Red Diamond Threats Newsletter
TRADOC G-2 Operational Environment Enterprise ACE Threats Integration
Fort Leavenworth, KS Volume 6, Issue 7 JUL 2015
INSIDE THIS ISSUE
UGF in North Korea...... 4 Fight for Hama, Syria .... 12 JMRC Ex CR 15-04 ...... 17 WEG 2015 Changes...... 22 Boko Haram ...... 24 Recon & Assault Pt 2 .... 29
ACE-TI POCs ...... 35
by TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration
OEE Red Diamond The Threat Tactics Course will be at Fort Leavenworth next month, 24– published monthly by 28 August. The week-long course provides students with an TRADOC G-2 OEE understanding of the tactics and techniques employed by the threat in ACE Threats Integration complex environments. Those who design or participate in training
Send suggestions to: exercises and scenario development will benefit from this free course.
ATTN: Red Diamond Slots for August are still available. Please contact Angela Wilkins Dr. Jon H. Moilanen ([email protected]) to register for the course, and Operations BMA Contractor provide the following: your name, rank/civilian/contractor, duty title, and organization, installation, email, and phone. If you are unable to attend Angela Wilkins but would like to be contacted about future courses, you will be added Chief Editor and to the contact list. Typically, the course is provided twice a year in Product Integration BMA Contractor March and August.
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RED DIAMOND TOPICS OF INTEREST by Angela M. Wilkins, TRADOC G-2 ACE-Threats Integration, Editor, Red Diamond Newsletter (BMA Ctr) This month’s front-page feature serves as a reminder to Nigerian governments’ ability to conduct business. A register for the Threat Tactics Course to be held next prime example was the threat group’s effect on the month. Contact us with questions about the course or to timeline of the presidential election. Although Nigeria register. has the potential to be one of the world’s fastest growing economies this year, Boko Haram has found success in The use of subterranean spaces, or underground impeding the government’s progress and legitimacy with facilities (UGF), is an effective technique the threat a variety of common tactics and simple techniques. employs against the United States’ air superiority. The article beginning on page 4 discusses the over 10,000 This month’s issue of Red Diamond concludes with Part 2 UGFs operated in and by the North Korean government. of a tactical vignette on reconnaissance and assault techniques (page 29). The article takes the reader Recent operations in Hama, Syria demonstrate how the through a recon and assault mission in explicit detail, Syrian regime used a variety of organizations to conduct providing a realistic sense of a way such tactical actions defensive and offensive operations, including non-state might take place. Additionally, opposing force doctrinal actors and local militias. In particular, in 2014, Syria was definitions and descriptions are provided to demonstrate able to defend the airbase in Hama from opposition to the reader the connection between doctrine and real- forces. See page 12 for details. word threat tasks. An analyst from ACE Threats Integration observed a Contact information for all TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats DATE-based exercise at the Join Multinational Readiness Integration personnel is provided on the final page of the Center (JMRC), Combined Resolve IV. The exercise, newsletter. We are here to help, so contact us with your taking place in May and early June 2015, successfully questions. employed a realistic and robust OPFOR to challenge the
US and its partners, providing excellent training. Find the Email your topic recommendations to: analyst’s observations beginning on page 17. Dr. Jon H. Moilanen, ACE Threats Integration The Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) is updated Operations, BMA CTR annually by TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration. The [email protected] 2015 iteration will undergo format changes to aid in ease and of extraction of information, and will streamline content Angela M. Wilkins, ACE Threats Integration by eliminating outdated weapons and equipment if there Chief Editor and Product Integration, BMA CTR is a similar entry with the same capabilities. See page 22. [email protected] The article on page 24 discusses tactics and techniques successfully employed by Boko Haram to disrupt the
Red Diamond Disclaimer The Red Diamond presents professional information but the views expressed herein are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its elements. The content does not necessarily reflect the official US Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other official US Army publications. Authors are responsible for the accuracy and source documentation of material that they reference. The Red Diamond staff reserves the right to edit material. Appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the US Army for information contained therein.
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Director’s Corner Thoughts for Training Readiness
by Jon Cleaves, Director, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (DAC) The Threat Tactics course we teach twice a year here at Fort Leavenworth is one of the best ways to become familiar with the concepts of hybrid threat, operational environment, and functional tactics, and to learn how to apply them in your daily responsibilities supporting the soldier. The knowledge you will gain from attending the course will provide you with bya solidJon understanding S. Cleaves, Director,of threat concepts ACE-Threats to enhance Integration tasks such as writing scenarios, developing exercises, and simply reading about and understanding threat actions currently taking place worldwide. The week-long class is based on doctrine detailed in the TC 7-100 series, and also makes references to the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) and some of our other publications on recent hybrid threat actions. Students will experience an engaging atmosphere in a small classroom setting with state-of-the-art equipment. Our instructors are the same people who analyze operational environments and develop the products upon which the course content is based. ACE Threats Integration, a member of TRADOC G-2 Operational Environment Enterprise (OEE), is the Army's lead to study, design, document, validate, and apply hybrid threat and operational environment (OE) conditions that support all US Army and joint training and leader development programs. All military, civilians, and contractors are eligible to attend the course, with a maximum of three personnel per organization. The course is UNCLASSIFIED, and there is no fee. Having students with multiple backgrounds and experience in intelligence operations is ideal. Foreign officers are eligible with approval. We typically offer the course twice a year, in March and August, and we consider and implement changes to the course after each iteration based on student and instructor feedback, and to keep course materials current. If you’d like to take advantage of this opportunity, there are a limited number of seats still available for the 24–28 August course. To register or ask questions about the course, please contact Angela Wilkins ([email protected] or 913-684-7929).
Key Links on Army Training Network
TC 7-100 Series: https://atn.army.mil/dsp_template.aspx?dpID=311
DATE: https://atn.army.mil/media/docs/DATE%202.2.pdf
Threat Tactics Course Material from March 2015: https://atn.army.mil/dsp_template.aspx?dpID=447
JON
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by H. David Pendleton, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (CGI Ctr) Some analysts estimate the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), commonly known as North Korea, operates between 11,000 and 14,000 underground facilities (UGF) for military or governmental use. North Korea has taken much of its military and governmental activity below ground because of the massive destruction UN airplanes caused to above- ground facilities during the 1950–53 Korean War and as a means to avoid enemy imagery intelligence opportunities. The actual amount of subterranean activity is only speculation, however, and often UGF excavations are only discovered by the amount of debris generated—whether left on site or transported away. Many other countries have now accepted that subterranean operations may be the best way to survive American air superiority. It is likely any countries who face off against the US military will use UGFs and American Soldiers will need to understand what they may potentially face. While this article will cover the subterranean activities of North Korea, it is important to note many other countries may also adopt the same strategy if they face the US on the battlefield.
The North Korean use of underground concrete bunkers dates back to at least January 1951 when the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) located a bunker a little outside of Pyongyang’s city limits designed specifically for use by the then-DPRK leader, Kim Il Sung. UGF construction has slowed down in the last decade due to shortage of materials, the lack of heavy equipment, and frequent electrical blackouts throughout the country. Nevertheless, work on underground facilities continues with much of the work formerly done by machinery now completed using manual labor.1
The DPRK recruits its citizens, usually in their late teens, into special military units that construct and/or operate underground facilities. The soldiers sign a confidentiality agreement and the North Korean government expects the individuals to work in the same facility until they turn 60 years old. The Korean People’s Army (KPA) expects the male soldiers to find a wife from among their co-workers, but are forbidden to marry until they have served ten years in the military. The KPA, however, allows females to marry after they reach the age of 24. The DPRK government does not usually allow the workers outside their facility, even to see their families, and defectors call the service in these underground facilities more like a prison sentence than an occupation.2
Since the western corridor has been the traditional route used by armies moving north–south in Korea for centuries, the KPA has concentrated much of its subterranean construction in this western region of the country. The North Korean terrain varies widely with the most arduous terrain in the eastern part of the country and less difficult terrain in the western part of the country. The eastern mountains are the most rugged terrain feature and are best suited for light infantry operations. The central region, while mountainous, is not as difficult to traverse as in the eastern part of the peninsula, and is better suited for light armored vehicles. The western lowlands are the least Figure 1. Former KPA Headquarters Tunnel forbidding in terms of terrain and are the best-suited for armor
Red Diamond Page 4 warfare on the Korean peninsula. Both the North Korean capital city of Pyongyang and the South Korean capital city of Seoul lie on the western side of the peninsula. The region’s geological formations, with substantial granite and other metamorphic hard rock formations, provide natural protection against damage from the weapons of war—even the most modern equipment. The DPRK has enhanced nature by digging underground in order to protect itself from aerial attack while hiding its activities from overhead intelligence collection efforts. All military branches and civilian agencies are involved in keeping their activities shielded from outside prying eyes. The North Koreans use their underground construction not just for defensive purposes, but for offensive operations as well.3
Infiltration Tunnels
North Korea has dug at least four infiltration tunnels reaching under South Korean territory that could complement a KPA direct attack on its southern neighbor above ground. The existence of these tunnels became known in the mid-1970s when a KPA engineer defected to South Korea and disclosed the information during his debriefing. Of the four known tunnels, ranging in length from 1.64 km to 3.5 km, three tunnels are aimed primarily at Seoul, a potential strategic KPA target. All four tunnels remained undiscovered until they actually crossed the military demarcation line (MDL), the dividing line from the 1953 armistice that currently serves as the de facto border between the two countries, into South Korea. The length of the tunnels’ passageway south of the MDL ranges from 435 m to 1,100 m. The number of troops who could pass through the tunnels ranges from 4,000 soldiers per hour for Tunnel #1 to 8,000 soldiers per hour for the other three tunnels. Some sources estimate an even higher troop movement capacity for the tunnels. Some of the tunnels could also move heavy weapons such as large machine guns or small-caliber artillery. One of the tunnels even possesses a concrete interior instead of a Figure 2: North Korea Topography
dirt floor. Tunnel #3 is unique as the diggers installed a rail system to remove the debris created during its excavation and a mechanical system to take the water out of the tunnel on the North Korean side of the MDL. Some analysts, as well as the Republic of Korea (ROK) Defense Ministry, estimate there could be an additional 17 to 21 KPA tunnels that cross the MDL into South Korea. This estimate is supported by another North Korean defector who stated during his debriefing that in the early 1970s, Kim Il Sung ordered that every forward-deployed KPA division along the MDL must dig and maintain at least two infiltration tunnels into South Korea. If a general war were to resume between the two Koreas, it is likely North Korean Special Operations Forces (SOF) would use the infiltration tunnels as one of their methods to gain access to South Korean rear areas. The SOF Figure 3: North Korean Infiltration Tunnels would establish a “second front” by creating chaos in the
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South Korean strategic rear areas by attacking military command posts and key logistical centers. Table 1 compares the specifications of the four infiltration tunnels discovered so far (shown in Figure 3).4
Table 1. Known North Korean Infiltration Tunnels5 Tunnel #1 Tunnel #2 Tunnel #3 Tunnel #4 Location 8 km NE of 13 km N of Chorwan 4 km S of 26 km NE of Korangpo Panmunjon Yanggu Invasion Route Korangpo-Uijongbu- Chorwan-Ponchon- Munsan-Seoul Sohwa-Wontong- Seoul Seoul Seoul Troop Capacity 4,000 8,000 8,000 8,000 (per hour) Total Length (km) 3.5 3.5 1.64 2.05 Lengths of the 1,000 1,100 435 1,030 MDL (m) Distance from 65 101 44 203 Seoul (km) Depth below 45 50-160 70-73 145 surface (m) Tunnel Height (m) 1.2 2 1.95 1.6 Tunnel Width (m) 0.9 2 2.1 2.6 Tunnel Lining Concrete None None None Discovery Date 15 November 1974 19 March 1975 17 October 1978 3 March 1990 (24 December 1989)6
The Republic of Korea (ROK) forces and their allies continue to monitor suspected tunnel entrances in North Korea as well as possible exits in South Korea. In the past, the ROK military built counter-tunnels to intercept the KPA tunnels to make them inoperable for use during an invasion. Counter-tunneling is a costly endeavor, however, and the exorbitant price tag may force the ROK to employ other counter measures if another KPA underground invasion route is discovered.7
The South Korean media regularly publishes articles about North Korean tunneling activities. In October 2014, a retired ROK general claimed North Korea had drilled at least 84 invasion tunnels into South Korea and some of these tunnels were 40 miles long and could reach all the way to Seoul. In all likelihood, this information is erroneous, as the ROK Defense Ministry believes no tunnel could extend beyond six miles south of the DMZ due to groundwater issues in South Korea and the tunnel would need to pass successfully beneath the Imjin River. The ROK Defense Ministry, however, does believe there are undiscovered North Korean infiltration tunnels in existence.8
In April 2015, Israel announced that one of its leading defense electronics firms, Elbit Systems, recently developed a system able to locate underground tunnels with almost 100% accuracy. If South Korea obtained this tunnel-detection equipment from Elbit Systems, any North Korean tunnels currently undiscovered may come to light. Some South Koreans spend their free time searching for tunnels, but no new ones have been located in over a quarter century. Still, the ROK government/military continue to search for additional infiltration tunnels in the DMZ while the amateur detectives search in areas slightly south of the DMZ, which is off limits to civilian personnel.9
Army
The KPA is the major beneficiary of the DPRK’s subterranean activities. North Korean UGFs stretch along the DMZ from the east coast to the west coast, creating a fortified defensive belt along the entire border between North and South Korea. The bunkers and UGFs take advantage of the mountainous terrain located along most of the mutual boundary. Due to the directions the mountains run in the Kae Sung region, north of Panmunjom, the KPA opted to build many “Y” type bunkers. The KPA built many of these bunkers from pre-cast concrete, but covered them with rocks and dirt. The bunkers increase protection for KPA soldiers from the anticipated direction of attack when the terrain does not.10
The KPA deploys 65–70% of its entire military force, including artillery, within 50 miles of the mutual border between the two Koreas. The KPA selected its current artillery positions so approximately 2/3 of each weapon’s range is inside South Korean territory. Many of the artillery units operate from a hardened artillery site (HARTS), a robust position with a Red Diamond Page 6 complex network of subterranean chambers connected by tunnels. While the KPA’s first defensive belt contains the majority of the HARTS, the second and third defensive belts encompass some HARTS as well. These second- and third-belt HARTS may not always be manned depending on the tactical situation. The KPA artillery units have already surveyed the unoccupied HARTS, however, to provide immediate indirect fire use once occupied by the firing unit. It is estimated North Korea has constructed some 500 HARTS in the central and western corridors alone, the most likely avenue of advance for an offensive from the south.11
Not to Scale
Ammo Ammo Ammo
Ammo Ammo
Sleeping Mess Hall Quarters
I
FDC Hardened Artillery Site (HARTS) Legend AA 152-mm Howitzer Ammo
ZPU-2/ZPU-4 Anti- Aircraft Machine Guns
Figure 4: HARTS (hardened artillery site), ACE Threats Integration, 6 July 2015
A HARTS is a fortified battery fighting position with shelters, usually underground, for ammunition, the fire direction center, barracks, mess hall, latrine facilities, bathhouse, recreation room, classroom, and outdoor recreation facilities— often with a concrete ping pong table and/or basketball goal. Based on the terrain, the HARTS could be entirely manmade or a modification of a natural cave or cave system. If needed, a HARTS may contain surface trenches for both communication purposes and internal self-defense against ground attack. The entrance doors to the bunkers will often be made of either steel or hollow steel with concrete poured between the metal slabs for additional protection. If the artillery is of the towed variety, the artillery prime movers will likely be nearby in a covered area for protection from counterbattery or direct aerial fire attack. Tunnels will likely connect the various guns so the crew members can move between the positions without being seen by their enemy or becoming vulnerable to direct or indirect fire.12
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Each artillery piece in a HARTS will feature its own gun platform, crew cover, and ammunition storage areas. Each firing position, as some guns will have more than one position, features a sheltered location that consists, at a minimum, of a crushed rock pad surrounded by a high berm, created by the rock and dirt excavated during the construction process. Some HARTS will also contain a concrete pad for the artillery pieces or concrete walls. The HARTS position will be situated in such a way so the artillery tube or multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) can be fired from just inside its covered position. Each gun or MLRS emplacement will likely have immediate access to one to four “units of fire.” A unit of fire is 120 rounds of ammunition per gun. It is estimated 30 to 90 days of additional ammunition is also stored in the local area. In offensive operations, the KPA planning factor is four units of fire on day one and then two units of fire for the next two days, before moving forward to a new position. In defensive operations, the KPA plans on two units of fire per day. ZPU-2 or ZPU-4 heavy anti-aircraft (AA) machine gun emplacements in protected positions, most likely crewed by local female militia members, will protect any HARTS from aerial attack. The AA machine guns will likely be mounted on an elevator system so the weapons are hidden from view except when firing.13
Navy
The Korean People’s Navy (KPN) is responsible for DPRK coastal defense and operates several subterranean activities to support its mission. Like the KPA, the KPN also uses HARTS situated on likely landing spots along both coasts, near major ports, and on KPN naval bases. HARTS have been spotted on islands off the DPRK’s western coast that can cover the Northern Limit Line (NLL), the naval dividing line between North and South Korea. The NLL is an extension of the MDL on the peninsula, but is located on water. Evidence indicates that around November 2011, the KPN constructed 20 new artillery positions in Hwanghaedo Province that can reach the NLL. It is likely there are at least 1,000 KPN artillery pieces designated for defensive operations, mostly 76.2-mm and 130-mm, on the DPRK west coast alone.14
The KPN also uses UGFs to store some of its vessels for protection from aerial attack. The KPN uses its subterranean areas for ammunition and fuel storage, training, and operations centers/command posts. Some of these protected tunnels will even allow the KPN’s ships to travel without being seen from the air until they reach the sea. According to an old CIA report, at least ten port cities provide underground berthing facilities for ships. Once the KPN ships leave their protective positions, however, they become susceptible to aerial attacks.15
Air Force
Because North Korea believes its armed forces will not be able to obtain air superiority in the skies, ground anti-aircraft fire as well as cover, camouflage, concealment, deception, and decoys will serve as the best protection for ground forces against enemy aircraft. This policy means that over the last 50 years, the Korean People’s Air Force (KPAF) built many of its airfields with underground runways and/or hangers for protection from aerial attack. In a KPA manual, smuggled out of North Korea in 2010, emphasis is on the protection of facilities located in cave strongholds such as command posts, fighter jet bases, naval bases, and runways. The DPRK armed forces take great solace in the knowledge that NATO forces in their 1999 aerial attacks in the former Yugoslavia actually destroyed only 13 of the Serbs’ 300 tanks despite early claims the UN aircraft destroyed 40% of all Serbian armored targets. North Korea believes its UGFs, in coordination with its decoys, cover, and concealment operations, will only further reduce its military forces’ vulnerability to aerial attacks. The KPAF conducts much of its support operations from UGFs. This includes airplane manufacturing; vehicle, fuel, and ammunition storage; aircraft repairs and maintenance; and ground training.16
While many KPAF runways may be soft-surfaced, at least 20 North Korean airfields feature some type of underground aircraft shelters, dispersal facilities, or maintenance bays. Often, North Korean airfields feature taxiways that lead away from the runways to fortified dispersal tunnels located in nearby hills. The distance to these protective locations may be as far as 1–2 km from the actual runways. The doors to these tunnels often feature moveable blast walls, concrete barriers, or earth blast barriers. Inside the dispersal area, the tunnels may curve within the hill and contain several separate rooms. The tunnels inside the hill may be as long as 0.6 km in length. Most of these tunnels are 14 m wide and 10 m high. Some tunnels feature internal blast walls that cordon off the inside rooms from the main tunnel. At Sunchon Air Base, possibly the most important DPRK airfield, the KPAF stores at least half of all its MiG-29 and Su-25 airplanes in underground
Red Diamond Page 8 hangers. The MiG-29 is the KPAF’s most advanced fighter and the Su-25 is the KPAF’s only modern ground attack airplane. The KPAF operates one “underground” air base and is in the process of constructing a second. The completed underground air strip is located in Onchon-up on the west coast. The base under construction is on the east coast at Kangja-ri and will serve as a replacement for the nearby Kangja-ri highway strip. These two bases feature runways and hardstands extending out from underneath mountains so airplanes can take off without taxiing in the open and then land directly into the protection of the mountains.17
Due to the fear of aerial attack, the KPAF operates over 50 ground control intercept (GCI) and early warning radar facilities throughout the DPRK. While the system is overlapping, there are blind spots due to the mountainous terrain. Many of these GCI and radar facilities operate from underground locations. In many cases, the actual radar system is mounted on a hydraulic lift system so the KPAF personnel can raise it out of the ground when in use. When the radar is not in use or maintenance is needed, the radar operators can retract the system to reduce its vulnerability to an enemy attack. Some of the KPAF air defense weapon systems may also be housed in underground facilities. The air defense weapons are also situated on retractable lifts and only elevated when the weapons are prepared to fire. The underground air defense complex will house additional missile launchers, support vehicles, administrative offices, and crew sleeping quarters. It is likely 20% of the air defense bases are unoccupied at any one time, allowing the crews to change locations dependent on the tactical situation.18
Logistics
The KPA maintains a two- to three-month level of strategic supply reserves in case of war. These strategic stocks include food, primarily rice; petroleum, oil, and lubricants for its armored forces; and ammunition of all types. The KPA stockpiles this war materiel in UGFs especially constructed for war. At one time, analysts estimated the DPRK stored 1.2 million tons of food, 1.46 million tons of fuel, and 1.67 million tons of ammunition in subterranean facilities. Reports indicate the DPRK now constructs its fueling facilities underground in the missile launch sites. The North Korean military provides security for these below-ground facilities as the resources are not available for general public use.19
Factories
North Korea operates at least 300 underground munitions factories supported by numerous other civilian factories also built underground. If needed, the DPRK can convert some of these civilian goods factories to war production. The construction of underground manufacturing plants dates back to the 1950–53 Korean War when North Korea needed to do so to avoid UN air strikes. After the armistice in 1953, underground factory construction halted due to the fiscal reality of the increased cost of construction projects in a subterranean environment. In 1964, however, Kim Il Sung reinstated his underground construction policy by stating all new major plants must be built underground instead of on the surface. Almost all of the DPRK’s critical industries are now located underground. About 180 factories dedicated for military support or capable of being converted to supporting the military are located in the Jagang-do region, a mountainous province adjacent to China. Often the workers do not even know the plant’s final product, but only their small role in the process. The factories’ subterranean locations will make it difficult for any military to destroy North Korea’s military production capability.20
Training Implications
North Korea uses underground facilities for protection from aerial and indirect fire attacks. The DPRK also uses subterranean activities to help prevent its enemies from discovering what North Korean units or agencies are doing. Increasingly, other countries and actors have turned to subterranean activities as a method to counter the sophisticated aerial intelligence equipment fielded by modern militaries. Examples include the use of tunnels to smuggle drugs from Mexico into the United States, Hezbollah’s use of tunnels to strike at the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), and Taliban members hiding in caves in Afghanistan to avoid capture. Other countries heavily invested in underground facilities include the Russians with their Kosvinsky Mountain nuclear war command post; Cuba with its command, control, and communications facilities located in bunkers at least 20 m below ground; Iran with its recently revealed underground missile silos, and the
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People’s Republic of China with an advanced underground facility program protecting its military forces, logistics, missile facilities, and command and control posts. When planning military operations, commanders must take subterranean activity into account, as it must be dealt with differently than activity taking place above ground. The IDF is already training its forces to use specialized techniques to uncover and destroy tunnels used by Hezbollah and other militants in the Gaza Strip. The US Army needs to train the way it will fight and almost any future fight the US becomes involved in against a technologically-inferior opponent will likely include some sort of subterranean warfare.21
Notes 1 Barbara Demick, “N. Korea’s Ace in the Hole,” Global Security, 14 November 2003; US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “Underground Shelter Used by KIM Il-Sung,” 9 May 1951, Sanitized Copy approved for release 22 January 2010, CIA-RDP82-00457R007700420002-6; Military Periscope, “Nations/Alliances/Geographic Regions: Asia – North Korea Army,” 1 September 2014; James Dunnigan, “North Korean Tunnels Turned Into Tombs,” Strategy Page, 9 May 2011; Han Ho Suk, “N Korea Military Tactics In A War With US: A Strategy of Massive Retaliations Against US Attacks,” Rense.com, 24 April 2003. 2 Military Periscope, “Nations/Alliances/Geographic Regions: Asia – North Korea Army,” 1 September 2014; James Dunnigan, “North Korean Tunnels Turned Into Tombs,” Strategy Page, 9 May 2011; Han Ho Suk, “N Korea Military Tactics In A War With US: A Strategy of Massive Retaliations Against US Attacks,” Rense.com, 24 April 2003. 3 Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Annual Report to Congress, “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” p 9; Mark Lavin and J. David Rogers, “North Korean Infiltration Tunnels and Clandestine Tunnel #4,” Undated; Military Periscope, “Nations/Alliances/Geographic Regions: Asia – North Korea Army,” 1 September 2014. 4 OSD, Annual Report to Congress, “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” p 13; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Army,” 1 September 2014; Jane’s World Armies, “World Armies > Korea, North,” 3 April 2014; Reera Yo, “North Korea Believed To Still Be digging Tunnels To Seoul,” KoreaAM, 3 October 2014; Around This World, “The Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) Part 1 – The Third Tunnel between South and North Korea and Dorasan Station,” June 2013; Atlas Obscura, “Third Tunnel of Aggression,” Undated; Michael E. Wikan, “I Was There,” Military.Com, 8 September 2003; Global Security, “DMZ – DPRK Tunnels,” Undated; Han Ho Suk, “N Korea Military Tactics In A War With US: A Strategy of Massive Retaliations Against US Attacks,” Rense.com, 24 April 2003. 5 Mark Lavin and J. David Rogers, “North Korean Infiltration Tunnels and Clandestine Tunnel #4,” Undated; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Army,” 1 September 2014; DMZ, “North Korean Infiltration Tunnels Under the DMZ,” Undated; Korean War Educator, “North Korean Tunnels Discovered at the DMZ,” Undated. 6 Mark Lavin and J. David Rogers, “North Korean Infiltration Tunnels and Clandestine Tunnel #4,” Undated. While the tunnel was discovered by seismic equipment in December 1989, the actual tunnel was not reached by counter-tunneling until March 1990; The New York Times, “Seoul Uncovers a Border Tunnel,” 4 March 1990. 7 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Army,” 1 September 2014; DMZ, “North Korean Infiltration Tunnels Under the DMZ,” Undated; Korean War Educator, “North Korean Tunnels Discovered at the DMZ,” Undated. 8 The Telegraph, “South Korea investigates reports of Invasion tunnels’ from North,” 28 October 2014; Lucy Williamson, “Hunt for North Korea’s ‘hidden tunnels’,” BBC, 22 August 2012; Reera Yo, “North Korea Believed To Still Be digging Tunnels To Seoul,” KoreaAM, 3 October 2014; Choe Sang-Hun, “Hunting for Tunnels to Prove a Threat,” The New York Times, 2 July 2012; Paul Szoldra, “South Korean ‘Tunnel Hunters’ Fear Surprise Attack By North Korea,” Business Insider, 11 March 2013; Paula Hancocks, “Is North Korea still digging tunnels to the South?,” CNN, 2 October 2014 9 The Telegraph, “South Korea investigates reports of Invasion tunnels’ from North,” 28 October 2014; Lucy Williamson, “Hunt for North Korea’s ‘hidden tunnels’,” BBC, 22 August 2012; Reera Yo, “North Korea Believed To Still Be digging Tunnels To Seoul,” KoreaAM, 3 October 2014; Choe Sang-Hun, “Hunting for Tunnels to Prove a Threat,” The New York Times, 2 July 2012; Paul Szoldra, “South Korean ‘Tunnel Hunters’ Fear Surprise Attack By North Korea,” Business Insider, 11 March 2013; Paula Hancocks, “Is North Korea still digging tunnels to the South?,” CNN, 2 October 2014; Abraham Rabinovich, “Israel Announces Development of System that Can Detect Tunneling at a Distance,” The Free Beacon, 17 April 2015. 10 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Army,” 1 September 2014; Nautilus Institute, “DPRK Briefing Book: HARTS in North Korea,” 1986. 11 OSD, Annual Report to Congress, “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” p 12; John Gordon IV, “ROK Artillery— Present and Future,” Field Artillery Magazine, February 1990, pp 11-16; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Army,” 1 September 2014; Jane’s World Armies, “World Armies > Korea, North,” 3 April 2014; Popular Mechanics, “War Primer: The Current Korean Conflict,” 23 November 2010; Han Ho Suk, “N Korea Military Tactics In A War With US: A Strategy of Massive Retaliations Against US Attacks,” Rense.com, 24 April 2003. 12 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Army,” 1 September 2014; Jane’s World Armies, “World Armies > Korea, North,” 3 April 2014; John Gordon IV, “ROK Artillery—Present and Future,” Field Artillery Magazine, February 1990, pp 11-16; Nautilus Institute, “DPRK Briefing Book: HARTS in North Korea,” 1986. 13 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Army,” 1 September 2014; Jane’s World Armies, “World Armies > Korea, North,” 3 April 2014; Nautilus Institute, “DPRK Briefing Book: HARTS in North Korea,” 1986; John Gordon IV, “ROK Artillery—Present and Future,” Field Artillery Magazine, February 1990, pp 11-16. 14 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Army,” 1 September 2014; Jacob Bogleat, “My North Korea,” 27 April 2013; Han Ho Suk, “N Korea Military Tactics In A War With US: A Strategy of Massive Retaliations Against US Attacks,” Rense.com, 24 April 2003. 15 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Navy,” 1 September 2014; Nautilus Institute, “DPRK Briefing Book: HARTS in North Korea,” 1986; US CIA, “Underground Berthing Facilities: North Korea,” Undated, approved for release 18 June 2009, CIA-RDP85T00339R00200250004-3. 16 Military Periscope, “Nations/Alliances/Geographic Regions: Asia – North Korea: Air Force,” 1 September 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Army,” 1 September 2014; Jane’s World Air Forces, “North Korea – Air Force,” 9 April 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Air Force,” 1 September 2014; Han Ho Suk, “N Korea Military Tactics In A War With US: A Strategy of Massive Retaliations Against US Attacks,” Rense.com, 24 April 2003. 17 Jane’s World Air Forces, “North Korea – Air Force,” 9 April 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Air Force,” 1 September 2014; Choe Sang- Hun, “Hunting for Tunnels to Prove a Threat,” The New York Times, 2 July 2012; Nautilus Institute, “DPRK Briefing Book: HARTS in North Korea,” 1986; “Wired, “Online Spies Spot North Korea’s Underground Airfields,” 12 July 2010; Jeffrey T. Richelson, “Underground Facilities: Intelligence and Targeting Issues,” The National Security Archive, 23 March 2012; IMINT & Analysis, “Underground Airfields: The DPRK,” 12 July 2010; ANI, “US, S. Korean forces parachuting into N. Korea to probe underground facilities,” Yahoo News, 29 May 2012; Han Ho Suk, “N Korea Military Tactics In A War With US: A Strategy of Massive Retaliations Against US Attacks,” Rense.com, 24 April 2003.
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18 Jane’s World Air Forces, “North Korea – Air Force,” 9 April 2014; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Air Force,” 1 September 2014; Nautilus Institute, “DPRK Briefing Book: HARTS in North Korea,” 1986; Jeffrey T. Richelson, “Underground Facilities: Intelligence and Targeting Issues,” The National Security Archive, 23 March 2012. 19 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Army,” 1 September 2014; Associated Press (AP), “Report: N. Korea Builds Underground Fueling Facility,” Fox News, 25 February 2008; Han Ho Suk, “N Korea Military Tactics In A War With US: A Strategy of Massive Retaliations Against US Attacks,” Rense.com, 24 April 2003. 20 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Korea, North > Air Force,” 1 September 2014; Associated Press (AP), “Report: N. Korea Builds Underground Fueling Facility,” Fox News, 25 February 2008; Barbara Demick, “N. Korea’s Ace in the Hole,” Global Security, 14 November 2003; Jeffrey T. Richelson, “Underground Facilities: Intelligence and Targeting Issues,” The National Security Achieve, 23 March 2012. 21 Defense Intelligence Agency, “Annual Threat Assessment 2014,” 2014; Jeffrey T. Richelson, “Underground Facilities: Intelligence and Targeting Issues,” The National Security Archive, 23 March 2012; Andie Adams, “Mexican Soldiers Discover Drug Tunnel in Tijuana, Arrest 9,” 7 San Diego, 8 April 2015; HIS Jane’s Defence Weekly, “IDF steps up counter-tunnel training,” Vol 52, Issue 6, p 17, 11 February 2015; Global Security, “Kosvinsky Mountain,” Undated; Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014,” 24 April 2014.
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by Jerry England, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (DAC) In early 2014 the Syrian government’s Syrian Arab Army (SAA), with help from local National Defense Forces (NDF) and foreign militias, were able to protect the Hama airbase from opposition forces in Hama’s capital and the surrounding area and allow operations to continue.1 By the summer, however, when governmental opposition groups consisting of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and Jabhat al Nusra (JN) put aside their ideological differences and decided to work together in a new offensive against the province, the regime’s inability to defend it was exposed.2 This agreement coincided with the attack on the Iraqi city of Mosul by the violent extremist organization known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). ISIL’s success in Mosul gave the Syrian opposition a window of opportunity as Iraqi militia fighters left Syria to defend their homeland. The Iraqi fighters’ departure for home weakened the already limited combat power of the pro-regime fighters and allowed the opposition groups against the Syrian government to penetrate farther south. This report will discuss the Syrian army’s response to the tactical situation in Hama in 2014 and the techniques employed to defend the area. Syria’s Hama province, due to its central location and its key infrastructure, would give a commanding advantage to the group that wrested it from the regime. The Hama airbase, a key component of the Syrian government’s air campaign, flew an estimated 15 fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft sorties out of the facility daily.3 The city of Mhardah, a predominantly Christian city, contains one of the largest electrical power plants in the country providing an estimated seven percent of Syria’s electrical power. Additionally, there was a suspected barrel bomb facility near Hama city.4 Barrel bombs are improvised munitions composed of simple metal containers filled with explosives and shrapnel. Human rights groups attributed a large number of civilian casualties to barrel bombs, which are notoriously inaccurate, and the regime relied on them to conduct preparatory fires when conducting attacks. Not only did Hama hold the airbase, the province supported a number of army bases, contain several ammunition depots, and served as a key logistics hub to support governmental forces fighting north in Aleppo. When opposition groups began their offensive on Hama province in the summer of 2014, the protection of these key facilities became an important factor in the government deciding to commit reinforcements to the area. Defense of Hama Figure 1: Syrian Arab Army fire an S-60 Towed AA gun on a town in Northern Hama Province The Syrian regime maintained an area defense using both regular and NDF troops at military installations and area villages. The Syrian governmental forces designed their area defense to deny key areas to the opposition including two major highways, the Mharda power plant, and the Hama airbase. In a war of attrition, the area defense is used to inflict losses on the enemy, while retaining ground and protecting combat power.5 Traditionally, the Syrian Arab Army’s 3rd Corps, a heavy force consisting of four armor brigades and four mechanized infantry brigades, provided operational control for the area. Due to severe losses fighting in other parts of the country, the 3rd Corps had dwindled to less than 50 percent strength.6 The NDF fighters, formerly known as “popular committees,” consisted of local groups recruited into service by the Assad regime. Some of these groups received two to
Red Diamond Page 12 four weeks of training from Iranian and Hezbollah advisors and then integrated into the Syrian Army.7 The quality and performance of these forces were mixed. The Syrian regime billed the NDF fighters as heroes defending their homeland and integrated them into military operations when possible. Some reports, however, accused the NDF fighters of looting and abusing their power. Most NDF fighters suffered from inexperience and could not defend against the JN and FSA raiding techniques. An Iranian general, in his captured memoirs before he died in Damascus, described the NDF as unreliable in combat situations.8 Despite a lack of training and limited equipment, the Syrian government assigned the NDF to provide security to their areas of responsibility. Many NDF checkpoints consisted of fewer than 12 fighters outfitted with small arms such as rifles and rocket-propelled grenades. The NDF fighters also used a combination of military and civilian tactical vehicles, some armed with heavy machine guns. These NDF patrols served as the regime’s eyes and ears with the responsibility to secure long stretches of highway, small villages, and quarters in Hama’s major cities. The defensive posture in Hama epitomized the Syrian regime’s “win by not losing” strategy, which some analysts referred to the patrolling as “an army in all corners.”9 The regime conducted access control operations that traded time for the opportunity to attack the opposition when and where the opposition forces were most vulnerable. In support of the area defense, the Syrian Air Force conducted air strikes against known concentrations of enemy fighters and their sympathizers. The air force wanted to degrade the opposition groups’ ability to mount offensive operations and cause unacceptable risks for any of the anti-government supporters. The NDF performed to free up regular SAA units to conduct offensive operations either in strategically important fronts throughout Syria or against known enemy safe havens. Despite the presence of the pro-regime troops in Hama, JN and FSA fighters infiltrated into Halfaya, a city in Hama province, and established a base of operations to conduct raids and ambushes throughout the province. The Opposition Attacks With government security forces degraded, opposition groups consisting of FSA and JN launched operation “Badr al Sham” against Hama province and the military structure supporting it. The opposition fighters wanted to seize the power plant in Mharda and attack the airbase in Hama city. Included among its targets was the suspected barrel bomb production facility, north of Hama city. The JN and FSA fighters established support zones and secured lines of communication in cities within Hama province’s boundaries that held large populations of Sunni sympathizers. The opposition forces designed perception management operations that highlighted the regime’s brutality against Sunnis to garner influence with the Sunni population, and imposed fear on non-aligned parties as a means to maintain security and ensure support in these friendly areas. In southern Idlib and northern Hama provinces, opposition groups established support areas in Morek, Lataminah, and Kifr Zita. The opposition fighters infiltrated into Halfaya, massing troops for offensive operations in villages along the Orontes River and the Hama Latakia highway.10 Many of the outposts and small villages fell to the opposition fighters as the regime fighters barricaded themselves in their security outposts, or simply dispersed into the countryside. At the Serthel checkpoint, the opposition forces used captured Syrian Army equipment to overrun the government force’s outpost.11 Throughout the summer of 2014, rebel forces and pro-regime fighters fought in the villages north of Hama city including al Jadida, Tayyibat al Imam, Khattab, and most notably Halfaya. The Khattab ammunition depot fell in late July with opposition forces capturing ammunition in their crates, various artillery pieces, and some armored vehicles.12 Armed with captured Syrian equipment, the opposition force advanced to within four kilometers of the Hama airbase, close enough to engage the base with BM-21 grad missiles mounted on medium trucks.13 Counterattack The Syrian government dispatched elements of the 4th armored division and an elite special forces unit known as the Tiger Brigade to Hama. In addition to these forces, the national defense forces received augmentation by additional Iranian advisors and an array of foreign fighters coordinated by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Figure 2: NDF Soldiers with truck mounted Corps (IRGC). heavy machine gun advance in Northern Hama
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Using a combination of air and ground forces, the Tiger Brigade systematically attacked areas containing large concentrations of opposition forces in Hama province. The air campaign intensified with sorties against individual and area targets using attack fixed wing aircraft and helicopters. The Syrian Air Force dropped barrel bombs killing dozens in opposition-controlled areas such as Kifr Zita and Morek.14 In addition to the air campaign, the Syrian regime adopted more aggressive tactics to meet with and engage the enemy. The techniques employed were likely a result of the Iranian advisors’ suggestions to crack open opposition defenses with specially trained “line breaker” troops which were fast-moving troops ordered to sweep ahead of armored vehicles and defeat antitank missile teams. These techniques were viewed by Syrian military officials as successful when Hezbollah used them in a regime offensive in the Qalamoun Mountains in 2013.15 Analysis of pro-Syrian regime videos shows small groups of ten to twenty infantry attacking positions with support from heavy 16 machine guns and tanks on the edges of population centers. Figure 3: Syrian Air force barrel bombs en route Typically, ground forces advanced after rebel fighting positions to an unknown target were sufficiently degraded by aerial bombardment. Using preemptive strikes against concentrations of enemy troops and equipment as well as suspected support facilities such as medical clinics and food distribution sites, the air force isolated and reduced the rebel forces.17 The air force also targeted specific heavy weapons such as tanks and antiaircraft guns. The Syrian governmental forces may have used barrel bombs, some of which contained chlorine gas, to punish the civilian population for supporting the fighters. Without precision guided munitions, the Syrian Air Force caused large number of civilian casualties due to their inaccuracy. After the bombardment, Syrian governmental ground forces assaulted enemy fighting positions using fire and maneuver techniques. Ground forces used mortars, artillery, and short-range missiles against remaining opposition targets to dislodge the enemy from its positions and allow the infantry to close within the effective range of their small arms and anti-armor weapons.18 The pro-governmental forces used heavy weapons at maximum standoff distances to protect combat power. Artillery and multiple launch rocket systems shelled villages throughout the offensive operations, removing enemy defensive positions for the attacking forces and closing off escape routes for the opposition. In larger towns heavy weapons were cautiously moved close to the main battle zone to provide support for advancing infantry. T-55 main battle tanks (MBTs), in Figure 4: Syrian Arab Army use ZSU-23 AA gun and coordination with dismounted observers, engaged BMD-1 fighting vehicle in Northern Hama Province opposition fighting positions that were particularly well- defended. Using heavy guns mounted on medium trucks, the regime forces fired on enemy positions and also acted as spotters for tanks to fire their main gun. Dismounted radio operators directed the tanks into fighting positions and oriented the guns to their target. The pro-government units only advanced after the threat was either destroyed or neutralized. Infantry cleared roads, patrolled ditches, and inspected culverts for improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in order to protect the tanks. The exploitation force cleared the fighting positions, defused booby traps, and performed site exploitation operations by taking images of enemy weapons, ammunition, and equipment left behind by the fleeing opposition fighters. This last step provided the Syrian government the evidence needed to support the claims of a large amount of foreign assistance to the anti-government opposition groups.
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Figure 5: Syrian Regime Operations in Hama Province 2014 (estimate), ACE Threats Integration 2015
The Syrian regime’s surge took back the cities of Khattab, Jadidah, and Zalaqiyat within a few days of the reinforcement’s arrival and initiated a pursuit of enemy forces to the north toward the cities of Morek and Lataminah.19 The Syrian Army, along with the NDF, continued the offensive and forced the rebels out of the Hama through a combination of maneuver and fires. Once the opposition forces were no longer a threat, NDF units moved into the newly “liberated” villages and conducted security operations, coordinated relief, and conducted displaced persons operations.20 By September 2014, the Syrian regime controlled the cities of Tayyibat al Imam, Halfaya, and Al Boida and secured the east–west corridor from Suran to Halfaya. With the area south of the river bend secured, the Syrian Air Force unleashed aerial attacks on the cities of Morek and Kifr Zita, known opposition strongholds.21
Table 1. Syrian and NDF Force Estimated capabilities for a BTG22 Ground (Divisional) Aerial23 Fires BMD/BTR24 100 (est.) Su-22 Ground 7-8 Daily Sorties D-30 122-mm 45 (est.) Armored vehicles attack Towed Gun T-55/T-72 Tanks 100 (est.) Su-24 Multi-Role 7-8 Daily Sorties 9A52-2 300-mm UNK MRL RPG-7/29 27 (est.) MIG-29 Multi-Role 7-8 Daily Sorties Zu-23 AA gun UNK Fighter Light Trucks 12 Mi-8/17 Multi-Role 7-8 Daily Sorties ZSU-23-4 UNK Helicopter 9P135 ATGM 12 Mi-24 Attack 7-8 Daily Sorties Fagot Helicopter
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Implications The Syrian regime used a variety of organizations to conduct defensive and offensive operations, including non-state actors and local militias. Syrian Air Force assets served as a key component in the regime’s defense. An extra-regional force entering Syria will require neutralization of the opposition air assets, either through lethal force or an international agreement, is critical for freedom of movement in Syria. Cover, concealment, camouflage, and deception are required for forces faced with a dangerous aerial threat. Information operations designed to counter Syrian propaganda and highlight government brutality against its own citizens are important for gaining support both within Syria and globally. The presence of foreign fighters and their trained proxies means that the nature of the conflict will potentially change if the central government is defeated and shifting alliances make it difficult for US forces to determine friend and foe.
Sources Bennet, Richard. “The Syrian Military: A Primer.” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin. September 2001. Holliday, Joseph. “The Assad regime From Counterinsurgency to Civil War.” Middle East Report 8. Institute for the Study of War. 2013. Holliday, Joseph. “The Syrian Army Doctrinal Order of Battle.” Institute for the Study of War. February 2013 Kozak, Christopher.” “An Army in All Corners” Assad’s Campaign Strategy In Syria.” Institute for the Study of War. February 2013. Headquarters, Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-102, Operational Environment and Army Learning. TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. November 2014. US Army, TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. Worldwide Equipment Guide – Volume 1: Ground Systems. August 2014. US Army, TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. Worldwide Equipment Guide – Volume 2: Airspace and Air Defense Systems. August 2014.White, Jeffrey. “Syrian Air Force Operations: Strategic, Effective, and Unrestrained,” The Washington Institute, 11 December 2014.
Notes 1 Valerie Szybala with Chris Harmer, “Regime Air Activity in Hama: 1,800 Sorties in 50 Days,” Institute for the Study of War, 30 May 2014. 2 AFP, “Syria rebels advance on key airport in Hama province,” 29 July 2014. 3 Yalla Souriya, “#Syria, Sorties of warplanes and Helicopters in Northern hama,” 22 May 2014, Luftwaffe A.S, “Air Raids From Hama & Sh'eirat AFB's (1st Quarter 2014),” 8 April 2014. 4 AFP, “Syria rebels advance on key airport in Hama province,” 29 July 2014. 5 Headquarters, Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-102, Operational Environment and Army Learning. TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. November 2014. 6 Chris Kozack, “An Army In All Corners Assad’s Campaign Strategy in Syria,” April 2015. 7 Carter Center, “Syria: Pro-Government Paramilitary Forces,” 5 November 2013. 8 David Axe, “Iran transformed Syria’s army into a militia that will help Assad survive another year,” 14 December 2104. 9 Chris Kozack, “An Army In All Corners Assad’s Campaign Strategy in Syria,” April 2015. 10 Tom Perry, “Syrian forces win battle with rebels in Hama, Reuters,” 12 September 2014. 11 “Syria War Heavy Firefights And Clashes In Hama Syrian Civil War 2014! FSA VS SAA!,” YouTube, October 2014. 12 Scott Lucas, “Syria Daily, July 27: A Multi-Front Battle Between Assad’s Forces & Islamic State,” EA Worldview, 27 July 2014. 13 Syria: Direct, “Hama military airport key to controlling province,” 28 August 2014; Scott Lucas, “Syria Daily, July 30: Insurgents Close on Major Military Airport Near Hama,” EA Worldview, 30 July 2014. 14 Brown Moses, “Alleged Chemical Attack Tall as Sayyad,” YouTube, 28 August 2014. 15 LiveLeak, “Iran’s Agony in Syria - Captured document reveals infighting, manpower shortage,” 7 July 2014. 16 “Syrian Arab Army & NDF advance in Noth Hama, Syria,” YouTube, 20 September 2014; “Syrian NDF Civilians 2014 Syrian Army Tribute,” YouTube, 15 December 2014. 17 Jeffrey White, Syrian Air Force Operations: Strategic, Effective, and Unrestrained, The Washington Institute, 11 December 2014. 18 Syria: Direct, “Syria Direct: News Update 9-9-14,” 9 September 2014. 19 Xinhua, “Roundup: Syrian Troops Advance In Countryside Of Hama Province,” 16 September 2014. 20 “The anniversary of the siege of Al-Tulaysiyah in Hama province (NDFvideo),” YouTube, 28 April 2015. 21 “National Defense Force (Hama Province) in action NDF Hama im Einsatz,” YouTube, 23 April 2015. 22 Joseph Holliday, “The Assad regime From Counterinsurgency to Civil War,” Middle East Report 8. Institute for the Study of War, 2013. 23 Richard Bennet, “The Syrian Military: A Primer,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, September 2001. 24 Richard Bennet, “The Syrian Military: A Primer,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, September 2001.
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JMRC Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) Rotation 15-04, Combined Resolve IV (CR IV) by Mike Spight TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (CGI Ctr) DATE Rotation 15-04 was conducted at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC), Hohenfels, Germany 7 May–5 June 2015, with box dates (force on force) running from 27 May–3 June. Like previous Combined Resolve exercises, CR IV was designed to exercise the Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) and NATO/European Response Force (NRF/ERF) concept. In this case, the Rotational Training Unit (RTU) was 1st Heavy Brigade Combat Team (-), 3rd Infantry Division. The BCT deployed with a complete mechanized infantry battalion task force (3rd Bn, 69th Infantry Regiment), with one artillery battalion (-) (1st Bn, 41st FA Regiment), and with 3rd Bn, 2nd Cavalry Regt. 1st BCT also deployed its organic brigade support and battlefield enhancement battalions. The BCT was rounded out with NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations to produce a formidable, US-led multinational brigade (+) as BLUFOR. An element from HQ, 4th Infantry Division served as HICON during the rotation, and worked in JMRC’s Building 100 Operations Center.
As last year, this exercise was observed by a Combat Training Center (CTC) Accreditation Team comprised of personnel from the G-27 OE/OPFOR Program Management TRADOC DCoS G-2, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration, and the Combined Arms Center’s Combat Training Center Directorate. This accreditation focused on specific areas such as: equipping, manning, and training of the Opposing Force (OPFOR); replication of the operational environment (OE); replication of the PMESII-PT [political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time] variables; how well the overall DATE scenario and hybrid threat (HT) are replicated and OPFOR doctrine and tactics planned and executed; and how well is the information environment replicated at the CTC and within the framework of the exercise. This article’s focus is on how the OPFOR executed its tactical plan for challenging the RTU commander’s training objectives.
As in previous NRF/ERF and DATE rotations, the OPFOR was built around JMRC’s organic unit, the 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment. This unit has undergone significant changes to its Modified Table of Equipment (MTOE) and manning documents. It has been reduced in strength to a degree that required it stand down Company D and roll remaining personnel and equipment assets into its three remaining line companies. This typically requires significant augmentation by US Army Reserve, National Guard, and NATO partner units in order to replicate an Arianian brigade tactical group (BTG). For this rotation, the OPFOR replicated the 112th BTG, 11th Division Tactical Group (DTG) of the Arianian Army, consisting of three organic battalion detachments (BDETS) and an aviation detachment (Falcon). For CR IV, the OPFOR was augmented with a US Army National Guard infantry company, a US Army Reserve engineer company, a Romanian light infantry company, and a Slovenian tank platoon. The Romanian light infantry provided dismounts for Apache and Blackfoot (A and B) companies’ OPFOR surrogate vehicle (OSV) BMPs, and the Slovenian tank platoon was task organized as required by the tactical situation. The OPFOR Bn also fielded OSV T-72/80 tanks. Cherokee (C) Company personnel portrayed Arianian Special Purpose Force (SPF) personnel and served as the BTG’s Reconnaissance BDET which is equipped with OSV BRDMs. There was no play by an insurgent force (SAPA) that conducted kinetic operations against the RTU for this particular rotation. However, several soldiers from Cherokee Company were tasked to role play as members of the South Atropian People’s Party (SAPP), but they did not engage in any kinetic operations against BLUFOR or civilian role players who replicated Atropian citizens. Note that other than SPF operations replicated by the OPFOR Bn, there was no SOF play or participation in support of the RTU during the force on force portion of the exercise.
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The RTU commander’s training objectives drove refinement of the overall exercise scenario and the tactical tasks selected by the OPFOR which are specifically developed to provide the RTU with a rigorous validation of their training status. Not surprisingly, the RTU commander’s primary focus was on conduct of offensive and defensive operations, stability tasks, security operations, mission command, and employment of fires.
The 11th DTG Operations Order directed its three BTGs to conduct their separate attacks with the intent to seize key terrain and prevent any NATO reinforcements moving from Gorgas into Baku along the A-3 corridor. Specifically, the DTG would conduct an integrated attack to the north and seize the A-3/A-6 highway junction which is the high speed avenue of approach into Baku. Intent was to halt the movement of follow-on multinational and Atropian military forces to the east, and prevent them from reinforcing Baku. The 111th, 112th, 113th, and 114th BTGs were tasked to conduct their tactical movements as the DTG’s three enabling forces and one action force. The 112th BTG’s OPORD (issued to its three BDETs and Air Element) mission statement directed that BDETS would conduct tactical movements and conduct an attack to seize Milesov, with the ultimate objective of attacking and destroying BLUFOR in depth, and seizing Belake. The mission statement also directed that upon achieving their objectives, the BTG would establish a maneuver defense between Phase Lines New Jersey and Texas (Disruption Zone) and Phase Lines Texas to Nevada (Battle and Attack Zones) in order to prevent BLUFOR/NATO forces from massing combat power and then attacking in order to counter the DTG’s plan for decisive operations. Figures 1 and 2 below depict the OPFOR’s plan for both their planned tactical movement and integrated attack. Note that the OPFOR developed three separate contingencies for both their tactical movement and their integrated attack. The differences in the three contingencies were solely based upon how far they were able to advance to the west during their tactical movement which objectives they would be able to achieve (Phase 2). Note: All graphics used in this article were provided by JMRC Ops Group and/or OPFOR.
Figure 1
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Prior to and during Phase 2 (attack to seize key terrain) the BTG inserted reconnaissance elements and SPF (Cherokee BDET) via air and ground to overwatch key terrain, identify BLUFOR HVTs, and report BLUFOR defensive preparations to the BTG commander. The OPFOR had then begun to work toward its initial Phase 2 objectives regarding key terrain with their tactical movement along AXIS NORTH (Blackfoot Co) and along AXIS SOUTH (Apache BDET), as seen in Figure 1. Once their objectives were achieved, they then prepared to conduct their attack, as shown in Figure 2. Once the attack commenced along Axis Hammer, the action element (assault element) was the BDET portrayed by Blackfoot Co, and the enabling element was the BDET portrayed by Apache Co whose movement was along Axis Anvil.
During the conduct of the attack, the objective was, as shown in Figure 2, to attack and seize Objective Pig, and to prevent BLUFOR from concentrating forces against Blackfoot BDET and its attack to the north. During the movement along Axis Anvil, numerous BLUFOR units were encountered and either bypassed or attacked and destroyed. Eventually, Apache BDET was caught in the open by BLUFOR AH-64 rotary wing assets, and was destroyed, except for approximately three vehicles that were later engaged by BLUFOR armor and destroyed as well. As a result, the Blackfoot BDET was not able to attack and seize Objective Pig, falling approximately three kilometers short of that objective.
Figure 2
Following the normal suspension of battlefield events (SOBE) so that both BLUFOR and OPFOR could reset for the next phase of the rotation (BLUFOR attacks, OPFOR defends), OPFOR was required to modify its original plan to conduct a maneuver defense. The Exercise Director instructed OPFOR to conduct an area defense, as it was felt that tactic would greatly facilitate accomplishment of the BLUFOR commander’s training objectives. As a result, OPFOR broke both BDETs up into smaller company detachments (CDETs) or independent mission detachments (IMDETs) and tasked them to over watch specific kill zones along the most likely avenues of approach that BLUFOR would use. Figure 3 depicts the locations
Red Diamond Page 19 of identified kill zones that the OPFOR had designated. Although there is no slide that depicts the actual locations of CDETs, those kill zones closest to the towns of Holtri, Pasron City, and Noust were of primary focus. Additionally, Cherokee BDET was designated as the BTG’s reserve element, and would be tasked to act as the counterattack element if BLUFOR managed to break through the disruption zone and deep into the attack or support zone. Cherokee BDET’s reconnaissance elements were still acting as a security element by positioning elements throughout the disruption zone. Additionally, Cherokee BDET’s SPF assets were continuing to conduct tactical operations deep in BLUFOR’s rear area in an effort to locate high value targets (HVTs) such as command and control facilities (CPs), BLUFOR indirect fire assets, and logistical nodes. Figures 3 and 4, below, depict the locations of OPFOR’s kill zones, but not the exact positioning of the CDETs. Figure 4 shows what, in the end, was the BLUFOR’s attack, with their main effort focused to the south against Holtri.
Figure 3
During the OPFOR’s area defense, the ACE-TI observer was located with the Cherokee BDET’s mobile CP, which was to the east or northeast of Holtri. Once BLUFOR’s main effort was detected, Cherokee BDET was contacted by the BTG commander, and directed to execute a counterattack on BLUFOR elements that had entered and/or were moving toward Holtri. The CDET commander than made contact with all available Cherokee elements, which by that point consisted of 3 OSV BRDMs equipped with anti-tank guided missile launchers, and an SPF team that was not deep in BLUFOR’s rear area. Along with the CDET commander’s OSV BRDM armed with a heavy machine gun, this was the entire counterattack element. It is significant to note that another SPF team did locate BLUFOR’s indirect fires direction center and a battery of its 155-mm self-propelled howitzers in the vicinity of Belake. They attempted to engage that HVT with indirect fires, but were unable to execute that mission as those fires had been limited to only one engagement per hour.
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Figure 4
Once the three ATGM BRDMs had arrived, the counterattack element moved out toward Holtri and, other than near detection by a pair of BLUFOR AH-64s, arrived to a covered position that provided an excellent view of the town. Although BLUFOR had been successful in clearing Holtri of its OPFOR defenders, the cost was indeed heavy. BLUFOR tactical vehicles with flashing yellow beacons (MILES devices that indicate a destroyed vehicle and crew) were everywhere in and around the town, and along the roads leading to Holtri. The ACE-TI observer was then able to witness the Cherokee BDET counterattack element begin a methodical advance on BLUFOR elements in the town. With the commanders BRDM and HMG providing security, the three ATGM BRDMs began a textbook attack in which while one BRDM would move to a position from which to engage BLUFOR, the other two would provide covering fires. Over the course of approximately an hour, BLUFOR sortied multiple main battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, only to have them destroyed by the BRDM’s guided missiles. As a result of the engagement, BLUFOR lost a platoon (+) of Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks, as the BLUFOR element commander sent them out singly, rather than sending three or four that could provide suppressive fires. Eventually, the OPFOR BRDMs were overwhelmed and the three ATGM BRDMs were destroyed, leaving only the commanders BRDM and a few SPF troopers alive and mission capable.
This DATE rotation was an excellent example of how the OPFOR, even though out gunned and out manned, can still subject BLUFOR to a serious challenge. Their knowledge of the ground, understanding of OPFOR tactics, and dedication to their mission and aggressive nature all provide the support BCT’s need to transition out of a counterinsurgency and forward operating base mentality, into an expeditionary mentality.
Combined Resolve II was another successful example of how cooperation between the US Army and their NATO and PfP partners continues to prepare them for the eventuality of conducting real-world, combined operations as part of a multinational unit. This process will continue to mature with follow-on evolutions of the Combined Resolve series of exercises that are planned for execution at the JMRC over the foreseeable future.
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UPGRADES AND CHANGES TO THE 2015 WORLDWIDE EQUIPMENT GUIDE by John Cantin, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (BMA Ctr) The 2015 Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) will have several new sections, chapters, and revisions to format and content. Tier Tables have been updated to reflect changes in proliferation and the number of systems that are used worldwide. Chapters have also been updated, with some being eliminated or absorbed into other existing chapters. The Introduction and narrative sections have been updated to reflect adaptations and upgrades in equipment and systems due to the changing nature of warfare in areas such as Ukraine, Africa, and Syria/Iraq. WEG Sheets have a new format that allows the user to easily extract relevant technical information and specifications.
The 2015 WEG Tier Table section will reflect changes in the number and proliferation of systems that are prevalent in the world today. Some systems have been dropped from the list due to age, disuse, or discontinuation of production. Others have been moved up or down on the list accordingly. These adjustments reflect real-world trends in weapons production, procurement, and use.
Some WEG chapters will be integrated into similar chapters to eliminate redundancy and to streamline the information in the product. Chapters have also been edited and rewritten to keep up with changes in use and deployment of certain systems. The introductions in many chapters will also describe the ways in which threat forces are upgrading existing systems due to economic constraints, the need for quick turnaround in research and development, and the trend of militaries to integrate or “mix and match” various weapons systems due to shortages of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and artillery. Also, new color photographs will be used when available. The 2015 WEG chapters are listed below:
Volume 1 Ground Systems Volume 2 Air and Air Defense Systems Chapter 1 Recon Chapter 1 Fixed Wing Aviation Chapter 2 Infantry Weapons Chapter 2 Rotary Wing Aviation Chapter 3 Infantry Vehicles Chapter 3 UAVs Chapter 4 Tanks Chapter 4 Aviation Countermeasures, Upgrades, Chapter 5 Anti-Tank and Anti-Armor Emerging Technology Chapter 6 Artillery Chapter 5 Unconventional and SPF Aerial Systems Chapter 7 Engineer and CBRN *Addresses ultralights, paragliders, parasails, gliders, etc. Chapter 8 Logistics Chapter 6 Theater Missiles Chapter 9 C2 and INFOWAR Chapter 7 Air Defense Systems Chapter 10 Countermeasures, Upgrades, and Emerging Technology Volume 3 Littoral Systems *Concentrates on Conventional Forces Chapter 1 Littoral Systems Chapter 11 Insurgent and Guerrilla Forces Chapter 2 Surface Systems *Concentrates on non-state, terrorist, and insurgent Chapter 3 Undersea Systems weapons. Broken into sub-sections of IEDs, SVIEDS, Chapter 4 Unconventional and SPF Surface and Improvised Weapons and Weapons Systems, Technical Undersea Systems Vehicles, Rockets, and Improvised Mortars, etc. *Addresses Zodiacs, Mini-Subs, Diver Propulsion Vehicles (DPVs), etc.
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Three new chapters (Vol 1, CH 11, Vol 2, CH 5, and Vol 3, CH 4) concentrate on SPF, unconventional, non-state, and insurgent weapons, equipment, and weapons systems used by these groups. The WEG Sheets have also been updated and reformatted. WEG sheets were simplified by eliminating some redundancies in the information section. Also, the information is now in columns that make it easy to cut and paste information from the WEG sheet into other formats. WEG sheets will also feature color photographs where possible. The text in the WEG sheets has also been reduced to the basic “need to know” information. This was done in order to make the WEG sheet easier to read and provide the most pertinent information to the reader. Detailed descriptions of equipment capabilities and other information can be found in the Introduction and the Notes sections.
The 2015 WEG will continue to provide the most up-to-date information on threat equipment available. The updated Tier Tables, reorganized chapters, and changes to the format will allow the user to access basic information quickly. Until its publication, access the 2014 WEG on ATN: https://atn.army.mil/dsp_template.aspx?dpID=311.
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Boko Haram
Techniques
by Rick Burns, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (BMA Ctr) Coming soon is the Threat Tactics Report (TTR): Boko Haram. The Boko Haram TTR provides an overview of Boko Haram’s tactics, techniques, and capabilities in five sections. Section 1 is an introduction that provides an overview of Boko Haram. Section 2 is a discussion of Boko Haram’s tactics and techniques with specific graphic and narrative examples. Section 3 provides information on Boko Haram’s weapons and equipment. Section 4 details Boko Haram’s organization and military capabilities. The TTR also provides a conclusion in Section 5 and identifies where the conditions specific to Boko Haram are present in the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) and other training materials so these conditions can be easily implemented in training.
With the largest economy in Africa and projected to be one of the ten fastest growing economies in the world in 2015, Nigeria is a key to regional stability. Boko Haram, a Nigerian home-grown paramilitary insurgency group, threatens both Nigeria and its neighbors. Boko Haram’s attacks, both actual and threatened, caused Nigerian officials to postpone the 2015 presidential election by six weeks to allow a military offensive into northern Nigeria to secure safe voting areas. Boko Haram’s recruiting and its attacks in and occupation of safe havens in border countries threaten already volatile areas within those countries.1
Nigeria is a country with abundant natural resources, but a country also with great internal turmoil and challenges. Endemic corruption has concentrated much of the national wealth in the hands of a few at the expense of the many. A definitive division between the predominately Muslim north and the predominately Christian south combined with hundreds of different ethnic groups make for religious and ethnic tension. A power-sharing agreement allowing for two terms alternating between leaders from the Muslim North and the Christian South as president was disrupted when President Umaru Yar'Adua died in office in 2010 before completion of his term, at which time his vice president, Goodluck Jonathan, assumed office.2 In the 2015 presidential election, Nigerians voted to elect a northern Muslim and former military dictator from the 1980s, Muhammadu Buhari, as president.3 Buhari’s election was made possible in part by the deteriorating security situation that resulted from the government’s slow response to Boko Haram as well as rising levels of poverty and corruption within the government. The electorate viewed Buhari, a former general, as a leader who could address one of Nigeria’s greatest internal threats, Boko Haram.
Persistent ethnic, regional, and religious divisions, corruption, and poverty gave rise to Boko Haram, one of the most dangerous threats to the Nigerian government and regional stability. Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad)—more commonly known as Boko Haram in the local Hausa language from which it came—emerged in the 1990s from a loose-knit Islamist movement centered on its founder, Mohammed Yusuf. Yusuf was an Islamic scholar who preached in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria.4 Yusuf died while in police custody in July 2009 in a crackdown that also resulted in the death of hundreds of his followers. Boko Haram launched military operations in 2009 with the eventual goal of creating an Islamic State in Nigeria. This goal is aimed at returning to a pre-colonial Islamic state that was in place before British colonialists established Nigerian borders; a potentially less radical goal than might be imagined.5
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Boko Haram uses a variety of identifiable techniques in its attacks on targets which include critical religious and civilian leaders, villages, security forces, and civilian and military infrastructure. This article briefly describes four of these techniques: improvised explosive devices, kidnapping, assassinations, and deception.
Improvised Explosive Devices
Boko Haram has shown an increasing capability and use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) since its first vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) in June 2011. On 26 August 2011, Boko Haram attacked the UN headquarters in Abuja with a suicide vehicle borne IED (SVBIED), killing 23 and injuring more than 76 people. Since then, targets of Boko Haram IED attacks expanded to include Christians, market centers, bus stations, Nigerian security and police, the media, schools, politicians, and Muslims deemed collaborators or who speak out against Boko Haram.6
One report suggests while IEDs are widespread across Nigeria, explosive materials and Boko Haram bomb-making skills remain unsophisticated. Boko Haram constructs IEDs from materials such as commercial-grade explosives purchased on the black market or stolen from mining companies. Explosives used in recent bomb attacks have been of the quality used for blasting rocks in mining operations.7 Boko Haram also uses fertilizer to create homemade explosives (HME).8 What Boko Haram lacks in sophistication, however, it has made up for in volume. Bombings in recent months continue to steadily increase causing large numbers of casualties across Nigeria.
Boko Haram controls much of northeast Nigeria, particularly the area between Borno State and northern Cameroon, where it has found success in launching attacks against Nigerian government representatives, military personnel, and civilians. Boko Haram has conducted successful attacks elsewhere including the south. A coordinated attack, likely executed by a female implementing an SVBIED on a fuel tanker at Apapa port in Lagos (southern Nigeria) by an affiliated Boko Haram faction on 25 June 2014, signaled the opening of a new threat. Nigerians in the South felt relatively safe and distanced from Boko Haram’s reach despite three published statements by the current Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau, threatening to attack targets in southern Nigeria. These attacks have been limited, but demonstrate Boko Haram’s potential to expand beyond its historical areas of operation.9
Of particular concern is the increasing number of suicide bombings, using both vehicles and explosives strapped to individuals. Between 27 and 30 July 2014, female suicide bombers conducted separate attacks against a university campus, petrol station, and shopping center in Kano State. Less than two months prior, the first known female suicide bombing occurred against a military barracks in Gombe. The use of females creates a new security concern and heightened anxiety about how to detect and prevent suicide attacks.10
Kidnapping Boko Haram has increased its use of kidnapping, particularly of women and children, for purposes as diverse as slavery and creating dissatisfaction with the Nigerian government. Boko Haram kidnappings began in 2011 and 2012 when the Nigerian government detained more than 100 wives and children of Boko Haram leaders, including members of Shekau’s family. In January 2012, Shekau stated in a 40- minute video message his intention to kidnap the families of government officials, ostensibly in retaliation for the detention of Boko Haram family members.11
A year later, in May 2013, Shekau made good on his promise when he kidnapped a dozen government officials along with Figure 1. Shekau takes credit for Chibok kidnapping their families, taking credit for the kidnappings in a video.12 Boko Haram kidnapped twelve Christian women and children in a May 2013 raid on a battalion barracks in Bama town.13 Shekau released a video message after the kidnapping stating the hostages would become his slaves if the Nigerian
Red Diamond Page 25 government did not meet certain requirements, including the release of the Boko Haram family members detained by the government.14 Boko Haram takes the women and girls to temporary camps and then later to towns and villages where it has safe houses for indoctrination.15 What may have started as an act of revenge has developed into a standard raiding technique. Shekau, in multiple video messages, declared that captured females will be married to Boko Haram fighters and forced to convert to Islam, and/or sold into slavery.16 During her three-month captivity, a girl from Gwoza in Borno State stated in an interview that the Boko Haram fighters forced her to cook and clean, convert to Islam, and to lure government soldiers into ambushes.17 The kidnappings have generated fear throughout the Nigerian population, causing many to leave their homes for safer areas and others to live in constant fear for their safety.
Beyond the human tragedy, the kidnappings greatly reduce the trust of Nigerians in their government to protect them. While only one of many such kidnappings, the Chibok Girls Secondary School kidnapping received international attention, significantly amplifying Boko Haram’s message of government incompetence. While there are complex reasons for Goodluck Jonathan’s defeat in the 2015 presidential election, a slow recognition of and response to the Chibok kidnappings was at least a component in his not being re-elected. Protests against the government’s handling of the Boko Haram security threat continue to plague the government. In videos, Shekau cites the Chibok raid and other kidnappings to point to his successes and the government’s failure, further eroding the general public’s confidence in the Nigerian government.18
Exclusive of all of the other reasons for Boko Haram’s kidnappings, targeted kidnappings for ransom now serve as a readily available revenue stream. Boko Haram received $3 million in ransom payment for releasing seven members of a French family kidnapped over the border in Cameroon on 19 February 2013. Most kidnappings, however, are not so lucrative; kidnapping victims tend to be mid-level officials or their relatives, unable to afford personal security, but who can pay modest ransoms of about $10,000 for the return of the kidnap victim.19
Assassination
Assassinations are deliberate actions to kill specific individuals with the intent to have a significant psychological impact on the relevant population. This technique intimidates and causes anxiety and fear and can coerce the passive support of a population.20 In 2009, Boko Haram began targeted assassinations against not only security personnel, but also against anyone deemed a threat, including local and regional government officials, Muslim clerics who speak negatively against it, and civilians suspected of collaborating with the Nigerian government.21 Boko Haram conducts the assassinations through a variety of methods including convoy ambushes, suicide bomber detonations, and attacks on places that a target might frequent such as their homes, markets, mosques, etc.
Figure 2. Boko Haram Recent Attacks, Boko Haram has a particular sensitivity to criticism, manifested in its 2009-2013 targeting of openly critical Muslim leaders. In March 2011, Imam Ibrahim Ahmed Abdullahi died outside his mosque in Maiduguri after gunmen jumped from a sport utility vehicle, opened fire, and then escaped into the city.22 On 13 July 2012, a suicide bomber detonated himself outside a Maiduguri mosque following Friday prayers in an attempt to assassinate the Shehu of Borno, the highest traditional leader in that state, killing five other people.23 In January 2013, Boko Haram attempted to assassinate Emir al Haji Ado Bayero of Kano, considered the second-most important Nigerian Muslim leader. He survived the attempt, but his bodyguards and driver died protecting him. On 1 February 2014, Boko Haram fighters killed Muslim cleric Sheik Adam, his wife, and son as he drove home from preaching at a mosque in Zaria, Kaduna State.24 Gunmen shot the emir of Gwoza, Alhaji Idrissa Timta in his car in May 2014 while en route to a funeral. The emirs of Uba and Askira, traveling in the same convoy with Timta, escaped unharmed.25 Boko Haram also targets Christian ministers as evidenced
Red Diamond Page 26 by the killing of the pastor for the Redeemed Christian Church of God in Dille Village, Askira-Uba, Borno State in August 2014. Boko Haram fighters shot the minister in the head and chest as he fled his house during an attack on his village.26 Other targets include government officials and security personnel. On 28 January 2011, Boko Haram members assassinated both Madu Fannami Gubio, a candidate for governor, and the cousin of the Borno State governor.27 Boko Haram killed a federal legislator outside his home in October 2011.28 In September 2012, Boko Haram gunmen shot and killed the Borno State attorney general.29 While not assassinations in the strictest terms, Boko Haram targets security personnel in police stations, military barracks, convoys, and patrols.30
Deception
Boko Haram employs deception primarily for purposes of infiltration prior to an attack. The technique allows Boko Haram fighters to position themselves inside a village prior to attacking. On 14 February 2014, Boko Haram fighters exploited the hope that the Nigerian military would answer repeated calls to send soldiers to protect the village of Izghe in Borno State village. Boko Haram militants showed up in Nigerian military uniforms, carrying weapons, driving pickup trucks, and initially saying they were there to protect them. Once inside the village, the Boko Haram fighters rounded up the villagers and killed at least 106 people.31 Boko Haram used a similar technique when they kidnapped the Chibok girls. The assault element, dressed as Nigerian soldiers, encouraged the girls to follow them by saying they were there to protect them from Boko Haram. The deception allowed the Boko Haram fighters to gain momentary trust and facilitated moving the girls to the vehicles for transport. False checkpoints set up by Boko Haram fighters in military uniforms is another variant of this technique. In September 2013, Boko Haram militants dressed in military uniforms set up a false checkpoint in the Benisheik area in Borno State, shooting Nigerians in their cars and as they attempted to flee on foot after voluntarily stopping for what they thought was an official checkpoint.32
Boko Haram also uses deception other than military uniforms to precede an attack. On 31 August 2013, Boko Haram gunmen, dressed as traders, attacked a market in Gajiran, killing 15 people. On 6 April 2015, Boko Haram fighters dressed as Islamic religious leaders pretended to preach Islam in the rural village of Kwajafa in Borno State. After a crowd gathered to listen, the false preachers opened fire, killing 24 and wounding others. Boko Haram’s use of government military uniforms, religious garb, or local clothing allows Boko Haram militants to gain the trust of the local population and closer proximity to those it intends to attack. Boko Haram members will also dress as women or preachers as a means of escape from arriving Nigerian security forces.33
To this point, there are no open-source reports that Boko Haram is using captured vehicles as a means of deception. As the Nigerian military increases pressure and Boko Haram evolves over time, it is likely Boko Haram will follow the lead of other insurgent groups and use captured military vehicles to its tactical advantage. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), for example, successfully uses captured military vehicles, packed with explosives, to get closer to its enemies before it detonates, most recently seen in Ramadi, Iraq.34 Coupled with captured military uniforms, Boko Haram in the future could potentially deliver fighters and/or explosives to unsuspecting Nigerian military installations via captured military vehicles.
Training Implications
Boko Haram is ruthless in its attacks with conscious intention. Creating both fear and compliance, Boko Haram’s techniques are not new, but effective. IEDs, easily assembled from readily available materials, fit well with Boko Haram’s operations. IEDs are particularly effective in places such as markets and bus stations where large numbers of people gather; they also effectively support ambushes. Kidnappings by Boko Haram not only degrade the trust of the people in their government’s ability to protect them, but ransoms paid provide the added benefit of additional income to the insurgent group. Targeted assassinations can influence decision makers while increasing the security costs to protect Nigerian leaders. Deception techniques used to infiltrate targeted areas and gain trust before initiating an attack create universal suspicion, paranoia, and fear among populations. Utilizing these techniques creates a security challenge, allowing Boko Haram to strike where and when it chooses, particularly in vulnerable areas due to poorly-resourced Nigerian security forces.
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These techniques are easily implemented in a training environment by the Oppositing Force (OPFOR). The DATE includes insurgent, criminal, and guerrilla groups that can replicate Boko Haram tactics and techniques. Pages 1-I-17 through 1-I- 22 of DATE 2.2 contain a convenient chart that lists and describes all of the groups included in DATE. The Hybrid Threat TC 7-100 series provides the doctrinal basis for implementing techniques used by Boko Haram. Boko Haram is using and improving these techniques as are other groups. Including these OPFOR techniques in training will better prepare the American Army to succeed in future conflicts.
Notes 1 Calestous Juma, “Why Nigeria Matters to the World,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: Harvard Kennedy School, 27 February 2015; Alexis Okeowo, “An Election Postponed in Nigeria,” The New Yorker, 9 February 2015. 2 Scott Stearns, “Nigerian president Deat at 58,” Voice of America, 4 May 2010. 3 Charlotte Alfred, “Who Is Nigeria’s Next President Muhammadu Buhari?” The World Post, 31 March 2015. 4 Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, “Boko Haram,” 2 March 2015. 5 TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats-Integration, “Threat Tactics Report: Boko Haram,” to be published 2015. 6 Counterterrorism Guide, “Terrorist Groups: Boko Haram,” National Counterterrorism Center, 7 Moki Edwin Kindzeka, “Chinese Workers Abandon Cameroon Construction Sites,” Voice of America, 23 June 2014. 8 Moki Edwin Kindzeka, “Chinese Workers Abandon Cameroon Construction Sites,” Voice of America, 23 June 2014. 9 IHS Jane’s 360, “Boko Haram Militants’ Evolving Strategy in Nigeria Opens up New Fronts, As Risk of Suicide. Bombings Rise,” 3 August 2014; Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, “Boko Haram,” 1 May 2015. 10 IHS Jane’s 360, “Boko Haram Militants’ Evolving Strategy in Nigeria Opens up New Fronts, As Risk of Suicide Bombings Rise,” 3 August 2014 11 Jon Gambrell and Sunday Alamba, “Nigeria Sect Leader Threatens New Attacks,” Associated Press, 27 January 2015. 12 BBC News, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram Releases Hostage Video,” 13 May 2013. 13 Kingsley Omonobi and Nnamdi Ojiego, “Bama Attack: Boko Haram Plans to Overrun Barracks – Army,” Vanguard, 9 May 2013. 14 YouTube, “Nigeria Islamist Video Claims Attacks, Shows Hostages,” 13 May 2013. 15 Amnesty International, “Nigeria: Abducted Women and Girls Forced to Join Boko Haram Attacks,” 14 April 2015. 16 Reuters, “Boko Haram Leader: ‘We Will Sell the Girls on the Market,” 6 May 2014; David Blair, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram Isn’t Just Kidnapping Girls: It’s Enslaving Them,” 13 January 2015. 17 Jacob Zenn and Elizabeth Pearson, “Boko Haram and the Kidnapping of Women: A Troubled Tactic,” War on the Rocks, 11 March 2014. 18 The Economist, “A Clueless Government,” 10 May 2014. 19 Jacob Zenn, “Boko Haram’s Evolving Tactics and Alliances in Nigeria,” Combatting Terrorism Center, 25 June 2013; Heather Murdock, “Boko Haram’s Funding Remains ‘Illusive,’” Voice of America, 22 May 2013; Peter Weber, “Who’s Financing Boko Haram?,” The Week, 12 May 2014. 20 Headquarters, Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-100.3, Irregular Opposing Forces. TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. January 2014. 21 Human Rights Watch, “Spiraling Violence: Boko Haram Attacks and Security Force Abuses in Nigeria,” 2012. 22 Njadvara Musa, “Nonviolent Muslim Cleric Killed in Nigeria,” Associated Press article in The Washington Post, 13 March 2011. 23 Human Rights Watch, “Spiraling Violence: Boko Haram Attacks and Security Force Abuses in Nigeria,” 2012. 24 Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, “Boko Haram,” 1 May 2015. 25 Threat Matrix, “Boko Haram Kills Local Muslim Leader in Nigeria,” The Long War Journal, 30 May 2015; Lanre Ola, “Suspected Boko Haram Gunmen Kill Emir, Policemen in Nigeria,” Reuters Africa, 30 May 2014. 26 Manuel Ndimele, “RCCG Pastor Hacked Down by Boko Haram, Location of Wife, Three Kids Unknown,” Naij, August 2014. 27 Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, “Boko Haram,” 1 May 2015. 28 Human Rights Watch, “Spiraling Violence: Boko Haram Attacks and Security Force Abuses in Nigeria,” 2012. 29 Human Rights Watch, “Spiraling Violence: Boko Haram Attacks and Security Force Abuses in Nigeria,” 2012. 30 START: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, “Boko Haram Recent Attacks,” Department of Homeland Security, May 2014. 31 Associated Press, “Boko Haram Slaughters Hundreds While Disguised as Soldiers,” 5 June 2014. 32 Atlanta Black Star, “Boko Haram ‘Ambush’ in Borno Nigeria Claims at Least 87 Lives,” 20 September 2013. 33 John Hall, “Boko Haram Terrorists Caught after Disguising themselves as Women…But Not Shaving Their Beards off,” Daily Mail, 24 February 2015; Reuters, “Boko Haram Disguised as Preachers Kill at Least 24 in Nigeria,” 6 April 2015; Jack Moore, “Boko Haram Militants Disguised as Women Caught by Nigerian Military,” Newsweek, 24 February 2015. 34 Margaret Coker, “How Islamic State’s Win in Ramadi Reveals New Weapons, Tactical Sophistication and Prowess,” The Wall Street Journal, 25 May 2015.
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Threat Tactical Vignette Recon and Assault by Jon H. Moilanen, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (BMA Ctr) Part 2 in RZ-CRZ Series Situation Update In a June 2015 Red Diamond article, an encirclement operation was in progress with mechanized and motorized forces of operational strategic commands (OSCs) pushing deep into the enemy’s support zone. Division tactical groups (DTGs) were maneuvering to linkup and close the encirclement. One of the division commanders directed his reconnaissance battalion to screen his southern flank, report enemy advances between the RADO River and AHL rivers, and delay to the RADO river line if confronted with superior enemy forces. This July 2015 article is the second article in this Threats vignette series. The underdeveloped road network throughout the zone remains problematic for transportation based on the recent heavy rains and predominantly cultivated lowland or marshland. Overcast weather settles as fog in the low areas and recurring mist severely limits any long-range ground observation. Enemy reconnaissance elements from infantry or motorized infantry forces are expected as a vanguard of forces withdrawing to the northeast toward the RADO River crossings. Security Operations and Counterreconnaissance The reconnaissance battalion commander assigns company missions oriented on the limited road network and bridge sites across the RADO River in zone. A reconnaissance company commander, based on mission analysis, risk assessment, and significant width and depth of his zone, task-organizes each of his platoons as an independent reconnaissance patrol (IRP) focused on the limited number of roads Screen Mission Tasks that the enemy can use as avenues of approach from the southwest.1 This mission has to Platoon an expected duration of up to 48 hours. Reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance is an economy of force action. The Conduct Route and Site screen mission incorporates both tasks as part of providing early warning and a Reconnaissance degree of protection to the force main body. The battalion headquarters Find Enemy coordinates for additional assets from the division to support the mission of a Report Reconnaissance Provide Early Warning combined arms patrol.2 In addition to the capabilities of the platoon’s four Conduct reconnaissance squads and the platoon headquarters, the platoon leader receives Counterreconnaissance one combat engineer squad and one towed mortar/combination gun section. Even Maintain Contact with with this support, the platoon is understrength in manning. However, fewer soldiers Enemy Reconnaissance in each scout squad allows distribution of more 120-mm ammunition for the Report Zone Activity mortar/combo gun among the BTR series of armored personnel carriers.3 The Delay, on Order combat engineers arrive in a BTR, and the mortar section has a light armor wheeled vehicle as its prime mover. The towed mortar is a one-axle, two-wheel Figure 1. Mission tasks configuration. Note. The capabilities of this task-organized platoon are best understood by knowing the unit and weapon systems and equipment presented in TC 7-100.4 (2015) and its Threat Force Structure e-folders of units that are available on the Army Training Network. Another source for specific weapons, vehicles, and/or equipment is the TRADOC G-2 Worldwide Equipment Guide (Volume I) (2014).
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IRP
120mm
Figure 2. Independent reconnaissance platoon (IRP) (example)
Configuration of this patrol is consistent with typical combined arms operations—two reconnaissance sections with turret- mounted machinegun, or small-millimeter cannon and coaxially mounted machinegun. The combat engineer squad augments the reconnaissance effort and actions in support of the screen. Attached mortar fires are the only dedicated indirect fires the platoon leader can expect. Soldiers trained in combat lifesaver skills provide for immediate medical treatment. Radio communication with company headquarters is disciplined for time intervals but remains flexible to tactical developments. Independent Reconnaissance Patrol The platoon leader briefs the mission task priorities and finalizes mission preparation with the unit’s noncommissioned officers. The specified task of reconnaissance is the first phase of reporting situational updates as the patrol orients on the one road in zone that emerges from KOLTE to BEJUNIK and the RADO River. Counter-reconnaissance in a screen mission is a rehearsal action that includes actions of assault, ambush, or raid. The patrol operates independently, and based on the current tactical situation does not expect to be reinforced from security elements of its reconnaissance company or reconnaissance battalion. Study of available maps indicates locations of possible or probable enemy locations (PELs) in zone. Overhead imagery has not arrived from higher headquarters. Indirect fire targets are part of mission plans based on map reconnaissance. With rehearsals and pre-combat checks completed, the IRP alerts and moves from the assembly area across the line of departure (LD). Reconnaissance to the MIN River The patrol departs the woodline in the wee hours of the autumn morning in a dense fog. The patrol leader and a senior sergeant had previously reconnoitered a route to the passage point and moved quickly across the secured RADO River bridge. Movement is Figure 3. Bejunik-Kolte restricted to the main roadway due to swampy marshland on each side of the road. Even in the limited visibility, getting quickly to the vicinity of KOLTE is time sensitive. The initial objective is the bridge in BEJUNIK over the MIN River. The patrol travels almost 20 kilometers based on the patrol leader’s odometer. A dark gray haze clings to the marshland when scouts from the lead section dismount and verify that the village of BEJUNIK is just ahead. The scouts see several soldiers with a homeguard-like appearance at a wire barrier across the road, talking casually and smoking cigarettes based on the occasional glow on their faces. Accepting risk of only light enemy resistance in BEJUNIK, the patrol leader decides on a direct assault to destroy the road block and continue rapidly through the village to seize the bridge site.
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Assault The patrol leader reviews his plan with vehicle commanders, the mortar sergeant, and combat engineer. The senior sergeant in the trail scout section maneuvers to the flank to support by fire. The patrol leader will assault down the main road with the lead scout section to seize the bridge. The mortar section is set to provide indirect fires. The engineer squad follows the patrol leader. The patrol leader understands the importance of an intact bridge to conduct further reconnaissance south to the MIN River. Although the BTRs could swim the river, he may have to eventually delay back to the north while withdrawing under pressure. He does not want to be caught at the riverline with vehicles in the river. A sudden steady rain assists in muffling the sound of the approaching patrol. The patrol was able to get within 30 meters before machinegun fire quickly scatters the enemy soldiers at the roadblock. With the wire obstacle removed and some ad hoc barrier pushed off the roadway, the three lead vehicles race down the main road and approach the bridge. The haze is beginning to dissipate as the lead section turns a corner to see Figure 4. Assault task the gray outline of a bridge. The lead scout section has already dismounted two scouts and an engineer who are about to move along the riverbank toward the bridge. As the platoon leader checks with the senior sergeant to verify if his section is ready to support by fire, automatic rifle fire flashes from the far bank. Enemy small arms fire and a grenade explosion on the road cause the scouts to halt and return fire at enemy positions next to the bridge. After a gunfire exchange from both sides of the river, two enemy soldiers lie unmoving on the bridge. The brief fire fight reduces the enemy staccato to random rifle shots, and then, silence. Early morning haze hampers any distinct observation of enemy on the far side of the bridge. As the dismounted scouts approach the bridge near Figure 5. Scouts near the bridge the riverbank, a huge explosion erupts at the bridge’s main section. The explosion, although expected, is a still a shock as the concussion hits the scouts. Timber, metal, and other bits of the bridge start landing in the road and on nearby huts. The section BTRs move up to the near bank. The patrol leader assesses the scene at the bridge with the lead scout section—the bridge center span is completely gone and the bridge tilts at an angle. The bridge is destroyed. The senior sergeant with the trail scout section hears the explosion as he maneuvers to the flank toward the bridge. As they come around a street corner, they hear yelling and commotion directly ahead but the haze prevents any clear view beyond several feet. The BTRs move forward cautiously and are hit immediately with small arms fire. Several cannon rounds and machinegun fire from the BTRs seem to stun Figure 6. Destroyed bridge enemy firing down the street. Dismounted scouts see several enemy soldiers run into the haze directly toward the river. The Red Diamond Page 31 scouts follow the enemy soldiers and suddenly see the outline of a small bridge appear from the haze. Several soldiers are leaning over several boxes on the bridge. Scouts engage the soldiers immediately with automatic rifle fire. One soldier falls off the bridge into the river, one slumps over the boxes, and two other individuals disappear into the haze of the far side of the bridge. The senior sergeant rakes the far Figure 7. Security element south of river lead side with machinegun and cannon fire to support the dismounted scout squad in seizing the bridge. Scouts run up to the boxes, push the dead soldier aside, and cut or pull wires from the explosives. Other scouts run to the far side of the bridge, give a quick hand signal, and two BTRs dash across the bridge and position about 75 to 100 meters farther down the road. Scouts dismount and act as local security while engineers check the bridge footings and braces for any additional explosives. The platoon leader leaves the scout section at the destroyed bridge and shifts east as he receives the senior sergeant’s spot report of the bridge seizure. With the small wooden bridge secured, engineers and scouts verify bridge can support up to medium wheeled vehicles but is high risk crossing for heavy wheeled vehicles and tracked vehicles. Back at the destroyed bridge, the scout section sergeant deploys the BTRs at the near bank and orients south across the river. Four scouts swim across the river and establish an observation post (OP) about 50 meters down the road from the former bridge site. They report no activity heard or seen as the morning mist starts to clear along the raised road bed. A similar quiet exists south of the intact bridge. Training Implications An opposing force (OPFOR) is a plausible, flexible military and/or paramilitary force representing a composite of varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces (doctrine, tactics, organization, and equipment) used in lieu of a specific threat force for training and developing US forces.4 The OPFOR can represent a particular threat, hybrid threat, and/or an adversary that can morph in capabilities and influence within a relevant population. In US Army training, the Threat recognizes the value of reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance and employs a disciplined and aggressive approach to plan and conduct these mission tasks. Both of these tasks are typical of security operations. Offensive tasks at platoon echelon anticipate typical actions of ambush, raid, and assault. An assault is an attack that destroys an enemy force through firepower and the physical occupation and/or destruction of a position.5 A small echelon tactical unit conducting an assault is typically organized into three elements: assault element, security element, and support element.6
The assault element is the action element. It maneuvers to and seizes the position and destroys any enemy elements at the position.
The security element provides early warning of approaching enemy forces and prevents them from reinforcing the enemy. The leader may accept risk and employ a security element that can only provide early warning. In either case, security is an enabling element.
The support element provides the assault element with one or more of the following but is not limited to: command and control (C2), combat service support (CSS), supporting direct fire and/or indirect fire, and mobility support. Support is an enabling element. The OPFOR/Threat doctrine and training instill timely and adaptive decisionmaking and leadership that are results- focused. Decentralized command and control is a Threat norm grounded in a clear understanding of mission task and purpose and the overarching intent of higher commanders. The Threat thinks and acts decisively to achieve tasks with professional execution of individual and collective skills among each element or force level in the tactical mission.
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ASSAULT at BEJUNIK 1 1 IRP recon to BEJUNIK. SUPPORT 22JUNXXXX 2 IRP clears road block. Element MM2110 3 Mortar set to support. 3 120mm 4 Scout Section and Platoon Not to Scale Leader (PL) ASSAULT to 2 seize bridge. Enemy destroys bridge/withdraws. BEJUNIK 5 Scout Section and Senior Sergeant (SS) make contact en route to support by fire SS position. SUPPORT 6 Engage ENY and ASSAULT PL ASSAULT Element to seize bridge. Element Enemy withdraws. 5 7 Dismounted scouts swim 6 4 river and set OPs. 8 Scout Section set ad hoc MIN River simple battle position. D SECURITY 9 IRP prepares to continue Element 7 SECURITY screen in zone. 8 Element 9 9
Figure 8. Independent reconnaissance patrol seizes a bridge at BEJUNIK
What Happened? The two assaults and bridge seizure occurred in a 15-minute period. The combat actions varied greatly from what had been anticipated. Nonetheless, the conditions that arose suddenly were opportunities that the patrol leader and senior sergeant were quick to take advantage of in direct actions. While the senior sergeant was conducting combat-ready checks and reallocating ammunition, the platoon leader sketched his actions in BEJUNIK and the seizure of the bridge over the MIN River. (See figure 8.) The platoon leader remained focused on his mission—screen along a narrow corridor, based on terrain restrictions, as far south as KOLTE. He reviewed his current situation as follows: One scout section screens from the near bank at the destroyed bridge site. Scouts occupy an OP on the south bank. The senior sergeant is in charge of this section and will conduct reconnaissance to PEL 23. He has a “be prepared” task to conduct reconnaissance to PEL 25.
The platoon leader and the other scout section will conduct route reconnaissance along the roadway from the bridge at BEJUNIK toward KOLTE (PEL 27). PEL 26 is his initial objective.
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The combat engineer squad remains on the north bank of the MIN River to secure the bridge site and is ready to assist the scout section at the destroyed bridge or respond to the scout section maneuvering south toward PEL 26 and PEL 27.
The mortar section remains in position at BEJUNIK ready to assist the platoon with indirect fires.
What Next? The platoon leader verifies that his subordinate leaders acknowledge their assigned tasks and confirms the physical orientation of his independent reconnaissance patrol actions. The senior sergeant is in charge of actions at the MIN River and is responsible for PEL 23. The patrol leader starts his reconnaissance south from the bridge [that was not on the map] toward PEL 26. Physical reconnaissance of PEL 25 may depend on any lateral routes identified through the marshland. Communications with his company commander are sporadic and garbled. What next? See the August 2015 issue of the TRADOC G-2 Red Diamond newsletter.
Notes 1 Headquarters, Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics. TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. 9 December 2011. para. 8-83—8-86. 2 Headquarters, Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics. TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. 9 December 2011. para. 8-1. 3 BTR. Acronym from Russian word meaning, literally, "armored transporter," and common term for any of a family and series of Soviet or post- Soviet military armored personnel carriers. 4 Headquarters, Department of the Army. Army Regulation 350-2, Operational Environment and Opposing Force Program. Effective 19 June 2015. para. 1-5b. 5 Headquarters, Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics. TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. 9 December 2011. para. 3-106. 6 Headquarters, Department of the Army. Training Circular 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics. TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Threats Integration. 9 December 2011. para. 3-108—3-111.
Identify and Report SUSPICIOUS BEHAVIOR prior to ATTACK
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What ACE Threats Integration ACE Threats Integration POCs Supports for YOUR Readiness
Determine Operational Environment (OE) conditions for Army training, education, and leader development.
Design, document, and integrate hybrid threat opposing forces (OPFOR) doctrine for near-term/midterm OEs.
Develop and update threat methods, tactics, and techniques in HQDA Training Circular (TC) 7-100 series.
Design and update Army exercise design methods-learning model in TC 7-101/7-102.
Develop and update the US Army Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE).
Develop and update the US Army Regionally Aligned Forces Training Environment (RAFTE) products.
Conduct Threat Tactics Course resident at Fort Leavenworth, KS.
Conduct Threat Tactics mobile training team (MTT) at units and activities.
Support terrorism-antiterrorism awareness in threat models and OEs.
Research, author, and publish OE and threat related classified/unclassified documents for Army operational and institutional domains.
Support Combat Training Centers (CTCs) and Home Station Training (HST) and OE Master Plan reviews and updates.
Support TRADOC G-2 threat and OE accreditation program for Army Centers of Excellence (CoEs), schools, and collective training at sites for Army/USAR/ARNG.
Respond to requests for information (RFIs) on threat and OE issues.
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