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi 5 emphasized that the Indian Ocean‘s accessibility is determined by the seven choke points, prone to terror attacks which—in literal terms—is capable of choking the global economy. The IOR has both booming economies and those on the brink of collapse. The IOR is the hub for geopolitical maneuvers and buzzling geo-economic activities; the stability of the Indian Ocean region is unthinkable

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without India. While India is seen as a net security provider in the region, the littorals and other stakeholders‘ need for a stable region, shared responsibility for shared prosperity are the key elements.As the pre-eminent resident power in the Indian Ocean region, India has a vital stake in the evolution of a stable, open, inclusive and balanced security and cooperation architecture in the region.

According to India‘s Defence Minister, AK Antony6, India‘s position in the IOR and its naval capabilities makes it a natural leader in ensuring peace and stability in the region. For economic prosperity he stressed that it is ―crucial‖ that there be free and uninterrupted movement of trade and energy supplies and therefore, securing maritime activities through the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) is vital for safe transit of trade not only for India but also for the world. More so now, as the grand concept of integrating Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions for the creation of a new strategic arc is being put in place, ―The Indo-Pacific‖7 would be focused on India‘s global role. The Indo-pacific, a strategic arc will be responsible for binding the Indian Ocean with the Western Pacific to harmonize strategic perceptions with the emerging geopolitical reality.

Many geopoliticians have a penchant for geometrically representing regional structures by characterizing them, especially in the form of crescents, circles, triangles and arcs. The geopolitical tradition of identifying global regions of power (for example, the ―Heartland‖ ― Mackinder, 1919), regions of geopolitical commonality (for example, ―geostrategic regions‖ ― Cohen, 1964) as well as regions of instability (for example, ―The Eurasian Balkans‖ ― Brzezinski, 1997) 8 serve well to underwrite this new concept. In this consideration, there is no scope for India to turn a blind eye towards the threats emanating through the region from beyond and closing in towards India from the IOR and therefore, a forward looking vision with policies in place to secure India‘s position in a somewhat brewing fragile situation in the region.

With great position comes great responsibility, and such is the case with the Indo-Pacific. And with India holding the key geostrategic position in the Indian Ocean—also bestows on it the greatest responsibility of securing this region for economic as well as strategic interests. In doing so it avoids extra-regional powers‘pursuit of the security of theirinterests in the region. With the presence of extra- regional powers, India‘s aspirations should be to achieve naval supremacy in most of the Indian Ocean Region. India on one hand is developing blue water navy and on the other it is trying to secure its maritime relationships with its neighbours for peaceful co-existence.

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Furthermore, by becoming a part of many regional groupings, India has been able to flex its arms through its soft and hard power combined diplomatic tools to find common ground of interests with its neighbours and extended neighbourhood in order to maintain a balance and avert conflict. India‘s current External Affairs Minister, Salman Khurshid encourages a deeper economic relationship in the IOR laying great weightage on this area‘s strategic importance cannot be overstated. He pitched ―As focus of global economic growth shifts to Asia, it will occupy even greater salience in our strategic perspective‖9. Khurshid stressed the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR- ARC)could become the apex organization for facilitating a roadmap conducive for regional peace and prosperity. Although it has been in place since 1997, immense latent potential remains 10.In addition, he emphasized that ―Economic cooperation is at the core of our collective effort, and we need to consider appropriate initiatives aimed at meeting the developmental, energy and food security needs of our region, new infrastructural linkages with enhanced connectivity, and trade and investment facilitation that builds on the complementarities in our economic strengths‖11.

Conclusion The foundations for Indian Strategic Vision vis-à-vis the Indian Ocean Region hasbeen defined by our decision makers; which are determined by the threat perceptions challenging the stability of the region that are not unknown to anyone. India’s vision is to have a stable and secureIORfor economic prosperity, the means to which is through collective efforts of all the stakeholders in the region. In this regard, the IOR-ARC in particular could play an instrumental role, and therefore its relevance needs to be strengthened and has to be made more effective.The Indian Ocean region as put by Nirupama Rao, is a ―microcosm of global geopolitical trends‖. India’s pivotal position in the region bestows on her opportunities and challenges more than any other country in the emerging Asian century. The country’s track record of peaceful co-existence, and transparent and vibrant democracy, makes India and her interests agreeable to most, if not all the actors in the region and beyond. With the appropriate diplomatic and consultation, stakeholders can rely on Indian interests to fulfill theirs, as she safeguards the world’s most critical and vital oceanic and transoceanic space. Endnotes

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1. Covered in a speech by Foreign Minister of India on ―India as a Consensual Stakeholder in the Indian Ocean: Policy Contours‖ at the National Maritime Foundation, India on November 19, 2010, available at http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches- Statements.htm?dtl/816/Speech+by+Foreign+Secretary+at+National+Maritime+Foundation+on+India+as+a+Conse nsual+Stakeholder+in+the+Indian+Ocean+Policy+Contours, (accessed on February 17, 2013) 2. ―Dimensions of National Security: The Maritime Aspect‖, Ministry of Defence, available at http://mod.nic.in/samachar/dec15-01/html/ch2.htm (accessed on March 15, 2013) 3. Vice Admiral Sangram S. Byce, ―India‘s Maritime Security Challenges: The Power Equation in the Indian Ocean Region‖, available at http://inpad.org/res111.html (accessed on February 17, 2012) 4. Donald L. Berlin, ―India in the Indian Ocean‖, Naval War College Review, vol. 39, no.2, 2006, p. 60, available at http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/cc7b0300-af3a-47be-99c4-4dd3cb9c801a/India-in-the-Indian-Ocean---Berlin,- Donald-L-, (accessed on February 17, 2013) 5. n. 1 (India as a Consensual Stakeholder in the Indian Ocean: Policy Contours) 6. ―Security situation around Indian Ocean Region worrisome, says Defence Minister Antony‖, May 8, 2012, available at http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/security-situation-around-indian-ocean-region-worrisome-says- defence-minister-antony-207953 (accessed on March 11, 2013) 7. Rory Medcalf and Ashley Townshed, ―India and China: Competitive Coexistence in the Asian Century‖, p.8, available at http://lowyinstitute.cachefly.net/files/medcalf_and_townshend_india_and_china.pdf (accessed on March 4, 2013) 8. Dennis Rumley, ―Australia‘s Arc of Instability: Evolution, Causes and Policy Dilemmas‖, The Otemon Journal of Australian Studies, v.32, 2006, p.39, available at http://ir.oullib.otemon.ac.jp/infolib/www/_com/pdf/aus/b0167501.pdf (accessed on March 15, 2013) 9. ―India emphasises on maritime security in Indian Ocean region‖, The Hindu, (November 2, 2012: Gurgaon), available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-emphasises-on-maritime-security-in-indian-ocean- region/article4057934.ece (accessed on March 11, 2013) 10. Ibid. (India emphasises on maritime security in Indian Ocean region) 11. n.6 (India emphasises on maritime security in Indian Ocean region)

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Maritime Piracy in Indian Ocean: Case Study of Somalia

Maria Ayub

Researcher Fatima Jinnah Women University Rawalpindi, Pakistan

Email : [email protected]

Academic Credentials Master’s in Defense and Diplomatic Studies Fatima Jinnah Women University, Rawalpindi. 2010-2012 Publications: Detailed Thesis Published as book by Lambert Academic Publishing’s foundation Germany; Maritime Security Challenges: Case Study of Indian Ocean Opinion Article: Myth of holocaust & Palestine in Pakistan Daily Observer ; Indo-China relations in Pakistan Daily Observer Other major projects during masters CBMs between India and Pakistan since 2001-2010 West Bank, Israel violation of international law India as an emerging power and its implication for defence economics of Pakistan. US public diplomacy towards Iraq. Global war on terror and its impact on Pakistan. Internal security challenges of Pakistan. Conflict Resolution: case study of Afghanistan Work Experience Working as Teaching Assistant in Fatima Jinnah Women University Rawalpindi. Served as an intern in Pakistan daily observer for six weeks from July 2011- September 2011 Community Service at Al-Khidmat foundation Pakistan. International conferences International Conference on Implementing Human Rights: A Way Forward 2012. Workshops Workshop on End Notes X6 Software on December 19, 2012 Attended a workshop on “Research Practices and publication” in collaboration with University of Bradford, Uk on 11-12- 2012. ______

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Abstract

Advent of 21st century and globalization increases the importance of oceans because almost 80% to 90% trade travel through sea. Though security of ocean was important in past but now security of oceans is major concern of states. In these days Indian Ocean become hot place for piracy and terrorism. Specifically Somalia is hot place for piracy due to internal problems of Somalia; piracy incidents increase not only the areas of Somalia but also in the whole Indian Ocean. Maritime piracy is the biggest threat for economy as in 2011; $159.62 million was paid to Somali pirate. Till date there are many efforts for countering these two threats, still there is need of more efforts.

Key words: Maritime piracy, Indian Ocean, Somalia

______

Introduction

Oceans of world contain large amounts of resources this entails to accept that security of seas is as important as the security of land. Trade and traveling through ocean started almost 40,000 to 60,000 years ago (Pinet, 2009, p. 4). Historically, ocean had much importance, it was not only the cheapest and easy way for trading because other means of trade and traveling were not so sufficient but it was also the source of power for states1 at that time. Still the same importance of ocean is there because now this world has turned into a globalized and interdependent world, also because of revolution in communication. Still trade through ocean is cheapest way of trading and almost 80% to 90% of world trade is travel by sea (Rosenberg, 2009, p. 44). But with the growing importance of sea and with remarkable advancement in science and technology, security challenges and threats also emerging at full tilt and capacity of those threats and challenges are also enhanced that emerge from the sea. Maritime piracy in Indian Ocean is as old as the travel and trading through Ocean is. It has dramatically increased in last few decades. Maritime Piracy in Somalia is not new phenomenon, especially after the collapse of Said Barre’s regime in Somalia, incidents of maritime piracy increased. According to Live piracy reports and International maritime bureau annual report of 2012 the highest number of piracy incident occurs in the coast of Somalia. Loss occurs due to maritime piracy is difficult to estimate, according to some recorded things insurance cost is increased from $500 per trip to $150,000 per trip. Cost of ransom money also create problem, only in 2012 $159.62 Million ransom was being paid to pirates (The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy, 2011, p. 11).

Conceptual Consideration Pirates had long been considered as “hostes humani generis”. This means adversary of all. Famous English jurist Edward Coken also use this term (Burgess, 2008; Widd, 2008. p. 5). Another Latin term “animo furandi” means intention to steal also use as piracy (Young, 2004, p.11). The term piracy was use as “lesitos” in Greek which means armed robbery (Souza, 1999, p.3). The term of “peirates” that means to hit or to attack. Peirates later become pirata in Latin and then piracy in English (Widd, 2008, p. 21). Piracy means any unlawful act which involves kidnapping, theft, murder, rape and wounding innocent people. According to article 101 of UNCLOS, 1982 Piracy as: (a) Any illegal acts of violence or United Nations detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft and directed: (i) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;

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(ii) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; (b) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b). (United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea, 1982, p. 57). This definition also mentioned in Geneva Convention on the High Seas 1958. But the problem with this definition is that any act would consider as an act of piracy that would occur on the high seas but today many incident of piracy occur in territorial waters, if stick on this definition that incidents that occur in territorial waters are not come under umbrella of act of piracy. According to International Maritime Bureau (IMB) definition, piracy is; “An act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act” (http://www.maritimeterrorism.com/definitions/). IMB divided definition of piracy in two categories one is all incidents that occur on high seas are act of piracy and all incidents that occur in territorial waters are act of armed robbery. In resolution A. 25 (26) draft code of practice for the investigation of the crimes of piracy and armed robbery against ships 2000, IMB define armed robbery as “Any unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship, within a State’s internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial waters”. (Piracy and armed robbery against ships, 2011, p. 3).

Some other definitions of piracy include the following: “an act of violence, or the threat of violence, against a ship in international waters (outside a state’s geographic sovereignty) with the intent to commit crimes such as theft, hijacking, murder, and kidnapping” (Kline, 2010, pp. 69); and “an act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in furtherance of that act” (Chalk, 2008, pp. 3). Maritime piracy is criminal act, which include violence, theft, hijacking of ships, kidnapping for ransom and for other means, killing of people in ships not only for private ends but also for political ends. Also such types of criminal acts whether they occur in internal waters, territorial waters or on high seas are act of piracy and would be treated as piracy.

Definition of Pirates According to an online dictionary the person who robs at sea is called pirate (www.thefreedictionary.com/pirate). According to UNCLOS article 101/a, A person who is occupant of a ship but commit an act of piracy on other ship that person is called as pirate. But a person who boarded on a ship and indulges in illegal activities is not called pirate (Hanif, 2010, p. 10).

Other terms that were used in place of pirates Another term privateer was used in place of pirate. There is difference between pirates and privateer, pirates as mention in definition of piracy robbed people for their own interest on private bases, privateer were like pirates but they were government sponsored pirates they got licenses for that purpose and government used that pirates as a weapon against its enemy. That privateers attacked upon enemies merchants’ vessels to economically and try to damage their economy, privateer get letter of marque which allowed them to conduct such type of activities (Barry, Pavlov & Staver, 2009, p. 2). Especially in war times privateer provide support to navies, as privateer knows about sea routes and they also captured enemy’s ships (Anderson, & Gifford, 1991, p. 100). Buccaneer was another term used in place of pirate. Buccaneers in the 17th century lived on the Caribbean island. At first government paid them to attack on Spanish vessels and ports but later they became dangerous and attack any ship. Corsair was another term use in place of pirate; corsairs were functioned in the Mediterranean Sea. Christian corsairs captured ships and passengers and if passengers do not have resources to fulfill demand of corsair they were sold (Soomro, n.d. p.7).

Definition of Pirate ship According to article 103 of UNCLOS a ship is consider as a pirate ship if it is involve in all those activities that are mentioned in article 101 of convention (United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea, 1982, p. 57)

Legal Framework for maritime piracy The early writing on piracy can be traced back form Justinian’s Digest and in King John’s Digest in 529 AD and in the King John’s Ordinance of 1201 (Keyuan, 2009, p. 323). Then in 1580s an Italian jurist Alberico Gentili also throughs light on piracy. For him piracy is any illegal act which is not authorized by state. Hugo Grotius in 1635 also wrote on piracy and for him suppression of piracy is important (Benton, 2005, p. 705). In 16th century there was mutual consensus between European and Non-European countries to eliminate threat of piracy (Kempe, 2010, p. 361). The English act on piracy which was adopted in 1698 was another law against piracy. This act changed offense at sea act 15362 This was again law against piracy; in act of 1698 it was decided to take strong action against piracy (White, 2009, p. 76). But the problem with all those law was they just domestically punished pirates.

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In 1856 first international measure was taken against piracy. “Treaty of Paris” which ends the “Crimean War”3 in this treaty all powers were agreed that they will not issue “letter of marque4 to people. For the security of sea all power must cooperate (kraska, 2011, p. 32). In 1899 Montevideo Convention was another effort, in this convention it was decided that piracy threats all humanity and it is necessary to end this threat and it is responsibility of states to suppress this threat (Keyun, 2009, p. 324). In 1932 Harvard Draft was the first draft in customary laws, this Draft gave some extra powers to states like it was accepted that piracy comes under the universal jurisdiction. This Draft also provides help to International Law Commission for making of law against piracy (Hanif, 2012, p. 17). Geneva Convention on the High Sea 1958 also has laws regarding piracy, from article 15 to article 22 of this convention deals with the suppression of piracy. Article 15 of Geneva Convention and UNCLOS 1982 article 101 are same (Geneva Convention, 1952, p. 5-6). In 1982 UNCLOS simply adopted articles of Geneva Convention for suppression of piracy. In article 100 of UNCLOS it is mentioned that all states shall cooperate for suppression of piracy. From article 100 to article 107 of UNCLOS deals with laws regarding piracy (United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea, 1982, p. 57-58).

Instability in Somalia and Maritime Piracy In the last few years Somalia got world’s attention not due to civil war but growing incidents of piracy. Beginning of piracy in Somalia is directly related to the political situation in Somalia. Since the fall of Said Barre’s regime in 1991 piracy increased in Somalia. Somalia was the former colony of Britain and Italy, got independence in 1960. In 1969 Said Barre come in to power through coup in country, his vision of Greater Somalia 5 create many problems in country. Somali National Movement (SNM) and United Somali Congress (USC) in 1991 ousted the Barre regime (Beri, 2011, p. 453). United Nations took several steps to solve Somali problem, in 1992-93 The UNOSOM (United Nations Operation in Somalia) I and II initially got success but failed. In 1995 peace agreement was signed between the Somali National Alliance (SNA) and Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA). In 2000 Fledgling interim federal administration was created and in 2004 Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was established. In 2006 Islamic Courts Union (ICU) control of the country but TFG with the assistance of Ethiopian troops with the support of west start war against ICU. After this coalition government was created in Somalia. From 2009 onward civil war is still present in Somalia (Cohn, 2010). Due to bad conditions in Somalia illegal fishing and dumping of toxic material started in Somali waters, this create problems for the Somali fisherman because fishing is there basic source of earning. In the beginning local fishermen decided to punish foreigner for their illegal activities, they capture their ships (Parmar, 2012, p. 292), but when they found it beneficial they started working in groups and now in Somali pirates work in group from which is having ex-fisherman, ex- military men and technical experts and all these people coordinate during any attack for making hijack successful (Hunter, 2008).

Piracy incident in Indian Ocean and all over the World

Regional Analysis of piracy attacks 500 400 2007 300 2008 200 2009 100 2010 0 2011 South East Asia Indian Sub- South America Africa Rest of World Total continent

Source: Piracy and armed robbery against ships 2011, p. 5

This figure shows that Africa form 2007 to 2011 was the hot place for piracy and the highest number of piracy attacks occurs in Africa specifically in the coast off Somalia

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Seven locations recorded 75% attacks from total of 439 reported attacks in 2011

200 150 100 50 0

Source: piracy and armed robbery against ships 2011, p. 5. Modified by researcher This figure shows that in 2011 Somalia was the area where highest number of piracy attacks occurred

Attack on different places Jan 2012-May 2012

43 37

17 13 10 9 10 6 2 2 1 2 2 1

Live piracy and armed robbery report, 2012. Prepared by researcher

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Types of attacks from Jan 2012-Dec 2012

20 39

10 20 2 0 14

Boarded Attempted Fired Upon Hijacked

Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships from Jan 1 to 31 Dec 2012

Major pirate groups in Somalia

It is believed that at least five pirate groups are working in Somalia (Rice, 2008). The most active groups involved in piracy include the following:

Location Groups and their Affliation Eyl Isse Mahmuud and Leelkase of the Darood clan Garad Omar Mahmuud of the Darood clan Hobyo Habargedir (Saad, Ayr, Suleiman) of the Hawiye clan Haradera Habargedir (Ayr, Sarur, Suleiman) of the Hawiye clan Mogadishu Habargedir (Ayr) of the Hawiye clan

Source: Piracy off the Somali Coast Workshop commissioned by the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN to Somalia Ambassador Ahmedou Olad-Abaddllah 2008, p.17.

Categories of pirates

Pirates are divided into three main categories

(1) Ex-fishermen are considered as the brain of groups, because they knows about sea very well can guide the member of groups in better way. (2) Ex- militiamen are considered as the strength of groups because they are trained and can operate in better way. (3) Technical expert are those people those who have know how about technology, as pirates are using latest technology they are also important (Hunter, 2008).

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Pirates’ mode of operation

In last few years mode of operation become more complicated. Pirates operate in seven steps. (1) Investigation and information gathering (2) coordinated actions (3) boarding and capture ships (4) move towards safe areas (5) negotiation (6) ransom payment (7) provide safe passage to capture ships (Gilpin, 2009, p. 10).

The most important thing for pirates is getting relevant information regarding ship like value of the ship its crew members and the value of the goods of that ship which they want to hijack. They get information, facts and figures through observing different ports at the time of loading of ships. For coordinated actions and capturing of ships they use latest technology like GPS (Global Positioning System) and Satellite phones. Then pirates hire different translator for demand of ransom money (Jamaa, 2011).

Division of Ransom Money

Investor6 got the 50% from the total amount; Hijackers got 35% of total ransom, 10% is given to arms guard and 5% goes to local authorities and administration (Ahmed, 2011).

Tactics of Pirates

Somali Pirates use different tactics, they gather information about ship through observing ships on ports, they know about value of ship, value of goods and crew members boarded on that ship which they want to hijack. They use mother ships7for capturing other ships. They hijack ships for getting ransom money also latest technology like satellite phones and GPS. Pirates use hijack ship and its crew members to capture another ship and use crew members as human shield8

Types of weapons used in piracy

Year Guns Knives Other weapons 2004 11 40 8 2005 9 37 5 2006 4 41 6 2007 13 24 3 2008 9 32 1

2009 243 71 6

2010 243 108 6

2011 249 68 8

2012 113 73 7

Source: Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia, 2008 p. 24, International Maritime Bureau report Jan 2012 Dec 2012

Pirates also use RPG-7 (Rocket propelled Grenade) which range is 900 meters, AK-42, PK series Machine Guns which range is 1500 meters, RGD-59 (Mark, 2011, p. 5).

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Reasons behind piracy in Somalia

These are reasons behind piracy State failure10 is behind piracy because failure states do not focus on sea and they just try to make the land environment smooth and easy going. Somalia has no Central government which can exercise law order along its coasts. In this climate crime will flourish ((Munkundan, 2012; Riggs, 2009, p. 2-9). “Somalia is failed state” Since 1990 Somalia do not have stable government and economy (Sterio, 2011, p. 1454). In Somalia failure of State become major contributor of growing piracy incidents (Ho, 2011, p. 3009). In case of Somalia Poor economic conditions lead towards piracy. People in Somalia are not having even basic needs. In African countries almost 100 million people live below poverty line (www.allafrica.com). Extreme level of poverty leads towards growing incidents of piracy. Now almost 80% to 90% of world trade travel by sea. Pirates found it easy to capture vessels and looting of things and they also kidnap vessels and people for ransom. In Somalia people indulged in piracy because they get economic benefits, in Somalia where yearly average income of person is “at most US$600, a pirate can earn between US$ 10,000 to US$30,000 per year” (Bedford, 2008, p.3). November 2010 Somali pirates received $9.5 million, to release the Samho Dream, a South Korean oil tanker (Somali pirates receive record ransom for ships' release, 2010). Somali water is full of very good type of fishes but due to problem within the country illegal fishing increase and local fishermen deprived from money that’s why they indulged in illegal activities of piracy another reason is dumping of waste material in this water that affect living resources of ocean. it is less costly for developed countries to dump their waste material here this thing become cause of piracy (Hassan, 2012) Another reason for piracy in Indian Ocean is governments support to act of pirates. Like in Somalia government has not sufficient economic resources, they allow pirates to carry on their activities and fulfill their needs. Pirates are not strong then government like in 2006 Islamic government took control of Somalia and at that time there was sudden decrease in piracy. But after TFG took hold of Somalia piracy increased (Ahmad, 2012). Lack of proper maritime power can also increase problem of maritime piracy, like 200 years ago South Pacific Ocean faced problem of piracy but now they don’t have such type of problem because of strong naval forces. But in case of Indian Ocean some states like Somalia do not have proper navy which can tackle problem of piracy (Ahmar, 2012). Pirates need safe area for their activities where they have chance to easily attack their targets, they have low risk of detection and they have close safe heavens from where they can put their animations and also chance to repair them. Favorable geography provides opportunities to pirates for their activities. Straits are more crowded than high seas, ships slowly navigate from these places that’s they are easy targets of pirates. There are some seas which are close to land this help pirates to go back home after any attack. Southeast Asia, Bay of Bengal, Somalia is near to coast, that’s why these places are hotspot of piracy (Murphy, 2007, p. 13-17). All countries around Indian Ocean face conflicts and wars. Conflicts and wars in country can provide chances and opportunities to pirates. War and conflicts mostly occur on land those conflicts divert government attention to solve them and government of that country also use resources to solve that problem. This thing allow pirates, criminals and other corrupt people to do their activities easily, like in case of Somalia government is trying to solve issues on land, this thing is beneficial for pirates to carry on their activities on sea. (Murphy, 2007, p. 13-17). Cultural acceptability another reason for piracy, historically in Sulu region of Philippine and in eastern Malaysia young people indulged in activates of piracy to prove them as brave and risk taking man (Ho, 2011, p. 312). But this case was with some specific area. Region like West Africa and Southeast Asia piracy shifted from one generation to another because of these areas providing trading routes. In some areas. A 25 year old Somali pirate Mohammad Olad Hassan gave telephonic interview to BBC he said “we have local support: most of the people here directly or indirectly depend upon pirates. Because if there is lot of money in town they can get some through friendship, relative or business” (it’s a pirate’s life for me, 2009). Piracy increased in Indian Ocean is due to strong support of pirates by some people. Young people on boats are not pirates. Real pirates are those who are behind the scene, purchased weapons, boats and trained those young people (David, 2011, p. xiii). Pirates even know about the registration number of ship, its crew number and its time of sail, pirates are not so strong that they have such type of secret information. Captain Wasi Hassan who was the captain of MV Suez which was hijacked by Somali pirates in 2010 said in personnel interview taken by researcher that at the time of attack pirates have list of crew members and he said that ship had crew of 23 members including an Indian, but he got clearance from immigration authority only few hours before sailing and he had signed off. Pirates asked about that 23rd member because they had threat that he could attack from somewhere. Captain Wasi said that he is unable to understand that how those pirates have such type of secret information. Most of the supporter of pirates live western countries they gave rewards to pirates (Ho,2011, p. 11) Another reason is insufficient maritime security measures; mostly countries around Indian Ocean do not have sufficient resources, trained forces and technologies for maritime security and this thing give chance to terrorist to carry their activities easily (Murphy, 2007, p. 13-17). One reason that researcher understand after interview taken by different personalities that anti piracy measures are not so strong. More important thing is that mostly pirates attacks on non government ships or flag of convenience11. That’s why there is no quick action taken by states.

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Another major reason behind piracy is lack of proper definition and law. Countries around Indian Ocean do not have proper law to remove this threat they also did not understand which incident comes under umbrella of maritime piracy.

Economic impact of maritime piracy

Maritime piracy pose negative impacts on economy of countries around Indian Ocean and economy of world as well. In November 2012, UN General Secretary stated that “piracy in the region has had an immense impact on the economies of East Africa and also the world wide” (Ban Ki-moon shuffles statistics like a world-class flake, 2010). Impact of maritime piracy are following:

Maritime piracy and Cost of Ransom

According to IMB annual reports from 2005 to 2011 there are 2274 attacks of piracy all over the world whether successful or unsuccessful. According to IMB 2011 annual report Somali pirates hijack 28 different ships and vessels. According to live piracy reports of IMB from January 2012 to may 2012 total piracy attacks are 158 and out of them 12 ships are hijacked by Somali pirates with 176 crew members. Piracy damages economies due to growing rate of hijacking and ransom. Ransom money increase in recent years, in 2005 the averaged ransom was $100,000 to $200,000 but in 2009 the average ransom was $2 million (Payne, 2010). In 2010 the average ransom was $3.5 to $4.4 million (Bandel & Crowely, 2010). In 2011 total 31 ransom were paid with average hostage situation was 6 months, average ransom money was $4.97 million and total $159.62 million ransom was paid (The economic cost of Somali piracy, 2011, p. 11). In 2009 Somali pirates got $3 million and $3.2 million ransom for two ships Sirus Star12 and MV Faina 13 (Pham, 2009). Year 2010 set a record for highest ransom payment for example in January 2010 MV Maran Centaurus 14 got released after $7 million paid to pirates (Supertanker Maran Centaurus seized off Somalia, 2009). In November 2010 $ 9.5 million was paid to Somali pirates for the release of Samho Dream 15 (Somali pirates get hefty ransom, 2010). According to ICC International Maritime Bureau annual reports of 2009 Somali pirates successfully hijacked 26 ships and in 2010 hijacked 39 ships.

Table 3.1 Analysis of cost of ransom of 2009-2010s

Year Average Ransom No of hijacked Averaged Ransom x no of hijacked

ships ships= Cost of Ransom

2009 $2 million 26 $52 million

2010 $3.5-$4.4million 39 $133 million- $ 172 million

Prepared by researcher

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Table 3.2 Ransom Paid in 2011

Ship Name Date Hijacked Date Released Days Held Ships type Ransom Amount (million) Motivator 4 July 2010 16 Jan 2011 196 Chemical Tanker $4.97

Izumi 10 Oct 2010 28 Feb 2011 191 General cargo $4.50 EMS River 27 Dec 2010 1 Mar 2011 64 General Cargo $3.00 Rak Afrikana 11 Apr 2010 9 Mar 2011 332 General Cargo $1.20 York 23 Oct 2010 9 Mar 2011 137 LPG Tanker $4.50 Hannibal II 11 Nov 2010 11 Mar 2011 120 Chemical Tanker $2.00 Jahan Moni 5 Dec 2010 14 Mar 2011 99 Bulk Carrier $4.00 Irene SL 9 Feb 2011 7 Apr 2011 57 Oil Tanker $13.50 Thor Nexus 25 Dec 2010 12 Apr 2011 108 General Cargo $5.00 Beluga Nomination 22 Jan 2011 13 Apr 2011 81 General Cargo $5.00 Asphalt Venture 28 Sep 2010 15 Apr 2011 199 Bitumen vessel $3.60 Renuar 11 Dec 2010 23 Apr 2011 133 Bulk Carrier $3.600 Jih Chun tsai No.68 30 Mar 2010 1 May 2011 397 Fishing vessels $8.00 Sinar Kudus 16 Mar 2011 1 May 2011 46 Bulk Carrier $4.50 Yuan Xinag 12 Nov 2010 1 May 2011 170 General Cargo $3.60

Vega 5 (Spanish Crew) 28 Dec 2010 11 May 2011 130 Fishing vessel $5.00 Khaled Muhieddine K 20 June 2011 25 May 2011 124 Bulk Carrier $2.50 Zirku 28 Mar 2011 11 Jun 2011 75 Oil Tanker $12.00

Suez 2 Aug 2010 13 Jun 2011 315 General Cargo $2.10

Susan K 8 Apr 2011 16 Jun 2011 69 General Cargo $5.70

Jubba XX 16 July 2011 27 July 2011 11 Product tanker $0.20

Sinin 12 Feb 2011 13 Aug 2011 182 Bulk Carrier $4.00

Eagle 17 Jan 2011 19 Aug 2011 210 Bulk Carrier $4.00

Polar 30 Oct 2010 26 Aug 2011 300 Product Tanker $7.70

Panama 10 Dec 2010 6 Sep 2011 270 Container Ship $7.00

SS ING (Danish Hostages) 24 Feb 2011 7 Sep 2011 195 Yacht $3.00 Hoang Son Sun 17 Jan 2011 17 Sep 2011 243 Bulk carrier $4.50

Dover 28 Feb 2011 30 Sep 2011 214 Bulk Carrier $3.50

$3.50Blida 1 Jan 2011 3 Nov 2011 306 Bulk carrier $3.50

Rosalia D’ Amito 21 Apr 2011 25 Nov 2011 218 Bulk carrier $6.00

Gemini 30 Apr 2011 30 Nov 2011 214 Chemical Tanker $4.05

Savina Caylyn 8 Feb 2011 21 Dec 2011 316 Oil Tanker $11.50 Total Ransom Paid in 2011 $159.62 Million

Source: The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy, 2011, p. 11

Table shows the total ransom money paid in 2011, after comparing with total paid ransom of 2011 with the ransom paid in 2009-10, the researcher comes to know about that cost of ransom increased in 2011 and if the piracy will not be encountered in future the cost of ransom will be increased in future.

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Another problem is sometimes pirates released ships after getting ransom but do not release crew members and demand more ransom for release of those crew members as in case of Asphalt Venture (Hijacked MV Asphalt Venture – Ransom Paid, Hostages Kept, 2011). This ship was captured by Somali pirates in 2010 and released in 2011 after paying $3.6 million. This ship had 15 crew members. But pirates at the last moment refused to release 7 Indians and demand that first India released 100 Somali pirates that are captured by Indian Navy (7-month-ordeal over, MV Asphalt Venture crew returns home, 2011).

Major problem is there is lack of proper data because above mentioned cost is just that cost that is paid to pirates but this cost not include cost of damaged of ship while it is captured by pirates, cost of negotiation with pirates, consultants and mediator.

There is no specific case in which maritime terrorist groups kidnapped or hijacked any ship for ransom but in future there is threat that terrorists can indulge in this activity or collaborate with pirates to finance their activities.

Insurance Cost of maritime threats

Insurance is basically a form of risk management, individual invest to secure from uncertain losses. Marine insurance is also a protection against any threat. Marine insurance covers “damage to or loss of ship, passengers, or cargo caused by the sea” (www.dictionary.reverso.net). There are three main types of marine insurance16

Hull and Machinery17 P&I18(protection and identity) Cargo19(An Introduction to P&I Insurance for Marine, n.d, p. 3)

With the growing threat of maritime piracy, ships and the crew members face threats of attack. Ship owners naturally want financial protection due to these two risks, and especially protection to pay ransom money. Now war risk20 and kidnap and ransom are two forms of insurance related to maritime piracy (Shah, 2012).

War risk

Due to growing threat of piracy now mostly ship owners get war risk insurance. This insurance is having extra charges for passing through the war risk areas. “If current piracy levels continue, companies everywhere will pay a growing ‘piracy tax’ to maintain their global trading networks over the next few years (Piracy: a tax for shipping, 2009). The cost of insurance increase especially war risk premium have increased 300 folds means $500 per trip to 150,000 per trip (Bavldwin, 2011).

Kidnap and ransom (K&R)

This type of insurance protects the crew but not beneficial for vessel and cargo, in 2008 hijacking of BBC Trinidad by Somali pirates become major cause of higher K&R insurance (Bandel & Crowley, 2010). According to Ocean beyond piracy report on economic cost of Somali piracy in last few years K&R insurance increase because growing threat of piracy made K&R insurance crucial for crew members. But this thing increase K&R insurance premium. Same report shows that in 2010 the cost of these two insurance was between $460 million and $3.2 billion and in 2011 the total war risk insurance cost was $420,287,250 and K&R insurance cost was $214,620,000 (The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy, 2011, p. 14).

Cost of Re-Routing and speed

Many ship owners want to decrease their loss due to piracy. They decided to re-route because of increase in insurance and re-routing would become safer and cheaper option for them. AP Moller-Maersk21, Odfjell chemical tankers22and Frontline23shipping group decide to re-route and pass through Cape of Good Hope and this would decrease risk and threats (Crowe, n.d; odfjell to avoid Guld of Aden due to piracy threat, 2008; Frontline could follow Odfjell lead and the cape to avoid piracy attack, n.d.). The alternative route is also expensive for example, routing a single tanker from Saudi Arabia to the United States around the Cape of Good Hope adds approximately 2,700 miles to each voyage and about $3.5 million in annual fuel costs (Freiheit, Pollack, & Siemens, 2009).

According to BMP424(Best management practice version 4) pirates are unable to attack or capture ships with speed of 18 knots25or more and they suggest that while ships passes from piracy risk areas they must sail at full sea speed or at least speed of 18 knots. It is very important for ships to increase maximum safe speed while found any suspicious vessel try to reach near it and try to open the CPA (closest point of approach), (BMP4, 2011, p. 7). But it is very costly because high speed means more consumption of oil; in 2011 cost of re-routing was $486-$680 million and the increased high speed from risk areas was approximately $2.7 billion (The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy, 2011, p. 20).

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Cost of security

Ship owners take several measures to protect their property and crew members from pirate attacks that are why take different measures for their protection. For example additional lookout and enhanced watch keeping26, razor wire27 water spray28, Alarms29 and Close Circuit Television (CCTV)30. Deployment of private armed security on merchant vessels is a new escalating trend (Rinchard, 2009, p. 1). In past few years, some flag states adopted national legislation for the use of armed guards. Those flag states are Cyprus, Greece, Italy, India, Norway, UK, and USA (National regulations on the use of armed guards). In 2011 $1.06- $1.16 billion was total cost of security equipments and hiring of private guards (By the Numbers: How Much Does Somali Piracy Cost? 2011).

Impacts of Maritime piracy on trade

Generally it is accepted that insecurity decreases trade opportunities (Anderson, 2009, p. 1). Above mentioned costs impose negative impacts on extra regional and regional trade. For example growing cost of war risk insurance, K&R insurance, cost of re-routing, speed, cost of security become cause of inflation all over the world. MV Sirius Star captured by pirates in 2008 and from an economic viewpoint this tanker earned round about $47,000 per day at the time of hijacking and this remained captured for ten days, the total vessel revenue loss round about $470,000 (Elmaghawry, 2009, p. 4). Seychelles minister for environment and natural resources has stated that maritime piracy damages both trade and regional stability, especially our country losses $10.5 billion per year due to piracy (Dikove, 2010). Threat of Somali pirates has forced 20,000 vessels to move around Cape of Good Hope rather Suez Canal31, this Canal earn $5.1 billion revenue in 2008 but this declined to $3.6 billion in 2010. This cause 30% decreases in two years. (Wasser, 2009). In 2009 due to piracy Yemen fishing sector losses $150 million (Yemen losses reach US$ 150 million due to piracy in 2009, 2010). $1 billion to $16 billion is total trade loss per year due to piracy (Islam, 2010, p. 43).

It is difficult to analyze economic cost of maritime piracy because of lack of data on economic cost. Above mentioned cost not include cost of naval operations32 and cost of counter piracy organizations. Economic cost of maritime piracy also not include physical damages of ships, psychological trauma, humanitarian losses and environmental impacts.

Human costs of maritime piracy

Maritime piracy imposes significant cost on humanity; there are more than 100,000 seafarers at any time travel through Indian Ocean or preparing to travel through this ocean. While traveling they have threat of kidnapping and almost quarter of seafarers are captured by Somali pirates (The Cost of piracy). Seafarers are important for pirates and terrorist attacks, both motives are to some extent different but both use them for fulfilling their motives, pirates kidnap them for ransom and the terrorists killed them for creation of chaos. Despite of taking so many security measures and spending of millions of dollars in 2011, 24 seafarers have been killed and 1,118 were held hostage by Somali pirates (Economic cost of Somali piracy, 2011, p. 21). According to IMB Live Piracy Reports from January 2012 to May 2012, 16 ships and more than 178 seafarers held hostage by Somali pirates.

Figure 3.1 will shows that human cost of piracy from 2007 to 2011, this figure also display this fact that in every year death rate of seafarers increase except in 2009

Death of Seafarers from 2007-2011

2 18 8 2007 15 2008 2009 24 2010 2011 1 2 3 4 5

Source : Edward & Lee, 2011

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Source: Edward & Lee, 2011

Pirate physically33and psychologically34 abuses seafarers. During an interview taken by researcher, Captain Wasi said that he is unable to express misery and mental torture that he faced during his ship was captured by pirates. “He said I lost even my teeth during torture by Somali pirates”. According to save our seafarer hostage story, the interview who was captured by pirates said that during hostage, condition on ship was unspeakable, “we were confined to a tiny corner of control room windows were sealed, it was airless and suffocating. Once ever a week we were allowed on deck to stretch our legs. Nearly all of us become ill and our basic meals of onion and potato keeps us alive” (I was kidnapped by Somali pirates). According to another hostage story, Captain of MV Iceberg said that during hostage we have unclean water and only meal a day that was boiled rice (Mwangura, 2011). It is important to recognize that piracy impose serious challenge to innocent people who attack and held hostage by pirates, not only those people but their families also suffer a lot due to piracy, especially in case if a hostage person is only bread earner of family this cause financial problems for family of that person as well (Shah, 2012). Another problem for families of seafarer is lack of proper knowledge for a very long time they even don’t know about their beloved ones, many families get infrequent and inconsistence information of about their beloved ones but after they know about hostage of their beloved ones they are in constant state of fear and uncertainty and an extremely distress situation which has long lasting psychological impacts. Now the pirates use families to pressurize ship owner to negotiate with pirates. In case of ship owners refused to negotiate with pirates families try to collect ransom money by different ways. As in case of MV Suez hijacking, family of Captain Wasi launch campaign to raise ransom money (Family of Captain Wasi launches campaign to raise money, 2011). All these attacks cause long term psychological impacts but the major problem is no available data on psychological impacts. Dr. Michael Garfinkle is conducting a study for the Seamen’s Church Institute (SCI) on the psychological impact of piracy on seafarers, his study is not completed yet but his initial study suggest that those seafarer who have or have not experienced an attack have anxiety and threat of attack from pirates (Hurlburt, 2011, p.19).

Human shield

Pirates sometimes used seafarers as human shield when naval forces approach. Pirates drag hostages on deck and beat them until warship went away; even sometime pirates use seafarers to attack on another ship (Howden, 2011).

Maritime Piracy and cost of food price

Approximately 40% of pirates’ attacks are on general cargos and bulk carriers (Carious, Charles & Mejia, 2009, p. 893). Most of the world’s food supply by cargos. Growing attacks of pirates on these vessels directly affect food price. Due to growing incident of piracy ship owner hesitate to carry goods and this cause food problem, in April 2009 a Somali food importer claimed that in less than a month, price of a 50 kg sugar increase from $30 to $34, price of rice increase from $25 to $28 and price of wheat from $18 to $22 (Bowden, 2010, p.22).

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Maritime piracy impact on humanitarian aid

Millions of Somalis has deprived from their homes and livelihood due to civil war in Somalia. Now Somalia is facing its worst humanitarian crisis, food security situation is critical in Somalia (Dagne, 2011, p. 2). Somali must rely on foreign aid for food and shelter (Silva, 2010, p. 562). More than three millions Somali dependent on humanitarian aid pass through sea. World Food Program (WFP) transports by sea between 30 and 40,000 tons of food aid into Somalia every month. (Piracy off the Somali Coast, 2008, p.30). Between 80 to 90% of Somali humanitarian aid passes through sea, as land based alternative are problematic for example by land food reach in three weeks form Mombasa to Mogadishu. Maritime piracy threatens the vessels carrying aid and food for Somalia. From 2005 onward pirates started targeting on humanitarian ships. Because of increased danger of piracy the number of ships willing to carry aid to Somalia is become half (Coordinated action urged: piracy threatens UN lifeline to Somalia, 2007). In 2007 WFP waiting for dock in Tanzania to supplies 2, 400 tons of food, ship owners refused to take this supply because of fear that their vessel would be hijacked by pirates.

List of pirate attacks on humanitarian relief vessels

Date Description June 2005 The MV Semlow was chartered by the WFP and carried 850 tons of rice, food aid for victims of the Indian Ocean tsunami in Somalia. The ship and crew were eventually released in September. the shipping agency responsible for the vessel admitted they had paid US$135 000 to the pirates October The MV Miltzow was carrying over 800 tons of food aid for the Lower Juba Valley, which 2005 had been repeatedly affected by droughts, floods and civil conflict. It had offloaded about half of its cargo of 703 tons of maize, 108 tons of beans and 30 tons of vegetable oil in the port of Merca when it was stormed by pirates and forced to leave port. Less than two days later, the vessel and its ten crew members were released after negotiations with a Somali businessman. No ransom was reported paid February The MV Rozen, a vessel charted by the World Food Programme to deliver UN food aid to 2007 Somalia, and its twelve-member crew were hijacked by armed pirates off the Somali coast. After intervention by tribal elders in Puntland and subsequent mediation efforts, the Rozen was subsequently released in early April, with its crew unharmed March Two UN World Food Programme boats were stolen from the southern Somali port town 2008 of Merca (pirates sometimes steal boats to use in their operations) May 2008 The cargo ship MV Victoria was attacked again; this time it was hijacked off Mogadishu. The vessel was carrying a cargo of sugar from India donated by Denmark and was bound for Somalia April 2009 The US-flagged and crewed MV Maersk Alabama was carrying food aid for Somalia, Kenya and Uganda where the WFP is attempting to feed almost eight million people in 2009 because of drought and high food prices. The ship was attacked on its way to Mombasa35, Kenya. April 2009 The Togo-flagged vessel MV Sea Horse was attacked 700 kilometres from Mogadishu on its way to pick up 7 000 tons of maize for the WFP from Mumbai, India.

Source: (Nincic, 2010, p. 12).

Secretary General of International Maritime Organization and Director of World Food Program warned that growing incident of piracy can severely impact on aid and it is threat for food lifeline (Pirates Constant Menace to Food Lifeline, 2009).

Anti Piracy Measures There are different task forces working against piracy, EUNAVFOR (European Union Naval Force), NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Operation Ocean Shield, CTF (Combined Task Force) 150 & 151. Along with that United Nations Security Council passed different resolutions against maritime Piracy, like UNSCR 1816, 1836, 1846, 1851, 1897, 1917, and 2020. At regional level Anti-Piracy measures are also taken, like Djibouti code of conduct36and Regional Cooperation agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships (ReCAAP), The Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS). Ship owners take several measures to protect their property and crew members from pirate attacks they take different measures for protection of ships. For example additional lookout and enhanced watch keeping, razor wire water spray, Alarms and Close Circuit Television.

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Conclusion Indian Ocean continuously gets world’s attention due to growing incidents of piracy in Somalia. After taking so many anti piracy measures it is still difficult to counter piracy, because there are approximately 20 naval ships patrol in the ocean but this number is not sufficient for securing such a vast ocean (Mukundan, 2012). Somali pirates are not strong enough than state but problem is that Somalia is a failed state and unable to control pirates, other regional and extra regional countries can take strong action against pirates but problem is pirates capture many ships even from January to June 2012 Somali pirates capture 16 ships with 178 crew members hostages, if naval forces attack on pirates this would definitely cause death of seafarers.

Several steps should be taken in future to combat piracy. First of all the most important need is proper definition of maritime piracy because definition of UNCLOS is not fulfilling the today’s requirements, UNCLOS defines piracy as any illegal act that occur on the high seas but now pirates capturing and attacking on ships even in territorial waters. Proper definition must be adopted by UN for capturing piracy.

Awareness regarding maritime is important. People even don’t know about what is the importance of ocean in our lives. Media campaigns are needed to promote awareness regarding maritime importance; impacts of piracy, in this way public can force governments to take some effective measure for curbing maritime piracy.

Land base measures are needed Navy can create deterrence but solution lies on the shore, as root cause of piracy lie on land. Conditions in Somalia are hard 37, there is need of proper government, proper socio economic system, as researcher mentioned earlier that if country internally face problem she will be unable to secure her land and securing sea become difficult. Better law and order and Peace in Somalia can attain Somali government attention to counter piracy and government can also capture and destroy safe heavens of pirates on land.

Somali pirates use small arms38 like AK- 47 and rocket propelled grenades, these weapons are accessible in Somalia. In 1992 UN Security Council adopted 733 Resolution, which puts arms embargo39on Somalia but still small arms are access able in Somalia. Sanctions against proliferation of small arms are important because pirates use AK-47 and rocket propelled grenades while capturing any ship.

Another land based measure is registration of ships, because some owners want to save registration money and not get registered in their own state but in an open registry under a flag of convenience, this thing create so many problems like lack of data that how many ships sail on the ocean and if pirates captured that ship can use it in their illegal activities. Disruption of ransom money is also needed; countries should track ransom money and also discourage supporter or financier of pirates.

Few years back Strait of Malacca was considered as war risk area and piracy directly affected Southeast Asian nations. But those piracy affected countries decided to cooperate with each other to combat piracy. Since 2003 Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore cooperate with each other, they established ISC under agreement of ReCAAP and in result of their efforts piracy decrease in Strait of Malacca. This thing proves that ocean unite rather divide. Countries around Indian Ocean can adopt this method for countering piracy.

As for as the future of maritime piracy is concern, after few years piracy in Somalia can be tackle by tacking land based measures and with the support of neighboring countries and international efforts as some efforts are already taken like Djibouti code of conduct, CGPCS, role of CTF and UNSCR. In recent history Strait of Malacca was hot spot for piracy regional states cooperate with each other and control piracy in that strait. The major issue with piracy is it erupts again in some other area after disruption in one area. Threat of piracy can decrease in future only in case if all countries have proper and strong governments, country develops economically and that country has potential to control such illegal activities.

There is an urgent need that countries around Indian Ocean sit together and with mutual consensus establish an effective maritime security regime. All collaborative state must trust each other and share information. Major problem of these countries is lack of advanced technology and resources to tackle problems Due to vastness of ocean it is difficult for regional powers to secure this ocean that’s why extra regional powers especially US and China can play important role for regime building and security of this ocean because it would be beneficial for their trade as well. Well equipped, well trained and technologically strong countries around Indian Ocean can perform better than extra regional power, it is need that extra regional power support regional countries for establishment of secure ocean.

The solution of piracy lies in creation of maritime security regime that enhances cooperation at regional and international level. Due to vastness of ocean it is impossible for any country to secure it that’s why countries can cooperate with each others, share capabilities, information and resources in order to secure oceans. Pakistan and India though both have historical rivalry and lack of trust for each other. Both countries can cooperate with each, if it is not possible due to political reasons, should cooperate with likeminded countries and establish a maritime security regime. There is need of one step and with the passage of time all littoral state of Indian Ocean will be part of that regime. As countries economy is dependent on sea.

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It is important for economically and technologically advanced countries like US and China to support countries around Indian Ocean in capacity building, support financially and technically. Such type of cooperation can lead this ocean towards peace and stability.

One system under UN charter is needed, different forces like CTF, NATO and EUNAVFOR are playing their role for curbing maritime piracy. But still success rate is not sufficient; in case of one system all forces can better perform and achieve their target.

______Endnotes

1. Power in term of economy, trade and control of more land by crossing sea. 2. It was an act of Parliament of England against piracy, 3. This war was fought between Russian Empire and alliance of British, France and Ottoman Empire. For the sake of getting power in weak Ottoman Empire. 4. This letter was published by government which gave authority to people to indulge in illegal activities, create problems for enemies and destroy their economy. 5. greater Somalia include the current Somali state, ogaden province of Ethiopia, north eastern part of Kenya and Djibouti 6. investor are basically financers of pirates 7. This type of ship carries one or more smaller ships. 8. It means use civilians to deter an enemy from attack, for example Somali pirates use crew member for deterring navies from attack on them 9. Type of hand grenade 10. State is having internationally recognized status but government has little control over territory. 11. This means a ship registered in a sovereign state, different form that of the ship owners, for reducing the operation cost. 12. Sirius Star a 300 meter Saudi oil tanker was carrying 2 million barrel of crude oil with 25 crew members was captured by pirates on September 2008 (Adetunji, 2008). 13. MV Faina a Ukrainian Cargo which was carrying military hardware was captured by Somali pirate on November 2008(Rice, 2009). This cargo carrying 33 Russian made T-72 tankers with rocket propelled grenades and anti- aircraft guns (Jones & McGreal, 2009). 14. MV Maran Centaurus Greek super tanker carrying $162 million of crude oil for USA and 28 crew members. 15. Samho Dream a South Korean super tanker carrying $2 million barrel of oil and 24 crew members 16. It was the earliest well developed kind of insurance; it was present in Greek and Roman Era. In 1601 the Act of 43rd of Elizabeth was passed. In 1871 Llyod‘s Act was passed by British parliament. In 1906 Marine insurance act was adopted (Hare,2000, p. 44) 17. This is type of insurance which protects the insured fleets, cargos, machinery and equipments of that ship as well. The owner will be protected for losses caused by loss of or damage to the ship and its equipment. 18. This type of insurance covers psychical damage of ships or loss of ships, deaths and personnel injuries and illness which occur on board 19. Cargo insurance covers psychical damage of cargos, loss of goods while it is passed through sea, land or air 20. War risk insurance provides benefits damages in case of war and in case of piracy related war risk insurance, owner of ship got benefits in case of pirates hijack ship

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21. Ap Moller-Maersk is the world‘s largest shipping company in Denmark 22. Odfjell chemical tankers are located in Dubai 23. frontline is the world‘s largest oil shipping company which in located in Bermuda 24. Purpose of this booklet is to guide ships to avoid, threaten and delay piracy attacks in risk areas of piracy. 25. Through this one can measure speed of vessels. Knots speed is the number of unit that is covered in certain amount of time. 1 knot = 1 nautical mile per hour = 6076 feet per hour. (http://www.grc.nasa.gov) 26. Ships try to maintain a careful radar watch and most interestingly well constructed dummies are stand at different places and look likes many guards are securing that ship. 27. This comes under umbrella of physical barrier, pirates usually use hook to get access for boarding on ship, razor wire is a measure to make it difficult for pirates to get access to vessel. 28. Water spray is another strategy for threatening pirates. Sometimes water cannon and hot water use to deter pirates. 29. Crew members are aware of every type of alarm in ship. This helps crew members to take safety measures while pirates are attacking on ships. 30. At the time of attack it become difficult for crew member to go outside, CCTV helps them to know how many pirates are attacking. 31. Suez Canal is the third highest earner receipt of foreign currency in Egypt. 32. The cost of naval operations includes administrative and headquarter operations, military vessels. Combined Task Force 151, European Union Naval Force operation Atlanta and NATO Operation Shield are big three missions for countering piracy. 33. physical abuses includes deprivation of food, water, beating, shooting at hostages with water canon 34. pirates punished hostages by using different methods they threaten them and punish them with solitary confinement 35. Port critical for WFP programs, throughout the Horn of Africa since it serves as a point of entry for food aid for Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, southern Sudan and the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. In 2008, more than 500, 000 tons of WFP food assistance was delivered onboard more than 200 ships through the port 36. This meeting was held in Djibouti under the supervision of IMO and these countries attend this meeting Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Jordan, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, United Republics of Tanzania and Yemen

37. hard conditions means unstable government, poor economic conditions, lack of education and even basic necessities 38. Those arms which an individual can carry easily are called as small arms. 39. Arms embargo is legal stoppage of weapons.

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