Why UW: Factoring in the Decision Point for Unconventional Warfare
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Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2012-12 Why UW: factoring in the decision point for unconventional warfare Agee, Ryan C. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/27781 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS WHY UW: FACTORING IN THE DECISION POINT FOR UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE by Ryan C. Agee Maurice K. DuClos December 2012 Thesis Advisor: Leo Blanken Second Reader: Doowan Lee Third Reader: Randy Burkett Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202–4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704–0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED December 2012 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS WHY UW: FACTORING IN THE DECISION POINT FOR UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 6. AUTHOR(S) Ryan C. Agee, Maurice K. DuClos 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943–5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) There has been a dramatic unconventional warfare (UW) renaissance in recent years. Much of the published material on the subject has been focused on what unconventional warfare is, re-defining it, and attempting to frame the concept of its use as it relates to the current military operational environment. Little work has been produced that examines the more basic question: Why UW? This research begins where the 2009 redefinition of UW left off. Identifying an expanded field of 51 cases of U.S.-sponsored unconventional warfare from 1892 to 2010, the authors select four cases that represent a wide variety of UW methods, locations, and goals. These four cases of UW are compared with one case of conventional warfare focusing on the question: What are the factors that lead to the use of unconventional warfare as a strategic policy option? This study empirically identifies what factors lead to the use of unconventional warfare. The results of this study provide recommendations for the advancement of UW as a strategic option. By understanding the why first, as in why unconventional warfare is chosen as a method of operation, the subsequent questions of how and who become easier to answer. 14. SUBJECT TERMS Unconventional Warfare, UW, Decision Points, Networks, Covert 15. NUMBER OF Action, Covert Operations, Irregular Warfare, Special Forces, Phase 0, Left of Beginning, PAGES Operational Steady State, TPAJAX, STCIRCUS, STBARNUM, OPHOTFOOT, 197 OPWHITESTAR, Iran-Contra, OPJUSTCAUSE, Dynamic Typology, UW Database, UW in 16. PRICE CODE Cold War, Golden Era of UW, Revolution, Resistance, Insurgency, Guerilla Warfare, Synthetic-Resistance, Synthetic-Revolution, Organic-Resistance, Organic-Revolution, Central Intelligence Agency, CIA, OSS Legacy, UW Capability, UW Mechanism, UW Feedback Loops, UW Factors, Influence on Policy, Internal Enablers, External Enablers, Internal Constraints, External Constraints. 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540–01–280–5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited WHY UW: FACTORING IN THE DECISION POINT FOR UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE Ryan C. Agee Major, United States Army B.S., California Maritime Academy, 2000 Maurice K. DuClos Chief Warrant Officer Four, United States Army B.S., Excelsior College, 2010 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL December 2012 Author: Ryan. C. Agee Maurice K. DuClos Approved by: Leo Blanken Thesis Advisor Doowan Lee Second Reader Randy Burkett Third Reader John Arquilla Chair, Department of Defense Analysis iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT There has been a dramatic unconventional warfare (UW) renaissance in recent years. Much of the published material on the subject has been focused on what unconventional warfare is, re-defining it, and attempting to frame the concept of its use as it relates to the current military operational environment. Little work has been produced that examines the more basic question: Why UW? This research begins where the 2009 redefinition of UW left off. Identifying an expanded field of 51 cases of U.S.-sponsored unconventional warfare from 1892 to 2010, the authors select four cases that represent a wide variety of UW methods, locations, and goals. These four cases of UW are compared with one case of conventional warfare focusing on the question: What are the factors that lead to the use of unconventional warfare as a strategic policy option? This study empirically identifies what factors lead to the use of unconventional warfare. The results of this study provide recommendations for the advancement of UW as a strategic option. By understanding the why first, as in why unconventional warfare is chosen as a method of operation, the subsequent questions of how and who become easier to answer. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION: THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE ...................................................................................................... 1 A. U.S. SPONSORED UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE ............................ 1 B. THE EVOLUTION OF THE LANGUAGE OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE AND ITS IMPACT OF THE FIELD .................................... 3 C. THE LANDSCAPE REDEFINED AND RECREATED ............................. 5 D. THE STRUCTURE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE THESI ................... 6 II. CASE SELECTION ............................................................................................. 9 A. THE EXPANDED FIELD OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE .............. 9 B. SEPARATING THE CASES BY PERIODS: THE THREE MAJOR ERAS ................................................................................................. 11 1. The Colonial Period ................................................................... 12 2. The Cold War .............................................................................. 12 3. Hegemony of Power–Uncontested to Contested .................... 14 C. THE “GOLDEN ERA” OF UW .............................................................. 14 D. CATEGORIZING CASES BY TYPE-THE DYNAMIC TYPOLOGY ....... 15 1. Revolution Versus Resistance .................................................. 17 2. Organic Inception versus External Synthesis ......................... 17 E. UW CASE SELECTION ......................................................................... 18 F. NEGATIVE CASE SELECTION ............................................................. 20 G. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN UW CASES AND NON- CASE ................................................................................................. 22 III. CASE STUDIES ............................................................................................... 25 A. CASE I: IRAN–1953 ............................................................................. 25 1. Introduction ................................................................................ 25 2. Background ................................................................................ 26 3. Analysis ...................................................................................... 36 a. Decision Point ............................................................. 36 b. Internal Enablers ......................................................... 38 c. External Enablers ........................................................ 41 d. Internal Constraints .................................................... 45 e. External Constraints ................................................... 45 4. Summary .................................................................................... 46 B. CASE II. TIBET, 1956–1974 .................................................................. 49 1. Introduction ................................................................................ 49 2. Background ................................................................................ 50 3. Analysis .....................................................................................