MOD Nuclear Liabilities Management Strategy
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Cover image: Courtesey of EDF Energy — www.edfenergy.com/energy CONTENTS... 1 AT A GLANCE... 2 A BRIEF HISTORY OF NUCLEAR ENERGY... 4 BENEFITS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY... 5 WHAT THE PUBLIC THINK... 6 HOW NUCLEAR CREATES ENERGY... 7 HOW A REACTOR WORKS... 8 THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE... 9 MANAGING WASTE... 10 RADIATION EXPLAINED... 12 NUCLEAR AROUND THE WORLD... 14 UK NUCLEAR SITES... 16 NUCLEAR NEW BUILD... 17 NEW BUILD IN NUMBERS... 18 LOOKING TO THE FUTURE... 19 DECOMMISSIONING... 20 CAREERS IN NUCLEAR... 21 FUTHER INFORMATION... AT A GLANCE... Nuclear is a major part of our energy mix. Today it accounts for 21% of electricity generated in the UK and has been providing secure low carbon electricity for over 60 years. Low carbon energy, including There are 15 nuclear power and renewables, nuclear power account for almost 51% of the reactors operating UK’s generation electricity mix across eight sites in the UK In 2016 nuclear energy avoided 22.7 million metric tonnes of CO2 emissions in the UK BEIS,Digest of UK Energy Statistics 2018 That’s equivalent to taking around a third of all cars in the UK off the road Civil nuclear contributes over £6 billion to the jobs in the UK civil nuclear sector UK economy as much as aerospace manufacturing 12,159 Women in civil nuclear 1,981 People on apprenticeships Three quarters of the public 914 believe nuclear should be part People on graduate schemes of the clean energy mix Jobs Map figures generated from participating NIA members 1 This simple timeline charts some of the key people, events and legislation A BRIEF HISTORY OF NUCLEAR ENERGY.. -
小型飛翔体/海外 [Format 2] Technical Catalog Category
小型飛翔体/海外 [Format 2] Technical Catalog Category Airborne contamination sensor Title Depth Evaluation of Entrained Products (DEEP) Proposed by Create Technologies Ltd & Costain Group PLC 1.DEEP is a sensor analysis software for analysing contamination. DEEP can distinguish between surface contamination and internal / absorbed contamination. The software measures contamination depth by analysing distortions in the gamma spectrum. The method can be applied to data gathered using any spectrometer. Because DEEP provides a means of discriminating surface contamination from other radiation sources, DEEP can be used to provide an estimate of surface contamination without physical sampling. DEEP is a real-time method which enables the user to generate a large number of rapid contamination assessments- this data is complementary to physical samples, providing a sound basis for extrapolation from point samples. It also helps identify anomalies enabling targeted sampling startegies. DEEP is compatible with small airborne spectrometer/ processor combinations, such as that proposed by the ARM-U project – please refer to the ARM-U proposal for more details of the air vehicle. Figure 1: DEEP system core components are small, light, low power and can be integrated via USB, serial or Ethernet interfaces. 小型飛翔体/海外 Figure 2: DEEP prototype software 2.Past experience (plants in Japan, overseas plant, applications in other industries, etc) Create technologies is a specialist R&D firm with a focus on imaging and sensing in the nuclear industry. Createc has developed and delivered several novel nuclear technologies, including the N-Visage gamma camera system. Costainis a leading UK construction and civil engineering firm with almost 150 years of history. -
The Referendum on Separation for Scotland
House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee The Referendum on Separation for Scotland Written evidence Only those submissions written specifically for the Committee and accepted by the Committee as evidence for the inquiry into the referendum on separation for Scotland are included. List of written evidence Page 1 Professor Bernard Ryan, Law School, University of Kent 1 2 Francis Tusa, Editor, Defence Analysis 8 3 Professor Jo Shaw, University of Edinburgh 14 4 Dr Phillips O’Brien, Scottish Centre for War Studies, University of Glasgow 21 5 Electoral Commission 24 6 Rt Hon Michael Moore MP, Secretary of State for Scotland 28 7 Ministry of Defence 29 8 Brian Buchan, Chief Executive, Scottish Engineering 46 9 Babcock 47 Written evidence from Professor Bernard Ryan, Law School, University of Kent Introduction If Scotland were to become independent, its relationship with the United Kingdom would have to be defined in the fields of nationality law and immigration law and policy. This note offers a summary of the relationship between the Irish state1 and the United Kingdom in those fields, and some thoughts on possible implications for Scottish independence. 1. Nationality Law 1.1 The Irish case A new nationality The nationality law of a new state must necessarily provide for two matters: an initial population of nationals on the date of independence, and the acquisition and loss of nationality on an ongoing basis. In the case of the Irish state, the initial population was defined by Article 3 of the Irish Free State Constitution of 1922. Article 3 conferred Irish Free State citizenship upon a person if they were domiciled in the “area of the jurisdiction of the Irish Free State” on the date the state was founded (6 December 1922), provided (a) they had been resident in that area for the previous seven years, or (b) they or one of their parents had been born in “Ireland”.2 A full framework of nationality law, covering all aspects of acquisition and loss of nationality, was not then adopted until the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1935. -
International Conference on Nuclear Criticality Safety
OFFICIAL PROGRAMPREVIEW International Conference on Nuclear Criticality Safety International Cooperation Hosted by the Nuclear Criticality Safety Division of the American Nuclear Society Co-Sponsored by NEA Photo by Randy Montoya/SandiaPhoto Randy by Laboratories National September 13-17, 2015 Omni Charlotte Hotel Charlotte, NC 2015 International Conference on Nuclear Criticality Safety Our most sincere thanks to the following contributors for their support Gold Level Silver Level Bronze Level Other Table of Contents General Meeting Information Conference Officials 4 Schedule at a Glance 5 Daily Schedule 6-7 General Information 8 Plenary and Special Sessions Welcome Reception 9 Opening Plenary 9 Reception at the Mint Museum 9 ICNC Poster Session and Reception 10 Banquet Dinner at Founders Hall 10 ICNC Workshop 10 V.C. Summer Nuclear AP1000® Nuclear Plant 10 International Cooperation Construction Tour Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility Plant Tour 10 Technical Sessions Technical Sessions by Day: Monday 11-12 Technical Sessions by Day: Tuesday 13-16 Technical Sessions by Day: Wednesday 17-20 Technical Sessions by Day: Thursday 21-22 Additional Hotel Map 23 www.ans.org 2015 International Conference on Nuclear Criticality Safety: Official Program 3 Meeting Officials International Cooperation International Conference on Nuclear Criticality Safety Every 4 years the international nuclear criticality safety community gathers to discuss technical, operational, computational, and regulatory issues in the practice of nuclear criticality safety. ICNC 2015 (International Conference on Nuclear Criticality) allows specialists from around the globe to come together to discuss, analyze and study the latest developments in the area of nuclear criticality safety. This is a unique opportunity to exchange ideas with industry experts, leaders, colleagues and peers. -
The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority Progress with Reducing Risk at Sellafield
A picture of the National Audit Office logo Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority: progress with reducing risk at Sellafield HC 1126 SESSION 2017–2019 20 JUNE 2018 Our vision is to help the nation spend wisely. Our public audit perspective helps Parliament hold government to account and improve public services. The National Audit Office scrutinises public spending for Parliament and is independent of government. The Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG), Sir Amyas Morse KCB, is an Officer of the House of Commons and leads the NAO. The C&AG certifies the accounts of all government departments and many other public sector bodies. He has statutory authority to examine and report to Parliament on whether departments and the bodies they fund, nationally and locally, have used their resources efficiently, effectively, and with economy. The C&AG does this through a range of outputs including value-for-money reports on matters of public interest; investigations to establish the underlying facts in circumstances where concerns have been raised by others or observed through our wider work; landscape reviews to aid transparency; and good-practice guides. Our work ensures that those responsible for the use of public money are held to account and helps government to improve public services, leading to audited savings of £734 million in 2016. The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority: progress with reducing risk at Sellafield Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on 18 June 2018 This report has been prepared under Section 6 of the National Audit Act 1983 for presentation to the House of Commons in accordance with Section 9 of the Act Sir Amyas Morse KCB Comptroller and Auditor General National Audit Office 15 June 2018 HC 1126 | £10.00 This report examines the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority’s progress with reducing risk and hazard at its largest and most hazardous site, Sellafield. -
Movement of Radioactive Material Sellafield Site
Proceedings of the 18th International Symposium on the Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Materials PATRAM 2016 September 18-23, 2016, Kobe, Japan Paper No. 3034 Movement of Radioactive Material Sellafield Site Maz Hussain Sellafield Ltd., United Kingdom. Abstract Background The UK nuclear decommissioning priority is to reduce risk and hazard and to deliver the clean-up mission cost effectively. This is particularly relevant at Sellafield where the Legacy Ponds and Silos pose the most significant challenges. The availability of safe packaging for the movement and storage on the Sellafield site is a key enabler to meet the NDA mission for safe interim storage ahead of its subsequent treatment, packaging and final storage to a Geologic Disposal Facility (GDF). There are a significant number of packages and package design types operating on the Sellafield site. Some packages are licensed to the IAEA regulations for safe transport and others comply only with the Sellafield site specific requirements. Introduction Packages to and from the Sellafield site need to comply with the IAEA regulations for safe transport and must meet the Sellafield site requirements. However, the IAEA regulations do not apply to packages within a licensed site. For on-site safe package operations compliance is required against Sellafield site specific procedures, standards and guidance. Package Management System There are a significant number and types of package transfers routinely undertaken safely on the Sellafield site. The packages range from small (18Kg) hand held sample castles to large complex (100Te) packages some with in-built gamma gates, mechanical interlocks and hoisting drive mechanisms. The Sellafield Package Management System (SPMS) efficiently manages package operations and includes for asset register, package tracking, operational history and maintenance. -
Onr Corporate Plan 2017/18 En Route to 2020
ONR CORPORATE PLAN 2017/18 EN ROUTE TO 2020 Office for Nuclear Regulation Corporate Plan 2017/18 Financial year 1 April 2017 to 31 March 2018 Presented to Parliament pursuant to Paragraphs 23 and 25(3) of Schedule 7 to the Energy Act 2013 July 2017 © ONR copyright 2017 The text of this document (this excludes, where present, the Royal Arms and all departmental or agency logos) may be reproduced free of charge in any format or medium provided that it is reproduced accurately and not in a misleading context. The material must be acknowledged as ONR copyright and the document title specified. Where third party material has been identified, permission from the respective copyright holder must be sought. Any enquiries related to this publication should be sent to us at [email protected] This publication is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications Print ISBN 9781474145695 Web ISBN 9781474145701 ID P002881793 06/17 Printed on paper containing 75% recycled fibre content minimum Printed in the UK for Williams Lea Group on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office CONTENTS 1. Foreword .........................................................................................................1 2. About this plan ..............................................................................................3 3. Our Operating Environment .........................................................................9 4. Our Strategic Themes and Key Activities ....................................................15 Influencing improvements -
HMNB Clyde Health and Safety Report 2009-10
HM Naval Base Clyde I I Health & Safety Annual Report Safety, Health, Environment & Fire 2009/10 Progressing Positive, Pro-active Safety Culture During 2009/10 we made good progress In reallslng our Heallh and Safety objectives. which were bui~ on previous learning and improvement. and continued towards our ambition of ensuring that every person entering HMNB Clyde goes "home sate. every day·. • Our processes and procedures continued to be sharpened to reftect best practice. • All areas now hove robust. maturing Heallh and Safety improvement plans and we continue to challenge so that there is no place for complacency. • We put a special focus on Alcohol and Drugs through a tailored wellbeing programme. • We continued to invest in developing "leaders of Safety' through our IIF Programme which is the backbone of our behavioural approoch to solely • We encouraged one of the most comprehensive independent Peer reviews ever conducted at HMNB Clyde. A group of specialists from other sectors of the nuclear industry and representatives of regulatory organisations were invited to assess ou organisation and arrangements against their best practice and learning. Their report was positive and we are taking forward suggestions on further improving our safety performance. • To reach audiences Internally and externally. we organised or took port In events such as exhibitions and Road shows demonstrating our commilment to a positive safety culture. During the year under review. we finalised our new Solely Slrategy which sets out our long term objectives on Safety. Environment. Nuclear and Social practices that should be expected of the Base. For 2011/12 our objectives wUI be prloritised to ensure the highest of standards in improvement measures. -
A Better Defence Estate November 2016 Amended Version: December 2016 Front Cover: a II (Army Cooperation) Squadron Typhoon in Front of the Squadron’S New HQ
A Better Defence Estate November 2016 Amended version: December 2016 Front Cover: A II (Army Cooperation) Squadron Typhoon in front of the squadron’s new HQ. RAF Lossiemouth © Crown copyright 2016 This publication is licensed under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0 except where otherwise stated. To view this licence, visit nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3 or write to the Information Policy Team, The National Archives, Kew, London T W9 4DU, or email: [email protected] Where we have identified any third party copyright information you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned. Contents Preface by the Secretary of State for Defence and Chief of the Defence Staff .......................... 5 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................................... 6 Part A - Our Strategic Approach ................................................................................................................. 9 Part B – A Better Defence Estate Strategy ............................................................................................12 a. Royal Navy........................................................................................................................................14 b. Army ...................................................................................................................................................17 c. Royal Air Force ................................................................................................................................28 -
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority Infrastructure Development Working Group Meeting 8 May 2014 Natasha Hanson Head of People Relations Skills Challenges Growing Global Demand for Nuclear Skills An Ageing Workforce The NDA Estate Wide Resource Profile NDA Total Resource Gap - 2012 to 2026 18000 Shortage = -1395 17000 16000 15000 Excess = +930 14000 13000 Total Demand Attrition 2.5% pa 12000 11000 Full Time Equivalent Number 10000 9000 8000 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 Year 3 NDA Estate Wide & New Nuclear Build Requirements NDA Estate and New Build Requirements 28000 26000 24000 22000 20000 18000 16000 14000 NDA Estate 12000 New Build 10000 Total 8000 Full Time Equivalent Number 6000 4000 2000 0 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 Year 4 NDA Estate Resource Issues • Acceleration of de-commissioning leading to early release of nuclear resources • Low staff attrition (average of 2% for staff) • Higher attrition of ASW staff – dependent on economic climate, opportunities within the catchment and scarcity of skill • Over next 15 years at least 34% of the workforce will reach pensionable age • Implied recruitment of 18% of existing population over the next 15 years • Approach (overall) is to continue with apprentice, and graduate training schemes and development of the current workforce 5 Skills Priorities High Priorities Other Priorities • Project / Programme Managers • Design Engineers / Technicians • Construction Project Managers • Quality Assurance • Steel -
Determination of the Off-Site Emergency Planning and Prior Information Areas for HM Naval Base Clyde (Faslane)
[Type text] Commodore M E Gayfer ADC Royal Navy Naval Base Commander (Clyde) Lomond Building Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde Redgrave Court Merton Road Helensburgh Bootle Argyll and Bute Merseyside L20 7HS G84 8HL Telephone: Email: Our Reference: TRIM Ref: 2017/22779 Unique Number: CNB70127 Date: 28th February 2017 RADIATION (EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND PUBLIC INFORMATION) REGULATIONS 2001 (REPPIR) – HMNB CLYDE (FASLANE) EMERGENCY PLANNING AND PRIOR INFORMATION AREAS Dear Commodore Gayfer, As you are aware, ONR has been re-determining the REPPIR off-site emergency planning area(1) and the area within which prior information shall be provided to the public(2) around the HMNB Clyde (Faslane) DNSR Authorised Site as prescribed in REPPIR regulations 9(1) and 16(1) respectively. On behalf of the Ministry of Defence (MOD), Naval Base Commander (Clyde) (NBC) has made a declaration to ONR that there is no change to the circumstances that might affect its Report of Assessment (RoA) for the naval submarine reactor plant. Our re-determination has been made in accordance with ONR’s principles and guidance for the determination(3) of such areas and this letter is to inform Navy Command, as the MOD duty-holder with responsibility under REPPIR for supplying prior information to members of the public around the HMNB Clyde (Faslane) DNSR Authorised Site, of the following: 1. ONR notes that, in accordance with the requirements of regulations 5 and 6, NBC has reviewed its Hazard Identification and Risk Evaluation (HIRE) and Report of Assessment (RoA) for the naval submarine reactor plant, and has submitted to ONR a declaration of no change of circumstances, as provided for under regulation 5(2). -
Radioactivity in Food and the Environment, 2006
RIFE - 12 Radioactivity in Food and the Environment, 2006 2007 ENVIRONMENT AGENCY ENVIRONMENT AND HERITAGE SERVICE FOOD STANDARDS AGENCY SCOTTISH ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AGENCY Radioactivity in Food and the Environment, 2006 RIFE - 12 November 2007 1 This report was compiled by the Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science on behalf of the Environment Agency, Environment and Heritage Service, Food Standards Agency and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency. Printed on paper made from a minimum 75% de-inked post-consumer waste. Photograph reproduced with kind permission of the Health Protection Agency © Crown Copyright, 2007 Requests for the reproduction of materials contained in this report and for other information should be addressed to: • In England and Wales, Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Team of the Environment Agency ([email protected]) or the Emergency Planning, Radiation and Incidents Division of the Food Standards Agency (radiological.surveillance@ foodstandards.gsi.gov.uk) • In Scotland, the Radioactive Substances Unit of SEPA ([email protected]) and • In Northern Ireland, the Industrial Pollution and Radiochemical Inspectorate of EHS ([email protected]) Contents Page LIST OF TABLES ...............................................................................................................................................................5 LIST OF FIGURES .............................................................................................................................................................7