Distributional Politics and Central Bank Independence: Monetary Reform in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand
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London School of Economics and Political Science Distributional Politics and Central Bank Independence: Monetary Reform in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand A Thesis Submitted by Michael R. King 92,000 words (102,750 with appendix and footnotes) Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations University of London September 2001 UMI Number: U615222 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U615222 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 i yeses F 7%o Library British Library of Political and Economic Science Abstract Why do politicians change the legislation governing the central bank to give this institution operational independence in the setting of monetary policy? This thesis examines the political debates over central bank independence in New Zealand, Canada, Australia and New Zealand during the 1980s and 1990s. These cases were selected due to the variation in their levels of central bank independence, while holding key institutional variables constant. Four hypotheses are suggested by the political economy literature to explain the timing of this legislative change: the need to signal creditworthiness to international financial markets, in response to lobbying by domestic interest groups opposed to inflation, in response to proposals from an epistemic community of monetary experts or based on the self-interest of politicians concerned with re-election. The case studies find that politicians delegate to the central bank when this reform has the consensus support of an epistemic community of monetary experts, and a key politician is willing to champion the legislation through parliament. This epistemic community has increased influence during periods of economic uncertainty, such as following a financial crisis. A key politician is motivated to support this reform due to ideological or electoral reasons. This reform was facilitated by political institutions characterised by few checks and balances that concentrated power in the hands of the executive and offered few obstacles to changing the central bank’s statute. Central bank independence was rejected in the cases where the epistemic community did not hold a consensus on the need for reform, and politicians saw only electoral risks from changing the central bank’s statute. This study finds that politicians retain room to manoeuvre despite the rise of financial globalisation. Acknowledgements This study was made possible due to financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (award # 752-2000-0104). Field research was made possible by a grant from the University of London Central Research Fund and the sponsorship of Robert Pringle, editor of Central Banking. Much of the data used in this work was made available through the Data Archive at the University of Essex. The author has benefited greatly from the contributions of a number of individuals. I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Andrew Walter, whose guidance and ideas have stimulated and informed by research. The following individuals were kind enough to read and comment on earlier drafts of my work: William Bernhard, Daphne Josselin, Randy Germain, Anja Graupe, Charles Goodhart, John Maloney, Layna Mosley, Adam Posen, Razeen Sally, Tim Sinclair and David Stasavage. In the course of my field research, I received particular help from Chuck Freedman at the Bank of Canada, Guy Debelle at the RBA, Michael Reddell at the RBNZ, Andrew Bailey at the Bank of England, and Arthur Grimes and Roderick Deane at Victoria University at Wellington. Finally and most importantly, I would like to thank my wife, Yvonne, and my parents for their continual support and encouragement through this project. Table of Contents Abstract..................................................................................................................................... i Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................ii Table of Contents ...................................................................................................................iii List of Tables ...........................................................................................................................v List of Figures ....................................................................................................................... vii Ch. 1 Distributional Politics and Central Bank Independence ............................................1 1.1 Central Bank Independence in the 1990s ....................................................................2 1.2 The Role of Central Banks ........................................................................................... 8 1.3 Inflation Control .......................................................................................................... 11 1.4 Different Perspectives on Central Bank Independence ............................................15 1.5 Four Hypotheses Explaining Timing ........................................................................ 20 1.6 Summary of Findings ................................................................................................. 27 Ch. 2 Central Banking and the Power of Economic Ideas ................................................29 2.1 History of Central Banking ........................................................................................30 2.2 Crisis of International Monetary Frameworks ......................................................... 36 2.3 Emergence of New Paradigm ....................................................................................39 2.4 Central Bank Models and Policy Emulation .............................................................57 2.5 Status of the Paradigm ............................................................................................... 59 Ch. 3 Domestic and International Sources of Central Bank Independence ..................... 61 3.1 Pressure from International Financial Markets ........................................................ 62 3.2 Ideas of a Transnational Epistemic Community ......................................................65 3.3 Lobbying by Groups Opposed to Inflation ...............................................................72 3.4 Politicians Tying the Hands .......................................................................................81 3.5 Impact of Political Institutions ...................................................................................86 3.6 Summary of Hypotheses ............................................................................................ 89 Ch. 4 Monetary Reform in Four Industrial Countries: An Introduction ...........................94 4.1 Overview of Cases ......................................................................................................95 4.2 Political and Economic Institutions .........................................................................101 4.3 Interest Groups by Country ...................................................................................... 124 4.4 Observable Implications of Hypotheses ................................................................. 135 Ch. 5 Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Financial Crisis as a Catalyst for Reform 139 5.1 Overview of RBNZ Act 1989 ................................................................................. 140 5.2 Background to Central Bank Reform ................................................................. 144 5.3 Design and Political Debate over RBNZ Act 1989 .............................................. 156 5.4 Explaining Timing and Design ................................................................................165 5.5 Putting it All Together ..............................................................................................180 Ch. 6 Bank of Canada: The Pursuit of Price Stability ......................................................184 6.1 How Independent is the Bank of Canada? .............................................................. 187 6.2 Distributional Conflict over 'Zero Inflation' ...........................................................191 6.3 Political Debates over Bank of Canada Independence ..........................................197 6.4 Explaining Policy Continuity ...................................................................................208 6.5 Measuring Electoral Gains and Costs ..................................................................... 219 Ch. 7 Reserve Bank of Australia: The Importance of Electoral Gains ...................... 223 7.1 Status of Reserve Bank of Australia ....................................................................... 223 7.2 Challenging Economic Background ....................................................................... 229 7.3 Political Debates over RBA Independence .............................................................234