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National Security Space (NSS) Programs National To fully understand the story of the development of the Space Shuttle, it is important to consider the national defense context in which it was Security conceived, developed, and initially deployed. The Cold War between the United States and the Union of Soviet Jeff DeTroye James Armor Socialist Republics (USSR), which had played such a large role in the Sebastian Coglitore initiation of the Apollo Program, was also an important factor in the James Grogan decisions that formed and guided the Space Shuttle Program. The United Michael Hamel States feared that losing the Cold War (1 94 7-1 991 ) to the USSR could David Hess Gary Payton result in Soviet mastery over the globe. Since there were few direct Katherine Roberts conflicts between the United States and the USSR, success in space was Everett Dolman an indicator of which country was ahead—which side was winning. Having lost the tactical battles of first satellite and first human in orbit, the United States had recovered and spectacularly won the race to the moon. To counter the successful US man-on-the-moon effort, the USSR developed an impressive space station program. By the early 1980s, the USSR had launched a series of space stations into Earth orbit. The Soviets were in space to stay, and the United States could not be viewed as having abdicated leadership in space after the Apollo Program. The need to clearly demonstrate the continued US leadership in space was an important factor in the formation of the Space Shuttle Program. While several other programs were considered, NASA ultimately directed their planning efforts to focus on a reusable, crewed booster that would provide frequent, low-cost access to low-Earth orbit. This booster would launch all US spacecraft, so there would have to be direct interaction between the open, civilian NASA culture and the Defense-related National Security Space (NSS) programs. Use of the civilian NASA Space Shuttle Program by the NSS programs was controversial, with divergent goals, and many thought it was a relationship made for political reasons only—not in the interest of national security. The relationship between these two very different cultures was often turbulent and each side had to change to accommodate the other. Yet it was ultimately successful, as seen in the flawless missions that followed. 42 The Historical Legacy National Security 1970-1981: Role signed by President Ronald Reagan formalized this position: “The STS Space Programs of National Security will be the primary space launch Space Programs system for both United States military The Department of Defense uses space and civil government missions. systems in support of air, land, and in Development of The transition to the shuttle should sea forces to deter and defend against the Shuttle occur as expeditiously as practical. hostile actions directed at the interests Launch priority will be provided to of the United States. The Intelligence The National Security Space (NSS) national security missions, and such community uses space systems to collect is often portrayed as having forced missions may use the shuttle as intelligence. These programs, as a group, design requirements on NASA to dedicated mission vehicles.” are referred to as National Security gain NSS commitment to the Space This mandated dependence on the Space (NSS). Despite having a single Shuttle Program. In reality, NASA was shuttle worried NSS leaders, with name, the NSS did not have a unified interested in building the most capable some saying the plan was “seriously management structure with authority (and largest) shuttle that Congress deficient, both operationally and over all programs. and the administration would approve. economically.” In January 1984, Since the beginning of the space era, It is true that NSS leaders argued for a Secretary of Defense Caspar these defense-related space missions had large payload bay and a delta wing to Weinberger directed the purchase been giving the president, as well as provide a 1,600-km (1 ,000-mile) cross of additional expendable boosters defense and intelligence leadership in range for landing. NASA, however, because “total reliance upon the the United States, critical insights into also wanted a large payload bay for STS for sole access to space in view the actions and intents of adversaries. space station modules as well as for of the technical and operational In 1967, President Lyndon Johnson said, spacecraft and high-energy stage uncertainties, represents an “I wouldn’t want to be quoted on this— combinations. NASA designers unacceptable national security risk.” we’ve spent $35 or $40 billion on the required the shuttle to be able to land This action, taken 2 years before space program. And if nothing else had at an abort site, one orbit after launch the Challenger accident, ensured that come out of it except the knowledge that from the West Coast, which would expendable launch vehicles would be we gained from space photography, it also require a delta wing. Indeed, available for use by the NSS programs would be worth 10 times what the whole NASA cited the delta wing as an in the event of a shuttle accident. program has cost. Because tonight we essential NASA requirement, even Furthermore, by 1982 the full costs know how many missiles the enemy has for launches from the East Coast. of shuttle missions were becoming and, it turned out, our guesses were way NASA was offered the chance to build clearer and the actual per-flight cost off. We were doing things we didn’t a smaller shuttle when, in January of a shuttle mission had risen to need to do. We were building things we 1972, President Richard Nixon over $280 million, with a Titan didn’t need to build. We were harboring approved the Space Transportation launch looking cheap in comparison fears we didn’t need to harbor.” Due to System (STS) for development. at less than $ 180 million. With the these important contributions and others, The NASA leadership decided to stick skyrocketing costs of a shuttle launch, the NSS programs had a significant with the larger, delta wing design. the existence of an expendable amount of political support and funding. launch vehicles option for the NSS As a result, both the NSS program National Space Policy: The programs made the transition from the leadership and the NASA program Shuttle as Sole Access to Space shuttle inevitable. leadership often held conflicting views of which program was more important The Space Shuttle Program was and, therefore, whose position on a approved with the widely understood Military “Man in Space” given issue ought to prevail. but unstated policy that when it To this day, the US Air Force (USAF) became operational it would be used These two characteristics of the NSS uses flight crews for most of their to launch all NSS payloads. The programs—lack of unified NSS airborne missions. Yet, there was production of all other expendable program management and a competing much discussion within the service launch vehicles, like the reliable view of priorities—would cause about the value of having a military Titan, would be abandoned. In 1981 , friction between NASA and the NSS human in space program. Through shortly after the launch of STS -1 , the programs management throughout the the 1960s, development of early National Space Transportation Policy duration of the relationship. reconnaissance satellites like Corona The Historical Legacy 43 demonstrated that long-life The Space Shuttle Program plans Launch System Integration: electronics and complex systems included a payload specialist selected Preparing for Launch on the spacecraft and on the ground for a particular mission by the payload could be relied on to accomplish sponsor or customer. Many NSS The new partnership between NASA the crucial task of reconnaissance. leadership were not enthusiastic and the NSS programs was very These systems used inexpensive about the concept; however, in 1979, complex. Launching the national systems on orbit and relatively a selection board made up of NSS security payloads on the shuttle small expendable launch vehicles, leadership and a NASA representative required the cooperation of two large, and they proved that human chose the first cadre of 13 military proud organizations, each of which presence in space was not necessary officers from the USAF and US Navy. viewed their mission as being for these missions. These officers were called manned of the highest national priority. This spaceflight engineers. There was belief in their own primacy was a part During the early 1960s, NSS had considerable friction with the NASA of each organization’s culture. From two military man in space programs: astronaut office over the military the very beginning, it was obvious first the “Dyna Soar” space plane, and payload specialist program. Many of that considerable effort would be then the Manned Orbiting Laboratory the ex-Manned Orbiting Laboratory required by both organizations to forge program. Both were cancelled, largely astronauts who had been working at a true partnership. At the beginning due to skepticism on the part of the NASA and waiting for over a decade of the Space Shuttle Program, NASA Department of Defense (DoD) or to fly in space were not enthusiastic focused on the shuttle, while NSS NSS leadership that the programs’ about the NSS plans to fly their own program leaders naturally focused on contributions were worth the expense officers as payload specialists. In the the spacecraft’s mission. As the as well as the unwanted attention that long run, NASA astronauts had little partnership developed, NASA had the presence of astronauts would bring to be concerned about. When asked to become more payload focused. to these highly classified missions. his opinion of the role of military Much of the friction was over who Although 14 military astronauts payload specialists in upcoming was in charge.
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