House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee

The Referendum on Separation for Scotland

Written evidence

Only those submissions written specifically for the Committee and accepted by the Committee as evidence for the inquiry into the referendum on separation for Scotland are included.

List of written evidence

Page

1 Professor Bernard Ryan, Law School, University of Kent 1 2 Francis Tusa, Editor, Defence Analysis 8 3 Professor Jo Shaw, University of Edinburgh 14 4 Dr Phillips O’Brien, Scottish Centre for War Studies, University of Glasgow 21 5 Electoral Commission 24 6 Rt Hon Michael Moore MP, Secretary of State for Scotland 28 7 Ministry of Defence 29 8 Brian Buchan, Chief Executive, Scottish Engineering 46 9 Babcock 47

Written evidence from Professor Bernard Ryan, Law School, University of Kent

Introduction

If Scotland were to become independent, its relationship with the United Kingdom would have to be defined in the fields of nationality law and immigration law and policy. This note offers a summary of the relationship between the Irish state1 and the United Kingdom in those fields, and some thoughts on possible implications for Scottish independence.

1. Nationality Law

1.1 The Irish case

A new nationality

The nationality law of a new state must necessarily provide for two matters: an initial population of nationals on the date of independence, and the acquisition and loss of nationality on an ongoing basis.

In the case of the Irish state, the initial population was defined by Article 3 of the Irish Free State Constitution of 1922. Article 3 conferred Irish Free State citizenship upon a person if they were domiciled in the “area of the jurisdiction of the Irish Free State” on the date the state was founded (6 December 1922), provided (a) they had been resident in that area for the previous seven years, or (b) they or one of their parents had been born in “Ireland”.2

A full framework of nationality law, covering all aspects of acquisition and loss of nationality, was not then adopted until the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1935. The reason for delay was a disagreement between the London and Dublin Governments concerning the nature of the new citizenship.3 The British Government conceived of Irish Free State citizenship as a local citizenship, within a wider international status of British subject. The Irish state authorities preferred instead to consider Irish Free State citizenship as autonomous from British subject status, and to be capable of being relied upon internationally. Nationality legislation was eventually adopted in 1935, before a resolution of this fundamental question.

Irish nationality law and Northern Ireland

1 The official name of the state is ‘Ireland’. To avoid confusion, the term ‘Irish state’ is preferred here, unless the context permits ‘Irish Free State’ or ‘Republic of Ireland’ to be used. 2 There was an exception for persons who held the citizenship of another state, who could elect not to become Irish Free State citizens. 3 See Mary Daly, ‘Irish nationality and citizenship since 1922’ (2001) 32 Irish Historical Studies 377, 377-384.

1 The treatment of Northern Ireland within Irish nationality law has historically been a controversial issue.4 Initially, special provision for Northern Ireland within Irish nationality law was primarily a consequence of the Irish state’s claim to the whole island of Ireland. Latterly – especially since the Belfast Agreement of 1998 – special provision has reflected the Irish state’s wish to uphold the Irish identity of a minority in Northern Ireland.

In the early years of the Irish Free State, its authorities took the view that Article 3 citizenship applied to those who were domiciled and resident in Northern Ireland on 6 December 1922. That was based on the theory that, on that date, the “area of jurisdiction” of the Free State was the whole island of Ireland, as Northern Ireland did not exercise its right to opt-out of the new state until the following day. The United Kingdom Government would later acquiesce in this theory, when it neutralised its effects in British nationality law.5

The Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956 went further, and provided that a person born in Northern Ireland would automatically acquire Irish citizenship if either of their parents was an Irish citizen. That was unlike the position for births elsewhere in the world, where registration was a precondition to the acquisition of Irish citizenship for the second and subsequent generations. For persons born in Northern Ireland, but who did not have an Irish citizen parent, there was an entitlement to Irish citizenship, which the individual could freely take up.

More recent developments began with the recognition by the Belfast Agreement of 1998 of “the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves, and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may so choose …”6 That statement legitimised the application of Irish nationality law to Northern Ireland, but also implied that it should be based upon individual choice, rather than arising automatically.

The Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 2001 then introduced an apparent element of choice into Irish nationality law for persons born in Northern Ireland. All those born in either part of the island of Ireland continued to be entitled to Irish nationality by virtue of their place of birth. The acquisition of Irish citizenship was automatic for those who were entitled to Irish citizenship alone. In other cases - including persons born in Northern Ireland who became British citizens - Irish citizenship would be acquired only if positively asserted. The rules as regards citizenship by descent remained unaltered, however, so that a child born in Northern Ireland to an Irish citizen continued to acquire Irish citizenship automatically. That had the effect of removing much of the element of choice introduced into the provisions concerning the acquisition of citizenship through place of birth.

The scheme set out by the 2001 Act remained unaltered by the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 2004, which introduced a parental pre-condition to entitlement to Irish

4 For a detailed account, see Bernard Ryan, ‘The Ian Paisley Question: Irish Citizenship and Northern Ireland’ (2003) 25 Dublin University Law Journal 116-147. 5 See Ireland Act 1949, section 5. 6 In the British-Irish Agreement reached as part of the Belfast Agreement, the two Governments set out their “understanding” that, for this purpose, “The term ‘the people of Northern Ireland’ … means … all persons born in Northern Ireland and having, at the time of their birth, at least one parent who is a British citizen, an Irish citizen or is otherwise entitled to reside in Northern Ireland without any restriction on their period of residence.”

2 citizenship by birth. Children born on the island of Ireland since 1 January 2005 have been eligible for Irish citizenship by virtue of their place of birth only if, on the date of the birth, at least one parent is an Irish citizen (or entitled to become one), is a British citizen, is entitled to reside in a permanent basis in either Northern Ireland or the Republic, or has been lawfully resident on the island of Ireland for three of the previous four years.

British nationality law and Irish citizens

The possibility of continued access to forms of British nationality by Irish citizens arose as a result of the overhaul of British nationality law by the British Nationality Act 1948. Previously, British subject status had primarily been conferred on persons born in any British territory, including dominions such as the Irish state. Under the 1948 Act, British subject status was based instead upon possession of the nationality of a Commonwealth state. In recognition of the Irish state’s lack of enthusiasm for membership of the Commonwealth by this time, the 1948 Act excluded the Irish state from the list of states covered by the new principle.7 Instead, Irish citizens who had been British subjects prior to the coming into force of the 1948 Act were permitted to give notice that they wished to retain that status on the grounds of an association with the United Kingdom.8 Irish citizens were not however given a general entitlement to the separate citizenship of the United Kingdom and colonies (‘CUKC’) introduced by the 1948 Act, which was the forerunner to today’s British citizenship.

1.2 Implications for Scotland

Were Scotland to become independent, parallels to a number of the questions posed in the case of Irish nationality might arise. The following are speculative examples of such possible questions.

A new nationality

In general terms, an independent Scotland would presumably be free to define both its original population of citizens and the rules on the acquisition and loss of nationality. That would not however preclude specific agreements on the content of its nationality law with the United Kingdom, either before or after independence.

In defining Scotland’s initial population of nationals, a key question would be whether prior possession of British citizenship, or eligibility for it, was to be a precondition. In both the 1922 Constitution and the 1935 Act, the Irish Free State defined its nationality law without reference to British subject status. While that approach would be one option for an independent Scotland, it would equally be possible for Scottish nationality to be limited to a

7 In 1936, the Irish Free State unilaterally re-defined its relationship to the Commonwealth as one of ‘external association’, rather than membership. That re-definition was not however accepted by the United Kingdom at the time. The Irish state would proclaim a republic, and definitively leave the Commonwealth, in 1949. That new constitutional position was recognised by the United Kingdom through its Ireland Act 1949, which nevertheless declared that “the Republic of Ireland is not a foreign country for the purposes of any law in force.” 8 British Nationality Act 1948, section 2, and now British Nationality Act 1981, section 31.

3 sub-set of actual or potential British citizens thought to have a sufficient connection to Scotland.

Beyond that, it is to be expected that Scotland would legislate for the whole of nationality law more rapidly than the Irish Free State did. It is difficult to imagine a fundamental disagreement with the United Kingdom over the nature of Scottish nationality, or the content of its nationality law, which would preclude such legislation.

Scottish nationality law and the United Kingdom

There is no general parallel in the Scottish case to the position of Northern Ireland within Irish nationality law. Nevertheless, an independent Scotland might wish to favour the acquisition of Scottish nationality by some persons born in the post-separation United Kingdom, much as the Republic of Ireland does for births in Northern Ireland. That could potentially lead it to a more generous approach to acquisition of nationality by descent for those born in the United Kingdom than applied to the rest of the world.

British nationality law and Scotland

Scottish independence would also presumably lead to questions for the nationality law of the post-separation United Kingdom, especially if a proportion of the post-independence Scottish population continued to identify themselves primarily as British. One parallel here is with the provision for the retention of British subject status by Irish citizens after the 1948 Act. Potentially, the United Kingdom might wish some or all persons who were alive at independence to have the option of retaining British citizenship, in addition to acquiring the new Scottish nationality.

The question might also arise whether persons born in post-independence Scotland –in particular, those born to British citizen parents - should have the option of acquiring British citizenship on more favourable terms than persons born elsewhere in the world. There is again a parallel with the favoured position of Northern Ireland within Irish law on the acquisition of citizenship by descent.

2. Immigration law and policy

If Scotland were to become independent, questions would arise concerning its participation within what is termed the ‘common travel area’. That phrase is used in the Immigration Act 1971 to refer to two distinct sets of arrangements.9 The first concerns the relationship between the United Kingdom on the one hand, and the Channel Islands and Isle of Man on the other. Travel between these places is not subject to immigration control, and there is mutual recognition of immigration permissions granted by each jurisdiction in the others.

9 Immigration Act 1971, sections 1(3) and 9.

4 If Scotland were to become independent, the more relevant parallel would be with the second aspect of the ‘common travel area’: the relationship between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland.10 The core elements of that relationship are elaborated here.

2.1 The British-Irish common travel area

Foundations

For most of the period since the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922, there has not been immigration control on travel between the United Kingdom and the Irish state, in either direction. The main reason has been the presumed impracticability of immigration control at the Irish land border. Exceptionally, for a period between 1939-1952, immigration control applied to journeys between Great Britain and both parts of the island of Ireland. In peacetime, however, the United Kingdom government has accepted free movement between the two states, and has sought to co-operate with the Irish state in immigration control.

It is known that agreements on the terms of their co-operation were entered into when the Irish Free State was founded in 1922, and again when immigration controls were lifted in 1952. The terms of those agreements, and of operational co-operation between the United Kingdom and the Irish state in immigration maters, have not generally been publicised by the two states. That has presumably reflected the political sensitivity of this co-operation, as it may be thought by some to call the two states’ sovereignty over immigration matters into question.

Recent years have seen a more open discussion of the arrangements between the two states. In 2008, the Labour Government launched a consultation concerning the e-borders project and the common travel area, which referred to the fact of “administrative agreements” between the two states in 1922 and 1952. Details of discussions between the two Governments concerning the common travel area were also given publicity through a ‘joint statement’ in December 2011 by the Ministers involved.

Partial immigration control

The absence of immigration control between the United Kingdom and the Irish state has come under pressure since the mid-1990s. The initial impetus to change was the Republic of Ireland’s having experienced significant immigration for the first time in its history. In 1997, it introduced selective immigration control upon persons arriving from the United Kingdom, by air, land or sea. Since 2004, it has required persons arriving by air or sea, other than British and Irish citizens, to obtain permission to enter the state. In addition, there are selective checks upon immigration status on board bus and rail services from Northern Ireland.11

10 For a fuller account, see Bernard Ryan, ‘The Common Travel Area between Britain and Ireland’ (2001) 64 Modern Law Review 855-874.

11 These checks has been criticised for giving rise to racial discrimination, as officials make appearance-based assumptions concerning nationality: see Migrants Rights Centre of Ireland, Singled Out: Exploratory study on ethnic profiling in Ireland (2011).

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In 2008-2009, the free movement principle was also questioned by the United Kingdom Government. It proposed the introduction of immigration control on air and sea arrivals from the Republic of Ireland, and of selective controls on persons and vehicles crossing the land border from the Republic of Ireland. While these proposals were ostensibly motivated by the e-borders project, the British authorities had presumably learned from developments in Irish border control. In order to permit these reforms, in the Borders Immigration and Citizenship Bill in 2009, the Government proposed to remove the provision in the Immigration Act 1971 which exempts arrivals from elsewhere in the ‘common travel area’ from immigration control. That proposal was however defeated in the House of Lords, largely because of the belief that restricting free movement from the Republic of Ireland would lead to greater control on travel between Northern Ireland and Great Britain.

Mutual recognition?

British and Irish citizens, and other persons with rights under EU free movement law, have a right to enter either state from the other. In the case of the United Kingdom, persons with leave to enter or remain may rely upon that leave in order to enter the United Kingdom from the Republic of Ireland, while persons who are visa-exempt may enter the United Kingdom and stay for up to three months. In the case of the Republic of Ireland, persons who are not British, Irish or covered by EU free movement law, may enter the state without obtaining permission only if they possess a visa or are visa-exempt, and only if they enter by land from Northern Ireland.

What is lacking in the British–Irish relationship is mutual recognition of immigration permission. The effect is that persons with a visa or residence permit issued by one state may not rely upon that to travel to the other, even for a short period of time. The absence of mutual recognition causes particular problems on the island of Ireland, where it impedes cross-border travel by non-EU nationals who are lawfully present in Northern Ireland or the Republic of Ireland.

The two Governments have begun to consider forms of mutual recognition in recent years. The 2008 consultation document referred to the possibility of a common visa for the common travel area, and to the possible recognition of some Irish immigration decisions by the United Kingdom. In 2011-2012, in order to promote tourism, the Irish Government began to recognise short-stay visas issued by the United Kingdom to nationals of 16 states. Finally, the December 2011 joint statement referred to the intention to explore “further co-operation in the area of mutual visa recognition, possibly up to a fully common short stay visit visa”.

Co-operation in immigration control

The common travel area arrangements have led to co-operation in immigration control between the two states in a variety of ways. For example:

- Each state’s immigration law provides for the exclusion of persons considered undesirable in the other. This implies a practice of communication between the two states in relation to foreign nationals who are undesirable, or who have previously been excluded.

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- There has been operational co-operation in relation to immigration enforcement, including at ports in Northern Ireland (known as ‘Operation Gull’).

- In parallel with e-borders, the Republic of Ireland is developing an ‘Irish Border Information System’. The December 2011 joint statement was explicit that the two governments have been “working together” on the two projects.

- Ireland has generally followed the United Kingdom’s lead in introducing visa requirements for given nationalities. Building upon that, the December 2011 joint statement committed the two governments to “co-operating to the fullest extent possible to align the list of nationals who are visa required for travel to the two countries.”

2.2 Implications for Scottish independence

Were Scotland to become independent, it is to be assumed that both it and the post-separation United Kingdom would wish to have an open immigration border between them. Much as in the case of the Irish land border, the social, economic and organisational costs of imposing immigration control on the Scottish-English land border would argue against any other course of action. The close social ties between Northern Ireland and Scotland would be a further reason not to have immigration control on travel between the two states.

The British-Irish case shows that the question would then arise as to how much publicity to give to the details of any arrangements between the two states. The greater openness in recent years concerning the British-Irish common travel area suggests that the terms of any Scotland-United Kingdom arrangements would also come to be openly acknowledged.

The British-Irish case also shows that a number of questions might arise for the content of the arrangements between Scotland and the post-separation United Kingdom. It is not inconceivable that full or selective immigration control would apply to journeys by air and sea, or that selective control might be applied to land journeys. The question of mutual recognition of immigration permission would also arise, particularly to facilitate short-term travel for tourism, business and personal reasons. Finally, forms of operational co-operation in immigration control between Scotland and United Kingdom could be expected to emerge.

29 August 2012

7 Written evidence from Francis Tusa, Editor, Defence Analysis

Outline

1. This memorandum is provided to support testimony provided to the Scottish Affairs Committee of the House of Commons on the topic of the impact of the prospect of Scottish independence on defence.

2. More specifically, it is to provide some extra depth to the subject of the relocation of the nuclear deterrent force in the event of independence being followed by electoral victory by the Scottish National Party, whose manifesto has stated that an independent Scotland would be "nuclear free".

The Issue

3. When the topic of the deterrent, its current basing at Faslane and associated facilities, and what might happen in the event of independence and an SNP electoral victory is raised, a number of reactions are stated immediately, almost as matters of faith:

a. "The movement of the deterrent would be immensely difficult to consider, and would take decades to achieve";

b. "It would cost many billions of pounds to replicate the facilities that are at present in the Faslane/Coulport area, and it would take well over a decade to do so";

c. "There are no realistic options for the deterrent in the event of a non-nuclear Scotland";

4. These views are, and have been treated as a form of gospel truth, with heavy backing from the Royal Navy, but also from other areas of the defence world.

5. There are some signs that these dogmas have also taken on political overtones, as it is widely believed that an independent Scotland would have the rump UK over a barrel in the event of independence, with the ability to bargain, to Scotland's advantage, on what happened to the deterrent.

6. However, simple examination of the subject suggests that the issue is not as complex as might have been thought, and that the dogma has muddled clear thinking.

7. What is strange is that one of the major source of the type of views expressed in point 3 is the Royal Navy. This has given the dogma a degree of momentum which is not backed up by more rational thinking.

The Resolution

8. A major source of the belief that the deterrent relocation is an insoluble problem results from the fact that the issue is looked at in its entirety, and on such a basis, things can look incredibly complicated and difficult to resolve.

8 9. But by breaking the whole into its constituent parts, it is far easier to see how the deterrent re-location problem can be tackled, and in easy steps.

9

Deterrent Current Future Notes Segment Location Location Submarine basing HMNB Faslane HMNB Devonport A fully licensed nuclear submarine base. Homeport of the nuclear fleet since the 1960s. 16+ nuclear berths available, compared to 10 at HMNB Clyde. Submarine HMNB Devonport HMNB Devonport All the facilities for the current and future SSN/SSBN fleet support will maintenance be based at HMNB Devonport. Ballistic missile King's Bay, King's Bay, Georgia, No evidence of any plans to change this bilateral arrangement. storage Georgia, USA USA Warhead AWE Aldermaston AWE Aldermaston No evidence of any plans to change this arrangement. build/maintenance Warhead storage RNAD Coulport ?AWE Aldermaston? The issue is not about replicating RNAD Coulport - see below. Satellite facility at new missile loading facility. Missile Mating RNAD Coulport TBC The one element of the current cycle for which there is not an automatic facility available elsewhere in the UK. However, as the Explosive Handling Jetty is floating, and was towed into place, there would seem to be little reason why it couldn't be

10 10. The analysis shows that for four out of the six stages of the SSBN support/operational cycle, there is either an easy, readily available alternative, or there would be no change in the status in the event of Scottish independence.

11. In one of the six stages, there is an existing option - the storage of nuclear warheads at AWE Aldermaston - one that could readily be changed in status from a maintenance role to a storage one.

12. In only one state of the cycle - missile/warhead mating - is serious decision making required. But as seen by the fact that the current piece of equipment is floating, and thus re- locatable, this is not as insolvable a problem was might be considered.

The "Coulport Question"

One of the biggest misconceptions with the debate - or lack of it - about the issue of where the deterrent would go to, is that people talk about "replacing Coulport". This has muddied the water, as there is no direct requirement to replace Coulport.

Coulport was designed, scaled, and built to support the original Trident deterrent systems. This saw a Vanguard-class SSBN able to carry a maximum of 192 warheads. In theory, the 58 Trident missiles that the UK has access to as part of a shared pool of weapons with the US Navy can carry in the original design, some 700 warheads.

However, in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review it was stated that:

"The single Trident submarine on deterrent patrol at any time will carry 48 warheads" and:

"We will maintain a stockpile of fewer than 200 operationally available warheads"

The Strategic Defence and Security Review announced that the current Vanguard-class SSBNs would carry a maximum of eight Trident missiles, and around 40 warheads.

The intention is that the entire stock of nuclear weapons will be certainly no more than 160 by the 2020s. If there is to be one deterrent SSBN on patrol at any one time with 8 missiles, with 4-6 warheads each (the issue of decoys brings the mathematics into a different area!), then this could see the maximum requirement for warheads down to around 100. It is difficult to imagine the Successor-class handling:

a. More missiles than the eight that the current Vanguard-class SSBNs carry;

b. More warheads than the current Vanguard-class SSBNs carry

The point here is a simple one: Coulport, as a storage facility, was scaled to stock and handle hundreds of Trident warheads, but the current and future requirements are for far smaller stocks. The current licensed facilities could readily store and handle such numbers, and could do so almost immediately.

11 As a result, there is no need to replace, in all aspects, least of all size, Coulport as a facility. This means that the cost of Coulport wouldn't have to be replicated in the same magnitude. This would make the "replacement" of Coulport substantially easier.

In practice, most warheads could be stored at the current maintenance/support facilities at AWE Aldermaston/Burghfield, with a small satellite facility required for the process of mating to the missiles.

Summary

People, especially the Royal Navy, have become "comfortable" with the current situation regarding nuclear submarine/warhead basing and operations - it is easy to show that of the options available, it was at the time, the best selection.

However, the factors that made Faslane (and RNAD Coulport) the optimal solution in the 1960s-70s would be irrelevant if there was a vote in favour for Scottish independence, followed by a demand for the withdrawal of deterrent systems from Scotland - the suitability or otherwise of Faslane would no longer be open for discussion.

But substantial elements of the deterrent - arguably, most of them - could be moved with little trouble to existing facilities in the rump UK. The one element that requires planning would be for the missile/warhead mating facility, but as this is a floating edifice, it could be moved to another location.

It is true that the resulting operational construct might be less convenient than the current one - but it would be entirely workable.

Note on Comparative Sizes of Nuclear and Conventional Submarine Bases and Work Forces

Outline: This paper intends to lay out, as far as is possible, the difference in the size of the current Royal Navy ballistic submarine (SSBN) base, and those of conventional submarine (SSK) operators in other European countries. it also intends to show the size of the industrial workforce used to design and build conventional submarines in European shipyards.

Current Situation: The submarine facilities at HMNB Faslane employ some 1000-1100 people, excluding civilian workforce employed by Babcock as part of the contract to manage the base, and also to support the submarines. RNAD Coulport employs an extra 600-700 staff.

Differences between SSBNs and SSKs: The workforce to support SSBNs/SSNs is substantially larger than that required to support SSKs. The principle reason for this is the safety aspect of nuclear reactors, but the complexity of extra systems carried by larger SSNs/SSBNs also adds to the total.

The crew size for nuclear submarines also tends to be higher, typically 80-95 for SSNs, 110- 130 for SSBNs, as opposed to 30-40 for many SSKs. As SSBNs, too, tend to operate on a "Gold-Blue" double crew systems, to allow for longer, and more manageable deployments, the overall size of the crew required for a fleet of 4 SSBNs will be 6+ complete crews.

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European SSK bases: It has to be noted that most European navies operate their submarines from the same bases as surface ships, so some jobs are common across the piece. This is true for Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway. Some figures for naval base size are:

• Sweden: Karlskrona naval base 1250 personnel (1000 military, 250 civilian) Submarine support element: c300 • Netherlands: Den Helder naval base 11-1350 personnel Submariner support element: 350-400

Although it is difficult to get precise triangulation, some of the SSK support services of southern European navies (Spain, Italy, Greece) seem to be larger at 600+ personnel or more.

Conventional Submarine Construction: There are 3-4 shipyards in Europe (Germany, Sweden, France, and potentially Spain) where there are the complete design and construction skills to undertake all aspects of conventional submarine building. There are then several other yards (Italy, Norway, Greece, Turkey) which have the capabilities to build-to-print conventional submarines.

The Thyssen Krupp Marine Systems yards in Kiel employ around 1800 personnel, although there is some non-submarine activity here. It should also be pointed out that TKMS is a world leader in submarine design and construction, so has a large customer base to support from Kiel, which means that there is a larger workforce than would be the case in other countries.

The Kockums yard, also owned by TKMS, but based in Sweden, employs directly 3-400 people in support of Swedish national programmes, and the small export business that requires on-going support services.

The Navantia yard at Cartagena employed about 400-600 at the peak of the S-80 build programme, but is down at 2-300.

Conclusion: The smallest sensible size of a conventional submarine flotilla (on the basis of operation and affordability) is four boats. For manpower, there would be 20-25% of the crew required to man these as opposed to a 4 boat SSBN flotilla.

The support of a four boat SSK group would be 40% of that required today for 4 nuclear SSBNs at a maximum of 400 personnel.

The workforce required to build, and then provide longer term in-service support for a four boat SSK fleet in Scotland would be a peak of 5-600 in the middle of construction, falling to 100-150 for support.

14 August 2012

13 Written evidence from Professor Jo Shaw, Salvesen Chair of European Institutions, University of Edinburgh

These notes are based on the points made in my oral presentation and on my responses to questions from members before the Committee at the hearing on 5 September 2012, but they include include a number of points that were not emphasised during the Q&A and which deserve closer attention or clarification. They are not detailed explanations of all the issues raised, but rather key points that could usefully be followed up during any future debate. It deals solely with the issues of citizenship and nationality which arise. Issues relation to immigration law and immigration policy should be dealt with separately.

The purposes and nature of citizenship laws 1. Citizenship laws have a number of purposes, including the assurance of a stable population, and the transmission of ‘membership’ across generations. Factors such as patterns of immigration and emigration are amongst the historical and demographic contingencies that tend to affect the choices that states will make on such questions. Questions of identity and how a nation defines itself – e.g. by reference ethnic belonging or by reference to a sense of civic belonging within a pluralist and multicultural community based on residence (which seems to be the current Scottish Government’s proposal) – are also important. Typically a mix of factors affects the rules under which citizenship is acquired and lost, and the fact that a state is a ‘new’ state will be another variable that is likely to be influential over a period of time after independence as citizenship definition ‘beds in’. The ‘death’ of national citizenship is often announced (i.e. that it is becoming unimportant), but never in practice seems to occur. Citizenship continues to be practically and symbolically important for states, even in the context of EU membership. Citizenship encompasses several key elements around status, rights and identity. In relation to rights, many states now routinely give most rights historically associated with citizenship only to all those who are lawfully on the territory, and increasingly the boundary lines between citizens and non-citizens are blurred. However, rights to vote in national elections are retained in most states by citizens alone, although the UK and Ireland with their now reciprocal arrangements are an exception to that pattern.

Initial determination of citizenry and rules of acquisition and loss 2. A distinction needs to be drawn between the initial determination of the citizenry and the rules of acquisition and loss of citizenship after independence. One of the tricky questions is who determines who are the citizens? In the absence of a state, there is no ‘demos’ (i.e. people) to say who are the citizens in the future, and who can vote – as well – in which elections (resident citizens? non-resident citizens? resident non-citizens?). Clearly, therefore, these are issues that need to be a part of any pre-referendum debate. Comments about the franchise for the referendum and the intersection between this and the initial determination of the citizenry and the subsequent determination of both the franchise and the ongoing rules on acquisition and loss of citizenship follow below.

3. Initial determination raises two questions, namely who votes in any referendum that might drive a process of separation forwards, and second, who would be defined as citizens at the moment of separation and would thus participate in the

14 first and subsequent democratic elections (assuming that these are confined to citizens). In states where a concept of citizenship has evolved over centuries (e.g. out of concepts of subjecthood) there is no memory of establishing the citizenry.

4. Rules of acquisition and loss are those that all states must have, whether new or old, but they have a particular meaning in the context of newly established states, and in some cases have been the subject of various types of manipulation or ‘engineering’. Experience, for example in the new small successor states of the former Yugoslavia, has highlighted that political elites can continue to manipulate the rules of acquisition and loss, and consequential political and socio-economic rights attached to citizenship, in problematic ways many years after a state is first established. This can be a particularly difficult question where there are many, or potentially many, external citizens who are not resident in the territory. For states with relatively small electorates, these issues of electoral calculus can be challenging waters for new states to navigate if they want to avoid making the limits of citizenship too inclusive or too exclusive.

5. Substantively, any new state must make certain choices about defining the new citizenry ab initio and then determining – for the future – how citizenship is acquired and lost. There are various factors to be taken into account in establishing both sets of rules, if the decisions about who will become citizens are not to be seen as being over inclusive or over exclusive. We could identify the core elements of the menu of options, across which choices would be made about the scope of the citizenry, as follows:

a. For the initial determination of the citizenry, what degree of connection with Scotland will be demanded for a person to be defined as a Scottish citizen? i. Birth in the territory (but what about long residence away?) ii. Residence in the territory (when? how long? must it still be subsisting?) iii. Consanguinity to those born or residing in the territory (how close? across how many generations is citizenship transmitted to the children of expatriates?) iv. Is prior UK citizenship an underlying condition to be included in the initial body of Scottish citizens, or can either EU citizens or third country nationals resident (or born) in Scotland acquire Scottish citizenship (e.g. by long residence) despite the fact that they (may) have chosen not to take UK citizenship?

b. For the rules on acquisition and loss of citizenship after independence, a distinction needs to be drawn between acquisition: i. At birth (whether on the basis of birth in the territory, or birth to parents to hold Scottish citizenship, or a combination of the two factors) ii. After birth (naturalisation of immigrants; possible facilitated naturalisation for returning diaspora) Citizenship acquisition at birth tends to be an automatic, involuntary and unconditional process, although in some circumstances a registration process may be required. But acquisition after birth is not only a voluntary

15 act (one must apply for citizenship) but tends to be conditioned. So, for example, immigrants must satisfy conditions such as time of residence, probity tests, integration/language tests, possible oaths of allegiance or loyalty tests, and fees. There is also generally a discretionary element for most naturalisation processes.

c. One of the peculiarities of the process of creating a new state which needs to be emphasised is that it is (for the new citizens) a case of citizenship acquired after birth, but with the element of automaticity (because of the operation of the definitions contained in the law) which is more akin to the acquisition of citizenship at birth. It is therefore important to point out that the determination of the first generation of new Scots on independence would normally happen automatically by law (or because it is so stated in a new Scottish constitution), but there would be no necessary implication that any individual would have to choose to exercise their Scottish citizenship (e.g. by registering to vote in an election as a Scottish citizen, by taking a Scottish passport, or by exercising some other (e.g. socio-economic) right that was exclusive to Scottish citizens). The interaction between new Scottish citizenship and old UK citizenship is discussed in more detail below.

6. In Scotland, because of high levels of mobility (and large numbers of cross- national families) between Scotland and the rest of the UK, both recently and historically, as well as emigration outside the UK over many generations, determining the first generation of Scots will involve very tricky choices about the level of connection to be needed. A large number of external citizens can be a de- stabilising factor for a new state, but in any event the existence of a potential pool of external citizens, even if they not granted citizenship in the first ‘cut’ (if the first cut is entirely residence based which seems likely to be the proposal emanating from the Scottish Government), can also have an influence on party politics and political interests after independence, because they often lobby to be included or to be given facilitated naturalisation rights (with or without residence), and are seen as likely to reward, electorally, those who respond to the lobbying by campaigning for citizenship laws to be more externally inclusive. By the same token, it is worth noting that the UK would face having a large number of (potential) external citizens as a result of the changes to the territory of the UK and this could have significant impacts because of the interface with external voting rights (limited to fifteen years in the UK at present).

7. Internal inclusivity is influenced by Scotland’s putative membership of the European Union, and also by the subsisting electoral rights (to vote in Scottish Parliament elections) enjoyed by EU citizens resident in Scotland at the present time and the proposal that this group should also be included in the referendum franchise. The Scottish Government consultation document suggests that this inclusive franchise should be derived by the principle under which it suggests that the people of Scotland are those who are resident in Scotland.

Constraints: the EU factor and international human rights law 8. A Scottish separation would be a unique event in the history of new state creation. The factor that makes it unique is that it would be the first case of the break up of

16 an EU Member State, with both states aspiring – we assume – to EU membership. It is, of course, true to say that some of the state break-ups that have occurred in Europe since 1989, such as the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the independence of the Baltic states, and the break up of Yugoslavia, have occurred under the shadow of EU law. But it is clearly going to be a different type of situation where the existing state is already a member of the EU, both succeeding states are likely to aspire to continued and uninterrupted membership, there are EU citizens exercising their EU citizenship rights in both states (and citizens from both those states who are exercising their rights elsewhere), and where EU law has now – as it has since 1993 – stepped into the political domain by requiring that EU citizens should be able to vote in local elections under the same conditions as nationals on the basis of residence in the host state.

9. The issues of how continued EU membership might occur can be left to one side, but for these purposes let us assume that Scotland and the rest of the UK will both be members, with separate citizenship regimes, where such citizens would then in turn also (continue) to be EU citizens. EU law does not as such constrain the new state in relation to the choices that it makes about who are the new citizenry and how would citizenship be passed on through the generations, but the broader EU context, and the rights that are held by current EU citizens (both UK citizens and citizens of other Member States resident in Scotland) does have significant potential to influence key issues, including the relationship between the status of citizen and the exercise of various kinds of voting rights. Here in brief are some of the issues: a. EU citizens would vote in the referendum under the current franchise proposals. One reason why the local/Scottish parliament electoral franchise is being chosen is doubtless because it is wholly residence based and avoids the question of external voters (unlike the Westminster franchise). Unless a new franchise/register is invented (e.g. to exclude EU citizens and perhaps also Commonwealth citizens) then this seems to be the most likely outcome. The question arises as to what happens to this group after independence. Would they be included in the franchise either by (a) being included within the definition of a Scottish citizenship based on residence or (b) being given the right to vote in national elections? While it seems entirely plausible that such rights would be given to Irish and Commonwealth citizens, by extrapolation from the current state of UK and Irish electoral law, both of which give the citizens of the other state the right to vote in national elections, it would be a novelty for an EU Member State to give the right to vote in national elections to all other resident EU citizens, under the same conditions as nationals. b. If Scotland does decide on an inclusive residence base, this could include also lawfully resident and settled third country nationals who at present may not yet qualify for UK citizenship, or who may have decided not to take it. If Scotland effectively ‘naturalises’ through an inclusive approach to residence a large group of third country nationals, it thus gives them the right to exercise EU citizenship rights, including the rights of free movement and residence, and the right to work, in all other EU Member States. Similar issues could also arise were Scotland to be externally inclusive with its citizenship acquisition, giving citizenship to descendants of emigrants who do not currently qualify for UK citizenship because of

17 limits on intergenerational transfer of UK citizenship. Such issues are a matter of concern to other EU Member States, and states are under an obligation to consult with each other on such matters. c. In the recent case of Rottmann, the European Court of Justice has stepped into the tricky territory of national sovereignty in relation to the determination of acquisition and – in that case – loss of citizenship. The Court has made it clear that while this is in principle a matter for national law, none the less states must act in such a way that a person who is an EU citizen is not deprived of substantially all the rights of EU citizenship. This could affect decisions about limiting the scope of Scottish citizenship to external citizens, in case the UK also takes action to try and limit the number of external citizens that it might acquire as a result of Scottish independence and the moving of the boundaries of the state. This issue would need to be carefully managed in order to avoid possible cases of statelessness, which is also a factor in relation to the application of international law (see below).

10. There are two principles of international law that constrain both the ab initio and the ongoing citizenship regimes, and these concern the avoidance of statelessness and the prohibition on discrimination (especially as established in the European Convention on Human Rights). Scotland would have a free choice as to whether it wished to sign up to various treaties on nationality matters to which the UK is not a party, such as the European Convention on Nationality.

Citizenship and relations across these islands 11. Existing UK citizens in Scotland would continue to hold UK citizenship unless the UK government changed the rules on holding UK citizenship (it has not hitherto been the UK’s practice to deprive people of citizenship because they leave the UK territory; the question is whether it is different because the UK territory leaves them). Experience with the creation of new states highlights that whether people choose to ‘adopt’ new citizenships that they are given after birth as a result of the establishment of a new regime of citizenship tends to be the result mainly of pragmatic considerations based on access to travel documents, access to political rights and access to socio-economic rights such as the right to live and work in more than one state or to welfare rights, perhaps with dash of ‘identity’ thrown in. For those who voted against independence, would taking a Scottish passport be seen as ex post facto approving separation?

12. Obviously there have been precedents when the Dominions and the colonies (as well as Ireland) became independent from the UK (although these almost all predate the modern conception of UK citizenship), but the physical co-location of Scotland with most of the rest of the UK on the same island, the high levels of mobility, the factor of common EU membership, and the arrangements that have been made in relation to citizenship in Northern Ireland (where persons can opt for either or both UK and Irish citizenship) suggest that similar types of arrangements might need to be made for Scotland and the UK. A mass deprivation of UK citizenship from Scottish residents who are Scottish citizens by operation of law might prove to be politically tricky and legally problematic for the UK authorities. In practice, an arrangement based on choice for individuals (hence seeing citizenship as a voluntary act), plus resolution of how electoral rights might

18 play out are likely to be the options taken forward in intergovernmental negotiations between the two states which would then be enshrined in legislation. In that context, dual citizenship may help to maintain flexibility. The UK has a strong tradition of tolerating dual citizenship both for the children of mixed citizen parentage and for migrants (immigrants and emigrants). This would be a useful principle for it to continue to adhere to, and for Scotland also to adopt, although this would be at the cost of significant numbers of external citizens over a number of generations.

How is citizenship determination (and the transition to the new citizenship regime) managed? 13. The majority of the examples of state dissolution in post second world war Europe have involved either federal states (Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) with a ‘state’ level as well as a ‘federal’ level of citizenship on which to base the allocation of citizenship or states where there is a historical tradition of statehood to which reference can be made. Scotland does not fall into either of these categories. This complicates the process of determining the substantive principles on which determination of who to include should be based (see above), but also the pragmatic issue of the process of determining who the citizens actually are, e.g. through a registration process which would not necessarily be seen as being in the bureaucratic traditions of the UK. It might be seen as partially akin to the electoral registration process, or indeed – more controversially – to the poll tax registration process that was so controversial in Scotland in the 1980s. However, because – unlike Yugoslavia – where there were republic level registers of citizens (however incomplete and inaccurate) to fall back on as a first cut to determine who are the citizens, in Scotland this would not be the case. This would become particularly complicated if any element of external citizenship were to be permitted, because while it might be reasonably certain to determine the current residents (with or without UK citizenship), the task of determining external citizens claiming Scottish citizenship on the basis of birth would be a challenging one and would leave open huge questions as to exactly how many Scottish citizens there really might be. One might suggest that nothing need to be done until a person ‘claims’ Scottish citizenship by seeking to vote as a Scot or to obtain a Scottish passport, but a new state is likely to want to know what the pool of actual and potential citizens might be in order, for example, to be able to say how many votes or MEPs it should or could lay claim to within the European Union. It is worth noting that the history of Yugoslavia and its successor states indicates that it is often the bureaucratic processes of registration (e.g. for people who do not clearly fall within the new legislative definitions), rather than the legislative statements about the scope of citizenship themselves, which have been the most contentious and fraught aspects of the whole process. It is to be hoped that these can be avoided in the event of Scottish independence by careful future planning and by cooperation between the relevant authorities of the two states.

Sources 14. This briefing paper is based upon my own and colleagues’ research on EU citizenship, the rules of acquisition and loss of citizenship in European states, and the specific of citizenship in the successor states of the former Yugoslavia. Further information can be obtained, in particular, from the following websites:

19 EUDO Citizenship Observatory (co-directors Prof Jo Shaw and Prof Rainer Bauböck of the European University Institute): www.eudo-citizenship.eu

CITSEE (the Europeanisation of Citizenship in the Successor States of the Former Yugoslavia) (Principal Investigator Prof Jo Shaw): www.citsee.eu and www.law.ed.ac.uk/citsee

7 September 2012

20 Written evidence from Dr Phillips O’Brien

The Future of Faslane/Coulport: Comparable Test Cases

The purpose of this paper is to compare the naval facilities of comparable countries to an independent Scotland to see if a facility along the lines of Faslane/Coulport (HM Naval Base Clyde) could be reasonably kept in service if Scotland were to leave the United Kingdom. The comparable nation’s chosen are Norway, Denmark, New Zealand and Ireland. They have approximately the same populations and incomes per capita as Scotland. All have considerable coast lines with numerous islands and all of them stress a strong maritime component in their national defence doctrine. Two of them are NATO members, Norway and Denmark, whilst Ireland and New Zealand are now not formally allied to a United States, UK-backed international alliance structure. Moreover they have enacted a range of ‘non- nuclear’ policies from New Zealand’s strong position requiring all visiting ships to declare that they are not carrying nuclear weapons to Norway and Denmark, who operate what is best termed a ‘Don’t Ask-Don’t Tell’ nuclear policy.

Comparable equipment

At present Faslane/Coulport is the home of the UK’s nuclear deterrent and its new generation of hunter-killer submarines. None of the comparable countries with the exception of Norway, maintain a submarine force. Indeed the move has been against maintaining submarine forces with Denmark deciding in 2004 to decommission its remaining two submarines and discontinue it plans to purchase four new submarines from pan-Scandinavian ‘Viking’ project. Neither New Zealand nor Ireland have any plans to deploy a submarine force at present.

Norway does maintain in service six ULA class submarines. These are small boats of 1040 tons with a crew of 21. Even if Scotland matched this appropriation it would not need a facility nearly as large as Faslane/Coulport. In terms of basing submarine forces, there seems to be no comparable facility. Even assuming that an independent Scotland wanted to maintain a submarine force as large as Norway’s (a precarious assumption), it would need a far smaller facility.

An All-Inclusive Naval Facility.

Turning again to the Norwegian example, it is here that we have the closest comparison to a base with the personnel needs and modern facilities to Faslane/Coulport. According to the public statements of the UK MOD, HM Naval Base Clyde employs approximately 6000 personnel in total, including military and civilian workers. The naval base at Haakonsvern, 8 kilometres west of Bergen, Norway’s second largest city, is the combined home port for the entire Norwegian Fleet including submarines, surface vessels, command structure, and naval officer training school. It has a publically stated personnel component (again both military and civilian) of approximately 4000. Outside of the new Norwegian coast guard complex being constructed in Sortland much further to the north, Haaksonsvern contains all of

21 Norway’s naval assets. These include 5 frigates, 6 submarines, 6 new fast attack craft as well as a large number of diverse smaller craft.

Therefore if an independent Scotland maintained a naval force as large as that of Norway, and decided to base this entire force in one facility, it would be a facility smaller but roughly comparable to HM Naval Base Clyde. However this begs the question of whether such an all- inclusive facility should be located in Faslane/Coulport. Bergen is ideally located to cover Norway’s strategic needs. It is ice-free year round with relatively quick access to cover both the entrances to the Oslo fjords and also the northern coast. Faslane/Coulport is everything that Bergen is not in terms of location. It is located on a difficult to reach extremity of the Scottish coast, with a very long sailing time to the East Coast where most of the Scottish oil fields are located.

If Scotland were not to maintain as large a naval force as Norway, it seems impossible to see how the new country could maintain a naval facility more than 25% as large as Faslane/Coulport is at present. Of the comparative countries, the next largest naval force is Denmark’s. The Danish Navy is composed of 7 frigates and a number of different patrol and specialized craft. The Danes have divided this force into two squadrons. The first in Fredrikshaven specializes in domestic security and has a total of 600 personnel, military and civilian. The second, which specializes in Denmark’s international responsibilities including its NATO maritime operations, is based in Korsor and contains about 500 personnel. This basing model might make a great deal of sense for an independent Scotland in NATO, but it certainly would make it impossible to maintain a facility comparable to Faslane/Coulport.

The non-NATO countries Ireland and New Zealand have, like Norway, opted for one major naval base. However they maintain such small naval forces that each of their central facilities is at most around 20-25% as large as Faslane/Coulport. Ireland bases its entire force of 8 large patrol boats at Haulbowline in Co Cork. However, even with this concentration the authorised maximum personnel strength at Haulbowline is 1144. New Zealand has a navy based around two frigates and a number of smaller craft. This force is concentrated at Devonport, though as the entire New Zealand Navy employs less than 3000 personnel in total, including civilian employees, it is much smaller than Faslane/Coulport. It must also be mentioned that these concentrated facilities are well located to cover Ireland and New Zealand’s maritime interests unlike Faslane.

It is conceivable but perhaps not particularly logical that a non-NATO Scotland could maintain a naval force considerably larger than New Zealand or Ireland. If it did so, it would represent a completely new and much more expensive model.

A Mixed-Use Facility

If an independent Scotland decided to concentrate its either a large element of its ground and air forces as well as its entire naval force then it would be conceivably possible for it to maintain a facility similar in size to HM Naval Base Clyde. When it comes to rebasing aircraft to Faslane/Coulport there is a major issue to consider and that at present there is no airstrip or air basing facilities nearby, and these can be extremely expensive to construct.

22 Moreover, the terrain in the area of Faslane is extremely hilly and does not lend itself to the construction of an airstrip.

Rebasing army units to Faslane might be logistically easier and represent the most sensible option to maintain a facility approximately as large as at present. However this would require the closure of different existing facilities now in Scotland.

10 September 2012

23 Written evidence from the Electoral Commission

This note provides additional information requested by the Committee to supplement the Commission’s oral evidence on 4 July 2012. It deals with the subject of possible arrangements for voluntary disclosure in respect of the funding of and spending by campaigners at a Scottish referendum in the period before the regulated referendum period.

The Commission has made clear that we would welcome a statutory regulatory role at a Scottish referendum, and that the statutory regulation period should begin at least 16 weeks before polling day. However, we do not believe it would be appropriate for us to have an oversight role for any voluntary disclosure arrangements in the period before statutory regulation begins. Without legal powers to monitor and regulate, we would not be able to take steps to check the accuracy of any returns made to us under such arrangements, which would in turn mean we were unable to vouch for the accuracy of any data we were to publish. We would not want to risk the high levels of public confidence in the data we currently publish on a statutory basis being undermined by our publishing potentially less reliable data in this context. In addition, a voluntary agreement overseen by the Commission would also create the inaccurate and undesirable perception that should it be breached, we would have the power to act.

Background

1.0 For referendums held under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA), campaigners are subject to controls on the sources of funding they can accept for campaigning during the regulated referendum period and on the amount of campaign spending they can incur during that period. The length of the referendum period for each referendum is set in the enabling legislation.

1.1 Prior to the start of the regulatory controls for each referendum, donations to political parties and other regulated organisations and individuals continue to be regulated as normal under PPERA.

1.2 At referendums where the PPERA rules apply, during the referendum period:

• campaigners that want to spend more than £10,000 must register with us • registered campaigners can only accept donations of more than £500 towards spending during the referendum period from sources with specified connections to the UK. • registered campaigners are subject to spending limits set depending on the type of organisation – PPERA sets the limits for UK-wide referendums whilst the relevant Secretary of State sets the limits for referendums in parts of the UK. • after the poll registered campaigners must report donations and spending to us for publication. The report must include details of spending, information about permissible donations over £7,500, and all impermissible donations. We have recommended that at future PPERA referendums the rules should be amended to provide for some donation reporting before polling day.

1.3 The enabling legislation for a Scottish referendum will set out the applicable rules for the referendum, including the length of the referendum period, the spending limits, the

24 controls on the sources of donations and the reporting requirements in respect of donations and campaign spending. We have said the regulated referendum period should be at least 16 weeks long.

Possible voluntary arrangements

1.4 The Committee has invited our views on the issues that campaigners would need to consider if they wish to set up voluntary arrangements for disclosing information about funding and/or spending before the start of the referendum period.

1.5 The remainder of this note summarises our view of (i) the general scope of any voluntary arrangement, in terms of the range of requirements that could be included in the arrangement, (ii) the detailed information and/or controls that would need to be reported or applied in respect of each requirement, and (iii) the supporting processes that would be need to be put in place to enable any voluntary arrangement.

Overall scope

1.6 The requirements that might be included in a voluntary arrangement are: • reporting on funding (donations and potentially also loans) accepted by campaigners • restrictions on the sources of funding accepted by campaigners • reporting on spending by campaigners • restrictions on the level of spending by campaigners

1.7 It would in principle be possible for a voluntary arrangement to include some or all of these requirements. Campaigners would need to agree both the set of requirements to be included in the voluntary arrangement and the detailed rules that would apply in respect of each requirement that is included.

1.8 As discussed in our oral evidence to the Committee on 4 July 2012, for any arrangement to be effective it would be important for reporting by different campaigners to be in a consistent format. We have set out below our initial thoughts on how this might be achieved.

Reporting on funding

1.9 The issues that would need to be agreed include: • Whether loans as well as donations should be covered. Loans are not covered by the generic PPERA referendum rules, but they were regulated at the UK Parliamentary voting system referendum in 2011 and we have recommended that they should be regulated at future PPERA referendums. • Which campaigners should report on funding. We would not anticipate a need for registered political parties to report since they already report donations and loans to the Commission on a regular basis.

25 • The threshold above which funding should be reported. PPERA applies a £7,500 threshold for donations to parties, third party campaigners at elections and referendum campaigners. • The information to be published in respect of each donation, loan etc. PPERA requires us to publish the names of individual donors, but not their addresses (which are reported to us for permissibility checking purposes). We publish the names, addresses and where relevant registration numbers of non-individual donors such as companies. • How frequently campaigners should report funding received. PPERA requires registered parties to report donations and loans every three months; other regulated individuals and members associations must report donations and loans as they accept them. Referendum campaigners and third party campaigners at elections are required to report donations after the poll, but as noted above we have recommended that an element of pre-poll reporting should apply at future PPERA referendums.

Restrictions on sources of funding

1.10 The issues that would need to be agreed include: • The threshold above which funding should be restricted. PPERA applies a £500 threshold above which donations and loans can only be accepted by parties and regulated campaigners if they come from a permissible source.

• Which sources should be regarded as permissible. PPERA sets a standard framework for this, and we publish guidance on the requirements and how to check whether donations and loans are permissible. Our guidance on this for regulated referendum campaigners is published on our website:

http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/105615/sp- permissibility-pvs-rc.pdf

• Associated process issues, including how long campaigners should have to check, and decide, whether to accept a donation, and whether donations that campaigners have rejected because they have identified that they are impermissible should be reported.

Reporting on spending

1.11 It would be necessary to agree what spending should be reportable, and at what frequency. PPERA sets a framework for what spending by regulated referendum campaigners is controlled and reportable, and our guidance on this is published on our website: http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/105607/to-spending-pvs- rc.pdf

Restrictions on level of spending

26 1.12 It would be necessary to agree what voluntary limits, if any, should apply to spending before the regulated referendum period begins. We have described our views on the spending limits during the referendum period for a Scottish referendum in our response to the UK Government and Scottish Government consultations which is available at:

http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/146927/The-Scottish- referendum-Response-to-consultations.pdf

Supporting arrangements

1.13 Issues for consideration include: • whether an external facilitator should be invited to enable discussions between campaigners • which campaigners and prospective campaigners should be invited to agree the arrangement • whether there should be a process for new campaigners to join the arrangement over time, and how that could happen • where and how the information should be published and updated • what should happen if a party to the arrangement does not comply with it. For example:

o Whether there should be a process for correcting mistakes in information provided. what should happen in the event of a disagreement about the nature of the requirements or an allegation that a requirement has not been complied with.

25 July 2012

27 Letter from the Rt Hon Michael Moore, Secretary of State for Scotland to Ian Davidson MP, Chair

I would like to thank the Committee for inviting the Rt Hon David Mundell and me to give evidence on 17th September. Whilst giving evidence, I promised to write to the Committee to provide further information on foreign donations in relation to the 2011 referendum on the law making powers of the National Assembly for Wales.

The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (“PPERA”) sets out rules for general and certain local elections and certain referendums held in the UK or a particular part of the UK. PPERA sets out rules on donations for elections and referendums regulated under PPERA. These rules apply to Scottish Parliament elections by virtue of PPERA and the Scottish Parliament (Elections etc) Order 2010.

The Order for the 2011 Wales referendum did not modify PPERA in relation to foreign donations, and the usual rules on permitted donors therefore applied. Section 54(2) of PPERA sets out a list of permissible donors, which applies to elections or referendums regulated under the Act. Permissible donors include an individual registered on a UK electoral register (including overseas electors), and most UK-registered companies. In the 2011 Wales referendum, donations from within the UK but outside Wales were permitted.

24 September 2012

28 Written evidence from the Ministry of Defence

Following the evidence session with the Minister for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology and Minister for the Armed Forces on 13 June 2012, further background information is attached. Also included is a summary of the defence footprint in Scotland, which is part of an integrated, overall defence footprint organised, resourced and managed on a UK-wide basis.

The establishment figure for a regiment does not include officers.

29 PROCUREMENT SPEND EXEMPTIONS FROM EU REGULATIONS (INCLUDING ARTICLE 346 EXEMPTIONS)

While the majority of exempt procurements come under the auspices of Article 346, and this particularly applies to high value procurement, there are other exclusions that the Department may use from time to time. These are:

• disclosure of highly sensitive classified information; • intelligence activities; • cooperative programmes based on Research and Development (R&D) between European Union (EU) Member States; • local purchases during military or security operations outside the EU; • international procedural rules of international organisation or international agreement; • acquisition of land; • government to government sales; • arbitration or conciliation services; • financial services except insurance services; • employment and other contracts of service; and • R&D services exempt where the Authority takes exclusive rights

The Department does not hold information on the percentage of procurement spend that is exempt from EU regulations following the application of Article 346 specifically. The MOD does, however, collect data on all exemptions from EU regulations relating to the contract expenditure that is contained on the Department’s Defence Bills Services (DBS) database; this database covers approximately 95% by value of the Department’s contract expenditure, excluding that which is set up, for example, by Trading Funds and Executive Non Departmental Public Bodies, which lie outside the MOD’s accounting boundary. It also excludes miscellaneous contracts (i.e. where the payment method employed does not require an actual contract number to be generated) and expenditure on Government Procurement Cards. This is shown in the table below for payments made in the last two financial years:

Exempt 2010/11 Payments 2011/12 Marking Payments* Unknown £1,220,274,134 6.2% £1,064,250,460 5.4% Non-Exempt £5,985,040,642 30.5% £6,050,706,867 30.4% Exempt £12,402,191,407 63.3% £12,761,099,921 64.2%

*Provisional date awaiting confirmation from DBS Finance

There is one further important caveat to the data contained in the table. EU regulations do not apply for contract expenditure below certain defined thresholds. It is not possible from the data

30 collected to determine the amount of payments which have been declared ‘exempt’ where they fall below the threshold, rather than the application by MOD of a particular exemption, such as Article 346.

CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS

You asked, should Scotland become independent, whether or not we would have the ability to tell a company to move its production from Scotland to the remainder of the UK, if it was in the best interests of the remainder of the UK taxpayers.

In short the answer is that it would depend on the terms of the particular contract and the importance, with regard to performance of the contract, that it be carried out in the remainder of the UK.

My officials are trying to arrange a briefing for you on commercial issues and will be in contact when they have some dates to offer.

31

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OFFICER AND SOLDIER TRAINING

Soldier Training

A soldier’s basic training is 14 weeks long and is military based with training in fieldcraft, skill at arms, fitness, military knowledge etc, after which they move on to their specialised trade training, i.e. infantry, engineering etc.

Officer Training

The 44-week Commissioning Course for Officers, spread over 3 terms, is designed to develop leadership potential and an Officer Cadet's character, intellect and professionalism in addition to military training. At the end of the course a newly-commissioned Officer will be qualified to lead and manage soldiers while at the same time upholding the British Army's core values of selfless commitment, respect for others, loyalty, integrity, discipline and courage.

Military training is infantry-based so that everyone, no matter what their eventual regiment or corps, will have mastered the core essentials before they go on to more specialised training after Sandhurst.

Overall, the core objectives of the Commissioning Course are:

• To develop commanders of courage and willpower, with the temperament for decisive action in difficult and dangerous circumstances. • To foster attitudes to integrity, selflessness and loyalty which set the soldier apart from others. • To teach Officer Cadets how to think and communicate as commanders and to foster a deep interest and care for the individual. • To achieve a grounding in British Military Doctrine and its significance in all forms of conflict. • To encourage the analysis of strategic and war studies as a foundation to military thought and wisdom. • To train Officer Cadets in the basic skills and battlefield disciplines of soldiering.

32 PROCESS FOR AN OFFICER TO JOIN THE BLACK WATCH

Officer Cadets are not allocated, nor have they applied, to any regiment or corps when they begin their training at Sandhurst, although they probably have a preference in mind. It is in Term 2 that Officer Cadets have to make a final decision about which regiment or corps they wish to join. They must narrow their choices down to just two - or three if they are applying to join the Army Air Corps, which has strict medical requirements. Selection interviews start in Week 12, when a regiment or corps selects which candidates to accept, and by the end of term most people know which regiment or corps they will be joining after Sandhurst. Whether they get their preferred choice depends on if the regiment or corps wants them, vacancies and on their level of performance at Sandhurst.

An Officer Cadet who wishes to join the Royal Regiment of Scotland (SCOTS) will be interviewed and either offered or declined a commission with them dependent upon the number of commissions available for that year. During the Senior term, those Officer Cadets who have been offered a commission with SCOTS will be then be informed which of the battalions/regiments have Platoon Commander vacancies available to be filled. The Officer Cadets can indicate their preference that they wish to go to 3 SCOTS (Black Watch) but there are no guarantees that this is where they will go.

This is standard practice across all cap badges.

33

REFERENDUM FRANCHISE

Officials in the MOD remain in contact with Scotland Office officials on a wide range of issues in relation to the referendum, including the franchise.

Members of HM Forces and their spouses or civil partners are entitled to vote in an election providing that they have registered to vote, either as an ordinary voter, an overseas voter (if applicable) or a Service voter.

As an ordinary voter, the Service person would register at their permanent address, which can be a private address or if living in Service accommodation, the address of that accommodation.

A Service voter can register an address where they currently reside in the UK, an address where they would be living if they were not in the Services or an address where they have lived in the past. In the latter case this could be a parent’s address, or a previous private or Service residence.

As a Service voter, someone who was resident outside of Scotland but registered to vote there would be able to vote in the independence referendum if the franchise for a referendum on Scottish independence were to be the same as the devolved legislature franchise.

We encourage all members of the Armed Forces to register to vote and advise them on the registration and voting options available. The way they choose to register is a personal choice and very much influenced by their own personal circumstances. Together with the Electoral Commission we run an annual campaign informing personnel and their families about voting matters.

34 DEFENCE FOOTPRINT IN SCOTLAND

Overview

1. As at 1 April 2012 there were 15,880 regular armed forces and MOD civilian personnel based in Scotland: 11,190 regular armed forces and 4,690 MOD civilians (full-time equivalents).

2. There were also over 3,000 volunteer reserves and 17,000 cadets.

3. As at January 2012 MOD had over 50 locations in Scotland. As at 1 April 2011 MOD had land holdings (owned, leased or with legal rights) totalling 146,000 hectares.

Naval Service

4. As at 1 April 2012 there were 4,530 regular naval service personnel based in Scotland. There were also some 300 maritime reserves and 1,300 cadets.

5. Most naval service personnel are based at HM Naval Base Clyde, which includes the submarine port at Faslane and the RN armament depot at Coulport. In all, over 6,000 naval service, MOD civilian and contractors’ personnel work at the base. The base is the home port of the UK’s nuclear deterrent and on current plans will become home to all RN submarines by 2017, including the nuclear powered fleet of attack submarines. It is also home to: Flag Officer Scotland, Northern England and Northern Ireland/Flag Officer Reserves; Flag Officer Sea Training Director (North); 43 Commando Fleet Protection Group Royal Marines; First Mine Countermeasures Squadron; and the Northern Diving Group. Vessels based there are:

• four Vanguard Class SSBN submarines; • one, to be followed post-build by a further six, Astute Class SSN attack submarines; • in the meantime, and by 2017, at least three Trafalgar Class SSN attack submarines; • seven Sandown Class mine countermeasures vessels; and • two patrol boats.

6. 45 Commando RM is based at RM Condor, Arbroath.

7. There are two RN Reserves units in Rosyth (HMS SCOTIA) and Greenock (HMS DALRIADA) and a detachment in Inverness. HQ RM Reserves is in Glasgow, with detachments in Dundee, Aberdeen and Inverness.

8. There are also seven Combined Cadet Force RN sections and one Combined Cadet Force RM section and 38 Sea Cadet units (three of which also have RM Cadet detachments) in Scotland.

Army

9. As at 1 April 2012 there were 3,250 regular army personnel based in Scotland. There were also some 2,500 volunteer reserves and 12,250 cadets.

10. General Officer Commanding Scotland and Headquarters 51 (Scottish) Brigade, which have responsibility for the Army across the whole of Scotland, are based at Stirling. The Army Personnel Centre is based in Glasgow.

11. There are four regular light role infantry battalions based in Scotland:

• The Royal Scots Borderers, 1st Battalion Royal Regiment of Scotland (1 SCOTS) at Dreghorn Barracks, Edinburgh;

35 • The Royal Highland Fusiliers, 2nd Battalion Royal Regiment of Scotland (2 SCOTS) at Glencorse Barracks, Penicuik; • The Black Watch, 3rd Battalion Royal Regiment of Scotland (3 SCOTS) at Fort George, near Inverness; and • 3rd Battalion The Rifles at Redford Barracks, Edinburgh.

12. 39 Engineer Regiment (Air Support) is scheduled to move to Kinloss later this year.

13. There are also five Scottish-recruited regular units based outside Scotland:

• 1st Battalion Scots Guards, an armoured infantry battalion based in Catterick as part of 4 Mechanised Brigade; • The Royal Scots Dragoon Guards, an armoured regiment based in Fallingbostel, Germany with 7 Armoured Brigade; • The Highlanders, 4th Battalion Royal Regiment of Scotland (4 SCOTS), currently a light role infantry battalion (having re-roled from armoured infantry to support operations in Afghanistan) based in Fallingbostel, Germany as part of 7 Armoured Brigade; • The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 5th Battalion royal Regiment of Scotland (5 SCOTS), an air assault battalion based in Canterbury as part of 16 Air Assault Brigade; and • 19th Regiment Royal Artillery (The Highland Gunners), an artillery regiment equipped with light guns and AS90 based in Tidworth with 1 Mechanised Brigade.

(Note: 40th Regiment Royal Artillery (The Lowland Gunners), a light artillery regiment based in Lisburn as part of 19 Light Brigade, has been disbanded along with 19 Light Brigade as part of the restructuring of the Army following the Strategic Defence and Security Review).

14. There are seven major Territorial Army (TA) units under command of 51 (Scottish) Brigade:

• 105 Regiment Royal Artillery; • 71 Engineer Regiment; • 6th Battalion Royal Regiment of Scotland (52nd Lowland) (6 SCOTS); • 7th Battalion Royal Regiment of Scotland (51st Highland) (7 SCOTS); • 225 Medical Regiment; • The Scottish Transport Regiment; and • Regional Training Centre (Scotland).

15. There are a further two major and seven minor TA units based in Scotland but under command of brigade headquarters outside Scotland:

• 32 Signal Regiment; • 205 Field Hospital; • A Company 4th Battalion The Parachute Regiment; • 243 Company RMP; • 52 Military Intelligence Company; • 2 Signal Squadron (38 Signal Regiment); • 125 Ration Squadron (159 Supply Regiment); • Personnel Recovery Unit Edinburgh; and • Personnel Recovery Centre Edinburgh.

16. There are four Officer Training Corps in Aberdeen, Edinburgh, Glasgow and Tayforth (comprising Dundee, St. Andrews and Stirling), eight Army Cadet Force battalions, two independent sub-units (Orkney and Shetland Islands) and 15 Combined Cadet Force Army sections.

36 RAF

17. As at 1 April 2010 there were 3,420 regular RAF personnel based in Scotland. There were also some 300 volunteer reserves and 3,300 cadets.

18. There are currently three main RAF stations in Scotland:

• RAF Lossiemouth, which is home to: three squadrons of Tornado fast jet aircraft, a search and rescue helicopter unit, and an RAF Regiment field squadron; • RAF Leuchars, which is home to: a squadron of Typhoon fast jet aircraft, an RAF Regiment field squadron and a military mountain rescue team; and • RAF Kinloss, which used to be home to Nimrod maritime reconnaissance aircraft but ceased routine flying operations last year. The station is also home to the Aeronautical Rescue Co- ordination Centre and a military mountain rescue team. 39 Engineer Regiment (Air Support) is scheduled to move to Kinloss later this year.

19. There are four Royal Auxiliary Air Force squadrons in Scotland, as well as two University Air Squadrons, two Air Experience Flights, 87 Air Training Corps squadrons and ten Combined Cadet Force RAF sections.

Estate/infrastructure

20. MOD owns outright some 29,000 hectares of land in Scotland. The Department also holds rights over 117,000 hectares.

21. Apart from the main bases, much of the MOD estate in Scotland consists of training areas for infantry and armoured vehicles, air weapon and air defence trials and training, test ranges for missiles and ordnance and other specialised training environments.

22. Other MOD sites include: Defence Support Group at Stirling; radar heads; and specialised research and development centres, such as the underwater test and evaluation centre and a seismic monitoring station.

24 July 2012

BRIEFING FOR THE SCOTTISH AFFAIRS SELECT COMMITTEE FOLLOWING THE EVIDENCE SESSION ON 13 JUNE WITH MINISTER(AF) AND MINISTER(DEST)

The Committee asked for further information about the structure of the UK’s Armed Forces. This is set out in the Annexes.

The Committee also asked for further information on possible scenarios for future Armed Forces presence in Scotland. As agreed with the Committee providing any information of this type would be purely speculative and, as we are not undertaking any contingency planning, we have not provided this information.

Annex A dated 22 June 2012

Royal Regiment of Scotland – Personnel

Below are the numbers of service personnel in each battalion of the Royal Regiment of Scotland.

37 Regulars

Soldier Officer 1 Scots 517 33 The Royal Scots Borderers 2 Scots 448 29 The Royal Highland Fusiliers 3 Scots 520 35 Black Watch 4 Scots 460 28 The Highlanders 5 Scots 465 33 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders Total Regulars 2410 158

Reserves

Soldier Officer 6 Scots 253 25 52nd Lowland 7 Scots 327 25 51st Highland Total Reserves 580 50

38 Annex B dated 22 Jun 2012

How the Army is Constituted

Introduction

The British Army is comprised of a number of Arms and Services that perform different functions which are all aimed at producing what we call force elements at readiness. These Arms and Services are comprised of Regular and Territorial Army elements. The information below explains in outline the purpose of the Army (the concept of force elements at readiness), how it is organised to meet that purpose when on deployments and during peace-time, and the Regimental System.

Force Elements at readiness

The Army Headquarters commands all Army activity, the purpose of which is to provide the Permanent Joint Headquarters (which commands all troops on overseas operations) with Force Elements at Readiness. A force element is an organisation or group of organisations that is tailored to a particular operation, it can vary in size capability and endurance. This force element will require an effort to be made in order to place it where it can provide operational effect in line with the purpose of the deployment, and the measure of this effort is defined by the ‘readiness’ of the force. A force element with low readiness might need to be re-roled, organised, assembled and trained before it can deploy, and a high readiness force may only need the briefest of preparation periods before deployment.

The force element that deploys to an operation is grouped from the basic organisations of the peace-time British Army: arms and services that are organised into regiments and corps.

Arms and Services

Arms are the elements of the British Army that fight adversaries in the field of battle, Services are the elements that support the preparation and sustainment of the Arms. Arms and Services are divided up into Combat Arms, Combat Support Arms and Combat Service Support Arms. The Combat Arms are organised and trained to conduct close combat with adversaries, they are the Household Cavalry and Royal Armoured Corps, the Infantry and the Army Air Corps. The Combat Support Arms are providing direct support to the Combat Arms and include the Royal Artillery, the Royal Engineers, the Royal Signals and the Intelligence Corps. The Combat Service Support Arms provide sustainment and support for the Combat and Combat Support Arms. Whilst Combat Service Support personnel are not intended to close with and engage opposition forces, the fluidity of the modern battlefield means that these personnel are likely to be engaged in close combat at times and will need to be trained to operate in this environment, they include the Royal Logistic Corps, the Corps of Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, the Army Medical Services and the Adjutant General’s Corps.

The Territorial Army is constructed in a similar manner with particular posts being held by regular personnel in order to support the command, and administration of its constituent organisations.

Peace-time Army hierarchy

The Army is commanded by the Chief of the General Staff, a 4 star general and organised into three functional areas each commanded by a 3 star general (Lieutenant General): Land Forces, Force Development and Training (which includes the various training schools, equipment programmers and capability directorates), and the Adjutant General’s area responsible for managing the Army’s personnel.

The bulk of the Army is under command of the Commander Land Forces. This is the area where the Divisions, Brigades, Regiments and Battalions are organised during peace time. Land Forces

39 also includes organisations with support and administrative command roles that are linked to the geographical area within which they reside; they include London District, British Forces Germany, the Regional Brigades and Headquarters Scotland. The geographically defined support and administrative command organisations are fairly small organisations that are usually limited to headquarters areas. The Field Army Divisions, of which there are 2, and the Joint Helicopter Command, contain almost all of the Combat Arms, about half of the Combat Support Arms and a significant proportion of the Combat Service Support Arms.

The Field Army Divisions and the Joint Helicopter Command

The British Army has 2 Field Army Divisions, 1st (UK) Armoured Division based in Germany, and 3rd (UK) Division based in the UK, and the Joint Helicopter Command. Each of these organisations is commanded by a 2 Star officer (for example a Major General) and contains a number of deployable combat Manoeuvre Brigades of which the Army has 7 in total commanded by a Brigadier (1 Star). They are not organised on geographical lines, they are organised in accordance with their varying capabilities to produce the most balanced force on which to base an operational deployment.

These Brigades are comprised of Regiments and Battalions from the Arms and Services and when deployed or preparing for a deployment, will re-organise these Regiments and Battalions, commonly referred to as ‘units’, specifically to support the operational effect that the commander wishes to achieve. In peace-time, they remain organised along exclusively regimental or corps lines, for example the Light Dragoons is a Royal Armoured Corps Regiment (or ‘unit’) commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel that is based in Norfolk, commanded by Commander 12 Mechanized Brigade, a Brigadier based with his Headquarters in Wiltshire, who in turn is commanded by the General Officer Commanding the 3rd (UK) Division based in Wiltshire. Another example, is 1st Battalion, the Royal Irish Regiment is an Infantry Battalion (or unit) commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel that is based in Shropshire, commanded by Commander 16 Air Assault Brigade, a Brigadier based with his Headquarters in Essex, who in turn is commanded by the Commander of the Joint Helicopter Command Division based in Hampshire.

The historic Regimental System of the British Army

Underpinning all of this regional and operational based command groupings, is the Regimental system. This is similar to a college system within a university; you might represent the university at sport, but you are from a particular college and always will be. A solider or officer enlists into a particular parent regiment, corps or ‘cap badge’ and remains of that denomination throughout their military service. During the course of their Army career, they may be posted between a number of organisations either outside their parent ‘cap-badge’ or within it; according to their skill-set. For example, a Royal Signals soldier who completes training may be posted to 207 Headquarters & Signals Squadron in Hohne, Germany where he will support Headquarters 7th Armoured Brigade. After a couple of years he may be promoted and posted to 3rd Divisional Signals Regiment in Bulford, Wiltshire to do a similar job supporting Headquarters 3rd (UK) Division. Alternatively an Infantry officer, Commissioned from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst into his parent Regiment, the RIFLES, may serve for 5 years as junior officer in the Second Battalion in Northern Ireland, but may then be posted to a Regional Brigade Headquarters in Southern England where he is the only representative of his Regiment working in that organisation. Later on in his career, he might be posted back to another Battalion in his Regiment to be the Operations Officer. He will spend his career wearing the RIFLES beret and uniform, and serving in RIFLES Battalions and other larger organisations.

As a result of the histories of the various corps and regiments, and the requirements over the years to raise and disband many parts of the British Army, not all parent regiments and corps are the same size. For example, the Royal Irish Regiment currently has only one Regular Battalion and one Territorial Army Battalion, however it has reached its current shape and size as a result of the various amalgamations and disbandments of its antecedent regiments and battalions, which number over 15. This can be contrasted with the Royal Regiment of Scotland, which in its current

40 guise has a much larger number of 5 Regular and 2 Territorial Battalions, all of whom reached their current shape and size due to particular amalgamations and disbandments of its antecedent regiments and battalions peculiar to past Scottish Infantry regiments.

The net result of these amalgamations and disbandments is that some Infantry Regiments (or cap- badges) have more Regular and TA Battalions than others, but each Battalion is the same size. There are some minor variations in the sizes of units (Infantry Battalions, Royal Armoured Corps Regiments, Royal Engineer Regiments etc) dependent upon their specific role, for example an Armoured Infantry unit that operated from Infantry Fighting Vehicles requires up to 100 more soldiers than a light role Infantry Battalion whose primary means of transport is by foot. This is because there is an extra requirement for specialists to command and maintain the Infantry Fighting Vehicles in an Armoured Infantry Battalion (or ‘unit’). In the Royal Engineers, a Close Support Engineer Regiment such as 26 Engineer Regiment based in Hampshire supporting 12 Mechanized Brigade has over 600 soldiers in it, but a specialist Force Support Engineer Regiment such as 39 Engineer Regiment which is configured for airfield damage repair, rapid runway provision and delivering the lead air support squadron (a rapidly deployable infrastructure support squadron that supports the RAF when it is deployed abroad) has over 100 fewer soldiers in it.

Open source British Army website: http://www.army.mod.uk/structure/structure.aspx

Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structure_of_the_British_Army

41 Annex C dated 22 Jun 2012

HMNB Clyde

As of June 2012, there are approximately 6,300 personnel working at Her Majesty’s Naval Base (HMNB) Clyde, including the Royal Naval Armaments Depot Coulport. This consists of approximately: 3350 service personnel; 1300 MOD civilians; and 1650 civilian contractors. This number includes all lodger units at the Naval Base, and excludes contractors and subcontractors who are not resident on site. It should be noted that the total number of personnel will fluctuate on a daily basis as staff are posted in and out of the Naval Base, and contractors’ taskings vary.

Furthermore, these numbers will increase gradually in the run up to all RN submarines being based at the base from 2017.

42 Annex D dated 22 Jun 2012

RAF in Scotland

The number of RAF Personnel as at 1 April 2012 located in Scotland was around 3,400 personnel. There were also some 300 volunteer reserves. There are also around 550 civilians at RAF bases in Scotland.

The exact number of Tornados based at RAF Lossiemouth varies on a day-to-day basis depending on the tasking that they are given, but there are nominally 46 airframes allocated to squadrons there: 13 to each of the 2 operational squadrons and 20 to the Operational Conversion Unit. In addition, there will be a number of airframes on the unit undertaking maintenance, being prepared for, or recovered from, deployment to Afghanistan, or else in temporary storage. There are currently no Typhoon aircraft based at Lossiemouth, however, it is planned over the 2013-14 period to transfer the Typhoon squadrons currently at RAF Leuchars to RAF Lossiemouth.

What are the other bases that provide fast jests in the UK

There are a number of military bases in the UK with Fast Jet aircraft, with some covering operational roles and the others training roles; each location varies greatly in its size, capacity and infrastructure. There are Tornado GR4 aircraft based at RAF Marham and Lossiemouth, and Typhoon aircraft at RAF Leuchars and Coningsby. Additionally, Coningsby is home to a small number of Tornados of the Operational Evaluation Unit. RAF Leeming has Hawk aircraft, as does RAF Scampton (the Red Arrows), RAF Valley (fast jet training) and RNAS Yeovilton and Culdrose for the Royal Navy. Finally, a small number of aircraft are operated by the Test Pilot School at MOD Boscombe Down.

How long would it take to fly from that base (Lincolnshire) to Lossiemouth?

Transit times will depend on the route and speed of the aircraft and whether it is authorised to fly at supersonic speeds.

Essentially what is the advantage of being able to launch fast jets from a base in Scotland?

It would be best to answer this question by describing the role of the Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) aircraft. QRA are launched to intercept unidentified aircraft because the aircraft cannot be identified by any other means, i.e. the aircraft is not talking to civilian or military Air Traffic Control, has not filed a flight plan and is not transmitting a recognisable secondary surveillance radar code. QRA procedures entail aircraft and crews being held at continuous ground readiness, so that they can take off within minutes to protect UK sovereign airspace.

Under current plans, we hold a continuous ground readiness posture at RAF Coningsby in Lincolnshire (Southern QRA), and RAF Leuchars (Northern QRA (NQRA)) in Fife (it is planned that in future the NQRA will be supplied by RAF Lossiemouth). Aircraft are available at each base allowing us to provide a good response across the country. Typhoons at RAF Coningsby and RAF Leuchars are held at high readiness 24/7 to intercept any aircraft approaching or in NATO- monitored airspace or National airspace without prior approval or not having identified themselves.

Aircraft could also be redeployed to other airfields to counter specific threat(s) if required. However the routine basing of QRA aircraft in Scotland and Lincolnshire allows the provision of a rapid response across the UK and its Flight Information Region/Air Policing Area.

28 June 2012

43 Name RM CONDOR Royal Marine HQ Site /Barracks (includes Airfield)

BARONS POINT Degaussing Range (QinetiQ operated) DM GLEN DOUGLAS Munitions Depot HMNB CLYDE (FASLANE) Submarine Base LOCH FYNE QinetiQ operated Test/Trials Range LOCH GOIL QinetiQ operated Test/Trials Range NATO POL DEPOT CAMPBELTOWN Fuel Storage Depot NATO POL DEPOT LOCH STRIVEN Fuel Storage Depot OFD GARELOCHHEAD Fuel Storage Depot RNAD COULPORT Armaments Depot (Main Nuclear Deterrent Storage)

ROSNEATH Degaussing Range (QinetiQ operated) SKIPNESS TARBET LOCH FYNE QinetiQ operated Test/Trials Range RAF BUCHAN Comms Facility

RNWC CRIMOND Aerial Site (Royal naval Wireless Centre)

CAPE WRATH BOMBING RANGE Air and Sea Bombing Range

NRTE VULCAN DOUNREAY Nuclear reactor Test Establishment

RAF TAIN DTE Air Weapons Range

HMS GANNET (PRESTWICK) Search and Rescue HQ KIRKUDBRIGHT TRAINING AREA DTE Live firing training area MOD RANGE WEST FREUGH QinetiQ Operated Test and Development Establishment

SEISMOLOGICAL ARRAY STATION, ESKDALEMUIR Seismological Activity Monitoring Site

Barry Buddon Training Area DTE Multiple Range/Live Firing Training Area

DM CROMBIE Munitions Depot

HMS CALEDONIA MOD Caledonia Mixed use site for ships in refit

FORTHVIEW HOUSE HQ DIO

CALEDONIA HOUSE Vacant - being handed back to Landlord 17 July

EDINBURGH CASTLE Owned by Scottish Ministers part occupied by MOD Army

DREGHORN BARRACKS Infantry Barracks (1 Scots The Royal Scots)

REDFORD INFANTRY BARRACKS Infantry Barracks (3 Rifles) HQ 2 DIV Army HQ Scotland - Craigiehall

44 KENTIGERN HOUSE Army Personnel Centre UNIVERSITY AIR SQUADRON GLASGOW Townhouse/Office

ROYAL MARINES RESERVE GLASGOW TA Reserve Centre NAVY BUILDINGS GREENOCK MOD offices (currently home to Marine Coastguard Agency)

FORT GEORGE BARRACKS Historic Barracks (3 Scots The Black Watch)

KINGUSSIE ADV TRG HUT Adventure training Centre

BURNTISLAND Former Degaussing Range, now handed back to Landlords.

GLENCORSE BARRACKS Infantry Barracks (2 Scots Royal Highland Fusiliers)

RAF KINLOSS Former RAF Air Station to be Army Engineer Esatblishment

RAF LOSSIEMOUTH Raf Fast Jet Station

AIRD UIG R.S. SITE G Comms Site

AIRD UIG TRANSMITTER SITE TIMSGARRY Comms Site

MOD RANGE HEBRIDES QinetiQ operated Weapons test Facility

RAF BENBECULA EAST CAMP Admin and Accommodation site

DM BEITH Munitions Depot RAF LEUCHARS RAF Fast Jet Station RAF SAXA VORD Comms Site

BRITISH UNDERWATER TEST & EVALUATION CENTRE QinetiQ operated underwater test facility (BUTEC)

JSMTC SCOTLAND BALLAHULISH Mountain Training Centre (Joint Services) NATO POL DEPOT LOCH EWE Fuel Storage Depot RONA RANGE QinetiQ operated noise trials range ATE HQ SCOTLAND Forthside Depot (HQ 51 Brigade, DSTL etc) QUEEN VICTORIA SCHOOL Military Coeducational school VICTORIA BARRACKS BALLATER Queens Guards HQ when Sovereign is in residence at Balmoral

45

Written evidence from Bryan Buchan, Chief Executive, Scottish Engineering

Scottish Engineering is a wholly apolitical organisation, whose primary responsibility is representation of our member companies (circa 400 at present) whose interests are certainly affected by the question of Independence.

As you know, several thousand individuals are directly employed in defence-related industries under Babcock alone; however, it should be borne in mind that those direct jobs also result in a support infrastructure which would extend that number at least two-fold.

I am not at liberty to directly quote any of the member companies; however, I can cite the example of one prominent organisation in the east of the country, which will certainly lose three of its key defence-related product lines should Independence go ahead.

Concerns have been directly related to this organisation by members across all sectors as to the uncertainty around the potential question of forthcoming Independence. Where organisations are either owned by a foreign parent or, as is the case with many, operate throughout the UK, there is reluctance to commit to either basic investment or substantial capital projects, due to the aforementioned uncertainty. The very strong message which we are receiving is that members feel many of the key questions remain unanswered, from fiscal arrangements through regulatory affairs, and indeed the budgetary process should we retain a common currency with the rest of the UK. In a recent address by Alistair Darling to the 15th Annual State of the City Economy Conference (Glasgow), he posed the question of how this would in effect be executed, i.e. a Scottish budget would have to be prepared for submission to Westminster for approval.

The question of EU rules on procurement would be interesting, in that we could expect an extension of the protectionist behaviours referenced in the recent Chatham House Paper on the subject. It would seem unlikely that the rump UK would offer support or opportunities to the remnants of the defence industry in Scotland.

A further concern to members was the recent indicator from the Credit Rating Agency, Fitch, that whilst the rest of the UK would retain its Triple A Credit Rating, that Scotland almost certainly would not, placing further pressure on the cost of borrowing for indigenous Scottish operations, including those in the defence sector.

Of the specific questions which you cite, we are not in a position to offer responses on the detail of the business agreements between the MoD and BAE Systems, or other specific member companies.

15 November 2012

46 Correspondence from Babcock following a visit by the Committee to Faslane and Rosyth

Q - Do you have a rough breakdown on the proportion of your work force that lives in the immediate area, Dumbarton or across Scotland?

A – The total Babcock Clyde workforce is 1470, engaged in a range of tasks from submarine engineering to hard and soft facilities management. Of that 1470, 35% live in Argyll and Bute (generally in Helensburgh, Garelochhead and the Rosneath Peninsular), 15% in West Dunbartonshire, 15% in Inverclyde and 15% in Glasgow. A more detailed breakdown is in the attached Word file.

Q – Do you have information on the proportion of your staff by wage?

A – Of the Babcock Clyde staff, 40% are earning a basic rate between £21k and £30k, 32% between £13k to £20k, 15% between £31k and £40k, 9% between £5k and £12k and 5% over £40k.

Q - Do you have a description by skill level or qualification?

A – 32% of the Babcock Clyde workforce are in the managerial/professional category, with 8% in associate professional/technical grades. Of the industrial workforce, 28% are skilled. A more detailed breakdown is in the attached MS Word file.

Q – Could you provide examples of the positive impact of partnership working between Babcock and the RN at Faslane and Rosyth (I am thinking in terms of the economic impact from long term ventures such as the TOBA).

A – The local economic impact of Babcock’s presence is outlined in the attached paper. The overall impact is driven more by the size and shape of the whole Clyde operation (MoD and Babcock), which is defined by the output it is required to deliver rather than the commercial construct through which it is managed. That said, at Clyde, Babcock has an annual budget for donations to local charities of around £10k, with the distribution of funds decided by the employee led Community Investment Group and consideration given to charities that fall into the areas of Education, Regeneration and Environment. We also sponsor groups participating in sporting and community activities to the tune of £20k to £25k per annum, and provide a considerable amount of help ‘in kind’ to local organisations, such as carrying out mock interviews; being involved with enterprise activities within schools; providing catering for events and getting our apprentices to advise on career days.

Supplementary 1. Babcock Marine (Clyde) SAC Requested Data 2. Socio Economic Impact Study, Babcock Group in Scotland, 2012

47 Babcock Marine (Clyde)

1. Can you provide a breakdown of the job type /skills levels of your employees? (A description of the type of qualifications and training required for each category is attached.) % Managerial 6.2% Professional 26.3% Associate Professional/Technical 8.1% Admin. & Secretarial 6.4% Skilled Trades 27.6% Other Service Sales & Customer Service 18% Process, Plant, Machine Operatives 7.4% Elementary Occupations Total 100%

2. Can you provide a breakdown of the Scottish local authorities in which your employees live?

Local Authority % Argyll & Bute Council 35% Dumfries & Galloway Council 0.6% Fife Council 5% Glasgow City Council 15% Inverclyde Council 15% Renfrewshire Council 10% South Ayrshire Council 0.6% East Ayrshire Council 0.6% South Lanarkshire Council 3% Stirling Council 0.2% West Dunbartonshire Council 15%

48 Socio Economic Impact Study

Babcock Group in Scotland, 2012

49 Overview

• Earlier this year, Babcock commissioned a Socio Economic Impact Study to assess the impact of its Scottish Operation

• Benefits:

– although a snapshot in time, the outcomes provide a source of reliable information to assess Babcock’s contribution to the local economy

– the calculations for employment and GVA use standard Scottish Government multipliers and averages which will withstand external scrutiny

– on average, conclusions drawn from this type of study are valid for a 5 year period

• The key findings can be broadly summarised as:

– Babcock support around 8000 jobs in Scotland and £480 million of Gross Value Add (GVA)

– the people we employ in our 3 key employment areas (Clyde, Rosyth and Dounreay) are generally remunerated at twice the national level in Scotland

– our employees are generally better qualified than people in Scotland (on average) especially in the local authorities surrounding key sites

– 20% of Group revenue is generated via its Scottish operations

50

1 Employment & GVA

Total BIG Employment and GVA by Division, 2011/12

• BIG makes a major direct contribution to the Marine & Support BIG economy of Scotland; employing 4,750 people Technology Services Employment and supporting 3,200 jobs Direct 3,130 1,650 4,790 • The economic impact of BIG in Scotland can be Indirect 750 960 1,710 Induced 870 580 1,450 measured in terms of effects on employment and Total 4,750 3,200 7,950 on Gross Value Added (GVA), which comprises GVA, £m Direct 196.7 123.1 319.8 wages, salaries and profits Indirect 44.0 49.7 93.7 Induced 39.3 26.5 65.7 Total 280.0 199.2 479.2

In 2011/12, almost 8,000 jobs and £480 million of GVA in Scotland were supported by BIG

51

2 Babcock earnings in relation to local authorities

• BIG employees live in 27 of the 32 Scottish local authorities, but most employees are located in the areas around the major sites:

– Rosyth – 87% of employees live in Fife

– Clyde – 35% of employees live in Argyll and Bute, 15% in Glasgow, 15% in Inverclyde and 15% in West Dunbartonshire

– Dounreay – 100% of employees live in Highland

• Babcock staff have an annual GVA per worker of £67,000 - 43% above the average of £46,700 for all Scottish workers.

Three of the main areas from which Babcock draws its workforce are areas with low levels of income and a lack of job opportunities

52

3 Highly skilled workforce

• BIG employees in Scotland are more highly skilled than the average Scottish worker, more productive and much better remunerated.

– productivity can be measured by GVA per worker – this is £67,000 per Babcock employee as compared to £45,000 for all Scottish workers

• This skill difference is even more marked at a local level; skill levels at the three largest Scottish sites (Rosyth, Clyde & Dounreay) are much higher than in their local areas

75% of Babcock employees are in the two highest skill categories (levels 3 and 4) compared to 53% across Scotland as a whole

53

4 Marine & Technology

• M & T accounts for 65% of BIG employment in Scotland; dominated by core activities at Clyde and Rosyth

• Highly skilled workforce with over 77% of employment in the two highest national skill levels

– Rosyth: 86% of the workforce is in the two highest skill categories compared to just 51% across Fife as a whole

– Clyde: 68% of the workforce is in the two highest skill categories compared to 61% across Clyde, Argyll & Bute

• Earnings at Rosyth and Clyde are 1.8 and 2.1 times the local authority average respectively

– three of the main areas from which Clyde draws its workforce (Glasgow, Inverclyde and West Dunbartonshire) are authorities with some of the highest levels of income deprivation in the country

• Direct impact: 3130 employees generate GVA of almost £196.7million

– Rosyth supports almost 1,600 jobs and over £100 million of GVA

– Clyde supports almost 1,500 employees and over £90 million of GVA

• Indirect impact: expenditure supports over 750 indirect jobs and GVA of over £44 million

• Over £2.1 million was spent on training in 2011/12 and over 14,000 days of training were provided

• M & T provided almost £100,000 of sponsorship to a range of activities throughout 2011/12.

54

5 Support Services

• Support Services employment is dominated by the Nuclear business unit which accounts for almost 63%

– Nuclear activities are primarily centred on the decommissioning of the Dounreay site; accounting for 83% of Nuclear employment

• Average earnings in Support Services are very high, reflecting the dominance of Dounreay

– Earnings at Dounreay are 2.6 times the average for Highland Council

• Direct impact: 1650 employees generate GVA of almost £123.1million

• Indirect impact: expenditure supports over 960 indirect jobs and GVA of over £49.7 million

– the largest number of indirect jobs and GVA, across the Group, are supported by Nuclear spending at Dounreay

– Dounreay accounts for 75% of Support Services expenditure

• Some 580 induced jobs are supported in Scotland and GVA is £26.5 million

• Support Services provided almost £55,000 of charitable donations throughout 2011/12

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