Dżihadyści Współdziałają Z Państwem Islamskim. Siły Assada W Aleppo Odcięte

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Dżihadyści Współdziałają Z Państwem Islamskim. Siły Assada W Aleppo Odcięte 24.02.2016 DŻIHADYŚCI WSPÓŁDZIAŁAJĄ Z PAŃSTWEM ISLAMSKIM. SIŁY ASSADA W ALEPPO ODCIĘTE Państwo Islamskie (Daesh) 22 lutego przecięło w rejonie Khanasir (na południowy-wschód od Aleppo) drogę łączącą Aleppo z Damaszkiem. Dzień później, wspólnie z Jabhate al Nusra (Al Kaida), Jund al Aqsa oraz turkmeńskimi oddziałami protureckich dżihadystów, działających formalnie pod szyldem Wolnej Armii Syryjskiej, przejęło kontrolę nad strategiczną wioską Khanasir - pisze Witold Repetowicz. Ta dość niespodziewana ofensywa dżihadystów w południowej części Aleppo ma znaczenie z kilku względów. Przede wszystkim, chodzi o strategiczne położenie Khanasir. Od czasu interwencji rosyjskiej, dzięki wsparciu lotniczemu Rosji, syryjskiej armii (SAA) udało się odblokować dwie enklawy lojalistów – najpierw bazę Kweiris, na wschód od Aleppo), a następnie Nubl na północny-zachód od tego miasta. Sukcesy wpisane były w udaną ofensywę, dzięki której dżihadystyczni rebelianci operujący w prowincji Aleppo znaleźli się w krytycznym położeniu. Chodzi przy tym zarówno o Daesh, Al Kaidę, jak również o tzw. opozycję syryjską, czyli de facto protureckich dżihadystów z takich organizacji jak Jund al Aqsa, Ahrar al Sham, Jaish al Fath czy Brygady Sultan Murad. Tymczasem utrata Khanasir powoduje odcięcie wszystkich sił rządowych znajdujących się w kluczowej prowincji Aleppo od reszty terenów kontrolowanych przez siły wierne Assadowi. Dopuszczenie przez SAA do tej ofensywy dżihadystów było karygodnym zaniedbaniem lojalistów. W ostatnich tygodniach SAA koncentrowała się na operacjach w północnym Aleppo. Po odcięciu rejonu Azaz w północnym Aleppo SAA skoncentrowała się na domykaniu kotła między Al Safira a Al Bab (wokół wysuniętego na południe przyczółka sił Daesh z rejon Al Bab). W weekend 20-21 lutego udało się zamknąć ten kocioł, jednak był to umiarkowany sukces, gdyż większość terrorystów Daesh wycofała się do Al Bab. W tym samym czasie Syryjskie Siły Demokratyczne (SDF – koalicja, której trzonem jest kurdyjskie YPG) przejęła kontrolę nad południową częścią enklawy Azaz. Spowodowało to, iż tereny kontrolowane przez dżihadystów w prowincji Aleppo ograniczone zostały do czterech części. Po pierwsze tereny Daesh rozciągające się między enklawą Azaz a Dżarabulusem z głównymi miastami Manbidż i Al Bab. Ilustracja: Wikimedia Commons/Spesh531/NordNordWest/CC BY SA 2.0/[https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/deed.en] Te tereny są celem potencjalnej ofensywy SDF, blokowanej groźbą tureckiej interwencji przeciw SDF, w przypadku ataku SDF na Daesh w tym rejonie. Po drugie – enlawa Azaz, znajdująca się pod protektoratem Turcji (ostrzeliwującej sąsiedni kanton Efrin kontrolowany przez SDF). Po trzecie – zdominowane przez Ahrar al Sham siły we wschodniej części miasta Aleppo, ostrzeliwujące kurdyjskie dzielnice mieszkalne i jednocześnie będące celem rosyjskich nalotów. Po czwarte – siły tzw. opozycji (zdominowane przez Front Al Nusra, czyli Al Kaidę i ściśle związany z nimi Jund al Aqsa) operujące we zachodniej i południowej części prowincji Aleppo, przy granicy z opanowaną przez Nusrę prowincją Idlib. To właśnie rebelianci z tej ostatniej części podjęli współpracę z Daesh w celu odcięcia SAA w Aleppo przez przejęcie kontroli nad Khanasir. Utrata kontroli nad Khanasir przez SAA to dotkliwa klęska, jednak najbliższe dni pokażą jak bardzo trwała. Niewątpliwie odzyskanie kontroli nad tym odcinkiem będzie teraz priorytetem SAA, niemniej póki co inicjatywa jest po stronie dżihadystów, którzy odparli pierwszy atak sił SAA odpowiedzialnych za kontrofensywę. Co więcej, według niektórych doniesień Daesh przejął w Khanasir znaczne ilości broni i planuje z Khanasir ofensywę na ważne miasto Al Safira (na wschód od miasta Aleppo i na południe od Al Bab). Ponadto 23 lutego terrorystom z Daesh udało się przeciąć drogę Aleppo–Damaszek jeszcze w jednym miejscu tj. znajdującym się w pobliżu granicy prowincji Aleppo i Hama checkpoincie al Azib. Pocieszające dla lojalistów może być to, że nie jest to pierwszy przypadek przecięcia drogi Aleppo- Damaszek przez rebeliantów lub Daesh i wszystkie wcześniejsze takie przypadki były nietrwałe. Niemniej na uwagę zasługuje pierwszy od dłuższego czasu przypadek współpracy Daesh, Al Kaidy (Nusry) oraz dżihadystycznych rebeliantów wspieranych przez Turcję. Nie jest to jednak zaskoczeniem, zważywszy na długoterminową wspólnotę celów (oparcie ustroju Syrii na sądach szariackich), nawet jeśli średnioterminowo organizacje te różnią się w kwestii kalifatu. Ofensywy na Khanasir nie można też rozpatrywać w oderwaniu od kontekstu międzynarodowego. Choć po negatywnym stanowisku USA, NATO i ONZ interwencja saudyjsko-turecka w Syrii wydaje się w najbliższym czasie mało prawdopodobna, to jednoczesna ofensywa SAA na Al Bab i SDF na Manbidż (przeciw Daesh), całkowicie by ją uniemożliwiła. Tymczasem wobec utraty Khanasir SAA będzie się musiała przegrupować spod Al Bab. Ponadto, trudno powiedzieć jak wpłynie to na rozejm, który ma zacząć obowiązywać od soboty 27 lutego. Z jednej strony nie obejmuje on Nusry i Daesh, więc może ułatwić przegrupowanie SAA, z drugiej jednak strony w operacjach w tym rejonie uczestniczą też rebelianci nie związani z tymi organizacjami. Turcja może zatem oświadczyć, iż koalicja rosyjsko- assadowska atakując Khanasir łamie rozejm. Witold Repetowicz.
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