Red Diamond Threats Newsletter

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Red Diamond Threats Newsletter Red Diamond Threats Newsletter TRADOC G-2 Operational Environment Enterprise ACE Threats Integration Fort Leavenworth, KS Volume 6, Issue 7 JUL 2015 INSIDE THIS ISSUE UGF in North Korea......... 4 Fight for Hama, Syria .... 12 JMRC Ex CR 15-04 ........ 17 WEG 2015 Changes....... 22 Boko Haram ................... 24 Recon & Assault Pt 2 .... 29 ACE-TI POCs ................. 35 by TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration OEE Red Diamond The Threat Tactics Course will be at Fort Leavenworth next month, 24– published monthly by 28 August. The week-long course provides students with an TRADOC G-2 OEE understanding of the tactics and techniques employed by the threat in ACE Threats Integration complex environments. Those who design or participate in training Send suggestions to: exercises and scenario development will benefit from this free course. ATTN: Red Diamond Slots for August are still available. Please contact Angela Wilkins Dr. Jon H. Moilanen ([email protected]) to register for the course, and Operations BMA Contractor provide the following: your name, rank/civilian/contractor, duty title, and organization, installation, email, and phone. If you are unable to attend Angela Wilkins but would like to be contacted about future courses, you will be added Chief Editor and to the contact list. Typically, the course is provided twice a year in Product Integration BMA Contractor March and August. OEE NEWSLETTER DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED RED DIAMOND TOPICS OF INTEREST by Angela M. Wilkins, TRADOC G-2 ACE-Threats Integration, Editor, Red Diamond Newsletter (BMA Ctr) This month’s front-page feature serves as a reminder to Nigerian governments’ ability to conduct business. A register for the Threat Tactics Course to be held next prime example was the threat group’s effect on the month. Contact us with questions about the course or to timeline of the presidential election. Although Nigeria register. has the potential to be one of the world’s fastest growing economies this year, Boko Haram has found success in The use of subterranean spaces, or underground impeding the government’s progress and legitimacy with facilities (UGF), is an effective technique the threat a variety of common tactics and simple techniques. employs against the United States’ air superiority. The article beginning on page 4 discusses the over 10,000 This month’s issue of Red Diamond concludes with Part 2 UGFs operated in and by the North Korean government. of a tactical vignette on reconnaissance and assault techniques (page 29). The article takes the reader Recent operations in Hama, Syria demonstrate how the through a recon and assault mission in explicit detail, Syrian regime used a variety of organizations to conduct providing a realistic sense of a way such tactical actions defensive and offensive operations, including non-state might take place. Additionally, opposing force doctrinal actors and local militias. In particular, in 2014, Syria was definitions and descriptions are provided to demonstrate able to defend the airbase in Hama from opposition to the reader the connection between doctrine and real- forces. See page 12 for details. word threat tasks. An analyst from ACE Threats Integration observed a Contact information for all TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats DATE-based exercise at the Join Multinational Readiness Integration personnel is provided on the final page of the Center (JMRC), Combined Resolve IV. The exercise, newsletter. We are here to help, so contact us with your taking place in May and early June 2015, successfully questions. employed a realistic and robust OPFOR to challenge the US and its partners, providing excellent training. Find the Email your topic recommendations to: analyst’s observations beginning on page 17. Dr. Jon H. Moilanen, ACE Threats Integration The Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) is updated Operations, BMA CTR annually by TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration. The [email protected] 2015 iteration will undergo format changes to aid in ease and of extraction of information, and will streamline content Angela M. Wilkins, ACE Threats Integration by eliminating outdated weapons and equipment if there Chief Editor and Product Integration, BMA CTR is a similar entry with the same capabilities. See page 22. [email protected] The article on page 24 discusses tactics and techniques successfully employed by Boko Haram to disrupt the Red Diamond Disclaimer The Red Diamond presents professional information but the views expressed herein are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its elements. The content does not necessarily reflect the official US Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other official US Army publications. Authors are responsible for the accuracy and source documentation of material that they reference. The Red Diamond staff reserves the right to edit material. Appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the US Army for information contained therein. Red Diamond Page 2 Director’s Corner Thoughts for Training Readiness by Jon Cleaves, Director, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (DAC) The Threat Tactics course we teach twice a year here at Fort Leavenworth is one of the best ways to become familiar with the concepts of hybrid threat, operational environment, and functional tactics, and to learn how to apply them in your daily responsibilities supporting the soldier. The knowledge you will gain from attending the course will provide you with bya solidJon understanding S. Cleaves, Director,of threat concepts ACE-Threats to enhance Integration tasks such as writing scenarios, developing exercises, and simply reading about and understanding threat actions currently taking place worldwide. The week-long class is based on doctrine detailed in the TC 7-100 series, and also makes references to the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) and some of our other publications on recent hybrid threat actions. Students will experience an engaging atmosphere in a small classroom setting with state-of-the-art equipment. Our instructors are the same people who analyze operational environments and develop the products upon which the course content is based. ACE Threats Integration, a member of TRADOC G-2 Operational Environment Enterprise (OEE), is the Army's lead to study, design, document, validate, and apply hybrid threat and operational environment (OE) conditions that support all US Army and joint training and leader development programs. All military, civilians, and contractors are eligible to attend the course, with a maximum of three personnel per organization. The course is UNCLASSIFIED, and there is no fee. Having students with multiple backgrounds and experience in intelligence operations is ideal. Foreign officers are eligible with approval. We typically offer the course twice a year, in March and August, and we consider and implement changes to the course after each iteration based on student and instructor feedback, and to keep course materials current. If you’d like to take advantage of this opportunity, there are a limited number of seats still available for the 24–28 August course. To register or ask questions about the course, please contact Angela Wilkins ([email protected] or 913-684-7929). Key Links on Army Training Network TC 7-100 Series: https://atn.army.mil/dsp_template.aspx?dpID=311 DATE: https://atn.army.mil/media/docs/DATE%202.2.pdf Threat Tactics Course Material from March 2015: https://atn.army.mil/dsp_template.aspx?dpID=447 JON Red Diamond Page 3 by H. David Pendleton, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (CGI Ctr) Some analysts estimate the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), commonly known as North Korea, operates between 11,000 and 14,000 underground facilities (UGF) for military or governmental use. North Korea has taken much of its military and governmental activity below ground because of the massive destruction UN airplanes caused to above- ground facilities during the 1950–53 Korean War and as a means to avoid enemy imagery intelligence opportunities. The actual amount of subterranean activity is only speculation, however, and often UGF excavations are only discovered by the amount of debris generated—whether left on site or transported away. Many other countries have now accepted that subterranean operations may be the best way to survive American air superiority. It is likely any countries who face off against the US military will use UGFs and American Soldiers will need to understand what they may potentially face. While this article will cover the subterranean activities of North Korea, it is important to note many other countries may also adopt the same strategy if they face the US on the battlefield. The North Korean use of underground concrete bunkers dates back to at least January 1951 when the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) located a bunker a little outside of Pyongyang’s city limits designed specifically for use by the then-DPRK leader, Kim Il Sung. UGF construction has slowed down in the last decade due to shortage of materials, the lack of heavy equipment, and frequent electrical blackouts throughout the country. Nevertheless, work on underground facilities continues with much of the work formerly done by machinery now completed using manual labor.1 The DPRK recruits its citizens, usually in their late teens, into special military units that construct and/or operate underground facilities. The soldiers sign a confidentiality agreement and the North Korean government
Recommended publications
  • Syria Update: August 30-September 4, 2014
    Syria Update: August 30-September 4, 2014 6 August 31: Rebels from the 1 August 31 - September 4: After shooting down an Iranian drone on Islamic Front, Kurdish Front, August 31, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) declared the Israeli border with Jabhat al-Nusra, and other groups Quneitra a “closed military zone” and deployed armored vehicles to the area clashed with ISIS ghters near on September 2. On September 4, IDF struck the regime’s 90th Brigade the Shahba Dam in northern Headquarters in Quneitra after mortars landed in Israeli territory in the Aleppo province, amid ongoing Golan Heights. ree regime soldiers were reported killed. rebel shelling of ISIS positions. 6 Aleppo 2 August 30: ISIS created a social media account for Hasakah “Wilayat al-Furat,” which extends from Abu Kamal in eastern 7 September 2-3: JN and Idlib-based rebels seized Syria to al-Qaim in western Iraq. is is the rst time ISIS Idlib four military checkpoints just northwest of Hama city, has announced a cross-border “Wilayat” – a term they use for 10 ar-Raqqa near Halfaya and Maharda. e checkpoints lie near a the administrative units of their areas of governance. regime supply route leading to the al-Ghab Plain and Latakia Idlib Province. 3 September 4: Rebel groups including Jabhat al-Nusra ( JN), al-Muthanna Islamic Movement, and FSA aliated 7 8 September 2: e Islamic Front and other rebels have Hama continued to target the Hama Military Airport, a major groups announced a new oensive in Quneitra province and Deir ez-Zour seized the villages of Majduliya and Masharah, located 8 Hama Military Airport regime transportation and resupply hub, and claimed to southeast of Quneitra city.
    [Show full text]
  • Boko Haram, Iran, and Syria
    SEPT 2016 Vol 2 Thr eat Tactics Report Thr eat Tactics Report Compendium Compendium BBookk oo HHaarraamm,, IIrraann,, aanndd SSyyrriiaa Includes a sampling of Threat Action Reports and Red Diamond articles TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Threat Tactics Report Compendium, Vol 2 Introduction TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (ACE-TI) is the source of the Threat Tactics Report (TTR) series of products. TTRs serve to explain to the Army training community how an actor fights. Elements that contribute to this understanding may include an actor’s doctrine, force structure, weapons and equipment, education, and warfighting functions. An explanation of an actor’s tactics and techniques is provided in detail along with recent examples of tactical actions, if they exist. An actor may be regular or irregular, and a TTR will have a discussion of what a particular actor’s capabilities mean to the US and its allies. An important element of any TTR is the comparison of the real-world tactics to threat doctrinal concepts and terminology. A TTR will also identify where the conditions specific to the actor are present in the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) and other training materials so that these conditions can easily be implemented across all training venues. Volume 2: Boko Haram, Iran, and Syria This compendium of Threat Tactics Reports, Volume 2, features the most current versions of three TTRs: Boko Haram (Version 1.0, published October 2015); Iran (Version 1.0, published June 2016); and Syria (Version 1.0, published February 2016).
    [Show full text]
  • Regime and Allies: November 9, 2015
    Posture of Syrian Regime and Allies: November 9, 2015 Turkey Z Qamishli Hasakah Nubl / Zahraa A Kuweires Aleppo B E C D Ar Raqqah Fu’ah / Kefraya Idlib 4 1 F G Latakia 2 H I J Hama Deir ez-Zor 3 7 K Tartous L Homs 5 M S 9 Y R I A N 8 T4 (Tiyas) Iraq n o n O a Sayqal b P e KEY Regime Positions L Q R Damascus S T 6 Regime Control Besieged U V Hezbollah Presence Isolated W Quneitra Jabhat al-Nusra Control Airbase l Rebel Control e X Foreign Positions a r As Suwayda ISIS Control s Y A B Iran and Proxies I Deraa ISIS, JN, Rebel Control 1 2 Russia Jordan YPG (Syrian Kurds) Control 10 mi 20 km KNOWN IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS (IRGC) OR PROXY POSITION KNOWN RUSSIAN POSITION A - Nubl and Zahraa K - Brigade 47 and Tel Qartal U - Amal Farms 1 - Port of Latakia B - Bashkuy and Handarat L - Tartous City V - Nabi al-Fawwar 2 - Bassel al-Assad Airport C - Neyrab Airbase / Aleppo Airport M - Homs City W - Sanamayn 3 - Tartous Naval Facility D - As-Sara Defense Factories N - Qusayr X - Izraa 4 - Slinfah E - Fu’ah and Kefraya O - Yabroud Y - Dera’a Municipal Stadium 5 - Homs City F - Latakia City P - Zabadani Z - Qamishli Airport 6 - Damascus International Airport G - Joureen Q - Jamraya 7 - Hama Military Airport H - Tel al-Nasiriyah R - Mezze District and Airbase 8 - Shayrat Airbase I - Qumhana S - Sayyida Zeinab District 9 - T4 (Tiyas) Airbase J - Hama Military Airport T - Damascus International Airport Key Take-Away: Russia shifted military assets into eastern Homs Province, positioning at least ve attack helicopters at the T4 (Tiyas) Airbase in eastern Homs Province and additional rotary-wing aircraft at the Shayrat Airbase east of Homs City by November 4.
    [Show full text]
  • (CHI): Planning for Safeguarding Heritage Sites in Syria and Iraq1 S-IZ-100-17-CA-021
    ASOR Cultural Heritage Initiatives (CHI): Planning for Safeguarding Heritage Sites in Syria and Iraq1 S-IZ-100-17-CA-021 April 2017 Michael D. Danti, Marina Gabriel, Susan Penacho, William Raynolds, Allison Cuneo, Kyra Kaercher, Darren Ashby Table of Contents: Other Key Points 2 Military and Political Context 3 Incident Reports Syria 9 Incident Reports Iraq 86 Incident Reports Libya 121 Satellite Imagery and Geospatial Analysis 124 Heritage Timeline 127 1 This report is based on research conducted by the “Cultural Preservation Initiative: Planning for Safeguarding Heritage Sites in Syria and Iraq.” Weekly reports reflect reporting from a variety of sources and may contain unverified material. As such, they should be treated as preliminary and subject to change. 1 Other Key Points ● New video footage shows damage to al-Kabir Mosque in al-Bab, Aleppo Governorate. ASOR CHI Incident Report SHI 17-0048 ● New video footage shows damage to al-Iman mosque in al-Bab, Aleppo Governorate. ASOR CHI Incident Report SHI 17-0049 ● New photographs show cleanup and reconstruction efforts taking place at Beit Ghazaleh in Aleppo, Aleppo Governorate. ASOR CHI Incident Report SHI 17-0050 ● New photographs show cleanup and reconstruction efforts taking place at the al-Umayyad Mosque in Aleppo, Aleppo Governorate. ASOR CHI Incident Report SHI 17-0051 ● New photographs show cleanup and reconstruction efforts taking place at Suq Wara al-Jame in Aleppo, Aleppo Governorate. ASOR CHI Incident Report SHI 17-0052 ● Shells land near the National Museum in Damascus, Damascus Governorate. ASOR CHI Incident Report SHI 17-0053 ● Reported SARG airstrikes severely damage al-Sahbat al-Abrar Mosque in Damascus, Damascus Governorate.
    [Show full text]
  • Erkenntnismittelliste Syrien
    VERWALTUNGSGERICHT STADE Verzeichnis der vorhandenen Materialien über die Arabische Republik Syrien - 10. Kammer - Stand: 16.09.2021 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Das Gericht beabsichtigt, gemäß § 86 VwGO die genannten Materialien gegebenenfalls zur Entscheidung heranzuziehen. Falls Sie Einsicht in ein nicht frei verfügbares Erkenntnismit- tel benötigen, wenden Sie sich bitte an die Service-Einheit der 10. Kammer. I. Auswärtiges Amt A. Lageberichte 01.04.2004 13.12.2004 14.07.2005 17.03.2006 26.02.2007 05.05.2008 09.07.2009 28.12.2009 (Ad-hoc Ergänzungsbericht) 07.04.2010 (Ad-hoc Ergänzungsbericht) 27.09.2010 17.02.2012 (Ad-hoc-Bericht) 13.11.2018 Stand: November 2018 kein regulärer Asyllagebericht; Er- stellung im Hinblick auf die IMK im November 2018 20.11.2019 Stand: November 2019 kein regulärer Asyllagebericht; Er- stellung im Hinblick auf die IMK im Dezember 2019 19.05.2020 Fortschreibung des Berichts über die Lage in der Arabischen Republik Sy- rien vom November 2019 (Stand: Mai 2020), kein regulärer Asyllage- bericht; Erstellung im Hinblick auf die IMK im Juni 2020 04.12.2020 Bericht über die Lage in der Arabischen Republik Syrien (Stand: November 2020), kein regulärer Asyllagebericht; Erstellung im Hin- blick auf die IMK im Dezember 2020 - 2 - B. Auskünfte Datum Adressat Inhalt 14.01.2004 VG Darmstadt staatenlose Kurden; rot-orange- nes Plastikdokument; Wehr- dienst 14.01.2004 VG Darmstadt staatenlose Kurden; Ausweispa- piere; Bescheinigung des Orts- vorstehers; rot-orangene Plas- tikkarte; Maktumin 14.01.2004 VG Darmstadt Echtheit Personaldokument - Wehrdienst staatenloser Kurden 19.01.2004 VG Darmstadt Identitätsbescheinigung eines Mukhtars; geringer Beweiswert 19.01.2004 VG Bayreuth Identitätsbescheinigung; Volkszäh- lung 1962; rot-orangene Plastikkar- ten 04.03.2004 VG Braunschweig Ehrenmorde; Familienehre; Az.
    [Show full text]
  • Syria Conflict (RAS) Is Now Produced Quarterly, Replacing 3.7 Deir-Ez-Zor the Monthly RAS of 2013
    1. OVERVIEW 1.1 Executive Summary 1.2 Timeline Q3 1.3 Armed conflict and possible developments 1.4 Humanitarian Population Profile 1.5 Displacement profile 1.6 Humanitarian Access 1.7 Possible developments 1.8 Data sources and limitations REGIONAL 2. COUNTRYWIDE SECTORAL ANALYSIS 2.1 Protection 2.2 WASH 2.3 Livelihoods and Food Security 2.4 Shelter NFI ANALYSIS 2.5 Health 2.6 Education 3. GOVERNORATE PROFILES 3.1 Aleppo 3.2 Al-Hasakeh 3.3 Ar-Raqqa 3.4 As-Sweida Q3 2014 | 13 OCTOBER 2014 3.5 Damascus/Rural Damascus 3.6 Dar’a This Regional Analysis of the Syria conflict (RAS) is now produced quarterly, replacing 3.7 Deir-ez-Zor the monthly RAS of 2013. It seeks to bring together information from all sources in 3.8 Lattakia the region and provide holistic analysis of the overall Syria crisis. While Part I focuses on the situation within Syria, Part II covers the impact of the crisis on neighbouring 3.9 Hama countries. More information on how to use this document can be found on page 2. 3.10 Homs Please note that place names which are underlined are hyperlinked to their location 3.11 Idleb on Google Maps. The Syria Needs Analysis Project welcomes all information that could 3.12 Quneitra complement this report. For more information, comments or questions please email 3.13 Tartous [email protected]. 1. OVERVIEW 1.1 Executive Summary 1.2 Possible Developments 1.3 Timeline Q3 1.4 Humanitarian Population Profile 2. COUNTRIES 2.1 Lebanon 2.2 Jordan 2.3 Turkey 2.4 Iraq 2.5 Egypt ANNEX 1.
    [Show full text]
  • DCS Table of Frequencies All Maps V10.Xlsx
    DCS Syria Table of Frequencies Airfield Lat (N) Long (E) Runway(s) (ft) UHF / VHF TACAN VOR ILS (Runway/Frequency/Course) Elevation MF/HF ICAO Abu al-Duhur AB 35˚43'53" 37˚07'07" 09-27 (9496') 250.35 / 122.20 - - - 820' 3.950 / 38.80 OS57 Adana Sakirpasa Airport 36˚59'17" 35˚17'28" 05-23 (9071') 250.90 / 121.10 - 112.70 (ADA)RWY 05/108.70/056˚ 55' 4.225/39.350 LTAF Al Qusayr 34˚34'00" 36˚35'07" 10-28 (9600') 251.25 / 119.20 - - - 1729' 4.400 / 39.70 OS70 Al-Dumayr Military Airport 33˚36'16" 36˚44'08" 06-24 (9843') 251.55 / 120.30 - - - 2066' 4.550 / 40.00 OS61 Aleppo Int Airport 36˚10'55" 37˚12'37" 09-27 (9496') 250.75 / 119.10 - 114.50 (ALE) - 1253' 4.150 / 39.20 OSAP An Nasiriyah AB 33˚55'35" 36˚52'31" 04-22 (8318') 251.35 / 122.30 - - - 2746' 4.450 / 39.80 OS64 Bassel Al-Assad Int Airport 35˚24'38" 35˚56'52" 17-35 (9168') 250.45 / 118.10 - 114.80 (LTK) RWY 17/109.10/179˚ 93' 4.000 / 38.90 OSLK Beirut-Rafic Hariri Int 33˚50'14" 35˚29'14" 17-35 (10566'), 251.40 / 118.90 - 112.60 (KAD) RWY 17/109.50/179˚ RWY 16/110.10/169˚ 39' 4.475 / 39.85 OLBA 03-21, 16-34 RWY 03/110.70/035˚ Damascus Int Airport 33˚24'55" 36˚30'15" 05L-23R (11903'), 251.45 / 118.50 - 116.00 (DAM)RWY 23R/109.90/230˚ RWY 05R/111.10/050˚ 2007' 4.500 / 39.90 OSDI 05R-23L Eyn Shemer 32˚26'30" 35˚00'06" 09-27 (3826') 250.00 / 123.40 - - - 93' 3.750 / 38.40 LLES Gaziantep 36˚57'05" 37˚27'52" 10-28 (8871') 250.05 / 121.10 - 116.70 (GAZ)RWY 28/109.10/286˚ 2287' 3.775/38.450 LTAJ H4 35˚32'12" 38˚12'22" 10-28 (7179') 250.10 / 112.60 - - - 2257' 3.800 / 38.50 OJHR Haifa Airport
    [Show full text]
  • An Army in All Corners: Assad's Campaign Strategy
    APRIL 2015 CHRISTOPHER KOZAK MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 26 “AN ARMY IN ALL CORNERS” ASSAD’S CAMPAIGN STRATEGY IN SYRIA Cover: February 11, 2015A fighter loyal to Syria’s President Bashar Al-Assad hangs his picture as fellow fighters rest by a Syrian national flag after gaining control of the area in Deir al-Adas, a town south of Damascus, Daraa countryside February 10, 2015. Syrian government troops and their allies in the Lebanese group Hezbollah pressed a major offensive in southern Syria on Wednesday, taking new ground in a campaign against insurgents who pose one of the biggest remaining threats to Damascus. Syrian state TV broadcast live from Deir al-Adas, a town some 30 km (19 miles) south of Damascus that it said had been captured. The sound of artillery being fired could be heard. The nearby town of Deir Maker was also captured, state TV said. Picture taken February 10, 2015. REUTERS/Stringer All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. ©2015 by the Institute for the Study of War. Published in 2015 in the United States of America by the Institute for the Study of War. 1400 16th Street NW, Suite 515 | Washington, DC 20036 www.understandingwar.org CHRISTOPHER KOZAK MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 26 “AN ARMY IN ALL CORNERS” ASSAD’S CAMPAIGN STRATEGY IN SYRIA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 26 | “AN ARMY IN ALL CORNERS” | CHRISTOPHER KOZAK | APRIL 2015 U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Syria SITREP MAP 2014-12-02
    Syria Update: December 3 - 9, 2014 1 December 2 - 9: ISIS launched an oensive against the Deir ez-Zour Military Airport, seizing con- 6 December 3 – 9: ISIS militants clashed with regime and Hezbollah forces in the trol over several villages and checkpoints on the eastern outskirts of the base after clashes involving Hajar al-Aswad neighborhood of southern Damascus city and published a photo set two SVBIED attacks. On December 6 and 7, ISIS militants launched two separate assaults claiming to show a large number of local residents pledging allegiance to ISIS. spearheaded by two additional SVBIEDs against the airport itself but were forced to withdraw Meanwhile, Jaysh al-Islam reported clashes with ISIS amidst over fty regime following heavy shelling and an alleged regime deployment of chlorine gas. ISIS forces also engaged airstrikes in the Bir al-Qaseb region southeast of Damascus. ISIS later released images in heavy clashes with the regime in the southeastern neighborhoods of Deir ez-Zour city which of a small reinforcement convoy deployed to the area. involved a tank-borne SVBIED. Qamishli Ayn al-Arab 3 Ras al-Ayn 2 December 3: JN detonated a car bomb in the northern 2 Masakin Barzeh neighborhood of Damascus city, killing four regime soldiers. 4 Aleppo Hasakah 7 December 3 - 5: JN and other rebel forces seized the regime-held village of Abu Dali in Idlib Sara 3 December 2 – 9: YPG forces advanced in southeastern Idlib Province following clashes ar-Raqqa southern Ayn al-Arab/Kobane amidst ongoing which reportedly involved a JN VBIED attack.
    [Show full text]
  • Transformations of the Syrian Military: the Challenge of Change and Restructuring
    Transformations of the Syrian Military: The Challenge of Change and Restructuring Note of Appreciation Omran Center for Strategic Studies expresses its appreciation to the Carnegie Middle East Center for its partnership and support in this project funded by the European Union and Germany as part of the Syria Peace Process Support Initiative (SPPSI). All the information, ideas, opinions, themes and supplements contained in this book are the express the views of the authors and their research efforts and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the Carnegie Middle East Center or the donors. -3- -3- Concepts and Practices -4- -4- Transformations of the Syrian Military: The Challenge of Change and Restructuring Omran Center for Strategic Studies -5- Omran Center for Strategic Studies An independent think tank and policy research center focusing on presenting an objective understanding of Syria and the region to become a reference for public policies impacting the region. Omran began in November 2013 in Istanbul, Turkey. It publishes studies and policy briefs regarding Syrian and regional affairs in the areas of politics, economic development, and local administration. Omran also conducts round-table discussions, seminars, and workshops that promote a more systematic and methodical culture of decision making among future leaders of Syria. Omran’s work support decision making mechanisms, provide practical solutions and policy recommendations to decision makers, identify challenges within the Syrian context, and foresee scenarios and alternative solutions Website: www.OmranStudies.org Email: [email protected] Publish date in English: December 31, 2018 © All rights reserved to Omran for Strategic Studies -6- Contributors Navvar Şaban Bashar Narsh, Ph.D Maen Tallaa Col.
    [Show full text]
  • Summary-Of-Consultation-Results.Pdf
    1 Contents Summary of consultation results ...................................................................................................... 5 Besieged areas..................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5 Suggested solutions ......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5 Detainees ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 5 Suggested solutions ......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 6 Shelling ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 6 Suggested solutions ......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 6 The Syrian Civil Society Platform .....................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • "An Army in All Corners": Assad's Campaign Strategy in Syria
    APRIL 2015 CHRISTOPHER KOZAK MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 26 “AN ARMY IN ALL CORNERS” ASSAD’S CAMPAIGN STRATEGY IN SYRIA Cover: February 11, 2015A fighter loyal to Syria’s President Bashar Al-Assad hangs his picture as fellow fighters rest by a Syrian national flag after gaining control of the area in Deir al-Adas, a town south of Damascus, Daraa countryside February 10, 2015. Syrian government troops and their allies in the Lebanese group Hezbollah pressed a major offensive in southern Syria on Wednesday, taking new ground in a campaign against insurgents who pose one of the biggest remaining threats to Damascus. Syrian state TV broadcast live from Deir al-Adas, a town some 30 km (19 miles) south of Damascus that it said had been captured. The sound of artillery being fired could be heard. The nearby town of Deir Maker was also captured, state TV said. Picture taken February 10, 2015. REUTERS/Stringer All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. ©2015 by the Institute for the Study of War. Published in 2015 in the United States of America by the Institute for the Study of War. 1400 16th Street NW, Suite 515 | Washington, DC 20036 www.understandingwar.org CHRISTOPHER KOZAK MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 26 “AN ARMY IN ALL CORNERS” ASSAD’S CAMPAIGN STRATEGY IN SYRIA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 26 | “AN ARMY IN ALL CORNERS” | CHRISTOPHER KOZAK | APRIL 2015 U.S.
    [Show full text]