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Boko Haram, Iran, and Syria SEPT 2016 Vol 2 Thr eat Tactics Report Thr eat Tactics Report Compendium Compendium BBookk oo HHaarraamm,, IIrraann,, aanndd SSyyrriiaa Includes a sampling of Threat Action Reports and Red Diamond articles TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Threat Tactics Report Compendium, Vol 2 Introduction TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (ACE-TI) is the source of the Threat Tactics Report (TTR) series of products. TTRs serve to explain to the Army training community how an actor fights. Elements that contribute to this understanding may include an actor’s doctrine, force structure, weapons and equipment, education, and warfighting functions. An explanation of an actor’s tactics and techniques is provided in detail along with recent examples of tactical actions, if they exist. An actor may be regular or irregular, and a TTR will have a discussion of what a particular actor’s capabilities mean to the US and its allies. An important element of any TTR is the comparison of the real-world tactics to threat doctrinal concepts and terminology. A TTR will also identify where the conditions specific to the actor are present in the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) and other training materials so that these conditions can easily be implemented across all training venues. Volume 2: Boko Haram, Iran, and Syria This compendium of Threat Tactics Reports, Volume 2, features the most current versions of three TTRs: Boko Haram (Version 1.0, published October 2015); Iran (Version 1.0, published June 2016); and Syria (Version 1.0, published February 2016). This volume also contains three recent Threat Action Reports (TARs): Al-Shabaab Janaale Attack (published December 2015); Battle for Sinjar, Iraq (published April 2016); and Pathankot, India, Airbase Attack (published May 2016). In addition, several articles from the Red Diamond monthly newsletter, ranging from threat doctrine to threat equipment, are included in this volume. ACE-TI plans to publish two more TTRs later this year: Militant Groups Operating in Pakistan, and Hizballah. Each of these, once published, is eligible for update as appropriate so the product stays relevant. Cover photos (clockwise from lower left): A destroyed tank lies in the street in Aleppo, Syria, Voice of America, 6 October 2012; Car Bomb: Maiduguri Market, Voice of America, 2 July 2014; Head officials of the government of Iran, Official website of Ali Khamenei, 29 December 2015; Sinjar Mountains, Phillip Melton, 8 November 2009. i UNCLASSIFIED Threat Tactics Report Compendium, Vol 2 Contents Threat Tactics Reports 1 Boko Haram, Version 1.0, October 2015 ............................................................................... 1 Iran, Version 1.0, June 2016 ................................................................................................ 33 Syria, Version 1.0, February 2016 ........................................................................................ 69 Threat Action Reports 101 Al-Shabaab Janaale Attack, December 2015 ..................................................................... 101 Battle for Sinjar, Iraq, April 2016 ....................................................................................... 115 Pathankot, India, Airbase Attack, May 2016 ..................................................................... 127 Red Diamond Articles 153 INFOWAR: North Korean Capabilities, Part 2 of 2 (Jan 2015) ........................................................ 157 Wadi al Deif and al Hamadiyah Military Base Attacks (Feb 2015) ................................................. 164 People’s Liberation Army: Challenges to US Warfighting Functions (Jun 2015) ............................. 170 Fight for HAMA 2014 (Jul 2015) ...................................................................................................... 174 WEG: Chinese SLC-2 Artillery Locating Radar (Aug 2015) ............................................................... 180 Threat Tactical Vignette: Recon and Raid (Sep 2015) ..................................................................... 184 Cartel Warfare: Analyzing Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations (Oct 2015) ............................. 195 Russian Tactics in Syria (Nov 2015) ................................................................................................. 202 Mission Command Training Program: Warfighter Exercise (WFX) 16-2 (Feb 2016) ....................... 207 DATE-Based Scenario Concepts for Training (Apr 2016) ................................................................. 215 Hotel al Shabaab: Why and How the Group Targets Hotels (May 2016) ........................................ 223 JMRC DATE Rotation 16-04: Saber Junction 16-04 (May 2016) ...................................................... 229 Antilanding Operations and Threats to Aircraft (Jun 2016) ............................................................ 236 New Egyptian Plague: ISIL and the Sinai Province (Jun 2016) ......................................................... 241 Threat 2025+: Hybrid Threat Blueprint Two (Jul 2016) .................................................................. 250 Militia Battalions in the Ukrainian Conflict, Part 2: Pro-Russia Units (Aug 2016) ........................... 255 ii UNCLASSIFIED THREAT TACTICS REPORT: BOKO HARAM TRADOC G-2 ACE THREATS INTEGRATION VERSION 1.0 OCTOBER 2015 Threat Tactics Report: Boko Haram Executive Summary Boko Haram is a relatively new organization, having begun serious military operations against the Nigerian government in 2009. Abubakar Shekau leads a confederation of sub organizations with commanders who mostly control their own day-to-day operations. Shekau’s legitimacy comes from his position as deputy to the founder of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf. Boko Haram primarily conducts offensive raids, assaults, and ambushes against thinly-stretched and poorly-resourced Nigerian security elements and civilians in northeastern Nigeria. Influence from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), to whom Boko Haram recently swore allegiance, can be seen in an improved and increasing Boko Haram social media presence. The Nigerian military counterinsurgency campaign begun in 2013 has reduced Boko Haram’s freedom of maneuver within Nigeria, causing it to setup safe havens in Niger, Chad, and Cameroon utilizing hundreds of unguarded border transit points. Due to a campaign of violence against civilians and businesses, Boko Haram has lost both Nigerian civilian support and recruits, causing it to look to disaffected and poverty-ridden areas in border countries, particularly Cameroon. Boko Haram’s violent attacks have alienated it from much of the Nigerian population. This (U) Threat Tactics Report (TTR) was produced in accordance with (U) Intelligence Community Directive Number 203: Analytical Standards (Effective: Jan 2015). This TTR was coordinated with: National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC)—Thomas Peters HQDA DCS G-2—Tiffany Graham Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO)—Tom Wilhelm Global Cultural Knowledge Network (GCKN)—Benjamin Okonofua US Army Africa (USARAF)—Erica Hedrick Comments and feedback are welcome. Jon S. Cleaves Director, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration 2 UNCLASSIFIED Threat Tactics Report: Boko Haram Introduction Nigeria’s economy is the largest in Africa, and is projected to be one of the ten fastest growing economies in the world in 2015, making the country a key to regional stability. Boko Haram,i a Nigerian home-grown paramilitary insurgency group, threatens both Nigerian and regional stability. Boko Haram’s attacks, both actual and threatened, caused Nigerian officials to postpone the 2015 presidential election by six weeks to allow a military offensive into northern Nigeria to secure safe voting areas. Boko Haram’s recruiting and attacks in and occupation of safe havens in border countries threaten these already volatile areas.1 The Threat Tactics Report (TTR): Boko Haram provides an overview of Boko Haram’s tactics, techniques, and capabilities. This report contains five sections. Section 1 is an introduction that provides an overview of Boko Haram. Section 2 is a discussion of Boko Haram’s tactics and techniques with specific graphical and narrative examples. Section 3 provides information on Boko Haram’s weapons and equipment. Section 4 details Boko Haram’s organization and military capabilities. Section 5 provides a conclusion and identifies where the characteristics specific to Boko Haram are present in the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) and other training materials so these conditions can be easily implemented in training. Section 1: Introduction to Boko Haram Nigeria is a country with abundant natural resources, but also a country with great internal turmoil and challenges. Endemic corruption has concentrated much of the national wealth in the hands of a few at the expense of the many. A definitive division between the predominately Muslim north and the predominately Christian south combined with hundreds of different ethnic groups make for religious and ethnic tension. A power-sharing agreement allowing for two presidential terms alternating between leaders from the Muslim North and the Christian South was disrupted when President Umaru Yar'Adua died in office in 2010 before completion of his term at which time his vice president, Goodluck Jonathan, assumed office.2 In the 2015 presidential election, Nigerians voted to elect a northern Muslim and
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