National To fully understand the story of the development of the , it is important to consider the national defense context in which it was Security conceived, developed, and initially deployed.

The Cold War between the and the Union of Soviet Jeff DeTroye James Armor Socialist Republics (USSR), which had played such a large role in the Sebastian Coglitore initiation of the Program, was also an important factor in the James Grogan decisions that formed and guided the . The United Michael Hamel States feared that losing the Cold War (1 94 7-1 991 ) to the USSR could David Hess Gary Payton result in Soviet mastery over the globe. Since there were few direct Katherine Roberts conflicts between the United States and the USSR, success in space was Everett Dolman an indicator of which country was ahead—which side was winning. Having lost the tactical battles of first and first human in orbit, the United States had recovered and spectacularly won the race to the moon. To counter the successful US man-on-the-moon effort, the USSR developed an impressive program. By the early 1980s, the USSR had launched a series of space stations into Earth orbit. The Soviets were in space to stay, and the United States could not be viewed as having abdicated leadership in space after the .

The need to clearly demonstrate the continued US leadership in space was an important factor in the formation of the Space Shuttle Program. While several other programs were considered, NASA ultimately directed their planning efforts to focus on a reusable, crewed booster that would provide frequent, low-cost access to low-Earth orbit. This booster would launch all US , so there would have to be direct interaction between the open, civilian NASA culture and the Defense-related National Security Space (NSS) programs. Use of the civilian NASA Space Shuttle Program by the NSS programs was controversial, with divergent goals, and many thought it was a relationship made for political reasons only—not in the interest of national security. The relationship between these two very different cultures was often turbulent and each side had to change to accommodate the other. Yet it was ultimately successful, as seen in the flawless missions that followed.

42 The Historical Legacy National Security 1970-1981: Role signed by President Ronald Reagan formalized this position: “The STS Space Programs of National Security will be the primary space launch Space Programs system for both United States military The Department of Defense uses space and civil government missions. systems in support of air, land, and in Development of The transition to the shuttle should sea forces to deter and defend against the Shuttle occur as expeditiously as practical. . . . hostile actions directed at the interests Launch priority will be provided to of the United States. The Intelligence The National Security Space (NSS) national security missions, and such community uses space systems to collect is often portrayed as having forced missions may use the shuttle as intelligence. These programs, as a group, design requirements on NASA to dedicated mission vehicles.” are referred to as National Security gain NSS commitment to the Space This mandated dependence on the Space (NSS). Despite having a single Shuttle Program. In reality, NASA was shuttle worried NSS leaders, with name, the NSS did not have a unified interested in building the most capable some saying the plan was “seriously management structure with authority (and largest) shuttle that Congress deficient, both operationally and over all programs. and the administration would approve. economically.” In January 1984, Since the beginning of the space era, It is true that NSS leaders argued for a Secretary of Defense Caspar these defense-related space missions had large payload bay and a wing to Weinberger directed the purchase been giving the president, as well as provide a 1,600-km (1 ,000-mile) cross of additional expendable boosters defense and intelligence leadership in range for landing. NASA, however, because “total reliance upon the the United States, critical insights into also wanted a large payload bay for STS for sole access to space in view the actions and intents of adversaries. space station modules as well as for of the technical and operational In 1967, President Lyndon Johnson said, spacecraft and high-energy stage uncertainties, represents an “I wouldn’t want to be quoted on this— combinations. NASA designers unacceptable national security risk.” we’ve spent $35 or $40 billion on the required the shuttle to be to land This action, taken 2 years before space program. And if nothing else had at an abort site, one orbit after launch the Challenger accident, ensured that come out of it except the knowledge that from the West Coast, which would expendable launch vehicles would be we gained from space photography, it also require a delta wing. Indeed, available for use by the NSS programs would be worth 10 times what the whole NASA cited the delta wing as an in the event of a shuttle accident. program has cost. Because tonight we essential NASA requirement, even Furthermore, by 1982 the full costs know how many the enemy has for launches from the East Coast. of shuttle missions were becoming and, it turned out, our guesses were way NASA was offered the chance to build clearer and the actual per-flight cost off. We were doing things we didn’t a smaller shuttle when, in January of a shuttle mission had risen to need to do. We were building things we 1972, President Richard Nixon over $280 million, with a didn’t need to build. We were harboring approved the Space Transportation launch looking cheap in comparison fears we didn’t need to harbor.” Due to System (STS) for development. at less than $ 180 million. With the these important contributions and others, The NASA leadership decided to stick skyrocketing costs of a shuttle launch, the NSS programs had a significant with the larger, delta wing design. the existence of an expendable amount of political support and funding. launch vehicles option for the NSS As a result, both the NSS program National : The programs made the transition from the leadership and the NASA program Shuttle as Sole Access to Space shuttle inevitable. leadership often held conflicting views of which program was more important The Space Shuttle Program was and, therefore, whose position on a approved with the widely understood Military “Man in Space” given issue ought to prevail. but unstated policy that when it To this day, the US Air Force (USAF) became operational it would be used These two characteristics of the NSS uses flight crews for most of their to launch all NSS payloads. The programs—lack of unified NSS airborne missions. Yet, there was production of all other expendable program management and a competing much discussion within the service launch vehicles, like the reliable view of priorities—would cause about the value of having a military Titan, would be abandoned. In 1981 , friction between NASA and the NSS human in space program. Through shortly after the launch of STS -1 , the programs management throughout the the 1960s, development of early National Space Transportation Policy duration of the relationship. reconnaissance like

The Historical Legacy 43 demonstrated that long-life The Space Shuttle Program plans Launch System Integration: electronics and complex systems included a payload specialist selected Preparing for Launch on the spacecraft and on the ground for a particular mission by the payload could be relied on to accomplish sponsor or customer. Many NSS The new partnership between NASA the crucial task of reconnaissance. leadership were not enthusiastic and the NSS programs was very These systems used inexpensive about the concept; however, in 1979, complex. Launching the national systems on orbit and relatively a selection board made up of NSS security payloads on the shuttle small expendable launch vehicles, leadership and a NASA representative required the cooperation of two large, and they proved that human chose the first cadre of 13 military proud organizations, each of which presence in space was not necessary officers from the USAF and US Navy. viewed their mission as being for these missions. These officers were called manned of the highest national priority. This engineers. There was belief in their own primacy was a part During the early 1960s, NSS had considerable friction with the NASA of each organization’s culture. From two military man in space programs: astronaut office over the military the very beginning, it was obvious first the “Dyna Soar” space plane, and payload specialist program. Many of that considerable effort would be then the Manned Orbiting Laboratory the ex-Manned Orbiting Laboratory required by both organizations to forge program. Both were cancelled, largely astronauts who had been working at a true partnership. At the beginning due to skepticism on the part of the NASA and waiting for over a decade of the Space Shuttle Program, NASA Department of Defense (DoD) or to fly in space were not enthusiastic focused on the shuttle, while NSS NSS leadership that the programs’ about the NSS plans to fly their own program leaders naturally focused on contributions were worth the expense officers as payload specialists. In the the spacecraft’s mission. As the as well as the unwanted attention that long run, NASA astronauts had little partnership developed, NASA had the presence of astronauts would bring to be concerned about. When asked to become more payload focused. to these highly classified missions. his opinion of the role of military Much of the friction was over who Although 14 military astronauts payload specialists in upcoming was in charge. The NSS programs were chosen for the Manned Orbiting shuttle missions, General Lew Allen, were used to having control of the Laboratory program, the sudden then chief of staff of the USAF, launch of their spacecraft. NASA kept cancellation of this vast program in related a story about when he played firm control of the shuttle missions 1969 left them, as well as the nearly a major role in the cancellation of and struggled with the requests for completed launch facility at the Manned Orbiting Laboratory unique support from each of the many Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, Military Man in Space program. programs using the shuttle. without a mission. With NASA’s In 1984, another NSS senior wrote: Launch system integration—the existing programs ramping down, “The major driver in the higher STS process of launching a spacecraft on NASA was reluctant to take the costs is the cost of carrying man on a the shuttle—was a complex activity military astronauts into its Astronaut mission which does not need man. . . . that had to be navigated successfully. Corps. Eventually, only the seven It is clear that man is not needed on For an existing spacecraft design, youngest military astronauts the transport mission. . . .” The NSS transitioning to fly on the shuttle transferred to NASA. The others senior leadership was still very required a detailed engineering and returned to their military careers. skeptical about the need for a military safety assessment. Typically, some These military astronauts did not fly man in space. Ultimately, only two redesign was required to make the until the 1980s, with the first being NSS manned spaceflight engineers spacecraft meet the shuttle’s Robert Crippen as pilot on STS -1 . flew on shuttle missions. operational and safety requirements, The Manned Orbiting Laboratory such as making dangerous propellant pad at Vandenberg Air Force Base and explosive systems safe for a would lie dormant until the early crewed vehicle. This effort actually 1980s when modifications were begun offered an opportunity for growth for use with the shuttle. due to the shuttle payload bay size

44 The Historical Legacy and the lift capacity from the (KSC) launch site. Typically flying alone on dedicated missions, the NSS spacecraft had all the shuttle capacity to grow into. Since design changes were usually required for structural or safety reasons, most NSS program managers could not resist taking at least some advantage of the available mass or volume. So many NSS spacecraft developed during the shuttle era were much larger than their predecessors had been in the late 1960s.

National Security Space Contributions to the Space Shuttle Program The NSS programs agreed to provide some of the key capabilities that the Space Shuttle Program would need to achieve all of its goals. As the executive agent for DoD space, the USAF funded and managed these programs. One of these programs, eventually known as the , focused on an upper stage that would take a spacecraft from the shuttle in low-Earth orbit to its final mission orbit or onto an escape trajectory for an interplanetary mission. Another was a West Coast launch site for the shuttle, Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Launching from this site would allow the shuttle to reach high inclination orbits over the Earth’s poles. Although almost complete, it was closed after the on Space Launch Complex 6 during pad checkout tests at Vandenberg Challenger accident in 1986 and much Air Force Base in 1985. Enterprise was the Orbiter built for the Approach and Landing Tests to prove flightworthiness. It never became part of the shuttle fleet. of the equipment was disassembled and shipped to KSC to improve or expand control center in Houston, Texas, for manifest after the Challenger accident, its facilities. Another program was a these classified missions. USAF built the facility was not needed for shuttle USAF shuttle flight operation center in the facility and their personnel trained flights and eventually it was used for . This was intended to be the at Johnson Space Center; however, other purposes. mission control center for NSS shuttle when the decision was made to flights, easing the workload on the remove NSS missions from the shuttle

The Historical Legacy 45 Flying National Security Space To prepare for a mission, NASA flight 1982-1992: National Payloads on the Shuttle operations employed a very thorough process that focused on ensuring that Security Space The NSS program leadership matured flight controllers were ready for and NASA Complete during a period when spacecraft and anything the mission might throw at their ground systems were fairly simple them. This included practice sessions in 11 Missions and orbital operations were not very the control centers using spacecraft complex. In the early 1980s, one simulators that were better than The first National Security Space (NSS) senior NSS program director was often anything the NSS personnel had seen. payload was launched on Space heard to say, “All operations needs is NSS flight operations personnel Transportation System (STS)-4 in June a roll of quarters and a phone booth.” thought they had died and gone to 1982. This attached payload (one that This was hyperbole, but the point was heaven. Here, finally, was an never left the payload bay), called clear: planning and preparing for orbital organization that took “ops” seriously “82-1,” carried the US Air Force operations was not a priority. It wasn’t and committed the resources to do it (USAF) Space Test Program Cryogenic unheard of for an NSS program with right. As the partnership developed, Infrared Radiance Instrumentation for budget, schedule, or political pressures NASA forced, cajoled, and convinced Shuttle (CIRRIS) telescope and several to launch a new spacecraft before all the NSS programs to adopt a more other small experiments. This mission the details for how to operate the thorough approach to the shuttle was originally scheduled for the 18th spacecraft on orbit had been completely integration and operations readiness shuttle flight; but, as the Space Shuttle worked out. processes. Over time, NASA’s approach Program slipped, NSS program management was able to maintain its Early on, NASA flight operations caught on within the NSS. It was schedule and was ready for integration personnel were stunned to see that the simply a best practice worth emulating. into the shuttle early in 1982. Since the ground systems involved in operating Another component of NASA human first two shuttle missions had gone so the most critical NSS spacecraft were spaceflight—the role of the well, NASA decided to allow the 82-1 at least a decade behind equivalent astronaut—was initially very foreign payload to fly on this flight test mission NASA systems. Some even voiced to NSS personnel. Astronauts tended to despite the conflicts this decision would concern that, because the NSS systems place a very personal stamp on the cause with the mission’s test goals. were so antiquated, they weren’t sure plans for “their” mission, which came This rather selfless act on the part of the NSS spacecraft could be operated as a shock to NSS program personnel. NASA was characteristic of the positive safely with the shuttle. In NASA, Some NSS personnel chafed at the relationship between NASA and the flight operations was a major effort required to satisfy the crew NSS programs once the shuttle began organizational focus and had been member working with their payload. to fly. For the NSS programs, a major since the days of Project . On early missions, the commander purpose of this mission was to be a NASA flight operations leaders such or other senior crew members would pathfinder for subsequent NSS missions. as John O’Neil, Jay Honeycutt, Cliff not start working with the payload This payload was controlled from the Charlesworth, and Gene Kranz had an until the last 6 months or so prior to Sunnyvale USAF station in California. important voice in how the Space launch and would want to make This was also the only NSS mission Shuttle Program allocated its resources changes in the plans. This caused some where the NSS flight controllers talked and in its development plans. Line friction. The NSS people did not want directly to the shuttle crew. managers in NASA, including Jay to deal with last-minute changes so Greene, Ed Fendell, and Hal Beck, close to launch. After a few missions, worked closely with the NSS flight as the relationship developed, Operational Missions operations people to merge NSS adjustments were made by both sides The next NSS mission, STS-51C, spacecraft and shuttle operations to ease this “last-minute effect.” into one seamless activity. Many of occurred January 1985, 2½ years after the NASA personnel, especially flight STS-4. STS-51C was a classified NSS directors, had no counterpart on the mission that included the successful NSS government team. use of the Inertial Upper Stage. The

46 The Historical Legacy Inertial Upper Stage had experienced The Challenger and her crew were a failure during the launch of the first lost in a tragic accident the following NASA Tracking and Data Relay January. After launching only three Satellite mission on STS-6 in 1983. spacecraft payloads on the first 25 The subsequent failure investigation and missions, the NSS response to the redesign had resulted in a long delay in Challenger accident was to move all Inertial Upper Stage missions. With the spacecraft that it could off shuttle problem solved, the shuttle launched flights. The next NSS spacecraft flew into a 28.5-degree orbit with an altitude almost 2 years after the Challenger of about 407 km (220 nautical miles). accident on the 4-day mission of The first manned spaceflight engineer, STS-27 in December 1988. This Gary Payton, flew as a payload mission was launched into a 57-degree specialist on this 3-day mission. This orbit and had an all-NASA crew, as did was also the first use of the “Department the subsequent NSS spacecraft payload of Defense (DoD) Control Mode”—a missions with only one exception specially configured Mission Operations (STS-44 [1 99 1]). No other details on Control Room at Johnson Space Center the STS-2 7 mission have been released. that was designed and equipped with all The launch rate picked up 8 months the systems required to protect the spacecraft and attached later with the launch of STS-28 in classified nature of these missions. Inertial Upper Stage prior to release from Atlantis August and STS-33 in November on STS-44 (1991). This spacecraft provides warning (both in 1989), followed by STS-36 of ballistic attacks on the United States. in February and STS-38 in November (both in 1990). The details of these STS-44 crew members included an missions remain classified, but the Army payload specialist, Tom Hennan. rapid launch rate—four missions in This mission marked the end of flights 15 months—was working off the on the shuttle for non-NASA military backlog that had built up during the payload specialists. Ironically, Warrant delays after the Challenger accident. Officer Hennan performed experiments This pace also demonstrated the called “Military Man in Space.” The growing maturity of the NSS/NASA spacecraft launched on this mission was working relationship. the USAF Defense Support Program satellite designed to detect nuclear In April 1991, in a departure from the detonations, missile launches, and NSS unified approach to classification space launches from geosynchronous of its activities on the shuttle, the USAF Gary Payton, US Air Force (USAF) Lieutenant orbit. This satellite program had been Space Test Program AFP-675 with the General (retired), flew on STS-51C (1985) as a in existence for over 20 years. The payload specialist. He was part of the USAF CIRRIS telescope was launched on satellite launched on STS-44 replaced manned spaceflight engineering program and STS-39. This was the first time in the an older satellite in the operational served as USAF Deputy Under Secretary for NSS/NASA relationship that the details Special Programs. Defense Support Program constellation. of a dedicated DoD payload were released to the world prior to launch. The second and final manned The focus of this mission was Strategic spaceflight engineer, William Pailes, Space Test Program Defense Initiative research into sensor flew on the 4-day flight of STS-51J designs and environmental phenomena. Another series of experiments, called in October 1985. This shuttle mission The details of this flight and STS-44 in “M88-1,” on STS-44 was announced deployed a defense communications November 1991 were released to the as an ongoing series of tri-service satellite riding on an Inertial Upper public. Their payloads were from experiments designed to assess man’s Stage, which took the satellite up to previously publicized USAF programs. visual and communication capabilities geosynchronous orbit. from space. The objectives of M88-1

The Historical Legacy 47 Michael Griffin, PhD Deputy for technology at the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (1986-1991). NASA administrator (2005-2009).

Strategic Defense Initiative Test

“STS-39 was a very complex mission that led to breakthroughs in America’s understanding of the characteristics of missile signatures in space. The data View of the Aurora Australis—or Southern Lights—taken by Air Force Program-675 we gathered enhanced our ability Uniformly Redundant Array and Cryogenic to identify and protect ourselves Infrared Radiance Instrumentation during from future missile threats. STS-39 (1991). One of the equipment’s objectives was to gather data on the Earth’s This is one of the most under- aurora, limb, and airglow. recognized achievements of the shuttle era.” STS-39’s Air Force Program-675 equipment mounted on the experiment support system pallet in Discovery’s payload bay.

overlapped those done by Hennan mission (STS-53) are the only the 10 years of shuttle missions, with his experiments; however, NASA acknowledged examples of this policy. 11 of the 52 missions were dedicated Mission Specialist Mario Runco and to NSS programs. The end of A year later in December 1992, the rest of the NASA crew performed NSS-dedicated shuttle missions STS-53 was launched with a classified the M88-1 experiments. This activity resulted from the rising costs of shuttle payload called “DoD-1” on a 7-day used a digital camera to produce missions and policy decisions made mission. Marty Faga, assistant secretary images that could be evaluated on as a result of the Challenger accident. of the USAF (space), said: “STS-53 orbit. Observations were to be radioed There were few NSS-dedicated marks a milestone in our long and to tactical field users seconds after missions relative to the enthusiastic productive partnership with NASA. the observation pass was complete. plans laid in the late 1970s; however, We have enjoyed outstanding support Emphasis was on coordinating the Space Shuttle Program had a from the Space Shuttle Program. observations with ongoing DoD lasting impact on the NSS programs. Although this is the last dedicated exercises to fully assess the military While the number of NSS-dedicated shuttle payload, we look forward to benefits of a spaceborne observer. missions was small, the partnership continued involvement with the program The policy implications of using NASA between the NSS programs and NASA with DoD secondary payloads.” astronauts to provide input directly to had a lasting impact. military forces on the ground during With the landing of STS-53 at shuttle missions have long been Kennedy Space Center, the NSS/NASA debated. This flight and the following partnership came to an end. During

48 The Historical Legacy Legacy of the Space applied to the future complex NSS leadership to future programs. Several programs with great success. ex-astronauts, such as Bob Stuart, John Shuttle Program Fabian, and Kevin Chilton, have held Another significant legacy is that or are now holding senior leadership and National of leadership in the NSS programs. roles in their respective services. Security Space The manned spaceflight engineer program in particular was adept at The role that the NASA/NSS The greatest legacy of the selecting young officers with potential collaboration played in the formation NASA/National Security Space to be future leaders of the NSS of Space Command also left a legacy. (NSS) partnership was at the personal programs. A few examples of current While the formation of the USAF level for NSS engineers and managers. or recent NSS leaders who spent Space Command occurred late in the Working on the Space Shuttle their formative years in the manned NASA/NSS relationship, close contact Program in the early 1980s was spaceflight engineer program include: between the NSS programs and the exciting and provided just the sort Gary Payton, Mike Hamel, Jim Armor, shuttle organizations motivated the of motivation that could fuel a career. Kathy Roberts, and Larry James. Department of Defense to create an NSS personnel learned new and Others, such as Willie Shelton, were organization that would have the different operational and engineering US Air Force (USAF) flight controllers organizational clout and budget to deal techniques through direct contact assigned to work in Houston, Texas. with the Space Shuttle Program on a more equal basis. with their NASA counterparts. As a Many military personnel working result, engineering and operations with NASA returned to the NSS space The impact on mission assurance and practices developed by NASA were programs, providing outstanding the rigor in operations planning and

US Air Force Space Test Program— Pathfinder for Department of Defense Space Systems

The US Air Force (USAF) Space Test Program was established as a multiuser space program whose role is to be the primary provider of spaceflight for the entire Department of Defense (DoD) space research community. From as early as STS-4 (1982), the USAF Space Test Program used the shuttle to fly payloads relevant to the military. The goal of the program was to exploit the use of the shuttle as a research and development laboratory. In addition to supplying the primary payloads on several DoD-dedicated missions, more than 250 secondary payloads and experiments flew on 95 shuttle missions. Space Test Program payloads flew in the shuttle middeck, cargo bay, , and Spacehab, A Department of Defense pico-satellite known as Atmospheric Neutral Density and on the Russian space station during the Experiment (ANDE) is released from the STS-116 (2006) payload bay. ANDE consists of two micro-satellites that measure the density and composition of the low-Earth Shuttle-Mir missions in the mid 1990s. orbit atmosphere while being tracked from the ground. The data are used to better predict the movement of objects in orbit.

The Historical Legacy 49 preparation could be the most Another Legacy: the first orbit. So our hypothesis was significant technical legacy the Space that the development of the shuttle Shuttle Program left the NSS programs. Relationship with was mainly for military purposes.” NASA required participation by the USSR and Its Allies It was estimated that a military payload NSS spacecraft operators in the early could reenter Earth’s atmosphere from stages of each mission’s planning. In 1972, with the US announcement orbit and engage any target within the NSS operations personnel quickly of the Space Shuttle as its primary USSR in 3 to 4 minutes—much faster realized that this early involvement space transportation system, the than the anticipated 10 minutes from resulted in improved operations USSR quickly adapted to keep pace. launch to detonation by US nuclear or survivability and provided the “Believing the Space Shuttle to be a submarines stationed off Arctic tools and experience necessary military threat to the , coastlines. This drastically changed the to deal with the new, more complex officials of the USSR Ministry of deterrence calculations of top Soviet NSS spacecraft. Defense found little interest in lunar decision makers. The impact of the Space Shuttle bases or giant space stations. What Indeed, deterrence was the great Program on the NSS cannot be judged they wanted was a parallel deterrent game of the Cold War. Each side had by the small number of NSS-dedicated to the shuttle.” Premier Leonid amassed nuclear arsenals sufficient shuttle missions. The policy decision Brezhnev, Russian sources reported, to destroy the other side many times that moved all NSS spacecraft onto was particularly distraught at the over, and any threat to the precarious the shuttle formed a team out of the thought of a winged spacecraft on an balance of terror the two sides had most creative engineering minds in the apparently routine mission in space achieved was sure to spell doom. country. There was friction between suddenly swooping down on Moscow The key to stability was the capacity the two organizations, but ultimately and delivering an unthinkably to deny any gain from a surprise or it was the people on this NSS/NASA dangerous cargo. first strike. A guaranteed response in team who made it work. It is Russian design bureaus offered a the form of a devastating counterattack unfortunate that, as a result of the number of innovative counter- was the hole card in this international Challenger accident, the end of the capabilities, but Brezhnev and the game of bluff and brinksmanship. partnership came so soon. The success Ministry of Defense were adamant that Any development that threatened to of this partnership should be measured a near match was vital. They may not mitigate a full second strike was a not by the number of missions or have known what the American menace of the highest order. even by the data collected, but rather military was planning with the shuttle, Several treaties had been signed by the lasting impact on the NSS but they wanted to be prepared for limiting or barring various anti-satellite programs’ personnel and the exactly what it might be. The Soviets activities, especially those targeted experiences they brought to future were perplexed by the decision to against nuclear launch detection NSS programs. go forward with the Space Shuttle. capabilities (in a brute attempt to blind Their estimates of cost-performance, the second-strike capacity of the other particularly over their own side). The shuttle, with its robotic arm mass-produced space launch vehicles, used for retrieving satellites in orbit, were very high. It seemed to make little could act as an anti-satellite weapon in practical sense until the announcement a crisis, expensive and dangerous as its that a military shuttle launch facility use might be. Thus, the shuttle could at Vandenberg Air Force Base was get around prohibitions against planned; according to one Soviet space anti-satellite capabilities through its scientist, “… trajectories from public image as a peaceful NASA space Vandenberg allowed an overflight of plane. So concerned were the Soviets the main centers of the USSR on

50 The Historical Legacy if the United States would agree. The catch was the shuttle could not be used for military activities. In exchange, the Soviets would likewise limit the Mir space station from military interaction—an untenable exchange. So a shuttle-equivalent space plane was bulldozed through the Soviet budget and the result was the Buran/Energiya shuttle and heavy-lift booster. After more than a decade of funding—and, for the cash-strapped Soviet government, a crippling budget—the unmanned Buran debuted and flew two orbits before landing flawlessly in November 1988. Immediately after the impressive proof-of-concept flight, the Soviets mothballed Buran. James Moltz, professor of national security at the Naval Postgraduate School, commented that the “self-inflicted extreme cost of the Buran/Energiya program did more to destabilize the Soviet economy than any response to the Reagan administration’s efforts in the 1980s.” If so, the Space Shuttle can be given at least partial credit for winning the Cold War.

Buran/Energiya shuttle and heavy-lift booster, built by the USSR, flew once—uncrewed—in 1988. with the potential capability of the In the 1978 -1 979 strategic arms shuttle, they developed designs for at limitation talks, the Soviets asked for least two orbiting “laser-equipped battle a guarantee that the shuttle would not stations” as a counter and conducted be used for anti-satellite purposes. more than 20 “test launches” of a The United States refused. In 1983, massive ground-launched anti-satellite the USSR offered to prohibit the weapon in the 1970s and 1980s. stationing of any weapons in space,

The Historical Legacy 51 52