Italian Seaports' Competition Policies Facts and Figures

Transport Policy 25 (2013) 198–209

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Transport Policy

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Italian seaports’ competition policies: Facts and ﬁgures

Antonio Musso a,n, Cristiana Piccioni a, Eddy Van de Voorde b a ‘‘Sapienza’’ University of Rome, School of Engineering, DICEA — Department of Civil Engineering, Building and Environment, Via Eudossiana 18, 00184 Rome, Italy b University of Antwerp, Department of Transport and Regional Economics, Stadscampus (CST) Bureau B431, Prinsstraat 13, 2000 Antwerp, Belgium article info abstract

Available online 24 January 2013 Three decades ago, ports were generally regarded as homogeneous entities that competed with each Keywords: other at different operational levels. In the course of the 1990s, however, the ‘‘port product’’ Port management increasingly came to be seen as a set of interlinking functions, with the port as such serving as one Competitiveness of the links in the overall logistic chain. The most recent literature has revisited the concept of port Italian port system competition to take due account of the complex and heterogeneous nature of ports today. Moreover, Operating efﬁciency the focus is no longer exclusively on competition between ports, but increasingly also on internal competition, between individual production companies and service providers operating within or making use of the same port setting. Starting from the above framework, this paper focuses on the exogenous and endogenous variables that can affect port competition, which ultimately provides insight into potential strategies for improving the competitiveness of Italy’s seaports. & 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction 2. The current situation

The recent port literature concurs that port competition has 2.1. Analysis of port traffic evolved towards a competitive struggle between logistic chains. Law 84/19941, which reformed the Italian port system, has Successful ports belong to successful chains. This means that the produced significant effects over the past two decades, representing competitiveness of individual ports depends not only on their a first step towards a more competitive port regime (cf. OECD, 2011). own strengths, but also on those of other links in the chain. There It has contributed to revitalising the national port industry, enhancing are ample examples of ports located at open sea and accessible to Italy’s role as a Mediterranean port destination and supporting freight the largest sea-going vessels that nonetheless lose some of their traffic increase (Marchese and Musso, 1997; Valleri et al., 2007; competitive edge due to, for example, inadequate hinterland Ferrari and Musso, 2010; Siviero, 2010; VV.AA., 2011). For one thing, connections. Within the European port landscape, strikingly high the total traffic volume increased by 27%, from approximately 400 throughput volumes are realised by some of the ports located million tons of maritime freight in 1997, including around 6.5% by in the so-called Hamburg – Le Havre range, indicating that they container, to 508 million tons in 2008, with a containerised share of belong to successful logistic chains. The Italian and, by extension, around 20% (Valleri et al., 2007; Costa and Casagrande, 2011). Mediterranean ports for their part seem to find it hard to However, the increases realised by the main Italian ports2,while integrate into alternative, more successful chains for the same destinations. 1 Law 28.01.1994, n. 84 and s. a. s. ‘‘Reorganization of the port legislation’’, regulates The present study starts from the question of which economic port activities and brings them in line with the General Transport Plan targets, and/or technological variables can influence and improve the updating/identifying the Plan’s implementation tools and the criteria for adopting and competitiveness of the Italian ports. A detailed overview is revising the Regional Transport Plans. The law also removed the port companies’ mo- provided of the current port landscape, followed by theoretical nopolies (previously, shipping lines were obliged to call on the port companies for dock and empirical analyses of the various key variables that can, at operations), introducing agreement tools (i.e. concessions) that allow private companies to manage port terminals and traffic-related operations (Tongzon and Heng, different levels, influence port competition. Additionally, a num- 2005). After over a decade, this law has been shown to have some weaknesses (cf. ber of potential strategies — as previous aimed at improving the World Bank and PPIAF, 2007; Ferrari and Musso, 2010). In order to modify law 84/ competitiveness of Italian ports — are identified and discussed. 1994, two years ago, three draft laws were put forward as a unified act (quote: ‘‘Testo Unificato del 21 Dicembre 2010, ‘‘La riforma della legislazione portuale’’). However, the debate is currently still in progress. 2 Gioia Tauro, the only Italian transhipment port of international stature, and n Corresponding author. Tel./fax: þ39 0644585146. the port of Taranto container terminal, which opened in 2001 and has a handling E-mail addresses: [email protected] (A. Musso), capacity of over 2 million TEUs/year, have contributed to Italy’s growing maritime [email protected] (C. Piccioni), traffic (cf. Costa and Casagrande, 2011; Costa and Dallari, 2008; Euro Mediterranean [email protected] (E. Van de Voorde). Transport Project, Technical note, 2005; VV.A.A., 2012).

Table 1 Trafﬁc in the main European ports (in 1000 TEUs and % variations). Source: Eurostat, Port Authorities.

EU framework Ports 2000 2001 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Var. 07/08 Var. 08/09 Var. 09/10 Var. 10/11 Var. 00/10 Var. 01/11

Northern Europe Hamburg 4,248 4,689 9,914 9,767 7,031 7,906 9,014 1.48 28.02 12.44 14.02 86.10 92.24 (North Sea side) Rotterdam 6,275 6,096 10,773 10,631 9,579 11,017 11,877 1.32 9.89 15.01 7.80 75.58 94.83 Antwerp 4,082 4,218 7,879 8,379 7,014 8,144 8,864 6.35 16.29 16.11 8.84 99.52 110.15 Felixstowe 2,793 2,800 3,342 3,131 3,021 3,374 3,265 6.31 3.52 11.70 3.24 20.82 16.61 Le Havre 1,465 1,525 2,685 2,512 2,257 2,369 2,215 6.45 10.13 4.96 6.51 61.73 45.25 Central and Southern Marseille 722 742 1,058 901 943 1,031 945 14.80 4.64 9.30 8.37 42.79 27.31 Europe (MED side) Algeciras 2,009 2,152 3,419 3,297 2,953 2,777 3,603 3.58 10.42 5.97 29.75 38.22 67.43 Valencia 1,308 1,507 3,049 3,606 3,654 4,198 4,327 18.28 1.33 14.87 3.08 220.92 187.13 Marsaxlokk 1,033 1,165 1,900 2,300 2,260 2,400 2,360 21.05 1.74 6.19 1.67 132.33 102.58

impressive in absolute terms, lagged behind those achieved in the Extending the analysis to the past decade one notices that, while rest of Europe (Table 1), thereby underscoring the lack of competi- the Italian port system has experienced substantial growth, this has tiveness of the Italian port system (Beretta et al., 2009; Costa and not translated into greater market share. According to the Eurostat Casagrande, 2011). statistics on container traffic, ten years ago Italy enjoyed a 15.20 % Moreover, although freight volumes handled in the main share in total volumes handled by the EU-15, ranking it well behind Italian seaports grew between 2000 and the first half of 2007, in Germany (more than 20%), but close to Spain and the Netherlands the subsequent three years there was a substantial decline in (more than 16%). By 2010, within the EU-27, Italy saw its share freight movements by sea (Table 2). This trend was due in part to reduced to 10.5%, falling well behind Belgium (12.9%) and even the economic recession affecting European and global trade further behind Germany (17.5%), Spain (15.5%) and the Netherlands during the 2008–2009 period. Indeed, in 2008 (and excluding (15%). Moreover, looking at the absolute values over a ten-year Trieste, as its 26% increase would distort the mean value), traffic period, the rate of container volume handled by Italian ports has fell on average by 2.10% compared to the previous year, while increased considerably less than the corresponding figure for other between 2008 and 2009, the average decrease at the national countries. Indeed, Italy realised a 35% increase, which is not particu- level was 5.1%. larly spectacular when compared to the 42% achieved by France, the By contrast, the 2009–2010 period marked an average 11.9% 68% by Germany, 89% by Spain, 82% by the Netherlands and, most increase in overall traffic excluding Taranto and Salerno, which impressive of all, 192% by Belgium. saw significant declines. These declines were however offset by Substantial growth in international container traffic is forecast the quite substantial increases of the total tonnage handled over for the coming years (2012–2016), in consequence of an antici- that same period at these ports. During 2010–2011, the ports pated increase in trade (Heymann, 2011). This trend is expected under study registered an average 4.3% decrease mainly due to a to be enhanced by the fast-changing dynamics in seaborne traffic decline in traffic at the ports of Brindisi, Gioia Tauro, Savona and at the European and global levels, driven more than ever before Civitavecchia. The port of Trieste3, for its part, registered the by overseas emerging economies. greatest increase, followed at quite a distance by Genoa, Salerno, Taranto and La Spezia. It should also be noted that the port of Gioia Tauro has, for the past four years, experienced substantial 2.2. Port typologies and related services decline in traffic, mainly due to the growing competitiveness4 of other Mediterranean ports such as Tangier, Port Said, Valencia, The analysis presented here covers the principal Italian ports. Algeciras and Marsaxlokk (Costa and Casagrande, 2011) and to As key nodes of the TEN-T network, they all play a major role with changes in port actors’ business models5 (i.e. Global Operators). respect to either deep-sea and feeder connections. Indeed, Gioia Tauro and Taranto operate as hubs, while Trieste, Genoa and Naples are important gateways, where goods either reach their final destination or continue their journey by another transport 3 Due to its draught, which enables it to accommodate the world’s largest mode. An overview of the main port technical features is provi- container ships, Trieste is progressively becoming the chosen port of call of the ded below, in order to identify issues strictly related to selected most globalized shipping companies, such as MSC and Maersk. Today, Hanjin and variables that, as will be explained later, can influence — at Hyundai Merchant Marine (Korea), Yang Ming (Taiwan) and UASC (Arabian Emirates) all call at this port. different levels — port competition. 4 From May 2011, the world’s largest container shipping company Maersk Table 3 focuses on Northern Italy, where the port of Trieste, (source: Alphaliner), which accounted for about 25% of traffic handled at the Gioia located on the Adriatic side, is important to traffic links with Tauro port, excluded the port from its network. Maersk has re-distributed its Croatian ports as well as with Greece and Turkey. Trieste, through transhipment traffic in favour of Port Said, also launching a mother vessel service fifty trains a week, serves some major industrial centres in Europe calling at Genoa for Far East - Europe routes. Furthermore, the negative impact of Maersk’s strategies on the Gioia Tauro port business is compounded by the fact (Austria, Bavaria, Poland, Romania, Hungary and the Czech that, together with the major investor Contship Italy, it is a 33% shareholder in Republic). On the Tyrrhenian side, the port of Genoa is one of Medcenter, the company running the container Terminal. Still with reference to the most important multi-traffic and transit nodes for interna- the Southern Italy port context, Evergreen, which is ranked 5th among the global tional sea trade. Located around 150 km from Milan and Turin players (source: Alphaliner), has decided to move its direct connection between the Mediterranean and Far East from Taranto to Piraeus. (and directly linked to the railway and road networks), its 5 Global port operators play an essential role in the dynamics of container port catchment area also includes some important markets of Central terminals, both for the operation of terminal facilities and for the strategic planning of infrastructure investments. They deal with three groups of stakeholders: steve- dores, shipping companies and financial holdings (cf. Rodrigue, 2010). It is worth (footnote continued) mentioning the case of the Maersk Group, which evolved from a pure shipping line Maersk Group has strengthened its strategic position in many European and to a global logistics provider through the AMP terminal network; in so doing, the Mediterranean hubs (i.e. Le Havre, Zeebrugge, Algeciras, Tangier, Port Said, Aqaba). 200 A. Musso et al. / Transport Policy 25 (2013) 198–209

Table 2 Trafﬁc in the main European ports (in 1000 TEUs and % variations). Source: Eurostat, Assoporti, Port Authorities.

Var. 07/ Var. 08/ Var. 09/ Var. 10/ Var. 00/ Var. 01/ Italian framework Ports 2000 2001 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 08 09 10 11 10 11

North-West (Tyrrenian Savona Vado 55 50 243 253 196 196 170 4.2 22.4 0.02 13.17 258.2 240.9 side) Genoa 1,501 1,527 1,855 1,767 1,534 1,759 1,847 4.8 13.2 14.7 5.0 17.2 21.0 La Spezia 910 975 1,187 1,246 1,046 1,285 1,307 5.0 16.1 22.9 1.7 41.2 34.1 North-East (Adriatic side) Trieste 206 201 266 336 277 288 393 26.4 17.6 1.7 39.6 36.7 95.6 Central (Tyrrenian side) Civitavecchia 13 16 31 25 29 42 37 19.0 13.3 45.4 9.8 229.2 134.2 Napoli 397 430 461 482 516 532 527 4.5 7.1 3.2 1.1 34.2 22.5 Salerno 276 321 385 330 269 235 245 14.3 18.5 12.8 4.3 14.9 23.7 South (MED side) Gioia Tauro 2,653 2,488 3,445 3,468 2,857 2,851 2,350 0.7 17.6 0.2 17.6 7.5 5.5 Taranto 3n 186 756 787 741 582 604 4.1 -5.7 -21.5 3.9 19298 224.9 Brindisi n.a. 6 5 0.6 0.7 1.1 0.4 n.a. 7.3 53.3 56.2 – 91.9

n In 2000 the Taranto container terminal was not opened yet.

Table 3 Northern Italian ports: Trieste and Genoa. Source: data elaborations (2009–2011) from Banca d’Italia, Port authorities, Assoporti, TOC.

TRIESTE GENOA

Port areas Total port area [m2] 2,304,000 5,588,300 Commercial areas [m2] 1,765,000 2,235,000 Industrial areas [m2] – 2,147,000 Storage areas [m2] 925,000 (500,000 warehouses) 140,000 (warehouses) Layout Total docks length [m] 12,128 24,023 Operative moorings 47 38 Maximum depth of seabed [m] 18.00 15.00 Berths capacity Conventional/multifunctional ships 24 12 Container ships and ro-ro ferries 11 14 Oil tankers/ Industrial ships 10 10 Facilities Total container handling area [m2] 400,000 1,609,355 Container terminals 13(VTE, SECH and Messina) Handling capacity [TEUs/year] 500,000 2,600,000 Container handling cranesn [units] * 12 55 Internal network ICT A broadband port connection net (ﬁbres optical) VTE is provided with the E-port custom connection is integrated with a WI-FI network. within the port community system. Rail tracks 44 tracks (70 km total length). All docks 8 marshalling tracks, each 650 m length at VTE; are served by rail; trains composable in 3 tracks, each 370 m length at SECH; the terminals. 5 on-terminal railway lines, 440 m each at Messina; about 2,300 m of tracks at general cargo terminals. Roads n.a. 12 lanes for container and 2 for general cargo dedicated to automated real-time tracking system. Dry –port accessibility Rail service Shuttle trains from/to Cervignano freight Shuttle trains from/to Rivalta Scrivia terminal; village; frequency: weekly frequency: 10 couple trains/week Shuttle train from/to Fernetti intermodal terminal; frequency: weekly

n quay cranes plus RMGs and RTGs.

Europe (i.e. Basel, Munich) and countries bordering the Mediter- The port of Gioia Tauro is ideally located in the barycentre ranean Sea, up to the Black Sea and the Far East. of the Mediterranean region, in an optimal position6 on the Table 4 provides a summary of the main features of ports Gibraltar–Suez route. As such, it is a key international tranship- located in the Central and Southern part of Italy. More specifically, ment hub for attracting transoceanic traffic and managing a the port of Naples, on the Tyrrhenian side, is an important multi- feeder network for goods distribution in the medium-short range traffic and transit node for Mediterranean sea trade (i.e. with (cf. Costa and Dallari, 2008). The port is connected to the national North Africa). In more recent years, and with particular reference railway network (Paola–Sibari line), though this is inadequate to to the Motorways of the Sea, the port has experienced growth in ensure good port accessibility; rail freight traffic7 intensity is cabotage traffic, an area where the shipping lines for Sicily about five trains/day. As a direct link between highway exit and (mainly links with the ports of Palermo and Catania) represent the port is lacking, road accessibility also represents a weakness. 49% of the whole Italian sector (source: Naples Port Authority). The port commercial area is directly connected to the freight villages of Nola (serving as a kind of dry port, it includes a railway station 6 The distance Gibraltar-GioiaTauro-Suez is almost 2000 nautical miles, of the same name) and Marcianise, both of which are linked to the respectively 359, 348 and 305 miles less than the corresponding distance for national railway network (De Simone et al., 2003). In terms of the Genoa, La Spezia and Leghorn ports. Calling at Gioia Tauro port instead of the Northern Tyrrhenian ports saves one sailing day (Cersosimo and Donzelli, 2000). transit time, three days are required for rail forwarding from the 7 Assuming a 24-hour operation, the maximum capacity allowed by the port of Naples to Munich through the Nola node and the Milan existing rail infrastructure would be about 20-24 trains/day, estimating a terminal. 200,000-TEU volume (source: Gioia Tauro Port Authority). A. Musso et al. / Transport Policy 25 (2013) 198–209 201

Table 4 Central and Southern Italian ports: Naples, Gioia Tauro, Taranto. Source: data elaborations (2009–2011) from Banca d’Italia, Port authorities, Assoporti, TOCs.

NAPLES GIOIA TAURO TARANTO

Port area Total port area [m2] 1,426,000 6,090,000 3,408,560 Storage areas [m2] 330,000 1,558,047 750,000 80,000 – Small workshops, near Shipyards [m2] the port area, are equipped for onboard emergency repairs. Layout Total docks length [m] 11,145 5,125 9,995 a Operative moorings 74 n.a. n.a. Maximum depth of 15.00 18.00 25.00 seabed [m] Berths capacity Conventional/multifunctional 30 n.a. ships c Container ships and ro-ro n.a. 4 32b ferries Oil tankers and Industrial n.a. n.a. ships Facilities Total container handling 230,000 1,524,766 1,000,000 area [m2] Container terminals 3 1 1 (TCT) Handling capacity [TEUs/year] 500,000 4,200,000 2,000,000 d Container handling cranes 62435 [units] Internal network ICT Terminal operator use an EDI standard n.a. TCT, by its own ICT network, system CODECO/COARRI andCOPRARN). manages/supervises the Operations are managed by tablet pc. operational cycles. Operations are controlled by an ‘‘airport-style’’ control tower. Rail tracks Total rail tracks are 1.8 km in Max operational 5 tracks, each 1,000 m length at length. They are connected to the capacity TCT national rail network. of the rail infrastructure is 20–24 trains/day Roads Total road length within the n.a. Three access lanes. A new entrance port area is 3 km (the North gate) in the commercial port has improved access to the external road network. Dry –port Rail service Shuttle trains from/to Nola freight village, n.a. Block trains from/to Nola accessibility frequency: weekly (and Ancona and Bologna) freight village, frequency: 3 block trains/ day

CODECO: container gate-in/gate-out report; COARRI: container discharge loading report; COPRARN: container announcements. a Value also includes the moorings dedicated to passenger trafﬁc (four are dedicated to cabotage). b Value is underestimated; it has been obtained according to the number of loading/unloading bays parallel to the quay. c Available data refer only to berth capacity of TCT terminal: four container ships (Panamax class). d Quay cranes plus RMGs and RTGs.

The port of Taranto, located in Southern Italy (on the Ionian 1.18 (2006) to 0.75 million TEUs (2009). At the same time, the coast), is the second Italian transhipment port after Gioia Tauro. market share (containers forwarded through rail, net of tran- Besides its important role in intra-Med and transoceanic traffics, shipment traffic) dropped from 23% to 15%. This apparently the port manages feeder routes gravitating in the Aegean sea (i.e. problematic integration of the seaborne system and the main Gemlik, Izmir, Limassol) up to the Black Sea and to the African land transportation networks exacerbates the competitive gap Mediterranean ports (i.e. Tunis, Misurata, Alexandria). Shipping that Italy’s port system faces with the Northern range ports, lines coming from the Suez Canal can save six or seven sailing where the modal split in favour of the sea-rail combined transport days by calling at Taranto instead of the ports of Rotterdam or is 30–40% on average. Hamburg. Indeed, 34–36 h is the time required for cargo rail moving from the port to the inland terminal of Munich/Riem. Moreover, the container terminal is directly linked to the national 3. Variables influencing port competition rail network8 and the Adriatic motorway network is accessible by a 15 km-direct road link. The port competition literature has evolved rapidly. Three Finally, it is interesting to consider the aspect of port accessi- decades ago, authors such as Verhoeff (1981) tended to regard bility by rail. Figures9 show that the Italian port system has seen a ports as rather homogeneous entities, competing with one 36% overall reduction in container traffic forwarded by rail, from another at different levels: within a country, for freight flows and for infrastructure investment in additional capacity; within a cluster, for a common hinterland; and increasingly between port ranges, for investment and traffic, particularly from areas where 8 About 3 block trains/day operate to/from the Tyrrhenian (Nola) and Adriatic (Ancona, Bologna) inland intermodal terminals. the spheres of influence of port ranges overlap (Meersman et al., 9 Cf. Naples Port Authority (2010), Piano Operativo Triennale 2011-2013. 2010). 202 A. Musso et al. / Transport Policy 25 (2013) 198–209

Table 5 Port actors, objectives and instruments. Source: Meersman et al. (2010).

Actors Objectives Most important instruments

Shipper and/or owner of the goods Minimising the generalised cost (including time) Negotiating power (e.g. depending on volume) Forwarders Minimising the generalised cost plus profit margin Negotiating power (e.g. depending on volume) Shipping company Maximising profits or, alternatively: Rates Maximising market share and/or control over the supply chain Cost control Port authority Private: maximising profit Port dues (Semi)-public: maximising profit or market share or total volume Concession policy Investments (e.g. dredging) TOC—terminal operating company Maximising profit Handling fees Technological choice Hinterland operator Maximising profit Rates Capacity Speed

During the 1990s, however, a different perspective emerged on 3.1. The crucial variables concerning competitiveness the phenomenon of port competition. The port product came to be regarded as a chain of interlinking functions, and hence the Port competitiveness and competition depend on a number of port as such was likened to a link in the overall logistic chain exogenous and endogenous variables. As far as the exogenous (Suykens and Van de Voorde, 1998). Besides throughput, the variables are concerned, a port and its actors are only able to industrial and commercial functions (including warehousing and anticipate on and/or adjust their strategies to future freight flows. distribution of goods) as well as hinterland transportation ser- Not so in the case of endogenous variables, though. With respect vices, need to be incorporated. In the course of time, the relative to these variables, port actors enjoy some degree of freedom in importance of these various links has clearly changed, e.g. due to deciding on the crucial threshold values. In what follows, we significant technological developments such as larger vessel and consider three of those variables: price, capacity and productivity. more speedy handling (Meersman et al., 2009). The recent literature has revisited the concept of port competition once more, starting from two important observations 3.1.1. Price (Meersman et al., 2010). It is increasingly apparent that ports The owner of the goods and/or the forwarder base their are far from homogeneous environments. The nature of ports decision concerning the shipping company and/or the departing today is inherently more complex and heterogeneous, involving a port of call on the minimisation of the generalised cost. An variety of market players and mutual interconnections. Moreover, important component of this cost is the so-called out-of-pocket competition unfolds not only between ports, but also, primarily cost, i.e. all payments to be made in money terms. In the case of even, between individual production companies and service the goods owner/forwarder, the out-of-pocket cost corresponds providers located in or making use of a port. Thinking in terms with the freight rate demanded by the shipping company. Each of supply chains likewise presupposes the existence of different cut in the freight rate will help decrease the generalised cost and, types of competition, both horizontal and vertical. Each actor in a as such, will have a positive effect on demand as well as on the chain has specific objectives and will deploy specific tools to competitiveness of the port involved. The size of this effect will reach them (Table 5). evidently depend in part on the share of the out-of-pocket cost in Selecting an appropriate port of call is an interactive and the total generalised cost and in part on the price elasticity of simultaneous process, governed largely by the principles of demand (Fig. 1). supply and demand. Demand for port throughput, i.e. the choice The freight rate demanded by a shipping company will depend of a port, is a function of a number of well-defined variables: the on its own cost structure. Besides expenses linked to operating goods flows, the extent of the ‘‘merchant-haulage’’ and ‘‘carrier- the vessel, the cost may depend on the port of call and its actors: haulage’’ nature of the goods flows, and the generalised cost the port dues demanded by the port authority, the handling associated with the supply chain to which the prospective port charges asked by the Terminal Operating Companies (TOCs), the call belongs, including the rates charged. Supply is determined by price of services (pilotage, towage etc.). a combination of actors who together represent the port of call as A port authority has direct control over the level of port dues. a product. Each actor contributes to the generalised cost of the Moreover, it also influences the cost and the price level of service supply chain (Meersman et al., 2010). The port that contributes to providers. Consider the example of a TOC, where the final price the cheapest logistic chain is, in theory at least, most likely to be resulting from the terminal tendering process, as well as the called at. To elucidate the decision process, one may consider the duration of the concession, will influence the related handling generalised cost as the most influential variable. price level. A similar reasoning applies to other service providers, From Table 5, a number of important factors can be selected such as pilotage and towage companies. that impact on port selection by the most important port users, As regards the price level, a further argument has to be taken i.e. the owner/sender of the goods and the shipping company. into account. Within some ports, there is internal competition, In this context, it should be noted that the cost structure is e.g. between two or more terminal handling companies, while influenced by both exogenous factors (e.g. scale increases in other ports do not operate under such conditions. In this respect, global trade) and endogenous factors within the port’s direct greater internal competition may be expected to results in lower sphere of influence. price levels. A. Musso et al. / Transport Policy 25 (2013) 198–209 203

PortPort Authority

port dues

license cost OwnerofOwner of thethe goods ShippingCo.Shipping Co. freight rate or Forwarder handling price

price price TerminalTerminal price OperatingCo.Operating Co. Pilotage Towage

OtherOtherservices services

Fig. 1. Price dynamics in the port area. The main port actors and the price dynamics, including those related to the logistic and nautical services, have been shown.

3.1.2. Capacity S1 (before expansion) Capacity would appear to be a very important variable to Price ports, as is reflected in their frequent preoccupation with building S2 (after expansion) new terminals and/or increasing the number of available berths. In order to avoid time losses, shipping companies commonly base their choice of port of call on the availability of ‘‘free capacity’’ or P1 so-called ‘‘dedicated capacity’’. However, port capacity can be P2 quite a confusing concept. First and foremost, there is a distinc- tion to be made among physical capacity, effective capacity and economic capacity. The physical capacity is the maximum capacity that can be used without any external distortion; in other words, it is the intrinsic capacity, determined only by size and other D physical characteristics of the structures. The effective capacity is the highest possible capacity given the prevailing external conditions, such as the number of working hours, maintenance and C1 C2 Capacity repair operations and legal restrictions. The economic capacity is that part of the effective capacity that can be used with the Fig. 2. The effect of handling capacity increase. The linear curve explains the highest economic and commercial return. In the short run, the relationship between price and capacity increase. available capacity forms the upper limit for the throughput of a port. Capacity supply can be influenced in several ways (Jansson and Shneerson, 1982). just a higher output/input ratio. Productivity increase within a Fig. 2 shows the effect of a capacity increase, considering that port context is discussed by Valleri and Van de Voorde (1996). the expansion can be achieved by three different kinds of The various actors within a port each control one or some of measures. the links in the maritime supply chain (Fig. 3). The different In particular, the number of terminals and/or berths can be points of view of terminal operators, shipping companies and port increased; the throughput capacity per berth can be improved by authorities on the productivity concept correspond with the expanding the back-up area and by improving storage; and the specific input and output of their part of the logistics process. handling capacity can be boosted by means of gantry cranes, straddle For example, a shipowner who, in consequence of vertical carriers if applicable, or indeed other technical equipment. integration, controls part of a container terminal where his After expansion, the supply curve shifts to the right. In the past, vessels are loaded/unloaded can directly influence the productiv- supply could cope with demand increase, so that the effect on price ity of various links. The elements making up the maritime chain level was limited. With demand being constant, an increase in supply should be adjusted in such a way that the highest productivity would cause the price level to decrease. A good example in this increase is achieved, resulting in an important cost saving. In context is the case of Port of Rotterdam, where the expansion project this manner, a shipowner can boost the productivity of the known as ‘‘Maasvlakte 2’’ will create 12 million TEUs in additional entire chain. capacity. This means that, in this case, the difference between C1 and If the shipping line is not vertically integrated with one or C2 amounts to 12 million. The shift in price level (from P1 to P2) more port actors, the effect of productivity will depend on the depends on the evolution of the demand function increase, status quo relation between the shipping lines and the terminal operators. or even decrease as well as on competition with other ports. Clearly, though, with the shipping line being the strongest actor, it However, additional free capacity in this order of magnitude will will try to gain the greatest possible control over the generalised unquestionably force market prices down. cost of a port call. As such, productivity increases should generate cost reduction. For vertically integrated shipping lines, this can result in profit 3.1.3. Productivity increases, or to lower prices if part of the productivity gains are Productivity has to do with the relation between input and passed on to the clients, be they the owner of the goods or the output. A productivity increase corresponds with more output forwarders (see also De Monie, 1987; Tongzon, 1994; Estache linked to the same input, or the same output with less inputs, or et al., 2002). 204 A. Musso et al. / Transport Policy 25 (2013) 198–209

3.2. Internal competition Ports in the Hamburg-Le Havre range are generally characterised by a higher level of internal competition. With particular Ports are heterogeneous entities, involving a multitude reference to the port of Antwerp, Table 7 outlines the existing of relationships between various port actors. For the port of competition in the container throughput business. In Antwerp, Antwerp, these relationships have been quantified, both forward two major TOCs are locked in competition (PSA and DP World), and backward (Coppens et al., 2007). However, what do we know while the major shipowner-client (MSC) uses a dedicated term- about so-called ‘internal competition’, as may manifest itself inal (joint venture of MSC and PSA, with 50% ownership each). between different TOCs within a single port? Is it true and/or This type of competition puts pressure on prices, productivity acceptable that some ports have one company per field of action, (e.g. measured here as TEUs/h/crane) and quality of services, but without any internal competition, while other ports have various would appear only to be possible if enough volume is available. operators per field and hence are characterised by internal From a general perspective, in container handling, some ports competition? appear to have more suppliers than others, which is indicative of Clearly there can be no competition at the level of the port a more competitive environment. In many cases, however, the authority. Those authorities are in most cases subject to govern- number of specialised operators is limited to two, although at ment or municipal control, and they provide the basic infrastruc- some terminals there might be co-operation with third parties. ture (e.g. locks) and, in some cases, services. Table 6 provides an In the non-container business, the number of suppliers is overview for the selected Italian ports of the number of compa- generally limited and depends largely on the total volume to be nies for the major activities: shipping companies and related liner handled (e.g. the chemical sector). At ports with more suppliers, services, TOCs, pilotage, towage, as well as port service providers there is usually evidence of price competition, except in instances and forwarding companies. of collusion or cartelisation. In situations with just one supplier, The overview above is suggestive of quite a heterogeneous there is no internal price pressure whatsoever. However, in port framework. Multi-activity ports such as Genoa and Naples have a ranges with competing neighbouring ports, price may be kept larger number of shipping companies and shipping lines than under control by external pressure, depending on the negotiating specialised ports such as Gioia Tauro and Taranto. Of course, the power of the actors involved. number says nothing about the size of the companies involved or the Finally, regarding pilotage and towage activities, in both the level of competition pursued. The larger number of TOCs in Genoa Italian and Hamburg-Le Havre range ports, there is evidently a and Taranto does not necessarily reflect severe competition, since monopolistic situation. those companies are often specialised in the handling of specific goods flows (e.g. fuels, chemicals, forestry products).

4. Potential strategies to improve the Italian port Terminal Operating competitiveness Company The question arises of which (endogenous) strategic variables present themselves for enhancing the competitiveness of Italian Productivity ports. At a glance, three variables would seem to be suitable for the envisaged purpose: price, productivity and capacity. Handling charge Lowering the price — be it through lower port dues, lower concession prices and/or changing the duration of concessions, or Shipping Company by lowering the prices of nautical and logistic services — will improve the competitiveness of a port. Productivity increases can result in lower prices, too, or in a greater proﬁt for the shipowner. Productivity In both cases, competitiveness will be enhanced. Capacity increase, by the addition of terminals and/or berths, may also Freight (transport cost) have the effect of increasing port competitiveness, since ship- owners tend to choose their ports of call on the basis of ‘‘free Owner of the goods capacity’’, as this prevents loss of expensive shipping time. or Forwarder In this section, an overview is provided of the various strategies pursued by Italian and Hamburg – Le Havre range ports, Fig. 3. Productivity within a port context. The effects due to a productivity linking each to the above-described variables. Subsequently, some increase both for TOCs (terminal operating companies) and shipping companies. further potential strategies for Italian ports will be formulated.

Table 6 Italian ports: users and logistic/nautical service Providers. Source: authors’ elaboration from Port authorities data (2011).

Port Shipping Companies Shipping liner servicesn TOCsnn Pilotage Towage Port services providers Forwarding agents

Trieste 17 20 18 1 1 36 86 Genoa 54 150 16 1 1 9 197 Naples 36 n.a. 3 1 1 n.a. 118 Gioia Tauro 10 12 2 1 1 11 12 Taranto 3a 11 4 1 1 4 22

a Data refers to container service only. n Connections with Mediterranean and Black Sea, the Middle/Far East and the North/South America, provided by the shipping companies regularly calling at the selected ports. nn Figures match the number of dedicated terminals within the port. A. Musso et al. / Transport Policy 25 (2013) 198–209 205

Table 7 Port of Antwerp: internal competition and crane productivity. Source: authors’ elaboration from terminal operating companies data (2011).

Owner Terminal Throughput (TEUs) Number of gantry cranes Output

MSC MSC Home Terminal 4,600,000 (sea) 24 (21 are super post-panamax, ULCS of 14,000 TEUs handled with 6 portal cranes; no ‘tandem lift’ 704,914 inland for ‘twin lift’) (because of quays). Output: 55 to 60 TEUs/h/crane barge PSA Int’l Total PSA 2,350,000 28 Deurganck dock 500,000 11 (5 are ‘tandem lift’) ULCS of 15,500 TEUs (Maersk Line) handled with 5 ‘tandem lift’ cranes. Output: 50 moves, or 75 TEUs/h/crane North Sea terminal 1,000,000 8 (limited to ‘twin lift’; later shift n.a. possible to ‘tandem lift’) Europe terminal 430,000 7 (only ‘twin lift’) n.a. Churchill dock 120,000 2 cranes n.a. DP world Total DP 1,150,000 16 Antwerp Gateway (at 862,000 9 (4 are ‘tandem lift’) 56–60 TEUs/h/crane Deurganck dock) Churchill dock 288,000 5 (twin lift) n.a. Katoennatie Terminal at left bank 68,000 2 (twin lift) n.a. Independent Hanza dock 91,000 1 n.a. maritime terminal

ULCS: ultra large container-ship. Twin lift: two 20-feet boxes handled with 1 spreader; tandem lift: two 40-feet boxes handled with 1 spreader.

Table 8 Major targets deﬁned in the Hamburg-Le Havre range ports. Source: own composition based on strategic plans from Port authorities.

Strategic variable Targets

Capacity Providing enough free handling and storage capacity (A, R, H, Z, L); Congestion-free lanes, landside and waterside (A, R); Infrastructure Several high-profile investments in extended, state of the art infrastructure (A, R, H, L); Hinterland infrastructure investments towards more efficient logistic chains in a European network (all modes: road, rail, barge, short sea and feeder) (A, R, H, Z, L); Improving accessibility (R, L). Systems Investment in ISPS (Port management information system) certificates at each terminal and integrated EDI systems (A, R); integration Transition of the industry i.e. integrating industrial clusters of Antwerp and Rotterdam in order to reach efficiency benefits (R); Improving the quality of the community by decreasing annoyance (R, A). Productivity Highly-trained workers (A); High productivity: between 32 and 35 moves per hour per crane (A); Increasing land productivity (R) Prices Lowest terminal handling charges in Europe (A); Guaranteeing cost-effective and efficient services (A). Innovation Technological innovation of container handling (A); From process optimisation and chain integration in the industry and installing quick terminal equipment to more sustainable transport modes (R)

Antwerp (A), Hamburg (H), Le Havre (L), Rotterdam (R) and Zeebrugge (Z).

4.1. Overview of strategic plans, variables and targets competitiveness of a port. Investment and capacity are often linked, of course. A third variable is productivity, measured as Quite a number of ports have developed their own strategic output/input (e.g. in terms of throughput per metre of quay plans in recent years. A comprehensive comparison of these plans length, or throughput per square metre). Fourth there is the price is a complex undertaking, as each port operates in a different variable: lower (relative) prices again increase competitiveness. environment, under a different port governance system, with ‘Price’ is related to fixed as well as variable costs, including targets that may be their own or may be imposed by a controlling elements such as port dues, terminal handling tariffs, pricing and body, such as a national or a regional government. In order to duration of licences, tariffs of various services (including pilotage, nonetheless acquire a degree of insight into the question of port towage). The final strategic variable is innovation, particularly if planning, a number of leading Hamburg-Le Havre ports were aimed at lower average costs and first-mover advantages. selected and their planning approach analysed. This resulted in an It should be noted that the strategic plans analysed have a different outline of their main targets and the strategic variables deployed time horizon, while there are also important differences between with a view to reaching those targets (Table 8). ports in terms of how their strategic plans are translated into policy. The capacity variable is very important, as more free capacity On the other hand, it is clear that, to an extent, the various (measured in number of berths, size of the back-up area, etc.) can plans follow similar lines. They seem to be copies of one another, increase the competitiveness of a port. Potentially equally impor- with similar targets and the use of the same strategic variables. tant is the strategic variable of investment, if earmarked for They all aim at providing enough free handling and storage basic infrastructure, for example. More investments, measured in capacity, and improving hinterland connections in order to total amount spent, may also guarantee and/or improve the optimise the logistics chains to which the ports belong. But even 206 A. Musso et al. / Transport Policy 25 (2013) 198–209

Table 9 Major targets and strategic variables (Trieste and Genoa). Source: own composition based on strategic plans from Port Authorities

Strategic variables Targets

Capacity Trieste A new container area (capacity up to 106 TEUs), where the wharf extension (900,000 m2) and the deep seabed (up to 18 m) will accommodate larger container ships. A new ‘‘general cargo’’ terminal with 350,000 m2 of warehouses and berths for medium-large ships and a new ro-ro terminal (Southern area) with a capacity of four large ships.

Genoa A new container terminal and a new plant for liquid bulk (mineral oils). A new quay, adjustment of existing dry docks, construction of new spaces for shipyard activities.

Infrastructure Trieste Renovating rail and shunting points in the railway crossings and installation of new tracks. New rail and road links connecting the new ro-ro terminal. Rationalisation of the vehicle ﬂows access in the port.

Genoa New track electriﬁcation and links to the new container terminal adding three track branches. Building a new parking area for trucks.

Systems integration Trieste Setting up port entrance vehicle-control systems. Enhancing the port telematic network and the equipments for port-controlling system. Protecting structures for the scanner in the New Free Zone and a new ramp for trucks control.

Genoa Rationalising the operating cycles by developing the port telematic system (E-port), creating the Port one-stop shop (customs and road haulage) and interfacing the port ICT systems Improving incoming/outgoing rail links.

Productivity Trieste Expanding the Free Zone. Two new RMG cranes and revamping of three quay cranes at the Southern port area. Turning the Cervignano freight village (48 km aﬁeld) into a gateway to form full trains (today frequency is 1 train/week) and growth of rail links to capture important trafﬁc presently handled by the Slovenian port of Koper

Genoa Implementing road, sea and plants maintenance programmes to improve port operations. Improving electronic management of dangerous goods authorisations on board/ashore.

Prices Trieste and Genoa Port charges to be adjusted to the rate of inﬂation. No policy on pilotage and towage services price.

Genoa Reducing costs for dangerous goods operators.

Innovation Trieste and Genoa Connecting to the ERTMS—European Rail Trafﬁc Management System, by 2015.

Genoa

Progress in logistics related to the Motorways of the Sea by developing a prototype for the ICT systems interoperability (VTS—Vessel Trafﬁc Service, customs and port security platforms).

with similar strategies and identical strategic variables, the plans, one can never know for certain whether port authorities and/ quantification of those variables can differ. or port actors are being entirely honest about their objectives and Some differences are due to geographical features. A typical the strategic actions they intend to deploy to reach those goals. example is Rotterdam, with its specific target of increasing land The same set of strategic variables was investigated for the productivity. Certain strategic variables are not incorporated in all selected Italian ports (Tables 9 and 10). plans. Antwerp, for example, refers explicitly to the price variable, The price, and precisely the terminal-handling charge, is fixed with its ambition to offer the lowest terminal-handling charges in on a country basis rather than on a port basis10. Europe. The other ports under consideration do not emphasise the price variable in the same way. Also, it is clear that some of the 10 All the Italian ports have the same pricing structure, which is competitive if strategic variables mentioned are under direct control of the port compared to that of other Mediterranean ports (e.g. Barcelona, Valencia, Alge- authority, while others are controlled by other port actors. Finally, ciras). Indeed, in Italy the average range is h 111-180/TEU vs. a Spanish ports range it should be taken into account that, when analysing port strategic of h 130-255 /TEU (cf. Hackett, 2009). A. Musso et al. / Transport Policy 25 (2013) 198–209 207

The above analysis of the strategic planning framework et al., 2011). There is also a lack of back-up port areas. Moreover, allowed us to identify the main constraints to improving the possible synergies with freight villages located in the proximity of competitiveness of the Italian port system. These constraints can the ports are often missing or not optimised. Investments (public be synthetically traced to the following factors. and private) are in many cases not yet funded or have still to be Ports are affected by a severe lack of infrastructural equipment deﬁned. Furthermore, the majority of the Italian ports, especially as well as ﬂoor space/yardage for the handling of goods (Beretta the larger ones, are integrated in historical cities. This creates

Table 10 Major targets and strategic variables (Central and Southern Italy’s ports). Source: own composition based on strategic plans from Port Authorities.

Strategic variables Targets

Capacity Naples Completion of the new wet dock and quay front enlargement to increase capacity to two containerships. A new container terminal (106 TEU capacity) and a 250,000 m2 distripark, in the back-port area.

Gioia Tauro New quays/ areas dedicated to cargo handling. Dredging of the seabed and enlargement of the port canal to hold larger containerships. Creating a platform for logistics and cargo services related to port activities. Constructing a regasiﬁcation terminal.

Taranto Widening of a pier (from 80 to 220 m) and a new quay (12 m draught) with an operating area. A new container terminal, a new logistic platform (148,000 m2) dedicated to conventional/added-value services, a new 750,000 m2 distripark, near the container terminal and linked to the platform.

Infrastructure Naples New layout of the internal road links included in the port commercial area. Improving road (also avoiding vehicle ﬂow interferences) and rail accessibility to the port.

Gioia Tauro Improving the multi-modal access, connecting the port directly to the national networks. Building of a new gateway with a 700,000 TEU capacity and block trains up to 650 m in length.

Taranto Opening the ‘‘Piers Road’’, which will directly connect all piers and quays, also improving links with the national network. Connecting the logistic platform directly to the national rail network.

Systems integration Naples Full implementation of the port security plan in compliance with the ISPS (International Ship and Port Facility Security) code.

Gioia Tauro Implementing services and technology-based devices for improving the safety and security of port areas. Creating a telematic platform to provide port users with a faster digital connection.

Taranto Connecting the port to a new regional rail system (managed by a single operator), aimed at directly linking Taranto port and Bari freight village with minor regional logistics nodes.

Productivity Naples Increasing equipment including super post panamax ship-to-shore cranes and transtainers. Efﬁciency development in logistics services and customs procedures.

Gioia Tauro Increasing container handling capacity from 21-23 TEU/h to 30 TEU/h (such as Port Said).

Taranto Increasing port facilities and ancillary services dedicated to short sea and general cargo trafﬁc.

Prices Naples, Gioia Tauro and Taranto Ports charges to be adjusted to the rate of inﬂation. No policy on pilotage and towage services price.

Innovation Naples, Gioia Tauro and Taranto Connecting to the ERTMS European Rail Trafﬁc Management System, by 2020.

Gioia Tauro Changing the port role, from transhipment hub to integrated intermodal and logistic hub. Constructing a power generation facility from renewable sources and the related quay electrical supply system. 208 A. Musso et al. / Transport Policy 25 (2013) 198–209 frequent interferences between commercial traffic and the urban System strategy mobility system, producing a structural bottleneck that limits Port competition has evolved towards competition between road access to the port. In several cases, then, the connection to maritime logistics chains. A port may be part of such a chain the national road/motorway or rail network is not direct and/or either as a port of origin or as a port of destination. The the performances of the infrastructure facilities are not adequate. competitiveness of a port therefore depends crucially upon the As expected, all these factors impacting on port perfor- competitiveness of the maritime chain to which it belongs. mance — in terms of capacity, operational efficiency and acces- Hence, strategies may be devised for the purpose of getting a sibility to the infrastructure and services — are essential in tighter grip on a larger section of such a chain, for instance by defining the level of attractiveness of a port (Musso et al., 2012). gaining control over other constituting links, such as hinterland transport modes or hinterland terminals. Various options 4.2. Potential strategies for Italian ports may be explored to that end, ranging from the takeover of hinterland operators or terminals to capital swaps with other Based on the above analysis, a number of potential strategies may partners involved in the chain. be put forward for increasing the competitiveness of the Italian ports. We deal consecutively with a capacity increase, cost reduction programmes, a plan to increase port productivity, stimulating co- operation between ports and focusing on system strategies. 5. Conclusions

Capacity increase The starting point of this paper was the research question of A capacity increase can be achieved by boosting the number of which economic and/or technological variables can influence and terminals and/or berths, or by increasing the size and storage improve the competitiveness of Italy’s ports. On the basis of capacity of existing terminals. New capacity increases the the above analysis, a number of interesting conclusions can be probability that a port authority and/or a terminal operator formulated. can offer so-called ‘free capacity’ to a potential client- We are faced with a heterogeneous landscape of Italian ports, shipowner. Hence the attractiveness and competitiveness of i.e. an environment where some ports are competing with each a port will be enhanced. An important question in this regard other, but where most do not feel competitive pressure at all. This is whether the Italian ports have a need to increase their holds a risk of a situation where the status quo is fostered, with- capacity, i.e. is the current capacity utilisation high enough to out any incentive to improve one’s own competitive position. justify additional investments? And if it is, are there any physical constraints to building new terminals and/or berths? Hitherto, some Italian ports have faced competition from ports What is the capacity needed to guarantee hinterland connec- abroad, but they lack a strategy to respond. tions without bottlenecks and time losses? Some potential strategies cannot be played, because of Cost reduction programmes limited degrees of freedom, e.g. the capacity expansion strat- The Italian port authorities and the major port actors (term- egy. Some Italian ports are hemmed in by residential areas inal-handling companies, pilots, towage firms) could opt for and consequently have no expansion possibility at land side cost reduction programmes. Cost reduction can translate into (e.g. Naples, Genoa). In such cases, the only option for expan- lower prices and/or greater profit. To the extent that cost sion is expensive waterside development (cf. Maasvlakte 2 in reduction contributes to lower relative prices, the competi- Rotterdam) or developing direct rail connections with near- tiveness of the port is increased, depending on the elasticity by freight villages or inland ports (e.g. Rivalta Scrivia and of demand. An important consideration is that port prices Genoa port). should reflect cost differences. In other words, the regulated Price strategies have a limited potential. Decreasing price will price structure that currently prevails in the Italian context increase a port’s competitiveness and generate more throughput, needs to be changed. but at the same time it will lead to high capacity utilisation and Productivity increase time losses for all actors. Ultimately, the potential positive impact A port authority and/or the major port actors can opt for no would appear to be rather small. By contrast, any price increase, price changes at all, i.e. no change in the out-of-pocket cost of e.g. as a consequence of high capacity utilisation, holds the risk the client. Instead they may opt to implement a plan aimed at of loss of market share. The size of the market loss will depend boosting productivity, at several levels. For example, increas- crucially on the price elasticity. ing the number of moves per hour per crane has the effect of The question arises whether there is room for co-operation, lowering the (generalised) cost per unit. Antwerp’s ‘crane e.g. within so-called strategic alliances between ports. That option productivity’ figures might serve as a target for Italian TOCs. would create an opportunity for adjusting supply towards a (sub- Such cost-reduction effect can be achieved while increasing )Italian Port System. It would then become possible to offer more some or all of the other output/input ratios, such as the ‘free capacity’ to potential clients. It remains to be seen which throughput per metre of quay or the storage per square metre ports might consider such co-operation. This kind of collaboration per year. A similar effect can be attained by reducing the can, moreover, be organised in different ways, and may involve average dwell time. anything from holding-type arrangements to systems based on Co-operation between ports capital swaps. Europe lacks a tradition of co-operation between port autho- Future research will focus on the fine-tuning of the above rities. Scarce previous attempts at co-operation have tended to potential strategies and the quantification of the effects resulting fail over concerns of one or several partners that another from those strategies. The behaviour of global operators and their partner would acquire a dominant position. Yet co-operation decision processes will also be studied in further detail, as will the between ports could mutually enhance their competitiveness, (joint) ownership of port terminals. Additionally, more in- for instance by a reduced need for back-up areas. Certain depth analysis will deal with the concept of internal competition, forms of inter-port co-operation may also lead to services investigating some key relationships, such as those between the specialisation and the prospect of capturing the full potential number of TOCs and volumes handled, as well as the effect on for economies of scale. prices and quality of services. A. Musso et al. / Transport Policy 25 (2013) 198–209 209

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