Journal of the history of International Law 22 (2020) 507–535 brill.com/jhil ‘A Retrograde Tendency’: The Expropriation of German Property in the Versailles Treaty Nicholas Mulder Department of History, McGraw Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY
[email protected] Received: 20 March 2019 | Revised: 30 September 2019 | Accepted: 13 November 2019 | Published Online: 17 July 2020 Abstract This article explores how the Versailles Treaty was shaped by the effects of econom- ic warfare 1914–1919. The First World War was in part an Allied economic war waged against the Central Powers in conditions of advanced economic and financial global- ization. This was reflected in the treaty’s expropriation mechanisms, which were used to take control of German property, rights, and interests around the world. Whereas Articles 297 and 298 of the treaty legalized wartime seizures, the Reparations Section of the treaty also contained a provision, paragraph 18, that gave the Allies far-reaching confiscatory powers in the future. The article places these mechanisms in a wider po- litical, legal and economic context, and traces how they became a bone of contention among the former belligerents in the interwar period. Keywords Treaty of Versailles – First World War – economic warfare – expropriation – property rights – sanctions – reparations The Treaty of Versailles concluded between Germany and the Allied and Associated Powers in 1919 was more than just a European peace settlement.1 It rearranged significant elements of the world economy through international 1 225 Consolidated Treaty Series (C.T.S.) 188. © Nicholas Mulder, 2020 | doi:10.1163/15718050-12340136 This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the CC BY 4.0Downloaded license.