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Home , Basque Nationalist Party, Batzarre, East Tyrol, Italian Parliament, Landtag of South Tyrol, Southern Basque Country

Eduardo J. Ruiz Vieytez* and Markko Kallonen�

Territorial Autonomy and European National Minorities: South , the Basque Country and the Aland Islands

I. INTRODUCTION The aim of this article is to provide an overview of the historical, legal and political ele- ments of the current situation and conflict in the Basque Country, and the Aland Islands through a comparison between these regions. Recent events in the Basque Country have stressed the existence of an unresolved conflict within the Spanish state. This article seeks to compare the legal and political system of the Basque Country with the cases of the Aland Islands and South Tyrol to reflect on the elements which make territorial autonomy either successful or not in managing national identity conflicts within Western European states. To develop our analysis, we will systematically describe the similarities and differences between the three cases, concentrating on the different legal and political aspects. Finally, we will draw some conclusions, including some future prospects.

ll. 7he Basque Country The Basque Country' is located in Southwestern Europe, at the western corner of the Per- enees Mountains. The concept and delimitation of the Basque Country is not a peaceful one. Traditionally, the term 'Basque Country' has referred to the Basque-speaking popula- tions and, subsequently to the lands occupied by them. However, the influence of languages has been reducing the Basque-speaking area for the last ten centuries. Today we consider the Basque Country to be formed by all the political or historical communities in which the (Euskera) and culture have remained alive in some way. In this

* Director of the Institute of Human Rights at the University of Deusto (The Basque Country). t Researcher at the European Academy of Bozen/ (South Tyrol). 1 In the Basque language, EuskalHerrin (EH); in Spanish, Pais Vasco; In French, Pays Basque.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access sense, the Basque Country covers approximately 20,000 km2, of which 18,000 are to the south of the Pyrenees and 2,000 to their north, within the French Republic. However it is necessary to clarify from the very beginning that there is a strong political opinion stating that Upper Navarra2 is not a Basque territory. In fact, the current Basque Autonomous Community includes only the three provinces of (Bizkaia), and Alava, with a size of around 7,000 kM2. The Northern Basque Country is located in the 64' territorial administration division or French departement, Atlantic Pyrenees.1he population of the Basque area is only 40% of the total population of this departement, the capital of the departement (Pau) being located out- side the Basque area. This departement makes part of the French region of A quitaine, whose capital is the city ofBordeaux. The regions in enjoy some administrative competencies but no sort of political autonomy system has been developed in the French Republic. In the last years there has been a significant movement within the Northern Basque Country, with the support of the majority of the municipalities, demanding the creation of a new Basque department. However, these demands have not been taken into consideration by the succes- sive French governments. The current population of the Basque Country is around 2.8 million, with 2.1 million living inside the Basque Autonomous Community. One third of the actual population moved into the Basque Country from different Spanish regions, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. Only one third of the people have native grandparents. There are also very important Basque communities in Latin America and in the . Foreign immigrants repre- sent today in the Basque Country no more than 2.5% of the population and most of them are citizens of other European countries. began to evolve during the nineteenth century following the French model. The attempts to politically unify the kingdom came into conflict with the special political regime of the Basque Provinces. enacted in 1839 and 1876 would suppress the most important aspects of this semi-independent political system. Nation- alism was also developed among the Basque in the late second half of the nineteenth century, creating a political party: Eusko Alderdi Jeltzalea-Partido Nacionalista Vasco (EAJ- PNV),3 which gained ground rapidly. In 1931, following the proclamation in of the Second Republic, a system was estab- lished in the Constitution to enable some regions to gain autonomy. The Basque Country (without Navarra) elected an autonomous government in 1936 that was suppressed a year later after the conquest of the whole territory by insurgent military forces in the Span- ish Civil War. The Franco regime was characterized by a savage repression of the Basque national and linguistic identity. As a counteraction to this repression, new -leaning nationalist groups sprang up, including in some cases the use of armed struggle to combat

2 'Upper Navarra refers to the actual Community of Navarra while 'Lower Navarra is the ancient part of the Kingdom of Navarra in the Northern part of the Pyrenees or . We will refer to historical Upper Navarra as'Navarra. 3 The name is different in Basque and Spanish versions, meaning respectively 'Basque Party of God and Old Laws' and `'.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access the dictatorship. Amongst these groups, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)' was founded in 1962 and still carries out violent , although popular support for the use of violence is becoming marginal.

The current , however, has not to do directly with armed struggle, but with the political controversy about sovereignty and the rigbt to self-determination. The pres- ent system of autonomy in force for the Southern Basque Country is based on the Spanish Constitution of 1978 and the historical rights of the four historical territories (provinces). Today, Navarra is an Autonomous Community of its own, while the three provinces of Biscay, Gipuzkoa, and Alava have constituted the Basque Autonomous Community since 1979 based on an Act on Autonomy passed bv the Spanish and approved by by the Basque population.

B. The Aland Islands The Aland Islands is a monolingual Swedish-speaking region located in northern Europe, in the Baltic Sea between Finland and Sweden. The population of Aland is approximately 25,000 of which nearly 40% live in Mariehamn, the administrative centre of the islands which is as well the only city on the islands. The total area of Aland Island is 6,784 km2 of which 1,527 km2 is land area. The region encompasses thousands of islands, the majority of which are uninhabited. Aland was part of the kingdom of Sweden until the year 1809 when as a consequence of war Sweden lost Finland and Aland to imperial Russia. From 1809 to 1917 Aland belonged to the Grand Duchy of Finland which formed an autonomic entity as a part of the Russian Empire. Russia fortified Aland during the in 1856. Afterwards the islands were demilitarized according an international signed bWhe countries involved in the conflict. Finland declared itself independent in 1917 as a consequence of the Russian Revolution and the breakdown of the Russian Empire.5 Alanders wanted to grasp the moment and join the country they felt they belonged to, namely Sweden. Sweden showed interest in realizing the aspiration of the inhabitants of the Aland Islands. Finland was not willing to accept this and relations between Sweden and Finland become strained. The Finnish Parliament adopted an Autonomy Act for Aland in 1920 which the Alanders did not accept. Moreover, the question on Aland had an international dimension due to the earlier mentioned treaty on demilitarization of the islands. The question was addressed to the League of Nations and Finland and Sweden were prepared to accept its decision on the matter as a basis for the future of Aland.6 In June 1921 the League of Nations declared its decision according to which Aland

4 Euskadi TaAskatasuna (ETA) literally means: `Basque Fatherland and Freedom'. 5 See, for example, James Barros, 7he iland Island Question. Its Settlement by the League of Nations, (New Haven, 1968); Harry Jansson and Johannes Salminen (eds.), The SecondAland Islands Question -Autononry or Independence? (l\lariehamn, 2002).. 6 Thomas l\1usgrave, SelfDetermination and National Minorities (Oxford, 1997),32-3.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access would remain as a part of Finland. The Finnish state was obliged to provide Alanders with broad self-government, protection and guarantees for the maintenance of their culture and lastly to accept the demilitarization and neutralization of the islands in an interna- tional treaty.7 The 1921 Autonomy Act on Aland was revised in 1951. This became outdated and finally in 1991 a new law, which is the current law in force, was promulgated.8

C. South Tyrol South Tyrol is located in northeastern and shares border with and . Its mountainous area covers 13,600 km2 of which over 64% lies at an altitude of over 1500 meters above sea level. The territory of South Tyrol belonged for centuries to the larger Tyrolean entity being part of from the 13`" century until 1919, excluding the years under the Napoleonic occupation 1810-14. Italy signed a secret pact in 1915, which lead to its entering the First World War on the side of the entente. One of the territories promised to Italy, as a compensation for joining the war on the side of the entente was South Tyrol.99 South Tyrol was officially annexed by Italy according the treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye in 1919. According to the last census conducted by Austria in 1910,'° 89% of the South Tyrolean population was German, 4% Ladinsll and 3% . Italy promised to safeguard the identity of its new linguistic minority after the annexation. However, no measures were taken to hold to this promise. In 1922 the Fascists rose to power and ended the hopes of the South Tyroleans for the protection of their language and culture. During the Second World War South Tyrol's German-speaking inhabitants were forced to opt either to leave the country to be resettled in an area in the Third Reich or stay in South Tyrol and face forced transportation to southern parts of Italy.12 After the Second World War, South Tyrolean representatives with the provisional tried in vain to influence peace negotiations requesting that South Tyrol be returned to Austria.13 Italian

7 Ibid, 36-7. 8 Act on the Autonomy of Aland, 1991, at http://www.finlex.fi/pdf/saadkaan/E9911144.PDF. 9 The was signed by Italy, Great Britain, France and Russia in April 1915. According to the treaty Italy was supposed to receive as a compensation for its joining the war not only South Tyrol but also the coastline of Istria and Dalmatia as well as some smaller areas. 10 Giinter Rautz, Die Sprachenrecbte der Minderheiten, ein Rechtsvergleicb zwischen Osterreich und Italien (Baden-Baden, 1999), 191. 11 Ladins are the oldest and smallest language group of the province. Reto-Romanic, Ladin culture is concen- trated particularly in the five Dolomite valleys of , Livinallongo, Fassa, Ampezzo and Val Badia. Christoph Perathoner, Die Dolomitenladiner 1848-1918, (Bozen, 1998), 23-5; Government of the Province of Bolzano-Siidtirol (ed.), South Tyrol - an Inrioduction (Bolzano, 2002). 12 See, for instance, Rolf Steininger, Sudtirol im 20. Jahrhundert ( 1997), 153; Umberto Corsini and Rudolf Lill,flltofldige 1918-1946 (Bolzano, 1988), 261. 13 In South Tyrol 163,777 signatures were collected calling for a plebiscite and in Innsbruck a huge demonstra- tion was held on 5 May 1946.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access borders were officially reconfirmed in 1947 in the Peace Treaty of Paris. The agreement on the self-government of South Tyrol was reached by the Italian Prime De Gasperi and Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber in 1946." This agreement was formally signed in 1947 and annexed to the peace treaty with Italy. The South Tyrol question was thereby given international standing. A first Statute of Autonomy was passed by the Italian Parliament in 1948, but it referred not only to German-speaking South Tyrol but also included the Italian- speaking region of . As a result, the post-war years were characterized by disputes and clashing interests of the South Tyrolean and Italian governments. South Tyrolean activ- ists organized bomb attacks to which Italian authorities answered with harsh measures in South Tyrol. At the same time, Austria brought the case to the attention of the UN. A new agreement was reached in 1969 (known as the 'Packet'), consisting of a set of 137 concrete measures with an aim to establish effective autonomy in South Tyrol. As a consequence a new Statute of Autonomy was drafted and passed in 1972. This Statute is currently in force and was amended in 2000. The official settlement of the dispute before the UN was not reached until 1992.15

II. ELEMENTS FOR COMPARISON: TERRITORY AND SOCIETY

A. Territorial Aspects All three territories enjoying self-governance rights are geographically very small in comparison with their respective states: Spain (Basque Country 1S°�fo), Italy (South Tyrol 2.3%) and Finland (bland Islands 05%). Both the Basque Country and South Tyrol areas are characterized by their dramatic landscape. In both cases, very mountainous territory determines the traditional way of life in many aspects. In the case of South Tyrol, the average altitude of the land is quite high. The Basque Country, however, is located on the coastal zone of the Bay of Biscay but, to a great extent, the structure of the territory is also based on narrow valleys surrounded by steep mountains. Aland is obviously a territory in which small islands are scattered, and consequently has a strong maritime dependence. Neither Tyrol nor the Basque Country, even though they are geographically difficult areas, have ever been isolated in any way, since they have seen the transit of numerous peoples and groups through their respective territories. In the case of Tyrol, the has been for many centuries the easiest way of communication between the Ger- manic and Latin worlds, while in the Basque Country, the western comer of the Pyrenees has been one of the two main ways linking the Iberian Peninsula with the rest of Europe.

14 The text of the treaty can be found in German at the following web site: http://zis.uibiLac.at/stirol- doku/ dokumente/19460905.html. 15 Antony Alcock, The South Tyralllutonamy -!1 Sbort Introduction (Bolzano, 2001), http://www.provinz.bz.itl aprov/publ/publ�etreso.asp?PRES_ID=1899; Melissa Magliana, The Autonomous Province of South TyroL--41 Model of Self-Governance? (Bolzano, 2000), 24-42; Emma Lantschner,'Breve Sintesi della Storia dell'Alto ', in Joseph Marko, Sergio Ortino and Francesco Palermo (eds.), L'ordinamento speciale della Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano ( , 2001), 14-33, at 32.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access Aland plays a more peripheral role in the continent, although it also enjoys a significant geopolitical position in the Baltic Sea area in regional terms.

The three areas are also similar in that they are border regions. South Tyrol is located on the Italian border with the Austrian Republic; the Southern Basque Country has a frontier with France, while Aland is situated halfway between Sweden and Finland. Even more, the historical territories both of Tyrol and the Basque Country are to-date divided between two different states. In the first case, North and remain part of Austria, while Italy annexed South Tyrol in 1919. In the second case, as we have already explained, the border of the Pyrenees has been dividing for many centuries a common Basque lan- guage and culture between the French and Castilian-Spanish political entities. In both cases the autonomous area we are referring to here is located in the southern part of the frontier. This element of territorial division is to some extent repeated in the interior of the respective southern territories. In the Basque situation, the perception of administrative division is due to the fact that Navarra has not been incorporated into the Basque Auton- omous Community. In the South Tyrolean case, the autonomous province of South Tyrol is one of the two provinces of the Autonomous Region of Trentino-Alto Adige.16 A major aspect in the case of South Tyrol is the strategic importance of the area at hand. The historical special status of South Tyrol was based on its importance as a gateway to the . It was of immense importance for the trade and domination of surrounding areas. A way to guarantee the stability of the regions was by granting it extended self-gov- erning rights. The strategic importance of South Tyrol was underlined again by before the First World War leading the Italian state to take part in the war on the side of the allied powers. The significance of the South Tyrolean mountainous area for the defence of the Italian state became clear again after the Second World War. The majority of South Tyrol's German-speaking population hoped for reunification with Austria, but it was not granted to them .17 Today strategic reasons do not play such an important role in the case of South Tyrol. As for Aland, its compactness has favoured addressing the administration powers of different entities throughout history. Aland has been administrated in the past by Sweden or Finland or it has formed its own administrative entity. The fact that Aland is an archi- pelago has sometimes protected it from turbulent times, but on the other hand has made it very vulnerable and dependent on the surrounding states. Finland's strategic interests concerning the Aland Islands have been obvious. Aland became an object of international law in nineteenth century due to military reasons. Its

16 It is important to note that the five traditional Ladin-speaking valleys were divided by the Fascist regime in 1924 and they are still divided into three different provinces: Badia and Gardena remain in the province of South Tyrol, but Fassa was incorporated into the autonomous province of , while Livinallongo- Fodom and Ampezzo are part of the (Region of ). As a consequence, Ladins living in different provinces are enjoying different level of protection. Manuela Zappe, Das Etniscbe Zusam- menleben in Sudtirol, Europaische Hochschulschriften Reihe XXI (Frankfurt am Main,1996),103-4, 271. 17 Melissa Magliana, 1he Autonomous Province ..., 24-5.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access location holds importance for all the states around the Baltic Sea. It seems that it has not lost its importance in spite of technical progress and changing international politics. In fact, the most potential present crisis or conflict areas close to Finland are located south or east of its borders. In a case of escalating conflict, the maintenance of Finland would mainly rest on sea transportation.18 The history of South Tyrol and Aland contains an analogy; the decisions concerning the fate of the Aland Islands and of South Tyrol were made after as a result of drawing the new borders in Europe, borders which were, according to United States President Wilson's declaration, supposed to guarantee the self-determination principle for people following the 'clearly recognizable lines of nationality In both cases the aspirations of the majority of the population were not fulfilled. The victorious powers could not allow all European minorities to decide for themselves to which country they would belong due to state interests and fear of facing dangerous similar situations in their own countries. Moreover, Aland under Finnish supremacy was seen as a Swedish-speak- ing stronghold in Finland that would also serve as a guarantee for the permanence of the Swedish-speaking minority on the mainland.20 The last aspect concerning the territory discussed here is that of delimitation. This appears to be an important issue in the current politics of the Basque Country, but not for Aland Islands. In the case of South Tyrol, there is no discussion on the territorial bound- aries of the province, apart from the weak claim for the regrouping of the three Ladin valleys outside the autonomous province of South Tyrol. In the Basque Country, however, the separation of Navarra constitutes a major topic, since the majority of the popula- tion in the Basque Autonomous Community regards Navarra as a substantial part of the Basque history and culture. Many social, cultural, and political organizations work in the same line along the four territories of the Southern Basque Country. However, there is a very strong political attitude in the opposite sense, represented mainly by the first party in this province (a brother party of the right-wing Spanish Popular Party). In the polls, approximately one fourth of the votes in Navarra go for Basque national parties, and some areas in the northwest of the territory show very high percentages of knowledge and use of the Basque language. This conflict over delimitation begins with the naming of the country. There is no agreement even on the terminology with which to refer to the Basque Country or to the whole Basque area, which is considered by some sectors as a kind of 'Greater-Basque-Country' idea. Paradoxically, there is much less disagreement about con- sidering the Northern Basque Country (including Lower Navarra) as an integral part of the Basque Country. In this sense, a full understanding of the different meanings of the concept 'Basque Country' depends on both the interlocutor and the context in which the

18 Teija Tiilikainen, 1he Ä/and Islands, Finland and European Security (Mariehamn, 2002), 46-7. 19 Thomas Musgrave, SelfDetermination ..., 22-4. 20 Frank Horn, 'Minorities in Aland with Special Reference to their Educational Rights', in Lauri Hanni- kainen and Frank Hom (eds.), flutonomy and Demilitarisation in International La2u: The Aland Islands in a Changing Europe ('Ihe Hague, 1997),153.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access term is being used. However, the main factor for recognizing the territorial area referred to in any discourse is the ideological one.

B. Population and Society There is a substantial difference between the populations of the studied regions. The popu- lation of the Basque Country is approximately five times greater than the population of the Trentino-Alto Adige region, and 50 times greater than of the Aland. As for the per cent of total population, the Basque country comprises approximately 5.2% of the Spanish population, South Tyrol represents only 0.8% of the Italian population and the Aland's population forms only 0.5% of the total Finnish population. Aland is a practically monolingual Swedish-speaking region .21 The identity of both the South Tyrolese and the Alanders is rooted strongly in their own regions and has developed during the era of self-governance. Even the term 'South Tyrol' did not really exist until its annexation to Italy; only afterwards it formed a political and cultural entity. Aland's identity has been carved and developed by its geographical nature, monolingual society and autonomy statute. Alanders do acknowledge their cultural and historical ties with the Finnish Swedes living on the mainland, but primarily identify themselves as members of a distinct group.22 Respectively the historical aspirations towards reunifica- tion with Austria in South Tyrol cannot be considered to have strong support among the German-speaking population of the province due to the formation of a South Tyrolean identity over decades of internal self-government arrangements. In the Basque Country approximately 25% of the population has Basque as its mother tongue,23 In general terms, roughly half-a-million people on both sides of the Pyrenees speak Basque. Both the Basque Country and South Tyrol have in common linguistic plurality. At the same time, both have traditionally been strongly Catholic societies. However, while in South Tyrol we find three different clearly defined linguistic communities, the language does not constitute an element of clear social division in the Basque Country, though there are two main spoken languages. The separation of ethnic and linguistic communities that can be easily identified in South Tyrol cannot be found in the Basque case. In fact, it is obvious that knowledge of the Basque language plays a role in the socialization of people in the Basque-speaking areas and also in social relations, but linguistic differences do not affect fundamental social attitudes in the Basque Country. National identity in the Basque area depends more on ideological aspects than on objective criteria of belonging to one or another social-cultural group.

21 Approximately 95% of the Alanders speak Swedish as their mother tongue. There are just over a thousand Finns, less than 5% of the local population, living on the islands who have declared Finnish as their mother tongue. 22 Dag Anckar, Aland as a Microstate. The Independence Scenario', in Harry Jansson and Johannes Salminen (eds.), The Second.41and Islands Question ..., 224-5. 23 Basque is not an Indo-European language although the vocabulary displays a strong influence of Latin, Spanish, and French words.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access The , a minority language in the Italian state, is the dominant lan- guage for the population of the South Tyrol, as is Swedish in Aland, while the Basque language is a minority language even inside the Basque Country. In this regard, it should be kept in mind that the German language is a very strong and official language in the neighbouring countries of Austria, Switzerland, and , as is Swedish for Sweden, while the Basque language has no support from any state-like entity, and is also in a very difficult situation both in Navarra and in the French Basque Country.

C. Education Autonomy arrangements also guarantee the conservation of identity through Aland's edu- cational system, which, unlike on the mainland, is monolingual. The small size and ethnic homogeneity in Aland have helped to preserve its autonomy. The size of the Finnish- speaking population is small and does not pose a considerable threat to the local culture due to reasons we will discuss in the chapter dealing with legal framework (see Section III.D). The status of Swedish-speaking minority in the Finnish framework is particular due to the fact that Swedish is the second official language of the country, not just a lan- guage of the minority. Therefore, it can be said that Alanders enjoy a blend of territorial and personal autonomy within the Finnish State. In Finland any person can use her/his Swedish mother tongue in monolingual Swedish and bilingual municipalities. One has also the right to communicate with the authorities by using one's own mother tongue.14 The Finns are obliged to learn Swedish at school even if the person is living in a purely Fmnish-speaking region. By contrast, education in Finnish is not offered in Aland by the public authorities. English is a mandatory subject at schools; Finnish is optional. Aland does not have institutions offering higher university education, which is seen as a negative factor, since the young Alanders move to Sweden or to Finland in order to receive univer- sity education. Many of them do not return afterwards to their region of origin.25 In South Tyrol there are three parallel school systems corresponding to the linguistic communities: German, Italian and Ladin. According to the Autonomy Statute, teaching in primary and secondary schools must be given in the mother tongue of the pupils. Due to functional autonomy the region has increased its influence on education in South Tyrol; this does not however mean that it would hold primary competencies in the area of education .26 As for the Basque Country, the education system is mixed, parents being offered the choice for their children to be taught in Spanish (model A), in Basque (model D) or in

24 A in Finland becomes bilingual if the number of speakers of the other language reaches 8% of the total population or is at least 3,000. However, a bilingual municipality only becomes monolingual if the number of speakers of the other language decreases to 6% or falls below 3,000. 25 Farimah Daftary, 'Insular Autonomy: A Framework for Conflict Settlement? .A Comparative Study of Corsica and the Aland Islands', ECMI working paper no.9, October 2000,14. 26 Government of the Province of Bolzano-Siidtirol, South Tyrol..., chapter `Schools and Further Education; Jens Woelk, "Ihe Case of South Tyrol: Lessons for Conflict Resolution?', paper presented at the 5' Annual Convention, Association for the Study of Nationalities, on Identity and the State: Nationalism and Sover- eignty in a Changing \Vorld, Columbia University, NYC, 13 April 2000.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access both languages at the same time (model B). Although Basque is a minority language inside the region, a vast majority of the parents ask for models B and D for their children's primary education.27

D. Economy Aland is a prosperous region within Finland, its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) being second only to Finland's capital area and its unemployment rate is low. Yet, there are sea- sonal changes due to tourism and the economy's sensitivity to external fluctuations in the markets. Aland's economy is traditionally based on agriculture, fishing and shipping the size of industries being small. The tourism on Aland has been playing an increasing role as a (seasonal) income source for the islanders. Tourism is connected to the frequent ferry traffic between Sweden, Finland and Aland.28 South Tyrol's strong economy is based primarily on tourism. Other important branches are the manufacturing industry and agriculture. As a consequence of the Auton- omy Statute the public sector also offers plenty of working opportunities in state and provincial administration.29 Today the average income per capita in autonomous province of South Tyrol is one of the highest in Italy and higher than in the neighbouring Austrian Bundesland ofTyrol. The size of the industry is small and having more than one occupation as an income source is typical for the population of this autonomous province. Another indicator of the powerful economy in South Tyrol is its low unemployment rates Economically, the Southern Basque Country is one of the richest areas in Spain in terms of per capita income. The unemployment rate is rather low outside the metropolitan area of . The average income in the Basque Country is very similar to that of the EU.3' South Tyrol, the Basque Country and Aland also share high standards of living, as their respective GDPs are higher than the average in Italy, Spain and Finland. The three places can be considered as some of the richest areas within their respective states enjoy- ing extensive services offered by a developed welfare state. The economic structure of these autonomous areas is mainly based on service sector. Yet during the 20th century, the Basque Country was a very powerful industrial area while South Tyrol's and Aland's economies mainly rest in the primary sector.

27 The three models are known as A, B and D since the letter C is not used in the Basque language. 28 Statistics and Research Aland (ASUB), Aland in Figures, at http://www.asub.aland.fi/index.con. 29 Government of the Province of Bolzano-Sudtirol, South Tyrol..., chapter `Employment'. 30 The average unemployment rate in the region of Trentino-Alto Adige is 2.1% while the general national unemployment rate in Italy is approximately 9%. Even more striking is the difference between the unem- ployment rate among young people (people under 25) which in Trentino Alto-Adige is 4.2% and 28% in Italy as a whole, Italian National Statistical Institute, at http://www.istat.it/index.htm and Provincial Statistics Institute, at http://www.provinz.bz.it/service/download/e/siz2002.pdf. 31 For statistics on the Basque Country, see http://www.eustat.es/document/en_cifras_i.html (Statistics from the Basque Autonomous government) and http://www.map.es/po-autonomica/ca-socioeco/princpv.htm (Statistics from the Spanish government).

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access Due to economical prosperity, all three regions have been appealing destinations to migration flows- The Basque Country was for many years a very attractive area for manv inhabitants of rural areas in western and southern Spain. Although this big process of immigration stopped after the crisis in the late 1970s, today only one third of the Basque population has native grandparents. South Tyrol also experienced significant immigration flows from other from the 1920s until the 1970s. Today a considerable number of seasonal workers, coming especially from Eastern European countries, arrive yearly in South Tyrol where they are employed in agriculture and tourism. Aland has not received any relevant population from the Finnish mainland, due in part to its autonomy system, as we will discuss later (see Section IILD). Fmally, the number of immigrants arriving to the Basque Country, South Tyrol and the Aland Islands is, generally speaking, lower than in other Spanish, Italian or Finnish regions.

III. ELEMENTS FOR COMPARISON: THE LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE Framework

ll. Territorial Self-Government and Asymmetry The Basque Country, Aland and South Tyrol are autonomous territories within the frame- work of the respective states of Spain, Finland and Italy. In other words, self-government of the people inhabiting these regions is realized on a substate level. Both the Kingdom of Spain and the Republic of Italy are unitary states that have adopted a decentralized model for the internal distribution of political power. In the two countries, the decentralization is extended to the whole territory of the state without transforming the model into a federal one. Finland is also a in which political power is not distributed to the administrative regions. In this sense, Aland is the only politically autonomous entity of the Finnish state,32 In the three cases under research, the basic laws for the autonomous system are the constitution and the respective statutes or acts on autonomy. Autonomy based on constitution is seen as a strong guarantee for conserving the self-government since any changes in the status would require strong democratic legitimacy. For South Tyrol, the Italian Constitution and Act on Autonomy date back to 1947 and 1972 respectively. Furthermore, Article 5 of the Italian Constitution declares the support given to autonomy arrangements:

The Republic, one and indivisible, recognises and promotes local autonomy; it shall apply the fullest measure of administrative decentralisation in services dependent on the State and adjust the principles and methods of its legislation to the require- ments of autonomy and decentralisation.33

32 The only other autonomy arrangement in Finland is the limited cultural autonomy granted to the indig- enous Sami people in their home area in Lapland. (Law no. 973/1995, adopted in July 1995). 33 Constitution ofltalv, Article 5, the text of the Constitution can be found on the IRIS data base at http: //www.eurac.edu/miris.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access The current Italian Constitution was amended for the first time in 2001. Respectively, for the Basque Country, the Spanish Constitution was adopted in 1978, whereas the Statute is in force since 1979. The present Finnish Constitution entered into force in 2000 while Aland's current Autonomy Act was adopted in 1991 and came into force on January 1993. If we look for an element of asymmetry in the autonomous systems hitherto studied with respect to the rest of the communities or regions within the state, the answer is con- troversial. Aland's autonomy is unique within Finland's state structure. This asymmetry has evidently been beneficial for the region giving space for pragmatic solutions for the organizing of power sharing and dialogue between Finland and Aland's regional authori- ties. In the case of South Tyrol, the Italian Constitution foresees five autonomous regions with a special statute34 whereas the other 15 regions are considered ordinary statute regions. This could be considered as a first element of asymmetry (although shared with four other regions). Second, South Tyrol does not make up an autonomous region by itself since the autonomous province of Bolzano is one of the two provinces included in the autonomous region of Trentino-Alto Adige. In this sense, this region is unique, because the level of the strongest political power is the provincial one and not the regional one. Finally, there is an element of asymmetry in the fact that the autonomy for South Tyrol is included in an international legal instrument.35 In the same way, the autonomy status of South Tyrol was negotiated between the authorities of Italy and representatives of South Tyrol, more precisely with the representatives of the South Tyrol's People's Party.'Ihe outcome was a 'package', which contained a detailed operations calendar regarding implementation of the negotiated autonomy status. In the case of the Basque Country, there is in principle no element of asymmetry in the Spanish Constitution. The latter does not even mention the communities that would be set up at a later stage. What constitutes in fact a peculiar reference to the Basque autonomy is the first Additional Provision of the Spanish Constitution. This provision refers to the 'historical rights' of the territories with fùeros,361his peculiarity is recognized for the Basque provinces of Biscay, Gipuzkoa, Alava and Navarra which gives them the possibility of keeping or recuperating some political powers even going further than what is established under Title VIII of the Constitution for the rest of the Autonomous Com- munities."

34 Apart from Trentino-Alto Adige, , , Friuli-Venezia Giulia and the Aosta Valley are also special regions according to the Italian Constitution of 1947. 35 The Gruber-De Gasperi Agreement, see section III.E. 36 This word has no clear translation into English. In terms of public law it refers to the special regime enjoyed until the nineteenth century by the provinces or territories of Biscay, Alava, Gipuzkoa and Navarra. 37 Additional disposition: 'The Constitution protects and respects the historic rights of the territories with . The general updating of the system shall be carried out, when appropriate, within the frame- work of the Constitution and the Statutes of Autonomy.'1his is, for instance, the legal basis of the political power of the Basque provinces in tax law and tax management, roads and traffic and in police forces.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access The asymmetry in this case can also be appreciated by considering the territorial auton- omy for the Basque Country as a kind of agreement between the Basque people and the state. In the case of the Basque Country, the principle of the contract is further empha- sized in the Statute of Autonomy. The Additional Provision to the Act on Autonomy of the Basque Country states that 'the acceptance of the system of autonomy established in this Statute does not imply that the Basque People waive the rights that as such may have accrued to them in virtue of their history and which may be updated in accordance with the stipulations of the legal system'. The Statute of Navarra also includes a very similar Additional Provision, on the basis of the 'historical rights'that belong to the territories with fueros. These are the remaining consequences of the special political regime of the history of the Basque Provinces of Biscay, Alava, Gipuzkoa, and Navarra, which lasted until the nineteenth century. To summarize, in the three cases some peculiar legal elements can be found to defend the special character of these territorial autonomies.

B. Political Representation According to their respective Acts on Autonomy, Aland, South Tyrol and the Basque Country have each adopted internal parliamentary systems in which the president of the executive body is elected by an assembly and is accountable to it (in South Tyrol the Sudtiroler , in Aland, the Lagting and the Legebiltzarra in the Basque Country). One difference in the systems is that the Basque president nominates the rest of the members of the government, while in South Tyrol it is the local parliament who elects the members of the executive (Landesregierung) based on proportional representation of the three linguistic groups. Aland has a legislative assembly that contains 30 members and is elected by Alanders every fourth year.38The legislative assembly of Aland appoints the Aland government (Landska .psstyrelse). Aland's government has to be based on coalition and consensus to make it workable. In each of the three cases there is a parliament with a sole chamber. However, in the case of the Basque Statute, the fact that representation of the provinces within the is equal regardless of their population (Article 26 of the Statute), is a very remarkable characteristic. This has a great political influence on the composition of the parliament, when you consider that Alava has only a fifth of the population of Biscay. The explanation for this strange composition lies in the idea of as a build- ing up of a highly decentralized country, giving a great deal of power to the territories and their respective local and governments. In this sense, the central bodies of the autonomous community would have wide functions of coordination, and the parliament would remain like a second chamber of a federal system. However, the political practice in the Basque Country has erased this initial idea and today the most important acts and decisions are taken by the parliament of the community. The representation of the two

38 Only persons possessing regional citizenship in Aland may vote and stand in such elections.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access provinces in the regional parliament ofTrentino-Alto Adige is also the same, although in this case differences in population are not so important. In Aland there is no internal sig- nificant division of the archipelago that could be reflected in parliamentary composition. Likewise, the internal distribution of political power is also a common characteristic in the Basque Country and the autonomous region ofTrentino-Alto Adige. In both cases, under the autonomous level we find a provincial level of autonomy with its own parlia- ments and governments exercising political powers. This is in fact the case of South Tyrol where the power-sharing model is based on the proportional representation of the language groups. In this respect, both systems have this common element of a complexity because instead of forming a single institutional level, there are two territorial levels within the autonomous regions. However, the historical reasons for this power sharing are unique. Finally, on the state level, there is one seat preserved for a representative of the Aland Islands in the national , which consists of 200 representatives.39 This provides Aland with one source to make its voice heard on a national level but its concrete meaning can been seen merely as symbolic. In the case of South Tyrol there are no legal provisions according to which any seats in the national parliament would be reserved for South Tyrolean representatives.40 In Spain, both chambers of Parliament are elected through the provinces, so the Basque area is represented by a certain number of Members of the Parliament in any case. Aland has also had a permanent representative in the Nordic Council since 1970 .41 This autonomous presence has offered Aland a way to exercise regional diplomacy and promote its interests beyond the national level. Aland, like South Tyrol and the Basque Country, also has a representative in the EU's Committee of Regions, as well as in the Finnish Permanent Mission to the EU. As for a possible representation in the central government, there is no provision in the Basque case, while in the case of South Tyrol Article 52 in the Statute of Autonomy fore- sees the presence of the president of the province () in the Council of Ministers when the former is dealing with questions affecting the autonomous province. In both cases, the central government maintains a permanent representative in the auton- omous regions (RegierungskommissarlCommissario del Governo),42The of Aland

39 This arrangement came into existence due to mutual understanding, not as a part of the negotiation con- cerning the Act of Autonomy. 40 However, there was an important ruling of the Italian Constitutional Court (n.438/1993) according which the 4% threshold for political representation of political parties in national parliament was lifted in order to guarantee political representation to German- and Ladin-speaking minorities. Giuseppe Avolio, 'Gli organi statutari. Funzioni, composizione e sistema elettorale'in Joseph Marko, Sergio Ortino and Francesco Palermo (eds.), Lordinamento speciale ..., 398-424, at 406-7. 41 The Nordic Council, formed in 1952, is a forum for interparliamentary cooperation. Members of this Coun- cil are: Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Denmark, Faeroe Islands, Greenland and Aland Islands. 42 This 'Government Commissioner' supervises the province and functions as a link between central adminis- tration and province. Melissa Magliana, The Autonomous Province ..., 51; Antonio Lamps, '11 Commissario del Governo per la Provincia di Bolzano' in Joseph Marko, Sergio Ortino and Francesco Palermo (eds.), L ordinamento speciale ..., 558-64.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access is nominated by the President of Finland in accordance with the president of Landsting. If a consensus is not reached, the Finnish President appoints the governor from among five candidates nominated bv· the legislative assembly.43 A noteworthy feature in the relations between the regional and central levels is the existence of joint committees. 1he dland Delegation is a joint committee of the regional government and Finland's state authorities. It consists of five members, two of which are elected by the and two by the legislative assembly of Aland, with the Governor being the chairman of the delegation. This delegation functions as a mediator and facilitator between the parties in case of possible disputes between regional and state authorities. In South Tyrol there are two functioning joint committees which must be consulted in matters relating to the implementation of the autonomy statute. These com- mittees play a significant role in the interplay between state and regional administration."" As for the Basque Country, the only established joint committee works solely- on the matter of tax law and financing arrangements.

C. Scope and Financing of the Autonomy The self-governance in the Basque Country, South Tyrol and Aland is reflected in a long list of legislative and executive powers contained in their respective Acts on Autonomy to be exercised bW the community or provincial bodies. In the three cases, this degree of autonomy is complemented by an adequate provision of financial means or resources, which can be considered itself as an important guarantee for the functioning of self-gov- ernance. In the Western European context, it can be stated that these regions enjoy today extensive self-governance rights. If we compare their systems with those of other regions or autonomous entities in the surrounding countries, it is clear that the degree of self government granted to the Basque Country, South Tyrol and Aland are among the highest levels of decentralization across European states, including those of a federal nature. The level of self-government achieved by the Basque Country and South Tyrol is the most extensive within each of their respective Spanish and Italian systems. Outside these models but within Western European countries, it can only be compared with the autonomy enjoyed by the Faeroe Islands and Greenland in Denmark. The case of North- em Ireland is in this sense a peculiar one. This is because, on the one hand, the level of

-t3 Act on the Autonomy of Aland, Chapter 8, Governor and the gland delegation. 44 The joint committee on the regional level has twelve members 'of which six shall represent the state, two the Regional Parliament, two the Regional Parliament ofTrento and two that of Bolzano. Three of them must belong to the Italian speaking group'. The joint committee appointed to autonomous Province of Bolzano has six members of whom three shall represent the state and three the Province. One of the representatives of the sate must belong to German-speaking group, respectively one representative of the Province must be Italian. Special Statute for Trentino-Alto Adige, Article 107, the text can be found in the MIRIS data base at http://wvv.eurac.edu/miris; Francesco Palermo, 'Ruolo e natura delle Commissioni paritetiche e delle norme di attuazione, in Joseph Marko, Sergio Ortino and Francesco Palermo (eds.), Lordinamento special . 826--t-t.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access self-government actually recognized for devolved institutions is clearly lower than the one of the Basque Country, Aland and South Tyrol. But on the other hand, Northern Irish people enjoy the right to self-determination, as recognized in the Good Friday Agree- ment of 1998, unlike the populations of the Basque Country, South Tyrol or Aland.45 The Basque Country and South Tyrol share the element that their autonomous hodies have no explicit competencies in terms of international relations. In South Tyrol, however, the spirit to operate on an international level has increased. South Tyrol as well as the Province ofTrento are engaged in cross-horder cooperation with the Austrian Bundesland of Tyrol. This joint venture called Euroregion, aimed at promoting the economics of three regions, has its own representation in since 1995. 46 Aland has the possibility to overrule implementation of an international treaty should it collide with the Act on Autonomy. International issues remain as the sole jurisdiction of the state in all cases. However, in the case of the Aland Islands, the regional bodies play a role in international affairs according to their respective Acts on Autonomy. One result of the negotiations which preceded Finland's membership in the EU, was the so-called Aland Protocol'. According its provisions, Aland joined the EU as a Finnish region in 1995 becoming a member of the customs union but staying out of the tax union. Furthermore Aland's regional citizenship was about to stay in force despite colliding with the principles of the EU, namely free movement of people, goods and capital. The Aland Islands had an option to stay out of the EU when the rest of the state joined it, as an acknowledgement of its international status. There are some major differences among the three cases in terms of providing finan- cial autonomy. In South Tyrol, financing is provided by the state according to provisions laid out in the Autonomy Statute .47 Most of the revenues obtained hy the state in the province are transformed back to the budget of the autonomous bodies. In fact, the prov- ince receives some 90% of the tax revenues in return.48 Furthermore South Tyrol receives financing from the state for special projects in the region as well as financing from differ- ent EU funds. South Tyrol enjoys a broad financial autonomy compared with other Italian regions.49 In the Aland Islands the Finnish state collects the taxes in the same way as it does in other Finnish regions. Aland receives as compensation 0.45% of the state budget to cover the costs of local administration run by local authorities (the so-called 'amount of equali- sation'). The Act on Autonomy also contains several provisions on reasons that would

45 However, the concept of self-determination has been widely used in South Tyrol and, mainly, in the Basque Country. Indeed, the Basque parliament passed a political declaration in 1990 by an overwhelming majority stating the right of Basque people to self-determination. 46 Francesco Palermo, Die Auflenbeziehungen der italienischen Regionen in rechtsvergleichender Sicht (Frankfurt am Main, 1999), 37-8; Gunther Pallaver, 'I�Euroregione: un progetto a cavallo tra politica e diritto', in Joseph Marko, Sergio Ortino and Francesco Palermo (eds.), Lordinamento speciale ..., 943-58, at 943. 47 Article 78, Special Statute forTrentino-Alto Adige. 48 Ibid., Article 69. 49 Melissa Magliana, 7he Autonomous Province ..., 52-3.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access increase the sum granted for Aland.50 This rather flexible framework also fosters the inter- play between local authorities and central authorities when organizing and agreeing upon powers between local and state administrations in a changing environment. Occasionally regional or state authorities are temporarily vested with more competencies than are fore- seen in the Act of Autonomy in order to carry out a particular task In the case of the Basque Country, however, the autonomous system reflects the tra- ditional tax independence of the historical territories. In this sense, each Basque territory has its own treasury and is in charge of collecting taxes from citizens. After tax collection, provinces provide resources for the budget of the Autonomous Community first and then for that of the state for the powers exercised by the state inside the Basque Country. This system allows in practice an independent (although coordinated) functioning of the Basque treasury with respect to the state one. In circumstances where the economic situ- ation evolves better in the Basque Country than in Spain, or the autonomous administra- tions manage tax revenues better than the central tteasury, the Basque Country. obtains a benefit that would result in a loss if these factors were evolving the other way round. To summarize, the Basque Country is competent to create and collect its own taxes, while South Tyrol and Aland receive their financial means from their respective central govern- ments.

D. Political Rights The underlying principle is the guarantee of equal rights in political participation for all citizens of the state. In order to safeguard these principles for minorities, special protec- tion clauses are implemented bv the respective states. All Spanish citizens living in any municipality of the Basque Country are entitled to vote in the Basque autonomous elec- tions.52 Furthermore, all Spanish citizens and their descendents, even those living abroad, whose last residence in the Spanish state was located in any of the municipalities of the Basque Country, are entitled to vote and to be elected. Therefore, there is no requirement of a residence period to achieve political rights in the Basque system. In the autonomous province of Bolzano, on the contrary, there is a requirement of four years of uninterrupted residence to be entitled to vote and be elected in provincial polls, as established in Article 25 of the Statute. In Aland, the Act on Autonomy creates regional citizenship and the right to domicile as tools for the preservation of the Swedish identity of the Islands. This regional citizenship is a prerequisite to public posts and participation in an election of the legislative assembly of Aland. The right to own and hold real estate in Aland is reserved for persons with the right of domicile. Regional citizenship is acquired at birth if one of the parents possesses Aland citizenship. Immigrants, holding Finnish citizenship, who have lived in Aland for five years and have satisfactory knowledge of Swedish, can obtain

50 Act on the Autonomy of Aland, Chapter 7. 51 Farimah Daftary,'Insular Autonomy ...', 45; Act on Autonomy of land, Section 32. 52 Article 7 of the Statute.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access Aland citizenship upon application. On the contrary, persons who have been a resident outside Aland for longer than five years lose their regional citizenship.s3 In the field of linguistic rights, according to the Act on Autonomy of the Basque Country Article 6, Basque and Spanish are both official languages in the whole territory. According to this element of personal autonomy, everybody has the right to use either of these languages in both private and public life. Spanish citizens have the obligation to know Spanish 5^ but there is no obligation to know any other language of the state. The official statute of the Basque language follows a territorial model. Basque is also supposed to be official in some areas of Navarra. In theory, any citizen is entitled to use any of the official languages in his or her relations with any public administration, including the judi- ciary. However, the sociolinguistic reality of the country precludes the full implementation of this provision. It must be said also that some sectors of public administration, especially those depending on the central government, are very reluctant to implement any measures to facilitate the incorporation of the Basque language into the public relations sphere. In the case of South Tyrol, Article 99 of the Autonomy Statute states that within the region the German language enjoys equal status with Italian. This clause could be con- sidered as a proclamation of the official status of German in the whole region. However, this is not the interpretation commonly accepted. In general, German is considered to be an official language in the territorial sense in South Tyrol, while on the regional level, the German-speaking citizens of South Tyrol have the right to use German in their relations with regional bodies.55 In this sense, the status of German can be considered as official in a territorial sense in South Tyrol and in a personal sense at the regional administrative level. The cannot be considered an official language according to the Statute. If there were a similar official status for the Ladin language, this would not spread over the valleys of Badia and Gardena.

E. Legal Guarantees of the Autonomy Regime We can distinguish some differences between the guarantees given by the three self governmental systems. From the constitutional perspective, the Spanish Constitution recognizes, under Article 2, the right to autonomy of the nationalities that make up the 'Spanish nation'; but there is no further provision for granting autonomy to the Basque Country. The map of autonomous communities is not drawn in the Constitution and, in this sense, there is no specific guarantee for providing autonomy for the Basque Country as a whole. This also explains the fact that Navarra constitutes an autonomous community itself. Another difference in terms of guarantees appears with respect to international law. South Tyrol's autonomy was first granted by the Gruber - De Gasperi Agreement of 1946. To be precise, what was granted was the territorial autonomy of the German-speaking

53 Act on the Autonomy of Aland, Chapter 2. 54 Article 3 of the Spanish Constitution. 55 Article 100 of the Statute of Trentino-Alto Adige.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access population. Similarly, one of the bases for the devolution of the position of the Aland Islands was bilateral negotiations between Sweden and Finland. The consequence of these negotiations was the so called Aland Agreement' in which Finland basically guaranteed to preserve the Swedish language and culture of the islanders,56 In the Basque case no international guarantee for autonomy exists. Possible disputes between autonomous and central institutions are solved in a very similar way in the cases of South Tyrol and the Basque Country. On the one hand, the constitutional court holds judicial power over autonomous and central authorities. Autonomous and state acts can be taken before the constitutional court, and the latter can declare them to be unconstitutional. However, we must remember here that the composi- tion of the constitutional court in the Spanish and Italian systems does not come from a balanced election between state and regions or communities, as is the case in Germany. On the other hand, the Italian and Spanish states hold means to control the activities of the autonomous powers. These possible measures of control are foreseen in the Constitu- tions and the respective Statutes of Autonomy. This element stresses the characteristic of a unitary state, in which the political power is delegated into decentralized entities, which are not considered as constituent parts of the state. In the case of Aland different bodies are involved with mediation, both on a regional and on a state level. The rather informal joint committee, Aland's delegation, functions as a mediator in the case of disputes and consults legislative processes. After hearing the opinion of the supreme court, the President of Finland can veto passing a bill or part of it. This can be done when the president considers that Aland's legislative assembly has exceeded its powers or if the external or internal safety of the country is jeopardized.57 If an international treaty between Finland and a foreign state is signed it has to be in line with the Autonomy Act. If the negotiations deal with the subjects falling into the competency of the Aland Islands, the government of Aland should be informed and they should be provided with the possibility to take part in the negotiations.s8 It is possible that an international treaty, ratified by Finland, will not apply to Aland. The Finnish court holds competency over the matters related to the Aland Islands.39 Finally, some words should be said about amending the Acts on Autonomy. In the Basque Country, the reform process is a quite complex one. In each case, the new text must be passed by the central parliament and submitted to a referendum of the Basque people. These requirements stress the contract nature of the aforementioned Autonomy

56 This agreement is often quoted as an example of a longstanding bilateral trean. However, the Äland Agree- ment was not a legally binding treaty and it developed only later into international customary rule seen to oblige Finland to safeguard the Alanders' autonomy Kristian l\lmtti,'1he Aland Model - its Background and Special Characteristics', in Harry Jansson and Johannes Salminen (eds.), 77e Second Aland Islands Ques- tion...,110. For the text of the agreement see, for instance, Hurst Hannum (ed.), Documents on Autonomy and 'Minority Rights (Dordrecht 1993),141-3. 57 Act on the Autonomy of Aland, Chapter 4. 58 Ibid, Chapter 9, Section 58. 59 Markku Suksi,'Autonomy and Self-Government by International Decision', in Harry Jansson and Johannes Salminen (eds.), The Second Aland Islands Question ..., 84-5.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access Act. On the contrary, the Autonomy Statute of South Tyrol and the Act on Autonomy of Aland must be reformed following the process for constitutional laws as foreseen in the respective Constitutions. This means that neither the region nor the provinces have final decision-making power to amend the text. In this sense, the South Tyrol and Aland autonomy systems do not enjoy the same democratic guarantee included in the Act on Autonomy for the Basque autonomy system. However, it must be taken into consideration that in the Basque case there are no constitutional or international guarantees, as we have already mentioned above.

IV. ELEMENTS FOR COMPARISON: POLITICS AND CONFLICT From a political point of view, South Tyrol and the Basque Country are social realities in which different and even contradictory political aspirations coexist even if the Basque Country is the only one suffering from open violence. Aland, unlike the two other regions, can be described as a peaceful society where no major tension can be sensed. However, it would be misleading to think that there would not be any aspiration on the side of Alanders or Finns to reform or change the current status of the Aland Islands' autonomy. Thus, the politicians in Aland have so far been mediating in spite of some smaller disputes caused mainly by frustration of Alanders at not having enough competencies to influence decisions making especially at a European level. In the South Tyrolean case, there has always been a political aspiration in favour of reincorporating the land into its kin-state or, at least, the recognition of the right of the South Tyrolean people to self-determination. This aspiration clashes with the state view of the territorial integrity of the Italian Republic. In the case of the Basque Country, the original aspiration for Basque national identity is the independence of the country or, at least, the recognition of self-determination for the Basque people. On the other hand, national unity is one of the basic elements of the construction of the Spanish political identity. Therefore, both cases demonstrate a political conflict with contradictory political aspirations having long-established historical roots. The origin of the nationalist ideology60 in South Tyrol and in the Basque Country relates to the idea of 'nation', which was consolidated in the nineteenth century. In the Basque area, the Basque national identity in the modern sense appears in the last decade of the nineteenth century, claiming independence of the country from Spain and France. These two states had also lived a process of nationalization that, in the case of the Basque territories, had brought these provinces to an almost complete unification with the rest of the state. In South Tyrol, nationalism did not appear until the region was annexed by Italy. The Fascist period did not allow this ideology to emerge and develop. Yet, at the end of

60 When we use the term 'nationalist ideology', we normally refer to an aspiration to sovereignty that can be appreciated in several nationalities or national minorities that do not enjoy their own political frame- work nor belong to their respective kin-state. 'State ideology' in the sense of the maintenance of territorial integrity without consideration for the wishes for self-determination of these communities can be also considered as nationalistic, but this expression is not normally used in this sense. We will refer to this type of aspiration as 'unionist'.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access the Second World War, the sense of political organization of the South Tyrolean people around the Sudtiroler Volkspartei/South Tyrolean Peoples Party (SVP) in a new form of nationalism appeared very clearly. The difference between the Basque and the Tyrolean nationalism is that the aspirations of this ideology are experienced differently in the prac- tical arena. While in the Basque case, self-determination would be a step forward in the construction of a new political entity, in South Tyrol, the process of self-determination would be addressed in terms of unification with the kin-state and with the rest of Tyrol. In this sense, the former can be considered as a separatist nationalism and the latter as an irredentist nationalism. There are two different interpretations of history, which to a certain extent still coex- ist in South Tyrol playing an important role as a matrix for the collective memory of the different language groups. Extreme Italian interpretation sees South Tyrol as an ancient Italian territory, whose original inhabitants were 'Germanized' over the centuries; Italians are the rightful owners of the region because they were original inhabitants of the area. Furthermore, South Tyrol formed a natural border between Austria and Italy. The water- shed was also used as a geopolitical argument for the Italian condition of the region, just as the nature (climate and flora) were described to be Italian. The German interpretation sees the German-speaking population as victims of imperialistic Italian policy for which the Italian state has never formally apologized. The specialists of the League of Nations addressed in their statement that the Aland Islands are geographically part of the Finnish archipelago and this was used as one of the arguments for leaving Aland under Finnish supremacy. The secession of Aland from Finland would have decreased the number of Swedish-speaking inhabitants within the Finnish state having a negative impact on the status of the Swedish- speaking popula- tion as a whole. Aland was seen as a sound stronghold for Swedish culture in Finland. It was feared that otherwise it would be only a matter of time before the Swedish-speaking population on the mainland would lose their identity and be assimilated into the over- whelming Fmnish majority. When studying Finland's history after the independence declaration61 one can find a very sensitive approach towards the Swedish-speaking minority vested with broad protective rights. The long historical evolution can be given as an explanation, with the consequence that Finland's Swedish-speaking minority identifies itself with the Finnish state and not with Sweden. It is true that Swedish was the language of the elite and that the influence of this elite has been and is stronger in Finnish society than one would think when judging only by the numbers. The winners of the civil war were bourgeois, the so-called 'whites' among which the majority of Swedish-speaking Finns obviously fought.

61 Finland declared itself independent on 6 December 1917. Russia's revolutionary Bolshevik government recognized Finnish independence on 31 December. The political situation in Finland became strained and led to civil war between government troops (so-called 'whites') and socialists ('reds').'Ihe clement of a war of independence was present as well since the Finnish government forces had to drive away Russian troops still located on Finnish territory. The civil war ended in May 1918 with the victory of the `whites'. The main outline of Finnish history as well as other material dealing with Finland's history can be found on the inter- net at Virtual Finland, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, http://virtual.finland.fi/finfo/english/hist.html.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access One could say that the Swedish-speaking Finns fought on the right side in order to be entitled to extensive rights within the new republic. Moreover, it can be asked whether there were other reasons taken into consideration by the political elite of that time. Per- haps the existence and well being of a Swedish minority could be seen as a way to protect the Finnish state from the threat of the revolutionary, unstable eastern neighbour. By guaranteeing and safeguarding its Swedish-speaking minority, Finland tied itself more strongly and more closely to the Scandinavian countries.This served as well to support the identity-building of the state as a western country. In other words, the institutionalized existence of a Swedish-speaking minority in Finland could be seen as a form of defence policy. Aland's yearning for joining its kin-state in 1917 (being brought up again in 1945 by the Alandic legislative assembly)63 has rational reasons. An unstable Finnish state neighbouring an unstable and imperialist Russia and later Soviet Union superpower was not a very appealing host. Sweden's delicate and refraining approach towards Aland has definitely had a major impact on the devolution of the status of the islands. The reasons for Sweden's policy have been a mixture of diplomacy and domestic and foreign policy. Furthermore, Sweden's own approach as a centralized state towards its Finnish minorities in the past would have given rather little moral legitimacy to interfere in Finland's policy on Aland.64 Both South Tyrol and the Basque Country have a common past of suffering during the 20th century under different totalitarian regimens. In the Tyrolean case, the Fascist period lasted for 20 years from 1922 to 1943. After the surrender of the Italian forces, the German Reich annexed de facto South Tyrol and other territories under the new entity of Operationszone Alpenvorland until the end of the war in 1945. In the Basque case, the totalitarian experience begun under the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-29), but an even more brutal repression was suffered under Franco for nearly 40 years (1937-76). In the same context, it is worth mentioning that nationalist ideology has played in both cases a bigger role than the exclusively political one. Nationalist ideology has func- tioned as an element of socialization and a tool for the construction and maintenance of the community itself. Nationalism, in this sense, has given to the autochthonous culture, language, and way of life the space and means to manifest and develop itself. In both cases (similar to the Irish nationalism of the nineteenth century), nationalism has developed not

62 The term `rejoin' is commonly used in literature dealing with the Alands Islands. However, from the histori- cal point of view the term is slightly problematic. Aland formed its own administrative region or was ruled from the Finnish mainland for centuries. It was part of the Finnish Grand Duchy under Russian supremacy 1809-1917. Sweden, or Finland-Sweden, as an entity to which Aland helonged for centuries, no longer existed after 1809. Aland was a part of the Finnish state which declared its independence from Russia in December 1917. 63 Kristian Myntti, `The Aland Model...', 112. 64 See, for instance, Sia Spilipoulou Akermark, 'Steps Towards a Minority Policy in Sweden' in Snezana Trifu- novska (ed.), Minority Rights in Europe. European Minorities and Languages (The Hague, 2001),103; Jarmo Lainio,'European Linguistic Diversity - for whom? The Cases of Finland and Sweden', Mercator Working Papers 7/2002, 29-31.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access only a strong political party (SVP in South Tyrol, PNV and others in the Basque Coun- try), but also a wide web of cultural, sport, leisure, church associations, alternative systems of communications, community activities, gatherings, and many other issues to support the sense of community and identity. Similarly, it is of interest to note that in both communities the has traditionally played an important role in maintaining and developing a different national identity, mainly through the linguistic heritage and the traditionally close link between the nationalist movement and important sectors of the Church itself. Both South Tyrol and the Basque Country have a strong Catholic tradition, with very high indices of active participation in Catholic services, at least, until the 1970s. This characteristic of South Tyrolean and Basque nationalism was in fact shared by the traditional nationalism in Ire- land and even Quebec until the 1970s, both also being mainly Catholic rural countries. In all three cases examined the dominant religion of the self-governing region is the same as in the state under whose supremacy it belong. However, it is very hard to indi- cate clearly its impact on the political conflict at hand. In the case of South Tyrol, for instance, the Catholic Church has been an important element in the identity-building of the German-speaking language group. Furthermore, it has played a significant role in preservation of the local identity and culture. On the other hand it could be seen as well as a mediator towards Catholic Italian society. It is worth mentioning here that both the SVP and PNV share a Christian-Demo- crat ideology. Both were members of the European Christian-Democrat family from the foundation of this movement, although today the PNV is not part of the European Peoples Party (EPP) due to PNV's bitter differences with the Spanish Popular Party. However, the respective Members of the of the SVP and PNV have participated in the work of the European parliamentary group of the EPP. On the other hand, the unionist ideology is linked in both cases with the immigrant population living in South Tyrol or in the Basque Country. However, in the South Tyro- lean case, due to the clear division of linguistic communities, we can fully identify the Italian-speaking population (which today means primarily descendants of immigrants) with unionism, while in the Basque Country the reality is not so easy to establish. In fact, it is easy to show the link in the vote between immigrants (or descendants of immigrants) with unionist parties. And it is also true that one of the three geographical origins of the current Spanish Workers Socialist Party was the area of immigrant population around Bilbao. But the correlation between unionism and immigration is not definitive at all in deciding the vote. There is also a native sector, mainly linked with the industrial and banking oligarchies of Biscay and Gipuzkoa, which has traditionally been unionist and in general attached to the Spanish right-wing ideologies. Basque nationalism is of course stronger among the native population, becoming almost monopolistic in the rural areas and between the Basque-speaking populations. In any case, both South Tyrol and the Basque Country show an identity also in the fact that nationalism is a majority ideology according to regional polls. In South Tyrol, the votes obtained by the different German and Ladin parties have always been more than 60%. In the Basque case, according to the autonomous polls celebrated since 1980,

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access political parties in favour of self-determination for the Basque Country have in all cases obtained around 60% of the votes. In this respect, in both cases we can appreciate a very fixed behaviour in the electoral sociology. The native/immigrant ascendant, the linguistic ability and the rural/urban environment of living have a very strong influence on the vote of the South Tyrolean and Basque peoples. This influence is greater in the case of South Tyrol, since the social and political division of the linguistic communities is quite clearly defined. In the Basque Country, there is a very consistent pattern in the electoral behaviour, but the flexibility is greater in the sense that all political parties compete in practice for the votes of all social and linguistic sectors of the society. In any case, both societies are characterized by a very strong electoral sociology with very little space for external conditions to have any influence, The vote is probably to be understood as an element of identification with the respective community, although in the Basque case the ideological element plays a role in many cases. Aland, on the contrary, is a remarkably homogeneous region with regard to the language of its inhabitants. In this respect, the difference in political arrangements and voting behaviour as compared to the Swedish-speaking minority in Finland is obvious. In Aland ethnicity is not the guiding principle which controls the voting, as it is on the mainland among the Swedish- speaking Finns. Hence, we can see a difference between Aland and the other two cases, particularly South Tyrol, where so far ethnicity has been a major factor influencing in voting." The most visible differences between the political reality in South Tyrol, the Aland Islands and that in the Basque Country are the involve- ment of international actors, the use or lack of violence, and the perception of the conflict as a settled or an open one. First, the fact that South Tyrol and Aland have their own respective kin-states makes a significant difference with regard to the Basque conflict. In the case of Aland, Sweden could be considered theoretically as the kin-state, although the role played by this king- dom can hardly be considered as such in political terms, at least for the last decades. Aus- tria, however, has traditionally played a role in the South Tyrolean case. In contrast, the Basque Country has no kin-state. Even more, the division of the historical and cultural Basque territory into two different states does not make the conflict international, but rather a two-fold internal conflict. In this sense, the interests of the French and Spanish states are convergent. Unlike in the Tyrol and Aland cases, no international organization or institution has taken part in the solution of the Basque conflict, and both interested states are very reluctant to accept any international intervention to resolve the conflict. In the Basque case, there is not even the possibility of indirect intervention by a third state, as exemplified by the determinant role of the United States (apart from the United King- dom and Ireland) in the Northern Ireland conflict. Therefore, the contradictory political aspirations are in any case unbalanced, one being represented by the Spanish state and the opposing one lacking any state or international support.

65 Alcock mentions the term apartheid in his text when describing the ethnical exclusion taking place in South Tyrolean society. Antony Alcock, The South TyrolAutonomy ...,17. See as well critical article by Thomas Kager, 'South Tyrol: Mitigated hut not Resolved', 1(3) OnlineJournal of Peace and Conflict Resolution (1998).

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access The issue of open violence constitutes the second main difference between the three cases. While Aland has not suffered from the effects of violence used to meet political aspirations, in both South Tyrol and Basque Country violent actions appeared during the 1960s as manifestations of the dissatisfaction of the respective nationalist sides. However, a great difference in these two cases is also visible: In South Tyrol violence remains as something belonging to the past with no important consequences, being present in politi- cal debates but hardly in everyday life. On the contrary, in the Basque Country the use of violence by some sectors has enormously affected not only the political debate but also the everyday life of citizens. It must be clearly said at this point that current support for the armed struggle car- ried out by ETA in the Basque Country is becoming marginal. If the supposed political branch of ETA (�) has fallen to 10% of the votes in the last polls (May 2001) after the breakdown of the ceasefire (against 18% during the ceasefire in 1998), we know from different surveys that at least half of the voters of Batasuna do not agree with the use of violence by ETA. This would mean that support for use of violence would be at maximum about 5%. It is also true that after 40 years of armed struggle and violence not only by ETA but also by the state in many cases, there is an important sector of the popu- lation suffering directly from the conflict (relatives of prisoners, victims of state violence, ...) whose position tends to be favourable to that of ETA. We cannot forget the years of brutal repression under Franco's dictatorship and the campaigns of dirty war against ETA carried out by the Spanish government during the 1970s and 1980s. Death squads created with the complicity of some members of the socialist government in the 1980s caused some 30 deaths, many of whom were completely innocent. There are currently repeated and well-founded accusations of the torture and ill-treatment of detainees, exceptional legislation for the fight against terrorism that is questioned by the and a very hard-line policy against the ETA prisoners and their relatives that is also widely contested by Basque society At the same time, the vast majority of the Basque population has shown its disap- proval of ETAs criminal methods many times, and has asked for the dissolution of this group or, at least, its abandonment of the use of violent methods for political purposes. In any case, the violent element, not being a substantial part of the real political problem of the Basque Country, seriously complicates the search for a lasting resolution and makes the division between the different ideologies wider and bitterer.

66 In March 2003, Batasuna was banned by the Spanish Supreme Court, according to a new act on political parties, passed by the Spanish Parliament in 2002 with the clear aim of banning this concrete formation. The main urrionist parties supported the approval of this act, while Basque national parties and the opposed it in vain. The act was appealed by the before the Constitutional Court on the grounds of violation of freedom of association and political rights but this appeal was rejected. The decision taken by the Supreme Court is expected to be challenged before the European Court of Human Rights. 67 This can be observed in all the comments made by the UN Human Rights Committee and UN Committee against torture in the Spanish reports. The same can be said with respect to the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture. The last report published on the situation in Spain refers very closely and harshly to the conditions suffered by many Basque citizens; see http://www.cpt.int/ en/reports/inf2003-22en.htm.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access In this respect, one can identify today three different and very distinct groups in Basque politics: defenders of the right of self-determination, opponents of this right and a third group represented so far mainly by Batasuna,b8 which does not condemn ETAs violence, thus making any kind of political collaboration with the rest of Basque national parties impossible. The third important element of difference in this field is the perception of the conflict as existing or as a settled one. In the case of the Aland Islands and South Tyrol, a solu- tion for an ethnic and political problem has been found through the legal framework in force. Even more, these two autonomous regimes, including their respective complemen- tary measures of minority rights protection, are considered as internationally recognized models of solutions to national minority conflicts. Although there are political forces trying to achieve different degrees of reform in the system of South Tyrol (mainly the UFS on the nationalist side), a large majority of the population supports the current framework through the acceptance by the SVP of autonomy as an adequate model for living within the Italian state. In the Basque case, however, the political conflict is not resolved at all, not because there are still violent expressions, but due to the persistence of a strong disagreement on the self-determination question and the lack of consensus on the whole legal framework. On the one hand, the Spanish Constitution obtained a very narrow support of the Basque population in the referendum held on 6 December 1978 (30% of the census against 60% in the rest of the state). On the other, the Act on Autonomy for the Basque Country did secure the support of more than 50% of the census, but an important sector is still outside this system of autonomy and considers it as an imposition from the state. What is more, among the parties that once supported this statute there is today a deep disagreement on the interpretation of many clauses and, more importantly, on the very role played by this statute. While for the Spanish parties the statute is basically the final point of the Basque self-government and the highest level of autonomy possible within the Spanish Constitution, for the Basque parties the statute is only a step forward in the process of self-governance and it does not imply that the Basque people have renounced their right to self-determination. For the former, the constitution is the limit for any possible reform in the future; for the latter, the only limit would be the will expressed by the citizens of the Basque community. All this brings us to an easy conclusion that the Basque political conflict is far from a lasting solution. Any analysis of the development of Basque politics in the last five years would stress the affirmation that the disagreement between the Spanish and Basque par- ties is even deeper than ever in the past. It is not easy to foresee the future evolution of the situation in the Basque Country, although there is a strong tendency towards a deadlock

68 Recently a new political structure was created under the name Autodeterminaziorako Bilgunea (AUB, Grouping for Self-determination) to take part in the local and provincial polls of May 2003. However, the lists of candidates presented by this formation have also been banned, since the state bodies think this is a mere continuation of the already illegal Batasuna. Nowadays there is no legal political formation that can be considered as a clear representative of this sector.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access in the system, followed by a deeper division of the Basque society into the three different political blocks we have referred to earlier.69 Finally, another important element in the solution of this type of conflict is the attitude of the population living in the state but outside the conflict region. In the Basque case, the Spanish population experiences the conflict in a very sensitive way and the main Spanish political parties use the confrontation strategy against Basque nationalism in the search for sociopolitical cohesion. The political debate with Basque nationalism and the fight against violent action are very often highlighted, and public opinion is strongly shaped by views of the state mass media on this conflict. In such a situation, any possible solution in terms of recognition of the demands of the nationalists can be seen as a betrayal to one of the essential elements of the state. At the same time, the possible elements of asym- metry that could be integrated in favour of the Basque Country would be understood as privileges, and other Autonomous Communities would claim the same level of self-gov- ernment. Thus, asymmetry becomes very difficult for the Spanish constitutional structure. It is rather subjective to claim that this element is also present in the South Tyrolean case, but in general terms, the perception of the South Tyrolean autonomy by the rest of Italy as a privileged system does exist. Some also claim that the evolution from living side-by-side to living together (cohabi- tation) has been prevented in South Tyrol .70 This has been based mainly on unwilling- ness of the local political elite to change and develop the situation between the different language groups. Institutionalizing the ethnic division was introduced by a proportional system according to which everyone has to claim his or her linguistic affiliation every tenth year. In this context adjusting politics along ethnic lines cannot be promoted and accepted without reservation. The broad tax autonomy of the autonomous region of Trentino-Alto Adige causes envy within other Italian regions. Other prosperous Northern Italian regions in particu- lar find it hard to accept that their tax revenues are used by the central administration to subsidize poorer and less developed Southern Italian regions when at the same time South Tyrol can retain its revenues practically to be used for its own ends .71 This element is also present in the case of the Aland Islands. For some Finnish citizens Aland's special status has been hard to legitimate. Critics argue that Aland does not really take part in financing the maintenance and development of expensive public goods and infrastructure. The exemption of Alanders from compulsory military service sometimes causes bitterness among Finns who see it as an advantage when competing in the fields of education and labour. The fishing contingent, which is very beneficial for the Alanders and the state sub- ventions for Aland shipping have recently generated criticism towards Aland's position as a Finnish region.

69 See an analysis of the Basque conflict in Xabier Etxeberria et al., Derecbo de autodeterminacion y realidad vasca (Vitoria, 2003). 70 See, for instance, Thomas Kager,'South Tyrol ...'; Melissa Magliana, The Autonomous Province ..., 24-5. 71 Ibid , 53.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access Yet, as things stand, we cannot compare the sensitiveness of the Italian population with regard to South Tyrol or that of the Finns regarding Aland's autonomy with that of the Spaniards in relation to the Basque Country. In fact, South Tyrol is not today an important issue on the Italian political agenda, neither is Aland in Finnish politics. The Basque conflict, on the contrary, is probably the most important aspect of domestic poli- tics in the Spanish state. Therefore, we consider this to be an important difference between these cases, at least in the current situation.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS The comparative analysis of the realities of South Tyrol, the Aland Islands and the Basque Country has been so far extended to a number of issues, classified into social, political, and legal aspects. A table displaying most of these concrete elements for comparison has been inserted at the end of this paper. Although the role played by these elements is obviously very different in each case, it is arguably useful to make an overview of the general results provided by such a table before coming to more structured conclusions. The table compiles 53 concrete issues or elements of comparison, again grouped according to their sociological, political or legal nature. In 14 out of the 53 issues, we found similarities among the three cases referred to in this paper, noting that most of them refer to the legal or institutional framework provided for the respective autonomies. As for the rest, we found the highest numbers of similarities between the Basque Country and South Tyrol (17), and between South Tyrol and Aland (16). Finally, only in six issues did we find a similarity which existed in common between the Basque Country and Aland but not in common with the South Tyrol. Furthermore, none of these common issues corresponds to the political aspects considered. In general, we can identify two important present differences, which make the three cases rather distinct from each other. The first refers to national identity. National iden- tification is established in a different way in each of the examined cases. In the case of South Tyrol, identity is linked to the ethnicity inherited by birth. In fact, there is a clear difference of ethnic or national identities, perhaps due to the fact that there is a kin-state for the national minority concerned, although the Autonomy Act does not include any provisions regarding South Tyrol's bond to Austria.72 In Aland, identity is based mainly on ius sanguinis. In any event, the government of Aland can award regional citizenship on application. It is important to note that in Finland a Swedish surname does not necessarily indicate a person's lingual affiliation, nor are the two language groups easily distinguishable by appearance. In the Basque country, however, there is no kin-state and the construction of national identities is for some cases alternative, but for some other, complementary. For identity is based in the end on a personal decision and not only on the circumstances where the primary socialization takes place.

72 Jens Woellc, 'Reconciliation Impossible or (only) Undesirable? South Tyrolean Experiences', paper pre- sented at the conference 'Ethnic Diversity', Graz 1-2 March 2002, at http://www.peaceproject.at/ PPdocs /South Tirol study_Woelk.pdf.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access The second main difference is the perception of the conflict as settled or on-going. South Tyrol, like the Aland Islands, is considered today as an example of a successful solution to national minority conflicts, while the complex system in force in the Basque Country has not been able to gain the clear support of all the sectors concerned and the conflict remains alive. In fact, the existence of an ongoing conflict shows that the system has not been able to solve the problem in a peaceful and generally accepted way. In this respect, there is a big difference between the Tyrolean and Alandic cases, on the one hand, and the situation in the Basque Country, on the other. This leads us to different conclu- sions with regard to the political future of the three territories. To summarize, we foresee a broad perspective of stability and consolidation of the territorial autonomy in both South Tyrol and the Aland Islands. In the Basque Country, on the contrary, we predict ongoing instability at least in the near future, challenging the maintenance and consolidation of the current territorial autonomy. The Basque conflict does not appear so much in a violent way (in spite of the dramatic consequences of the use of violence by small minorities), as it does politically between supporters and opponents of the right to self-determination. This confrontation between political blocks, reflecting different national identities, is also increasing, at least in view of recent political practice. The use of violence by an armed group like ETA, with little but significant support, does not help at all in the search for a solution to the political problem. At the same time, the response of the state in combating the violence sometimes falls out- side the rule of law, adding in this way some fuel to the fire. Finally, violence is too-often used as an excuse to deny the existence of a political problem in the Basque Country, and to identify terrorism with any kind of aspiration of sovereignty. Taking into consideration the current political situation in the Basque Country, it is very difficult to formulate a vision for its future. All possible scenarios aimed at solving the problems or defusing the tension are facing considerable obstacles. In this respect, we foresee three possible future evolutions of the political status of this area: 1) Maintenance of the current status quo; 2) Creation of a higher level of self-government for the Basque Country inside the Spanish state; 3) Secession from Spain and creation of a new Basque State. The first of these is the proposal of the two main unionist parties (Partido Popular and Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol), with some differences in respect to the development of autonomy. However, keeping the actual status quo at the moment means preserving the instability of the region. The majority of people in the Basque Country vote in favour of political parties defending the right to self-determination, which is not recognized in the legal framework, while other groups have been excluded from the democratic arena against the majority of Basque public opinion. Political instability and confrontation affect institutional relations between central and autonomous governments, creating more and more practical problems in social and economic aspects. The process of structuring the system of autonomous communities all over Spain with balanced powers reduces the symbolic value of the Basque autonomy; in addition, armed struggle proves to be very difficult to erase by police means only.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access A solution based on the creation of a new framework of stronger self-government within the Spanish state, would be the proposal of the Spanish United Left (in favour of a federal solution) and a significant sector of the PNV, beginning with the current presi- dent of the Basque government.'3 However, there are many problems when it comes to implementing this solution. The question of the right to self-determination would remain in any case as the main obstacle to achieving such a solution. In addition, there is not very much room to maneuvre in creating new powers for the autonomous institutions without taking them from the basic core powers of the state. According to a broad reading of the statute in force, the Basque Autonomous Community has powers in almost all the areas apart from defence, international relations, border control, justice, citizenship, passport issuance and criminal law. At the same time, this solution would have to face the risk of not getting the support from both sides of the political confrontation. In addition, it would not be acceptable for Spain to create such different treatment for one region, with- out accommodating the others in the same way The domino effect would play a role, at least in a rhetorical sense. The third possibility for the future is independence, with the creation of a new Basque state. This is the solution preferred by political parties like Batasuna,74 (EA),'S and some sectors of PNV,76 always through the democratic exercise of the right to self-determination. The main problems for this solution, apart from the lack of mas- sive support at this particular moment, would be the territorial question. In drafting the borders of the new state, many Basques would be left out if Navarra were not part of it. Conversely, many non-Basque people would be included in the new state if Navarra were incorporated. A similar problem could arise for the province of Alava, whose rate of Basque national identity is clearly lower than the one of Biscay and Gipuzkoa. Citizen- ship of the new state should be inclusive in any case, and possibilities for keeping double nationality (like in Northern Ireland) would be strongly recommended. However, at the moment, the Spanish (and French) state can never accept this possibility without fearing a strong effect on the national sentiment of its population. The position of Spain (and France) would be decisive for the new state to be recognized within the international community and to keep itself inside the EU. In any case, the territorial autonomy established through the Statute of 1979 is today in crisis. There is no defined model for the future of the Basque Country and all possible

73 The Basque president (a member of PNV), has recently announced an initiative to propose a new status of free association with Spain in which the Basque Country would enjoy new powers and the right to decide its final political framework in a referendum. The proposal has been strongly rejected from the start by the Spanish unionist parties. 74 This is supposed to be the political branch of ETA. As we mentioned already, this party was banned in 2003. 75 EA (Basque Solidarity) is a centre-left wing party that was created in 1986 after an important split in the PNV The PNV and EA went in a coalition to the last regional polls in 2001, obtaining 43% of the votes, the best percentage ever reached by any political formation in the Basque Autonomous Community. 76 We could include here some other minor political parties on the left, like Aralar or .

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access solutions appear equally unsatisfactory for a significant sector of the population. The cur- rent model has helped to consolidate an autonomous system that worked reasonably well for about 15 years. However, at any given moment, an important political sector of the Basque Country has been excluded from this consensus. This exclusion of an important political share has also created the political condition for the keeping of a violent group alive. Today, disagreements in the interpretation of the statute and in the political aspira- tions of both the Spanish and the Basque parties are taking the situation to a permanent confrontation. Unless there is a kind of consensus on the principle of self-determination to create a new system with the agreement of all main parties, it will remain difficult to achieve a lasting solution to the national identity conflict in the Basque Country. However, in a very different situation, like the one in South Tyrol or the Aland Islands, a specific model of territorial autonomy can be considered as a successful experience. Taking into account the present high standard of living both in Aland and South Tyrol, it can be argued that a functioning autonomy is still the best way to guarantee the ethni- cally non-fitting state borders from the fear of secession and at the same time assure the minority the right to self-government and to maintain its identity. South Tyrol is often quoted as a rare example of solving violent ethnic conflict by introducing a functional territorial (and personal) autonomy. South Tyrol enjoys effec- tive minority protection and its economy has flourished during the time it has formed an autonomous province within the Italian state structure. The Italian state has benefited as well from the booming, stable South Tyrolean economy. Furthermore, South Tyrol's natu- ral resources, especially its hydroelectric capacities, are valuable for the whole country. ï7 However, the case of South Tyrol also shows some degree of uncertainty The peaceful solution to the conflict was meritoriously found after the goodwill shown by different par- ties to the dispute. The remedy was 'tolerance established by law' incorporating a system of rotation, parity and proportional representation.78 Due to current minority protection, the threat of assimilation is not present anymore. The structure of the autonomy status is based on ethnic division, to parallel societies that have rather little in common. These societies have been living together peacefully for the last 30 years. As things are at the moment, it could be claimed that South Tyrol is a prisoner of its own past. As time goes on, intermarriages are increasing at least in the urban areas of the region where the differ- ent linguistic groups have some interaction. Still, reform of the institutionalized lingual division has not really started nor is it desired by the majority of politicians and inhabit- ants. The German-speaking South Tyroleans have traditionally given their votes to the SVP based on the belief that a strong German party is needed to protect and guarantee their status. So far the attempts to establish a multiethnic party which would be attractive for large number of voters have been in vain. The secularization of society has led people to search elsewhere for belonging and continuity in their lives. For some individuals ethnicity and nationalism offer a way to

77 Melissa Magliana, TheAutonomous Province ..., 146-7. 78 Jens Woellc, 'Reconciliation Impossible ..., 5-6.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access fulfil this need. For politicians this might offer a way to gain easy votes by appealing to the emotionally charged topic of ethnicity. Despite many decades of peaceful coexistence, the potential threat of a return to shallow-minded ethnic policy has not entirely vanished from South Tyrol. The overwhelming victory for the position of the Italian nationalist right-wing parties in a local referendum held in Bolzano in October 2002, could be seen as a sign of an important protest attitude from the Italian group to the current situation. The EU has had a positive effect on certain sectors. For instance, it has increased cross-border cooperation between neighbouring regions. However, the question of the applicability of certain autonomy regulations (aimed at protection of the minorities) with EC law is problematic as these regulations collide with the principle of free movement in the common market. So far the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has not questioned the legitimacy of autonomy provisions.'9 The issue of shifting the policy and recomposing the institutions in South Tyrol touches very profound values of a society and its individuals. The question is should South Tyrolean society move away from maintaining linguistic groups and toward promoting a multiethnic society. Some authors suggest that the collective identity of the region could be based on the acceptance of the already-existing multicultural society, as a reality apart from the ethnicity of a member of the South Tyrolean society. The strategy to achieve this goal would call for concentrating on younger generations, establishing and increasing interethnic bonds among young people.80 In general it can be said that South Tyrol's extensive autonomy structure has been suc- cessful both in economic terms and for the preservation of the South Tyrolese (German) identity. The standard of living is high in the area, which serves to defuse the potential ten- sions between the language groups and promotes the maintenance of the current structure. Furthermore it has allowed for maintaining Italian unity without creating a bitter conflict. Apart from the aforementioned problems relating to the autonomy status of South Tyrol, no drastic changes in its status would be anticipated in the near future. As for the Aland, a remarkable feature is the absence of violence from the very begin- ning. Finland's reluctance to give up sovereignty over the islands has been demonstrated, for example, by the speeches given by the last two presidents of the state when visiting Aland. The reasons can be interpreted as being strategic. Finland holds a long democratic tradition and it would be rather unlikely that the majority of the Finnish-speaking population would not to be ready to accept the right of Alanders to self-determine their future. Aland has not been satisfied with its possibilities to influence decision-making on the European level. It has been disappointed with the fact that Finland has not been willing to preserve for it a seat among the representatives Finland has on European Parliament. Furthermore, the enlarge-

79 There have been two judgments issued by the ECJ touching on the field of language rights within South Tyrol's autonomy regulations. Neither of the rulings challenged the autonomy provisions but extend their scope. Ibid.,10. 80 This kind of idea would form sort of matrix for a shift towards shared society and 'civic nationalism',Thomas Kager, `South Tyrol ... ; Joseph Marko,'L'Alto Adige. Un `modello' per la composizione dei conflitti etnici?' in Joseph Marko, Sergio Ortino and Francesco Palermo (eds.), Lordinamento speciale ..., 959-84, at 982-3.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access ment of the brings with it the uncertainty of unforeseen influencing pos- sibilities in the future. Aland's strategic position on the Baltic Sea also changed after the Baltic countries joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Perhaps the potential membership of Sweden and/or Finland in NATO would finally allow Aland to make a clean break and open up all options for Aland from which to choose. As a part of Sweden, Aland could probably not maintain its special status, especially with regard to its linguistic protection and right to domicile. Another option presented would be the independence of the islands and joining the group of microstates. This would not, however, abolish problems rising from its insular location and dependence on external markets. Well-functioning contacts with the neighbouring countries as well as with EU institutions will continue to play a crucial role for the Aland Islands. One can ask whether the benefits gained by indepen- dence would be exceeded by the negative impacts and risks. Finally, all three cases have their own variable historical contexts and characteristics. It seems that in particular the cases of South Tyrol and Aland stress the importance of flexible autonomy implementation that permits asymmetry within the state structure. The small size of a given population with respect to that of the state, its distinguishable ethnic characteristics and its compact settlement are all factors which apparently increase the tolerance of special arrangements regarding that population within a democratic unitary state.

Table 1. Comparison between the Three Autonomous Areas

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access 81 Even though Sweden's policy towards Aland has not been active during the last decades its existence has an importance for Alanders and influence on Finland's policy.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 04:55:22AM via free access 82 We refer to an international presence at an intergovernmental level and consequently exclude sub-state repre- sentation, e.g., the European Committee of Regions, in which obviously all the three areas are represented.

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