Critical Feminist History of Psychology Versus Sociology of Scientific Knowledge

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Contrasting Views of Women Scientists?

Angela R. Febbraro DRDC – Toronto Research Centre

Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 2020, Vol. 40, No. 1, 7–20 ISSN: 1068-8471 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/teo0000133 Date of Publication from Ext Publisher: April 2020

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CAN UNCLASSIFIED Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology

Critical Feminist History of Psychology Versus Sociology of Scientiﬁc Knowledge: Contrasting Views of Women Scientists?

Angela R. Febbraro Defence Research and Development Canada—Toronto Research Centre, Toronto, Ontario, Canada

With the rise of second-wave feminism, new theoretical perspectives on women scientists began to emerge. By the 1980s and 1990s, 2 contrasting views of women scientists were discernible. Within the former, critical feminist historians rendered more visible and re/placed the lives and achievements of women psychologists within psychology’s history, challenged the “add women and stir” approach to the history of women psychologists, and suggested the need to view history through the lens of women’s distinct experiences within sexist scientific structures. Within the sociology of scientific knowledge, the contributions and experiences of women scientists remained largely ignored in favor of a meritocratic, universalistic, and objectivist image of science, despite recognition of the importance of social relations in scientific knowledge production. Today, a comparative analysis of developments within psychology and the sociology of scientific knowledge suggests a more nuanced, less dichotomous juxtaposition of views. Alongside critical feminist history of psychology, objectivist views of women scientists have also remained evident within related psychological subdisciplines, and the sociology of scientific knowledge has seen the emergence of feminist studies of science, technology, and society, on the borders of more traditional, objectivist views. This article reflects on some of the assumptions underlying different views of women scientists, past and present, within these (sub)disciplines. More broadly, this article examines the relevance of new developments in feminist theory and neoliberalism in theorizing women’s scientific careers, analyzes conceptualizations of gender discrimination and their implications for theory, and considers whether such (sub)disciplinary comparisons remain pertinent to understanding gendered scientific structures.

Public Significance Statement This article speaks to the need to understand sexist discrimination, and other forms of discrimination, in terms of its multiple, varied, and interconnected manifestations. Discrimination, within science and society, can be both overt and covert, and both informal and formal. As such, discrimination can be expressed in individual “choices,” as well as in cultural or other structural constraints. Rather than understanding discrimination narrowly, as distinguishable from culture, discrimination must be understood broadly, as pervasive throughout culture and society. Specifi- cally, this article suggests that the insights of critical feminist historians within psychology, as well as new feminist perspectives within the sociology of science, may provide understandings of women scientists that are more inclusive and contextual, that recognize the pervasiveness of sexist discrimination in all its forms, and that view social relations as complex, as indeterminate, and as inextricably linked to both individual subjectivities and broader scientific and societal structures.

Keywords: women in science, critical feminist history of psychology, sociology of scientiﬁc knowledge, sociology of science

I would like to acknowledge Ian Lubek for his contri- dressed to Angela R. Febbraro, Defence Research and Devel- butions to our early discussions on the sociology of knowl- opment Canada—Toronto Research Centre, 1133 Sheppard edge. Avenue West, Toronto, ON M3K 2C9, Canada. E-mail: Correspondence concerning this article should be ad- [email protected]

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In 1995, I presented an article at the annual (sub)disciplines. I begin with the analysis that I meeting of the Canadian Psychological Associ- articulated in 1995, in which I drew a sharp ation in which I elaborated two contrasting contrast between views, and then move to a views of women scientists (Febbraro & Lubek, more nuanced assessment of views within con- 1995). These views had been discernible by the temporary critical feminist history of psychol- 1980s and 1990s with the rise of second-wave ogy, present-day sociology of scientific knowl- feminism, when new theoretical perspectives on edge (or STS1), and related (sub)-disciplines. women scientists had begun to emerge. In that Subsequently, and more broadly, I examine the article, I argued that one contrasting perspective relevance of new developments in feminist the- was located within critical feminist history of ory, including intersectionality and interference, psychology, and the other, within the sociology and of neoliberalism, in theorizing women’s of scientific knowledge. Within the former, crit- scientific careers; I analyze conceptualizations ical feminist historians, such as Bohan (1990), of gender discrimination, both critical and ob- O’Connell and Russo (1980, 1983, 1990), and jectivist, and their implications for theory; and I Scarborough and Furumoto (1987), had begun consider whether such (sub)disciplinary com- to rectify an injustice by finding the “lost” parisons remain pertinent for understanding women of psychology; to render more visible gendered scientific structures. Ultimately, I sug- and “re/place” the lives and achievements of gest that an understanding of women in science women psychologists within their discipline’s will require the conceptualization of social re- history; to challenge the earlier and more prev- lations as complex, as indeterminate, and as alent “add women and stir” approach to the inextricably linked to both individual subjec- history of women psychologists, according to tivities and broader scientific, and societal, which women adhere seamlessly to dominant, structures. I begin with my view from 1995, male-defined, objectivist conceptions of sci- starting with an analysis of critical feminist ence; and to suggest the need to view history history of psychology. through the lens of women’s distinct experiences within sexist structures of science. In con- Critical Feminist History of Psychology trast, I suggested that, within the sociology of scientific knowledge, the contributions and ex- Despite the presence of women in science for periences of women scientists remained largely over a century, their existence and contributions ignored in favor of a meritocratic, universalistic, had been largely ignored, until critical feminist and objectivist image of science (Cole & Zuck- historians began in the 1970s to render them erman, 1984, 1987; Zuckerman, Cole, & Bruer, visible. Rossiter (1993), for example, discussed 1991), despite recognition within that discipline cases of women scientists who had been ig- of the importance of social relations in scientific nored, denied credit, or otherwise dropped from knowledge production. sight in various fields of study. Playing on the Today, nearly 25 years later, a comparative term, The Matthew Effect, coined by Robert K. analysis of developments within psychology Merton in 1968 to refer to the effect of accu- and within the sociology of scientific knowl- mulated advantage (for men), Rossiter (1993) edge suggests a more nuanced, less dichoto- coined her own term, The Matilda Effect,to mous juxtaposition of views. Alongside critical refer to the systematic exclusion and under- feminist history of psychology, objectivist recognition of women in science, named for the views of women scientists may be discerned American suffragist and feminist critic, Matilda within related psychological subdisciplines J. Gage. As Bohan (1990) suggested, in regard such as the psychology of women, and the so- to the exclusion of women from psychology’s ciology of scientific knowledge has seen the recorded histories: Women have often been in- emergence of feminist studies of science, tech- visible, have often confronted exclusionary nology, and society (STS), on the borders of practices and structures, have occasionally been more traditional, objectivist views. From this misrepresented or denied acknowledgment, more nuanced position, I reflect, in this article, on some of the theoretical and philosophical 1 STS may refer to science, technology, and society, or to assumptions underlying different views of science and technology studies. For the purposes of this women scientists, past and present, within these article, these terms are considered interchangeable. WOMEN SCIENTISTS 9 have frequently been trivialized. But women similar age and training; and the dilemmas they have not, despite all this, been absent (p. 216). faced involving marriage-versus-career and Indeed, in tracing the history of the early other family obligations, such as those of a women pioneers in American psychology, Scar- daughter to her family. Some of these obliga- borough and Furumoto (1987) suggested that tions, which conflicted strongly with their pro- women had been “a well-kept secret in the fessional lives, were labeled “family claims” by history of the discipline” (p. 1). Within psychol- social reformer Jane Addams (Furumoto, 1987; ogy, it had been only since the 1970s, with the Furumoto & Scarborough, 1986; Scarborough works of women psychologists such as Shields & Furumoto, 1987). Furumoto (1987) further (1975), O’Connell and Russo (1980, 1983, articulated that, although women were gaining 1988), Scarborough and Furumoto (1987), access to advanced training and taking PhDs in Russo and Denmark (1987), and Bohan (1990), psychology by the 1890s, they found their em- that attempts had been made to address this ployment opportunities restricted almost en- neglect, and thus render visible the lives and tirely to positions in women’s colleges, and the achievements of women psychologists. A spe- availability of even these was confined to cial issue on eminent women psychologists, women who remained unmarried. guest-edited by O’Connell and Russo, appeared Studies of the women pioneers in psychology in the Psychology of Women Quarterly in 1980 simultaneously aid the rediscovery of women’s (O’Connell & Russo, 1980, 1983). Ten years history as they radically alter previously held later, this work culminated in a coedited volume beliefs about the history of psychology. Such entitled, Women’s Contributions to Psychology, studies reclaim women’s lives and validate in which O’Connell and Russo sought to “doc- women’s work, as they bring into public view ument, evaluate, preserve, and make visible” the discipline’s “lost women,” and render visi- the gifts that women, represented by 36 biogra- ble those whose accomplishments have been phies of women psychologists, have made to obscured, at least temporarily, in accounts of psychology and society, and to provide a “foun- psychological research and practice. Yet, such dation and impetus for integrating this informa- studies also reveal the relationship of the soci- tion into future constructions of the field” etal context to women psychologists’ careers (O’Connell & Russo, 1990, as cited in Kimmel, and contributions (Russo & Denmark, 1987). 1992). On this account, women psychologists Inspired by feminist historians (Lerner, 1975), have “shifted and shaped” intellectual history; feminist philosophers of science (Harding, they have seen things from a different “stand- 1986), and other feminist scholars, critical “new point”— as outsiders, perhaps, in a “sacred historians” strove to go beyond both the “com- grove” (Aisenberg & Harrington, 1988). pensatory stage” of history (in which historians O’Connell and Russo (1990) also revealed “find” the “lost” women) and the “contribution that the status of women psychologists had also been “shifted and shaped,” by a broader societal stage” (in which historians delineate the “lost” context in which norms about marriage, family, women’s accomplishments), to achieve a more contextual, inclusive, and “reconstructed” his- and work, antinepotism rules, and so on, had 2 often hindered women’s achievements (see also tory (Bohan, 1990). Accordingly, the “add Russo & Denmark, 1987). In this regard, the women and stir” approach to the inclusion of work of Scarborough and Furumoto (1987) has women in the history of science, based on the also been highly influential. Their history of the assumption that women adhere smoothly and early women pioneers illuminated the lives and unproblematically to dominant, male-defined accomplishments of the early American women values and definitions of science, was thus psychologists (e.g., Mary Whiton Calkins, Christine Ladd-Franklin, Ethel Puffer Howes, 2 In the late 1990s, developments in postcolonial feminist Milicent Shin, Margaret Floy Washburn). Their theory provided similar insights regarding women and sci- account also made visible the barriers encoun- ence in North America, including the process for integrating tered by this group of women as they pursued new scholarship on women into science. Rosser (1999), for instance, described a six-phase model of integration that is their doctorates; the limited employment oppor- reminiscent of the stages described by critical feminist tunities and lower professional status they held historians, and which culminates in the reconstruction of compared with that of their male colleagues of science to include everyone (Rosser, 1999). 10 FEBBRARO viewed as inadequate (Bohan, 1990; Furumoto, women scientists had remained largely ig- 1987; Lerner, 1975). Indeed, the new critical nored—despite recognition within that disci- feminist historians suggested the need to view pline of the importance of social relations in the history from the base of women’s distinct ex- production of scientific knowledge (cf. Delam- periences within the sexist institution of science ont, 1987; Rossiter, 1993). Gender seemed to as well as the broader societal context (Bohan, represent a “blind spot” within the dominant 1990; Rossiter, 1982). discourse of that discipline, as it neglected to Reflecting similar concerns, feminist philos- articulate the connection between the socially ophers and critics of science had begun to ex- constructed nature of science, on the one hand, plore questions about women’s place in profes- and the social construction of gender, on the sional life, and within science in particular, other (Delamont, 1987). At that time, only the since the 1980s (Harding, 1986, 1991; Keller, “Columbia school” of the sociology of science 1985, 1991). In moving from the “woman ques- (Cole, 1979; Cole & Zuckerman, 1987; Zuck- tion” in science, which asks how women can be erman et al., 1991) had paid any attention to the treated equitably within science, to the “science question of women in science (cf. Harding, question” in feminism, which asks how a sci- 1986). Yet, unlike the new critical historians ence apparently so deeply involved in masculine within psychology, the Columbia school had projects can possibly serve emancipatory ends failed to address the distinct experiences of (Harding, 1986, p. 29), such critics have offered women scientists within a male-defined system. increasingly sophisticated—and radical—analy- Rather, this school viewed science as merito- ses of the fundamental tensions between women cratic, universalistic, and objective, and attrib- as a social and political category and science as a uted the invisibility of women largely to their social and political institution. Indeed, the work of own deficiencies. Thus, I turn now to a more such critics exposed several aspects of the sexism detailed analysis of the view of women scien- pervading science, as reflected in the relatively tists from the perspective of the sociology of few women in the so-called “hard” sciences, science. mathematics, and physics; the underrepresentation of women as researchers, especially at se- Sociology of Science nior levels; the relative lack of concern and research funds for topics of interest to women; Most schools within the sociology of scien- the systemic inequities in the salaries of women tific knowledge had devoted little attention to researchers and academics; the barriers women the topic of gender before 1987. But beginning face in terms of promotion (the “glass ceiling”), in 1970s, during the 1980s, and until the early job security, and benefits; and the sexist harass- 1990s, the Columbia school of the sociology of ment, and other forms of oppression, faced by science was raising questions about women and women in scientific institutions, not unlike science, and in particular, regarding gender dif- forms of sexism found throughout the work- ferences in scientific productivity. Founded by place and broader society. In short, these critics Jonathan Cole, along with his PhD advisor, proposed that sexist discrimination pervades Robert K. Merton, Harriet Zuckerman, and his science, as it pervades the broader society of brother, Stephen J. Cole, the Columbia school which science is a part, and which science re- of the sociology of science played a key role in flects and reproduces. Furthermore, these critics this discourse. According to this school, which suggested that merely “adding women” to ex- had provided the dominant perspective on gen- isting sexist structures within science, or ex- der differences in scientific productivity, and tending “equal opportunities” to women within almost all comparative studies conducted, such structures, are inadequate solutions, and women scientists publish one half to two thirds could even serve to further perpetuate long- as many scientific articles as men scientists pub- standing inequities. lish (Zuckerman et al., 1991). Several explana- In contrast, in the 1980s and 1990s, the soci- tions were offered to account for this “produc- ology of science, in general, had not explored tivity puzzle” (Cole & Zuckerman, 1984, 1987): deeply the reflections of feminist scholars. individual-level explanations based on biologi- Within the sociology of science literature at that cal or motivational factors (e.g., gender differ- time, the contributions and experiences of ences in cognitive abilities or achievement mo- WOMEN SCIENTISTS 11 tivation; Cole & Cole, 1973); cultural-level Likewise, the overriding theme of the Colum- explanations based on differential socialization bia school was the notion that sexist discrimi- or cultural practices, which lead to gender dif- nation, if and when it exists, is a relatively ferences in attitudes toward occupational suc- minor factor in explaining gender differences in cess and thus, gender differences in career pat- scientific productivity. Thus, as Rossiter (1993) terns and productivity (Cole & Fiorentine, pointed out, Cole strove to prove, in line with 1991); and structural-level explanations that fo- the title of his book, that science was “fair” to cus on institutional barriers and/or the differen- women (the “fairer sex”)—and that if only tial treatment of women and men within scien- women would publish enough quality work, tific organizations (Fox, 1991). Sociology of they would receive the recognition, honors, and science theorists tended to favor explanations salary they deserved. In the process, however, that emphasize the importance of gender social- Cole omitted from his book an extensive body ization and cultural factors (see especially, Cole of literature on discriminatory hiring practices & Fiorentine, 1991), the social organization of in academia that was available at that time (Ros- science, including access to informal networks siter, 1993). The notion of science as merito- and resources for research (Fox, 1991; Reskin, cratic, universalistic, and rational is particularly 1978), or the integration of socialization, cul- evident in Cole and Cole’s (1973) earlier dis- tural, and organizational factors (for an exten- cussion of women and minorities in American sive review and representative examples of science, according to which one’s “rank within these theories, see Zuckerman et al., 1991). the scientific stratification system depends Despite differences in emphasis placed on heavily on the quality of published research” (p. these levels of explanation, however, sociology 134), and gender differences in productivity of science theorists, for the most part, shared at merely reflect differences in “motivation” and least one underlying assumption: that science is “career commitment” (p. 150). essentially meritocratic and objective in both its Indeed, double entendres, and other such dis- principles and practice (cf. Briscoe, 1984; De- cursive devices, were common throughout the lamont, 1987; Rossiter, 1993). One notable ex- sociology of science literature at that time. Such ception was Mary Frank Fox’s (1991) discus- discursive practices appeared to reflect and re- sion of how scientific environments differ for inforce a form of social Darwinian “survival of women and men, and of how, due to this dif- the fittest” or “natural selection” account of ferential treatment, women scientists will tend gender differences in scientific productivity. to have fewer opportunities than men scientists Cole and Cole (1973), for example, defined the (e.g., for gaining access to informal networks). “survivors” among women scientists as those It is unsurprising when theorists who emphasize the individual level of analysis assume the mer- who have “overcome the cultural forces imped- itocratic character of science (Cole & Cole, ing their choice of science as a career and have 1973). It is more surprising, however, when actually received their doctorates” (p. 127), and theorists who consider the role of organizational claimed that women “self-select” themselves and structural factors in producing such differ- out of appointments at better departments (p. ences also assume that science is essentially a 140). This position had been challenged by meritocracy, as did many proponents of the Cynthia Fuchs Epstein (1991), who argued that Columbia school (Cole, 1979; Cole & Zucker- institutional discrimination, in both overt and man, 1987; Zuckerman et al., 1991). Indeed, as covert forms, is largely responsible for the low Scarborough and Furumoto (1987, p. 208, Note status of women in science. 1) observed, Jonathan Cole’s (1979) book on Despite such challenges, Cole and Fiorentine women in science, entitled, Fair Science, rep- (1991) used the term self-selection to refer to resented a comprehensive analysis of meritoc- individual attitudes toward pursuing specific oc- racy in science as applied to women: Its final cupations, and the term cultural selection to conclusion is that discrimination against women refer to those aspects of self-selection that are scientists is negligible. Indeed, Cole and Cole (1973) had argued that, “the amount of ‘dis- 3 Scarborough and Furumoto (1987) indicated that Jona- crimination’ against women scientists is small” than Cole acknowledged the existence of sexist bias in some (p. 151).3 areas of science in a later publication (Cole, 1981). 12 FEBBRARO constrained by culture (pp. 209–211; Cole & according to some liberal views, although sexist Zuckerman, 1987; Zuckerman, 1991). Simi- discrimination might exist within the broader larly, Cole and Singer (1991) identified “com- society and within nonscientific workplace or- petition” as the driving force behind the social ganizations, sexist discrimination is not a sig- system of science (p. 305), and reiterated Zuck- nificant force within science itself, and thus, erman and Merton’s assertion that “the proba- science represents a “special case” of workplace bility of a manuscript being published is largely organization (cf. Bielby, 1991; cf. Delamont, a function of the effort by the scientist to see the 1987). Or, as Cole and Singer (1991) had put it, paper through to publication” (p. 319, Note 22). discrimination represents, at most, “only one of In fact, the inspiration for these ideas appears to many causes of the cumulative productivity dif- have had a Darwinian source. For instance, Cole ferential between men and women scientists” and Singer (1991, p. 320, Note 15) identified (p. 279). Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species (in Within the sociology of science, the predom- particular, the chapter on natural selection), and inant view that sexist discrimination in science sociobiologist E. O. Wilson’s concept of “mul- is negligible was at least partly related to the tiplier effects” (which explains how small dif- conceptualizations of discrimination that were ferences can interact with the environment to prevalent within the sociology of science dis- produce larger effects), as providing inspiration. course. In fact, within the Columbia school, However, Cole and Singer’s (1991) ideas ne- discrimination tended to be conceptualized in glect to consider the unequal power relation- either purely subjective, informal terms (cf. ships between women and men, both within and Bielby, 1991), or in strictly structural, “noncul- without the social and political institution of tural” terms (e.g., selection policies practiced science. within scientific institutions; Cole & Fiorentine, The view that science is essentially a meri- 1991; cf. Epstein, 1991). Rather than seeing tocracy underlies not only extremely conserva- connections between informal and formal pro- tive or functionalist/sociobiological views of cesses within scientific institutions, sociologists gender differences; it also informs certain more of science limited their definition of discrimina- liberal views within the sociology of science. tion to “the distribution of rewards or active Thus, Zuckerman et al.’s (1991) analysis of gender differences in scientific productivity discouragement on the basis of functionally ir- suggests that the extension of equal opportuni- relevant criteria” (Cole & Fiorentine, 1991,p. ties and resources to women scientists will sig- 210), and distinguished discrimination from nificantly reduce the productivity gap between cultural selection or cultural factors. And, rather women and men scientists (see also Zuckerman, than drawing connections between such factors, 1991). According to some liberal perspectives, according to Cole and Fiorentine (1991), the science itself is fundamentally fair in nature, ability to understand the causes of inequality is and based on objective, universalistic princi- compromised by “lumping together different ples. To achieve a more equitable society, these processes [discrimination and cultural selec- universalistic rights and opportunities need only tion] under the same term” (p. 210). Such a be extended more equally to women, rather than statement is also reminiscent of Cole and Cole’s questioned or overhauled more fundamentally. (1973) assertion that defining a woman’s job as Even some liberal feminist analyses of women “less important” than that of her husband (and scientists emphasized the importance of extend- thus, women’s lesser job mobility, e.g., if a ing equal opportunities to women scientists to married woman turns down a job at a university create a fairer system. For instance, feminist in a location removed from her husband’s place psychologists, Russo and O’Connell (1980), of employment, as an individual adaptation to whose work was described earlier, noted that gendered cultural norms) is “certainly a type of the first lesson to be learned from the lives and discrimination; but it is not discrimination contexts of “our foremothers” is perhaps the within science” (p. 150). In a similar vein, “knowledge that barriers can be overcome, and Zuckerman (1991, p. 54) distinguished discrim- that with motivation and creativity, a little op- ination from differential access to scientific re- portunity can be taken a long way” sources, and from women’s occupational pref- (p. 48; see also Kimmel, 1992). Furthermore, erences. WOMEN SCIENTISTS 13

In contrast, some feminist conceptualizations and of neoliberalism, in theorizing women’s viewed sexist discrimination as endemic, as in- scientific careers and conceptualizing gender stitutionally and culturally pervasive, as ex- discrimination, and ultimately consider whether pressed overtly and covertly in a myriad of (sub)disciplinary comparisons remain pertinent forms, and as including informal, but also cul- to an understanding of women in science. tural and structural manifestations (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1994; Caplan, 1994; Scarborough & The View From 25 Years Later Furumoto, 1987; Simeone, 1987). Such an understanding of discrimination and inequality as- In the years since my 1995 article, studies in sumes the existence of interconnections be- the tradition of critical feminist history of psy- tween cultural factors and institutional chology have continued to illuminate women’s discrimination; between formal and informal contributions to the discipline (Shields, 2016; processes within scientific institutions; and be- Unger & Dottolo, 2016). For example, building tween individual “preferences,” “choices,” or on the work of Scarborough and Furumoto “adaptations” about scientific careers, and soci- (1987) on the “untold lives” of the first gener- etal norms. Likewise, such an understanding ation of women psychologists, Johnston and views science as reflective of and intimately Johnson (2008) analyzed the lives and careers intertwined with the broader social context, and of the second generation of women psycholo- emphasizes the pervasiveness of discriminatory gists.4 For this group of women, the marriage– practices both within and outside the institution career dilemma persisted, but marriage no lon- of science. Rather than viewing science as a ger ended careers, as it did for the first “special case,” such an understanding views generation of women. Rather, juggling marriage science as both reflecting and reproducing the and family with career became an issue, and broader society’s well-documented gender- antinepotism rules profoundly affected women related inequalities (Epstein, 1991). And, al- who married other academics. This cohort of though such feminist analyses of sexism in sci- women also experienced the emergence of the ence were becoming increasingly present in “separate spheres” for women in psychology, as social science journals 25 years ago, a major they were increasingly funneled into careers in journal within the sociology of science litera- applied and developmental psychology. As ture, Social Studies of Science, had largely ig- Rutherford (2017) observed, many women who nored such analyses, with few notable excep- remained in academic positions also experi- tions (Rossiter, 1993). enced tokenism, were frequently called upon to Rather than conceptualizing discrimination in serve on committees as the sole women in their such narrow, limited ways, I suggest that more departments, and in general had to carefully nuanced, contextual accounts of gender-related regulate their behavior to avoid being discred- phenomena within scientific structures are re- ited due to their gender. In that vein, Ruther- quired. Such accounts must consider the distinct ford’s (2017) analysis of the life and career of experiences of women scientists within struc- Janet Spence contextualized her experiences tures in which men still hold most of the posi- within the structural factors that have affected tions of power (e.g., on editorial boards, on women’s participation in psychology, and the promotion and tenure committees, etc.). More- specific strategies that women have used to nav- over, a focus on individual adaptations, rather igate an androcentric and sometimes overtly than on social and structural change, or a failure sexist discipline. to theorize the interconnections between indi- Other recent works within the genre of criti- vidual adaptations and structural requirements, cal feminist history have included studies on the may serve to maintain existing institutional gen- lives and works of Florence Goodenough (John- dered arrangements, both within and outside science. I turn now to a more contemporary compar- 4 The first generation of American women psychologists ative analysis of the views of women scientists were members of the American Psychological Association or mentioned in the American Men [sic] of Science before from within psychology and the sociology of 1906. The second generation of women psychologists were knowledge. As such, I will examine the rele- defined as those receiving their doctorates between 1906 vance of new developments in feminist theory, and 1945. 14 FEBBRARO son, 2015), Milicent Shin (Rodkey, 2016), and critical work of feminist historians of psychol- Magda Arnold (Rodkey, 2017). Johnson’s ogy, in illuminating the contributions and gen- (2015) analysis of developmental psychologist dered experiences of women psychologists Florence Goodenough, for instance, focused on within sexist structures of science, over the past Goodenough’s belief that women were just as several decades. capable of scientific achievement as men—a Within the sociology of science, there has belief that grounded Goodenough’s confidence (also) been continued recognition, over the past in mothers as scientific observers of their chil- 2 decades, of the importance of social relations dren. But Johnson (2015) also pointed out that within science—of the influence of the cultural Goodenough did not challenge the social and or political environment, such as the state, reli- institutional barriers that made it difficult for gion, industry, education, and social movements women to combine marriage and motherhood (including feminism) on scientific and intellec- with a scientific career. Although Goodenough tual movements (SIMs) and actors in SIM proj- acknowledged these difficulties, she did not ects. Frickel and Gross (2005), for example, think them insurmountable, as, in her words, observe that women and people of color, influ- “too many people have demonstrated their abil- enced by feminist and antiracist social move- ity to surmount them” (Johnston & Johnson, ments, have sought to create fields such as 2017, p. 254). Rather, Goodenough advocated women’s studies or African American studies to stronger motivation for women, along with ad- resonate with their life experiences and social vice to modernize gender roles in the home, identities. Yet, in the tradition of Cole and the representing an early version of the “lean-in” Columbia school, Frickel and Gross (2005) also strategy promoted in recent years (Johnston & maintained a fundamental belief in the meritoc- Johnson, 2017). For Goodenough, as well as for racy of intellectual institutions. In their view, many contemporary analysts of women in sci- for instance, conceptual innovations that trigger ence, the small number of individuals who have SIMs tend to be generated from intellectuals at succeeded in spite of discrimination was em- the top of their field, “precisely because the top ployed to suggest that discrimination is not an tends to accommodate conceptual innovators” obstacle for those with adequate motivation (p. 212). In supporting their claim, they explic- (Johnston & Johnson, 2017)—a view that is itly cite Cole (1989), and his belief that those reminiscent of those of some feminist psychol- with the intellectual potential to make major ogists, such as Russo and O’Connell (1980), contributions will have been identified at a rel- mentioned earlier. atively early stage in the game and channeled A key development in recent critical feminist toward the major centers for academic training, history of psychology has been the digital mul- which are precisely those that confer the highest timedia archive project, known as Psychology’s status. Thus, the influence of Cole’s thinking Feminist Voices, led by Alexandra Rutherford has continued within the sociology of science, at York University (MacArthur & Shields, despite his lack of activity in that specific field 2014). Formally launched online in August, since the early 1990s.5 2010, this project began in 2004 with oral his- However, sociologists of science have not tory interviews conducted with feminist psy- been the only theorists to invoke Cole’s meri- chologists, primarily from North America. Be- tocratic thinking in recent years. Psychologists, sides oral history interviews, the digital site too, have buttressed their arguments with simi- includes written profiles of women in psychol- lar claims. Ceci and Williams (2011), both de- ogy (past and present), as well as several addi- velopmental psychologists, are a case in point. tional resources (e.g., teaching resources, vid- Although Ceci and Williams (2011) recognized eos, transcripts) on the history of women in that “real barriers are still faced by women in psychology (feminist or not), all of which dem- onstrate the conditions and social relations of the discipline that women experienced, as well 5 Since the publication of The Outer Circle in 1992, as the influence of social context on the devel- Jonathan Cole has continued to work on questions of scientific literacy and higher education, but he has not contin- opment of psychology as a discipline (MacAr- ued his work on women in the scientific community. Yet, thur & Shields, 2014; Unger & Dottolo, 2016). his ideas on science as a meritocracy have retained cur- Thus, there is ample evidence of the continued rency. WOMEN SCIENTISTS 15 science” (p. 3158), they view past initiatives to ity and motivation, are brought to the fore- combat discrimination against women scientists ground, whereas systemic barriers recede into (including women psychologists) as highly suc- the background and become disconnected from cessful. Thus, they attribute the current under- individual subjectivities. Likewise, Eccles representation of women in math-intensive (2005, 2007) has made similar distinctions be- fields not to discrimination in these domains, tween, on the one hand, gender bias, gender role but rather to “sex differences in resources, abil- socialization pressures (including parental in- ities, and choices (whether free or constrained)” fluences), and cultural norms, and, on the other (p. 3157). Based on a similar line of reasoning, hand, the lack of “subjective task value” that they further argued that, “once sex differences individual women and girls place on science- in such positions and resources are taken into related domains and careers. Such distinctions, account, net differences between men and however, assume that gender-related societal women in productivity are nil or negligible” (p. and cultural norms are disconnected from wom- 3158). For Ceci and Williams (2011), a key en’s internalized, individualized values and in- issue, which they claim is separable from dis- terests. Rather, such norms and biases may play crimination, is why women occupy positions a critical role in individual women’s decisions that provide fewer resources. In their words, regarding work–family balance, in the value This situation is caused mainly by women’s choices, they place on pursuing a scientific career, and in both freely made and constrained by biology and so- their expectations regarding success in such a ciety (i.e., gendered expectations), such as choices to career (Eccles, 2005, 2007; Sáinz & Eccles, defer careers to raise children, follow spouses’ career moves, care for elderly parents, limit job searches 2012). geographically, and enhance work-home balance. (p. Similarly, Eagly and Riger (2014), both fem- 3158) inist psychologists, attributed the likely causes of continued forms of gender inequality in psy- Such discourse, regarding women’s choices as both “freely made and constrained by biology chology to “women’s failure to garner resources and society,” but as somehow separable from equal to those of men (e.g., laboratory space, discrimination, is highly reminiscent of Cole’s start-up funds)” (p. 689). However, unlike Ceci discourse about “fair science,” and similarly and Williams (2011), who they cite, Eagly and reflects a narrow and decontextualized concep- Riger (2014) did not discount the role of prej- tualization of discrimination. Thus, although udice and discrimination in the continuing gen- Ceci and Williams (2011) recognized that the der gap in productivity, nor in explaining the linear career path of the “modal male scientist” fact that, despite gains, women still constitute is not the only route to a successful scientific the minority of psychology department chairs, career—that “alternate life course options” full professors, tenured faculty, journal editors, exist—and although they endorse various insti- first authors of journal articles, and winners of tutional strategies for addressing the underrep- science prizes. Still, despite recognition of the resentation of women in science, such as teach- continuing role of discrimination in perpetuat- ing reductions for women with newborns, grant ing gender inequality, Eagly and Riger (2014) extensions, couples hiring, and child care pro- nevertheless distinguished prejudice and dis- grams, they nevertheless hold that gendered ex- crimination from “women’s choices and family pectations, and similar societal “constraints” on unfriendly environments,” much like Ceci and “choices,” are separable from discrimination Williams (2011), and reminiscent of Cole and (see also Williams & Ceci, 2015). the Columbia school. Thus, although critical Other psychologists, including those working feminist historians have continued to recover within the subdiscipline of the psychology of and re/place the lives and voices of women women, have offered similar explanations for psychologists over the past few decades, objec- the underrepresentation of women in science. tivist views of women scientists, based on fun- We have already seen glimpses of this, in the damental assumptions about the meritocracy of work of Russo and O’Connell (1980), in which science, have also been discernible within re- they attributed the success of eminent women lated subdisciplines, such as the psychology of psychologists to their motivation and creativity. women. Importantly, these objectivist strands On this account, individual factors, such as abil- cannot be seen as new developments; they were 16 FEBBRARO already present 3 decades ago, for instance, in Intersectionality, Neoliberalism, and a some feminist psychological work. Way Forward At the same time, however, fields related to the sociology of scientific knowledge have seen More important, perhaps, than a comparison an important new development: the emergence of disciplines, may be an analysis of women in of feminist studies of science, technology, and science that conceptualizes social relations society, on the borders of more traditional, ob- within science as complex, as indeterminate, jectivist views. Alongside three other themes and as inextricably linked to both individual (the history of technology; the history and phi- subjectivities and broader scientific, and soci- losophy of science; and science, engineering, etal, structures. As I have shown, some of that and public policy studies), a fourth theme, on analytic work has been undertaken by critical science, technology and society, has been cen- feminist historians, and by critical feminist psy- tral to the emergence of feminist scholarship in chologists of women, who have articulated the STS. Featured within this development are the importance of understanding the role of structural works of feminist scholars, such as Donna Har- and systemic inequalities in shaping the position away and Sandra Harding, who have sought to of women within psychology. Importantly, such address the exclusion of women from science analyses have challenged assumptions about the and engineering, as well as the recent emer- meritocracy of science, as well as attributions that gence, in 2014, of a feminist journal, Catalyst, locate the problem of women’s underrepresenta- devoted to expanding the interdisciplinary field tion within individual women themselves. In the of feminist STS. According to the journal’s words of Shields (2016), website, Catalyst was launched in solidarity ...itiseasy to buy into the myth of the meritocracy with other feminist technoscience initiatives (e.g., or see inequities as limited to the work of individual at York University, the University of California, actors or institutions....[and] to conclude that the and the University of Toronto), for which at pres- problem is with women—their motivation, productivity, and so forth . . . Knowledge of the history of ent there is a “marked paucity of theory-focused psychology, however, reveals structures and practices peer-reviewed journals.” The journal, subtitled, that have been in place since the turn of the 20th Feminism, Theory, Technoscience, seeks to pose century that actively inhibit women’s advancement. “challenges, both epistemologically and method- (pp. 398–399) ologically, to the wider STS field,” and to consider Further, Shields (2016) suggested that intersec- “not only the social relations of science and tech- tionality, or the assertion that multiple, social nology as they are framed sociologically, but also identities do not function independently of each the ontological and experiential dimensions of other, shifts the focus from atomized individual embodiment and its complex relation to nature, experience to the social systems of stratification the object of technoscience.” that maintain systems of power and privilege, In comparison with a single journal focusing on and as such, shape individual psychological ex- gender in STS, there are six gender journals in perience (see also Rutherford & Milar, 2017). psychology (Eagly & Riger, 2014).6 And, with As such, intersectionality may offer a potential few exceptions, the articles published in Catalyst lens for viewing women and science from a have not tended to focus on the lives and works of more nuanced perspective, one that takes into women scientists, nor on the challenges that account the connection between individual sub- women continue to face within sexist scientific jectivities and broader societal structures. structures. Nevertheless, feminist developments Originally coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw in within the sociology of science/STS, as well as the 1989, intersectionality refers to the interaction objectivist, meritocratic assumptions that have between gender, race, and other categories of continued to underpin explanations for gender in- difference in individual lives, social practices, equality in psychology, even within some feminist institutional arrangements, and cultural ideolo- psychological work, suggest the need for a more nuanced, less dichotomous, and more convergent 6 These are Feminism and Psychology, Women and Ther- view when considering the perspectives of psy- apy, Journal of Psychosomatic Obstetrics and Gynecology, chology and the sociology of science, on the topic Psychology of Men and Masculinity, Psychology of Women of women and science. Quarterly, and Sex Roles (Eagly & Riger, 2014). WOMEN SCIENTISTS 17 gies and the outcomes of these interactions in mental to neoliberalism is the belief that people terms of power.7 And indeed, within the past are self-contained, autonomous beings, func- few decades, intersectionality has become cen- tioning largely independently of social and cul- tral to current feminist theory. Yet, intersection- tural surrounds. Further, the emphasis on ality has also been criticized as falling into a choice, autonomy, and self-reliance insinuates form of universalism or essentialism. To ad- failure as self-failure, for which one is expected dress such criticism, Geerts and van der Tuin to bear sole responsibility (Sugarman, 2015). (2013) described a way of thinking about power Such an account is strongly consistent with an relations, intersectionality-as-interference,in objectivist, decontextualized view of science, which structures, social differences, or “inter- built on assumptions of meritocracy. As I have ference patterns,” are constraining and en- argued, this view of science focuses on individ- abling, but not determining. As such, the inter- ual adaptations to sexist structures, and on in- ference patterns of gender, race/ethnicity, dividual deficiencies, rather than on the perva- disability, and class can work in concert or can siveness of sexist discrimination faced by conflict with each other, and either intensify or women scientists, and thus, the need for sys- decrease oppression or privilege. On this view, temic changes, both within science and within an understanding of the social relations in sci- broader societal structures. ence would need to consider interactions be- Given the encroachment of neoliberal princi- tween gender, race, and other categories of dif- ples both within and outside the scientific acad- ferences in individual lives and related societal emy, and given the continued presence of ob- structures, but would also view these interac- jectivist, universalist views of science, which tions as complex and indeterminate in their stress meritocracy-maintenance while ignoring power implications. In that sense, although in- gender and power, I continue to look toward the tersectionality-as-interference may address con- insights of critical feminist historians within cerns about universalism, I caution that it may psychology, as well as the emergence of new also result in a kind of de-politicization if, for feminist perspectives within the sociology of example, the indeterminacy of power implica- science, for alternative voices to challenge neo- tions is taken to imply the equivalency of power relations between dominant and marginalized liberalist, objectivist narratives of women in groups. science. Such voices, regardless of specific dis- In addition to intersectionality-as-interfer- cipline, may lead toward more inclusive, con- ence, recent critical-theoretical work on neolib- textual, and intersectional reconstructions of eralism may also enrich understandings of women’s scientific careers—away from theoret- women in science. As Teo (2018) pointed out, ical approaches that ignore women’s distinct yet neoliberalism colonizes and privatizes all areas multiple experiences within sexist scientific of life from business to government, education structures; that assume that women adhere to hospitals, and the military to the prison sys- seamlessly to dominant, male-defined, objectiv- tem, but most importantly, it colonizes the self. ist conceptions of science; that are based on In neoliberalism, the intellectual form of life, overly narrow conceptions of discrimination; or including scientific work, becomes subsumed that locate the causes of women’s underrepre- under neoliberal principles, including (self)dis- sentation in science within women themselves. cipline and (self)control, which hold the indi- Ultimately, any such understanding of women vidual accountable for their success or lack in science will recognize the pervasiveness of thereof (e.g., in the scientific game or “mar- sexist discrimination in all its myriad forms— ket”). Similarly, as Sugarman (2015) articulated, within neoliberalism, people conceive of 7 Although Kimberlé Crenshaw introduced the term, she themselves as a set of assets—skills and attri- was not the first to address the issue of how Black women’s butes—to be managed, developed, and treated experiences have been marginalized or distorted within as ventures in which to invest. Accordingly, as feminist discourse. As early as 1977, the Combahee River enterprising subjects, people establish and add Collective, a Black feminist lesbian group in the United States, issued a highly influential manifesto in which they value to themselves through personal invest- argued that gender, race, class, and sexuality should be ment, and maximize and express their auton- integral to any feminist analysis of power and domination omy through choice (Sugarman, 2015). Funda- (see Davis, 2008). 18 FEBBRARO informal, cultural, and structural—and will re- Cole, J. R., & Zuckerman, H. (1984). 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11b. FUTURE DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE CANADA (Approval for further dissemination of the document. Security classification must also be considered.) 12. KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS (Use semi-colon as a delimiter.) women in science; critical feminist history of psychology; sociology of scientific knowledge; sociology of science

13. ABSTRACT/RÉSUMÉ (When available in the document, the French version of the abstract must be included here.)

This article speaks to the need to understand sexist discrimination, and other forms of discrimination, in terms of its multiple, varied, and interconnected manifestations. Discrimination, within science and society, can be both overt and covert, and both informal and formal. As such, discrimination can be expressed in individual “choices,” as well as in cultural or other structural constraints. Rather than understanding discrimination narrowly, as distinguishable from culture, discrimination must be understood broadly, as pervasive throughout culture and society. Specifically, this article suggests that the insights of critical feminist historians within psychology, as well as new feminist perspectives within the sociology of science, may provide understandings of women scientists that are more inclusive and contextual, that recognize the pervasiveness of sexist discrimination in all its forms, and that view social relations as complex, as indeterminate, and as inextricably linked to both individual subjectivities and broader scientific and societal structures.