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Hamas' Political Transformation and Engagement, 2003-‐‑2013

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Hamas’ political transformation and engagement, 2003-2013 Submitted by Bao Hsiu-Ping to the University of Exeter, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Palestine Studies September 2016 This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University. Signature: ………………………………………………………….. Abstract This thesis aims to explore the process of Hamas’ political transformation and engagement between 2003 and 2013 as well as the implications of the transition. In general, conventional scholarship research on Hamas and its transition in politics focuses either on the discussion of its tendency to violence or on its orientation towards moderation. However, both analyses fail to capture the essence of Hamas’ political transition over the ten years under discussion. This thesis argues that Hamas’ transition is interrelated with its perception of resistance. That is to say, Hamas’ transition aimed to keep its resistance work intact. Hamas believed that because of its Zionist ideology, Israel would continue to occupy and colonize at Palestinians’ expense. Furthermore, past negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and Israel had not helped Palestinians but on the contrary, had intensified the Israeli occupation. Therefore, nothing but resistance would restore Palestinians’ rights and defend them against Israel’s aggression. Ever since its inception in 1987, resistance has been Hamas’ only strategy and its means to end the Israeli occupation. It is worth noting that Hamas sophisticated the concept of resistance into a ‘resistance project’ from 2003 onwards, and then enforced it after taking over Gaza in June 2007; and for Hamas, the elements of resistance are comprehensive. In order to end Israeli occupation, armed struggle is its major tactic but this includes: the necessity of the national unity of Palestinians, the need for substantial support from the Arab and Muslim states and the understanding of the West. This thesis argues that as long as the Israeli occupation is in place, it is inevitable that Hamas’ engagement in politics will be irreversible and its work on resistance will continue, irrespective of the circumstances. However, it might appear in a different form. 1 Table of Contents Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 3 1. Research Background and Motivation ........................................................................................... 3 2. Research Questions ................................................................................................................................. 9 3. Sources and Methodology .................................................................................................................... 9 4. The Scope and significance of the Study ..................................................................................... 18 5. Thesis Outline: A brief description of each chapter ............................................................... 20 Part I Approaching the transition of the Islamists and the Study of Hamas’ transition ........................................................................................................................... 23 Chapter One: The Conceptual Framework: The transition of Islamists 24 1. Introduction: The transition of Islamists ................................................................................... 24 2. The Essentialist approach to the transition of Islamists ..................................................... 27 3. The Pluralist approaches to the transition of Islamists ....................................................... 31 4. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................ 48 Chapter Two: Hamas’ transition and its concept of resistance from the Palestinian historical perspective ............................................................................ 49 1. Before the 1987 Intifada .................................................................................................................... 49 2. From the first Intifada to the Oslo Peace Process (1987-2000) ...................................... 61 3. Conclusion: The transitions of Islamists in Palestine and the concept of resistance from the historical perspective ...................................................................................................... 76 Part II The political transformation and engagement ....................................... 80 Chapter Three: Analysis of Hamas’ political transformation (2003-2006) 81 1. The socio-economic context in the al-Aqsa Intifada .............................................................. 82 2. The content of the resistance project and its relation to the Islamic reference ........ 88 3. From the ceasefire to a call for Political reform ................................................................... 100 4. The path to political integration .................................................................................................. 114 5. Conclusion: The implication of Hamas’ political transformation during 2003 to 2006 ........................................................................................................................................................ 134 Chapter Four: Evaluation of Hamas’ political engagement (2006-2013) .. 139 1. The tenth Palestinian government and the unity government ...................................... 139 2. Governing Gaza ................................................................................................................................... 159 3. The repercussions of the Arab Spring ...................................................................................... 188 4. Conclusion: The Overall evaluation of Hamas’ political engagement ......................... 209 Part III Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 217 1. Summary and Findings: .................................................................................................................. 217 2. Challenges and Limitations ........................................................................................................... 221 3. Prospects for Future Research ..................................................................................................... 222 List of Glossary .............................................................................................................. 224 Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 225 2 Introduction 1. Research Background and Motivation This research aims to explore the process of Hamas' transition in politics between 2003 and 2013 and to attempt to interpret the implications of the transition. Over the decade, Hamas experienced a remarkable change in its practices and rhetoric. Prior to 2003, in the eyes of Western countries, Hamas was considered to be a spoiler, undermining the peace process and aiming to destroy of Israel. Its suicide bombings and rocket attacks were regarded as a form of terrorism and its hardline stance against Israel seemed to be clear indications of this. However, after its acceptance of the ceasefire in June 2003, Hamas gradually reduced the numbers of military attacks and considered the possibility of a political transformation. This turn towards a more political orientation was discernible. In addition, its military tactic did not appeal after its victory in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) election in January 2006. After that, Hamas gradually became an important non-state actor in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and played an essential role across the Middle East particularly during the period between Hamas’ take-over of Gaza after June 2007 and the Arab Spring (2011-2013). Hamas’ leaders demonstrated their willingness to coexist with Israel based on a long-term truce1 in order to erase the ‘terrorist’ stigma, to distance itself from the international militant Islamists and to be better accepted within the international community.2 On the other hand, Hamas’ leaders started to articulate their views on why at this moment they rejected the disarmament and refused to recognize Israel, which was one of the demands of the Quartet. 1 The long-term truce was based on the condition that Israel withdrew from the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the ease of Gaza and the right of return for Palestinian regugees, which corresponds to international law and the resolution of the United Nations. Please refer to Khaled Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2002), pp.73-78. Khaled Hroub, Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide (London: Pluto Press, 2006), pp.55-57. 2 Hamas leaders often cite the United Nations Resolution 194 in the General Assembly as a principle of the right of return for refugees. Please refer to Khalid Amayreh, ‘Hamas debates the future: Palestine’s Islamic Resistance Movement attempts to Reconcile ideological purity and political
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