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Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control

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Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control Chapter 7 Comparative Evaluation of ASAT Policy Options Contents Page Policy Overview . ...................125 ASAT Policy Choices . ......................125 Alternative Legal/Technical Regimes . .............................125 Regime I: Existing Constraints . ....127 Legal Regime.. ...............127 Offensive Posture . ...............128 Defensive Posture . ..128 Net Assessment. ...............129 Regime 2: A Comprehensive Anti-Satellite and Space-Based Weapon Ban . .......130 Legal Regime.. .........,.....130 Offensive Posture . ...............131 Defensive Posture . ...............,131 Net Assessment. .........................131 Regime 3: An ASAT Weapon Test Ban and Space-Based Weapon Deployment Ban . ..........................132 Legal Regime.. .................132 Offensive Posture . ...........132 Defensive Posture . ......................133 Net Assessment . .............133 Regime4: “OneEach/NoNew Types’’ Regime.. .....................134 Legal Regime.. ...............134 Offensive Posture . ...............134 Defensive Posture . ..135 Net Assessment. ................135 Regime 5: Rules of the Road . ...............................136 Legal Regime.. ...............136 Offensive Posture . ...............138 Defensive Posture . .................138 Net Assessment. + . ......138 Regime6: Space Sanctuaries. ...............138 Legal Regime.. ...............138 Offensive Posture . .....4... ...............139 Defensive Posture . .....................139 Net Assessment. ................139 Regime 7: A Space-Based BMD Regime . ............................140 Legal Regime.. .................140 Offensive Posture . ...................140 Defensive Posture . .......................140 Net Assessment. ......................141 Table Table No. Page 7-1. Effect of Regimes on ASAT Development and Arms Control. ......126 . Chapter 7 Comparative Evaluation of ASAT Policy Options POLICY OVERVIEW ASAT Policy Choices limited number for analysis. These packages have been constructed so that each will have Over the next 5 years, the United States will at least one advantage over the others consid- have to make key decisions regarding research ered and so that each contains elements which and development programs for anti-satellite might reasonably be expected to coexist in the weapons and countermeasures and for ballis- same proposal. Consideration of these regimes tic missile defense (BMD) systems. In addi- is intended to facilitate assessment of the ef- tion, the United States must also consider fectiveness and desirability of different com- whether it wishes to seek agreement with the binations of ASAT and BMD technology de- Soviet Union to halt or limit the development velopment, satellite survivability, and arms of certain weapons that would operate from control. space or against space objects. This chapter The seven regimes considered in the remain- analyzes the relationships between offensive ] and defensive weapons programs and arms ing sections of this chapter are : control. In so doing, it utilizes the technology 1 Existing Constraints. The first regime is discussions contained in chapters 3 and 4 and defined by treaties and agreements pres- the discussions of arms control found in chap- ently in force. The ways in which this legal ters 5 and 6. regime would affect technology develop- As discussed in chapter 6, those regimes ments designed to protect U.S. satellites which require negotiated arms control agree- or to place Soviet satellites at risk will be ments could be either of limited or unlimited examined. duration. Opponents of developing BMD sys- 2. A Comprehensive Anti-Satellite and Space- tems might prefer an agreement of unlimited Based Weapon Ban. Regime two could be duration. Agreements of limited duration– established by adhering to treaties and perhaps 5-10 years—might be attractive to agreements presently in force and, in proponents of advanced BMD research if they addition, agreeing to forgo the possession could be fashioned so as not to interfere with of deliberate anti-satellite weapons, the plans to develop and test prototype BMD testing—on Earth or in space—of any weapons. Such agreements would have the ad- deliberate ASAT capability, the testing ded benefit of temporarily constraining the de- in an ‘‘ A SAT mode’ of systems with in- velopment or testing of advanced .ASAT weap- herent ASAT capabilities, and deploy- ons which could attack space-based BMD ment—on Earth or in space—of any system components. ASAT weapon. <.? An ASA’T Weapon Test Ban and a Space- Based Weapon Deployment Ban. The third Alternative Legal/Technical Regimes This chapter considers possible arms control ‘These reginles might usefully include elements not discusswi h(rc, ~70J” ex:jmp]t, r~~~jn]t,s ~, ,?, 4, and 5 might also include a provisions, ASAT postures, and counter-meas- “no-use” pro~ l~ion w hi(h would prohihit the parties from de- ures together as packages in order to exan~- st ro~ri ng or ‘‘ rend(’rirrg inoperah]e each others satellites. “resting in an “AS. A’I’ mode” would include tests of land-, ine their interaction. Since there are many con- vea , air-, or spacf~-has(wi s~’st(~nls agairlst targets in space or ceivable packages, it is necessary to select a a~rai ns t points in spa(YI 125 126 — regime could be created by adhering to Table 7-1 .—Effect of Regimes on ASAT Development treaties and agreements presently in force and Arms Control —.———— and, in addition, agreeing to forgo test- Restrict with Develop ASAT ing in an “A SAT mode” and the deploy- arms control weapons ment of any weapon in space. This regime Existing constraints ... No Yes differs from regime 2 most importantly Comprehensive ASAT and space-based in that it would not ban possession or weapon ban . Yes No testing–on Earth-of deliberate ASAT Test ban and space- weapons. based weapon ban . Yes Yes/No a One each/no new types ., Yes Yesb 4. A “One Each/No New Types” Regime. Re- Rules of the road . Yes Yesc gime 4 includes arms limitation provi- Space sanctuary ... Yes YesC sions which would permit the United Ballistic missile defense . No Yes ain this regime ASAT weapons could be developed, tested, and dePloyed on Eaflh States and the Soviet Union to test and but not In space The United States could pursue ASAT development wlthln the bounds of the treaty, or (t could forego ASAT development entirely deploy their current ASATS but would bAll ASAT weapons other than “current types” could not be tested or deployed prohibit testing of more advanced sys- In space c Development and deployment opt !onal but strongly SU pported by advocates of tems. Advanced systems prohibited this regime would include those capable of operating or attacking targets at higher altitudes Ban and Space-Based Weapon Deployment and those that would be deployed in Ban, ” all other regimes assume some level of space. For the purposes of this assess- ASAT development. These regimes demon- ment, the U.S. MV will be considered to strate that although anti-ASAT arms control be the only deliberate “current” U.S. arguments and pro-ASAT weapon arguments ASAT. are related, there are many distinguishing fea- 5. Rules of the Road. The fifth regime illus- tures. ASAT arms control proponents believe trates the advantages and disadvantages that an ASAT treaty is in the national inter- of establishing ‘‘keep-out zones’ around est; those who support ASAT weapon devel- individual, high-value satellites. opment believe that this also is in the national 6, Space Sanctuaries. Regime 6 would pro- interest. However, ASAT arms control propo- vide high-altitude sanctuaries where sat- nents do not necessarily oppose all types of ellites could operate but where the test- ASAT development and ASAT weapon prop~ ing or deployment of weapons would be nents do not necessarily oppose all types of forbidden. ASAT arms control. ‘7. A Space-Based BMD Regime. The seventh regime might result from U.S. or Soviet Although the individual regimes vary con- withdrawal from the ABM Treaty fol- siderably, all of them should be assessed with lowed by the deployment of space-based two important considerations in mind: BMD systems. 1. First, if we wish to continue to use space As table 7-1 demonstrates, the regimes dis- for military purposes, a commitment to sat- cussed here can be characterized both by the ellite survivability is essential whether or extent to which they rely on negotiated arms not any arms limitation agreements are in controls and by the extent to which they al- force. The existence of space systems with low or encourage ASAT development. With some inherent A SAT capability makes it the exception of the “Existing Constraints” impossible to ban the ability to attack sat- and the “Space-Based BMD” regimes, all ellites. Therefore, even under the most re- other regimes involve some type of arms con- strictive ASAT arms control regime, pro- trol. With the exception of the “Comprehen- grams for satellite survivability and sive Anti-satellite and Space-Based Weapon countermeasures must be pursued. In the Ban, ” and perhaps, the “A SAT Weapon Test absence of arms control limitations on 127 ASATS, ensuring satellite survivability there will always be some risk that criti- will be a more demanding task. cal satellites can be destroyed or rendered 2. Second, the United States should exercise inoperable. The value of continued and fu- caution in its reliance on space assets to !per- ture reliance on space systems must be form tasks essential to the national secu- balanced against the probability that rity. No matter what
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