Evolving Terror February 2018

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Evolving Terror February 2018 Evolving Terror The Development of Jihadist Operations Targeting Western Interests in Africa Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Jacob Zenn, Sarah Sheafer, & Sandro Bejdic February 2018 FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES Evolving Terror The Development of Jihadist Operations Targeting Western Interests in Africa Daveed Gartenstein-Ross Jacob Zenn Sarah Sheafer Sandro Bejdic February 2018 FDD PRESS A division of the FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES Washington, DC Evolving Terror Table of Contents Acronyms ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5 Introduction and Executive Summary ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������6 Summary of Key Findings �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 7 Research Design and Methodology 8 Target Type Profiles 10 Establishments Popular Among Foreigners ������������������������������������������������������������������������������10 Energy and Mineral Resources Infrastructure and Facilities �����������������������������������������������������14 Non-African Tourists, Expatriates, and NGO Workers ������������������������������������������������������������16 National and International Government Facilities �������������������������������������������������������������������18 Aviation �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������21 Broader Implications and Conclusions 23 Acknowledgments 26 About the Authors 27 Appendix 30 Page 3 Evolving Terror Acronyms AQAP Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula AQIM Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham MPIED Man-portable improvised explosive device MUJWA Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa TTPs Tactics, techniques, and procedures VBIED Vehicle-borne improvised explosive device VNSA Violent non-state actor Page 5 Evolving Terror African jihadist groups have also developed Introduction and innovative ways to thwart the aviation industry’s Executive Summary security measures on the continent. For example, a Shabaab suicide bomber detonated a laptop bomb After the Arab Spring, North African countries on Daallo Airlines Flight 159 in February 2016. A experienced growing instability, and jihadist groups month later, Shabaab operatives concealed another capitalized on both social unrest and local conflicts.1 bomb in a laptop that exploded at Somalia’s As these groups strengthened, jihadists expanded their Beledweyne airport, and authorities defused two operations into the Sahel, and were able to propagate other bombs in the same incident, including one their transnational ideology to new audiences. The hidden in a printer. Not only do these events suggest threat that jihadist groups in Africa pose to Western an escalating threat to African aviation, but they interests has grown over the past decade, as groups also highlight how African jihadist groups learn operating in North Africa, the Sahel, West Africa, and innovate. The ability to learn is critical to any and the Horn of Africa have honed their capabilities. violent non-state actor (VNSA), but particularly This is reflected in the increased frequency and so for militant groups, which are pursued by state complexity of attacks against Western interests. actors and sometimes also by other VNSAs. These Between January 2007 and December 2011, jihadists groups need to be able to mount successful attacks conducted 132 successful, thwarted, or failed attacks against foes who constantly refine their defenses. against Western interests in Africa. This figure nearly The learning processes of African jihadist groups tripled to 358 attacks between January 2012 and are evident in this study’s data set, as these groups October 2017. have engaged in unambiguous adaptations over the course of the past decade. They will continue to While the 490 total attacks against Western interests engage in organizational learning in an effort to make in Africa recorded in this study have varied in target themselves more effective – and, consequently, more type and tactics, jihadist operations have generally dangerous. But there is also a significant risk that become more sophisticated. In some cases, jihadist outside jihadist groups are assisting African jihadists’ organizations developed new tactics for penetrating innovations, and watching carefully to bring these well-guarded facilities. For example, the Somali tactics to new theaters after seeing how they fare in militant group al-Shabaab has increased its use a “testing ground.” We return to the topic of jihadist of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices learning processes in this study’s conclusion. (VBIEDs), often supplementing such attacks with armed assaults. This adaptation allowed Shabaab To understand evolving tactics, techniques, to gain entrance to facilities like airports and UN and procedures (TTPs), targeting, and jihadist humanitarian compounds, frequently penetrating innovation, this report uses empirical and historical past guarded gates. analysis to map trends in operations against Western interests over the past decade. The report focuses on five target types: (1) establishments popular among foreigners, such as restaurants and hotels; (2) energy 1� See, for example: Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “The Arab Spring and mineral resources infrastructure and facilities; (3) and Al-Qaeda’s Resurgence,” Testimony before the House Armed non-African tourists, expatriates, and NGO workers; Services Committee, February 4, 2014� (http://docs�house�gov/ meetings/AS/AS00/20140204/101698/HHRG-113-AS00- (4) national and international government facilities, Wstate-Gartenstein-RossD-20140204�pdf) such as embassies and UN humanitarian compounds; Page 6 Evolving Terror and (5) the aviation industry. This report is based there were fewer attacks on the latter, those that on an extensive list of successful, thwarted, and occurred involved more resources on the part of failed attacks against each target type, and utilizes jihadist groups and resulted in a larger number both quantitative and qualitative analysis to identify of casualties. trends and draw conclusions about the evolution of targeting preferences and TTPs since 2007. • Non-African Tourists, Expatriates, and NGO Workers. While kidnapping foreigners is not Summary of Key Findings a new tactic in places like Somalia, jihadist groups in the Sahel have recently expanded these • Establishments Popular Among Foreigners. Over operations into atypical areas, such as northern the past decade, African jihadist groups attacked Burkina Faso and Cameroon. establishments popular among foreigners more often than the other four target types. Their TTPs • National and International Government became more complex as they combined multiple Facilities. Between 2012 and 2017, jihadist tactics and weapon types. operations against embassies, consulates, and UN humanitarian compounds became more • Energy and Mineral Resources Infrastructure and complex, as groups like Shabaab developed ways Facilities. Jihadists primarily attacked poorly to penetrate well-guarded facilities by combining defended infrastructure, such as gas pipelines, as VBIEDs with armed assaults. These complex opposed to well-guarded energy facilities. While attacks were some of the deadliest. But they have Page 7 Evolving Terror remained comparatively rare, as these groups kidnapped, and a brief description of the incident.3 have primarily employed simple bombings. Attacks were only recorded if they were perpetrated by confirmed or suspected African jihadists. For the • Aviation. In recent years, African jihadist purposes of this report, jihadism refers to militant groups have demonstrated a greater interest in Sunni groups that advocate the overthrow of local conducting sophisticated attacks against aviation regimes, seeking to replace them with government targets. Techniques have included measures ruled by a strict form of sharia (Islamic law).4 designed to evade airport security by concealing explosives in electronic devices, and the attackers Inclusion Criteria for Target Types have relied on complicit airport employees in several cases. Researchers identified and defined five general target types with implications for Western interests in Africa� They are:5 Research Design and Establishments Popular Among Foreigners includes attacks on hotels, restaurants and cafés, nightclubs Methodology and bars, local shops, markets and business areas, shopping centers, and entertainment venues such as This project began with the compilation of an cinemas and sports arenas� While some jihadist attacks extensive list of successful, thwarted, and failed on hotels are primarily driven by these venues hosting attacks and kidnappings in Africa against the five aforementioned target types from January 2007 to October 2017 by relying on publicly available 3� Tactic categories included plane hijacking, kidnapping, sources.2 Information collected about the attacks bombing, assault, launching projectiles (e.g., mortars or RPGs), and throwing explosives or incendiary devices (e.g., grenades, included target, date, location, suspected or confirmed Molotov cocktails)� Attacks that involved multiple weapons and assailant(s), number of perpetrators, tactics and tactics (e.g., VBIED combined with armed assault) were also weapons used, number killed and wounded, number given the
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