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U.S. Hypocritical with Terrorism UMBC Class Fee Increase Ludicrous 12 Opinion April 10, 2007 THE RETRIEVER WEEKLY UMBC class fee U.S. hypocritical with increase ludicrous terrorism though you are about to be fi nancially ravaged, Critics have also failed to take into CHARLIE GRIGGS but even this small universal expectation is now MATT MAINEN account the fact that Pakistan’s role in the Retriever Weekly Staff Writer being disregarded by UMBC. Retriever Weekly Senior Staff Writer war on terror must be placed within the I like UMBC and I don’t want to have to be context of its holistic security needs. The UMBC isn’t world renowned for its good the guy that either has to skimp on credits due to While simultaneously pushing for a vast majority of Pakistan’s military resources decision making abilities. And currently, UMBC this new class fee phase that UMBC is thinking troop withdrawal from Iraq, the Pelosi House must go to maintaining a balance of power is considering making what could possibly be about or watch his friends have to skimp on of Representatives passed a bill in January, with India, which is essential for ensuring one of the most detrimental decisions it will ever credits. I wish there was a classier way to phrase making future aid to Pakistan contingent that the nuclear states pursue diplomatic make. That is to say, UMBC is mulling over how I feel about the class fee consideration, upon certification that the country is doing solutions. There is no denying that relations whether they should apply a class fee to courses, however, the only two words that immediately all it possibly can to combat the Taliban with India are slowly improving, but a hasty most especially those in the life and chemical sink into my mind are: that sucks. and al-Qaeda. This bill demonstrates a clear reallocation of resources to the war on terror science majors. So, just like that drunk girl you saw double standard with respect to the war on could seriously threaten Pakistan’s balancing This begs the question: what exactly does wandering across campus last weekend, UMBC terror. Why must Pakistan “stay the course” capabilities. When it comes to fighting terror our tuition go towards? is sitting on the fence and about to make a in a battle analogous to United States’ battle or preventing a nuclear war, the latter takes I’ve been under the auspices that UMBC terrible decision that could ruin students’ in Iraq? To be sure, some reports suggest precedent. is willing to dick over its students Pakistan has constantly for a small buck ever since I was been portrayed as neglecting regaled with tales of the amount of to properly secure the Afghan money kept from housing deposits border. But, whereas there are in previous years and the one time I only about 100 border posts saw a staff member, who will remain in Afghanistan, Pakistan has anonymous, “borrow” ten dollars 80,000 troops patrolling 950 from a student to pay for their lunch posts. The U.S. does not even at the commons, but now I’m certain have 80,000 troops in the entire of it. country of Afghanistan; it has UMBC announced not too about 27,000. Most ironic, long ago that it was approximately however, is that the Pelosi two million dollars in debt, so one House would criticize another can only hope that this new class fee country’s border security when consideration isn’t correlated to the the issue of border security aforementioned announcement, but in the U.S. has never been a with that large of a debt to ignore major issue for Democrats (and such suspicions would be asinine. seemingly only of interest for I, personally, can’t grasp why such Republicans during election a decision would even be considered years). to begin with. First, housing deposits From the beginning of the go up to two hundred dollars (not war in Afghanistan to late 2006, a huge stretch, but an annoyance Pakistan aggressively pursued nonetheless) and now students may al-Qaeda and the Taliban in have to pay a separate fee for the Helen Zhang [Retriever Staff] Waziristan. Due to heavy classes they sign up for. losses, an increased threat to the It should be apparent that the outcome of loyalty for good. And just like that same drunk that Pakistan has lost just as many troops in stability of Pakistan’s government (including this decision could potentially ruin a few students. girl, you’ve got to hope that this university combating the Taliban and al-Qaeda as the two nearly successful attempts on the life of And with all the talk of class fees, innumerable has enough sense to keep its hands out of the US has in Iraq. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf), and questions regarding seemingly impertinent fi scal students’ metaphorical pants and away from The U.S. cannot hold Pakistan to a the vast depletion of resources, Pakistan matters are being continuously raised. Will their wallets. But, unfortunately, I wouldn’t put higher commitment to the war on terror signed a peace accord with the tribes of students’ scholarships cover the class fees? What it past either UMBC or the drunk girl to end up than it is willing to make. The issue of Waziristan in late 2006 and withdrew its if a student is struggling fi nancially in the fi rst screwing a couple students on their way to the American hubris has been invoked many combat forces accordingly—just as the Pelosi place and they’re not able to take certain classes ultimate goal: self-satisfaction. times in recent years, but this measure taken House is calling for the U.S. to do in Iraq. due to the fee? And the number one question I by the House clearly crosses the line. Those politicians pushing for the feel is most important: how much are these class When it comes to destabilizing the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq fees going to be? Charlie Griggs is a Retriever Weekly structure of al-Qaeda, Pakistan has been believe that the war is stretching the US It’s not too much to ask to be able to go to Staff Writer and can be reached for comment at responsible for the capture or execution of military too thin and costing it too many a college where you are not constantly feeling as [email protected]. more high-ranking terrorist officials than resources. This very well may be true, but if any other country. Included in this long list such is the case, how can the same politicians is September 11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh criticize Pakistan for withdrawing from an Speaker uninteresting Mohammed as well as his replacement Abu identical situation? Faraj al-Libbi. These individuals were al- When it comes to the Bush from WOLF, page 11. lower class poor, people who “care” shouldn’t work Qaeda’s third in command, operating directly administration, its reason for not unilaterally for pharmaceutical companies, and all unethical under Ayman al-Zawahiri. Furthermore, striking terrorist strongholds in Waziristan demonstrate her points, Wolf often relied on people are secretly miserable. She also recounted on January 26, 2006, the US, acting on is because it believes that such strikes dubious cause and effect scenarios, apples-to- the story of an African woman who escaped her intelligence provided by Pakistan, killed top would encourage an uprising against the oranges comparisons, and exaggerations. For sexual slavery by fl eeing across the “tundra.” This al-Qaeda bomb maker Midhat Mursi, who government of Pakistan. If such is the case, example, Wolf attributed concrete political gains is apparently a part of the African continent with wrote the training manual used by shoe- why would the expectations of an uprising be by women during the Clinton administration which I am unfamiliar. bomber Richard Reid and the failed 20th any different were Pakistan to strike, either to sexual harassment charges leveled by Anita Wolfe also urged the audience to contact September 11th hijacker Zacarias Moussaoui. alone or multilaterally? Hill against Clarence Thomas during Thomas’ elected offi cials to demand ethical leadership, and Also killed in this strike was Abdul Rehman If politicians in the U.S. wish to cast Supreme Court confi rmation hearing. She also advised that when they do so, audience members al-Maghribi, al-Zawahiri’s son-in-law. stones at Pakistan, they better be willing to claimed that the 1993 Oslo accords were a direct should lie about their political affi liation, in order While Pakistan pursued these terrorists, consider the U.S.’s own shortcomings in the result of a visit by the late King Hussein of Jordan to make the greatest impression. Yea, ethics. the Bush Administration slowly cut funding war on terror first. Otherwise, such hypocrisy to an Israeli citizen hospitalized after a terrorist While taking questions after her lecture, for program to find Osama Bin Laden, will only further isolate the U.S. from the attack, which she became aware of after having Wolf avoided complex issues by saying she had no known as Alec Station, and eventually international community and make it more seen a photograph. No record of any such visit real experience in “process,” repeatedly describing canceled the mission altogether in 2005. difficult to secure the crucial multilateral exists. She may have been thinking of a much- herself as a “generalist.” Having listened to Yet politicians on both sides of the aisle support needed in combating global Islamic photographed visit Hussein paid to former Israeli her speak for two hours, I now understand the have blamed Pakistan for not doing enough extremism.
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