Regime and Allies: November 9, 2015

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Posture of Syrian Regime and Allies: November 9, 2015 Turkey Z Qamishli Hasakah Nubl / Zahraa A Kuweires Aleppo B E C D Ar Raqqah Fu’ah / Kefraya Idlib 4 1 F G Latakia 2 H I J Hama Deir ez-Zor 3 7 K Tartous L Homs 5 M S 9 Y R I A N 8 T4 (Tiyas) Iraq n o n O a Sayqal b P e KEY Regime Positions L Q R Damascus S T 6 Regime Control Besieged U V Hezbollah Presence Isolated W Quneitra Jabhat al-Nusra Control Airbase l Rebel Control e X Foreign Positions a r As Suwayda ISIS Control s Y A B Iran and Proxies I Deraa ISIS, JN, Rebel Control 1 2 Russia Jordan YPG (Syrian Kurds) Control 10 mi 20 km KNOWN IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS (IRGC) OR PROXY POSITION KNOWN RUSSIAN POSITION A - Nubl and Zahraa K - Brigade 47 and Tel Qartal U - Amal Farms 1 - Port of Latakia B - Bashkuy and Handarat L - Tartous City V - Nabi al-Fawwar 2 - Bassel al-Assad Airport C - Neyrab Airbase / Aleppo Airport M - Homs City W - Sanamayn 3 - Tartous Naval Facility D - As-Sara Defense Factories N - Qusayr X - Izraa 4 - Slinfah E - Fu’ah and Kefraya O - Yabroud Y - Dera’a Municipal Stadium 5 - Homs City F - Latakia City P - Zabadani Z - Qamishli Airport 6 - Damascus International Airport G - Joureen Q - Jamraya 7 - Hama Military Airport H - Tel al-Nasiriyah R - Mezze District and Airbase 8 - Shayrat Airbase I - Qumhana S - Sayyida Zeinab District 9 - T4 (Tiyas) Airbase J - Hama Military Airport T - Damascus International Airport Key Take-Away: Russia shifted military assets into eastern Homs Province, positioning at least ve attack helicopters at the T4 (Tiyas) Airbase in eastern Homs Province and additional rotary-wing aircraft at the Shayrat Airbase east of Homs City by November 4. These deployments position Russia to blunt an oensive by ISIS against pro-regime forces south of Homs City that began after ISIS seized the village of Mahin on November 1, 2015. ISIS’s recent gains south of Homs threaten the strategic regime-controlled M5 Highway connecting Damascus to Homs as well as the regime-held provincial capital of Homs City. ISIS may seek to pressure Homs City in order to divert Russian and Iranian forces in Syria from their ongoing ground operations near Aleppo City. The advances in Homs have al- ready driven an apparent shift in the Russian air campaign to expand the targeting of ISIS forces threatening core regime terrain as well as ISIS-held positions in eastern Syria more broadly. Russia has also forward-staged rotary-wing aircraft out of the Hama Military Airport in order to target rebel positions north of Hama City. Syrian rebels have been pushing back regime forces in the northern countryside of Hama Province despite the start of Russian air support to the Syrian regime on September 30. Rebel forces seized the strategic town of Morek on the border between Hama and Idlib Provinces on November 5. The redeployment of some rotary-wing aircraft to Homs Province may limit the amount of repower that Russia has available to respond to the rebel oensive in northern Hama Province as well as pressure from ISIS southeast of Aleppo City. The expansion of the Russian footprint in Homs and Hama Provinces positions Russia to further deepen its military involvement in the Syrian Civil War. The ag- gressive use of helicopter gunships to conduct reconnaissance-by-re along active frontlines will provide Russia with valuable sources of additional intelligence on potential targets for xed-wing airstrikes. Over the long-term, the deployments to the two airbases in eastern Homs Province could also provide Russia with new forward positions for an expanded air campaign against ISIS in far-eastern Syria or western Iraq. The forward-staging of Russian rotary-wing nonetheless brings Russian personnel closer to direct contact with ISIS, raising the risk that ISIS could deliberately target these forces in order to punish Russia for its involvement in Syria. .

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N° 03/2017 recherches & documents mai 2017 The Shayrat Connection: Was the Khan Shaykun Chemical Attack Inevitable but Preventable? CAN KASAPOGLU WWW . FRSTRATEGIE . ORG Édité et diffusé par la Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique 4 bis rue des Pâtures – 75016 PARIS ISSN : 1966-5156 ISBN : 978-2-911101-96-0 EAN : 9782911101960 WWW.FRSTRATEGIE.ORG 4 BIS RUE DES PÂTURES 75 016 PARIS TÉL. 01 43 13 77 77 FAX 01 43 13 77 78 SIRET 394 095 533 00052 TVA FR74 394 095 533 CODE APE 7220Z FONDATION RECONNUE D'UTILITÉ PUBLIQUE – DÉCRET DU 26 FÉVRIER 1993 SOMMAIRE INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 5 BRIEF TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE KHAN SHAYKUN ATTACK ............................................ 6 THE CHEMICAL BLITZ .............................................................................................................. 8 THE REGIME’S TOP CHAIN OF COMMAND: MANAGING THE CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES .. 9 MILITARY GEOSTRATEGIC CONTEXT OF THE CW USE IN SYRIA ................................................10 CARRYING OUT THE DIRTY JOB: TACTICAL LINK OF THE WMD CHAIN ......................................14 THE SUSPECTED AIR FORCE LINK ..........................................................................................14 CALLING IN THE CHEMICAL STRIKE .........................................................................................15 CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................18