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How Israel Wins Its Wars

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How Israel Wins Its Wars 25 FEBRUARI 2018 HOW ISRAEL WINS ITS WARS THROUGH THE STRONG ALIGNMENT OF ITS CLAUSEWITZIAN TRINITIES, ITS WESTERN WAY OF WARFARE AND ITS PRACTICAL DOCTRINE - A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR WINNING WARS - NICOLAAS VAN MIERLO UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM Military History 11388838 “The trinity is a uniquely powerful framework for understanding the phenomenon of war. It cannot hope to answer all the strategic problems we face today – that was simply not what Clausewitz intended – but rather constitutes a mental guide for anyone interested in the subject, from commanders to university students. It focuses attention on the central underlying forces of war in their endlessly complex interaction” (Waldman). Page 1 Introduction The writing of this paper has been an interesting journey that started with a curiosity on why a country that fights wars against all odds can be very successful. David always (or at least often) seems to win against Goliath. We were not satisfied with the answers to be found in the literature so far, mainly because it is descriptive or analytical only in one of the aspects that provides an explanation. This did bring us to the question if it would be possible to develop an encompassing and powerful theoretical framework to explain results in warfare. A framework that would describe the three most important levels that affect and are affected by warfare i.e. the interplay between the relevant actors in a nation- state, the basic principles how that nation approaches warfare and the practical execution in the political and military arenas. That would benefit a description of the Israeli military history and provide us with a strong analytical and comparative tool. A decisive factor for success in warfare is the strength of the unity of a nation-state within the derived Trinity of the People-Army-Government in the primordial violence, hatred, and enmity against a common enemy or threat. We will call that the alignment of the People-Army-Government. The second factor is the way in which a country approaches warfare, the basic principles, and for our theoretical framework we have chosen the Western way of warfare as primarily described by Parker. The Trinities and the Western way of warfare need to be translated to the political and military arenas. This is the third factor that we will call the practical Doctrine. Therewith we have united society, strategies and tactics into a powerful descriptive, analytical and comprehensive theoretical framework. This has not been done before and will substantially contribute to another view on the military history of Israel. As with the Trinity the other two factors have to show internal strength and unity which we will also call the alignment. Actually, there is an implicit 4th factor and that is, apart from the alignment within each factor, the alignment between the three factors. There can be no success when the three factors are not aligned as we saw e.g. in the Vietnam War. We will unite these three factors and the derived fourth factor into an encompassing theoretical framework and test it to explain the successes of a nation-state that wins wars against all odds i.e. Israel. We will first describe the three levels of the theoretical framework. Are we able to decompose the original Trinities of von Clausewitz and use the elements as building blocks for our theoretical framework? It has to be kept in mind that von Clausewitz has only provided a very short description of the Trinities and therewith only provides a skeleton. Moreover, as confirmed by Waldman, von Clausewitz believed that his theories were always ‘work-in-progress’. There are linking pins between the Trinities and the Western way of warfare that can be considered as a blue print for effective and successful warfare. These are, amongst others, the role of the army in the forming of a society, the direct link between the society and the army in the delivery of the soldiers and the priority of politics in warfare. What are these linking pins and how can they be operationalised? We will lard the description of the theoretical framework using the Israeli circumstances and occurrences. Actually, in On War there is an implicit link between the Trinities and Doctrine. Von Clausewitz describes elements that can be considered doctrinal e.g. on centres of gravity, defence. It therewith links the Trinities to doctrines. Moreover, it shows that we need to operationalise the Israeli Doctrine and describe the constant factors over time. What are the linking pins between the Israeli Trinities and its Doctrine? An effective and practical Doctrine does translate all this to the battle fields. It is the strength within and between these three different levels that determine the potential for success in warfare. We need an understanding of the kinds of wars that Israel has been fighting to be able to apply our theoretical framework to different circumstances and situations. It allows us to show the robustness of the theoretical framework. Finally, we will summarise a carefully selected number of armed conflicts as case studies and we will draw our conclusions. This will provide an alternative approach to describe the military history of Israel. Page 2 Contents Introduction........................................................................................................................................2 List of Tables .......................................................................................................................................4 List of Figures ......................................................................................................................................4 A Theoretical Framework for Warfare .................................................................................................5 Contribution to Field of Military History ..............................................................................................8 Historiography ....................................................................................................................................9 Trinities – the Level of the Society ..................................................................................................... 12 Western Way of Warfare – the Basic Principles ................................................................................. 21 Doctrine – the Political and Military Arenas ....................................................................................... 26 The Nature of Israeli Wars and Operational Strategies ...................................................................... 31 Israeli Wars ....................................................................................................................................... 35 1947-1948 War – The Beginning of the Trinities ............................................................................ 36 The 1967 War – Alignment of Trinities, Western way of warfare and Israeli Doctrine .................... 38 The 1967-1970 War of Attrition – Counter Doctrinal Behaviour and the Weakening of the Trinities ..................................................................................................................................................... 41 The 1973 War – Cracks in the Doctrine and Blurring of the Roles ................................................... 43 The Gaza War 2014 – Adaptation of the Practical Doctrine ............................................................ 46 Conclusions....................................................................................................................................... 49 Abstract ............................................................................................................................................ 51 Appendix 1: Qibya (1953) – Always Retaliate Excessively .................................................................. 52 Appendix 2: Israel – Facts and Figures ............................................................................................... 55 Bibliography...................................................................................................................................... 57 Page 3 List of Tables Table 1 Examples of Israeli Politicians with Military Backgrounds ...................................................... 18 Table 2 Major Wars of Israel ............................................................................................................. 34 Table 3 1947-1948 War ..................................................................................................................... 36 Table 4 1967 War .............................................................................................................................. 38 Table 5 1967-1970 War of Attrition ................................................................................................... 41 Table 6 1973 War .............................................................................................................................. 43 Table 7 Gaza War 2014 ..................................................................................................................... 46 Table 8 Qibya Raid ............................................................................................................................ 52 List of Figures Figure 1 - Theoretical Framework for Warfare – Levels of Alignment ..................................................7 Figure 2 & 2a - 1947-1948 War ........................................................................................................
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