Distributional Politics and Central Bank Independence: Monetary Reform in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Distributional Politics and Central Bank Independence: Monetary Reform in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand London School of Economics and Political Science Distributional Politics and Central Bank Independence: Monetary Reform in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand A Thesis Submitted by Michael R. King 92,000 words (102,750 with appendix and footnotes) Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations University of London September 2001 UMI Number: U615222 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U615222 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 i yeses F 7%o Library British Library of Political and Economic Science Abstract Why do politicians change the legislation governing the central bank to give this institution operational independence in the setting of monetary policy? This thesis examines the political debates over central bank independence in New Zealand, Canada, Australia and New Zealand during the 1980s and 1990s. These cases were selected due to the variation in their levels of central bank independence, while holding key institutional variables constant. Four hypotheses are suggested by the political economy literature to explain the timing of this legislative change: the need to signal creditworthiness to international financial markets, in response to lobbying by domestic interest groups opposed to inflation, in response to proposals from an epistemic community of monetary experts or based on the self-interest of politicians concerned with re-election. The case studies find that politicians delegate to the central bank when this reform has the consensus support of an epistemic community of monetary experts, and a key politician is willing to champion the legislation through parliament. This epistemic community has increased influence during periods of economic uncertainty, such as following a financial crisis. A key politician is motivated to support this reform due to ideological or electoral reasons. This reform was facilitated by political institutions characterised by few checks and balances that concentrated power in the hands of the executive and offered few obstacles to changing the central bank’s statute. Central bank independence was rejected in the cases where the epistemic community did not hold a consensus on the need for reform, and politicians saw only electoral risks from changing the central bank’s statute. This study finds that politicians retain room to manoeuvre despite the rise of financial globalisation. Acknowledgements This study was made possible due to financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (award # 752-2000-0104). Field research was made possible by a grant from the University of London Central Research Fund and the sponsorship of Robert Pringle, editor of Central Banking. Much of the data used in this work was made available through the Data Archive at the University of Essex. The author has benefited greatly from the contributions of a number of individuals. I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Andrew Walter, whose guidance and ideas have stimulated and informed by research. The following individuals were kind enough to read and comment on earlier drafts of my work: William Bernhard, Daphne Josselin, Randy Germain, Anja Graupe, Charles Goodhart, John Maloney, Layna Mosley, Adam Posen, Razeen Sally, Tim Sinclair and David Stasavage. In the course of my field research, I received particular help from Chuck Freedman at the Bank of Canada, Guy Debelle at the RBA, Michael Reddell at the RBNZ, Andrew Bailey at the Bank of England, and Arthur Grimes and Roderick Deane at Victoria University at Wellington. Finally and most importantly, I would like to thank my wife, Yvonne, and my parents for their continual support and encouragement through this project. Table of Contents Abstract..................................................................................................................................... i Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................ii Table of Contents ...................................................................................................................iii List of Tables ...........................................................................................................................v List of Figures ....................................................................................................................... vii Ch. 1 Distributional Politics and Central Bank Independence ............................................1 1.1 Central Bank Independence in the 1990s ....................................................................2 1.2 The Role of Central Banks ........................................................................................... 8 1.3 Inflation Control .......................................................................................................... 11 1.4 Different Perspectives on Central Bank Independence ............................................15 1.5 Four Hypotheses Explaining Timing ........................................................................ 20 1.6 Summary of Findings ................................................................................................. 27 Ch. 2 Central Banking and the Power of Economic Ideas ................................................29 2.1 History of Central Banking ........................................................................................30 2.2 Crisis of International Monetary Frameworks ......................................................... 36 2.3 Emergence of New Paradigm ....................................................................................39 2.4 Central Bank Models and Policy Emulation .............................................................57 2.5 Status of the Paradigm ............................................................................................... 59 Ch. 3 Domestic and International Sources of Central Bank Independence ..................... 61 3.1 Pressure from International Financial Markets ........................................................ 62 3.2 Ideas of a Transnational Epistemic Community ......................................................65 3.3 Lobbying by Groups Opposed to Inflation ...............................................................72 3.4 Politicians Tying the Hands .......................................................................................81 3.5 Impact of Political Institutions ...................................................................................86 3.6 Summary of Hypotheses ............................................................................................ 89 Ch. 4 Monetary Reform in Four Industrial Countries: An Introduction ...........................94 4.1 Overview of Cases ......................................................................................................95 4.2 Political and Economic Institutions .........................................................................101 4.3 Interest Groups by Country ...................................................................................... 124 4.4 Observable Implications of Hypotheses ................................................................. 135 Ch. 5 Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Financial Crisis as a Catalyst for Reform 139 5.1 Overview of RBNZ Act 1989 ................................................................................. 140 5.2 Background to Central Bank Reform ................................................................. 144 5.3 Design and Political Debate over RBNZ Act 1989 .............................................. 156 5.4 Explaining Timing and Design ................................................................................165 5.5 Putting it All Together ..............................................................................................180 Ch. 6 Bank of Canada: The Pursuit of Price Stability ......................................................184 6.1 How Independent is the Bank of Canada? .............................................................. 187 6.2 Distributional Conflict over 'Zero Inflation' ...........................................................191 6.3 Political Debates over Bank of Canada Independence ..........................................197 6.4 Explaining Policy Continuity ...................................................................................208 6.5 Measuring Electoral Gains and Costs ..................................................................... 219 Ch. 7 Reserve Bank of Australia: The Importance of Electoral Gains ...................... 223 7.1 Status of Reserve Bank of Australia ....................................................................... 223 7.2 Challenging Economic Background ....................................................................... 229 7.3 Political Debates over RBA Independence .............................................................234
Recommended publications
  • Father of the House Sarah Priddy
    BRIEFING PAPER Number 06399, 17 December 2019 By Richard Kelly Father of the House Sarah Priddy Inside: 1. Seniority of Members 2. History www.parliament.uk/commons-library | intranet.parliament.uk/commons-library | [email protected] | @commonslibrary Number 06399, 17 December 2019 2 Contents Summary 3 1. Seniority of Members 4 1.1 Determining seniority 4 Examples 4 1.2 Duties of the Father of the House 5 1.3 Baby of the House 5 2. History 6 2.1 Origin of the term 6 2.2 Early usage 6 2.3 Fathers of the House 7 2.4 Previous qualifications 7 2.5 Possible elections for Father of the House 8 Appendix: Fathers of the House, since 1901 9 3 Father of the House Summary The Father of the House is a title that is by tradition bestowed on the senior Member of the House, which is nowadays held to be the Member who has the longest unbroken service in the Commons. The Father of the House in the current (2019) Parliament is Sir Peter Bottomley, who was first elected to the House in a by-election in 1975. Under Standing Order No 1, as long as the Father of the House is not a Minister, he takes the Chair when the House elects a Speaker. He has no other formal duties. There is evidence of the title having been used in the 18th century. However, the origin of the term is not clear and it is likely that different qualifications were used in the past. The Father of the House is not necessarily the oldest Member.
    [Show full text]
  • The Conservative Party's Credibility Deficit Updated Tax and Spending
    The Conservative Party’s credibility deficit Updated tax and spending commitments April 2010 2 Contents Page Introduction 5 Summary 7 Methodology 8 Tables 10 Broken promises 13 45,000 new single rooms in the NHS 15 5,000 new prison places 19 Reducing taxes on savings 22 More places for science courses, training and apprenticeships 24 Maternity nurses for all 25 Reinstate the Defence Export Services Organisation (DESO) 28 National Loan Guarantee Scheme 30 Tax cuts 33 Corporation tax and investment allowance changes 35 Freeze council tax for two years 38 Reduce employers’ NICs for some small companies 41 Tax cuts for married couples 43 Inheritance tax cuts 50 Reverse impact of abolition of dividend tax credit 53 Tax reversals 57 Raise National Insurance Contributions thresholds 59 Oppose Broadband levy 61 Oppose cider duty increase 63 Tax increases 65 Non-domicile levy 67 Spending reductions 73 Cut Government “waste” 75 Savings on employment and skills programmes 78 Reduce spending on Building Schools for the Future 83 Reduce eligibility for tax credits 85 Reduce eligibility for Child Trust Funds 88 Reduce government spending on consultants and advertising 90 Reduce “bureaucracy” spending by a third 92 Welfare savings 95 Scrap ContactPoint 98 NHS IT Programme 100 Freeze pay and cap pensions for public sector workers 103 Reduce spending on Sure Start outreach workers 105 3 Scrap some Regional Development Agencies 107 Scrap regional assemblies 109 Scrap identity cards 110 “Cutting the cost of politics” 112 Scrap the Trade Union Modernisation
    [Show full text]
  • What Happens After an Indecisive Election Result?
    BRIEFING PAPER Number 07163, 9 June 2017 What happens after an By Lucinda Maer indecisive election result? Gail Bartlett Inside: 1. Forming a government after a hung parliament 2. “Caretaker” administrations 3. The meeting of a new Parliament 4. The Queen’s Speech 5. An investiture vote? www.parliament.uk/commons-library | intranet.parliament.uk/commons-library | [email protected] | @commonslibrary Number 07163, 9 June 2017 2 Contents Summary 3 1. Forming a government after a hung parliament 5 1.1 What kind of government can form? 5 1.2 Historical precedents 6 1.3 When should an incumbent Prime Minister resign? 7 1.4 How long does government formation take? 9 1.5 Internal party consultation 9 1.6 Role of the House of Commons 10 1.7 Effects of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 10 2. “Caretaker” administrations 12 2.1 What is a “caretaker” administration? 12 2.2 The nature of the restrictions on government action 12 2.3 When do the restrictions end? 13 3. The meeting of a new Parliament 15 3.1 When does a Parliament return? 15 4. The Queen’s Speech 17 4.1 When does the Queen’s Speech take place? 17 4.2 The debate on the Address 17 5. An investiture vote? 19 Cover page image copyright UK Parliament 3 What happens after an indecisive election result? Summary Following the 2017 general election, held on 8 June 2017, the Conservative Party was returned as the largest party, but did not have an overall majority in the House of Commons.
    [Show full text]
  • From Next Best to World Class: the People and Events That Have
    FROM NEXT BEST TO WORLD CLASS The People and Events That Have Shaped the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation 1967–2017 C. Ian Kyer FROM NEXT BEST TO WORLD CLASS CDIC—Next Best to World Class.indb 1 02/10/2017 3:08:10 PM Other Historical Books by This Author A Thirty Years’ War: The Failed Public Private Partnership that Spurred the Creation of the Toronto Transit Commission, 1891–1921 (Osgoode Society and Irwin Law, Toronto, 2015) Lawyers, Families, and Businesses: A Social History of a Bay Street Law Firm, Faskens 1863–1963 (Osgoode Society and Irwin Law, Toronto, 2013) Damaging Winds: Rumours That Salieri Murdered Mozart Swirl in the Vienna of Beethoven and Schubert (historical novel published as an ebook through the National Arts Centre and the Canadian Opera Company, 2013) The Fiercest Debate: Cecil Wright, the Benchers, and Legal Education in Ontario, 1923–1957 (Osgoode Society and University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1987) with Jerome Bickenbach CDIC—Next Best to World Class.indb 2 02/10/2017 3:08:10 PM FROM NEXT BEST TO WORLD CLASS The People and Events That Have Shaped the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation 1967–2017 C. Ian Kyer CDIC—Next Best to World Class.indb 3 02/10/2017 3:08:10 PM Next Best to World Class: The People and Events That Have Shaped the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1967–2017 © Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC), 2017 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior written permission of the publisher.
    [Show full text]
  • Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)
    Wednesday Volume 527 11 May 2011 No. 155 HOUSE OF COMMONS OFFICIAL REPORT PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES (HANSARD) Wednesday 11 May 2011 £5·00 © Parliamentary Copyright House of Commons 2011 This publication may be reproduced under the terms of the Parliamentary Click-Use Licence, available online through The National Archives website at www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/information-management/our-services/parliamentary-licence-information.htm Enquiries to The National Archives, Kew, Richmond, Surrey TW9 4DU; e-mail: [email protected] 1145 11 MAY 2011 1146 12. Andrew Selous (South West Bedfordshire) (Con): House of Commons What progress has been made on the Government’s commitment to undertake a process similar to the Wednesday 11 May 2011 Calman commission on devolution funding; and if she will make a statement. [54363] The House met at half-past Eleven o’clock The Secretary of State for Wales (Mrs Cheryl Gillan): Following the yes vote in the referendum on further PRAYERS powers, we have started to consider the scope and form of such a process. Now that the elections to the National [MR SPEAKER in the Chair] Assembly have taken place I intend to discuss the process with other stakeholders and the First Minister. May I also take this opportunity while I am at the Dispatch Box to offer our congratulations to Carwyn Oral Answers to Questions Jones, who is currently considering forming the Welsh Assembly Government and has the largest party in the Welsh Assembly? WALES Mary Macleod: Our priority in Wales and elsewhere The Secretary of State was asked— right now is to ensure that the deficit is under control.
    [Show full text]
  • Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)
    Thursday Volume 501 19 November 2009 No. 2 HOUSE OF COMMONS OFFICIAL REPORT PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES (HANSARD) Thursday 19 November 2009 £5·00 © Parliamentary Copyright House of Commons 2009 This publication may be reproduced under the terms of the Parliamentary Click-Use Licence, available online through the Office of Public Sector Information website at www.opsi.gov.uk/click-use/ Enquiries to the Office of Public Sector Information, Kew, Richmond, Surrey TW9 4DU; e-mail: [email protected] 127 19 NOVEMBER 2009 Business of the House 128 we at business questions are the flint she sparks off, we House of Commons share in her reflected glory. May we assume that she is now a subscriber to that publication? Thursday 19 November 2009 May we have a statement on the prospects for the Bills in the Queen’s Speech? On Monday, the right hon. and learned Lady claimed that the majority of the Bills The House met at half-past Ten o’clock in the Queen’s Speech would become law before the next election. We have an absolute maximum of 70 sitting PRAYERS days before Dissolution, and we need to set aside time for debates on the pre-Budget report, as well as ensuring that we have time to discuss other issues, such as [MR.SPEAKER in the Chair] Afghanistan. Given all that, does the right hon. and learned Lady still stand by her original claim, or will Business of the House she admit that there may be difficulties in fulfilling the Government’s commitments? Given the limited time we 10.33 am have left, recess dates have an added significance, so is the right hon.
    [Show full text]
  • Annual Report
    COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ANNUAL REPORT July 1,1996-June 30,1997 Main Office Washington Office The Harold Pratt House 1779 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10021 Washington, DC 20036 Tel. (212) 434-9400; Fax (212) 861-1789 Tel. (202) 518-3400; Fax (202) 986-2984 Website www. foreignrela tions. org e-mail publicaffairs@email. cfr. org OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS, 1997-98 Officers Directors Charlayne Hunter-Gault Peter G. Peterson Term Expiring 1998 Frank Savage* Chairman of the Board Peggy Dulany Laura D'Andrea Tyson Maurice R. Greenberg Robert F Erburu Leslie H. Gelb Vice Chairman Karen Elliott House ex officio Leslie H. Gelb Joshua Lederberg President Vincent A. Mai Honorary Officers Michael P Peters Garrick Utley and Directors Emeriti Senior Vice President Term Expiring 1999 Douglas Dillon and Chief Operating Officer Carla A. Hills Caryl R Haskins Alton Frye Robert D. Hormats Grayson Kirk Senior Vice President William J. McDonough Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. Paula J. Dobriansky Theodore C. Sorensen James A. Perkins Vice President, Washington Program George Soros David Rockefeller Gary C. Hufbauer Paul A. Volcker Honorary Chairman Vice President, Director of Studies Robert A. Scalapino Term Expiring 2000 David Kellogg Cyrus R. Vance Jessica R Einhorn Vice President, Communications Glenn E. Watts and Corporate Affairs Louis V Gerstner, Jr. Abraham F. Lowenthal Hanna Holborn Gray Vice President and Maurice R. Greenberg Deputy National Director George J. Mitchell Janice L. Murray Warren B. Rudman Vice President and Treasurer Term Expiring 2001 Karen M. Sughrue Lee Cullum Vice President, Programs Mario L. Baeza and Media Projects Thomas R.
    [Show full text]
  • 'About Turn': an Analysis of the Causes of the New Zealand Labour Party's
    Newcastle University e-prints Date deposited: 2nd May 2013 Version of file: Author final Peer Review Status: Peer reviewed Citation for item: Reardon J, Gray TS. About Turn: An Analysis of the Causes of the New Zealand Labour Party's Adoption of Neo-Liberal Policies 1984-1990. Political Quarterly 2007, 78(3), 447-455. Further information on publisher website: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com Publisher’s copyright statement: The definitive version is available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-923X.2007.00872.x Always use the definitive version when citing. Use Policy: The full-text may be used and/or reproduced and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not for profit purposes provided that: A full bibliographic reference is made to the original source A link is made to the metadata record in Newcastle E-prints The full text is not changed in any way. The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. Robinson Library, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Newcastle upon Tyne. NE1 7RU. Tel. 0191 222 6000 ‘About turn’: an analysis of the causes of the New Zealand Labour Party’s adoption of neo- liberal economic policies 1984-1990 John Reardon and Tim Gray School of Geography, Politics and Sociology Newcastle University Abstract This is the inside story of one of the most extraordinary about-turns in policy-making undertaken by a democratically elected political party.
    [Show full text]
  • Annual Report 2003 La De Annuel Rapport Rapport Annueldela 2003 Banque Ducanada
    BANK OF CANADA OF CANADA BANK ANNUAL REPORT 2003 ANNUAL REPORT BANK OF CANADA ANNUAL REPORT 2003 2003 2003 BANQUE DU CANADA DU CANADA BANQUE BANQUE DU CANADA DU BANQUE LA DE ANNUEL RAPPORT RAPPORT ANNUEL DE LA RAPPORT Bank of Canada — 234 Wellington Street, Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0G9 5211 — CN ISSN 0067-3587 ISSN CN — 5211 0G9 K1A Ontario Ottawa, Street, Wellington 234 — Canada of Bank his many volunteer activities. His warm wit and generous spirit will be sorely missed. sorely be will spirit generous and wit warm His activities. volunteer many his Gerry Bouey and neither will his community to which he contributed to the very end through end very the to contributed he which to community his will neither and Bouey Gerry Those who worked with him over the course of his long and remarkable career will never forget never will career remarkable and long his of course the over him with worked who Those Achievement Award. In 1987, he was made a Companion of the Order of Canada. of Order the of Companion a made was he 1987, In Award. Achievement of Laws from Queen’s University. In 1983, he was presented with the Outstanding Public Service Public Outstanding the with presented was he 1983, In University. Queen’s from Laws of In 1981, he was made an Officer of the Order of Canada and also received an Honorary Doctor Honorary an received also and Canada of Order the of Officer an made was he 1981, In economic development and to the Bank’s growing international reputation.
    [Show full text]
  • Download Clinton Email November Release
    UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05772613 Date: 11/30/2015 RELEASE IN FULL CONFIDENTIAL October 9, 2010 For: Hillary From: Sid Re: Yes, some things: 1. Richard Wolff told me that one of the reasons Jones was summarily executed was payback for dumping Mark Lippert (whom he called "Thing Two," from Dr. Seuss' Cat in the Hat), McDonough's sidekick (whom Jones calls "Thing One"). Of course, Jones had to go to Obama himself to dispose of Lippert. The true cause was that Thing One and Thing Two were leaking negative stories about Jones. McDonough, naturally, has assumed Donilon's post. Obladi, oblada, as John Lennon (who would have been 70) might say. 2. Shaun Woodward is in the Labour shadow cabinet in his former position as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Gordon Brown's hatchetman, Charlie Whelan, whose job was to undercut Tony, had worked the unions to vote for Ed Miliband rather than Ed Balls (the one closest to Gordon) in order to beat David--the last scene in the revenge tragedy of Gordon v. Tony. Only 19 percent of the union people voted, but were credited with the full one-third of Labour votes for leader selection, so a minority of a minority threw the election by 1.3 percent to Ed. Then Balls, his wife Yvette Cooper (an MP and former cabinet secretary), and other Brownites ran as a slate for shadow cabinet--the first time the shadow cabinet was to be elected by the constituency. That succeeded to electing them all and shutting out Peter Hain, the former deputy PM, as well as Shaun.
    [Show full text]
  • Download Download
    New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 45(1): 14-30 Minor parties, ER policy and the 2020 election JULIENNE MOLINEAUX* and PETER SKILLING** Abstract Since New Zealand adopted the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) representation electoral system in 1996, neither of the major parties has been able to form a government without the support of one or more minor parties. Understanding the ways in which Employment Relations (ER) policy might develop after the election, thus, requires an exploration of the role of the minor parties likely to return to parliament. In this article, we offer a summary of the policy positions and priorities of the three minor parties currently in parliament (the ACT, Green and New Zealand First parties) as well as those of the Māori Party. We place this summary within a discussion of the current volatile political environment to speculate on the degree of power that these parties might have in possible governing arrangements and, therefore, on possible changes to ER regulation in the next parliamentary term. Keywords: Elections, policy, minor parties, employment relations, New Zealand politics Introduction General elections in New Zealand have been held under the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system since 1996. Under this system, parties’ share of seats in parliament broadly reflects the proportion of votes that they received, with the caveat that parties need to receive at least five per cent of the party vote or win an electorate seat in order to enter parliament. The change to the MMP system grew out of increasing public dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the previous First Past the Post (FPP) or ‘winner-take-all’ system (NZ History, 2014).
    [Show full text]
  • Liberals in Coalition
    For the study of Liberal, SDP and Issue 72 / Autumn 2011 / £10.00 Liberal Democrat history Journal of LiberalHI ST O R Y Liberals in coalition Vernon Bogdanor Riding the tiger The Liberal experience of coalition government Ian Cawood A ‘distinction without a difference’? Liberal Unionists and Conservatives Kenneth O. Morgan Liberals in coalition, 1916–1922 David Dutton Liberalism and the National Government, 1931–1940 Matt Cole ‘Be careful what you wish for’ Lessons of the Lib–Lab Pact Liberal Democrat History Group 2 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 new book from tHe History Group for details, see back page Journal of Liberal History issue 72: Autumn 2011 The Journal of Liberal History is published quarterly by the Liberal Democrat History Group. ISSN 1479-9642 Riding the tiger: the Liberal experience of 4 Editor: Duncan Brack coalition government Deputy Editor: Tom Kiehl Assistant Editor: Siobhan Vitelli Vernon Bogdanor introduces this special issue of the Journal Biographies Editor: Robert Ingham Reviews Editor: Dr Eugenio Biagini Coalition before 1886 10 Contributing Editors: Graham Lippiatt, Tony Little, York Membery Whigs, Peelites and Liberals: Angus Hawkins examines coalitions before 1886 Patrons A ‘distinction without a difference’? 14 Dr Eugenio Biagini; Professor Michael Freeden; Ian Cawood analyses how the Liberal Unionists maintained a distinctive Professor John Vincent identity from their Conservative allies, until coalition in 1895 Editorial Board The coalition of 1915–1916 26 Dr Malcolm Baines; Dr Roy Douglas; Dr Barry Doyle; Prelude to disaster: Ian Packer examines the Asquith coalition of 1915–16, Dr David Dutton; Prof. David Gowland; Prof. Richard which brought to an end the last solely Liberal government Grayson; Dr Michael Hart; Peter Hellyer; Dr J.
    [Show full text]