Reflections on Caen, Bocage and the Gap: a Naval Historian’S Critique of the Normandy Campaign
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Canadian Military History Volume 7 Issue 2 Article 2 1998 Reflections on Caen, Bocage and the Gap: A Naval Historian’s Critique of the Normandy Campaign Marc Milner University of New Brunswick, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Recommended Citation Milner, Marc "Reflections on Caen, Bocage and the Gap: A Naval Historian’s Critique of the Normandy Campaign." Canadian Military History 7, 2 (1998) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Milner: A Naval Historian’s Critique of the Normandy Campaign Marc Milner s the son of a Normandy campaign veteran I The Bessin west of Bayeux and the southern Ahave lived with - and relived - the campaign Cotentin were seized quickly following the for as long as I can remember. When I began to landings, and the northern Cotentin was a teach military history the Normandy campaign strategic dead end. The Bocage and the open found a prominent place in my classroom ground around Caen lay between the Allies and analysis of WW II battle practice. By then I had a break-out of the beachhead, thus they also largely bought into the two dominant command attention in the Normandy literature paradigms of the Normandy fighting. The first and are the focus of this paper. was that while the Americans ground their way doggedly (if ineptly) through the bocage, the Illustrations (see next page) serve better than excellent tank country around Caen was wasted words to describe the bocage (which seems to be by the Anglo-Canadians. The second paradigm used synonymously with "hedgerow country"). followed naturally from the first. The Allies fought A Canadian, familiar with the great open area poorly in Normandy while the Germans fought around Caen, is struck by the nature of the superbly. We had won through what John Ellis ground south and southeast of Bayeux in what calls "brute force."1 became the British sector. The ground around Villers-Bocage and Caumont is steeply rolling, My comfortable notions about the Normandy with open fields guarded by hedgerows and deep, campaign were profoundly altered by a tour of wooded valleys. The American bocage further the Anglo-Canadian battlefields in 1991, and by west of Bayeux is even more broken by a second one this past spring which ventured hedgerows. into the American zone. The experience so shattered my assumptions that it is hard to know The ground south and west of Bayeux where to start. But perhaps it is best to begin profoundly shaped the character and tempo of with the ground. the battle. The British bocage is noteworthy for two major offensives. The first was a thrust south Gordon A. Harrison, author of the US Army's of Bayeux that commenced on 11 June. It came official history, Cross-Channel Attack, broke the to a halt two days later when leading elements of Norman topography into five areas: the 7th Armoured Division were stopped by Michael Wittman's Tiger tank outside Villers- the north Cotentin (rolling uplands north of Bocage: the spearhead of Panzer Lehr Division. Valognes), the south Cotentin (generally flat and The British reacted by flattening Villers-Bocage well watered), the Bessin (the coastal strip lying from the air and cancelling the advance.3 The between Isigny and Bayeux), the Bocage (hilly wooded country extending south of the Bessin second, Operation "Bluecoat" - the so-called and Cotentin nearly to the base of the Brittany British breakout on 30 July - was launched Peninsula) and the relatively open Caen country against an enfeebled enemy. Nonetheless, the from Bayeux east and southeast.2 British found their own bocage tough going: © Canadian Military History, Volume 7, Number 2, Spring 1998, pp.7-17. 7 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1998 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 7 [1998], Iss. 2, Art. 2 An aerial photo showing the typical bocage that covers much of Normandy. The ancient patchwork of individual fields formed by the hedgerows which bound them proved a serious tactical problem for both the American and British armies. The height of the hedgerows is indicated by the length of the shadows, in many cases, taller than the buildings at the lower left. WLU Air Photo 305/4042 8 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol7/iss2/2 2 Milner: A Naval Historian’s Critique of the Normandy Campaign enough that the crisis in British infantry The idea that broken, heavily wooded ground casualties was attributed to it.4 It is interesting was suitable for infiltration was not limited to to note, however, that they launched only two Normandy or to the Allies. The ground in front major operations in the bocage in nearly two of the main German Gothic Line position in months of continuous fighting (to be fair, the northern Italy, between the Metauro and Foglia opening stages of "Epsom" passed through Rivers, is rugged, hilly country-perhaps bocage as well): a point I shall return to. The quintessentially Italian-with deep, heavily "real" bocage fighting, of course, fell to the US wooded ravines cutting into sharp hillsides, Army slogging its way south along either side of narrow winding roads, picturesque villages, the Vire River. But here, too, there were very few and razor-backed ridges. Looking at the ground (two?) major operations. I had always thought it from the village of Montemaggiore (south of the odd that there were so few distinguishable Metauro) in 1985 I hazarded a guess that a "battles" in the American Normandy campaign. determined enemy could delay an attacker for weeks over such ground. Dominick Graham, a In contrast, action in the open ground veteran himself, a distinguished gunner and around Caen was characterized by quite distinct military historian, and leader of the tour merely operational level battles: "Epsom," "Charnwood," frowned. Gazing at me over the rims of his "Goodwood," "Spring," "Totalize," "Tractable" and glasses he said wearily, "Yes, and you could others. Indeed, the difference in the structure of slip the whole bloody Chinese army through! the campaign on the two fronts lends credence No good fields of fire, Marc!-Too hard to to the criticism that Montgomery preferred set- defend. Wait till you see the main position." piece battles, which were a sign of his caution and the ineffectiveness of British fighting in When we reached the southern edge of the general. Meanwhile, the dogged Americans, Foglia valley I understood precisely what he buoyed by greater personnel reserves and driven meant. The main German position was laid out by a more aggressive doctrine, moved steadily north of the river, on wide, totally open, rolling against the Germans through the hedgerows. ground, sloping towards the river like the glacis of some great fortress. The broad open valley It is a comfortable image, and one popularly in front of that fortress was a killing ground, accepted. But the ground had a profound and there was virtually no cover up the grassy impact on the shape of the campaign, and some slopes beyond. Infiltration was not possible. Here historians have noted that. So long as the was ground that could be defended with fire. Germans retained any reserves of manpower and the ability to move men and equipment, and so If open ground can be defended by fire, then long as the Allies were stuck to the roads, fighting the bocage had to be defended by men and it in the bocage was simply a grinding, murderous could only be won by men fighting at close range battle of attrition. In the case of the US Army, it in a steady brawl. When I saw the ground it was possible to grind forward through the bocage immediately became apparent why the in battalion or regimental level operations, and American advance was so undramatic. No great it did so - as its casualty statistics reveal (US wind-up, followed by a crash of army groups of casualties by the end of the Normandy campaign artillery and a mad dash by whole divisions and were significantly higher than those of the Anglo- corps for some distant strategic objective. Canadians). Rather, the US advance was characterized by a steady grind and then the "sudden" capture of The ability to infiltrate the hedgerow country places: Carentan, St. Sauveur, Barneville, had, in fact, been seen as one of the benefits of Valognes, Cherbourg and, finally, the high fighting in the bocage in the first place. In such ground west of St. Lô. terrain it would be hard for the enemy to prevent gradual infiltration, and once the Allies were in, I had read about all of this, of course, but extremely hard for the Germans to knock them rather typically for a Canadian I ascribed this out with a single, strategic counterattack.5 So, rather featureless campaigning to the lack of before 6 June 1944 the bocage looked good - or any serious opposition to the US Army. Afterall, at least planners were able to put a positive spin all the tanks were opposite the Anglo-Canadian on it. 9 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1998 3 Canadian Military History, Vol. 7 [1998], Iss. 2, Art. 2 armies around Caen, all the US faced were (much more effective than contemporary British infantry, a few tanks and a few SPs. practice); good training provided to experienced troops; and the astonishing mobility given to This was, of course, not what the Americans the Americans in the bocage by invention of had bargained for.