South Africa’s relations with Gabon and the Ivory Coast: 1969-1994
Emmanuel NDZENG NYANGONE
Dissertation presented for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (History) at the University of Stellenbosch
Promoter: Professor Albert M. Grundlingh
March 2008
Declaration
I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this dissertation is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree.
Signature:…………………………………… Date:……………………………….
Copyright © 2007 Stellenbosch University
All rights reserved Abstract Security (war or peace), economy, technological progress, cultural development and issues of identity are some of the aspects that characterise the nature of relations between countries. Traditionally, the objectives of a country’s foreign policy concern security and welfare. But, the search for national prestige, for autonomy or for a change in the world’s power relationships or ideological re-orientation can all inform the foreign policies of many states.1 South Africa is no exception; during the stewardship of Prime Minister BJ Vorster, his objective was the launching of a policy of détente.
As a consequence, South Africa was subjected to continuous external criticism. At the insistence of the discrimination apartheid policy, South Africa was excluded from a wide range of intergovernmental agencies and conferences, was isolated by the international community and became the object of an economic boycott by the vast majority of African states.
It therefore was clear that the increasing hostility towards South Africa’s domestic policy would isolate the country further. The world’s reaction to South African’s domestic policy demonstrated that foreign opinion had an influence on domestic policy, and that it imposed constraints on the conduct of foreign policy. To extricate itself from this situation, South Africa initiated the policy of rapprochement called détente policy during Vorster’s time in office. Vorster had no illusions about the need for safety in South Africa, thus his main ideal as Prime Minister was to establish normal and friendly relations with African states. Vorster hoped to improve South African’s international position by improving relations with Black Africa through the policy of détente.
It is with regard to this policy, undertaken during the period of the African continent’s rejection of South Africa’s race discrimination policies and this country’s exclusion from the community of African states, that the present study investigates and analyses South Africa’s relations with the Ivory Coast and Gabon from 1969 to 1994, viewed from South African and French source material. In other words, this study analyses the interaction
1 South African Yearbook of International Affairs, 2001/2002, p. 73.
i that took place in the past with regard to the South African government’s relations with the governments of Gabon and the Ivory Coast, which directed human activities in the political, economic, military and cultural fields. This investigation and analysis were undertaken in order to understand why the Ivory Coast and Gabon became involved with South Africa when the African community and even the international community had called for the isolation of this country due to its apartheid policy, and how these relations would improve and be strengthened in the future.
ii Opsomming Sekuriteit (oorlog of vrede), ekonomie, tegnologiese vooruitgang, kulturele ontwikkeling en identiteitskwessies is van die aspekte wat die aard van verhoudinge tussen lande kan beïnvloed. Tradisioneel het die oogmerke van ‘n land se buitelandse beleid sekuriteit en algemene welsyn in die oog gehad. Maar die soeke na nasionale prestige, outonomie of ‘n verandering in die wêreld se magsverhoudinge of ‘n ideologiese re-oriëntasie is alles faktore wat die buitelandse beleide van state kan raak. Suid- Afrika was geen uitsondering nie en onder die premierskap van BJ Vorster was die oogmerk ‘n beleid van détente.
As gevolg van die diskriminerende apartheidsbeleid was Suid-Afrika die teiken van onder andere volgehoue eksterne kritiek. Op die aandrang van Afrikastate is Suid-Afrika van ‘n wye reeks inter-regeringsagentskappe uitgesluit, terwyl die land ook deur die internasionale gemeenskap ge-isoleer is en die oorgrote meerderheid Afrikastate ‘n ekonomiese boikot toegepas het.
Dit was derhalwe duidelik dat die toenemende vyandigheid ten opsigte van die land se binnelandse beleid, die land verder sou isoleer. Die wêreld se reaksie op Suid-Afrika se binnelandse demonstreer dat buitelandse meinig wel ‘n uitwerking op binnelandse beleid gehad het en dat dit beperkinge op die buitelanse beleid geplaas het. Ten einde die situasie die hoof te probeer bied, het Suid-Afrika ‘n toenaderingsbeleid teenoor Afrika begin volg.Vorster het nie illusies oor die noodsaak gehad om veiligheid vir blanke Suid- Afrika te probeer bewerkstellig en een van sy ideale was om deur middle van détente normale betrekkinge met Afrikastate te handhaaf en daardeur ook Suid-Afrika se internasionale posisie te verstewig.
Dié studie ontleed breedweg Suid-Afrika se verhoudinge met Gabon en die Ivoorkus tussen 1969 en 1994, ten tye van apartheid en die land se uitsluiting van die breër Afrikagemeenskap. Suid-Afrikaanse sowel as Franse bronnemateriaal word gebruik. Daar word gelet op die interaksie tussen die Suid-Afrikaanse regering se verhoudinge met die regerings van Gabon en die Ivoorkus ten opsigte van politieke, ekonomiese, militêre en
iii kulturele velde. Hierdie ondersoek is gedoen ten einde te probeer vasstel hoekom die Ivoorkus en Gabon betrokke geraak het by die Suid-Afrikaanse inisiatiewe ten tye van die res van Afrika en die internasionale gemeenskap se verwerping van apartheid, en die verdere verloop van die verhoudinge na apartheid.
iv Acknowledgements I would like to express my gratitude to the following trusted advisors, friends and mentors for their inspiration and support over the years, both in my life and for the completion of this thesis. Special thanks are due to:
Professor Albert M Grundlingh, who acted as supervisor for this thesis and who, in the early part of my study at Stellenbosch University, so generously shared with me his vast knowledge, his enthusiasm for the subject and his constant encouragement. I sincerely thank him for his relevant and crucial contribution to the present study. Even though he had many other commitments, he made time available for this task and I hold in high esteem his significant and valuable input.
Mrs Corinne Harmsen, Departmental Officer of the Department of History, who was always available to deal with any queries. She always received me with much kindness at her office and spared me some of her precious time to talk about my study.
All archivists and librarians of the South African, French and Gabonese Departments of Foreign Affairs, the South African National Archives, the South African Department of Trade and Industry, the Stellenbosch University Library, and the University of Paris X – Nanterre.
Les Bourses et Stages du Gabon, my sponsors, who acted on behalf of the Gabonese Government, for the financial assistance given to me.
My father, Thomas Nyangone Ndzeng, who passed away on 27 September 1998, my mother, Helene Mengue Mbele, my sister, Marie Akoma, my brothers, Dieudonnée Nna and Jean Clement Mbiaga, whose did all in their power to provide me with every possible assistance to ensure my success.
v Finally, my most heartfelt thanks to my wife, Doline Nyangone M, and my daughter, Emmanuelle Grace Etomo Ndzeng, who accepted the limits on the time I had to spend with them, for their love and encouragement.
vi Contents
Abstract i Opsomming iii Acknowledgements v List of Tables xi Abbreviations xii Maps of South Africa, the Ivory Coast and Gabon in Africa xiv
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Introduction 1 1.2 Aim and scope 4 1.3 Methodology and approach 6 1.4 Sources and literature 8 1.5 Scope 13
CHAPTER TWO: SOUTH AFRICA’S DETENTE POLICY 15 2.1 Introduction 15 2.2 The nature and characteristics of the détente policy 16 2.3 Motivations for the détente policy 22 2.4 Promotion of the détente policy 31 2.5 Difficulties of the détente policy 33 2.6 Conclusion 34
CHAPTER THREE: AMBIVALENCE WITHIN THE OAU 37 3.1 Introduction 37 3.2 Establishment of the OAU 39 3.2.1 The Addis Ababa Summit Conference 39 3.2.2 The OAU Charter 41 3.3 The OAU’s diplomatic offensive against South Africa 41 3.4 South Africa’s reaction 46
vii 3.5 The proposal of the Ivory Coast for dialogue with South Africa 48 3.6 The Ivory Coast’s proposal for dialogue causes division within the OAU 58 3.6.1 Meeting of the Council of Ministers (15-19 June 1971) 58 3.6.2 Assembly of Heads of States and Governments (21-23 June 1971) 64 3.7 Conclusion 73
CHAPTER FOUR: DIALOGUE POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA BY THE IVORY COAST AND GABON 75 4.1 Introduction 75 4.2 The philosophy behind the policy of dialogue 76 4.3 Dialogue policy strategy 81 4.4 Dialogue policy activities 85 4.5 Consequences of the policy of dialogue 93 4.6 Conclusion 97
CHAPTER FIVE: THE ROLE OF FRANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA’S RELATIONS WITH THE IVORY COAST AND GABON 100 5.1 Introduction 100 5.2 France’s Africa policy 102 5.3 French-South African relations 111 5.4 Franco-South African dialogue initiatives with Francophone Africa 114 5.5 Conclusion 118
CHAPTER SIX: SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY REGARDING GABON 123 6.1 Introduction 123 6.2 Military assistance 124 6.3 First mission for technical aid to Gabon (21-27 September 1969) 130 6.4 Economic mission to Gabon (12-18 April 1970) 132 6.5 Technical assistance mission to Gabon (27 September to 3 October 1970) 135 6.6 Agricultural assistance to Gabon (OGAPROV) 138
viii 6.7 The Gabon Railway Project 149 6.8 Other development projects 157 6.9 Conclusion 160
CHAPTER SEVEN: SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY REGARDING THE IVORY COAST 164 7.1 Introduction 164 7.2 Scientific cooperation 165 7.3 Nature conservation 167 7.4 Establishment of the mining school in the Ivory Coast 174 7.5 Conclusion 179
CHAPTER EIGHT: POLITICAL AND TRADE INFLUENCE ON SOUTH AFRICA’S RELATIONS WITH THE IVORY COAST AND GABON 180 8.1 Introduction 180 8.2 Political influence 181 8.3 Trade exchange influence 187 8.3.1 Ivory Coast business ties with South Africa 187 8.3.2 Gabon’s trade exchange with South Africa 192 8.4 Conclusion 199
CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION 203
APPENDIXES 208 A. The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa 209 B. Charter of the Organisation of African Unity 217 C. Visit of South African Prime Minister Vorster to the Ivory Coast 227 D. The “mission of peace” of the Ivorian Information Minister, Laurent Dona-Fologo, in South Africa 228 E. Principal contracts of weapons concluded between France and South Africa 229 F. Visit by Professor Christian Barnard and Dr Jack Peen to Gabon 230
ix G. List of South African Foreign Affairs officials who have worked at the embassies in France, the Ivory Coast and Gabon 231
BIBLIOGRAPHY 233 Primary Sources 233 1. Official 233 1.1 South African Government Publications 233 1.2 South African National Archives 233 1. 3 South African DFA Archives 233 1. 4 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives 242 1. 5 Gabonese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives 244 2. Unofficial 245 2.1 Newspapers, News Agencies, Journals, Annual Reports, Newsletters, and Magazines 245 2. 2 Websites 247 2.3 Articles in Academic Journals 248 Secondary Sources 251 Books and dissertations 251
x List of Tables
Table 1: Council of Ministers voting on resolution rejecting dialogue with South Africa (Chapter 3.6.1) 62
Table 2: Assembly of Heads of States and Government voting on the resolution rejecting dialogue with South Africa (Chapter 3.6.2) 70
Table 3: Supply of weapons to South Africa: 1965-1974 (Chapter 5.3) 112
Table 4: Animal population distribution in Gabon: 1975 (Chapter 6.6) 146
Table 5: Changes in the numbers of cattle, sheep and goats in Gabon: 1975-1985 (Chapter 6.6) 146
Table 6: South Africa’s trade with the Ivory Coast (Chapter 8.3.1) 191
Table 7: South Africa’s trade with Gabon (Chapter 8.3.2) 198
xi Abbreviations
AFP : Agence France-Presse (French Press Agency) AFFRETAIR: Gabonese private cargo airline company ANC : African National Congress ARMSCOR : Armaments Development and Manufacturing Corporation / Armaments Corporation of South Africa ATS : Agricultural Technical Service BCEAO : Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (Central Bank of West African States) BEAC : Banque des Etats de L’Afrique Centrale (Bank of Central African States) BOSS : Bureau for State Security CEMAC : Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (Central African Economic and Monetary Community) CFA : Communauté Financière Africaine (African Financial Community) CGIC : Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation CIA : Central Intelligence Agency CSIR : Council for Scientific and Industrial Research CODESA : Convention for the Democratisation of South Africa DAAM : Direction des Affaires Africaine et Malgaches (Department of African Affairs and Malagasy) DFA : Department of Foreign Affairs EMCCA : Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa IDC : Industrial Development Corporation IFP : Inkhata Freedom Party IRCT : Institute of Cotton and Exotic Textile Research NCO : Non-commissioned Officer NP : National Party NU : United Nations OAU : Organisation of African Unity OCAM : Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache (African and Malagasy
xii Common Organisation) OCTRA : Office du Chemin de Fer Transgabonais (Office of the Gabonese Railways) OGAPROV : Office Gabonais d’Amelioration et la Production de Viande (Gabonese Office for the Improvement and Production of Meat) ORSTOM : Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique Outre-Mer (Outre-Mer Office of Scientific and Technical Research) SAA : South African Airways SAAF : South African Air Force SACP : South African Communist Party SALT : Strategic Arms Talks SANDF : South African National Defence Force SDECE : Service de Documentation Extérieur et de Contre Espionnage (External Documentation and Counter-espionage Service) SOGEL : Societe Gabonaise d’Elevage (Gabonese Society of Cattle Breeding) SWA : South West Africa SWAPO : South West Africa People’s Organisation UNESCO : United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation UPC : Union des Populations du Cameroon (Union of Cameroonian People) USA : United States of America USSR : Union of Soviet Socialist Republics UTA : Union des Transports Aériens (United Air Transport) WAEMU : West African Economic and Monetary Union
xiii Map of South Africa in Africa
Map of Gabon in Africa
Map of the Ivory Coast in Africa
xiv CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction Research for this study began at Stellenbosch University, with Professor Albert M Grundlingh as promoter of the dissertation. On 3 December 2003, after the examination of my proposal with reference to my application, the University Senate allowed me to register for the Doctor of Philosophy (History) programme that commenced in February 2004. Professor Grundlingh and I, on a number of occasions, exchanged insights on a number of issues important to the study, particularly the importance of the French material in this dissertation.
In April 2004 I went to Pretoria, where I spent six months for the purpose of research at the South African Department of Foreign Affairs Archives, the South African National Archives, the South African Department of Trade and Industry, the University of Pretoria Library and the Ivorian and Gabonese Embassies in Pretoria. The most relevant materials collected during this investigation come from the Department of Foreign Affairs Archives. In this Department, I was able to access the archival material relating to the South African Government’s relations with the Ivory Coast and Gabon from the 1960s to the 1990s, to which few other scholars seem to have had access hitherto.
As my dissertation called for an extended research visit to France, I undertook a trip to France in 2005 where I spent seven months working in the French Department of Foreign Affairs Archives in Paris and in the Centre of Diplomatic Archives of Nantes. Meanwhile, I accessed the archival material of the Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine (Library of Contemporary International Documentation) at the University of Paris X – Nanterre. My research visit to France was successful. It permitted me to collect relevant material that is inaccessible to most other South African scholars working in the same field. The research in Pretoria and France was supplemented by research conducted in the archives of the Gabonese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The French material constitutes the main strength of this dissertation, because it provides an opportunity to view events from both the South African and French positions.
1 The realisation of such a laborious piece of work would not have been possible without having to face some difficulties, the principal one being to synthesise, with dexterity, all the materials collected after having classified, criticised and analysed them, and this proved to be rewarding. This study confines itself to the historical aspects of South Africa’s relations with Gabon and the Ivory Coast.
Regarding the structure of this dissertation, Chapter One presents the aims, scope, methodology and approach of and motivation for this study. Chapter Two focuses on the nature of South Africa’s détente policy. Here the interpretation and analysis of this policy towards Africa is presented in the light of the motivations or interests of South Africa in setting up and promoting the policy. At the same time, it was found to be necessary to look at the history of the concept of détente to better understand the outlines of the origins and characteristics of South Africa’s détente policy. The chapter therefore begins with a general description of the nature and characteristics of détente from the South African view. Thereafter it focuses on the motivation for such a policy in South Africa’s political history. Finally it shows how South Africa promoted this policy and why it failed.
The reaction of the OAU to South Africa’s détente policy is analysed in Chapter Three. The question of dialogue between South Africa and the rest of Africa dominated intra-African foreign relations in 1971. It divided the OAU into two groups: one forming the so-called dialogue club and the other in opposition to dialogue. In the same year, the OAU seemed to succeed, at its summit conferences, to block the attempt (announced in November 1970) by the President of the Ivory Coast to carry on with the initiative for dialogue started by Malawi. In fact, the OAU expressed its opposition to dialogue, except on the basis set out in the Lusaka Manifesto of April 1969. This set the scene for confrontation between the dialogue club and their opponents. Thus, for the Organisation of African Unity, 1971 was a year of heated dialogue among its member states on the issue of whether or not there was a basis for meaningful dialogue with South Africa. Chapter Three starts with an overview of the establishment of the OAU, with the purpose of gaining an understanding of its basic principles and its policy towards South Africa, and finishes with the OAU’s rejection of the Ivory Coast’s proposal for dialogue with South Africa.
2 Chapter Four examines the reactions and actions of the Ivory Coast and Gabon towards the call from Pretoria, with a view to understanding why these countries chose to cooperate with South Africa during the apartheid era, despite the OAU’s disagreement. It begins with a presentation of the philosophy behind the dialogue policy and ends with the consequences of such a policy. In fact, the words peace and dialogue had long been leitmotifs in any discourse of the Ivory Coast and Gabon. These words provided the motivating force in Ivorian and Gabonese diplomacy concerning South Africa and the apartheid issue, in what has come to be known as the tentative rapprochement between the independent black African States and South Africa. In the meantime, these two countries missed no occasion to stress that their willingness to talk to Pretoria did not imply acceptance of the apartheid policy, which they found abhorrent. They estimated that the true debate, a debate concerning the future of the African continent, did not take place at the OAU summit. Their fear was that the OAU would become an “Organisation of illusions”, the illusion of thinking that it was possible to end apartheid policy by force. They therefore decided to undertake dialogue and relations with South Africa despite the OAU’s disagreement.
Chapter Five presents France’s involvement in South Africa’s relations with the Ivory Coast and Gabon with a view to finding out what role France played in these relations. Following on from the fact that the Ivory Coast and Gabon are former French colonies, it is only to be expected that France played a role in their political and economical decision making. To better apprehend the scope of the close, interdependent relations between France and its former colonies, the researcher needed to know the history of France’s African policy towards those countries. After a discussion of this history, the relations between France and South Africa on the one hand, and the diplomacy of dialogue between South Africa and Francophone African States on the other, are analysed.
Chapter Six and Chapter Seven point out the participation of the South African government in development projects in and military assistance and technical aid to the Ivory Coast and Gabon during the time when these countries were advocating dialogue with South Africa.
Chapter Eight records the influence of political and trade exchange on South Africa’s excellent relations of friendship and brotherhood with the Ivory Coast and Gabon. This chapter therefore
3 intends to understand the role of political and trade exchange in these relations. In fact, as far as Gabon is concern, President Bongo initiated official consultations with FW de Klerk regarding the Southern African issue after he became President of South Africa. By the end of the 1980s, President Bongo used his African relationships to mediate with other African leaders on the Southern African issue in order to obtain the independence of Southern African countries, such as Namibia. In the course of events, South Africa took advantage of this context of political cooperation to pave the way to diplomatic relations with African countries, among them Gabon and the Ivory Coast. This political climate appeared to be favourable to improve trade exchange. This led to the initiation of business ties, and trade exchange increased constantly until the establishment of full diplomatic relation. Since 1994, with the election of Nelson Mandela as President, South Africa broke the chains of the apartheid system that for so long had crippled its future. In conclusion, this chapter makes some suggestions about what the future is likely to hold for these relations.
Chapter Nine presents the general conclusion. It discusses the fact that, by getting involved with South Africa when the African and international communities were calling for the isolation of the country due to its apartheid policy, the Ivory Coast and Gabon had simply been wrong to be right too soon. Meanwhile, the positive points of the diplomacy of peace and dialogue pursued by the Ivory Coast and Gabon, which appear more than necessary in these times when Africa is characterised by armed conflict, political turmoil and economic problems, point to the essential key objective to be pursued by any society, namely the ultimate, precious good for any people and the unique and indispensable environment for development and the implementation of democratic institutions. This should be the crucial preoccupation for the peoples of Africa, whose survival is already threatened. That is why President Felix Houphouet-Boigny and President Bongo have seriously questioned the use of conflict by the peoples of Africa.
1.2 Aims and scope South Africa’s relations with Gabon and the Ivory Coast, viewed from the South African and French perspectives, constitute the principal focus of this dissertation. The choice of these two countries (Gabon and the Ivory Coast) as the focus of this study finds its basis in the leadership
4 roles they have played in their respective African sub-regions. The Ivory Coast, which used to be called the “Elephant of Africa”, has become the bridge to the free market and international trade for other Western African countries because of its relatively strong economy and its strategic position. Indeed, the majority of economic transactions in that region are performed via the port of Abidjan.
A similar situation holds for Gabon. Due to its political stability and its growing economy, Gabon attracts foreign investments and, therefore, plays an important role in sub-regional bodies, such as the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (EMCCA), which furthers the material interests of all shared economic and technical activities. Gabon thus is a significant promoter of peace through diplomacy based on cooperation and mutual respect. In this task, Gabon attempts to find peaceful solutions to African conflicts through diplomatic negotiations.
As far as South Africa is concerned, no one is unaware of the fact that this country lived under the apartheid system for many years, and that this caused its marginalisation from the international community. After the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), African members of the OAU were divided with regard to the apartheid policy. In fact, African unity on the apartheid issue disintegrated rapidly during the 1970s. The meeting of the OAU heads of state in August 1970 was notable for the resolutions not passed. What was shattering the OAU was the strong response of several African states to the call from South African Prime Minister BJ Vorster for dialogue.1 South Africa’s relationships with other African countries were at their lowest level and this situation was deeply disturbing for South African foreign policy.
It was clear that the acceptance of the international community was conditioned by its contact with African states. In order to break out of this isolation imposed by the international community, to which African diplomatic activities against apartheid contributed significantly, the South Africa government embarked on a deliberate policy of building bridges into black Africa (détente policy), to which the Ivory Coast and Gabon responded positively.
1 E. Bissell Richard: Apartheid and international organizations, pp. 149-150.
5 South Africa’s principle purpose in entering into relations with Gabon and the Ivory Coast therefore was to establish more normal economic and diplomatic relations, on the one hand, and to restore its good relations with Western countries, which had declined disastrously after the Sharpeville shootings in 1960, on the other hand. These two aspects determined South Africa’s relations with Gabon and the Ivory Coast during the decade preceding the first democratic elections in April 1994, which marked the end of the divisive issue between South Africa and African states.
Guided by information derived from research in Pretoria, France and Gabon, this study explores and analyses South Africa’s relations with Gabon and the Ivory Coast from 1969 to 1994 as comprehensively as possible. The main goal is to better understand the evolution of relations between South Africa and Gabon, as well as between South Africa and the Ivory Coast, and to see what the future is likely to hold.
Therefore, this dissertation, in the first instance, examines South Africa’s détente policy towards Africa in order to understand what the main motivations and aims of South Africa were in setting up and promoting this policy. In the second instance, this study proceeds to profoundly and extensively analyse the reasons why dialogue between South Africa and Africa produced deep divisions within the OAU, what the position of the Ivory Coast and Gabon was and why they chose to have dialogue with South Africa despite the OAU’s anti-dialogue resolution. In the final instance, this dissertation points out the consequences of the Ivory Coast and Gabon’s acceptance of South Africa’s détente policy, and answers the question whether the Ivory Coast and Gabon were right or not to become involved with South Africa.
1.3 Methodology and approach The importance of this study lies in its contextual nature, which encompasses aspects of the academic discipline of History. Given the main source of information, this work needs to be considered as a case study in Diplomatic History or the History of International Relations. For many decades, Diplomatic History has been limited to the study of relations between states in a very external way (limited by the political aspects, such as the balance of powers and sets of
6 agreements, whether public or secret, and by the conclusion of alliances). Diplomatic History has grown considerably since expanding its field of study to the major forces of state (geography databases, demography, economy, technology, pressure of public opinion, etc.). Such aspects affect or concern all actors in these relations. Their importance is based on their consequences in time and space. This dissertation, therefore, is an attempt to address the current lack of information on South Africa’s relations with Gabon and the Ivory Coast.
However, the paradigm within which any study is undertaken determines the nature of the steps taken in the research process. In fact, the research approach in any study is determined mainly by the subject and the research aim. Consequently, and in accordance with the aim of this study, an appropriate approach has been followed. It is the historical approach or historical method. This approach is the means by which the historian deals with the significance, the latent meaning of history. It is a critical transcript of the relentless surge of events, the sequential and meaningful record of human activity. The historical approach aims to assess the meaning and to read the message of the happenings in which men and events relate meaningfully to each other. The object of this approach is to provide a means through which the historian may deal with events that happened in times past and to interpret what might otherwise be considered merely as the happenstance of blind fortune.
In order to appraise the meaning and relationship of events accurately, the historical researcher should always seek to get as close to the original happenings as possible in the hope of thus better reconstructing the past. To do so, this researcher has relied on documentary sources that have been submitted to external and internal criticism. The authenticity of documents was checked in external criticism and the message the documents seek to convoy was obtained with the help of internal criticism. A wide variety of primary and secondary sources were analysed and synthesised. Appropriate research was done in the relevant archives in Pretoria, Paris and Libreville. The researcher made use of a database of documentary archival material by working from the past to the present. The database was built up from written sources (secondary material) and other documents, such as trade agreements and files from Foreign Affair (primary material).
7 To analyse the subject as comprehensively as possible, the following questions were considered as part of the research problem: Why did the question of dialogue between South Africa and the rest of Africa produce deep divisions within the OAU and what was the position of the Ivory Coast and Gabon? Why did the Ivory Coast and Gabon choose to engage in dialogue with South Africa despite the OAU’s anti-dialogue resolution? What was the involvement of France in South Africa’s relations with Gabon and the Ivory Coast? What was South Africa’s foreign policy regarding Gabon and the Ivory Coast in the period investigated by this study? What was the impact of South Africa’s relations with Gabon and the Ivory Coast and what is the future likely to hold? According to the outcome regarding South Africa’s apartheid issue, were the Ivory Coast and Gabon right to become involved with South Africa?
Given the fact that it has already been acknowledged that a complete overview of the subject is not possible, the above-mentioned questions were taken as guidelines for the research strategy. As full attention has been focused on these issues, a wide range of answers hopefully can be provided.
1.4 Existing literature The motivation for this study lay in the fact that no extensive attempt has yet been made to undertake a comprehensive study of the subject matter in question. As far as could be ascertained, no extensive writing on South Africa’s relations with Gabon and the Ivory Coast has been done. The small amount of secondary literature that exists examines South African foreign relations with black African countries in general, viewed mostly from South African perspectives. A survey of the literature has therefore suggested that this dissertation is the first extensive study devoted to South Africa’s relations with Gabon and the Ivory Coast from 1969 to 1994, viewed from South African and French perspectives. As a pioneering work, this study has undertaken the difficult task of analysing this relationship. Existing works dealing with the African relations of South Africa are the following:
Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Culture Series (1970-71). This journal contains some articles that deal with the South Africa issue in Africa, e.g. “Proposed Dialogue with South
8 Africa”. President Houphouet-Boigny announced on 4 November 1970 that he was planning an African summit conference to urge a “dialogue” with South Africa. The government, he said, would contact all African heads of states individually to define his country’s viewpoint. This would ensure that dialogue with South Africa would not be a unilateral initiative by the Ivory Coast. Due to attitudes to the proposed “Dialogue”, the South Africa Prime Minister, JB Vorster, said in an interview on 19 March 1971 that his government was prepared to engage in dialogue without preconditions with other African countries that were prepared to talk. The dialogue initiative was condemned. Sixteen heads of delegation who addressed the OAU session on 18 June 1971 vehemently condemned dialogue with South Africa. These included the delegations of Nigeria, Tanzania, Somalia, Sierra, Leone, Sudan, Liberia, Cameroon, Libya, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Mali and Algeria. The delegations said that the proposal was against the Charter of the OAU. The Ivory Coast walked out of this session in protest against the way the proposed dialogue with South Africa was being handled by the conference. Four other delegations, namely Upper Volta, Togo, Dahomey and Gabon, said that they would not participate in any debate on dialogue, but would attend the conference later during the discussion of other agenda items.
FR Metrowich (1975): Towards dialogue and détente. As with several aspects of South Africa’s outside image, there are many misconceptions about the two concepts of dialogue and détente. One of these misconceptions is that, while South Africa had committed itself to dialogue and détente with its neighbours in Africa, it had turned its back on black communities within South Africa, whom it subjected to repression and suppression. This allegation seems not relevant because dialogue had been part of the South African way of life for generations, as is shown in this book, inter alia by the black leader, Paramount Chief Kaizer Matanzima, who remarked that the attainment of independence by Transkei was the result of negotiations that had taken place over a period of fifty years. Although this book is written in a rather popular fashion, it shows that the movement towards dialogue and détente between the Republic of South Africa and her neighbours on the giant continent of Africa was directed towards a relationship that was by no means unique. The basic objective of this movement was to create a climate of peaceful cooperation. The author presents this almost as a type of white-led “African renaissance” that was supposed to promote stability and the advancement of peoples in underdeveloped areas.
9 Sam C Nolutshungu (1975): South Africa in Africa: study in ideology and foreign policy. This book gives an account of South Africa’s policies towards the rest of the African continent in the period following the Second World War. With increasing international opposition to their domestic policies, South African governments became apprehensive of the change being initiated by post-war policies of imperial power in Africa. It was the object of South African policy to secure an optimal organisational and ideological milieu in Africa. To that end, South Africa sought to gain influence among the colonial powers and to persuade them to retain their empires. Even when they withdrew, it was hoped that their remaining influence would be exercised to advance African objectives in Africa. When African states did eventually emerge, they were hostile to apartheid and secured the isolation of South Africa from the rest of Africa. South African policy consisted of attempts to terminate this isolation, mainly by offering trade and aid to African governments. Economic expansion underlined the need for markets in Africa, while it enabled South Africa to exercise some influence, especially in Southern Africa.
Colin Legum (1976): Vorster’s gamble for Africa: how the search for peace failed. The changes sweeping across Southern Africa were revolutionary both with regard to their speed and the radical transformation of power that was occurring. The Vorster regime’s policies relied in large measure on the success of the attempts to prevent the Republic from becoming isolated on the continent and from the western community. In 1975, the new initiative to establish détente with black Africa looked as if it might, at least, buy the Republic valuable time and, no less importantly, that it might succeed in retaining an important measure of support from the western community. But these hopes began to look decidedly less promising in 1976 after the failure of South Africa’s intervention in Angola, an international involvement by the big power in that struggle. Part one of this study is concerned mainly with an examination of the implications of the Soweto riots and the “independence” of the Transkei. Part two traces the reasons for the failure of the détente exercise and the subsequent difficulties that were caused for Prime Minister Vorster in pursuing his African gamble. Part three analyses the internal state of the Republic, which, as its Minister of Interior had forecast, was facing its three most critical years. Part four comprises a number of important documents not previously published abroad. Among these are the constitution of the Transkei and the South African Parliamentary Act that transferred power to the Transkei.
10 Denis Venter (1980): South Africa and black Africa: some problem areas and prospects for rapprochement. The internationalisation of the apartheid question in the post-World War II era and the resultant deterioration in South Africa’s foreign relations forced the Republic to make a concerted effort over the years to formulate a more purposeful African policy. It gradually became evident that South Africa’s relationship with Africa was the key to better relations with the rest of the world and that only a normalisation of relations with black Africa could prevent further deterioration. As a consequence, the Republic was increasingly regarded as an inextricable part of Africa and, because of this, efforts were made to systematically expand contact and conclude relations with black African states. Dialogue with Africa, which seemed so promising in the late 1960s and early 1970s, had largely collapsed by 1974 due to the unflinching hostility of militant African states. It also became apparent that South Africa would no longer be separated from the rest of Africa by a buffer zone or cordon sanitaire consisting of the former Portuguese African territories and Zimbabwe Rhodesia. The realities of this new geopolitical situation had to be accepted and therefore dynamic new initiatives should emanate from the South African government to reactivate the process of dialogue on a more meaningful basis in order to reach some modus vivendi with Africa for Africa’s sake, and not merely as a key to relations with the West. This led to the initiation of détente efforts, which were primarily aimed at defusing the tense political situation in Southern Africa.
Deon Geldenhuys (1984): The diplomacy of isolation: South African foreign policy. This book discusses South African’s foreign policy making from the Union of South Africa to the Republic of South Africa. Successive chapters sketch the salient features of South Africa’s domestic and external environment, with particular emphasis on the period 1966 to 1981. It is probably one of the more scholarly books on the topic, but it does not deal exhaustively with Africa and no French sources were consulted. It is very much an Afrikaner-Anglo view of South Africa’s foreign relations.
Adedeji Abebayo (1996): South Africa and Africa: within or apart? The new democratic South Africa, led by the African National Congress, was in the process of making fundamental choices. Would South Africa’s future be one where the needs of the majority population are at last addressed? A future where their hegemonic relationship with neighbouring states was
11 restructured in an equitable direction? A future of South Africa standing up for its own interests and those of Africa? Or, alternatively, would the new leadership become distanced from its popular roots and be pushed into a globalising perspective? These are the interrelated questions explored by the author of this book. In a context which portrays the current state of Africa’s political economy and the legacy of apartheid within South Africa itself, the political, security and in particular economic dimensions of South Africa’s present and possible future relations with the rest of the continent are examined.
Roger Pfister (2005): Apartheid South African and African States, from pariah to middle power, 1961-1994. This book is based on a PhD dissertation researched in South Africa. The author explains what drove South Africa’s foreign policy towards Africa. By doing so, he first talks about South Africa’s foreign policy system and explains the role of various state and non-state actors who contributed to policymaking. The book also deals briefly with the period of HF Verwoerd. An outline is given of how the DFA and the military tried to come to terms with African independence, covering both the Congo crisis and the regime’s near-total isolation by the mid-1960s, despite its initial contacts with and offers of technical assistance to Lesotho and Malawi. The author also explores détente with Mauritius and Franco-South African cooperation with regard to South African forays into Francophone Africa. Brief information is given on the economic and technical assistance to Gabon and the French reasons for supporting Biafra. The book also covers the Angolan War and shows how the decision to send South African troops was taken by the military against the opinions of BOSS and the DFA. In the conclusion, the author summarises how the DFA was gradually pushed into the background after the 1960s. Its offer of technical assistance was not a successful means by which political advantages could be gained, as illustrated by the example of Gabon or the Comores.
Contrary to Pfister’s book, the present work focuses only on South Africa’s bilateral relations with the Ivory Coast and Gabon during the apartheid area. The originality of this work is based on its argumentation relating to why these two countries chose to have dialogue with South Africa, despite the OAU’s anti-dialogue resolution, what impact resulted from these relations, what the future is likely to hold and whether the Ivory Coast and Gabon were right to get involved with South Africa. By doing so, more relevant details are given about why the question
12 of dialogue with South Africa divided the African community, as well as about the role played by France in these relations.
Tom Wheeler (2006): History of South African Department of Foreign Affairs, 1927-1993. The book is a contribution to the knowledge of the foreign relations of apartheid South Africa and the foreign affairs ministry. However, the work in this book does not offer a comprehensive picture of the DFA as a government department, nor of its operations over a specific period. It rather tries to give a broad survey of the composition and diplomatic role of the DFA.
1.5 Scope History is unique in several of its dimensions. One of these is the dimension of historical time; the other is the dimension of historical space. Both of these dimensions are extremely important to the historian in interpreting data. Therefore, the period that has been demarcated and of which relevant data are considered is from 1969 until 1994.This choice was motivated by the fact that the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969 identified two main areas of conflict in Southern Africa: the confrontation with colonialism and the conflict with the system of apartheid. South Africa was seen as a colonial power in view of its “illegal occupation” of Namibia, and as a racist society owing to its policy of apartheid and racial discrimination.
Thus, black Africa’s opposition to apartheid provided a clearly defined and apparently uncontroversial objective, which served, inter alia, as the “moral and the mental basis” for a feeling of African Unity. The OAU charter committed all member states to the eradication of all form of colonialism.2 Consequently, the OAU adopted the Lusaka Manifesto, which had earlier been issued by the conference of East and Central States, in September 1969. The same year, the UN voted in favour of this Manifesto. In contrast, in the same year the South African Department of Foreign Affairs initiated contact with Gabon by inviting three Gabonese doctors to visit South Africa. This took place as a result of a trip to Gabon earlier in the same year by medical authority Chris Barnard and Jack Penn, a renowned plastic surgeon.3
2 W. Carlsnaes and M. Muller: Change and South African External Relations, p.1. 3 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol.3: Technical aid to Gabon, Glenn Babb, 31 December 1972, p.1.
13 Furthermore, 1994 marks the beginning of a new era in South Africa. South Africa’s first elections based on universal franchise and proportional representation, on 27 April 1994, in fact represent a defining moment in the country’s history, sweeping away the final bastion of apartheid (political discrimination against the black majority). The election was the culmination of three and a half years of tortuous negotiations over the constitution among a variety of political organisations, the most notable of which were President FW de Klerk’s ruling National Party (NP), the African National Congress (ANC), led by Dr Nelson Mandela, and Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi’s Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and other parties. As matter of fact, the democratic election of Nelson Mandela in April 1994 consecrated the return of South Africa to the international community and normalised its relationship with Africans countries.
14 CHAPTER TWO: SOUTH AFRICA’S DÉTENTE POLICY
2.1 Introduction For many years, South African foreign policy was contaminated by the apartheid system, which caused the country’s isolation. For that reason, a conference of emergent African states that took place in Addis Ababa as far back as 1960 decided to apply a total boycott against South Africa, which included the closing of ports and airports to South African shipping and aircraft. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), founded in 1963, perpetuated this boycott, in theory at any rate, as it was enforced in public but frequently broken in private. At the United Nations (UN), African states played a leading and frequently dominant role in proposing sanctions and other action against South Africa. South Africa, therefore, from a position of fruitful cooperation in her relationships with other African countries prior to the 1960s, was faced after 1960 with a hostile stance from those with whom she shared the continent. Relationships were at their lowest level and this situation was to last for several years.
However, when it became clear that the change in Africa and the rest of the world was long term and that the hostility against South Africa’s internal policy would increasingly isolate the country, the détente policy was initiated.1 But such a policy in Southern Africa was really nothing new for South Africa. On becoming Prime Minister after Verwoerd’s assassination in 1966, John Balthazar Vorster declared that he would continue his predecessor’s policy towards the rest of Africa. Détente policy therefore became a reality and more effective during the Vorster area, because one of Vorster’s main ideals as Prime Minister was to establish normal and friendly relations with African states.2
According to Roger Pfister (2003), in Apartheid South Africa’s Foreign Relations with African States, Vorster’s foreign policy towards Africa came to be dominated by interdepartmental rivalry among the Department of Foreign Affairs, the military, national intelligence and the Department of Information concerning the route to be followed. In Pretoria’s foreign relations
1 R. Ballinger and O. Gerrit: Détente in Southern Africa: two views, p. 21. 2 O. Geyser: Détente in Southern Africa, pp. 182-207.
15 with Africa, the main theme was a struggle over how these relations should be conducted. Conflicting strategies towards different countries, while being interrelated and often running parallel can broadly be categorised into the four phases of Outward Movement, Dialogue, Secret Diplomacy and Détente. This division into periods or phases is based on insights gained from research into the primary sources located in the archives of the Department of Foreign Affairs.3
The Outward Movement roughly defines DFA activities aimed at establishing contact with black African states immediately beyond Southern Africa after 1967. Dialogue was initiated by the military, beginning in late 1966, and refers to interaction with countries further afield, namely in Francophone Africa. Secret Diplomacy, practiced by the Department of Information and the intelligence agency, BOSS, began after 1972 and peaked at the time of Vorster’s visit to the Ivory Coast in September 1974. Détente, finally, describes the strategies of the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Information, as well as BOSS, during the mid-1970s in seeking a lasting and peaceful solution to both the SWA/Namibian and the Rhodesian issues.4
The goal of this chapter is to analyse South Africa’s détente policy towards Africa to find out what the motivations for or the interests in the establishment and promotion of this policy were for South Africa. At the same time, in order to better understand the outlines of the origins and characteristics of South Africa’s détente policy, this chapter also examines the history of the concept of détente. In others words, this chapter answers the following questions: What characterised South Africa’s détente policy? What were its motivations? How was this policy promoted? Why did it fail?
2.2 The nature and characteristics of the détente policy Détente is described in the Oxford English Dictionary as the easing of strained relations between states, and derives from a French verb meaning to relax or loosen. The Cambridge English Dictionary defines the term détente as an improvement in the relationship between two countries which in the past were not friendly and did not trust each other. However, it is generally accepted
3 R. Pfister: Apartheid South Africa’s Foreign Relations with African States, 1961-1994, pp. 90-91. 4 Ibid., p. 91.
16 that the idea of détente among the superpowers is American in origin, going back to the 1960s. It is associated with Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, consecutive United States presidents from 1969 to 1976, but the driving force was Henry Alfred Kissinger, Assistant for National Security Affairs to both presidents and Secretary of State from September 1973 to January 1977. It is not possible, here, to provide a comprehensive overview of détente, but it is important to this section to present its broad characteristics.
The principal motivation for Kissinger to promote détente was to extricate the United States from Vietnam, where that country had become involved in 1954. The longer the United States presence lasted there, the more Washington became embroiled in a regional conflict that it could not win. As a result, cooperation was sought, first with the Soviet Union, then with China, to terminate Washington’s traumatic experience while ensuring that Vietnam did not fall into the hands of the communists. Détente, in the view of the United States government, or Kissinger, for that matter, thus became “a means of maintaining the balance of power in a way that would be consistent with available resources”, as appropriately summarised by the diplomatic historian Gaddis.5
What Kissinger referred to as “Nixon’s Triangular Diplomacy”6 between Washington, Moscow and Beijing resulted in respectable success. The most significant achievements during 1972/73 were that the United States and Soviet governments signed several treaties, notably the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I, the document on Basic Principles of Relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States, which “seemed to hold out the promise of a more or less permanent flowering of relatively harmonious relations between the two great nuclear powers”, and the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War.7 Regarding Washington’s détente with China, Kissinger and Nixon visited Beijing in July 1971 and February 1972 respectively, meeting the country’s leader, Mao Zedong, and restoring Sino-American relations.8
5 J.L. Gaddis: The Rise, Fall and Future of Détente, pp. 354-377. 6 H.A. Kissinger: Diplomacy, pp. 703-732. 7 R.D. Markwich: Peaceful coexistence, detente and third world struggles, pp. 171-181. 8 H.A. Kissinger: Diplomacy, p. 726.
17 One can see, though, that the American definition of détente comprises a mode of management of adversary power. Arguments will be advanced in due course to sustain the proposition that the management of adversary power has been the main preoccupation of those who determine the nature of the policy, not only in Washington, Moscow and Peking, but in the other capitals that have used or responded to it. The power of one’s adversaries, or potential adversaries, and the modes of living with or offsetting that power at endurable cost and risk to one’s own society are, of course, the necessary constant preoccupations of foreign offices and defence departments everywhere. Looking at the post-war period as a whole, one may say that, for most of the quarter century after 1945, the dominant mode or strategy of managing adversary relations in the central balance was the Cold War. Since 1969 it has been détente. The difference between the two is that détente supposes a conscious and deliberate reduction of tensions in the central balance (or in a local balance, as in the South African area of the concept), whereas Cold War entails a conscious maintenance of tensions at a relatively high level.9 From this view, détente appears to have been a policy or strategy that grew out of a careful and subtle calculation of the balance of power.
However, in the South African view, it seems that the first evidence of the term détente entering Pretoria’s political jargon as a strategy to integrate the new situation in Southern Africa dates from late 1974. The first to promote this détente policy was the Bureau for State Security (BOSS), helped by the Department of Information, as published in the To the Point editorial on “Southern Africa new era” on 6 December, introducing the term détente and outlining its purpose: The lessons of the failure of South Africa’s former Africa policy have been invaluable. The earlier attempts to achieve Détente, as was done with Madagascar, for example, were a crushing disappointment. They taught the RSA that no breakthrough could come by depending on good relations with single states whose political control could be switched overnight. The revised diplomatic objectives had therefore to include all Southern Africa and through them other to the north; which is precisely what Vorster’s moves have recently been about. (...) The impediments to larger cooperation are still formidable. The South West Africa and Rhodesian issues are two of them.10
9 C. Bell: The Diplomacy of Détente, The Kissinger Era, pp. 1-2. 10 To the Point, 6 December 1974, p. 17.
18 The argument was that South Africa’s relations with Africa could only improve by consolidation of its position in Southern Africa, and Vorster was therefore supposed to “set his sights lower than previously”. To achieve that goal, the editorial suggested, the situation in both South West Africa (SWA)/Namibia and Rhodesia had to be settled to ease the strained relations between South Africa and the continent, paving the way for contact with African states. As an initial challenge, however, this meant that representatives from South Africa and other African states were to sit at the negotiation table, even though the latter disapproved of Pretoria’s apartheid policies. In this regard, reference was made to the détente debate between the superpowers. In November 1972, for example, Information Minister Mulder argued that dialogue and constructive cooperation were possible between countries despite differences over domestic politics.
To substantiate this, he referred to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between Washington and Moscow, as well as the talks between Washington and Beijing that took place despite differing internal political situations. On reading the To the Point issue of 11 July 1975, it becomes evident that the Department of Information, in promoting détente, followed Washington’s approach towards Beijing at the time: “Yet it is open dialogue that has achieved most in the West, on the model of Kissinger-Nixon and Mao as the pioneer of new United States-China relations.” Based on evidence presented later, we suggest that BOSS, given its privileged access to Prime Minister Vorster and its cooperation with Washington’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), instigated the concept of détente for Pretoria’s policy on Southern Africa, with particular application by the Department of Information, BOSS’s partner.11
In addition, according to an editorial in The Round Table, a distinction had to be made between East-West détente, as conceived by President Nixon and the Russian leader, and Southern African détente, as conceived by Vorster.12 In East-West détente there was the implicit hope that successful negotiation on specific matters would lead to further cooperation and benefits that went beyond the accommodation of limited interests; this was not the case for Vorster. The article continues:
11 R. Pfister: Apartheid South Africa’s Foreign Relations with African States, 1961-1994, pp. 223-224. 12 The Round Table, April 1975, p. 125.
19 It is here that Mr. Vorster’s conception of Détente is deficient. He is not interested in Détente being effective beyond the limited goals he has set himself. He did not want to see liberty broaden out from precedent to precedent throughout Southern Africa.
If one, for the moment, puts aside the question of whether Vorster’s conception of détente was deficient and ignores the one-sided introduction of liberty, one may still ask if this was a valid description of Vorster’s détente. This, of course, is a separate question from asking if what Vorster had said about détente in the past was a sufficient basis for bringing about a permanent détente in the future. Presumably, Vorster would have agreed with Kissinger that, if policymakers did not resolve immediate problems, they couldn’t hope to resolve the long-term ones. The difficulty here is to know which is which and to accept the fact that yesterday’s long- term problems have a habit of returning as tomorrow’s crises.
In any event, if this was not an adequate description, what then was détente? The author must confess to some difficulty in fully understanding the furore and the excitement aroused in the Republic by the diplomatic initiatives of the past. He assumes détente to have been the only practical response to the new realities in Southern Africa that were created by the suddenness of Portuguese decolonisation. As he understands it, what Vorster did was to offer South Africa’s assistance and cooperation in finding peaceful solutions to the problems on its frontiers and preventing the escalation of violence in Southern Africa. He described it as the normalising of relations between South Africa and other African states.13
Moreover, according to Denis Venter (1980) in South Africa and black Africa, the concept of détente is generally defined as an improvement in the relationship between two countries, which in the past were not friendly and did not trust each other. However, détente can also be defined as it is generally defined, as the easing of strained relations, and this represents an earlier stage than rapprochement in the development of relations on a healthy basis.
Because of the obvious difficulties in defining détente, at least in the Southern African context, the answer to a logical definition of the concept is to distinguish between an early probationary
13 R. Ballinger and O. Gerrit: Détente in Southern Africa: two views, p. 6.
20 and a later developed or mature stage in its development. The probationary stage could involve the authorisation of certain measures, including improved communication, which, either because they were planned that way or because of unintentional or secondary results, may lead to a somewhat tentative relaxation of tension between the political actors concerned. In the developed or mature stage, consultation is placed on a more regular and institutionalised footing and the already relaxed relations between the parties lead to the normalisation of relations. The crux of the matter, however, remains whether relations are eased to such an extent and in a manner sufficiently able to meet the requirements of détente in any of its stages.
For Denis Venter, the concept of détente in the Southern African context remains a serious conflict between parties. Throughout the period of détente, peripheral matters, even those of some importance, may be solved, but the core issue of the conflict will persist. In the Southern African case, apartheid constituted the central issue of the conflict. The persistence of this core issue would oblige the parties to start the negotiations on the peripheral issues and move towards the core issue. This shows that the détente exercise is clearly a strategy of progressing from the secondary to the principal issues. However, such negotiations will be characterised mainly by suspicion, mistrust, misjudgements, miscalculations and misunderstanding, as was the case regarding détente in the Southern African context. Each party is trying to achieve advantages for its own interest and recognises that the other’s willingness to sustain a more peaceful state of affairs will depend largely on its success in securing domestic and foreign policy objectives.
Thus, despite firmly-implanted political and racial cleavages in Southern Africa, a network of labour, trade, currency and transportation links join the subcontinent. Most of the states in the region do not have access to the sea, which consequently accentuates the elements of interdependence and dependence. In this fluidity, and because of the fact that the various relevant issues may move on divergent but interconnected levels, détente demands a more sophisticated and better-informed foreign policy decision-making process.14
14 D. Venter: South Africa and Black Africa: some problem areas and prospects for rapprochement, pp. 12-14.
21 2.3 Motivations for the détente policy Talking about South Africa’s policy of détente necessitates looking at South Africa’s foreign policy. It is accepted that the broad goals of a state’s foreign policy are usually taken to include the state’s survival; the preservation and promotion of particular values; wealth maximisation; and the ability to influence other states.
In fact, James Barber writes in South Africa’s foreign policy: 1945-1970 (1973) that these goals cannot be clearly separated and sometimes act counter to each other, but that they provide a useful basis for drawing together some general conclusions about South Africa’s foreign policy. In doing this, the close relationship between domestic and external policies is re-emphasised. In seeking to understand any state’s foreign policy, it is impossible to divorce external affairs from their domestic base. The question is not whether internal affairs are to be examined, but rather how much attention is to be paid to them, what sectors are to be considered and to what depth.
In South Africa’s case, the relationship between internal and external affairs was strong and obvious, both in terms of the external response to international development and the influence of the domestic situation on the attitudes and perception of the policymakers. Domestic and foreign policies overlapped continuously; therefore much of South Africa’s foreign policy was a product of, or a response to, international affairs.15
A feature of South Africa’s political development was the distinction drawn by the government between the Nation (seen as a group of people sharing common values, characteristics and loyalties, and having a sense of identity) and the State (seen as the geographical area over which the government claims sovereignty). The distinction existed, at least implicitly, under the United Party government, for Smuts was committed to retaining control of the state in white South African hands, while creating a sense of white South African nationalism based on reconciliation between Boer and Briton and loyalty to the crown.
The United Party’s policy towards non-whites was imprecise; it could be argued that the question of extending the concept of South African nationalism to include the non-whites was left open,
15 J.P. Barber: South Africa’s foreign policy: 1945-1970, p. 3.
22 but, at best, this was a remote possibility. In practice, both the United Party and the National Party were committed to ensuring the survival of a white-controlled state.16 Therefore, the state that was to be defended was ruled exclusively by white men, and the values that were preserved and promoted were those of the white society (or sometimes a particular group within the white society). Among these values, those which proclaimed the right of the white man to exclusive control of the state created strong hostility inside and outside South Africa.
It was this situation inside South Africa that created the main external dangers for the government. Throughout the post-war period, strong international criticism and hostility were directed at the government’s racial policies. There was broad international consensus according to which the claims of the South African government were rejected; consequently, South Africa became increasingly isolated.17 It is in this political climate that South Africa decided to set up its détente policy with the goal of breaking its isolation.
Agrippah T Mugomba, in Kenya Historical Review, The Rise and the Fall of “Pax Suid-Africa”: A historical analysis of South Africa’s Black African Foreign Policy (1975), reveals that there was little criticism of South Africa by the international community over the policy of apartheid in the early 1950s, primarily because most African states were still colonies, and secondly because it was still not quite clear what the consequences and implications of the policy of apartheid would be. It is also important to realise that South Africa itself was more concerned with combating what it styled the “Communist naval threat” and also the “threat” of Asian (Indian) nationalism at the time. This was clearly demonstrated by feverish efforts to establish defence ties with the European colonial powers, particularly Britain, with which it had long maintained tangible and sentimental ties.18
The conclusion of the Simonstown Agreement of June 1955 was the culmination of this canvassing activity. Realising, and alarmed by, the imminent departure of the colonial powers, South Africa had almost desperately attempted to reverse the trend of history by literally cajoling
16 J.P. Barber: South Africa’s foreign policy: 1945-1970, p. 302. 17Ibid., p. 304. 18 A. T. Mugomba: The Rise and the Fall of “Pax Suid-Afrika”: A historical analysis of South Africa’s Black African Foreign Policy, p. 127.
23 its European allies into subscribing to the idea of establishing an African Defence Charter, which it had been peddling from one European capital to the next for several years. This charter was aimed at ensuring the collective defence of Africa and guiding its peoples along the path to European civilisation. The South African government’s complaint was that the European colonial powers were hastening their exodus and leaving the continent exposed to both Communist and Asian infiltration. The real motive behind all this diplomatic activity, however, was to guarantee South African’s own protection through a continuation, and even greater entrenchment, of Europe’s presence in Africa.
It had become evident that the colonial powers were definitely on the way out and that there was no way that the process could be reversed. This situation made it necessary for South Africa to attempt to reconcile itself with this inevitable historical development and proceed to make friends with the emerging independent states. The change in attitude was reflected in a kind of optimism that was characterised by talk of peaceful coexistence on the continent and the possibility of establishing economic ties and even diplomatic relations with the new nationalist governments. It was this pioneer spirit that guided the establishment of the policy of détente in South Africa.
The 1960s were problematic with regard to South Africa’s efforts to gain recognition and acceptance of its apartheid policy on the continent and abroad. A number of domestic and external factors influenced the temporary retreat and abandonment of the northward trek. The sad events at Sharpeville in March 1960, in which many people were killed, is a graphic illustration of the problematic situation in which South Africa found itself during 1960s.19 Sharpeville evoked an international outcry, and the extreme indignation of the world community contributed to South Africa’s isolation. Even its major Western friends and allies deserted it (at least temporarily) in shock and disbelief.
A second major factor was the extremely hostile attitude adopted by the newly independent African states, dramatised by the active diplomatic moves they initiated at the United Nations
19 A. T. Mugomba: The Rise and the Fall of “Pax Suid-Afrika”: A historical analysis of South Africa’s Black African Foreign Policy, p. 128.
24 and in other councils of international organisations to isolate South Africa even more (for example, by having it expelled from membership of various agencies) and to try to institute economic sanctions against the country as a possible lever for forcing either a complete abandonment or a fundamental revision of the policy of apartheid. Yet another blow was the imposition of an arms embargo by the United Nations Security Council in August 1963 (reinforced in December of that year). All these factors served to isolate South Africa.
South Africa reacted to the crisis through the rapid development of a psychological wall of resistance, which in practice meant that the regime never really bothered to defend and explain its domestic racial policy, but simply turned a deaf ear to practically all international criticism, however constructive it might be. The country then adopted an insurance type of defence policy of massive armament and set up a local munitions industry, as the traditional bogey of the “communist threat” of invasion by a sea-borne force was replaced by a potentially much more real threat of a landward attack by African states. Finally, South Africa initiated brute suppression of all internal opposition, which was carried out systematically on the orders of BJ Vorster, then Minister of Justice, Police and Prisons.20
Because of the fact that independent African states were extremely hostile towards South Africa due to it apartheid policy, it became urgent for South Africa to safeguard itself against guerrilla attacks or war from anywhere. This reaction was based on the legitimate natural right of anyone or any country to protect oneself or itself against violence or threatened violence with whatever force or means are necessary.
For the first half of the 1960s, South Africa maintained its attitude of doing nothing to counter the criticism levelled against it from all quarters of the globe. In the second half of the decade, however, it became obvious that a new effort was being made to counter this isolation.21 The programme carried out under Vorster’s leadership had been started by his assassinated predecessor, Dr Hendrik Verwoerd, and his Foreign Minister Dr Hilgard Muller. Vorster’s personalised enlightened policy was therefore not a novel approach as such. South Africa first
20 A. T. Mugomba: The Rise and the Fall of “Pax Suid-Afrika”: A historical analysis of South Africa’s Black African Foreign Policy, p. 129. 21 Ibid.
25 formulated a policy of promoting détente with black African states in the late 1960s, known as the outward-looking policy and dialogue policy. In the 1970s, it also came to be called the policy of dialogue. Finally, during the Rhodesian peace initiatives of 1974 to 1975, South Africa’s policy of rapprochement and peaceful coexistence became evident and was known as the policy of détente.22
In fact, Vorster inherited Verwoerd’s legacy of a South Africa that was an outcast on the African continent and which was steadily attaining pariah status within the international community. The government’s attempts during Vorster’s premiership to extricate itself from this isolated position are succinctly summarised by the term outward-looking policy, which originated in a contribution to the magazine News/Check, edited by Otto Krause, a prominent and somewhat controversial Afrikaans journalist with political views that were certainly well ahead of those of any other publication with pro-government sympathies. With the magazine’s primary focus on Africa, an article in the September 1965 issue was entitled “The Choice before South Africa: Look Inwards or Look Outwards”, and the term subsequently entered the South African vocabulary. While Verwoerd was somewhat taken aback by the sudden developments on the African continent, only reacting towards the end of his premiership, Vorster’s position was different in that his foreign policy was based on a deeper appreciation of the new situation in which South Africa found itself. This did not, however, result in a consistent strategy, as we shall see below.23
The basis for Pretoria’s policy of détente was its regained mood of confidence in the political, economic and military spheres. First, the ruling National Party had strengthened its position during the elections in both 1965 and 1966. Second, right-wing splinter groups were defeated, despite their criticism of the NP’s policy to grant sectors of the black population a degree of self- autonomy in the form of “homelands”, an aspect of apartheid ideology; the chances of a right- wing backlash on Pretoria as a result of establishing open relations with black African states further north were therefore reduced. Third, in July 1966, the International Court of Justice found that Ethiopia and Liberia did not have the power to challenge South Africa’s occupation of
22 E. Normandy: South Africa’s Policy of Détente: A Bibliographic Essay, pp. 289-305. 23 R. Pfister: Apartheid South Africa’s Foreign Relations with African States, 1961-1994, p. 89.
26 SWA/Namibia. Although the decision was not in favour of Pretoria, it removed a serious problem that had occupied the work of the foreign affairs ministry for six years. Finally, South Africa was experiencing an economic boom and the country’s defence capacity was steadily strengthened.24
The above-mentioned suggest that the policy of détente resulted in the establishment of closer contact with both Latin America and Australasia, but the current dissertation supports the secondary literature in agreeing that its principal aim was to bring about a modus vivendi with independent African states, whose endeavours had mainly been responsible for South Africa’s isolation. In a speech in August 1967, Minister of Foreign Affairs Hilgard Muller expressed Pretoria’s willingness to pursue a policy of friendly coexistence and fruitful cooperation with countries in Africa: South Africa is in a unique position to make a real contribution to the development of the continent. We are in a position to help other countries in Africa with their problems in the scientific, technological, economic and numerous other spheres, because down the centuries we have learnt to solve these problems. We are prepared to share our knowledge with the African states, and they are free to consult us and cooperate with us.25
According to James Barber in South Africa’s Foreign policy: 1945-1970 (1973), this statement is reminiscent of the failed attempt of the Department of Foreign Affairs to win the allegiance of African states by providing assistance to them in the early 1960s, through organisations such as the Inter-African Bureau of Soil Conservation and Land Utilisation, the Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa, the Scientific Council for Africa and the Foundation for Mutual Assistance in Africa. The Foreign Service officers continued to believe that technical assistance was the key to breaking South Africa’s isolation. Furthermore, South Africa’s objective was to develop its policy of détente on the sub-continent by building up contacts and friendship throughout Africa. This helps to explain the particular frustration that was felt on account of the obduracy of Zambia’s President Kaunda. In fact, Kaunda was not prepared to respond overtly to
24 R. Pfister: Apartheid South Africa’s Foreign Relations with African States, 1961-1994, pp. 89-90. 25 Ibid., p. 90.
27 South Africa’s offers of friendship, because he realised the limitations placed on his country by her geographical and economic circumstances. The possibility of discussion between the two governments was therefore mentioned in an exchange of confidential letters with Vorster. In 1971, Vorster revealed this correspondence, with the purpose of exposing President Kaunda of Zambia as a double-talker. He challenged him to honour his promise of talks, and coupled this with a general invitation to any African leader to have discussions on an equal footing.
However, the Zambian Government denied that Kaunda had ever suggested talks, and said the proposal had come from South Africa. In revealing the correspondence, Vorster may have hoped to discredit a leading critic of the Republic. If Kaunda lost office, his replacement might prove less hostile towards South Africa and Zambia might be prepared to take her natural place in the Southern African group of states.26 The revelations by Vorster about his long-standing secret correspondence with Kaunda seem to have been a political and diplomatic gaffe. Its effect seemed the opposite to what he had clearly intended: the embarrassment, even the downfall, of Kaunda, who had been in the forefront of the majority of OAU opposition to unconditional dialogue with South Africa. Embarrass Kaunda it did. But the effect was temporary and mild. The revelations were unlikely to cause his downfall, for claims by white Southern Africans were in any case treated in Zambia as being aimed at deliberately fostering discord with the objective of proving that black leaders in general, and Kaunda in particular, could not manage their own affairs like the civilised whites.
But the most important aspect of the affair was that it clearly demonstrated ignorance of fundamental facts of Zambian political life on the part of the South African Prime Minister. It showed, for example, ignorance of the fact that politicians, officials and journalists in Zambia knew about the traffic in both words and envoys between Zambia, South Africa and Rhodesia, almost since it began shortly after Zambia’s independence in 1964. The quiet exchange without benefit of publicity had been an understood part of Zambian diplomacy from the onset. At the same time, it was accepted that each state would publicly maintain its self-allotted stance on the Southern African racial and political issue.27
26 J.P. Barber: South Africa’s Foreign policy 1945-1970, p. 268. 27 African Confidential, May 1971, p. 4, and Jeune Afrique, 11 May 1971, pp. 28-29.
28 Anyone who talked to Kaunda or read his major speeches during that time knew that it was far from his wish that the Southern African struggle should escalate further, for he saw the dangers of such a situation to his own country and people only too clearly. The South African attitude in the affair also showed ignorance of both the spirit and letter of the Lusaka Manifesto, beyond which the content of the Kaunda-Vorster exchanges had not gone and on which Kaunda, in concert with President Nyerere of Tanzania, whom he had consulted on all major matters of foreign policy, had based his decision to undertake the dialogue.
All this can only mean that Vorster had nothing like the political acumen and shrewdness for which he was often giving credit in Africa. It also seems to show that his intelligence and security services, which the Zambians in particular had grown to fear greatly, were by no means infallible. Diplomatically, Vorster’s decision to make public the private correspondence he had been conducting with Kaunda must have had the effect of making other African leaders very wary of contact with him in the future. But it seems that Ivory Coast President Felix Houphouet- Boigny did not see things that way. Another possible reason for the disclosure could have been to encourage those black states that believed that it was better to talk than to fight with South Africa. If it could be shown that Kaunda had established personal dialogue with South Africa, it would encourage others to follow this example.
The controversial issue of establishing a peaceful dialogue with South Africa came into the open on 6 November 1970, when President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast declared: “We will not achieve the solution to the problem of apartheid in South Africa by resorting to force of arms. We must open talks with this country.”28 President Houphouet-Boigny added that his country wanted to engage in an official dialogue with South Africa, but this did not mean that he was going to recognise South Africa. He said that the Ivory Coast would lead this initiative by first visiting all African Presidents of independent black states with the purpose of organising an African summit at which the Ivory Coast would explain its position and give its reasons for its views on peaceful dialogue with South Africa.29
28 African Journal, 2 July 1971, p. 14. 29 American-African Affairs Association, December 1970, p.1.
29 Some dialogue already existed between the Republic and the small states of Southern Africa, but it was Houphouet-Boigny’s declaration that sparked off the major controversy. The behaviour of the Southern African states could be explained in terms of their dependence on the Republic. There was no such explanation for the Ivory Coast, which also announced its proposal to call an African summit about dialogue with South Africa. Pretoria took the point immediately. Prime Minister Vorster, in reacting to the Ivorian offer of dialogue, made a statement on March 1971. The purpose of this statement was to point out the official position of his country about the official offer from the Ivory Coast. In this statement, he mentioned that South Africa was ready to start a dialogue with all African countries that needed it, but on condition that the principle of non-involvement in South Africa’s internal affairs would be respected.30
In addition, Vorster said that South Africa was glad that this idea had been voiced. South Africa therefore, in the framework of a policy of détente, was going to establish good relationships with all nations without distinction of race or colour. The Ivorian President was praised by Vorster as an extremely brilliant man, and an intelligent and clever politician. Because of this, what he would say at a press conference on 28 April 1971 would hold great interest for South Africa.31
However, it seemed clear that the summit proposed by Houphouet-Boigny, which was supposed to bring together African countries in favour of dialogue, such as Gabon, Malagasy, Malawi and others, would be seen by South African leaders as opposition to the OAU crusade led by Kaunda against arms sales to South Africa.32 The old unanimously hostile attitude toward South Africa had been broken publicly. New opportunities were opening up to extend the policy of détente.33 But the position of the President of the Ivory Coast received more hostility than approbation.
President Houphouet-Boigny’s offer to South Africa of dialogue brought about serious consequences for the African community, and especially for the Zambian government. While Pretoria and the so-called dialogue club, including Gabon, supported the idea of dialogue, it naturally was rejected by Mali, Nigeria and Conakry Guinea. All these counties had regarded this
30 Agence France Presse, 19 May 1971, p. 7. 31 Le Monde, 20 March 1971, p. 7, and Fraternité Matin, 23 April 1971, p. 4. 32 Le Monde, 6 November 1970, p. 7. 33 African Journal, 2 July 1971, p. 14.
30 proposition as unacceptable, ridiculous and tragic for black African people. The racist policy in South Africa, in fact, was more dangerous than communism for the Zambian government. Moscow and Beijing were far away from Africa, while pressure from South Africa was more constant and current. Therefore, the Ivory Coast support for South Africa would be regarded as treason against the solidarity of black states by Zambia.34 These reactions made Houphouet- Boigny decide to bring the matter to the OAU, seeing that he was not understood. How the African community within the OAU reacted to the Ivorian President’s proposal, knowing that it went against the OAU position will be discussed in Chapter 3.
2.4 Promotion of the détente policy In pursuing the promotion of his policy towards Africa, Vorster initially followed in Verwoerd’s footsteps by meeting with Lesotho’s Prime Minister, Leabua Jonathan, on 10 January 1967. Given Lesotho’s geographical position as a mountainous and landlocked country, with an almost complete dependence on its all-surrounding neighbour, it was easy for Vorster to find Jonathan willing to interact with Pretoria, despite its apartheid policies. It is thus not surprising that the final communiqué after their meeting emphasised the importance of Pretoria’s economic assistance to Lesotho, one of its key levers at the time.
The Department of Foreign Affairs, equally, utilised South Africa’s economic strength and the country’s advanced technical standards for impressing the black African countries further north. This was applied through the provision of technical assistance and the expertise and finance for development/investment projects, in the context of which states and private companies played a central role.35 It becomes clear here that the economic component and related ambitions were important in the DFA’s activities for its African policy. Thus, in the absence of formal diplomatic relations, South Africa has nevertheless played a monumental role in respect of assistance to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. The wide range of cooperation between South Africa and these three countries was maintained, consolidated and expanded in the period of close on a decade since the latter attained sovereign status; and as far as Botswana, Lesotho and
34 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ Ivory Coast/1960s: Telegram No 75 from French Embassy of Zambia, March 1969, and Le Monde, 6 November 1970, p. 7. 35 R. Pfister: Apartheid South Africa’s Foreign Relations with African States, 1961-1994, pp. 91-92.
31 Swaziland provided the first test of South Africa’s declared objective friendship and meaningful cooperation with independent black African states, no objective observer could fail the Vorster Government on its record on this score.36
According to FR Metrowich (1975) in Towards dialogue and détente, the first country not bordering on South Africa to support contact with South Africa in public was Malawi. In February 1967, three Malawian cabinet ministers (Messrs JT Kumbweza, GW Kumtumanji and Aleke Banda) paid an official visit to the Republic during which they finalised a trade agreement with Pretoria to replace that which was concluded between South Africa and the defunct Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1960. Seven months later, on September 10, it was announced that South Africa and Malawi would establish diplomatic relations and that the two countries already had trade relations.
South African/Malawian relations have remained cordial ever since. In addition to South Africa granting Malawi a loan of R4,6 million towards the construction of the new Malawian capital at Lilongwe, Vorster paid an official visit to Malawi in May 1970. President Banda visited South Africa in August 1971 (the first black African head of state to pay a state visit to the Republic), and the State President of South Africa, JJ Fouché, paid a state visit to Malawi in March 1972. During his visit, President Fouché appealed for peaceful coexistence between African states so that they could join forces to combat the real enemies of Africa, namely poverty, ignorance and disease.37 A second Southern African country not amongst the Republic’s immediate neighbours initiated tentative contacts with South Africa in 1967 when an air agreement was concluded between the governments of Madagascar and South Africa, providing for the introduction of air services between the two countries. Three years later, in November 1970, Dr Muller visited Madagascar at the head of a South African delegation and signed an agreement for South African government participation in the development of the island’s tourist potential.
A Malagasy government delegation visited South Africa in August 1971 to discuss an extension of cooperation between South Africa and Madagascar, more specifically concerned with possible
36 Jeune Afrique, 10-18 December 1969, p. 34, and P. Giniewski: Le dialogue s’amorce entre Pretoria et l’Afrique du Sud, pp. 6-7. 37 F.R. Metrowich: Towards dialogue and détente, pp. 6-7.
32 South African participation in the construction of a R42 million dry docks and harbour at Narinda on the east coast of Madagascar. Formal agreements between South Africa and Madagascar were aborted in 1972 after the ousting of the pro-dialogue President, Philibert Tsiranana, and the installation of a leftist military regime led by General Gabriel Ramanantsoa. Meanwhile, Mauritius, which became independent in March 1968, has always had close links with South Africa dating back to before its independence.38 Nevertheless, in assessing the progress of the policy of détente, it is clear that the DFA’s initiatives in Africa only produced one tangible result, namely the establishment of diplomatic relations with Malawi. Yet, given Malawi’s economic dependence on South Africa and its relative insignificance in continental matters, it was only a relative success.
2.5 Difficulties of the détente policy Sam C Nolutshungu, in South Africa in Africa: Study in ideology and foreign policy (1975), makes it clear that, in spite of the setbacks experienced over Rhodesia, the years 1967 to 1968 did not see a “de-radicalisation” of the feeling of African states towards South Africa. Guerrilla activity in Mozambique was at its height, and armed conflict began in Rhodesia in 1967. South Africa’s participation in Portuguese and Rhodesian counter-insurgency activity merely served to increase hostility to South Africa at this time, although later on this form of white cooperation might have emphasised the weakness of African states and the vulnerability of states bordering on the “white redoubt”.39 In fact, South African involvement in Angola in 1976 contributed to the destruction of the policy of détente. This intervention confirmed black Africa’s scepticism about détente, and jeopardised its future promise. In addition, the United States involvement in the Rhodesian negotiations damaged South Africa’s independent and influential role in the region. The developments made it even more impossible for South Africa to keep foreign and domestic policy apart, thereby thwarting one of the primary aims of the outward policy.40
Economic aspects also contributed to the failure of détente. According to Timothy Shaw (1976) in International Organizations and the Politics of Southern Africa, détente appeared as South
38 F.R. Metrowich: Towards dialogue and détente, p. 7. 39 S. C. Nolutshungu: South Africa in Africa: Study in ideology and foreign policy, p. 263. 40 African Journal, 1971, pp. 298-299.
33 Africa’s attempt to achieve regional power without the redistribution of resources. Acceptance of détente by black states in Southern Africa would mean increased dependence on South Africa. Needless to say, South Africa’s offer of trade and aid appeared to many African states as a price South Africa was willing to pay to Africa for its political neutrality toward the Republic’s internal policies.
In other words, détente endangered the economies of African states, and partaking of the economic benefits of détente limited the foreign policy options of black African states. Due to the disparity in economic and military power between black African states and South Africa, African states risked not only the economic but the political hegemony of South Africa. Therefore, complete economic disengagement from South Africa was the only policy that was in the interest of African states.
For most African states, the normalisation of relations with South Africa and the development of economic and diplomatic relations therefore were not more important than decolonisation and apartheid issues. At one level, détente simply was a response to a new regional crisis and, at another level, it was a temporary alternative to the policy of political isolation and confrontation, to be judged by its success in achieving the same goals. This will become much clearer when we examine the major policy statements of the Organisation of African Unity in detail in Chapter 3. What the statements reveal, among others, is the identification of apartheid with the issues of anti-colonialism, and the key role it played in the relations between South Africa and the other African states.
2.6 Conclusion To sum up this chapter, it is possible to list several motives, without engaging in extensive analysis, that have been identified as being at the heart of South Africa’s attempts to reach an understanding with independent Africa. A principal claim has been that South Africa wanted to obtain a so-called “certificate of respectability or tacit approval” of the apartheid policy, the kind of acceptance that would enhance its closer cooperation with Western powers in the military and diplomatic spheres.
34 Related to this, says Agrippah T. Mugomba (1975) in Kenya Historical Review, The Rise and the Fall of “Pax Suid-Africa”: A historical analysis of South Africa’s Black African Foreign Policy, was the desire to become the dominant regional power in sub-Saharan Africa, in that South Africa would very much have liked to materialise the concept of a “Pax Suid-Afrika” or the “South Africanisation” of the continent, modelled on the pattern of America’s preponderance in the Americas. In this context, it was argued that, if Africa were to capitulate and acknowledge a position of subordination, the major Western powers would also recognise these roles and formally accept South Africa as an indispensable ally in their security system.
Other motives were that South Africa would dearly have liked to undermine and ultimately destroy the national liberation movements operating in the sub-region by splitting the OAU and rendering the organisation incapable of effectively supporting and sanctioning their activities. In fact, the Pretoria regime visualised immense economic benefits accruing to it if it could manage to exploit the riches of the other African states and also create a vast market for its exports, thereby reducing its dependence on the European market in particular. Finally, it was envisaged that dialogue would have a domestic feedback function, in the sense that the South African government would find itself in a position to offer its electorate both the illusion and substance of power and security by demonstrating that most of Africa could quite easily be made to dance to a tune played in Pretoria.
This is not, of course, to deny the fact that the process of decolonisation that was already taking place in Africa made it imperative for South Africa to attempt to reach accommodation with the emerging African states, whose friendship had to be cultivated rather than taken far granted. This policy of détente was focused on these objectives in order to prevent or contain South Africa’s further isolation and to persuade the majority of OAU member states, principally the sub- Saharan ones, to appreciate and accept its position of dominance and behave towards it accordingly. Thus, Vorster appealed to Africa to choose the path of peace rather than confrontation.41 It is in this political atmosphere that the Ivory Coast, followed by Gabon, replied positively to the offer from Pretoria.
41 A. T. Mugomba: The Rise and the Fall of “Pax Suid-Afrika”: A historical analysis of South Africa’s Black African Foreign Policy, pp. 127-130.
35 But we can say that this policy failed when South Africa became involved in the Angolan war in 1976. This contributed to the destruction of the policy of détente and confirmed the scepticism of black Africa and the OAU. Consequently, there was disagreement among the African states over dialogue with South Africa and the implications of the vote against dialogue in the OAU for the success of détente. However, what is of greater analytical interest here is to know how the African states responded to the South African challenge. This is what will be discussed in the next chapter.
36 CHAPTER THREE: AMBIVALENCE WITHIN THE OAU
3.1 Introduction One should need no reminding that the OAU was founded at a time when African leaders were experiencing their first taste of independence and were anxious to consolidate their leadership. Across the continent, they saw the danger posed by divisions of language, culture and religion, by economic inequalities, and by controversies over boundaries arbitrarily drawn by the colonial powers. It quickly became clear that a high degree of cooperation was necessary among the fledgling African states if the continent was to survive as a viable economic and political entity. The OAU was established to achieve this cooperation.1
Understandably, there were considerable differences of opinion on how African unity could best be attained. The signatories to the Charter were sharply divided into three rival blocks, notably the Casablanca group2, the Monrovia group3, and the Brazzaville Twelve4. There were several reasons for this division. One of them was the disagreement of the Casablanca group with the United Nations policy in the Congo (Zaire), a policy supported by the Monrovia group as well as the Brazzaville Twelve. Another reason was the support of the Casablanca group for the Algerian independence struggle and their recognition of the Algerian Provisional Government, which was accorded full membership of the group. This was strongly opposed by the Brazzaville Twelve, who, because of their close links with France, regarded the Algerian conflict as a problem to be solved by France alone.
The relationship between the Casablanca group and the Monrovia and Brazzaville groups was further aggravated by the support that the Casablanca group gave to Morocco, contesting the
1 Z. Cervenka: The unfinished quest for unity: Africa and the OAU, p. ix. 2 The African Charter signed at Casablanca by Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and United Arab Republic came into force on January 1961. 3 The Monrovia group derived its name from the Conference held in Monrovia, May 8-12, 1961, attended by the following African States: Liberia, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Senegal, Madagascar Republic, Togo, Dahomey, Chad, Niger, Upper Volta, Congo Brazzaville, Central African Republic, Gabon, Ethiopia and Libya later known as signatories of Lagos Charter (Dec. 20, 1962). 4 The Brazzaville Twelve were the signatories of the Brazzaville Declaration adopted on December 19, 1960, by the conference attended by: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo Brazzaville, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Gabon, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Madagascar, Niger, Senegal and Chad.
37 legitimacy of the independent existence of Mauritania, a member of the Monrovia group. On the issue of African unity, the Casablanca group was convinced that political unity was a prerequisite for the subsequent integration of African economies, while the Monrovia and Brazzaville groups maintained that African unity should be approached through economic cooperation only.5
However, there was a similarity in the fundamental aims of the three groups, particularly those concerning decolonisation, racial discrimination, maintenance of world peace and the urgent need for economic cooperation between African states, which is apparent in the instrument establishing the respective organisations. Thus, despite the divisions, there was a sustained desire to unite all the independent African states and each of the three groups made the greatest effort to end their differences. Therefore, all OAU members agreed on the fact that no OAU decision would conflict with their interests. The racial stand on decolonisation and apartheid issues adopted by all OAU members became one of the biggest challenges that the OAU had to overcome. They succeeded, for example, in turning the OAU liberation committee, an ad hoc organ, into the organisation’s most important institution second only to the Assembly of Heads of States and Government.6
Early on, the organisation found itself facing many conflicts that arose in Africa, such as the Nigerian Civil War of 1967 to 1970. The most important of these conflicts was the issue of South Africa, because South Africa’s apartheid policy dominated foreign African relations during the 1970s. In fact, nothing had divided Africa more deeply than the debate on the South African issue. The fundamental problem was whether African leaders should have accepted South Africa’s policy of détente based on the normalisation of friendly relations with all African states. By the end of 1971, no one was able to predict with real confidence the likely outcome of effort to commence a dialogue with South Africa that was initiated by Ivory Coast.
The purpose of this chapter is to find out why the question of dialogue between South Africa and the rest of Africa produced deep divisions within the OAU. For this, we have found it necessary
5 Z. Cervenka: The unfinished quest for unity, Africa and the OAU, p. 1. 6 Ibid., p. ix.
38 to look back to the establishment of the OAU with the goal to understand its basic principles. The chapter then examines OAU policy towards South Africa and the history of the dialogue within the OAU.
3.2 Establishment of the OAU 3.2.1 The Addis Ababa Summit Conference In 1963, African leaders from thirty-one7 African states met in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, to establish the Organisation of African Unity as an instrument that they hoped would lay the foundations for continental unity. This instrument was necessary particularly for the development of the economic and political unity that was essential if Africa were to prosper.
The Summit Conference of Heads of States and Governments held at Addis Ababa in May 1963 was opened by the Ethiopian Emperor, Haile Selassie on 23 May 1963 at Addis Ababa Hall by welcoming the delegations and describing the task of the conference by saying “What we still lack, despite the efforts of the past years, is the mechanism which will enable us to speak with one voice when we wish to do so and to take important decisions on African problems when we are so minded… … What we require is a single African Organization through which Africa’s single voice may be heard and within which Africa’s problems may be studied and resolved. We need an organization which will facilitate acceptable solutions to disputes among Africans and promote the study and adoption of measures in the economic and social fields. … Let us, at this conference, create a single institution to which we will all belong, based on principles to which we all subscribe, confident that in its councils our voices will carry their proper weight, secure in the knowledge that the decisions there will be dictated by Africans and only by Africans and that they will take full account of all Africa’s vital considerations…”8
7 Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Congo Leopoldville, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Toga, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta. 8 Z. Cervenka: The Organization of African Unity and its Charter, pp. 1-13, and C.O.C. Amate: Inside the OAU, Pan-Africanism in Practice, pp. 34-51.
39 The goal of the Emperor’s speech was to produce constructive paths, and this objective was achieved. The debate at the Summit was dominated by two main points: African unity and the decolonisation of Africa. In order to determine the priorities of the OAU, President Ben Bella of Algeria told the audience that, in his view, the first priority was unconditional support to the people who were still under colonial domination, such as the people of South Africa. The Algerian President concluded his intervention by calling other leaders “to die so that the peoples still under colonial domination may be free and African Unity may not be a vain word.”9
Most of those who were present agreed with President Ben Bella’s point of view. As a matter of fact, Prime Minister Milton Obote of Uganda offered his country as a training ground for African troops to be used to overthrow white governments in Africa. President Sekou Toure of Guinea asked for a date to be fixed after which, if colonialism were not ended, the African states should expel the colonial powers. President Senghor of Senegal called for an effective boycott of Portugal and South Africa in all spheres of both political and economic life. Most emphatic was the response of President Nyerere of Tanzania, who called for immediate action.10
Such was the impact of Ben Bella’s speech on the delegates that the proposed Charter was interpreted as a common weapon for the liberation of Africa. However, this impact could be divided into two groups. The first concerned those who were for immediate action, which means for war; the second represented those who were for peaceful solutions, such as the use of boycotts. Of course, these divergent points of view did not affect African unity at this time. All delegates were unanimously convinced of the imperious and urgent necessity to coordinate their efforts in order to accelerate the unconditional attainment of national independence of all African territories still under foreign domination.
9 Z. Cervenka: The Organization of African Unity and its Charter, pp. 1-13, and C.O.C. Amate: Inside the OAU, Pan-Africanism in Practice, pp. 34-51. 10 Ibid.
40 3.2.2 The OAU Charter Originally, thirty-two States11 signed the Charter of the OAU. All continental independent African states, including Madagascar and other island states surrounding Africa were eligible for membership. The charter consisted of a preamble, an operative section of thirty-two articles and a protocol. The preamble starts with an assertion of the general objectives and beliefs of the OAU. The most significant tenets were the commitment of the OAU to the inalienable right of all people to self-determination and to freedom, equality, justice and dignity; the need for greater understanding among their people and cooperation among their respective states; the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security, based on the UN charter; the defence of their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence; the eradication of all forms of colonialism in Africa; and non-interference in the internal affairs of states.12
Member states agreed to refrain from initiating or engaging in any type of action that could lead to undermining or abrogating the commitments contained in the Charter. It was also agreed that any action to be taken by member states with regard to the solution of the problems of colonialism, racial discrimination and apartheid in Africa had to be undertaken within the framework of the OAU and in full consultation with the liberation movements of the territories concerned. To achieve these aims, member states agreed to coordinate and harmonise their general policies in the fields of political and diplomatic cooperation; economic cooperation, including transport and communication; health, sanitation and nutritional cooperation; scientific and technical cooperation; and cooperation for defence and security.13
3.3 The OAU’s diplomatic offensive against South Africa One should need no reminding that the Organisation of African Unity was a league of post- colonial countries, the African expression of the world revolution to which reference was made earlier. Therefore, the OAU received its authority to support the struggle for the liberation of
11 Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Congo Leopoldville, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Toga, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta. 12 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ OAU/1960s: The OAU Charter. 13 Ibid.
41 Southern Africa from its charter. This charter called on all it signatories to eradicate all forms of colonialism in Africa. Its sixth principle enjoined all members to absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories that were still dependent.
As a matter of fact, the OAU realised how heavy its task was, because South Africa was dealing with the Western powers. Western Germany, the UK and France were selling arms to South Africa, as well as being South Africa’s main trading partners and principal investors in South African business. At the 1964 OAU summit in Cairo, the member states firmly condemned the encouragement that Western powers were giving to apartheid by maintaining commercial relations with South Africa. The Cairo Summit repeated the call for a boycott of South African goods and asked the major trading partners of South Africa to cooperate.14 But, unfortunately, at the same time, many African countries themselves were still trading with South Africa.
By 1966, the OAU had begun to shift its tactics. It became obvious that the Western powers would not be part of the machinery for the ending of apartheid or the liberation of any of the territories in Southern Africa. In the 1960s, the OAU was fully convinced that the success of its diplomatic campaign against South Africa ultimately depended on the attitude of the Western powers, which were the chief architects of colonialism in Africa. The OAU understood that the expression of sympathy and moral support, though valuable, was no longer sufficient for alleviating its problems unless they were supported by measures at governmental level. Only a decision by the governments of Western Germany, Great Britain and France could lead to the cessation of the supply of arms to South Africa. In addition, the OAU realised that the United Nations would be an excellent platform from which to appeal to the international conscience about South Africa’s racial policy. Therefore, the United Nations tribune became one of the OAU’s instruments for persuading the international community to isolate South Africa.
At the 1970 OAU summit in Addis Ababa, the member states showed their anger by unreservedly condemning Great Britain, the United States, France, West Germany and Japan for their political and military collaboration with South Africa, despite the appeal from the OAU to isolate South Africa. The Summit also condemned West Germany, France, Great Britain and
14 Jeune Afrique, 1970, pp. 24-25.
42 other Western powers for selling military equipment and arms and assisting South Africa in the production of munitions and poisonous gas.15
The same year, the OAU sent an official delegation to visit European capitals. The purpose was to discuss the supply of arms to South Africa. The delegation appointed by the OAU Assembly of Heads of States and Government in Addis Ababa in September 1970, led by President Kaunda of Zambia and comprising Diallo Telli, the OAU Secretary General, and the Foreign Affairs Ministers of Algeria, Cameroon, Kenya, Mali and Zambia, visited European capitals from 15 to 21 October 1970. In Paris, President Kaunda and his delegation held talks with President Pompidou on 21 October 1970, when a reduction in future French arms supplies to South Africa was officially announced. It was stated that France would send no further arms to South Africa and other countries for use against insurgent movements. Another agreement said that no new contracts would be concluded for the sale of arms, including light armoured vehicles and helicopters that were designed for national defence and could be used against insurgent movements.16
In order to shift its tactics and emphasise its diplomatic offensive against South Africa, the OAU adopted an important African initiative on apartheid, called the Lusaka Manifesto, at its 6th ordinary session of 6-10 September 1969 and, on 20 November 1969, the United Nations General Assembly also adopted the Manifesto and recommended it to the attention of all member states.17 The Lusaka Manifesto consisted of 24 articles. Its objectives were to explain Africa’s reason for united opposition to the racist policy of the government of South Africa; to outline Africa’s goals in Southern Africa (decolonisation and the elimination of racial discrimination); and to refute South African claims that its apartheid policy was an internal matter in which no state had the right to intervene.
The signatory states explained their concern about Southern Africa by arguing that “Our objectives in Southern Africa stem from our commitment to the principle of human equality. We
15 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ OAU/1970s: Telegram No 380/385 from French Embassy of Zambia, 31 August 1970. 16 Keesing’s contemporary archives, 1970, p. 24304. 17 A. Urnov: South Africa against Africa, 1966-1986, p. 81.
43 are not hostile to the administrations of these States because they are manned and controlled by white people. We are hostile to them because they are systems of minority control, which exist as a result of, and in the pursuance of, doctrines of human inequality. What we are working for is the right of self-determination for the people of those territories. We are working for a rule in those countries which was based on the will of all the people, and an acceptance of the equality of every citizen.”18
According to the Lusaka Manifesto, South Africa was an independent state. This meant that, on every legal basis, South Africa’s internal affairs were matters exclusively for the people of South Africa. In consequence, the policy of apartheid concerned only South African people. But the Manifesto suggested that the apartheid policy exceeded the limits of internal affairs and therefore concerned the international community, in the first instance the African community. In the light of this, the Manifesto asserted that “the purpose of law is people, and we assert that the actions of the South African Government are such that the rest of the world has a responsibility to take some action in defence of humanity.’19 Thus, the purpose of the Manifesto seemed to outline the African objectives concerning the South African racial issue in two mains points: first, the people in the territories still under colonial rule should be free to determine for themselves their own institutions of self-government; second, the individuals in Southern Africa should be freed from an environment poisoned by the propaganda of racialism, and be given opportunities to be men not white men, brown men, yellow men or black men.
In addition, the Lusaka Manifesto expressed the dedication of the African states to the full liberation of Southern Africa and their preference to achieve this goal without violence, by saying that, as far as possible “We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill. We do not advocate violence; we advocate an end to the violence against human dignity, which is now being perpetrated by the oppressors of Africa. If peaceful progress to emancipation were possible, or if changed circumstances were to make it possible in future, we
18 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ OAU/1960s: Lusaka Manifesto, 1969, 7th article. 19 Ibid., 20th article.
44 would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change.”20
While this section was interpreted as the abandonment of the armed struggle by the African community, the Manifesto said that, should the negotiations not be possible, the African community had to support the liberation movements. It therefore explained its support of liberation movements by saying “While peaceful progress is blocked by actions of those at present in power in the States of Southern Africa, we have no choice but to give to the peoples of those territories all the support of which we are capable in their struggle against their oppressors.”21
In analysing the Lusaka Manifesto, two divergent aspects came to the surface that makes the document appear controversial. First, the manifesto seemed to indicate a departure from the OAU policy of deliberately avoiding any direct contact with the Pretoria regime. Those who had signed the Lusaka Manifesto were eager to indicate to international opinion that they were ready for a negotiated settlement, if it was possible. This aspect provided the Manifesto with an opening of the door to dialogue with South Africa, a wish to negotiate rather than to destroy. Second, the document advocated violence by saying that the member states would support the arms struggle to liberate Africa from racial discrimination and colonialism.
The OAU may have employed all its energies to advocate peace in Africa, rather than calling for war, because Africa needed peace and all African countries needed to set up their development policies. It was stated clearly that war or violence had never been and would never be a solution to any problem. Thus, it could not be the solution for issues of apartheid and colonialism, as the principle of war is that only the more powerful has to win, while the loser must negotiate. Therefore, the wiser attitude recommends the use of all possibilities necessary to solve the problem in a diplomatic way, such as through dialogue.
20 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ OAU/1960s: Lusaka Manifesto, 1969, 12th article. 21 Ibid.
45 In addition, of course, it was to their benefit that the OAU member states eliminate all forms of colonisation and racial discrimination in Africa. But this had to be done with respect for international law, which calls for the respect of the sovereignty of all countries in the world. However, threatening to go to war against South Africa because its apartheid policy could be interpreted as a violation of international law. Although South Africa’s apartheid issue was considered an international affair, just like the United States of America’s racial segregation, it was first of all an internal affair. Therefore, in both cases, respect for international law was necessary and fundamental. But the Lusaka Manifesto appeared to be controversial because it seems not to have taken account of this aspect. This could have been one of the reasons why South Africa rejected the Lusaka Manifesto.
3.4 South Africa’s reaction South Africa’s initial reaction to the OAU diplomatic offensives was, of course, to explain that its racial policy was misunderstood. Thus, during a press conference on 16 October 1969 in New York, Dr Muller admitted that South Africa agreed with much of what was contained in the Lusaka Manifesto. There was one important obstacle, however, which was that these states wrongly believed that racial discrimination was practised in South Africa.22 Dr Muller furthermore stated that “…the Lusaka Manifesto said that a dialogue cannot start unless there is a commitment by South Africa to the principle of human dignity. According to him, this statement was based on a misconception. In South Africa there was in fact a commitment to this principle. By refusing to accept South Africa’s repeated assurances… (African states) were blocking a dialogue and were rendering the Lusaka Manifesto devoid of the humanism and good faith which is essential to make it a document of genuine intent.”23
In addition, speaking to the House of Assembly, Dr Muller pointed out the realism of the Lusaka Manifesto and said that certain aspects were encouraging. But, he stated that criticism with regard to racial discrimination was based on misunderstanding. It would take much hard work to break down the distorted image of South Africa’s racial policies that had systematically been
22 Africa Research Bulletin, October 1969, p. 1543. 23 Ibid.
46 built up overseas over the years.24 On 5 February 1971, Vorster promised that he would expose President Kaunda’s double talk. He made a long statement on South African relations with Zambia on 21 April 1971. The purpose of this statement was to protest against Zambia’s activism towards South Africa’s racial policy. The Prime Minister claimed in his statement that President Kaunda, although he was one of South Africa’s fiercest and most hostile critics, had been in secret communication with him during the previous three years and had several times indicated that he was ready for direct talks, but backed out at the last moment.25
Reacting to Vorster’s statement, the Zambian Foreign Minister said, on 22 April 1971, that there had never been any question of a meeting between Kaunda and Vorster. The accusations of double talk were an utter fabrication at a very high level. Sikota Wine, Zambian Minister of Information, Broadcasting and Tourism, presented letters and other documents covering the exchange with Vorster at a press conference in Lusaka on 23 April 1971. In an introductory statement, Sikota Wine said that “…the philosophies of Zambia and South Africa on the question of the dignity of man are so divergent that it would be impossible on Zambia’s part to imagine any possibility of a dialogue with South Africa.”26
One of the consequences of Vorster’s action in exposing secret talks with Kaunda was that other African states in favour of dialogue came to fear having discussions with South Africa. Another consequence involved the fact that Zambia had sent all official documents covering the exchange with South Africa to all OAU members to persuade them to reject dialogue with South Africa. Nevertheless, South Africa rejected the Lusaka Manifesto, arguing that the document was based on a misconception of its racial and other policies, which were regarded as being outside the jurisdiction of the United Nations and other organisations. While categorically rejecting the idea of a dialogue designed to influence its racial policy, South Africa announced that it would continue to engage in dialogue with governments that were genuinely interested in informing themselves on conditions in South Africa and on its policies.
24 Southern African Record, September 1976, p. 18. 25 Jeune Afrique, 11 May 1971, pp. 28-29, and Keesing’s contemporary archives, 1971-1972, p. 24634 26 Ibid.
47 Otherwise there was much in the Manifesto with which South Africa agreed, such as the fact that the document acknowledged South Africa as an independent sovereign state and a member of the UN. Therefore, according to international law, South African internal affairs were matters exclusively for the South Africa people, so that South Africa was probably right to have rejected the Lusaka Manifesto. On the other hand, if South Africa was really interested in multilateral exchange with the OAU, it would accept an offer to negotiate with the OAU.
But that was not the case. South Africa’s interest was direct exchange with single governments with which it was scoring successes, such as Gabon and the Ivory Coast, as we shall see in Chapter 6. Thus, after the formal rejection of the Lusaka Manifesto by South Africa, the OAU members concluded that there was no base for a meaningful dialogue and decided to revert to their policy of confrontation.27 On 6 November 1970, President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast made a proposal for dialogue with South Africa and reiterated his initiative for opening a dialogue with South Africa at a press conference in Abidjan on 28 April 1971.
3.5 The proposal of the Ivory Coast for dialogue with South Africa President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast first announced his readiness for dialogue with South Africa in November 1970. He promised to call an African Summit Conference with states who were not blinded by visionary idealism or impractical ideology into refusing to recognise the merit of discussing the future of South Africa with Vorster. President Houphouet-Boigny issued a call for an African summit conference with the purpose of exploring the possibility of opening a dialogue with South Africa through direct talks and to be sure that it was not a unilateral initiative by the Ivory Coast.
His motivation came from the conviction that force would not solve the problem of apartheid, and he considered favourably the anti-apartheid measures recently adopted by the Lusaka Manifesto of non-aligned nations. All African heads of state were contacted individually by the Ivory Coast President to explain these views. Gabon immediately backed the Ivory Coast proposal for an African summit to try to commence such a dialogue. President Bongo declared
27 B. Andemicael: The OAU and the UN: Relation between the African Unity and the United Nations, p. 143.
48 himself ready to respond favourably to the call from the Ivory Coast. Other countries, such as Upper Volta, Dahomey, Niger, Togo, Mauritius, Madagascar and Lesotho, also took a favourable stand.28
After President Houphouet-Boigny’s initial call for dialogue in 1970 failed to elicit wide positive response in Africa, the President appeared to withdraw, but it was clear that his views had not changed. As a result, one year later he reiterated his initiative for opening a dialogue with South Africa at a press conference in Abidjan on 28 April 1971. The President in particular declared that the states of Africa needed peace, and that only neutrality would enable them to steer clear of the rivalry among the great powers. Verbal threats against South Africa, he said, could lead to nothing but war; while he abhorred and condemned apartheid, he felt that the attitude of the white minority in South Africa could not be changed by force.29
He continued his argumentation by saying that independent African states must first of all remove the spectre of war with South Africa, which would be a catastrophe for the whole continent. Vorster had offered to receive any African leader in his country on a footing of equality. It would be an act of faith and courage to give him a favourable reply. At the same time, President Houphouet-Boigny admitted that it would be a time-consuming task to help white South Africans to change their policy. He did not, however, commit himself to go to South Africa, even if a majority of African states did not support his attitude.30
President Houphouet-Boigny elucidated his intentions further a few days later, on 30 April 1971, by explaining that any preliminary discussions would be started by his government on the basis of the Lusaka Manifesto. Afterwards, he said that, if anybody allowed himself to be dragged into a war with South Africa because of apartheid, it would offer a new opportunity for communism to intervene, with the usual distressing consequences. He added that he would not take a personal
28 American-African Affairs Association, December 1970, p. 1; Africa research bulletin, November 1970, p. 1921, and African Journal, 2 July 1971, p. 14. 29 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ Ivory Coast/1970s: President Houphouet-Boigny’s Press conference, Abidjan, 28 April 1971. 30 Ibid.
49 initiative, as this was a problem which concerned all African states and which would need agreement with other states on the methods to be used.31
The Ivory Coast president also raised the matter at a meeting of the heads of state of the member states of the conseil de l’entente (entente council) in Ouagadougou on 17 May 1971. The final communiqué issued at the end of this meeting, however, made no specific mention of the question. While Presidents Hamani Diori of Niger and Lamizana of Upper Volta expressed reservations, President Maga of Dahomey was known to share the views of the President of the Ivory Coast, and the Government of President Eyadema of Togo issued a statement on 21 May 1971 approving the principle of dialogue and declaring at the same time that the white minority in South Africa had to accept dialogue with the black majority in the Republic and that every effort should be made to establish a multiracial society in that part of the continent.32
On examining the Ivorian President’s press conference, it seems that the Ivorian President had no doubts about the good intentions of South Africa to have contact with the rest of Africa. He therefore proposed internal peace in each African state, peace between the African states, and peace between the African states and the rest of the world. Strong in his opinion, President Houphouet-Boigny did not hesitate to advocate dialogue with South Africa, despite its apartheid policy. His arguments were based on the fact that South Africa was too rich and powerful ever to change its racial policy because of pressure from outside. Therefore, South Africa’s racial policy was an internal matter that should be treated as such. The OAU should only be concerned with relations among its member states. This suggested that the OAU could only be preserved if the sovereignty of states was respected rigidly. Boycotting South African sovereignty would serve to create a precedent that member states of the OAU would eventually use against one another.
The aim was peace and a determination to contribute to a more just South African society in which hatred and fear would make way for harmonious coexistence among the different racial communities. As the racial policy had led South Africa into a dead end, it was engendering hatred and contained the seeds of an explosion that could be avoided only by dialogue. In other
31 South African DFA, 1/179/3, Vol. 1: Special airmails No 8/4/1/2 from South African Embassy of Cologne, 30 April 1971. 32 Ibid.
50 words, the different South African communities were in an impasse situation because of the hatred and suspicion that existing among them. According to the Ivorian president, this situation could be solved by establishing exchange relations with countries outside the Republic, in other words, that dialogue between independent African states and South Africa would develop conditions for dialogue within South Africa.33
Following the Ivorian President’s arguments, one could agree that advocating dialogue with South Africa was reasonable because the troubled situation in South Africa could have profound effects such as political and economic collapse on neighbours, sub-region and the continent as a whole. Violence, war or conflict in one country can spread to a neighbouring country because combatants judge that they have something to gain by taking this step. First, rebels groups may establish bases or seize territory across borders in order to gain access to resources from state security forces. Often this is done with approval of neighbouring country (e.g. Angola and Tanzania provided bases for African National Congress guerrillas from South Africa). Second, civil wars have spread across borders when government forces have attacked neighbouring states in the hope of eliminating rebel bases and supply lines in countries which gave sanctuary to rebels (throughout the 1980s South Africa defence forces attacked Botswana, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe in order to kill members or supporters of the ANC). Third, violent conflict has spread when neighbouring governments have used insurgencies to weaken and destabilise regional rivals. In Africa, support for rebel movement has been a common substitute for direct inter-state war.
Thus, as Africa at this time needed to organise its destiny, all African states were required to work towards this goal, especially those that were recording economic success, such as South Africa. Taking into account its economic success and technical development, African counties, which were characterised at that time, and still are so now, by serious problems such as economic instability, political disorder, starvation, malnutrition and upheavals, needed to become involved with South Africa to ensure a better future for the continent. Moreover, as many
33 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ Ivory Coast/1970s: President Houphouet-Boigny’s Press conference, Abidjan, 28 April 1971.
51 African countries already had some ties with South Africa, this dialogue was welcomed because it concretised the existing unofficial relations.
Besides the economic interest, South Africa and the rest of Africa had complementary political interests. South Africa was convinced that it could not sleep in peace if its neighbours were starving. And these neighbours saw South Africa as a powerful economic and military country that could protect them from communism. For these reasons, they had to become partners, as had been suggested by the Ivorian President. In other words, President Houphouet-Boigny’s plea was based on the belief that mutual contact between the independent African states and the South African regime would eventually lead to a change of heart on the part of the South African whites and bring about the end of apartheid.34
It is regrettable that President Houphouet-Boigny did not elaborate on the framework of his suggested dialogue. He did not explain how the black man in South Africa might gain from this dialogue. Did he think about it or not? The President of the Ivory Coast also did not say whether there was anything in South African history which led him to believe that the Pretoria regime would change its racial policy. He also did not discuss the matter with those who were of principal concern in the issue, namely South African black people, before taking the decision to open dialogue with South Africa.
If these questions were in President Houphouet-Boigny’s mind, they could have been developed during his press conference in an attempt to convince those who were opposed to his initiative to follow him. This author suspects that the initiative to enter into dialogue did not come from him, because, as he said on 4 November 1970, “…the government of Ivory Coast would contact all African heads of states individually to define his country’s viewpoint. This would ensure that a dialogue with South Africa would not be a unilateral initiative by Ivory Coast.”35 He may have been only the chief executor of this opening of dialogue with South Africa. And the African Summit Conference did not take place as President Houphouet-Boigny had planned it. Also, in the light of the timing of events, as revealed by Africa Confidential, President Houphouet-
34 P. Giniewski: Le dialogue s’amorce entre Petoria et l’Afrique Noire, p.2. 35 Africa research bulletin, 6 November 1970, p. 1921, and African Journal, 2 July 1971, p. 14.
52 Boigny had met Vorster in Paris towards the end of 1970. This means that the South African government was probably informed in advance of the Ivorian President’s press conference.36
After President Houphouet-Boigny’s press conference, the African countries in favour of the Ivorian initiative, such as Gabon, naturally reacted in favour of dialogue. In fact, the most favourable reaction came from Gabon. President Bongo applauded Houphouet-Boigny for adopting such an attitude. This was not surprising at all, because Gabon, as everyone was aware, had been practising trade relations with South Africa for a long time. A report from the Secretary for Commerce and Industry in Pretoria showed that Gabon’s imports from South Africa during 1959 were worth about 4.630.662 Franc CFA, while the exports were put at 20.302.030 Franc CFA.37
In addition, an agreement to finance the construction of a cellulose factory had been signed at Libreville by Edouard Mbouty-Boutzit, Minister of Economic Affairs, Commerce and Industry, and George Gavarry, representing a group of private undertakings. President Bongo attended the signing,38 and his reaction was undoubtedly in full support of President Houphouet-Boigny’s initiative. On his return from an official visit to the Federal Republic of Germany on 6 November 1970, President Bongo declared in Paris that he fully associated himself with President Houphouet-Boigny’s initiative, which was consistent with the Gabonese motto of Dialogue, Tolerance and Peace.39
36 Africa Confidence, 14 May 1971. 37 South African National Archives, Economic section, file No 20/13/15/1: Schedule of Economic reports of trade with Gabon from the Chamber of Commerce, Agriculture, Industry and Mines of Gabon, 17 June 1960. The CFA Franc is the common currency of 14 countries which are members of the Franc zone, namely: • Benin, Burkina, Ivory Coast, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo which form the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), whose common central bank is the Central Bank of West African States(BCEAO); • Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Chad which form the Central Africa Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), whose common central bank is the Bank of Central African States (BEAC). However, the CFA Franc was created on 26 December 1945, the day when France ratified the Bretton Woods agreement. At that time, it was standing for Franc of the French colonies of Africa. In 1958, it becomes Franc of the French community of Africa. Nowadays, the denomination CFA Franc means franc of the African Financial Community) for WAEMU member States, and franc of Financial Cooperation in Central Africa for countries belonging to the BEAC area. The CFA, which is the only legal tender, is not freely convertible. It is on a fixed exchange rate with the Euro, namely 1 Euro = +/- 656 Franc CFA (655,957 Franc CFA) see in http://www.bceao.int/internet/bcweb.nsf/pages/umuse (24 August 2006). 38 Afrique Express, November 1969. 39 Ibid., November 1970.
53 On 15 May 1971, President Bongo once again declared that he had always favoured dialogue with South Africa. The Gabonese president first explained that he had abstained from making any declaration on the South African question for more than a year, but declared that he was breaking this silence in order to associate himself with the recent propositions made by the President of the Ivory Coast, propositions which appeared to him to be realistic and of primary importance for the preservation of peace in Africa.
President Bongo said: “From 1969, during the meeting of the first seminary of Gabonese Democratic Party, I have stigmatized the attitude which concerned only to vote motions to condemn South Africa. It is not with slogans or insult that we solve the painful problem of apartheid. I estimate it also wrong to use or urge violence in the goal to help South African black people. In all, I am in favour of dialogue with South Africa in the spirit of negotiations as expressed in the Lusaka Manifesto, and I consider it desirable to try to reconcile the views of Presidents Houphouet-Boigny and Kaunda.”40
In analysing the Gabonese position towards dialogue with South Africa, it is clear that President Bongo also did not have any doubt about the good intentions of South Africa in seeking contact with the rest of Africa, because South Africa had already proved its sincerity to Gabon through their commercial exchanges. Through these exchanges, South Africa proved its intention to discuss questions of mutual interest with African countries. Surely one could also draw the conclusion that Gabon was basically ‘bribed’ by means of these commercial exchanges. This point can be justified by the fact that South Africa had achieved success in Gabon and this experience could be shared with other African countries. In addition, Gabon was convinced that Africa needed peace for its development; therefore all its energies had to be employed to this end. On the basis of the fact that contemporary history has many examples that show that the use of weapons has not brought definite solutions to the problems posed, it was better to discuss than to fight. Or, as a French idioms say, “Il vaut mieux prévoir que guérir” (It is better to prevent than to fix) and “De la discussion jaillit la lumière” (From the talk springs out the light).
40 Le Monde, 15 May 1971.
54 Therefore, it was more realistic and reasonable to solve the South African apartheid issue through dialogue. Moreover, the Gabonese President had a conviction that all African countries had to act in concert with each other in order to resist communist infiltration in Africa and to provide peace in an effort to create favourable circumstances for the development that was essential for underdeveloped African countries. To do so, the contribution of South Africa was necessary, despite its apartheid policy. All those convictions and considerations may have been in the Gabonese President’s mind when he took the decision to support dialogue with South Africa.
At the same time, something strange occurred in President Bongo’s behaviour. He did not say what his position would be if the dialogue did not take place according to the Lusaka Manifesto. His attitude was very prudent, because he had never taken any initiative about dialogue with South Africa. The only thing he did was to support the Ivorian dialogue policy. Did he fear being the target of criticism and attacks from the opponents of dialogue? Did he fail to decide on a specific framework for this matter? He had promised to try to reconcile the views of Presidents Houphouet-Boigny and Kaunda, but this never happened.
Whatever President Bongo’s strategy was regarding dialogue, one thing was clear, and that was that he feared to be the target of international criticism and attacks. This assumption can be justified by the fact that, according to Dr JG Boyazoglu’s report after visiting Gabon from 19 to 23 November 1976, President Bongo had mentioned that he would appreciated it if, during his presidency of the OAU (1977), a low-profile policy was followed by South Africa towards Gabon. He explained that this was necessary because of the fact that Gabon’s close links with South Africa could cause criticism and might oblige him to react in a manner not necessarily or truly representing his way of thinking.41
However, one thing was sure: President Bongo was a great admirer and follower of President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast. He fully endorsed and supported his views and ideas on foreign policy, for example in the “capitalist option and encouragement of overseas investors”
41 South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 7: re: visit to Gabon: 19-23 November 1976, from Dr Boyazoglu to Brand Fourie, Paris, 3 December 1976, 1.
55 (Ivorian President’s speech at OCAM, February 1964).42 He also backed his views on dialogue with South Africa with the ultimate aim of establishing an All-African Common Market.
Other positive reactions to President Houphouet-Boigny’s press conference came from South Africa. South Africa naturally welcomed the Ivorian initiative and declared that there would be sufficient opportunity to explain a lot of the misunderstanding concerning what its apartheid policy meant.43 Moreover, by responding enthusiastically to the Ivory Coast proposal, South Africa’s hopes were strengthened by five factors. First, there was the prestige of the President of the Ivory Coast in Africa, particularly in the French-speaking countries. Second, there were close relations between President Houphouet-Boigny and the French government, which had drawn closer economically to South Africa, largely through arms sales. Third, South Africa was increasing its trade with Francophone African countries and this was organised by French middlemen operating mainly through Gabon and the Ivory Coast. Fourth, President Houphouet- Boigny had clashed in the past with the OAU on spearheading the diplomatic and economic boycott campaign against South Africa. Fifth, President Houphouet-Boigny had close personal relations with Ghana’s Prime Minister, who also advocated dialogue with South Africa (a proposal unfortunately turned down by his own parliament).44
President Houphouet-Boigny’s press conference elicited a response from Vorster. He expressed his pleasure on learning that President Houphouet-Boigny advocated a favourable response to his recent invitation to African leaders to enter into dialogue with South Africa. He also pointed out his sincere appreciation for the firm stand taken by the Ivorian President towards South Africa. He believed this stand to be an act of wise statesmanship animated by a sincere desire for peace and the welfare of Africa. He ended by formally inviting President Houphouet-Boigny to visit South Africa.45 But President Houphouet-Boigny did not respond favourably to this invitation. Meanwhile, the idea of dialogue with Pretoria was strongly opposed by members of the Organisation of African Unity, such as Tanzania, Ethiopia, Mauritius, and by other countries around the world.
42 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 1: The Roberts Construction Company Limited report on the political and financial strength and future political development of Gabon, 1972, 10. 43 South African DFA, 1/179/4, vol. 2: Vorster’s Letter to President Houphouet-Boigny, Cape Town 8 March 1972. 44 C. Legum: South Africa courts its neighbours, p .1. 45 South African DFA, 1/179/3, Vol. 1: Vorster’s official mail to President Houphouet-Boigny, 6 May 1971.
56 President Houphouet-Boigny was violently attacked by certain African leaders, among them President Sékou Touré, who went as far as accusing him of being a traitor and a divider of Africa. In fact, no matter what opinion one may have on the merit of a policy of dialogue, one must admit that the Ivorian President only took public positions that already existed. For many years, a good number of African countries close to South Africa had traded actively with her. Certain West African states, such as Gabon, also started to have discreet trading relations with Pretoria. By initiating dialogue, the Ivorian President obliged these states to state officially that they were in favour of dialogue.
Among the national liberation movements, the banned African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) expressed its objection to the idea of dialogue. The ANC indicated that no dialogue had ever taken place between the South African Government and black South Africans in South Africa because the Pretoria regime did not want any dialogue. As a result, the only way open to them was to fight for their rights, even by resorting to arms. The ANC condemned dialogue with the Ivory Coast, which appeared to them as an instrument to help apartheid to be stronger and the black South African people to be more suppressed. That is why they stressed that, if South Africa needed dialogue, it should start with its own people inside South Africa.46 This shows that the ANC had never approved of the Ivorian President’s initiatives to enter into dialogue with South Africa, because they had not been consulted. For them, this seemed like a betrayal by their black African brothers, which is why it was not surprising to discover that Nelson Mandela has never been to the Ivory Coast.
To conclude this section: we have learned that policy regarding dialogue proposed by Presidents Houphouet-Boigny and Bongo was human, intelligent and opportune. In fact, dialogue took into account the real desire of many independent African counties to have contact with South Africa. It was also considered to be the sincere wish of South Africa to have friendly relations with all black African countries that were not dependent on communism. The diplomatic offensive by President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast and Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa resulted in a number of African heads of state coming forward to declare themselves in support
46 Le Monde, 21 May 1971, and F. Chenu: Perspectives et limites du dialogue avec l’Afrique du Sud, p. 4.
57 of dialogue with South Africa. French-speaking African countries in general were inclined to react favourably to the Ivory Coast initiative at the following OAU summit in June 1971.
It may not be mere coincidence that President Pompidou of France visited Africa for the first time in February 1970, at the time when the African states were preoccupied with the dialogue issue.47 It was clear that the OAU conference due to be held in June 1971 would be dominated by the dialogue issue.
3.6 The Ivory Coast’s proposal for dialogue causes division within the OAU 3.6.1 Meetings of the Council of Ministers (15-19 June 1971) The 16th session of the OAU Council of Ministers, adjourned on 1 March 1971, resumed in Addis Ababa on 12 June, with Uganda being present, but not the Congo (Kinshasa) or Mauritius, while the delegation of the Central African Republic was recalled to Bangui. The session completed its debate on the Organisation’s budget on 15 June.
The 17th session of the Council, which opened the same day, was attended by representatives of 37 of the Organisation’s 41 members. Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, in a brief inaugural address, pleaded for unity and said that “We believe in the need for Africans to live harmoniously, settling our differences of opinion on African and world issues through frank exchanges of ideas, mutual understanding, respect and cooperation within the OAU.” After the Emperor’s speech, the Chairman of the Council, Omar Arteh, the Foreign Affairs Minister of Somalia, issued a statement saying that whatever differences the members may have, the ultimate goal was one of African unity. The unity was evident when the Council began its deliberation on the agenda for the Summit.48 Despite the Emperor’s appeal and the wish of the chairman for unity, widespread disagreement became apparent the same day, when ministers began a debate on the proposal for dialogue with the South African government put forward by President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast.
47 C. Legum: South Africa courts its neighbours, p. 1. 48 Keesing’s contemporary archives, 1971-1972, p. 24737.
58 Arsene Assouan Usher, Foreign Affairs Minister of the Ivory Coast, proposed the inscription of the dialogue proposal in the agenda of the council. But the majority of members refused to have the dialogue issue recorded in the agenda of the council. While Arsene Assouan Usher threatened to leave the council meeting unless the dialogue proposal was placed before the forthcoming session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments, the head of the Nigerian delegation, Dr Arikpo, said that his delegation had instructions to leave the council meeting if the Ivory Coast succeeded in having the dialogue question referred to in the Assembly.
There was disagreement over the inscription of the dialogue issue in the agenda of the council. Of the 37 delegates who attended, 31 took part in discussing the question of dialogue. Madagascar, Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland spoke and the common thread that ran through their speeches was the attempt to present the dialogue as a policy capable of implementing the Lusaka Manifesto. Much reference was made to the statements in the Manifesto on the undesirability of using force.49 I think that, by taking into account the powerful economic and military reality of South African, this option was not really realistic and reasonable, because Africa could not succeed in changing South African policies through the use of force, whereas it might have been possible to change South African attitudes through dialogue. Moreover, Africa did not have the means to put this option into effect, simply because their arms could not challenge South African arms.
The Ivory Coast did not wish the matter to be discussed by the ministers, but wanted it to be put directly to the assembly of heads of state. This was strenuously opposed by the Nigerian delegation. A compromise was proposed by Ethiopia, whereby specific reference to dialogue would be omitted from the agenda inscription. The prevailing mood concerning dialogue with the South African government was shown in the wording of this item on the agenda. The proposal of the Ivory Coast to have the matter described as ‘peace through neutrality’ was defeated in favour of the Tanzanian proposal, ‘the principles of OAU and the Lusaka Manifesto: dialogue and the future strategy of Africa’.50
49 Keesing’s contemporary archives, 1971-1972, p. 24737. 50 Ibid.
59 The result, on 18 June 1971, was that the delegations from the Ivory Coast and Gabon walked out of the meeting in protest against the dialogue issue being placed on the council’s agenda. The delegations of Upper Volta, Togo and Dahomey (Benin) also left the meeting, but only to show solidarity with the senior member of the Entente, rather than as a direct expression of disagreement with the proposal.51 The scene was now set for a confrontation between the dialogue club and its opponents. The opponents of dialogue also referred to the Lusaka Manifesto, pointing out that the choice of forms and methods of struggle was a secondary issue, the main objective being ridding the continent of colonialism and apartheid. The Manifesto gave preference to peaceful settlement, they said, but it contained no categorical statement that this was the only way.
Two main factors tended to obscure the precise position of those who sided with the dialogue club. First, there was a difference of approach between those who favoured the direct initiative advocated by Malawi and the Ivory Coast and the others (prominently Lesotho), who favoured the heavily conditional approach of the Lusaka Manifesto. Second, there were those (like the majority of the Entente countries) who were in favour of an initiative concerning dialogue, provided it had the backing of the OAU.
At the end of the discussion, a vote was taken on the dialogue issue. The declaration rejected dialogue with South Africa, describing it as a manoeuvre by South Africa to divide African states, confuse world opinion and relieve South Africa’s isolation. The question of dialogue, to be placed before the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments, was adopted by 27 votes to four (Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi and Swaziland). Two abstentions (Niger and Dahomey) were recorded. The Ivory Coast, Gabon, Upper Volta and Togo did not vote; they were absent during the voting because they had walked out of the meeting. Zaire, Mauritius, the Central African Republic and Uganda were not present at the meeting.52
The final conclusion was set out clearly and stated that “The 17th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the Organisation of African Unity emphatically declares that there exists
51 J. de la Gueriviere: La conférence de l’OUA, pp. 5-9. 52 Keesing’s contemporary archives, 1971-1972, p. 24737.
60 no basis for a meaningful dialogue with the minority racist regime of South Africa. Under these circumstances, the Council reaffirms its determination to continue to render and increase its assistance to the liberation movements until victory is achieved.”53
Of considerable importance for the struggle against the attempts of those who supported the dialogue to split the movement was the statement in the declaration that “…any action to be taken by member states in regard to the solution of the problems of colonialism, racial discrimination and apartheid in Africa, must be undertaken within the framework of the Organisation of African Unity and in full consultation with the liberation movements of the territories concerned.”54
The council approved a declaration that rejected dialogue. Table 1 shows the voting by the Council of Ministers on the resolution rejecting dialogue with South Africa.
53 A. Urnov: South Africa against Africa, 1966-1986, pp. 91-92. 54 Ibid.
61 Table 1: The voting by the Council of Ministers on the resolution rejecting dialogue with South Africa
Countries Against In favour Abstention Absent Walk out dialogue of dialogue Algeria X Botswana X Burundi X Cameroon X Chad X Central Africa Rep X Congo Brazzaville X Dahomey (Benin) X Ethiopia X Equatorial Guinea X Gabon X Gambia X Ghana X Guinea Conakry X Ivory Coast X Kenya X Lesotho X Liberia X Libya X Madagascar X Malawi X Mali X Mauritania X Mauritius X Morocco X Niger X Nigeria X Rwanda X Senegal X Sierra Leone X Somalia X Sudan X Swaziland X Tanzania X Togo X Tunisia X Uganda X Upper Volta (Burkina X Faso) Egypt X Zambia X Zaire X TOTAL 27 4 2 4 4
Examining the resolution taken at the meeting of the Council of Ministers, it is clear that the departure of the delegations of the Ivory Coast and Gabon, followed by those of Upper Volta, Togo and Dahomey, did not deter those who formulated the declaration on the question of
62 dialogue. The declaration stressed the loyalty of the independent countries to the OAU Charter and the Lusaka Manifesto. The proposal for dialogue between the independent African states and South Africa was described by the opponents to the dialogue as a manoeuvre by South Africa to divide African states. However, it was clear that, if the meetings of the Council of Ministers had worked without passion on the administrative issue, the same was not the case in examining the Ivorian proposal for dialogue with South Africa.
Reacting to the resolution taken by the meetings of the Council of Ministers, President Houphouet-Boigny said that dialogue with South Africa was natural in terms of the fact that most of the African heads of state needed to protect Africa from the Cold War, which involved the communist block, led by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the capitalist block, led by the USA. He was fully aware of the danger that was approaching the African continent when he proposed the policy of peace and absolute neutrality. However, he did not admit that the communication by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on his behalf was first examined by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. For him, only the heads of state should act on this declaration and accept it or not. But, whatsoever the OAU would decide, it would not change his determination to have discussions with South Africa.55
President Houphouet-Boigny’s reaction shows without any doubt that, if the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments rejected the proposal, he would not stop working towards its objective, even if he had to do so alone. Therefore, he announced on 18 June 1971 that he intended to meet all those who were ‘tired of bellicose verbiage’; he also invited representatives of liberation movements to come to Abidjan for talks in which he would explain his policy of peace and neutrality to be agreed upon among independent Africa states. His invitation was unfortunately rejected by a meeting of these representatives in Addis Abba on 19 June 1971.56
55 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ Ivory Coast/ 1970s: Telegram No 868 from French Embassy of Ivory Coast, 18 June 1971. 56 Ibid.
63 3.6.2 Assembly of Heads of States and Government (21-23 June 1971) A showdown between the supporters and opponents of dialogue occurred at the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government held on 21 June 1971 in Addis Ababa. It was preceded by the Meeting of the Council of Ministers. The declaration of this meeting in Addis Ababa, from 15 to 19 June 1971, was presented to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.
With the arrival at Addis Ababa of the delegations from Zaire and Mauritius, the number of states participating rose to 39. Only 10 heads of state were present (Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Gambia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan and Zambia), the smallest number in the history of the OAU’s assemblies. Other countries were represented by cabinet ministers and special envoys.
The Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie opened the ceremony by calling all African heads of state to persevere on the course of action they had already chosen and to remain undivided. He emphasised the two obligations (fraternal and legal) of African states under the OAU Charter to support the liberation movements in their struggle. He continued that it would be self-deceiving and a waste of time to advocate dialogue with the rulers of South Africa, for it was obvious that the freedom of millions was not a commodity subject of bargaining.57
From Haile Selassie’s speech, it was clear that Ethiopia’s position on the issue of dialogue with South Africa supported an absolutely united front and rejected the proposal of dialogue, expressing the consistent position that Ethiopia had maintained on the issue. Emperor Hailie Selassie, in further efforts to maintain unanimity, advised the Assembly against a vote. His aim was to accept the declaration adopted by the meeting of the Council of Ministers.
Such a position was not wise. The Ethiopian Emperor may firstly have had to protect himself from a pronounced condemnation, before the African heads of state gathered for a conference, having been able to explain themselves about this matter. After Emperor Hailie Selassie’s speech, the discussion on the question of dialogue took place. There was conflict between those
57 Africa Research Bulletin, July 1971, pp 21-26.
64 who were opposed to dialogue and the supporters, namely those who were inclined towards the solution suggested by the Ivory Coast President.
The opponents to dialogue identified a major implication of dialogue. If the South African liberation movements were, for a variety of reasons, to develop and form a serious challenge to the Pretoria regime, it would become extremely awkward for a substantial number of independent states to pursue a policy of accommodation vis-à-vis a regime which desperately sought to destroy that opposition. In effect, to cooperate with South Africa in any significant way would be equal to participation in the physical and moral destruction of the liberation movement. That, in itself, was deemed too high a price to pay for dialogue.
Secondly, the unpopularity of a policy of befriending South Africa would have made it difficult for regimes emerging in some of the independent states to support it without being very clear about the goals and rewards. Dialogue would remain an essentially experimental approach, and experiments do not always succeed. The point was that failure would have much more serious repercussions, since it could turn out to be impossible to repair the damage done to the liberation movements.
Thirdly, the advent of black African rule in other parts of Southern Africa (Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe) would complicate matters, not just for South Africa itself, but also for the independent states cooperating with it. For, in order to establish cordial relations with the new regimes, which, almost without doubt, would be expected to assume a hostile attitude towards the Pretoria regime for having aided their former oppressors, it would be necessary to dissolve all existing ties with South Africa, and that could raise a host of problems for some states, particularly those situated in the southern zone, which by then might have become substantially dependent on that country.
Fourthly, dialogue has international repercussions, which would work against African interests: the adoption of a soft line by the majority, or even a substantial number, of African states would tend to encourage other states to do the same. In particular, the ‘respectability’ of apartheid would go a long way towards the erosion of the longstanding ‘bad fellow’ image of South Africa
65 abroad and would probably enhance its cooperation with the major Western powers. The African states would have no choice but to assume responsibility for such a development. At worst, dialogue and the equally emotive issue of arms sales to South Africa would become closely interlinked issues in so far as both would serve to promote South Africa’s defence and foreign policy objectives. This is precisely what South Africa would have liked to achieve through its détente policy. Independent Africa could not possibly expect to benefit from this.
Finally, the risk of destroying the OAU as the price for dialogue probably was the single most important restraining factor. The OAU was an all-African creation and most states valued its preservation immensely. South Africa, on the other hand, would very much have liked to contribute to the organisation’s demise. Thus, the desire to preserve the organisation and the facade of continental unity, for without some semblance of unity the African ‘voice’ in world politics could easily drown in troubled waters, would seem to have explained the expressed wish of most states to operate within the OAU framework in pursuit of the goal of liberating the whole of Southern Africa.58
The Ivory Coast delegation produced a statement by Houphouet-Boigny embodying a request for a special meeting on dialogue. In this statement, President Houphouet-Boigny once again reaffirmed his conviction that dialogue was possible with South Africa. Thus, he proposed a meeting with his fellow heads of state in order to explain his conception of dialogue. The position adopted by the president of Senegal was in harmony with Houphouet-Boigny’s proposal as outlined in his message to the participants of the Assembly. He said: “I propose a meeting with my responsible colleagues, the heads of African states, in order to put forward my view on the effective neutrality of Africa.” The Assembly noted the statement, but refused to vote on it.59 Despite the refusal of the Assembly to vote on statement, Houphouet-Boigny did not change his position; contrarily, he seemed firmly decided to pursue his dialogue with South Africa whatever the OAU position.
58 A. T. Mugomba: The Rise and the Fall of “Pax Suid-Afrika”: A historical analysis of South Africa’s Black African Foreign Policy, pp. 141-142. 59P. Biarnes: Cote-d’Ivoire, nouveau plaidoyer pour une politique de dialogue avec l’Afrique du Sud, pp. 5-8.
66 The supporters of dialogue based their argument on the fact that the armed struggle could cause a war in which only South Africa would win because of its strong military power. The difference between South Africa’s military power and that of the rest of the African states was too great to risk a war with South Africa. Another reason involved the fact that international condemnation and isolation did not make South Africa change its policy of apartheid. As a result, dialogue, diplomatic exchange and talks seemed to be the only solution. The Ivorian Minister of Information, Assouan Usher, pointed out the example of the harmonious racial relations between the United States of America and independent African states since 1960.60 In addition, it seemed to the supporters of dialogue that South Africa wanted dialogue precisely because the country had at last begun to feel the pinch of isolation and had grown sensitive to being continuously labelled the polecat of the world. Had this not become a salient concern, South Africa could have continued to ignore all the attempts at ostracising it. Africa could not, therefore, abandon the siege, for such a development would be interpreted as throwing in the towel by the OAU and giving South Africa a major tactical victory in the marathon confrontation. Such behaviour would obviously do tremendous damage to the liberation cause.
A second major argument put up by the supporters of dialogue was that Africa was not in a position to wage a ‘holy war’ of liberating South Africa. In substantive terms, it was contended that the African states did not collectively possess, nor could they be expected to in the foreseeable future, the military and economic capabilities to force a showdown with South Africa to win a decisive victory. Furthermore, a sharp increase in South Africa’s perceptions of the threat because of the hostile declarations of the African states and the activities of the liberation movements might force that country to take the offensive against its enemies; fear could lead to aggression rather than submission.
The third reason was that the performance of the South African liberation movements had been the least encouraging: their activities were actually suicidal. In contrast, the opponents of dialogue held the view that the offensive policies of the South African Government and its allies in the sub-region had left Africa with only one option: that of waging war. The conditions for extensive violence had been created by these regimes, and therefore revolutionary violence
60 Le Monde, 6 October 1970.
67 could be defended on the grounds that it was essentially defensive. The ‘time bomb’ that had been planted in Southern Africa could only be defused by a radical re-orientation in the attitudes of these regimes. Without this, a long war of attrition could not be avoided. Another argument in favour of dialogue was the assertion by Malawian President Kamuzu Banda that there were moderate forces among all races, but especially among the whites, who sought to change South Africa’s apartheid issue by peaceful means. These forces merited Africa’s active encouragement and support, so that white opinion in general would begin to ‘open up’ to external influences. Opposing dialogue would therefore do great disservice to this new movement.
Finally, the major assertion was the relative utility of violence. Using the big slick was not, it was held by some, the only suitable solution; in fact, violence would neither solve the problem of apartheid nor would it help the other forces working towards peaceful change in South Africa. However, there was a clear division of opinion among the states supporting a less belligerent strategy.61 But was it not precisely this OAU Assembly that represented a meeting of Houphouet-Boigny’s ‘responsible colleagues’, and did the Ivory Coast President not convene this meeting in full accordance with the high requirements upon such a forum for the discussion of his ideas? Of course it was, but Houphouet-Boigny could not hope to achieve success in Addis Ababa. Therefore, he thought it better not to attend and tried to delay matters to more favourable times. It was as if the opinion expressed by the majority of the OAU Council of Ministers did not exist for the Ivory Coast President and his message made no reference to the declaration that had just been adopted. The meaning was clear: Houphouet-Boigny intended to ignore any decision that he did not like.
At the end of the discussions, the Ivory Coast’s measure had not achieved its aim. The Assembly adopted the declaration on the question of dialogue without amendment, as recommended by the Council of Ministers, by 28 votes to six (Gabon, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi and Mauritius), with five abstentions (Dahomey, Niger, Swaziland, Togo and Upper Volta).62
61A. T. Mugomba: The Rise and the Fall of “Pax Suid-Afrika”: A historical analysis of South Africa’s Black African Foreign Policy, pp.139-140. 62 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ Ivory Coast/1970s: Telegram No 513/523/R from French Embassy of Ivory Coast, 24 June 1971.
68 The final resolution of the conference rejected any kind of dialogue with the racist regime of South Africa and affirmed that action concerning apartheid should be taken within the framework of the OAU, in close consultation with the liberation movements. The resolution further stated that the proposals for dialogue were manoeuvres to divide African states and confuse public opinion in order to end the isolation of South Africa, and thus to maintain the status quo in South Africa.63
The Declaration reiterated the commitment to the principles of the OAU Charter, stating that the Lusaka Manifesto was the only basis for a solution to the problems of apartheid, racial discrimination and colonialism in Africa. If there was to be any dialogue at all, it should be between the minority regime of South Africa and the people they were oppressing and exploiting. Perhaps its most important provision was the obligation that no member state of the OAU should initiate or engage in any type of activity that would undermine or abrogate the solemn undertakings of the OAU Charter, and that such activity should be undertaken only with the guidance, consent and approval of the OAU. This implied that the right of each member state to independent opinion and independent foreign policy did not apply in the case of dialogue with the South African Government.64
The Declaration made it clear that, from then on, any state pursuing a policy of dialogue would be acting contrary to the principles of the Charter and defying an expressly and strongly formulated opinion of the qualified majority of OAU members. The Ivory Coast expressed disapproval of the Declaration and President Banda of Malawi defied it by paying an official visit to South Africa in August 1971 (the first head of an independent state to do so); the principles laid down in the Lusaka Manifesto prevailed.65
63 S.C. Nolutshungu: South Africa in Africa: study in ideology and foreign policy, p. 276. 64 Ibid. 65 F.R. Metrowich: Towards dialogue and détente, p. 11.
69 Table 2: Assembly of Heads of States and Government voting on the resolution rejecting dialogue with South Africa
Countries Against In favour Abstention Absent dialogue of dialogue Algeria X Botswana X Burundi X Cameroon X Chad X Central Africa Rep X Congo Brazzaville X Dahomey (Benin) X Ethiopia X Equatorial Guinea X Gabon X Gambia X Ghana X Guinea Conakry X Ivory Coast X Kenya X Lesotho X Liberia X Libya X Madagascar X Malawi X Mali X Mauritania X Mauritius X Morocco X Niger X Nigeria X Rwanda X Senegal X Sierra Leone X Somalia X Sudan X Swaziland X Tanzania X Togo X Tunisia X Uganda X Upper Volta (Burkina X Faso) Egypt X Zambia X Zaire X TOTAL 28 6 5 2
From examining the voting behaviour of OAU Heads of State and Government on the Resolution rejecting the dialogue (see Table 2), some observations may be appropriate. First, among those who were in favour of dialogue with South Africa, the following six formed the hard core
70 supporters: Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi and Mauritius; three of them were French speaking, two English speaking and one (Mauritius) bilingual. Of these, the Ivory Coast obviously was the leading nation. In general, however, the Francophone states could be considered more pro-dialogue than the Anglophone states, although the Ivory Coast must have been very disappointed at the behaviour of her entente partners, such as Dahomey, Togo and Upper Volta, who had walked out of the Council of Ministers meeting in sympathy with the Ivory Coast, but had decided to abstain from voting at the Summit.
The second observation on the voting behaviour concerns the proposition that is often made that states that are geographically proximate to South Africa had no choice but to advocate dialogue, because South Africa’s strong economic power in the Southern Africa region put these states in a dependent position vis-à-vis South Africa. Because of it dominant economic position in Southern Africa, no project of significant development could be carried out without its participation, either as supplier, or as customer.
The countries close to South Africa, such as Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland, live with her in a state of economic symbiosis. While South Africa absorbs a broad percentage of their surplus labour (one million workers per annum) and their products, these countries profit from the South African infrastructure (ports, transport, distribution of electricity, medical services), industrial planning, scientific research and others. They receive from South Africa technical aid, capital with advantageous rates, and even gifts and loans. With Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland, South Africa forms a customs and monetary union.66 Botswana, however, defiantly maintained a fairly consistent anti-dialogue position, despite her geographical vulnerability and economic dependence on South Africa, which constrained Lesotho and Swaziland from taking an independent line on the question.
The last observation is that the OAU resolution, by rejecting dialogue, formed a de facto re- interpretation of the Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa, making it more closely aligned with the position of the hardliners than before. The Manifesto, as we observed earlier, had come under attack from the liberation-oriented militant Africans as being too soft and equivocal on Southern
66 P. Giniewski: Le dialogue s’amorce entre Pretoria et l’Afrique du Sud, pp. 3-4.
71 African colonialists and racialists, since it had conceded the point about the necessity, if possible, of a peaceful solution, before resorting to violence was contemplated. The 1971 resolution of the OAU rejected the dialogue strategy unequivocally and, in the name of the Lusaka Manifesto, stamped the document finally and unalterably as an anti-dialogue instrument. In any case, President Houphouet-Boigny had underestimated the complexity of apartheid and the humiliation felt by other African leaders.
Reacting to the OAU summit decision, President Houphouet-Boigny expressed fears that the OAU would fall prey to illusions that South Africa could be compelled by force to abandon apartheid, that the whole world would break off economic relations with South Africa, and that any war with this country would leave the superpowers indifferent. He added, by saying “we feel ourselves in no way bound by the statement made. I shall go on, even if I am the only one, on the path of peace through absolute neutrality…I am convinced that one day Africa will realize the danger which threatens it if conflicts between African countries are to be settled by force.”Along the same trend he said, “even now, the minority would not accept the will of the majority. I categorically refuse to accept this decision.” He announced that he would continue to try to find ways to get a dialogue going, even if he remained completely alone.67
The OAU’s rejection of dialogue with South Africa was reaffirmed by the signatories of the Lusaka Manifesto who met in Mogadishu in October 1971. In fact, after analysing the situation in Southern Africa, the Declaration concluded that there was no way left for the liberation of Southern Africa except armed struggle, to which the members had already given and promised increasingly to continue to give their fullest support, which was the reassurance demanded and received by the liberation movements to prove that the OAU had not abandoned them. The declaration condemned African states that maintained diplomatic ties with South Africa and called for strict adherence to OAU policy. Once the Mogadishu Declaration came into force, the African states adopted an even more committed position on the liberation issue.68
67 P. Giniewski: Le dialogue s’amorce entre Pretoria et l’Afrique du Sud, pp. 3-4. 68 Jeune Afrique, 30 October 1971, p. 18, and T. Yashpal: South Africa and the OAU: the dialogue issue, pp. 58-59.
72 3.7 Conclusion Dialogue with South Africa as recommended by President Houphouet-Boigny had nourished an underlying controversy and evoked more and more opinions in the OAU. Of course there was complete unanimity amongst OAU member states about ending apartheid and racial discrimination in South Africa. But there was a real conflict between those who supported the solution suggested by the Ivory Coast president, and those who were totally opposed to this proposal. Such division was justified by the divergent views held by the OAU’s member states.
Among the opponents of dialogue, the main argument was that dialogue was impossible. They said that one could not discuss something with someone who refused to sit at the same table with them. According to them, the bad faith demonstrated by Pretoria, its prejudices regarding the blacks in South Africa, its lack of respect for human values, and its perpetual violations of human rights, showed that dialogue was more impossible than changing a log into a caiman.
The so-called dialogue supporters were very conscious of South Africa’s considerable economic and military power and technological capability and tacitly acknowledged that full military confrontation with South Africa was beyond their capacity. Therefore, the violence advocated by the OAU in order to solve the issues of apartheid and colonialism would be inefficient and wrong. Due to this, it was necessary to envisage other methods.
The dialogue proposed by President Houphouet-Boigny suggested a simple modification of relations. Who could pretend that some African states did not have direct or indirect commercial relations with South Africa? Some of the others thought that dialogue necessarily ruled out the use of force and that the latter could lead to victory. But this lacked realism. One could only apply the force which one possessed, and most of the armies or foreign armies in one way or the other did not back the African states. It also was clear that no other foreign power in Africa was ready to combat Pretoria in the future.
I agree that dialogue would have compelled recognition. It was necessary that it should be effective. This definitely depended on the African states themselves. Those who were less engaged with South Africa had to revise their position, as isolated dialogue could only lead to the
73 safeguarding of personal interests. A policy of dialogue initiated by the Ivory Coast did not mean a cancellation of apartheid at all, but could bring South Africa to a change of mind. It was necessary to open dialogue because there was no other choice. It was a question of seriousness, of good faith and of courage. It was necessary for African states to have the courage to recognise their weaknesses.
Houphouet-Boigny responded to the OAU decision by planning to send a dialogue delegation, consisting of the Ivory Coast and friendly countries, to South Africa. Le Dialogue du mal partie (kind of “unpleasant dialogue”) was to be pursued along the informal and factional lines to which the Ivorian leader was fairly accustomed and which the South African government probably preferred.
74 CHAPTER FOUR: DIALOGUE POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA BY THE THE IVORY COAST AND GABON
4.1 Introduction A more lasting movement of dialogue between South Africa and the black African States emerged from French-speaking states in West Africa. In this movement, the Ivory Coast, supported by Gabon, played the leading role. In fact, on 6 November 1970, President Houphouet-Boigny for the first time opened the door to a policy of dialogue with South Africa by announcing his plan to urge direct talks between South Africa and African leaders
On 28 April 1971, in the presence of representatives of the national as well as the international press from every continent, President Houphouet-Boigny confirmed his dialogue policy during an international Press conference. The concept of dialogue was raised at the OAU Summit conference held in Addis Ababa, which ended on 23 June 1971. Condemned by a two-thirds majority (28 voices against 6, with 5 abstentions), the policy of dialogue with South Africa seemed to be rejected. The negative attitude of the OAU in mid-1971 effectively silenced the idea of dialogue, in public, at any rate. To all intents and purposes the entire attempt at dialogue seemed to be unsuccessful in as far as countries outside Southern Africa were concerned.
In reacting to the negative attitude of the OAU, the Ivory Coast and Gabon angrily asserted that Africa needed peace and not war for its development. They therefore rejected the OAU’s decision and retained the policy of dialogue with South Africa. President Houphouet-Boigny resolutely declared his intention to maintain a policy of peace in Africa on 2 July 1971, on the basis of the complete neutrality of the continent, even if he were alone. On 4 October of the same year, he made a fresh statement about his policy of dialogue with South Africa and further said that he was confident that the policy of dialogue would be of service to all Africa. He added that he did not consider himself bound by the anti-dialogue resolution voted in at the OAU summit meeting that took place in Addis Ababa. “I have no obligation to ask permission from anyone to launch dialogue” he declared. President Houphouet-Boigny further said that he was confident
75 about this dialogue policy which would be useful to all of Africa.1 In addition, as shown in the previous chapter, the Gabonese government formally reiterated its approval of dialogue of South Africa on 20 October 1971.2
The Ivory Coast and Gabon judged the OAU’s position as unwise because they saw this as opening the door to violence. Therefore they decided to maintain dialogue with South Africa. The focus of this chapter is to answer the following questions: Why did the Ivory Coast and Gabon choose to have and maintain a policy of dialogue with South Africa during the apartheid era despite the OAU’s anti-dialogue resolution? In other words, what was the motivation for the choice of the philosophy and strategy of the dialogue policy? What were the Ivory Coast and Gabon’s main activities in materialising the policy of dialogue? Was this dialogue policy successful?
4.2 The philosophy behind the policy of dialogue The words peace and dialogue had long been leitmotifs in the discourse of the members of the so-called dialogue club, as of President Houphouet-Boigny. These concepts were the motivating force for the role played by the Ivory Coast and Gabon in the exercise that has come to be known as the tentative rapprochement between the independent Black African States and South Africa. The Ivory Coast and Gabon missed no opportunity to stress that their willingness to talk to Pretoria did not imply acceptance of the apartheid policy, which they found abhorrent.
They estimated that the true debate concerning the future of the African continent did not take place at the OAU summit. Therefore they feared that the OAU would become an “Organisation of illusions”: the illusion of thinking that it was possible to bring an end to the apartheid policy by force; the illusion of thinking that the world would end its economic relations with South Africa just because of its apartheid policy; the illusion of believing that all the countries that advocated armed struggle against South Africa would join the fight.
1 Fraternité Matin, 4 October 1971. 2 Agence France Presse, 22 October 1971.
76 Facing such a peril, the Ivory Coast and Gabon did not want to sit back and do nothing. They wanted to prevent the crackle of guerrilla war in Africa. “Whatever happens in a war, it ends in dialogue,” said President Houphouet-Boigny. “But it is a dialogue more difficult than it would have been at the outset, carried out in hate, in fear of humiliation.” The Ivorian President drew a trenchant analogue between the situation of Black and White in Southern Africa and Arabs and Israelis in the Middle East. President Bourguiba of Tunisia counselled dialogue with Israel. His fellow Arabs did not listen. Consequently the Arabs had to negotiate in bitterness to regain occupied territories. Africa was in the same situation with South Africa as the Arabs with Israel.3
In addition, the racial inequality that the United States was fortunately bringing to an end had never divided North Americans among themselves, nor from others members of the American States Organisation, nor disturbed the relations between the United States and African countries. So why should the South African apartheid issue divide African States?
It seemed to the Ivory Coast and Gabon that promoting peace and neutrality would be the wisest route for Africa to follow at the time. In a world that was profoundly divided into two blocks, absolute neutrality was the right stance to maintain. Moreover, peace, as everyone knew, could not be reached, nor installed nor maintained unless prepared for and dominated by dialogue. Therefore it was in the hope of preventing Africa developing an analogous situation to the Middle East and to promote peace and absolute neutrality, that the Ivory Coast and Gabon judged it necessary to advocate dialogue with South Africa, despite the OAU’s disagreement. This choice was based on three main reasons.
The impossibility of changing the situation in South Africa by force and through armed struggle involving the national liberation movements, as the African States did not possess the military and economic resources to challenge South Africa decisively was the first deterrent. Secondly, the trade embargo was certain to fail because non-African powers, including western powers such as the USA, Britain, France, West Germany and Japan, could not stop trading with South Africa and a number of African states also could not afford to do so because of the advantages which economic cooperation with South Africa held for those African States. Thirdly, the
3 To the Point, 7 January 1977.
77 material and idealistic support that the African liberation movements were receiving from the West (such as Soviet Socialist Republics) seemed, to the Ivory Coast and Gabon, to be a dangerous threat to the political unity of the states on the African continent.4
On examination, these reasons appear to be pertinent. Firstly, the impasse between the different communities of South Africa because of the hatred and mistrust among themselves, required dialogue to end this situation. According to the Ivorian President, the multilateral exchanges between South Africa and other African countries were seen as an unavoidable condition to end apartheid. Such exchanges or relations with the exterior could create an internal dialogue.
Secondly, it was an attitude inspired by a clear perception of the evolution of international reality. Thus, the use of violence would not bring a change in the problem; it would, on the contrary, be to the advantage of South Africa, which was aware of its military and economic superiority over the majority of other African States. Moreover, a war against South Africa could prove disastrous for all Africa. In my opinion, war settles nothing. The spirit of tolerance and dialogue must always prevail to solve problems involving human society. A peaceful environment provides a unique context for the survival of mankind. It seems that this could have been what President Houphouet-Boigny and President Bongo envisaged. Thirdly, the superiority of the South African economy was something African countries could not ignore. It could have been to the advantage of the African continent to accept the South African offer. For the supporters of dialogue, South Africa after apartheid seemed to be able to play the role of a leader in Africa, which was why it was better to deal with her.
Taking account of all these realities, it was thought that moderate White opinion and influential business pressure groups within South Africa would be encouraged to make peace with the Black majority and put an end to apartheid if the independent African States should engage in dialogue with South Africa. Alternatively, it might bring about a change in the South African regime itself by methods which only those who lived in the country could legitimately use.
4 South African DFA, 179/1 vol. 1: Official note No 704672, 14 November 1970.
78 However, the economic aspect seems to have been the greater motivation for the Ivorian and Gabonese choice of entering into dialogue with South Africa despite the OAU’s disapproval. As shown in the previous chapter, Gabon could not reject dialogue with South Africa, mostly for economic reasons. It was not surprising to see Gabon supporting dialogue with South Africa, despite the OAU anti-dialogue policy, simply because it had been involved in relations with South Africa since the 1960s. Therefore The Ivorian initiative was therefore all the more welcome to Gabon because it offered an opportunity to normalise its unofficial relations with South Africa.
In the same context, according to B. K. Yao (1991) in Cote d’Ivoire-Afrique du Sud, l’aboutissement du dialogue (Ivory Coast-South Africa the outcome of dialogue), triangular trading between Israel, the Ivory Coast and South Africa took place during the apartheid period. The Ivory Coast had links with both South Africa and Israel, two countries that, as the pariahs of the international community, had formed a link. The policy of dialogue seemed to provide a useful method for developing such relations and could contribute to the consolidation of such a friendship.5 It is not necessary here to discuss the multiform relations between Israel and South Africa that were based on mutual interests such as anti-communism, but the Ivory Coast shared the phobia concerning communism with Israel and South Africa. The Ivory Coast had maintained relations with Israel for many years and was the last African State to end diplomatic relations with Israel, on 8 November 1973, to be re-established on 12 February 1986. Economic exchange, however, did not cease during the break; an office for Israeli exchange remained open in Abidjan.
This can be explained by the fact that Ivorian President’s best friends included Jews. If these relations were a handicap to Israel in its re-conquest of Africa after the Yom-Kippur war, they were an advantage for the Ivory Coast because it was possible to import products from South Africa through Israeli intermediaries, and South Africa could export its products through Israeli intermediaries.6 This really necessitated the establishment of relations with South Africa and could certainly explain the obstinacy of the Ivory Coast about dealing with South Africa.
5 B. K. Yao: Cote d’Ivoire-Afrique du Sud, l’aboutissement du dialogue, p. 150. 6 Ibid.
79 Like the economic aspects, political aspects also seem to have provided strong motivation for the Ivorian and Gabonese choice of entering into dialogue with South Africa despite the OAU’s disagreement. These can be seen as “unmentionable reasons”. The Ivorian President was deeply disappointed by the fact that African States refused to discuss the Nigerian civil war at the UN. The Ivory Coast and Gabon took an original position concerning the Nigerian civil war, by recognising the separate State of Biafra on 15 May 1968. This position was not followed by OAU members and faced strong criticism from these members.7 The Ivorian Foreign Affairs Minister, Usher Assouan, announced as matter of fact that the Ivory Coast would not vote on apartheid or the decolonisation of Rhodesia and Portuguese colonies in the future.
During his party’s congress, on 30 October 1970, President Houphouet-Boigny made an appeal for dialogue with South Africa. He had previously discussed this matter with President Bongo of Gabon in Paris during the summer of 1970.8 It seems clear, therefore, that the African states’ attitude to the UN regarding the Nigerian civil war had irritated Presidents Houphouet-Boigny and Bongo. Thus, encouraged by France, they may have decided to take “revenge” by boycotting OAU policy on South Africa. The Ivory Coast’s desire for a new form of relationship with South Africa is understood to have had the full support of France’s President, Georges Pompidou. Some circles in Paris even claimed that President Houphouet-Boigny’s policy had been personally master-minded by Georges Pompidou.9
Pretoria, of course, played an important role in preparing the campaign for dialogue. Its ties with Abidjan were largely maintained through ABF Burger, who, until August 1969, had headed the Africa Division in the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and since then had been the South African ambassador to France. ABF Burger worked together closely with Jacques Foccart, President Pompidou’s adviser for Afro-Malagasy affairs and Jean Mauricheau- Beaupré, a top aide to President Houphouet-Boigny.10
7 O. Aluko: The Foreign policy of African States, p. 125. 8 D. C. Bach: La France et L’Afrique du Sud: Histoire, mythes et enjeux contemporaines, p. 210. 9 African Communist, 1971, p 25. 10 A. Urnov: South Africa against Africa 1966-1986, p. 85.
80 According to reports in the journal Africa Confidential, a secret meeting between Vorster and Houphouet-Boigny took place during the South African premier’s visit to France in June 1970. “There is little doubt,” wrote the journal, “that the South Africans were informed about the Ivory Coast leader's press conference plans in advance.” The South African proposal, advanced in September 1970 to conclude “a non-aggression pact”, could also be regarded as part of the plans for preparing the press conference.11 The Western powers did all they could to get the idea of “dialogue” off the ground. In February 1971, President Georges Pompidou visited Mauritania, Senegal, the Ivory Coast, the Cameroon and Gabon. “The South African issue, in fact, probably constituted the most powerful reason for the visit”, noted The African Communist, “despite the fact that it was hardly mentioned in reports about the tour in the Western press.”12
Nevertheless, the Ivory Coast and Gabon did not approve of the South African government’s apartheid policy. On the contrary, they wanted to see substantial change away from discrimination in South Africa. This stand in its criticism of the apartheid policy was demonstrated on many occasions. During a press conference on 28 April 1971, the Ivorian President, for example, said that apartheid revolted not only Africans but all those who believed in man. In a message to the Secretary General of the UN during the international year against apartheid in 1978, President Bongo of Gabon, who at this time was the chairman of the OAU, expressed his hope for the end of “this contemptible system, which is [an] offence to mankind” in an appeal for the great powers to put an end to the apartheid policy.13
4.3 Dialogue policy strategy As mentioned earlier, President Houphouet-Boigny on 2 July 1971 declared resolutely that he would maintain a policy of peace in Africa based on the complete neutrality of the African continent, even if he was alone. He said that the minority (supporters of dialogue) would not accept the will of the majority (opponents of dialogue). “I categorically refuse to accept this decision,” emphasised President Houphouet-Boigny, when he announced that he would continue to try to find ways to establish a dialogue, even if alone. This latter prospect, however, was not
11 Africa Confidential, 1971, p. 3. 12 African Communist, 1971, p. 25. 13 L’Union, 23 March 1978.
81 shared by all and the President of the Ivory Coast tried to unite those who were likeminded for joint action. The newspaper Rapport on 27 June 1971, reported on an interview during which he stated that he intended shortly to call a meeting of states who were in favour of dialogue, to work out practical measures for its implementation.14
It obviously was in connection with this initiative that the President of Gabon, who had received President Maga of Dahomey at Libreville one month earlier, paid an official visit to the Ivory Coast. He arrived on 4 July and went back on 6 July 1971. The purpose of this visit was to coordinate the strategies of the dialogue policy. According to a telegram sent by the French Embassy in the Ivory Coast, President Bongo, asked about his sentiment on the dialogue with South Africa, said that his view always had been the same as that of the Ivorian leader. For him, dialogue constituted the most effective approach to the solution of the problem of apartheid in South Africa. Those who thought that guns would make it possible to solve the apartheid issue, were deeply wrong and the minority would not accept the will of the majority. He declared that the future would verify the minority that advocated dialogue, not war.15
After President Bongo of Gabon had spoken out in support of the dialogue, other leaders, such as Prime Minister Busia of Ghana and, in a more cautious manner, the Foreign Minister of Togo and the President of Niger, during the same month also expressed their support for dialogue. A secret meeting between President Houphouet-Boigny and Prime Minister Busia, which also took place in July, was similarly devoted to questions relating to the dialogue and a delegation from Lesotho made a secret visit to a number of African countries, including the Ivory Coast, with the purpose of planning and coordinating strategies for dialogue.16
Therefore, after the OAU at its summit conference in July 1971 seemed to have succeeded in blocking the attempt by Ivory Coast President Houphouet-Boigny to carry out the initiative for dialogue with South Africa, a group of countries, the so-called Dialogue Club, met in October 1971, on the occasion of Lesotho’s independence celebrations in Maseru, to plan their future
14A. Urnov: South Africa against Africa 1966-1986, pp. 91-98. 15 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ Ivory Coast/1970s: Telegram No 21047-048/DD from French Embassy of Ivory Coast, 7 July 1971. 16 A. Urnov: South Africa against Africa 1966-1986, pp. 91-98.
82 strategy in favour of dialogue with South Africa. According to Prime Minister L Jonathan, representatives of 11 countries (Botswana, the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Zaire, Lesotho, Mauritius, Madagascar, Malawi, Nigeria, Swaziland and Uganda) attended these consultations. Some observers said that it was an unofficial mission. But the evidence shows that Houphouet- Boigny’s proposal was discussed in Maseru at the time of the consultations for finding for a formula for dialogue.17 It was a notable feat for all Africa and this improvised meeting of the dialogue club at Maseru during the 5th anniversary of Lesotho’s Independence celebrations gave new impetus to the attempt to work towards a policy for dialogue.
The place of this first meeting was significant due to the fact that Lesotho, situated in the South African territory, literally had existed under South Africa’s surveillance, depending on it economically for many years. This choice expressed the willingness of Pretoria to accelerate the dialogue policy process. In fact, both sections (supporters of dialogue and South Africa) used the festivities around the Lesotho Independence Day to institute the practical steps of the dialogue policy. The South African Government was encouraged by these developments, despite the heavy defeat of the pro-dialogue club at the OAU summit. The Prime Minister of Lesotho, in his welcoming speech castigated those who advocated war against South Africa without any concern for South African black people.18
Their spokesman summed up the position in June 1971 as follows: The rejection of dialogue with South Africa was a clear one, but the substantial minority that did not go along with the anti-South African vote should not be ignored. Four years previously South Africa had had dealings with only four black African countries, but contact or potential contact had been trebled to include eleven countries within the space of few years,. This was not insignificant as pointer to current trends towards moderation in Africa, despite the insistent radical voice. The OAU had rejected dialogue and the dialogue club would be compelled to go it alone. The significance of the 1971 OAU summit was that an important minority had voiced its support for dialogue and had served notice that it was to press ahead with its plans despite opposition from the majority.19
17 Jeunne Afrique, 9 October 1971, p. 14. 18 Ibid. 19 C. Legum: Dialogue: Africa’s great debate, p. 1.
83 While the dialogue club was meeting in Maseru, President Houphouet-Boigny, on 4 October 1971, announced that he and other Black African leaders who supported dialogue with South Africa would send a joint delegation to Pretoria. But President Houphouet-Boigny, in exposing the strategy of the dialogue policy in an interview published by the government paper “Fraternié Matin”, did not indicate a date for the delegation’s trip. About the first stage in the dialogue policy, the Ivorian President said: “My friends and I will send a delegation to Pretoria to make contact with South African Prime Minister John Vorster and his colleagues. The latter will also send us in their return a delegation to continue dialogue with us. If, as I hope, these contacts prove to be encouraging, I shall then not hesitate to go to South Africa, with certain of my colleagues (other heads of States) and to invite Vorster to visit us also.”President Houphouet- Boigny added that he would revise his position, if his policy had no effect on apartheid.20
Simultaneously, Usher Assouan, the Ivorian Foreign Affairs Minister, repeated the Ivorian President’s declaration to the Assembly of the United Nations in New York. He said that the solution recommended by President Houphouet-Boigny was following its course. He mentioned that the Foreign Affairs Ministries of African countries in favour of dialogue had met in New York and that they had agreed to meet again in Gabon in the near future, with the goal of coordinating their strategy of dialogue with South Africa. After this meeting it would be decided to send a delegation to South Africa.21 Two days later, N’Dia Koffi, the head of the Ivorian delegation at Lesotho’s independence celebrations in Maseru made a stopover in Pretoria. Abidjan regarded this as an exploratory visit and it was categorised as private.22
The scene was set for multilateral activity between dialogue supporting States and South Africa. The year ended as it had started, with supporters of dialogue in the focus of attention: what would they do next?
20 South African DFA, 1/179/3 vol.1: Mail from Agence France Presse to the Department of Information in Pretoria, 4 October 1974. 21 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ Ivory Coast/1970s: Telegram No 21468-75/DD from French Ministry of Foreign Affairs to French Embassy of Ivory Coast, of 4 October 1971, and Fraternité Matin, 4 October 1971. 22 South African DFA, 1/179/3 vol. 1: Telegram No 172 from South African Embassy of Paris, 29 September 1971; Fraternité Matin, 4 October 1971, and Jeunne Afrique, 9 October 1971, p. 14.
84 4.4 Dialogue policy activities The peak of the activities was approached after Houphouet-Boigny set out his plan for a stage- by-stage development of the policy of dialogue with South Africa on 4 October 1971. In the context of the development of multilateral activities between dialogue-supporting States and South Africa, the first stage of the dialogue policy’s strategy set up subsequently, materialised in a number of State visits. Those state visits took place between South Africa and some dialogue club countries, such as the Ivory Coast and Gabon. We will focus on some of these state visits according to their importance, for instance the visit by the Ivorian Minister of States, N’Dia, to South Africa; the Prime Minister of South Africa, JB Vorster’s visit to Abidjan; the Ivorian Information Minister Laurent Dona-Fologo’s visit to South Africa; and President Frederick de Klerk’s visit to the Ivory Coast.
Thus, in the framework of the application of the first stage of dialogue policy strategy, with the Ivory Coast’s mission to Lesotho’s independence celebrations headed by the Minister of State, Dr Koffi N’Dia immediately afterwards flew from Lesotho to South Africa. The members of the mission arrived in South Africa for a three-day visit on 6 October 1971. They were given an official reception and had discussions with senior cabinet ministers. But in an interview with the Sunday Times, Dr N’Dia said that his visit was of a private and not of an official nature. According to Abidjan, the purpose of this visit was to see on the spot how ready Pretoria was to link the dialogue to a relaxation of apartheid. On his return to the Ivory Coast, Dr N’Dia claimed that he had received substantial guarantees on this matter. Dr N’Dia met Prime Minister Vorster as well as the Minister of Defence at a dinner arranged for him with other leading South Africa personalities.23
Analysis of Dr N’dia’s visit suggests that it was the Ivory Coast mission’s first official contact with South Africans on South African soil. The prominence given to Dr N’Dia’s visit (which was turned into a virtual state visit) upset President Houphouet-Boigny, who only authorised an unofficial visit, but so keen was the South African Government to boost the event that they caused serious trouble for the Ivorian envoy. It was pointed out that some official arrangements
23 South African DFA, 1/179/3 vol. 1: Telegram No 172 from South African Embassy of Paris, 29 September 1971; Fraternité Matin, 4 October 1971, and Jeunne Afrique, 9 October 1971, p. 14.
85 even were made despite the Ivorian President’s angry reaction to the prominence given to the event.
According to telegram No. 172 of 27 September, the Embassy in Paris advised the Department that Minister of state N’Dia Koffi of the Ivory Coast, accompanied by his Director of Cabinet, a member of parliament and an interpreter, would arrive in South Africa on 1 October 1971, en route to Lesotho’s independence celebrations. The telegram added that this information was reported to Prime Minister Vorster, who expressed his pleasure at the proposed visit and gave instructions that all necessary steps should be taken to make it a success. He added that all expenses would be borne by the South African Government.24
From this we can conclude that the visit was official, despite efforts by the Ivory Coast President to stress its private nature and the fact that it was not a step in his dialogue programme. Nevertheless, the press made much of the official significance of the visit. In fact, a report from Maseru prior to the Dr N’Dia’s visit to South Africa quoted him as saying that his President would accept an official invitation to visit South Africa with pleasure and he also speculated that he would discuss arrangements for a visit to South Africa by President Houphouet-Boigny with Prime Minister Vorster during his visit. Such an initiative could not be taken by Minister N’Dia without the blessing of his President.
It is doubtful that it was a coincidence, that meetings between the Foreign Ministers of South Africa and the Ivory Coast who were attending the 26th Session of the UN General Assembly were held in New York on the day of N’Dia’s departure. At a press conference, Usher Assouan stated that five or six African countries that supported dialogue had agreed to hold a meeting of foreign ministers on the question of sending a joint ministerial level delegation to South Africa. He said that Pretoria was ready to receive the delegation and that Gabon was considered the most likely place for the meeting.25
24 South African DFA, 1/179/3 vol. 1: Telegram No 172 from South African Embassy of Paris, 29 September 1971; Fraternité Matin, 4 October 1971, and Jeunne Afrique, 9 October 1971, p. 14. 25 South African DFA, 1/179/3 vol. 1: Telegram No 172 from South African Embassy of Paris, 29 September 1971; Fraternité Matin, 4 October 1971, and Jeunne Afrique, 9 October 1971, p. 14.
86 Gabon formally reiterated its approval of dialogue with South Africa on 20 October 1971 and declared willingness to take part in a conference of like-minded African countries, but stipulated that it favoured dialogue in the context of the Lusaka Manifesto. The Lusaka Manifesto, issued in April 1969 by the fifth Summit Conference of 14 East and Central African States, stated that compromise and peaceful methods of struggle with South Africa were to be desired, but only if peaceful progress to emancipation were or became possible. Otherwise, the African countries had no choice but to give increasing support to those fighting for their freedom.
A Gabonese Government statement issued by the Cabinet under President Albert Bernard Bongo noted that some countries had adopted the Lusaka Manifesto in its entirety. The declaration continued to say that, following the example of President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, several States had advocated the initiation of a dialogue with South Africa. Others, though, rejected the principle (of dialogue) in the final Mogadishu communiqué. For its part, Gabon maintained the position it had held since 1969. In the context of the Lusaka Manifesto, it favoured opening a dialogue with South Africa, a step which corresponded to its deeply held political convictions concerning the spirit which should inspire both internal and external relations.26
In the final Mogadishu communiqué, which the Gabonese declaration implicitly criticised, a majority of the 14 delegations at the seventh East and Central African Summit Conference held in Mogadishu earlier that week advocated armed action against South Africa. Responding to a proposal by the Ivory Coast, the Gabonese Cabinet concluded its declaration with a call for meetings of all Africans as provided under the Lusaka Manifesto. Gabon was determined to take part in such meetings, whether they were held in Libreville or in some other capital on the continent, the declaration said.27
In early November 1971, the Gabon government declared that it would be honoured to receive the participants of the conference in Libreville, as long as their work would be based on the Lusaka Manifesto. A month later President Bongo affirmed his support for dialogue, hut
26 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ Ivory Coast/1970s: Telegram No 21588-591/DD from French Embassy of Ivory Coast, 20 October 1971, and Agence France Presse, 22 October 1971. 27 Ibid.
87 expressed perplexity at the mention of Libreville as a venue for a conference.28 As a result, neither the conference nor the visit of the delegation to South Africa took place.
In the context of the activities linked to the dialogue policy, South African Prime Minister Vorster paid an official visit to the Ivory Coast on 22 September 1974. He was accompanied by Secretary of Foreign Affairs Brand Fourie, General HJ van den Berg, head of the Bureau of State Security, the secretary for information, Dr Eschel Rhoodie, and General Mike Geldenhuys. After leaving Cape Town in a South African Airways Boeing 707, under highly secretive circumstances at 2 a.m. on Saturday 22 September 1974, they met Presidents Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast and President Senghor of Senegal (Senghor had voted against dialogue at the OAU’s Summit of June 1971) in President Houphouet-Boigny’s hometown, Yamoussoukro. They returned in the early hours of Monday 24 September.29
In an interview, Prime Minister Vorster explained that his two days of talks with the President of the Ivory Coast had been very fruitful and enlightening and had covered a wide range of subjects, including the relationship between South Africa and the Ivory Coast, world problems and the problems of Africa. “It was an exchange of ideas in connection with all conditions. I want to say I was impressed by the insight which the President showed into world and general problems.”
He added a warm tribute to the Ivorian President as a great statesman and a person who showed great wisdom. He also praised the Ivorian President for his courtesy, hospitality and the fine security arrangements made for the visit. Asked what the main advantages flowing from his visit were, Vorster said they were all “part of the process of normalising relations”. “As you know, the President has been in favour of dialogue over a number of years.” The President was “a very easy man talk to”. At the press conference, Vorster also said that the Ivory Coast had been the
28 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ Ivory Coast/1970s: Telegram No 21909-910/DD from French Embassy of Ivory Coast, 29 November 1971. 29 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ Ivory Coast/1970s: Telegram No 354 from French Embassy of South Africa, 16 May 1975; J. Baulin: La politique Africaine d’Houphouet-Boigny, p. 207, and The Star, 15 May 1975.
88 host country and did a fine job, for which he had great regard. He also mentioned that his visit to the Ivory Coast was on President Houphouet-Boigny initiative.30
An analysis of Vorster’s visit to the Ivory Coast, suggests that the choice was based on Vorster’s judgement that Ivory Coast had such political influence in African political matters that South Africa’s ambition of being accepted by the continent could be achieved by securing Ivory Coast support. Given the fact that the Ivory Coast belonged to Francophone Africa and had especially good relations with Paris, France may have played a role in Vorster’s visit. As some African States were preparing to have discussions with Pretoria, such a visit was welcomed and may have motivated other African States to put the dialogue policy in practice.
According to statistics from Pretoria, 1245 officials from black African countries had also visited South Africa during the 1974 budgetary year. Two hundred of them were from Rhodesia, Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho. In the same period, South Africa had made official contact with twelve different African countries and ten were visited by one hundred and fifty South African officials. The South African Government, however, did not reveal the identities of these countries to protect their leaders from criticism.31 There also were numerous reports that Vorster’s envoys were visiting the countries that supported dialogue during the spring of 1974. 32 These statistics illustrate that South Africa’s détente policy and the Ivory Coast and Gabon’s dialogue policy were scoring success during this period, despite being boycotted by the OAU.
On 10 September 1975, a new bridge was crossed in the development of the dialogue policy’s activities when the Ivorian Minister of Information, Dona-Fologo, was allowed by his President and his party (Ivory Coast Democratic Party) to respond favourably to the invitation issued by his colleague, South African Information Minister Dr Connie Mulder.
September 1975 brought official confirmation of the Ivory Coast’s decision to send its Minister of Information, Dona-Fologo, on an official visit to South Africa. According to the official
30 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ Ivory Coast/1970s: Telegram No 354 from French Embassy of South Africa, 16 May 1975; J. Baulin: La politique Africaine d’Houphouet-Boigny, p. 207, and The Star, 15 May 1975. 31 Agence France Presse, 17 July 1975. 32 A. Urnov: South Africa against Africa 1966-198, pp. 98.
89 communiqué of the Ivory Coast Democratic Party of 9 September 1975, President Houphouet- Boigny approved the invitation for Dona-Fologo to visit South Africa officially. The purpose of this visit was not only to enable a member of the Government and a professional journalist such as Dona-Fologo to undertake an on-the-spot study of the South African situation, but also to provide an opportunity for Dona-Fologo to observe the evolution of relations between the various racial communities that made up the Republic of South Africa.
The information thus collected on the spot by one of the Ivorian people and not merely those reported by others would enable President Houphouet-Boigny to assess the results of the dialogue policy deliberately entered into by the Ivory Coast. Indeed, this dialogue that some people who were set and bogged down in their passionate and rigid attitudes disapproved of was going on with ever increasing intensity across the world. How could Vorster hold talks geared towards finding an honourable and African solution to the Rhodesian problem while at the same refusing to employ the same means to put an end to the South African problem?33
In any case, the observations made on the spot by the Ivorian Information Minister would allow the Ivory Coast the liberty and objectivity to reaffirm its faith in the future of Africa, a future which would not be bright if the continent could not avoid the war and the violence that other people had suffered for a long time and in a dramatic way. The Ivory Coast remained convinced that the only way to avoid this peril, was one of dialogue.34
The Ivorian Information Minister, Dona-Fologo, accompanied by his white wife for whom the apartheid laws had to be waived, finally arrived in South Africa on an unconditional mission of dialogue and peace on 10 September 1975. After landing, he told the press that the Ivory Coast was a country of tolerance, freedom, peace and justice. He added that his country had chosen the path of dialogue and negotiation rather than war and violence and that he, whatever the facts, had to take home the most accurate witness of life in South Africa. Asked about the possibility of diplomatic relations being established between South Africa and Ivory Coast, he said: “It is still
33 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ Ivory Coast/1970s: Official communiqué from the Ivory Coast’s Democratic Party, 9 September 1975. 34 Ibid.
90 too soon to say, but everything is possible if we can achieve peace”.35 Therefore, in a mission for peace and dialogue, no sacrifice would be spared, not even sacrifice of self-respect in the search for peace through dialogue. It seems clear that the Ivorian Information Minister pointed out the real motives for his visit by stressing that the visit was based on faith in the search for peace, but should not be taken to mean that the Ivory Coast approved the apartheid policy.
At a banquet given in his honour by the Foreign Affairs Association in Johannesburg, Dona- Fologo reaffirmed his country’s commitment to détente and the peaceful resolution of problems that existed between countries in Africa. He made it clear, though, that the search for reconciliation had to be conducted in mutual respect for the sovereignty of the different countries of Africa. He launched a strong attack on apartheid, saying that “at least one poison on this African land was South African racism”. He called for “a multi-racial society to be set up in South Africa to make it a place where a man can be a man, which is to say not just able to walk, eat and drink, but also to vote”. 36
In examining Dona-Fologo’s visit, it becomes clear that this visit was well prepared by President Houphouet-Boigny himself. The visit, in fact, constituted a victory for South African diplomacy and the policy of dialogue between South Africa and black African countries. Furthermore, an official trip to South Africa by a Minister of a West African country took place for the first time. This visit constituted an important step in the South African Government’s efforts towards normalising relations with black African countries.
Dona-Fologo’s visit also brought into the open a series of public and official exchanges between South Africa and the Ivory Coast, which had involved top level official exchanges in both directions. Significantly, it firmly committed President Houphouet-Boigny to active, public and official participation in cabinet level exchanges with the South African Government. The fact that the visit was public and official and had the backing of the Ivory Coast President, suggested that President Houphouet-Boigny had achieved considerable success in overcoming internal OAU pressure. In other words, the decision of the Ivory Coast to allow its Minister to pay an
35 C. Legum: Vorster’s gamble for Africa, pp. 26-27 and Rand Daily Mail, 11 September 1975, p. 18. 36 Ibid.
91 official visit to South Africa took the country into the sphere of active participation in South Africa’s détente policy.
In the framework of the dialogue policy activities, President De Klerk arrived in the Ivory Coast on 20 December 1989 to meet President Houphouet-Boigny, Africa’s elder statesman who had been advocating dialogue with South Africa since 1971. He followed in the steps of his predecessors PW Botha and BJ Vorster, both of whom had met the Ivory Coast leader. President De Klerk, who had met the heads of state of Zaire, Zambia, Mozambique and Lesotho after August of that year, stressed the need for cooperation between all African States, with the purpose of offering the hand of friendship to the rest of Africa. Like those before him, he believed one of South Africa’s most important paths to acceptance by the outside world lay through Africa.37 While in Ivory Coast, State President De Klerk expressed his readiness to admit South Africa’s faults and willingness to take leaders of other countries into his confidence regarding the reforms he was planning.38
This visit to the Ivory Coast marked another important stage in dialogue policy activities. Compared with Vorster and PW Botha’s visit, neither South African leader had admitted South Africa’s faults concerning apartheid policy in public. This was the turning of a new page in the history of South Africa and increasing the chances of dismantling apartheid by negotiation and dialogue, as advocated by the Ivory Coast and Gabon since the early 1970s. President De Klerk’s visit was therefore seen as an opportunity for South Africa and the Ivory Coast to coordinate their policies with the goal of ending apartheid. As the elder statesman of Africa and leader of the Francophone States, the Ivorian leader had done what he could to use his influence to project South Africa as a country that was changing significantly and deserved to be accepted by the rest of Africa.
Contrary to the Ivory Coast, Gabon did not wait for the establishment of dialogue policy activities to have contact with South Africa after the OAU anti-dialogue decision. In fact, the first official activity between Gabon and South Africa dates from 1968, when Prof Chris Barnard
37 The Argus, 1 December 1989. 38 The Citizen, 2 December 1989.
92 and Jack Penn, a renowned plastic surgeon, paid an official visit to Gabon with Philippe Doumenc, a Johannesburg-based manager of a French airline (United Air Transport).39 They returned from this visit with the information that two Gabonese doctors wanted to visit South Africa to study certain developments in the medical field. In May 1969, the South African Government responded positively to that hope by saying it would be happy to make arrangements for such a visit and also bear expenses. Three medical doctors consequently visited South Africa in August of the same year.40
This seems to have laid the foundation for the framework of Gabon’s activities in the development of the dialogue policy with South Africa. South Africa’s growing contact with black African states, notably with French-speaking states, in an effort to be useful and helpful to other countries in Africa in the economic and technical fields, was illustrated by Prof Chris Barnard and Jack Penn’s visit to Gabon. On 20 August of the same year, the South African Prime Minister informed President Bongo of South Africa’s willingness to deploy an economic mission in Gabon. After one month, the President gave his accord for the realisation of this mission. He furthermore requested that representatives from the mining, agricultural, industrial, fisheries, road-planning and pharmacy sectors be included in that mission.41 The mission was deployed in April 1970, and this matter will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
4.5 Consequences of the policy of dialogue As a reflection of the good relations established between South Africa and Gabon, Gabonese authorities as from 9 June 1975 allowed aircraft of the South Africa Airways Company to fly over Gabonese territory and to use the Franceville airport as a technical stop on the routes between South Africa and Europe.42
39 Union des Transports Aériens (UTA) (1963-1990) was a French international airline. It operated principally between France and former French colonial possessions in Africa and the Indian Ocean, as well as to destinations in Southeast Asia. 40 South African DFA, /178/3, vol.1: Telegram No 52, from the Secretary of Foreign Affairs at Pretoria to South Africa Embassy of Paris, 20 May 1969 and Jack Penn letter to Mr. Burger, Johannesburg 30 June 1969. 41 South African DFA, /178/3, vol.1: Hilgard letter to President Bongo of Gabon, 20 August 1969. 42 South Africa DFA, /178/3 vol.5: Special permission No276/SGAC, Republic of Gabon, General Secretary of Civil flying, 9 June 1975.
93 This period marked the beginning of the exchanges (meat, fruits and vegetables) between Libreville and Rhodesia (Rhodesia was under an international embargo). Gabon thereby became an important transit place for traffic between Rhodesia and European airports. The liaisons were assured by two Gabonese airline companies: the Gabonese cargo Airline Company (AFFRETAIR, which operated from 1975 to 1982) and Air Gabon which was created in line with Rhodesian private interests, with the authorisation of the Gabonese Government.43 Such activities suited the goal of assisting the South African government to overcome the negative consequences of its apartheid policy and to show the international community that the dialogue policy was working. By taking this decision, Gabonese authorities were conscious of possible attacks from the OAU, but they fearlessly decided to break OAU sanctions by allowing SAA refuelling and technical stopover rights, with the goal of materialising the policy of dialogue with South Africa.
Dona-Fologo visited South Africa again and undertook a successful tour as the initial contacts had opened the way to better relations. The way was opened for airplanes belonging to South African Airways to stop and refuel at Abidjan on north- and south-bound flights. On 21 January 1976, President Houphouet-Boigny conveyed the approval of Ivory Coast authorities for the institution of weekly technical stopovers and refuelling at Abidjan for South African Airways airplanes on north-south flights, for reasons that he called “humanitarian”.
Subsequently, an indication was given that there would be no objection to South African Airways airplanes enjoying passenger, postal and freight traffic rights. The South African authorities accordingly submitted an official request for these traffic rights on 28 April 1976. The service for the South African Airways technical stopover was commenced on 5 May 1976. Following this, Magnus Britz was sent to Abidjan on 25 March 1977 as the South African Airways Representative, assisted by his wife.44
In addition, several positive aspects of the dialogue policy were recorded in South Africa. The South African Home Affairs and Information Minister, Dr Mulder, declared in Fraternité Matin,
43 D. C. Bach: La France et l’Afrique du Sud: Histoire, mythes et enjeux contemporains, p. 210. 44South African DFA, /178/3, vol.8 and 11: South African Airways official notes, AIR/S19/222; AIR/S19/12, 25 March 1977.
94 on 23 March 1976: “For some time now our Prime Minister and all our other Ministers have opened their doors to any leaders to discuss any problem. And it is normal that we learn to find one another after these discussions”. In quoting the tangible and palpable results of dialogue, he mentioned the independence of the Transkei on 26 October 1976; the amelioration of certain criticised measures (open hotels for all); the nomination of coloureds and blacks to statutory bodies where they could freely participate in discussions and in decisions concerning their own populations and the rest of the community and, lastly, sport involving multiracial teams. In the same context, the Catholic Church of South Africa had decided to open some two hundred white schools to Blacks.45
All these changes provided proof of the materialisation of the South African détente policy and the Ivory Coast and Gabon’s policy of dialogue. Such results should have convinced other black African States to make public contact with South Africa or change the OAU view towards South Africa, but that was not the case. The South African Minister did not fail to underline the importance of Dona-Fologo’s visit to South Africa in the matter. He recognised that Dona- Fologo did an excellent job.
Despite these positive changes brought about by the dialogue, the OAU strongly criticised the dialogue policy activities. The OAU emphasised its determination to continue to support the South African nationalist movements. In fact, in OAU eyes, a policy of dialogue was a danger to the African community: largess from South Africa towards the countries in favour of dialogue could not be a determinant for the economy of such countries. It could not be received without political compromises. Such compromises would result in the isolation of the South African nationalist movements for which the OAU’s aid was insufficient.
From this point of view, President Houphouet-Boigny was violently attacked by the OAU members (President Sékou Touré of Conakry Guinea accused the Ivorian President of being a traitor and a divider of Africa)46 after having received a South African ministerial delegation in Abidjan (Vorster’s visit). In addition, the Ivory Coast initiative to authorise its State Minister, Dr
45 Fraternité Matin, 23 March 1976, p. 18. 46 O. Aluku: The foreign policies of African State, p. 130.
95 N’Dia, to visit South Africa was strongly criticised at the summit conference of the East and Central African states which met in Mogadishu from 18 to 20 October 1971.
The Mogadishu declaration repeated its members’ firm opposition to dialogue with South Africa. This result was achieved by taking a consensus opinion and so avoiding a vote. The communiqué at the end of the meeting said that they had examined the implications of the visit by one of the Heads of State to South Africa, and declared that their feeling was that there was no other way of liberating Southern Africa than armed struggle.47
President Houphouet-Boigny, by sending Dona-Fologo, his Information Minister, to South Africa to encourage inter-racial dialogue on apartheid once again provoked violent protest from the OAU in 1975. The visit did not increase the Ivorian government’s popularity with an OAU in the process of trying to isolate South Africa politically and economically.48 Nevertheless, President Houphouet-Boigny continued his dialogue policy with successive regimes in South Africa by receiving BJ Vorster on 22 September 1974; PW Botha on 25 October 1988 and FW De Klerk in 1989.
In examining the OAU attitude, it seems to us that the OAU should have been flexible and should have revised its position towards South Africa. Taking into account the positive changes brought about by the dialogue, the wisest attitude that the OAU could have adopted was to bring the matter to the table for discussion. Although the progress was almost imperceptible, it had the merit of making South African authorities aware of the danger of the apartheid policy. The positive results that were recorded provided a strong signal for the long walk to the processes for ending apartheid in South Africa to begin. The OAU therefore had no right or excuse to ignore the progress which needed to be encouraged.
Are we able to conclude, from what is mentioned above, that the dialogue policy with South Africa was successful? If, as is asserted in politics, the final result constitutes the only criterion of success, we can conclude that the Ivory Coast and Gabon had failed. In fact, their failure
47 C. Legum: Dialogue Africa’s great debate, p. 16. 48 The Star, 27 May 1988, p. 11.
96 seems total because their efforts to convince black African states to follow their example in dealing with South Africa did not produce any positive result or bring about any change in the South African apartheid policy. Ivorian diplomacy, on the contrary, led to isolation within the OAU.
They perceived themselves as preaching in the desert when they concluded, in 1978, that their peaceful approach was not producing significant change in South Africa’s apartheid policy. About this goal, the Ivorian Minister of State, Denise August, said: “One of the principal hopes for dialogue which was launched in 1971 by the Ivory Coast’s President Houphouet-Boigny, was that it would spur increased racial tolerance and positive inter-racial contact. We hoped that the South African whites would understand the need for change. But it seems that they did not understand. Vorster’s government has told us they cannot make changes without facing a revolution”. In addition, Liberia’s President Tolbert said: “We have been disappointed that more has not been done to match words with actions.”49
In spite of this acknowledgement, we can affirm that the dialogue policy was successful because the apartheid policy was brought to an end through dialogue among South African people. This certainly did not come about in the context and direction advocated by the Ivorian president and his supporters, but their contacts with South Africa may have produced the change in the view of South African leaders for the future of South Africa and South Africa’s position in Africa. In any case it is clear that the Ivory Coast and Gabon were simply wrong in being right too soon by opening dialogue and dealing with South Africa when the African community and even the International community were calling for the isolation of South Africa.
4.6 Conclusion In choosing for dialogue with South Africa despite the OAU’s disapproval, the Ivory Coast and Gabon were motivated by the fact that its was a mistake to think that there was no alternative but war to get rid of apartheid. If peace was to be brought to Africa they must engage in dialogue. In any event, dialogue could be essential one day, whether it comes before war or after war. It was
49 Africa research bulletin, 30 June 1978.
97 infinitely preferable to engage in dialogue as early as possible in order to avoid war, which, could never settle anything.
To my mind, if the reality imposed on all Africans had been the fundamental and permanent necessity of cooperation between Africa people, it was important to prepare for the future by organising a framework for such cooperation that took into account economic and human realities. This is what the Ivory Coast and Gabon tried to do by advocating dialogue with South Africa. Dialogue with South Africa did not involve a contradiction of the condemnation of apartheid or suggest approval of the apartheid policy. The path of dialogue and negotiation advocated by the Ivory Coast and Gabon seemed to be the only logical way to bring about a peaceful solution with regard to the apartheid policy. Such a solution could serve to formalise the economic and trade relations which already existed between South Africa and most of the African countries. In addition, it could contribute to the development of African society.
From this study, one point stands out clearly. It appeared that, apart from Houphouet-Boigny and Bongo’s initiatives in favour of dialogue with South Africa, which were supplemented by governmental activities, there were no positive responses from the public regarding such a policy. Ivorian and Gabonese people were well informed about what was going on between South Africa and their respective countries, but they showed no enthusiasm for these overtures, apparently for moral reasons. Thus, during the technical assistance mission to Gabon (27 September to 3 October 1970) conducted by Dr Boyazoglu and Brig. Gilliland, the delegation was interested to note that the Gabonese showed no fiery enthusiasm towards their President concerning his foreign policy towards South Africa.50
The lack of enthusiasm and indifference were founded on the fact that the Ivorian and Gabonese public did not agree with the policy initiated by their respective governments through Presidents Houphouet-Boigny and Bongo. They could not express their opinion publicly, though, for fear of being targeted by the regime. One must simply bear in mind that the Ivory Coast and Gabon were not democratic countries at the time. Both countries to some extent were under a
50 South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol.1: The technical assistance to Gabon summary of dispatches 1970/72.
98 “dictatorial regime” and public reaction against the view of the President could be regarded as a crime against the regime and could be punished.
It is also important to point out that Roger Pfister in his work did not analyse the dialogue policy as it has been done here. His work, in fact, presents the developments leading to the dialogue strategy that dominated Pretoria’s African policy from about 1969 to 1973 and his analysis is focused on the chronology of the principal South African actors in the dialogue policy and on the contribution of South Africa in the development of some African countries such as Gabon and the Ivory Coast on behalf of the dialogue policy.
According to his work, the military initially was the principal actor with regard to dialogue, and was heavily reliant on cooperation with France and two of its former key colonies in Francophone Africa (Gabon and the Ivory Coast), as well as engaging in rivalry with the foreign service officials who were hoping to profit from their efforts. Furthermore, Pfister makes no mention of the main reasons why the Ivory Coast and Gabon chose to have and maintain a dialogue policy with regard to South Africa and what their main activities in materialising such overtures were, as are pointed out in this chapter.
Apart from the reasons mentioned and the activities undertaken with regard to the dialogue policy, the French role in the Ivory Coast and Gabon’s choice of such a dialogue needs to be examined. In fact, the close links with France and its former colonies seem to have influenced their choice of dialogue with South Africa. The idea of dialogue was fully in accordance with France. Many sources confirm that the President of the Ivory Coast acted not so much as the author of the idea, but as executor. The next chapter (Chapter 5) focuses on clarifying this.
99 CHAPTER FIVE: THE ROLE OF FRANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA’S RELATIONS WITH THE IVORY COAST AND GABON
5.1 Introduction France’s African policy never ceases to intrigue. The drastic changes which swept through the world after 1945 left France with the status of a secondary power in an international system where Soviet-American domination seemed unchallenged. With the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the cold war, France went to great lengths to break out the inconsequential position for which it seemed destined. To this end, it summoned up the classic and diverse means of the powerful, from nuclear weapons through to industrial policy or even the promotion of language. France’s African policy was and is still in keeping with this framework. Therefore, the consistency with which the different governments of the Fifth Republic worked to preserve and reinforce the ties between the former colonial power (France) and the newly independent African States was based on France’s desire to perpetuate its influence on Africa in general and on Francophone African Countries in particular.
Francophone Africa for its part continued to affirm its loyalty to France. Its elites were hardly inclined to call for independence in the beginning of the 1960’s. For Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast and Léon Mba of Gabon the desire for Black Africans to be citizens of France prevailed.1 Houphouet-Boigny, an enthusiastic supporter of the Franco-African Community, which he dreamed of seeing develop into a federation integrating France with very distinct national communities, did not accept the transformation of this community into a kind of confederation of independent states after the constitutional change of 1960. Disappointed by this development, he led his country to total independence on 7th August 1960. However, he did not break his tie with France, and one of his first actions in foreign policy was to reaffirm the attachment of the Ivory Coast to France. Continuity and realism seem to have been the essential characteristics of the Ivorian Foreign policy.2
1 C. Alden and G. Martin: France and South Africa: towards a new engagement with Africa, p. 13. 2 O. Aluko: The foreign Policies of African States, p. 119.
100 The relations between Francophone African countries and their former colonial power were interdependent. While in need of French military support and economic assistance, most Francophone Black African leaders accepted being part of the French system. They continued to regard themselves as belonging to the intellectual and political life of the former colonial power, and it accorded them certain grandeur to be received by the French President on the same footing as the US President, for example. For France, on the other hand, the wielding of power in Francophone Africa was central to its ambition of becoming a global power in world politics, a situation that gave these countries some form of leverage. This applied particularly to Ivorian President Houphouet-Boigny who influenced Paris to become involved in the Nigerian Civil War. Similar to Pretoria’s foreign policy making towards Africa, a small number of officials in Paris influenced France’s foreign relations with South Africa and other African states.3 Thus, the close collaboration between the Francophone African countries, such as Ivory Coast and Gabon, advocating dialogue with South Africa and France, which in turn was increasing its collaboration with South Africa, suggested that France may have exercised its influence on these countries in favour of a more conciliatory attitude towards South Africa.
The purpose of this chapter therefore is to analyse France’s involvement in South Africa’s relations with the Ivory Coast and Gabon to find out what role France played in those relations. Following on from the fact that the Ivory Coast and Gabon are former French colonies, it is only to be expected that France played a role in their political and economic decision-making. For better understanding of the scope of the close interdependent relations between France and its former colonies, I investigated the history of France’s African policy concerning those countries. After discussing this, I will examine the relations between France and South Africa and the diplomacy of dialogue between South Africa and Francophone African States.
The fact that the implication of France in South Africa’s relations with Gabon and the Ivory Coast was dealt with as a state secret means that all sources are not open to the public while some decision-makers and actors regarding this matter are still alive. Such restriction of sources meant that the collection of data was not an easy task. According to French law (code du
3 J. Chipman: French power in Africa, pp. 120, 149, 227, 232, 241, 256, and R. Pfister: Apartheid South Africa’s Foreign Relations with African States, 1961-1994, p. 112.
101 Patrimoine article L213-2), with the exception of administrative documents concerning law number 78-753 of 17 July 1978, public archives can only be opened to the public after 30 years. Therefore I was notified that the files concerning the period after 1985 would not be made available.4, As it was not possible to conduct interviews with some decision-makers and actors concerning the role played by France in South Africa’s relations with Gabon and the Ivory Coast, the material discussed in this chapter are in part substantiated and based mostly on secondary material.
5.2 France’s African policy France had been the colonial power of the territories located mainly in West and Central Africa (French West Africa and French Central Africa) until the late 1950’s, but lost its direct political control over these territories gained independence in the early 1960’s. France then successfully managed to institutionalise and cement the political, economic, military and cultural ties with its former African colonies by means of defence agreements and the creation of a common CFA Franc5 monetary area with a fixed exchange rate.6
French diplomacy in Francophone Africa since 1960 has been fashioned to reinforce the belief among Black Africans that a partnership with France offered the only hope for their own national development. Acceptance of this by the Africans allowed France to pretend to a world role. While the majority of Francophone African countries remained within the French sphere of
4 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Letter No. 380 AR/HIS from Isabelle Richefort (Head of the Department of historic archives at French Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to Emmanuel Ndzeng Nyangone, Paris 19 January 2005. 5 The CFA Franc is the common currency of 14 countries which are members of the Franc zone, namely: • Benin, Burkina, Ivory Coast, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo which form the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), whose common central bank is the Central Bank of West African States(BCEAO); • Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Chad which form the Central Africa Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), whose common central bank is the Bank of Central African States (BEAC). However, the CFA Franc was created on 26 December 1945, the day when France ratified the Bretton Woods agreement. At that time, it was standing for Franc of the French colonies of Africa. In 1958, it becomes Franc of the French community of Africa. Nowadays, the denomination CFA Franc means franc of the African Financial Community) for WAEMU member States, and franc of Financial Cooperation in Central Africa for countries belonging to the BEAC area. The CFA, which is the only legal tender, is not freely convertible. It is on a fixed exchange rate with the Euro, namely 1 Euro = +/- 656 Franc CFA (655,957 Franc CFA). 6 J. Chipman: French power in Africa, pp. 120, 149, 227, 232, 241, 256 and R. Pfister: Apartheid South Africa’s Foreign Relations with African States, 1961-1994, p. 112.
102 influence, particularly close relations were maintained with an inner core group, namely, and in order of importance, the Ivory Coast, Gabon, the Central African Republic and Senegal. With the exception of Guinea, these countries all concluded and signed defence and military assistance agreements with France in the first year of independence.7
Between 1958 and 1969, France’s African policy was made by General de Gaulle alone. To the great majority of civilian leaders in Francophone Africa, de Gaulle was “the man of Brazzaville” and champion of French Black Africa’s emancipation. To its military rulers, the general was a professional soldier whom they admired as the incarnation and leader of France’s wartime resistance movement. General de Gaulle’s personality, flexibility and evident affection for Africa gave him a unique influence in Francophone African countries that has been equalled by no other Western leader in any part of Africa. Pompidou similarly showed his attachment and continued France’s influence in Francophone Africa soon after became President. He announced his policy to be one of Gaullist “continuity” in his relations with Francophone Africa and he confirmed this during his state visit to its capitals in February 1971.8
Therefore, it appears apparent that French diplomacy in Black Africa since decolonisation has traditionally operated on two quite distinct levels. On the one hand, there have been the personal links established between the French President and individual leaders of Black African states. This has often permitted bilateral inter-state issues to be addressed through conversations and personal undertakings rather than by diplomatic means and bureaucratic assurances. President de Gaulle’s special relationship with a number of African leaders (the strongest and most important of which was with Houphouet-Boigny), assured that special problems would be treated individually. All of de Gaulle’s successors have cultivated a similar approach. On the other hand, against these carefully nurtured personal relationships, which have stressed individual sentimental attachments, there has been a rigorously institutionalised approach to France’s African policy.9
7 J D Hargreaves (ed.): Decolonisation, French and British styles, pp. 3-15, and Journal of Third World Studies, 1997, p. 3-15. 8 T. Virginia Mc Lean: West Africa’s council of entente, pp. 137-142. 9 J. Chipman: French power in Africa, pp. 227-229.
103 With General de Gaulle and his African affairs advisor, Jacques Foccart, Francophone African States were raised to the specific domain of the head of state. The famous African committee on the Elysée, which drew its reputation from its untypical nature, was led by a personality who reported only to the president, and it was both an official and secret body. “Mister Africa”, who was responsible for it, found himself at the intersection between different actors and different institutions involved in France’s African policy, both in France and in Africa, especially in Francophone Africa. More than any other, Foccart personalised this policy, maintaining direct relations with African Heads of States through his intermediary.10
For France, both the highly personal and carefully institutionalised forms of diplomacy with Black Africa were meant to serve the same end: to perpetuate the image of a French role in Africa. For the Africans, cultivation of a close relationship with France has provided some material rewards in the form of an assured sequence of both military and economic assistance, and also, though this French role has receded, an advocate for them in international politics. This is not to deny the essential asymmetry that existed in these relationships, not only in power and resources, but also in the interests that conditioned France’s African relations.
The principal characteristics of asymmetric relations between France and Francophone African States have been the object of many remarkable studies that do not require discussion here, but it is convenient to remember that France’s African policy in the early days of the former French colonies’ independence was dominated by France’s involvement in the political and economic decision-making of Francophone African states such as the Ivory Coast and Gabon. This typical cooperation concerned all sectors (technical, cultural, juridical, etc.). Particular stress was put on the economic, political, and military fields. The economic cooperation included privileged trade exchange, financial aid and monetary cooperation. These three aspects explain the preponderant role played by France in the economy of Gabon and the Ivory Coast.
In fact, the former colonies were integrated into a new institutional body, which in many respects was a product of the construction of the neo-colonial mechanism. The structures put into place directly affected state prerogatives. In the monetary area, the CFA franc allowed France partly to
10 C. Alden and G. Martin: France and South Africa: towards a new engagement with Africa, p. 9.
104 prolong its control of African economic space but especially to confer the status of an international currency on the French franc. In the same way that a dollar zone or a yen zone exists, a franc zone exists.11 As such, it appears clear that independence did not fundamentally change the rules of the game insofar as the French franc was able to assert itself as a legacy of the colonial period.
In terms of the accords, petroleum as well as uranium, thorium, lithium and beryl were classified as strategic products. Article 4 of these accords stipulates that “The Republic of Gabon makes easier the storage of raw materials and strategic products to the advantage of the French army. When the interest of French defence requires it, the Republic of Gabon limits or forbids the exportation of these products to others countries”. And Article 5 establishes the Republic of Gabon officially as a French reservoir of raw materials, a true “shooting preserve”.12 Thus France was able to prospect and explore Gabonese petroleum, raw materials and eventually all other strategic products, sheltered from foreign competition. Paris thus completely managed the Gabonese subsoil.
Cooperation in the different sectors mentioned above has consequently developed into asymmetric relations due to the French domination of Francophone African States, despite their economic and political independence. This was illustrated when M Foyer, French Cooperation Minister during 1960s declared, at a press conference on 13 May 1962, that: “The cooperation between France and its former colonies is the extension of France’s historical responsibilities, responsibilities that General De Gaulle qualified as France’s great ambitions”.13
In achieving these “historical responsibilities”, Foccart, the all-powerful Secretary-General of African Affairs at the Elysée, appeared to be the key man for France’s African policy. He was an immensely influential person in France’s African relations. He constantly received African heads of state and was able to develop a personal set of connections throughout francophone Africa (the reseaux Foccart, as it came to be known) which allowed him to build up an independent
11 C. Alden and G. Martin: France and South Africa: towards a new engagement with Africa, p. 6. 12 P. Péan: Affaires Africaines, pp. 42-43. 13 M Verlet: L’impérialisme Français dans le Monde, pp. 86-99, and http://www.ina.fr/CP/MondeDiplo/Forum/ (25 August 2006).
105 basis of information on the political situation in Francophone Africa. According to Foccart himself, he travelled a lot at the request of French President George Pompidou, and met African Presidents in Africa, and as well during their visits to Paris, some in private. The visits that they paid to him with their families at his residence (Luzarches) became too much, so that at the end of 1973, it was decided to build a house of reception for them.14
The Foccart network was intimately bound up with the activities of the official intelligence service, le service de Documentation Exterieure et de Contre Espionage (SDECE). The service of external documentation and counter-espionage was France’s external intelligence agency from 1944 to 1982, when it was replaced by the General Directorate for External Security (DGSE),15 which in the early years of the Francophone Black African states’ independence played an important role in setting up intelligence services within a number of African States. Foccart insured that principal agents in African capitals reported directly to him.
Foccart also intervened in the choice of ambassadors, heads of the Missions d’aide et de cooperation (Aid and cooperation mission) and directors of companies who had important activities in Francophone Africa, such as Elf Aquitaine. In particular, he put a former Colonel in the Resistance, Maurice Robert Delaunay, in charge of SDECE’s Africa operations from 1960 to 1973. Thereafter, from 1974 to 1979, Delaunay headed Elf Aquitaine’s secret services. Subsequently, he was France’s Ambassador to Gabon until 1981 and thereafter Head of Elf Aquitaine Gabon. He was in charge of securing Gabonese President Bongo, his regime and Elf installations in Gabon. Thus, Delaunay was the most faithful defender of President Bongo and Gabon for seventeen years.16 Jean Mauricheau-Beaupré, well known under the name of “Monsieur Jean” (Mister John) was another key figure in Foccart’s politico-military network. According to Foccart, he was a man with a sense of initiative who lived for action and secrets.17 However, Mauricheau-Beaupré’s name neither appeared in the Who’s Who nor in the directory (of French government officials). He did not belong to any department, not even to the secret
14 J. Foccart and P. Gaillard: Foccart parle, vol.2, p. 87. 15 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Service_de_Documentation_Ext%C3%A9rieure_et_de_Contre-Espionnage (3 September 2006), and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direction_Générale_de_la_Sécurité_Extérieure (3 September 2006). 16 P. Péan: Affaires Africaine, pp. 139-140. 17 J. Foccart and P. Gaillard: Foccart parle, vol.1, p. 213.
106 services. But he occupied an office in the general secretariat in the Presidency of the French Republic for African and Malagasy Affairs, where it was not easy to find him.18 Apparently he was the executorial man of Foccart’s network.
Officially, Mauricheau-Beaupré was also the technical counsellor to the President of the Ivory Coast, Felix Houphouet-Boigny. From 1960, he found himself involved in all controversial issues on the black continent. Wherever France hesitated to intervene officially, or the SDECE was too detectable, it was possible to see Mauricheau-Beaupré.19 In the Franco-South African alliance, Mauricheau-Beaupré was such a key person that Foccart himself referred to him as an “indefatigable militant of reconciliation between black Africa and South Africa”.20 The above information makes it possible to affirm without doubt that Mauricheau-Beaupré was very close to Foccart and acted as Foccart’s faithful and confident man in the South African issue. Foccart effectively had a group of people who could provide him with his own reports to complement those received from other channels in each African country of importance to France. Such also was the case of Ivory Coast with Guy Nairy, principal private secretary of the Ivory Coast presidency. Guy Nairy occupied this post until the death of Houphouet-Boigny in 1993 and also worked with Houphouet-Boigny’s successor, President Henri Konan Bédié.21
The reseaux Foccart appeared to be the centre of decision-making regarding France’s African policy. It had three main functions. First, it had to relay messages that any of France’s African partners wished to address directly to the French president; second, it had to provide impetus to the initiatives of the Elysée in the direction of Africa; and third, it had to provide and harmonise dialogue between all the actors concerned with cooperation.
Thus, the justification of the existence of the Foccart network was due to the need for efficient control, harmonisation and coordination between the various tools of cooperation. France’s relations with African states were thus maintained on a number of different levels, most of these out of the public eye and beyond parliamentary scrutiny. African Presidents felt able to call on
18R. Faligot and P. Krop: La piscine: les services secrets français, pp. 253-254, and R. Pfister: Apartheid South Africa’s Foreign Relations with African States, 1961-1994, p. 115. 19 R. Faligot and P. Krop: La piscine: les services secrets français, pp. 253-254. 20J. Foccart and P. Gaillard: Foccart parle, vol.2, p. 110. 21 F. X. Verschave: La Françafrique: Le plus long scandale de la République, pp. 129.
107 Foccart and his network to help them to assess threats to internal security, and, though his response would depend very much on the circumstances, this form of assistance inevitably involved the Elysée secretariat in judgements about the internal politics of Francophone Africa and in the assessment of how these might affect France’s interests.22
The military aspect of this cooperation materialised in the military agreements concluded between France and Francophone black African States in the first year of independence. Such agreements gave African States the power to call on France for direct security assistance and military cooperation. But it seems clear that France’s principal aim in including such agreements was to maintain influence in these newly independent Francophone African States while preserving its own ultimate freedom of action. The French government wanted the right to keep bases and facilities in these States; the ability to ensure its supply of raw materials from these countries; and the right to abstain from sending forces to the continent in case of need.23
Military cooperation reinforced this French search for influence measuring up to its ambitions. The technical military assistance agreement signed with its former colonies and the defence pacts constituted a very comprehensive package. Through it, France was given the capacity to intervene in the area of African states’ security at the same time as it was provided with the knowledge of the internal security structure of each state taking part in the agreements.
This right to look into the internal affairs of African states was therefore in some way guaranteed by the clauses that were held secret and which linked certain African states, such as Gabon, to France and under whose terms France could be solicited to participate in operations to maintain order within the states seeking assistance. The Gabonese case is a good illustration of such a policy: French military troops intervened in Gabon to restore President Mba to power in 1964. Such intervention illustrates the remarks of former French Foreign Minister, Louis de Guiringaud, who declared, in 1975: “Africa is the only place where France can, with 500 men, change the course of history.”24 African states were therefore given freedom of ideological choice and internal political practice on condition that they remained in the French fold. In
22 J. Chipman: French power in Africa, pp. 233. 23 African Report, June 1968. 24 C. Alden and G. Martin: France and South Africa: towards a new engagement with Africa, p. 17.
108 return, France guaranteed them the benefit of its cooperation and its protection both externally and internally.
In analysing France’s Africa policy it seems clear, from the close collaboration between the countries of Francophone Africa advocating dialogue and France, which in turn was increasing its collaboration with South Africa, that France would have exercised its influence on these States in favour of a more conciliatory attitude towards South Africa. France, which altogether disregarded the UN arms embargo against South Africa, was coming under increasing criticism in Africa for its policies. France certainly chose to divert these criticisms by influencing the Ivory Coast and Gabon to have dialogue with South Africa, which had supported France during the Algerian war, as will be seen in the next section. Because of the Francophile sentiments of Gabon and the Ivory Coast, there was no doubt that these countries were able to manifest their loyalty to France anytime and anywhere.
President Bongo of Gabon, while declaring a policy of Gabon first in 1968, admitted to being Francophile: “we are French in heart and spirit”. Gaullist policy was to seek influence and good relations to French advantage with every country by the simple expedient of trying to secure the advantages of not being too closely identified with the US and the UK. This policy tended to blur the simplicities of the Cold War and often ran counter to the simpler pro-Western policies of the former colonies.25
It is arguable that France’s independent action might be the strongest argument for Francophone African States to align themselves with France to increase sympathy in France with their condition, if they could not thereby increase their bargaining power. If the maintenance of close relations with France was an important factor in the formation of attitudes towards South Africa, the relationship between the Quai d’Orsay and the pro-dialogue regimes was an aspect of wider conservatism of which it was not necessarily the cause. Conservatism in the post-colonial situation often expressed itself in the retention of the colonial order externally as well as internally.26
25 S. C. Nolutshungu: South Africa in Africa: A study in ideology and foreign policy, pp. 281-283. 26 Ibid.
109 Obviously, such policy had neo-colonial consequences: since the futures of Independent Francophone black African leaders could still be dependent on decisions taken in Paris, they worked within the limits imposed by France and in this way implicitly were obliged to support France’s diplomacy, as affirmed by one leader of SWAPO27 who declared, “We know from good sources that France pushes certain African countries, such as the Ivory Coast and Gabon, to open the dialogue with Pretoria.”28 This was why, for example, after 1960, they largely accepted the French argument that the Algerian problem was an internal matter and thus worked to convince others that it should not be taken up by the United Nations.29
In the Gabonese case, for example, Bongo’s chief virtues at first appeared to be a clear awareness of the bases of power and his amenability to the wishes of the French. Mineral-rich Gabon was an important interest for the French, and it was wise to retain it squarely within their sphere of influence. President Bongo did not disappoint them. His earliest acts of policy (especially in foreign affairs, such as the recognition of Biafra in May 1968, or the active and early pursuit of dialogue with South Africa) clearly depended heavily on advice from Paris.
Such advice was relayed to Bongo by the French ambassador, Delaunay, who was well known as a key man in the networks of de Gaulle’s African policy, which was managed by Foccart, the all- powerful Secretary-General of African Affairs at the Elysée, himself also an adviser of President Bongo. Bongo also depended for advice on the President of the Ivory Coast, Houphouet-Boigny, whom he saw as a father figure.30 According to Foccart, Houphouet-Boigny had a quasi natural authority over his colleagues, from which no one escaped completely.31
The existence of such cooperation seemed necessary on one side for France (regarding the economic, political and military advantages gained by France), and on another side for Francophone African Governments (regarding the setting up and maintaining of dictatorial
27 SWAPO: The South-West Africa People’s Organisation. It is a political party in Namibia. It was founded along with a number of other groups, as a liberation organization of South-West Africa (SWA) during the South African military occupation and extended apartheid to SWA. 28 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ Ivory Coast/1970s: Telegram No 706-708/R, from French Embassy of Ivory Coast, 7 October 1971. 29 J. Chipman: French power in Africa, p. 235. 30 Africa Confidential, 6 June 1975, p. 4. 31 J. Foccart and P. Gaillard: Foccart parle, vol.2, p. 100.
110 regimes protected by Paris). In fact, France’s aim after independence was to consolidate the young state apparatuses through widespread cooperation in the technical and development fields, based on the same model of state control and protectionism which had held sway since the early years of colonisation. Infrastructure, education and public administrations were on the agenda. Priority was given to the stability of the states and leaders in power and this was achieved through politico-military cooperation agreements. As matter of fact, the so-called independence given to Francophone African countries was based on a dependence on France that mostly served French interests.
5.3 French-South African relations The particular relations established between France and South Africa occupies an important place in France’s African diplomatic history. Such relations resulted from the need of each partner to face the pressures of international politics, which went against their interests. South Africa needed to mitigate the effects of the embargo of 1963 on the sale of armaments and, more generally, of the growing pressures which tended to insulate the country. France sought to benefit from this unexpected occasion to attenuate the cost of research and manufacture imposed by the practice of a policy of national independence on armaments matters, therefore good relations with Pretoria seemed to be advantageous. It was a good opportunity for France to import the uranium necessary for French strategic nuclear force and also to sell arms to South Africa.
Thus, France had developed close relations with South Africa from the 1950s, before becoming a privileged partner of this country in the 1960s and 1970s. Besides the political consideration, the considerable importance of the economic and military exchanges between Paris and Pretoria was certainly the leitmotif of the development of these relations. In the 1960s, French exports to South Africa were specialised in important sectors of the South African economy, expressing decisive support for its industrialisation policy. The French firms extended their implantation to the industrial sectors. After that, French investments in South Africa improved greatly. The trade in armament occupied a privileged place in these exchanges. After 1960, the year of Sharpeville,
111 South Africa multiplied its military budget each year and France has sold all the material necessary to obtain a modern and effective army to South Africa.32
The South African interest in armament and French technical expertise in war was born during the Algerian war. The political context was then favourable for the development of cooperation between Paris and Pretoria. According to P Bernetel (1977), author of Les enfants de Soweto, a certain political complicity had developed between France and South Africa since General de Gaulle’s presidency. France found Pretoria to be a faithful supporter when Paris, because of the Algerian war, saw its unpopularity increase in the Third World. In fact, due to the excellent contacts of Mauricheau-Beaupré, the South African apartheid regime gave logistic and military aid to France during this war. This cost nothing to South Africans who had been invited to familiarise themselves with the technical aspect of anti-guerrilla fighting developed by the French army in Algeria. To show his gratitude to South Africa for it support of France in the Algerian war, de Gaulle never pronounced the word “apartheid” in public.33
Opposition to any economic embargo against South Africa became the principal mark of French diplomacy.34 Thus, the first significant orders for French weapons from South Africa were realised in the early 1970s, and concerned anti-guerrilla materials: Helicopters and armoured cars. On 27 June 1971, France and South Africa established a military accord for the transfer to South Africa of the licence to build the Mirage III and F-1.35 Thereafter, the French military industry became the principal supplier of weapons to South Africa.
Table 3: Supply of weapons to South Africa (1965-1974) Total imports United States France United Kingdom others 373 million 24 million 266 million 38 million 45 million dollars dollars dollars dollars dollars Source: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1966-1975, in DC Bach: La France et l’Afrique du Sud: Histoire, mythes et enjeux contemporains, p.288.
32 M. Noël: L’évolution des relations économiques entre l’Afrique du Sud et la France, pp. 40-55 33 D. C. Bach: La France et l’Afrique du Sud: Histoire, mythes et enjeux contemporains, p. 286. 34 République Française, 25 June 1984, p 3964. 35 Die Burger, 29 June 1971.
112 In addition, France assisted Pretoria militarily, and massively, while Jacques Chirac was Prime Minister from 20 March 1986 to 10 May 1988. In this time, the international community strictly prohibited all the sales of weapons or materials of safety to this country by an embargo of the United Nations (the embargo was raised only after the abolition of apartheid, on June 30, 1991). Paris broke with this policy in a radical way while clandestinely organising the renewal of the fleet of combat helicopters of the South Africa army, which could be used against interior insurrections, in 1986. Thus, the Aerospatiale Company sold 50 S2 Puma, with armaments, for 13 billion French Franc, to Armscor, the consortium of South Africa military equipment.
The operation was completed on April 16, 1986, less than one month after the appointment of Jacques Chirac in the post of Prime Minister. From a technical point of view, this operation was made possible by the corruption of the staff of the Portuguese Air Force, which then agreed to create structures to mislead the international community, and to make believe that this great quantity of helicopters leaving the French building sites was to equip Portugal. Officially, a French ambassador was sent to Pretoria (in the person of Pierre Boyer) on 7 May1986, shortly after Chirac’s government took over its official function, whereas the relations between the two capitals previously were low-key, especially after the state of emergency issued by PW Botha, which struck the black population hard. Three weeks later, Jacques Chirac in person decided in favour of an easing of the economic sanctions against South Africa. And on 11 November 1986, President Botha paid a private visit to France; a first for a Western democracy, causing vigorous protest in the ANC.36
In examining Franco-South African relations, it becomes evident that the three main reasons that motivated France to support South Africa’s détente policy were of political, economic and military nature. As mentioned before, the political consideration was based on the fact that Paris and Pretoria had to face international criticism regarding the apartheid policy in the case of South Africa and the boycotting of the arms sales embargo on South Africa and its Algerian war in the case of France. They therefore saw that it was in their interest to work together. The economic and military motivations concerned the fact that the partners were interdependent. While France
36 http://www.geopolitique.com/defense/les-ventes-d-armes-de-l-equipe-chirac-au-regime-de-l-apartheid-157.html (15 March 2007).
113 needed to improve its investment in South Africa and to sell its arms, South Africa needed to bypass the 1963 UN embargo on the sale of armament to South Africa and to export its goods. In addition, Paris was also interested in accessing South African uranium.
France’s foreign policy in fact involved closer collaboration with Pretoria. This entailed a total disregard for the 1963 UN embargo on the sale of arms. However, despite increasing criticism from Africa, it was not uncommon for Francophone African States seeking to increase their standing with France to adopt a conciliatory position towards South Africa, especially if this was consistent with their own conservatism. This was the case for President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, who, in November 1970, declared the failure of existing strategies against apartheid and called for an African conference to discuss the alternative of dialogue. France, in pursuing its policy of influence in Africa, could therefore not ignore the progressive integration of South Africa in Africa via its economic advantages. Due to these close relations between France and South Africa, France had no choice then but to bring together its former African colonies and South Africa.
5.4 Franco-South African dialogue initiatives with Francophone Africa The diplomacy of dialogue between South Africa and Francophone African States was initiated by a small group of French Managers of French companies in South Africa, in close collaboration with the South African Foundation. First, there was a move to promote economic cooperation with Madagascar, Reunion and Mauritius, before attempting to make contact with all Francophone African States.37 But one should also understand that such an initiative was based on the close collaboration between France and Francophone African States in which France was exercising its influence, on one hand, and the close relations between France and South Africa, in which France was increasing its collaboration with South Africa, on the other hand.
As mentioned in the introduction, the end of the 1960’s saw French-South African relations becoming sufficiently close. Consequently an agreement on common initiatives in Africa was signed between France and South Africa. Initially established towards Southern African States,
37 Le Monde, 27 August 1974.
114 the objective of French-South African dialogue initiatives was to leave South Africa in its political insulation due to its apartheid policy and to promote South African economic exchange in Southern Africa.38 In this context, French businessmen and representatives of French companies that belonged to the South African Foundation contributed actively to the establishment of the first contacts between South African emissaries and the leaders of Francophone African States. From these contacts, the realisation of trade and financial operations associated with French, South African and Francophone African States’ interests were envisaged. This project had the support of the French office of economic expansion based at Johannesburg.
According to Jeune Afrique No. 478 of March 1970, a French private bank (La Banque d’Indochine) had had a very important subsidiary company called “French Bank of Southern Africa” in South Africa with several agencies at Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth, Cape Town, Johannesburg for 20 years. The French Bank was the best placed French credit establishment in South Africa. It was this establishment that had negotiated the major part of French-South African trade. It was therefore via this financial establishment, entirely controlled by La Banque d’Indochine, that the financial liaison between South Africa and Madagascar had been established. The French Bank and French-South African commercial development company intended to promote trade exchanges between South Africa and Francophone Africa.39
In France and South Africa, the economic-financial initiatives with which the South African Foundation was associated had had political support. According to correspondence from the French Ambassador in South Africa, Vorster, by receiving Arthur Conte, who spoke to him about the intentions of Houphouet-Boigny to open dialogue with South Africa, had mentioned his desire to see General de Gaulle bless the operation. Responding to the French Ambassador, the Director of African Affairs and Malagasy, at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, affirmed being informed about this, but expressed his fear of eventual consequences if France had to take an official position on this matter.40
38 D. C. Bach: La France et l’Afrique du Sud: Histoire, mythes et enjeux contemporain, p. 203. 39 Jeune Afrique, 3 March 1970. 40French Ministry of Foreign Affairs /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ South Africa/1960s: Official correspondence to Philippe de Luze, French Ambassador in South Africa, 17 February 1969.
115 Meanwhile, President Georges Pompidou, receiving the new South African Ambassador, MA Burger, declared himself in favour of dialogue that was constructive and useful in bringing together people despite their differences from October 1969.41 Two years later, the French news paper Figaro of 15 June 1971 said that Paris had indisputably been the nerve centre of this strategy.42 Foccart was no stranger in this matter. In fact, the General Secretary of African Affairs and Malagasy at the French Presidency visited South Africa many times during this period, to the extent that he acquired the reputation of being the South African Ambassador in the capitals of Francophone African States.43 While, in France, the new South African Ambassador was not sent there by accident. He was formerly in charge of the Africa Department in the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was one of the initiators of the South African policy of détente with black African States. This means that his mission to France was clear: to materialise the South African policy of détente with the support of France. Paris therefore became the advocate of this policy.
In the early 1970s, the rapport between France and South Africa became more bilateral and confident. During President Georges Pompidou’s presidency, these relations became less discreet. France was not limited in showing its close relations with South Africa. Common initiatives were undertaken regarding their African policy. A few months before the official visit of President Georges Pompidou to the Francophone African states, Vorster undertook an unofficial European tour (in June 1970). France was the only country that received him with the honour due to a Prime Minister. He met his French counterpart, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, in Paris on 11 June 1970. The reason for his meeting with French authorities was based on the real chance of bringing together South Africa and Francophone African states.44
According to this context, it is clear that Pretoria played an important role in preparing the campaign for the dialogue. Burger acted closely with Foccart and Mauricheau-Beaupré to bring France to exercise its influence with President Houphouet-Boigny in advocating dialogue with South Africa. Thus, a secret meeting took place between Vorster and Houphouet-Boigny during
41 P. Nandjui: Houphouet-Boigny l’homme de la France en Afrique, p. 20. 42 Le Figaro, 15 June 1971. 43 Le Monde, 27 August 197. 44 Jeune Afrique, 16 June 1970, and Keesing’s contemporary archives, 1970, p. 24128.
116 the South African Premier’s visit to France in June 1970, before the Ivory Coast’s President’s press conference. There is little doubt that the South Africans were informed in advance about the Ivory Coast’s President’s plans.45 Concerning the policy of dialogue with South Africa, Andrei Urnov (1988), in South Africa against Africa, noted that many sources have confirmed that the Ivory Coast President acted as the executor of the idea, rather than as its author. Urnov went on to say that the Ivory Coast’s desire for a new policy on the relationship with South Africa was understood to have the full support of France’s President Pompidou. Moreover, some circles in Paris even claim that President Houphouet-Boigny’s policy had been master-minded by Pompidou personally.46
One month later, after Vorster’s visit to France, the South African Defence Minister, PW Botha, (future President of South Africa), during his trip to Paris, declared: “We will never forget that France has been and is still ready to trust us when we affirm that we don’t have aggressive intentions against any country. South Africa is able to keep its strategic position on the most important marine route in the free world.”47 In February 1971, President Pompidou visited the Ivory Coast and Gabon during his African voyage. “The South African issue, in fact, probably constituted the most powerful reason for the visit” noted The African Communist.48
In examining all the events mentioned above, it is evident that France had no choice but to influence Francophone black African States to have dialogue with South Africa. But France managed the issue very well, so that it did not have to take an official position in support of the South African policy of détente. The unofficial character of France’s influence on Gabon and the Ivory Coast’s choice to enter into dialogue with South Africa can be explained by the fact that the so-called Foccart network had acted on behalf of France, during France’s African policy history. In fact, it was neither France nor the Elysée which chose and led French politics in Africa, but a random nebula of economic, political and military actors, networks polarised on the conservation of power and the extraction of revenues.49
45 Africa Confidential, 14 May 1971, p. 3. 46 A. Urnov: South Africa against Africa 1966-1986, p. 85. 47 Agence France Presse, 11 July 1970. 48 The African Communist, 1971, p. 82 49 F. X. Verschave: La Françafrique: le plus long scandale de la République, p. 296.
117 Pierre Dabezies, former French ambassador in Gabon, defined the Foccart network as “ networks of friendships and complicities so that one never knew where the occult action and the official policy started and finished.”50 However, the French move to bring South Africa and Francophone states together based on political and economic contact between France and South Africa, took into account the technical assistance and aid assistance that South Africa could bring to Francophone African States, such as the Ivory Coast and Gabon. The French government recognised the economic and strategic advantages that South Africa provided. In fact, South Africa seemed to be the only country able to help them to assure France’s historical responsibilities, which de Gaulle qualified as France’s great ambition, that were taken after the decolonisation, towards Francophone black African States.
France’s move was therefore aimed at the reduction of financial charges caused by the policy of cooperation. South Africa presented all necessary characteristics for substituting France’s assistance in Francophone African States without constituting a threat to French interests and influence in these countries. Direct contact between South Africa and Francophone African States such as the Ivory Coast and Gabon could contribute to the diversion of critics who were critical of France regarding its arms sale policy to South Africa. South Africa’s contact with Madagascar could contribute to the security of the Indian Ocean where the Soviet naval presence seemed worrying. In a global perspective, the development of relations between South Africa and Francophone African states made it possible to envisage the expansion and consolidation of bilateral French-South African lobbies.51 This opening breach by Paris resulted in the Ivory Coast and Gabon becoming the first Francophone African states to officially become involved with South Africa.
5.5 Conclusion After the cooperation agreements in all fields had been signed between France and its former black African colonies such as Gabon and the Ivory Coast, Houphouet-Boigny and Bongo,
50 F. X. Verschave: La Françafrique: le plus long scandale de la République, p. 299. 51 P. Nandjui: Houphouet-Boigny l’homme de la France en Afrique, p. 204.
118 whose honesty and loyalty to the French coloniser had never been contradicted, very quickly began to act as defenders of France’s interest in Africa.
Thus, despite Ivorian President Houphouet-Boigny’s disappointment concerning the evolution of the French community, he declared on 7th August 1960: “We have gained independence without bitterness and in friendship with the ex-mother country.” As from 24th April 1961, France and the Ivory Coast signed cooperation agreements between the two countries, establishing very close ties which were never to be questioned. On the occasion of President Georges Pompidou’s visit to the Ivory Coast in February 1971, President Houphouet-Boigny, acknowledging the privileged relations existing between the two countries, declared: “We are an old couple of loyal friends and our history is beautiful because it is confident and nourished by reciprocal esteem.”52
Due to this, France decided to position some French officials (Foccart, Mauricheau-Beaupré, Nairy, Delaunay and others) and military bases in Francophone black African States such as the Ivory Coast and Gabon in the early years of the Ivory Coast’s and Gabon’s independence. This included the creation of security services in states such as Gabon, which put France in a strong position to control the internal and external policies of such countries and also to secure their leaders. Such practices, managed by the powerful Foccart, aspired to reinforce France’s African policy and to protect France’s interests in Africa.
Until the 1980s, the cadres of the police force therefore were French. The French Gendarmerie was omnipresent and was the guide and framework of the Gabonese gendarmerie. The same was true of the Army, which was buttressed by French commissioned and non-commissioned officers. The personal guard of the President was composed of elite soldiers (not necessarily Gabonese) tightly controlled by a French paratrooper general. The same was true of the Gabonese Air Force. The French Air Force had a base in Libreville equipped with Hercules,
52 O. Aluko: The Foreign Policies of African States, p. 131.
119 Mirages and Jaguars (This Air Force is still in Libreville).53 The French Army presence in Gabon is very subdued.
While there undoubtedly were rivalries between the professional intelligence services and Foccart’s more informal network, the connective tissue of interrelations created in the 1960s at least served further to interweave African and French interests. Foccart’s personal power was such that he was sometimes treated with the respect due to a head of state in Africa. The closeness of his relations with African leaders was symbolised by the fact that he retained a number of representatives of African states as advisers within his secretariat throughout most of his tenure and with the full agreement of President de Gaulle. In Foccart’s view, this underscored the fact that de Gaulle was not obsessed with the precise form of juridical undertakings and could tolerate flexible arrangements with Africans as long as this helped to build strong relations. As the individual who controlled all information on Africa that was seen by de Gaulle, Foccart had a direct influence on policy making, so much so that he was often accused of drafting his own policy for Africa, making and unmaking governments throughout Francophone Africa.
According to Foccart himself, some policy making regarding French African policy was his initiatives. Concerning secondary affairs, de Gaulle was not informed of the details. De Gaulle’s role was to give a general policy from which Foccart could direct his actions any way he needed. De Gaulle would be informed only when his intervention was necessary. Thus, for example in April 1960, Foccart organised a coup d’état against Sékou Touré from Senegal without informing de Gaulle. De Gaulle was informed only when President Mamadou Dia’s Mali addressed his protestation to him after the failure of the project. De Gaulle in surprise became furious with Foccart, but calmed down after Foccart’s explanations.54
In addition, Bob Denard and his men from Gabon resorted to commando action in Benin on 13 May 1978. The purpose of the mission was to remove President Kérékou and his government from power. The initiative came from Eyadéma’s Togo and was support by Bongo’s Gabon. This action had received the blessing of France through Foccart who had convinced the French
53 South African DFA, 1/178/1, vol.1: Report of Samancor Metals and Minerals Limited Mission to Gabon, 17 November 1983. 54 J. Foccart and P. Gaillard: Foccart parle vol.1, pp. 213-215.
120 President of the necessity of such an initiative.55 The military interventions in Chad were organised on account of de Gaulle’s personal conviction (actively encouraged by Foccart ) that France’s reputation among other black African states close to Chad might collapse. The support of the Biafran secessionist movement flowed, in part, from similar considerations encouraged by Foccart: neighbouring small Francophone states would be saved from a too powerful Nigeria if it were broken up. The interest of French companies who wanted to establish and build on commercial ties with Nigeria were ignored, and it was only when the francophone states themselves showed that they supported Nigerian Unity that France’s plans were abandoned.56
In the 1960s and early 1970s there was a tendency to see the hand of Foccart in any African event. He constantly saw African Presidents and ministers, both in Paris and in African capitals, and in this way reinforced the view that Africa had a special place in France’s foreign policy. His knowledge of political leaders and his wide connections were thought sufficiently valuable to have him serve as adviser to Jacques Chirac between March 1986 and May 1988, who, in appointing Foccart, wished to advertise his preference for a Gaullist approach to France’s African policy.57
Obviously, the consequence of these close relations between France and its former African colonies through African leaders was an extension of French intervention in Francophone black African policy making, despite their independence. The South African case is one illustration of France’s influence in policy making in Francophone black African states. In fact, France decided to support South Africa’s policy of détente in recognition of South African support during the Algerian war and due to the expansion of its relations with South Africa.
The so-called Foccart network opened the doors at the Gabonese and Ivorian presidencies and Mauricheau-Beaupré’s excellent contact with the South African apartheid regime made it possible. Foccart and Houphouet-Boigny, supported by France, successfully brought Gabon, the Ivory Coast and South Africa together. However, after having agreed to open dialogue with
55 P. Péan: Affaires Africaines, pp. 172-182. 56 J. Chipman: French power in Africa, pp. 236-237. 57 Ibid., p. 234.
121 South Africa, what did Gabon and the Ivory Coast gain from these contacts? This is what I am going to examine in the next chapter.
122 CHAPTER SIX: SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY REGARDING GABON
6.1 Introduction As I have argued in Chapter 2, South Africa’s policy regarding aid to countries in Africa had been clearly stated by both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The South African Government was prepared to consider requests for aid from African governments on merit. Therefore, six months after President Bongo took over from Léon Mba as President of Gabon, contact was established between South Africa and Gabon. In February 1969, Mauricheau-Beaupré (President Bongo’s advisor) visited Albertus Albie Burger in Pretoria, informing him that he had seen President Bongo, who had said that the Gabonese Government would welcome South African capital towards its development.1 Burger was Under-Secretary of the South African DFA until 1969, and later carried a particularly heavy weight as Ambassador to Paris, the coordination centre for Pretoria’s activities in Francophone Africa, from 1969 to 1974. Thus, D Bach described him as one of the principal artisans of South Africa’s opening towards the outside world.2
Professor C Barnard and Dr J Penn visited Gabon shortly afterwards and were well received. On their return, they, as mentioned earlier, informed the Department of Foreign Affairs through the South African Foundation that they were interested in inviting two Gabonese doctors to South Africa. After President Bongo had been to Paris, where he had met a member of the South African Embassy, it was decided that the South African Government would pay the expenses, and an invitation was sent by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on 23 July 1969. Three Gabonese doctors, Dr Eloi Chambrier (President of the Gabonese Medical council), Dr Moutsinga (Chef de cabinet of President Bongo) and Dr Chastel, visited South African in August 1969.3
On 20 August 1969, the Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a further letter to President Bongo in which reference was made to a message from President Bongo relayed by the doctors, to the effect that Gabon would welcome an economic mission from South Africa. Even before this, the
1 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol.3: Technical aid to Gabon, from Glen Babb, 31 December 1972, p. 1. 2 R. Pfister: Apartheid South African and African states, from pariah to middle power, 1961-1994, p. 14. 3 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol.3: Technical aid to Gabon, from Glen Babb, 31 December 1972, p. 1.
123 Director of Military Information had supplied the Department with background information on development possibilities in cattle breeding, paper manufacturing and air traffic. A positive reply was received from President Bongo in a letter dated 18 September 1969, in which he specifically requested that experts in mining, animal husbandry, industry, road-building, fisheries and pharmacology be included in the mission.4 That these experts should examine local conditions in Gabon, probably for undertaking some form of assistance to that country, certainly was considered.
In line with what is mentioned above, the purpose of this chapter is to highlight South Africa’s participation in the development of Gabon, from military assistance to technical aid and investment projects. However, before examining the military assistance given to Gabon by South Africa, which was the first aspect of South African involvement in Gabon, and the technical aid and investment projects, it is necessary to point out that the strength of this chapter is based on the fact that the archival material used here is new. In fact, the great novelty here is the access I had to archival material belonging to the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and the French Department of Foreign affairs, all relating the sustained interaction between Gabon and South Africa, in other words, relating to the South African government’s involvement in Gabonese development projects from the 1960s to 1990s, to which apparently few other scholars have until now had access.
6.2 Military assistance South Africa’s involvement in the development of Gabon was primarily through military cooperation. In fact, Gabon became a reliable partner to the South African military during the Nigerian Civil war and even afterwards. Judging by Jacques Baulin and Francois-Xavier Verschave’s works, President Bongo of Gabon showed support for the Biafran cause during the Nigerian Civil war (1967-1970).5
4 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol.3: Technical aid to Gabon, from Glen Babb, 31 December 1972, p. 2. 5 J Baulin: La politique Africaine d’Houphouet-Boigny, pp. 94-126, and F. X. Verschave: La Francafrique: le plus grand scandale de la République, pp. 137-153.
124 Nigeria had to deal with a civil war in 1967. The decolonisation had left a precarious federation, made up of three areas and a multiplicity of people. The fight to access power degenerated into an ethnic pogrom. Certain Ibo leaders, managed by Lieutenant-Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu decided to transfer the south-eastern province of Nigeria, their area of origin, to the Republic of Biafra. Thus, in May 1967, they proclaimed the independence of Biafra. They decided to do it against the blessing of the majority of the people from that area, including the Ibo. But the secession had a strong odour of oil: Biafra was the principal zone of production in Nigeria (then the sixth producer worldwide, before Algeria and Libya).
The Franco-Ivorian tandem (Foccart-Houphouet) jumped on what appeared like a good opportunity to divide Nigeria and to open the boulevard to Elf Aquitaine, an oil subsidiary of the French secret service managed by the Foccart network. Elf Aquitaine had been a pillar of French influence in Africa since the 1960s. Through French secret service agents such as Maurice Robert, Elf Aquitaine had established particularly close relations with President Bongo of Gabon. Attempting to extend activities from its Gabon base to other African Countries, Elf Aquitaine already had some oil rights in Biafra, but its ambition to control all reserves clashed directly with the interests of the British-Dutch oil companies Petroleum (BP) and Shell, part of French-British competition in Africa. Therefore, to secure its claims, according to Foccart, Elf Aquitaine became directly involved in financing weapons and arms deliveries to Biafra by transferring the income generated from selling oil from Biafra to the secessionists.6
Thanks to the excellent contacts of Mauricheau-Beaupré, South Africa was incorporated in this coalition. While France, the Ivory Coast and Gabon supported Biafra from the early days of the war for the above-mentioned reasons, the South Africa military as armament provider to Biafra entered the stage during 1969, when the chances of the success of the secessionists became uncertain. One of the main reasons for the support from South Africa can be explained by the fact that this support could be seen as the key in establishing a network of black African states with anticommunist sentiments.7
6 J. Foccart and P. Gaillard: Foccart parle vol.1, p. 343. 7 A. Olajide: France and South Africa, pp. 59-76.
125 De Gaulle, on the suggestion of Houphouet-Boigny, ordered Elf to pay the income generated from selling oil that was due to Nigeria for the oil extracted in the Biafran zone to the secessionist leader, Odumegwu Ojukwu. De Gaulle knew well that this money would be used to purchase arms. In Gabon, Delauney was appointed as French Ambassador. He had the mission to coordinate the pro-Biafra strategy in Libreville. On 13 July 1967, a first French plane from Gabon landed to Uli airport (in the Biafran zone). Its mission was to deliver weapons to the secessionist leader. By August 1968, Abidjan and Libreville had become starting points for an air support bridge to Biafra.8 The Nigerian federal Government, mainly supported by the Soviet Union and later by Great Britain, opposed the independence of Biafra with military force. The ensuing Nigerian Civil War lasted until January 1970, but Biafra’s chances of success faded during 1969.9
After the Nigerian Civil War, President Bongo wrote to PW Botha to request the provision of armament from South Africa to Gabon, in April 1970 and early 1971. The reasons that President Bongo put forward to get this military assistance was the fact that Gabon was surrounded by communist-inspired countries (Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of Congo).10
In fact, Bongo’s argument was based on evidence. In the early years after independence, Africa saw the communist presence grow because Moscow was deeply suspicious of the nationalist leaders. Moscow regarded them as purely “bourgeois imperialist lackeys” not genuinely interested in working towards the decisive overthrow of the International system. It became clear that there was some strategic consideration behind Moscow’s policies in Africa; the Soviet policies on the continent formed an integral part of a global strategy. Consequently, the Soviets began to give military and economic largess to African states. The USSR moreover ensured that, quite apart from engaging in political flattery of African leaders, there were exchange visits between them and their Soviet counterparts. All these measures were embarked upon to ensure that the new African states would move much closer to the Soviet Union, including adopting the socialist model of political and economic development, than to the capitalist West. Within a short
8 F. X. Verschave: La Francafrique: le plus grand scandale de la République, pp 137-153. 9R. Pfister: Apartheid South Africa’s Foreign Relations with African States, 1961-1994, p. 121, and C. Chukwunedu Aguolu: Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970: An Annotated Bibliography, p. 10. 10 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol.1: Letter from President Bongo of Gabon to Pieter Willem Botha, Paris, 9 November 1970.
126 time, the Soviets had found good allies in the central African region, in Congo-Brazzaville, Macias Nguéma’s Equatorial Guinea, and Dr Maumi’s Cameroon with his party Union des Populations du Cameroon (UPC).11
A brief examination of USSR’s policy in Equatorial Guinea will ensure better understanding of Bongo’s fear. Until President Macias Nguéma was overthrown in August 1979, his regime was one of the most reactionary and despicable in Africa. He perpetrated a reign of terror for eleven years, and his policies forced about 40.000 Equatorial Guineans (roughly a third of the country’s population) into exile. The bulk of the country’s educated class had been systematically murdered, imprisoned, or had, when possible, fled into exile. To crown it all, the national economic situation was in shambles. In short, there was nothing progressive about Macias’s regime; nonetheless, it secured Soviet assistance in maintaining Equatorial Guinea’s territorial status quo. Indeed, the bulk of aid that the country received came from the USSR. Granted, other communist states like China and Cuba did grant economic and military aid to Malabo, but these countries had become increasingly disenchanted with Macias’s rule. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was far more interested in promoting their own national interests in the country rather than being unduly preoccupied with morals and ideology. It seems highly probable that the USSR had tried to maintain the same pragmatic policy with Téodoro Obiang Nguéma Mbasogo, who described his regime as revolutionary.12
Due to such a threat, like Houphouet-Boigny and Botha, Bongo considered the infiltration of communism in Africa, specifically in the Central African region, as a threat to the whole continent and more specifically to his region. Therefore securing his country became a matter of extreme urgency. That is why he, on 9 November 1970, availed himself of PW Botha’s anticommunist stance by means of the head of the South African Special Forces, Major General Fritz Loots. The initial material requested concerned three T6 planes, light Harvard planes of North American origin, to be used for pilot training, low intensity warfare and border
11 O. Ogunbadejo: Soviet Policies in Africa, pp. 297-325; S. R. David: Soviet Involvement in Third World Coups, pp. 3-36; A. Brayton Abbott: Soviet Involvement in Africa, pp. 253-269; R. D. Grey: The Soviet Presence in Africa: An Analysis of Goals, pp. 511-527; M. R. Atangana: French Capitalism and Nationalism in Cameroon, pp. 83-111, and http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/300/8/3/text/96-3-7.shtml (15 October 2006). 12 Ibid.
127 surveillance in Gabon.13 Due to the South African stand against communism and the fact that President Bongo had constantly promoted dialogue with South Africa and had openly maintained contacts with this country, the President’s request seemed to provide a good opportunity for South Africa to reinforce and maintain its relations and military link with Gabon.
PW Botha replied positively to Bongo’s appeal on 2 December of the same year. In his letter he said: “It gives me pleasure to inform you that I have approved of both requests and that the items in question will be delivered to you in accordance with arrangements to be made by Major General Loots in collaboration with our mutual friend Mr Beaupre [Jean Mauricheau-Beaupré]. No charge will be levied on these items.”14 However, this military assistance was kept secret until the South African Foreign Affairs Department mentioned, in July 1980, that there had been contact between the two countries concerning military support for Gabon.15 But it was only on 17 March 1995 that the Weekly Mail and Guardian revealed the existence of such assistance to the public, when a commander in the Gabonese defence force stated that South Africa had supplied a number of military aircraft to his country.16
In fact, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) was clear on covert links with African countries during the 1980s. The SANDF owned up to a secret mid-eighties project to help build a military base in the West African state of Gabon as part of Pretoria's efforts to forge covert links with African states whose public position towards the apartheid government was often neutral at best. The SANDF reversed an initial refusal to give information on "Project Canteen", saying in a statement that the government of Gabon had approached the South African government in 1983 for assistance in erecting infrastructure at a planned base at Léconi.
The project was undertaken jointly by ARMSCOR (Armaments Corporation of South Africa, a company dedicated to providing a leading edge service in the acquisition of products and services for defence communities around the world) and the SADF. The SADF undertook the
13 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol.1: Letter from President Bongo of Gabon to Pieter Willem Botha, Paris, 9 November 1970. 14 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol.1: Letter from Pieter Willem Botha to President Bongo of Gabon, Pretoria, 2 December 1970. 15 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol.10, July 1980. 16 Mail and Guardian, 17 March 1995.
128 planning and construction of sleeping quarters, ablution blocks, a light workshop, a water tower and an aircraft hangar. The operation took six months and was completed in November 1985. The total number of personnel involved at any given time numbered about 100. The SANDF said the budgeted cost of R2,3 million had been facilitated by the Department of Foreign Affairs, on a government-to-government loan basis.
The Weekly Mail & Guardian first gleaned information of the operation from a document, marked “top secret”, composed by South Africa’s security chiefs in 1984. The document contains an audit of military, police and Department of Foreign Affairs “strategic communication” projects, the term used for covert propaganda. The document describes “Project Canteen” as: To handle South Africa’s and the South African Defence Force’s involvement with the construction of a military base in Gabon in such a way that it does not become public and, should it become public, what action to pursue. A commander in the Gabonese Defence Force (whose name was not given) said there had already been military cooperation with South Africa in the late 1960s, when South Africa supplied a number of military aircraft to his country.
Such military cooperation was improved in more recent years, especially since the beginning of the democratic process in South Africa, since when South African and Gabonese military authorities have had frequent contact in order to develop military cooperation. That is why, between May 1993 and March 1995, a good ten official missions were exchanged between the two countries, comprising the training of Gabonese officers and NCOs17 in the air force, the navy and the army.
To emphasise South Africa’s military ties with Gabon, Lebona Mosia of the South African Institute for International Affairs at Wits University said Gabon, one of Africa's richest countries because of its oil reserves, had followed the “stand-off” neutrality common to Francophone African countries during the apartheid years. He said Gabon had maintained “coded relations”
17 A non-commissioned officer (sometimes noncommissioned officer), also known as an NCO or Noncom, is an enlisted member of an armed force who has been given authority by a commissioned officer. "Noncom" is the lesser-used term in many militaries since it may also refer to non-combatants. The NCO corps includes all the grades of sergeant and, in some militaries, corporals and warrant officers. The naval equivalent includes some or all grades of petty officer, although not all navies class their petty officers as NCOs see in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non- commissioned_officer (20 November 2006).
129 with the South African government. However, one SANDF bulletin during 1995 said military personnel from, among others, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Kenya, Zambia, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi had visited South Africa since April 1994 for training in the army, navy, air force, medical service and intelligence.18
In all, this military assistance can be interpreted as a gesture of goodwill from South Africa in return for Bongo’s consistent promotion of South Africa. Gabon became a reliable partner to the South African military. This access to Gabon by the department of Foreign Affairs certainly stimulated the interest of South Africa to participate in the development of Gabon, thereby proving to the international community that South Africa, despite it racial policy, had good relations with some African countries. The request from President Bongo regarding the economic mission to Gabon therefore required very serious consideration.
6.3 First Mission for technical aid to Gabon (21-27 September 1969) The first mission for technical aid to Gabon was organised by Mauricheau-Beaupré through Paris, before President Bongo’s letter requesting the economic mission from South Africa to be sent to Gabon. The purpose of the mission was to establish contact with Gabon and obtain information on Gabon’s requirements from Pretoria. Initial problems were encountered as it appeared that only the French advisers of President Bongo were aware of the mission, but after South African officials had arrived at their Embassy in Paris, the date and the arrangements were set for the mission. The mission spent six days in Gabon, from 21 to 27 September 1969, and consisted of RJ Montgomery and JB Shearar from the Department of Foreign Affairs, Eloff, a cattle breeding expert, A van Oostrum, a horticultural expert, FJ Swarts from the South African Airways and CA Border, a mining technologist.19
18 http://www.mg.co.za/articledirect.aspx?articleid=203500&area=%2farchives print edition%2f (20 November 2006) and Mail and Guardian (17 March 1995). 19 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs/ DAAM/ Africa Levant/ Gabon/ 1960s: South African mission to Gabon, from Maurice Delauney to Maurice Schuman, Libreville, 3 October 1969, and South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol.1: Report of State mission to the Republic of Gabon, 21-27 September 1969, from Robert Montgomery to Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 6 October 1969, pp. 7-10.
130 The mission was received by President Bongo and his advisers, Messrs Julienne (French economic adviser to President Bongo), Mouckamby (Gabonese adviser to President Bongo), Dr Desport (Frenchman, chief of Veterinary services in Gabon), Sibizangome (Gabonese Director of Public Works) and Edou (Gabonese Agricultural Technician). The group then made contact with responsible authorities of the Gabon administration and conducted discussions and visited various projects. Afterwards, visits were undertaken to several sites where South Africa could possibly provide assistance.20 Reports were handed in after the visit. Montgomery concluded that assistance was urgently needed to upgrade the existing transport infrastructures, while mentioning agricultural and mining assistance. The mining technologist reported that the mining industry was developed and stated that further development was hampered by the lack of a better transport system. He suggested participation in geological research.
The representative of the SAA (South African Airways) was interested in landing rights and had the assurance of the Gabonese that these would be accorded. Participation in tourist projects and road and airport extension to serve the projects was also suggested. Van Oostrum reported very favourably on the production of both tropical fruit (granadillas, mangoes and avocados particularly), vegetables (sweet potatoes, potatoes, beans and fruits, in view of market saturation and the high cost of the production of cabbage) and nuts. Interesting in the light of later developments, however, was the pessimistic report made by the cattle breeding expert, Eloff. He saw very little hope of furthering cattle breeding in Gabon, because of the presence of endemic diseases, humidity and parasites, and the absence of enthusiasm among the population regarding cattle farming activity did not, he said, “make the future of this industry propitious”.21
He stated that cattle should only be promoted as a secondary nutritional supply. He was disappointed in the standard of management of the existing cattle ranch and recommended that the South African authorities take over some of the SOGEL (Societe Gabonaise d’Elevage) cattle herd at Tchibanga and send four cattlemen to control it. The cattle were mostly of Guinean (Ndama) origin and the only South African cattle which were suitable were Nguni cattle, he
20 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs/ DAAM/ Africa Levant/ Gabon/ 1960s: South African mission to Gabon, from Maurice Delauney to Maurice Schuman, Libreville, 3 October 1969, and South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol.1: Report of State mission to the Republic of Gabon, 21-27 September 1969, from Robert Montgomery to Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 6 October 1969, pp. 7-10. 21 Ibid.
131 reported. He also suggested game farming and said it might be possible to produce meat on a reasonable scale near to Ogooué. Other recommendations of the mission were that a retail store be opened in Libreville (OK Bazaars was suggested) by private South African interests so as to reduce the price structure, and that a prefabricated housing factory be opened in Gabon.22
To conclude this section; it is evident that the first mission of technical aid to Gabon, considered as an exploratory mission, was successful, because the aims were reached. In fact, the mission pointed out the unlimited needs of Gabon. In other words, this mission gave an opportunity to the officials from South Africa to get to know more about Gabon and to be able to identify the priorities in Gabon’s needs. Due to this, it became necessary to select the domain in which South Africa could assist Gabon as South Africa could not get involved in all the fields in which Gabon needed aid. To do so, advice and recommendations from experts in the selected fields were necessary, therefore it was agreed to send an economic mission to Gabon, as had been requested by President Bongo.
6.4 Economic mission to Gabon (12-18 April 1970) To take account of the recommendations made during the first mission to Gabon, a meeting was held on 14 December 1969 at the Union Buildings. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss an economic mission to Gabon to give practical effect to the recommendations.
President Bongo’s suggested composition of the members of the mission was taken into account, but the eventual composition of the mission was only decided on 25 March 1970 when further discussions were held with representatives of the following departments: Commerce, Finance, Agriculture, Economics and Marketing, Agricultural Technical Services (ATS) and the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). The Embassy in Paris had meanwhile been pleading for an early start, due to the fact that the Rhodesians, for instance, had already become established in Gabon.
22 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs/ DAAM/ Africa Levant/ Gabon/ 1960s: South African mission to Gabon, from Maurice Delauney to Maurice Schuman, Libreville, 3 October 1969, and South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol.1: Report of State mission to the Republic of Gabon, 21-27 September 1969, from Robert Montgomery to Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 6 October 1969, pp. 7-10.
132 Emphasis was placed on the importance of being able to make firm propositions regarding the possibility of aid in the country. There was no problem from agriculture. Technical knowledge could be put at the disposal of the Gabonese by the CSIR and attention could be given to wood and cement production. Distribution of consumer items could be examined by Commerce, as well as mutual trade. As to mining, a company like Anglo-American was best able to assist.23 In other words, it appeared that particular importance had been placed on agriculture, mining, trade, housing and pharmaceutical equipment as the priorities of the mission. The dates decided on were 12-18 April 1970 and the mission consisted GJJ Steyn (Secretary for Commerce), TF van der Walt (Commerce), CT Welch (CSIR), FJ Le Riche (Director of South African Druggists), C van den Berg (General Mining), FE Bellingan (Retail representative), EA Loubser (Foreign Affairs), C van Tonder (Embassy, Paris), and JG Boyazoghu (Agricultural Counsellor at the South African Embassy in Paris).24
The mission spent two weeks in Gabon and on their return Steyn reported that starting a prefabricated housing factory could not be recommended as this type of housing was unsuitable, help for housing could not be recommended, however. The establishment of a supermarket chain was also not recommended; it was felt that a Gabonese project would better effectuate lower prices. Because of the lack of proper geological surveys and because of the poor transport system, meaningful help in the mining industry could also not be given.
It was stated that Steyn would see to what extent imports from Gabon could be increased (wood, palm oil, coffee beans, etc.); at a later stage the Department was furnished with a list of the suppliers of possible import items by the Gabonese. Agriculture was in its infancy in Gabon and 80% of agricultural needs were imported. This was a matter of grave concern to the Gabonese; the depopulation of rural areas might lead to communist infiltration, especially near the border with the Congo; help was already given by the Taiwan government for rice and tropical fruit and similar help was required for meat production; it was therefore recommended that the Government undertake the establishment of a model farm in a suitable area; expenses would not
23 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 1: Summary of discussion by interdepartmental meeting about the upcoming visit of an economic mission to Gabon, Union Buildings, Wednesday 25 March 1970. 24 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 2: Report of economic mission to the Republic of Gabon, 12-18 April 1970, pp. 3-4.
133 be disproportionate and the benefits would be tangible; help could also be given by the National Parks Board for the preservation of game. Medical requirements presented an urgent need in Gabon and medicines, apparatuses, vaccines, etc. could all be supplied; doctors could be sent to Gabon for short periods; the pharmaceutical institute would also conduct a study so as to improve the price structure of drug distribution in the country. For the above-mentioned aid schemes, the delegation recommended a budget of R800.000 for Agriculture and R200.000 for health.25
As a consequence, an interdepartmental meeting was called shortly after the return of the delegation on 24 April 1970 to discuss the outcome of the mission. At this meeting, it was agreed that a medical delegation be sent to Gabon at the expense of South African Minister of Foreign Affairs and that mobile and static X-ray units be supplied; the cattle-breeding project be undertaken, technicians be found on the spot for this, and cattle sent from South Africa; Dr Boyazoglu would work out the scheme in close collaboration with his Gabonese and French colleagues; ATS would supply seeds and plants for tropical plantations; the National Parks Board would send two officials to help start a Game Reserve; and the Secretary for Mines would speak to mining houses that might be interested in doing surveys in Gabon. Finally, it was stated that Gabon’s needs were limitless and the crux of the matter was to determine how assistance might be provided in a practical manner without burdening the Treasury too much.26 From this consideration, the application of technical aid needed ministerial approval after discussion and analysis of how better to deal with the matter. In other words, a feasibility study on the projects was necessary.
In taking account of the recommendations from the economic mission and the agreement from the interdepartmental meeting, a memorandum was duly submitted for Ministerial approval. During the meeting, the establishment of the model farm was recommended as well the supplying of small herds of Brahman and Afrikaner cattle (20 cows and 3 bulls each), goats (25 Boerbok ewes and 5 rams) and sheep (25 Dorper ewes and 5 rams). The seconding of an ATS
25 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 2: Report of economic mission to the Republic of Gabon, 12-18 April 1970, 3- 4, and South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 3: Technical aid to Gabon, from Glen Babb, 31 December 1972, p. 4. 26 South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 1: Interdepartmental meeting, Union Buildings, 24 April 1970.
134 technician was also put forward for running the farm. The supply of seed and plant varieties and furnishing help in game preservation were further recommendations.
The memorandum also contained the recommendation that drugs and vaccines be sent and that South African doctors render free service from time to time in that country. The aid was motivated by the moderate approach to South Africa by the Gabonese and the possibility that tangible help would encourage other African states to take the same line. Budgets of R800.000 for agriculture and R200.000 for health over a five-year period were recommended, as earlier agreed to in the interdepartmental meeting. The cabinet approved the memorandum and the nature of the help offered was conveyed to the Gabonese authorities through Paris on 12 June 1970. At later occasions the Gabonese authorities were also informed that imports of wood, coffee beans and handicrafts (including crocodile skins and ivory) would be stimulated. Published technical works on house building were also put at their disposal by the CSIR.27
6.5 Technical assistance mission to Gabon (27 September to 3 October 1970) President Bongo replied positively to South African proposals on 16 July 197028 and a further mission consisting of Brig. Gilliland (Health) and Dr Boyazoglu (ATS) was proposed to finalise health and agricultural aid matters at the behest of the Gabonese President. The final arrangements included Dr J Terblanche, Prof. A Bull (Anaesthetics), Prof. F Daubenton (Dean: Medical Faculty, University of the Witwatersrand), N Best and CJ van Tonder. The brief for Dr Boyazoglu was based on the need for the establishment of an experimental unit for cattle- breeding in Haut-Ogooué; the participation in Gabonese experimental development centres at Tchibanga, Ndendé, Franceville, Léconi, Okondja; and possible financial aid for rural development. It was still the intention of STA at this stage to station one of their staff members in Gabon and to receive four Gabonese for training in South Africa. The group visited Gabon from 27 September to 3 October 1970. The medical team visited Kango, Franceville and Oyem, while Dr Boyazoglu inspected likely places for the establishment of the cattle-breeding unit. Dr Boyazoglu’s recommendation was that the unit be established at Moanda.
27 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 3: Technical aid to Gabon, from Glen Babb, 31 December 1972, p. 5. 28 South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 1: Letter from President Bongo of Gabon to Hilgard Muller, Libreville, 16 July 1970.
135 The group met the President on 2 October and Brig. Gilliland, with Prof Daubenton, concisely set out the help intended: vaccines, medicines, four X-ray unite (two mobile), plasma, laboratory equipment and ad hoc medical teams to visit the country. President Bongo wanted the teams to stay for two to three years and requested a private doctor, as President Mobutu had a USA- supplied physician. The idea of a personal physician to President Bongo was approved, although a lack of French would be an obstacle. But the reply was that it would be impossible to accede to the request owing to a shortage of doctors in South Africa. The President said he would personally assist in the distribution of the medicines as he did not trust the Director of Medical Services. The establishment of a drug factory was also raised by the President, but it was explained to him that it would be prohibitively expensive to do so for the small population of Gabon (for about 950.000 inhabitants in 1970).29
The report of the doctors who visited Gabon in September 1970 was prepared only in February 1971. They confirmed the list of vaccines and drugs to combat the major endemic diseases already drawn up by Brig. Gilliland. They recommended a visit by Dr JH Aubame to South Africa. They also felt that medical teams should visit the country so that the whole population could be reached. Selected patients could be treated in South Africa and, if possible, Gabonese doctors should be given training in South Africa. The Secretary for Foreign Affairs wrote to the College of Physicians, thanking them for the report and supporting their recommendations. It later became clear that Dr JH Aubame was a political enemy of President Bongo and the invitation went unanswered.30
Concerning agricultural matters, it was stated that President Bongo was disappointed that the cattle-breeding unit could not be set up at Franceville, but Dr Boyazoglu explained to him that the Moanda farm of 2000 hectares directed by Muxart was the sole place (for biological reasons) which could be utilised. Dr Boyazoglu felt that the SOGEL (Société Gabonaise d’Elevage, the Gabonese company of breeding) herd at Tchibanga, to which Eloff had alluded, could not be
29 South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 1: Report on the Agricultural aid to Gabon following the visit from 27 September to 3 October 1970, from Jan Boyazoglu, Paris, 7 October 1970, and http://www.library.uu.nl/wesp/populstat/Africa/gabonc.htm (30 November 2006). 30 South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 2: Report medical mission to Gabon of September 1970 by Prof. AB Bull (Member of Council), Dr J Terreblanche (Honorary Registrar, College of Physicians, Surgeons and Gynaecologists of South Africa) and Brig. Gilliand (Department Health), October 1970.
136 taken over because of human and practical difficulties. However, there was no objection to flying in the cattle duty free. Finally it was stated that the farm would be divided into smaller units to accommodate the various species for breeding and grazing and available equipment would be taken over. The delegation recommended that bulk items that could not be confided to UTA be transported by the SAAF. A list of medicines and vaccines with French labels and equipment (including vehicles and X-ray machinery) was submitted for approval by the President. The mission concluded that medical and agricultural assistance (OGAPROV) should begin with immediate effect.31
After treasury approval had been obtained and indication given that President Bongo was becoming irritated by the delay in tangible results, the first arrangements were made to transport the greater proportion of plant material promised by OGAPROV, as well as vaccines and medicines, on 15 November 1970 by UTA. It was reported, by the Ambassador in Paris, that the material had arrived in good condition. Further requests were made in December 1970 by the Director of Agriculture, Moussavou-Ghenga, for 10.000 pineapple plants and two to three tons of hybrid maize seed and veterinary products for combating disease and parasites. It was decided, however, to send the cattle, goats and sheep at the beginning of 1972: a limited number of animals would be sent in June 1971 (two bulls of each of three breeds, five goat rams and five sheep rams).32
Meanwhile, the two static X-ray units which President Bongo was to distribute personally were sent on 24 March 1972 for the price of R70.000, and the two mobile units (Mercedes-Benz transport vehicles) for use in and around Libreville were sent on 15 April 1972 with vaccines, pharmaceutical products and blood plasma. It was later found that the hospitals for the static units were not even built and that the equipment was not being properly stored or looked after. On South Africa’s insistence, they were placed in air-conditioned surroundings.33 It seems that, in contrast of to the OGAPROV project, medical assistance did not really excite Bongo’s keen interest, and this could explain the reason why the hospital had not been built before the medical
31 South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol.1: Report on the Agricultural aid to Gabon following the visit from 27 September to 3 October 1970, from Jan Boyazoglu, Paris 7 October 1970. 32 South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol.1: Technical assistance to Gabon, summary of despatches 1970-1972. 33 South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol.1: Technical assistance to Gabon, summary of despatches 1970-1972.
137 equipment was supplied and such equipment was not properly stored. If the hospital could be built later, there was no excuse for neglecting the storage of the equipment.
In February 1973, Foreign Affairs official Glenn Babb reported that the visit of the Gabonese medical team had been abandoned, that no further action had been taken with regard to the visits by South African medical teams to Gabon, and that training of Gabonese doctors in South Africa proved too difficult because of the language problems.34 But for reasons that could not be established, the visit of the Gabonese medical team was not followed up. While medical assistance presented difficulties, Gabonese authorities, and particularly President Bongo, showed great enthusiasm for the agricultural project. The reason for such enthusiasm lay in the fact that the project was located in Bongo’s home province of Haut-Ogooué in Western Gabon and it strengthened his political standing.35
6.6 Agricultural assistance to Gabon (OGAPROV) While President Bongo did not show particular enthusiasm for medical assistance to Gabon, the agricultural project appeared very important for him. Gabon was almost entirely dependent on imported meat. One of the principal Gabonese meat suppliers was Rhodesia. Due to the economic sanctions against Rhodesia that were instituted by the UN in 1966, Gabon found itself in a very difficult position with regard to imported meat. To solve this problem, Bongo approached South Africa for assistance, and South Africa saw this situation as an opportunity to become involved in the development of Gabon. As a result, Gabon and South Africa decided to set up a meat production project in Gabon.
This project was called OGAPROV (Office Gabonais pour 1’ Amelioration et la Production de la Viande), which in English means Office for the Improvement and Production of Meat. It was intended to reduce Gabon’s dependency on the importation of meat and to do research on the treatment and prevention of tropical diseases in animals with considerable South African assistance. It comprised separate ranches for cattle and goats, as well as two sheep farms in
34 South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 6: Report on Medical aid to Gabon from Glenn Babb to Norman Best, Pretoria, 15 February 1973. 35 R Pfister: Apartheid South Africa’s foreign Relations with African States, 1961-1994, p. 156.
138 Franceville and nearby Okouma. The project was planned to be self-supporting after five years. Dr Jan Boyazoglu (The Agricultural counsellor at the South African Embassy in Paris) was South Africa’s man responsible for all issues relating to agricultural assistance to Gabon.36 Activities started off on a farm of 600 hectares, but it was expanded to three farms, of which more than 1500 hectares were used. The technical aspect was handled by the Department of Agriculture, while the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information provided financing.37
A detailed scheme was drawn up for this agricultural assistance. It included a Board consisting of a president, a vice-president and three members (two South African) who were to meet once a year. It would supply plants, including 2000 pineapple plants for the President’s own farm and maize seed, and take over the existing ranch at Moanda for cattle breeding and for establishing a genetic centre. It would control cross-breeding centres at Franceville, Moanda, and Tchibanga and would train local farmers. The OGAPROV budget would be supplied by South Africa for the first five years and thereafter would be self-generating through meat sales. Cattle (50 cows, 20 bulls, 60 sheep and 60 goats) would be imported as a priority. Wire and fencing poles would have to be purchased (preferably in South Africa) and houses would have to be built. The total cost for the first year was estimated at R220.000.38
On the suggestion of Dr Boyazoglu, the Frenchman Muxart worked for OGAPROV as director of the project, because he had experience in such matters. He had been involved in similar projects for the French development agency. This choice was based on the fact that he appeared quite secure politically and was a friend of South Africa.39 This assumption is justified by the fact that Muxart, after his retirement in May 1976, was decorated for his devoted contribution to OGAPROV with the lowest class of the Order of Good Hope, which is the highest award with which South Africa honours citizens of other countries.40
36 South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 1: Technical aid to Gabon, from Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 19 October 1970. 37 South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 12: Summary of South Africa’s relations with Gabon, Pretoria, 20 August 1980. 38 South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 1: Report on the Agricultural aid to Gabon following the visit from 27 September to 3 October 1970, from Jan Boyazoglu, Paris, 7 October 1970. 39 Ibid. 40 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 7: Award of the Order of Good Hope to Mr Jean Muxart, from Jan Boyazoglu to Brand Fourie, Paris, 23 November 1975.
139 The meat project had to begin no later than March 1971, though plant material had to be sent at the earliest possible opportunity. Control had to be exercised by a single person in Pretoria to eliminate unnecessary administrative matters. Transport could be facilitated through the Department of Defence: special labels showing a cow’s head and OGAPROV had to be used on all material for customs purposes and the address would be: Directeur des Services Agricoles, Boite Postale 43, Libreville (Director of Agricultural Services, Box 43, Libreville). It was proposed that slaughter and commercial facilities be provided after establishment of the ranch. Another important aspect was the training of Gabonese farmers, who would be helped by OGAPROV on a contract basis to settle on farms and be provided with cattle.41
Sheep and goat breeding would be undertaken by the Gabonese at Franceville (sheep breeding with rams from South Africa or bred at the Moanda station taken over by OGAPROV); at Ntoum and Franceville (small cross-breeding and upgrading station with goats bred at Moanda); a second cattle breeding station at Tchibanga, with the SOGEL herd mentioned by Eloff (to be taken over later by the Gabonese Ministry of Agriculture).
These recommendations, together with one concerning the training abroad of two veterinary experts and two technicians, were submitted to the Department, together with a draft decree for the establishment of OGAPROV, in which South African participation was not mentioned (decree promulgated on 7 April 1971 by President Bongo), an inventory of the ranch and a curriculum vitae of Muxart who would continue as manager.42
Dr Boyazoglu visited Gabon again from the fourth to the eighth of April 1971. The decree establishing OGAPROV formally had by then been promulgated by President Bongo (7 April 1971) and a management Board was established. The members who were nominated were Kounda Kiki, Nguema, Cognard, Boyazoglu and Thomas. Kounda. Kiki was appointed as Chairman of OGAPROV and Cognard was appointed as liaison officer. Dr Boyazoglu, seconded by Julian A Thomas, was designated by the DFA to represent South Africa on this Board. The Moanda property had been transferred to OGAPROV. However, Muxart was appointed as
41 South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 1: Report on the Agricultural aid to Gabon following the visit from 27 September to 3 October 1970, from Jan Boyazoglu, Paris, 7 October 1970. 42 Ibid.
140 manager of the farm as he had started the ranch and was regarded as an excellent manager. His existing contract ended in September 1971 and he could commence working for OGAPROV on 1 October 1971. The idea of sending a South African for such a position was to be abandoned.43
Dr Boyazoglu reported that equipment should be sent by June/July 1971, before the next rainy season. Since problems had been experienced with air transport (the airport at Moanda was inadequate for transport aircraft of the South African Air Force) and heavy duty Caterpillars and Hanomags would be purchased duty-free in Gabon. He confirmed that Muxart could assume duty as manager from 1 October 1971 and would be paid at 7000 French Franc per month. He recommended that the President’s villa be rented to avoid building costs: this would please the President and save capital expenditure to the amount of R40-50.000. The next visit was planned to take place in May of the same year and he suggested that a seed expert accompany him to estimate grazing requirements. A further suggestion was that the French Presidency be closely incorporated in the scheme. They provided four persons (Pinaton, Lebeurier, Alain and Faugere, all except Alain members of Mauricheau-Beaupré’s organisation) to Dr Boyazoglu to help with bush clearing and grazing control.44 There is no indication of by whom or where such a suggestion was made, but this involvement of the French Presidency implicitly appeared as an extension of France’s influence in Gabon by attempting to control everything Gabon was doing.
Naturally, in order to make things easy, South African authorities, through Dr Boyazoglu, welcomed the suggestion. He also welcomed the suggestion that South African experts travel to Gabon from time to time to control the development of the project. He suggested that Kounda Kiki (Chairman of OGAPROV) and others be invited to South Africa to give them an opportunity to experience South African expertise regarding agricultural assistance. At the same time, the Ivory Coast (through President Houphouet-Boigny) had shown interest in the goat and sheep breeding units (which would be run by Gabonese) and the maize project. Financial support from the Ivory Coast therefore had been promised to OGAPROV. Commenting on the report, the Ambassador in Paris said that South Africa had little choice but to accept that the implications of
43 South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 2: Letter from President Bongo of Gabon to Hilgard Muller, Libreville, 7 April 1971 and letter from Hilgard Muller to President Bongo, Cape Town, 23 April 1971. 44 South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 3: Report on the Agricultural aid to Gabon following the visit of 4-8 April 1971, by Jan Boyazoglu, Paris, April 1971.
141 being joined by the Ivory Coast in the maize scheme would extend to technical advice, supplying maize seeds and ploughing. He supported participation from South African for obvious political reasons. The scheme was known as the Léconi scheme.45
The first meeting of the OGAPROV Board took place on 22 May 1971, in President Bongo’s office. The points that arose were: greater expenditure was envisaged for the first year as all the tractors and machinery would have to be supplied directly. Thus, an extra R14.000 would immediately be payable above the expenditure foreseen for 1971, viz. R250.000. Treasury approval was obtained over three years instead of five as originally foreseen. The expenditure on capital equipment and installation would be telescoped. From 26 May to 8 June 1971, Dr Boyazoglu, Prof. Pienaar (Director, crops and pastures), Thomas and Crosby (Chief Engineer Agricultural Technical Services) visited Gabon, as was planned in April. At the end of the visit, it was stated that the expenditure for the1971/1972 book year would include caterpillar vehicles, salaries, fencing, fuel and machines. It was recommended that transport vehicles be purchased in Gabon, as prices were competitive, but that tractors and caterpillars should be obtained in South Africa as these were not available.46
However, personnel problems cropped up at the ranch during July 1971, due to the arrival of Frenchmen representing the French Presidency, as suggested to Dr Boyazoglu on April 1971. Friction arose concerning payment and the suspicion was that Mauricheau-Beaupré had been trying to oust Muxart from his position. Thus, Pinaton and Faugere, the men stationed by Mauricheau-Beaupré’s organisation, were causing friction and attempted to usurp Muxart’s authority, who had accepted the South Africans as his only direct bosses, and might not easily agree to orders from any other source, according to Dr Boyazoglu. Faugere, for instance, wanted access to financial statements, Muxart’s office, etc. Thomas found that relations were further strained by Muxart’s refusal to fire a driver who had disobeyed Faugere.
45 South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 3: Report on the Agricultural aid to Gabon following the visit of 4-8 April 1971, by Jan Boyazoglu, Paris, April 1971. 46 South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 3: Report on the Agricultural aid to Gabon following the visit of 22 May to 28 July 1971, by Jan Boyazoglu to Albie Burger, Paris, 2 August 1971.
142 Faugere seemed to approach the matter from the premise that he had instructions to have a larger say in the running of the ranch. Alain, another seconded member, on the other hand, was younger and more flexible and able to get on with the job. Thomas thought they would never trust one another: he said Muxart was the only person who could make the ranch a success. Mauricheau- Beaupré and his organisation only continued to support the project after assurance had been given that central control would be maintained over the project by a member of the South African Embassy in Paris and that Dr Boyazoglu would visit Gabon directly. The three men would be paid by OGAPROV and two could be disposed of after one year.47
The presence of Mauricheau-Beaupré’s agents in OGAPROV who were not given the expected respect showed the real desire of France to be informed and in control of what Gabon was doing with South Africa. Such involvement was a handicap to the project and a very difficult matter to manage due to its diplomatic aspect. It seemed that, in the diplomatic view, the main problem in the clashes between Cognard and Muxart on the one hand, and Mauricheau-Beaupré’s men seconded to the project on the other hand, was Mauricheau-Beaupré himself, who was acting on behalf France. That is why Ambassador Burger explained to Under-Secretary Best that “Jean [Mauricheau-Beaupré] can not or will not draw the line between matters of high policy and technical detail. We are playing matters as coolly as ever we can but the position is quite as difficult and complicated as Jean is himself”.48 That means that the problem needed to be solved smoothly so as not to endanger the link with Gabon and France. However, the presence of Mauricheau-Beaupré’s agents in OGAPROV showed the real desire of France to exercise control over Gabonese economic and foreign policy.
Towards the end of 1971, Mauricheau-Beaupré and his men withdrew from OGAPROV for reasons that were not reported. This facilitated the success of the project. By April 1971, a batch of equipment had been sent by the Department of Agricultural Technical Services (ATS). By April 1972, most of the equipment had arrived, including about 530 cattle on the ranch. But it appeared that the original (R800.000) budget allocated to the project was insufficient, so a further R400.000 was requested for the year. On 5 September 1972, Dr Boyazoglu indicated that
47 South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 3: Report on the Agricultural aid to Gabon following the visit of 22 May to 28 July 1971, by Jan Boyazoglu to Albie Burger, Paris, 2 August 1971. 48 South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 4: Letter from Albie Burger to Norman Best, 29 October 1971.
143 the essential facilities were provided, a lot of groundwork had been done and invaluable experience gained. Meanwhile Pienaar and Crosby inspected mechanical requirements on the spot at Moanda from 30 May to 7 June 1971. They concluded that the mechanical equipment requested on the whole was less than expected and recommended a visit to South Africa by Muxart and Cognard. The Embassy in Paris forwarded the report, together with an analysis of expenditure incurred till August 1971 and it appeared that certain savings could be made from the R400.000 budgeted for the year. The eventual expenditure for 1971/1972 was R298.000.49
Discussions were held in Paris between Muxart and Cognard during a period of vacation taken in France and between Dr Boyazoglu and Thomas on 25 January 1972. Lejeune, a member of Mauricheau-Beaupré’s organisation who had visited the OGAPROV ranch in 1971 was present during a discussion with the same persons on 26 January. From this meeting it was recommended that some of the savings for the 1971/2 budget be earmarked for a Caterpillar and that a certain T Jean be employed to replace Faugere. The trip to South Africa by Muxart and Cognard (a French advisor to the Gabonese Ministry of Agriculture and equivalent to the South African Secretary for Agriculture) was finalised as from13 to 30 March 1972.50
Thomas, accompanied by Muxart and Cognard, arrived in South Africa and held a meeting on 13 March 1972 at the Department of Agricultural Technical Services. As to finances, about which Paris had been worried (further cuts in the budget were to be effected in OGAPROV so as to pay for the extra amount spent on the medical equipment), it appeared that not all of the funds allotted could be disbursed in 1971/2: payments would be deferred to 1972/3. In South Africa, Muxart and Cognard visited a number of agricultural projects similar to the Okoma ranch and studied South African methods. The use to which the equipment which had been supplied could be put was successfully demonstrated to them. The visit was a success and revealed that a number of members of ATS could speak French.51
49 South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 5: The OGAPROV project during 1971/72 and prospects for the future, from Dr Boyazoglu, Paris, April 1972, and South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 4: Report on informal meeting held at South African Embassy in Paris on 25/26 January 1972, from Dr Boyazoglu, Paris, 16 February 1972. 50 Ibid. 51 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 3: Summary of despatches 1970-1972 on technical aid to Gabon, from Glen Babb, 31 December 1972, appendix 2.
144 While Thomas was in South Africa, the Léconi project was raised by Paris in a memorandum regarding the 1972/3 budget. This was the project which concerned maize planting and which was previously supported by President Houphouet-Boigny (see above). Dr Boyazoglu had recommended South Africa’s participation and had thought that it merely implied the supply of seed and technical advice. Also included in the estimates submitted for 1972/3 were the subsidiary schemes of a small piggery and a poultry unit at Moanda. It consisted of a chicken farm, goat farm, and the cultivation of grass and poultry feed.
Thomas foresaw a great number of difficulties if this scheme were to be incorporated into OGAPROV (Muxart was already fully occupied). As it was a scheme which had no future and had already fallen foul of bad management and had no funds at its disposal (the amounts provided by President Bongo and President Houphouet-Boigny were exhausted), he could see no use in becoming involved. The President’s advisor, Philippe Letteron, had led Thomas to understand that the South African government had agreed with Jean to take over the scheme, but this was not the case.52
As it is not necessary to discuss all details concerning the OGAPROV project, all we need to mention here is that, by May 1973, R60.000 remained unused and the project was thus well on track. During the particular year, numerous South African missions visited the project to follow its progress.53 Dr Boyazoglu and Thomas did not miss any opportunity to visit the project and they really worked very hard to ensure the success. Therefore the end of 1973 saw the R800.000 almost depleted and about six hundred cattle were counted on the ranch.54
In examining the results of the OGAPROV project, it seems that OGAPROV recorded a great success during the first five years (from 1970 to 1975). The project was so successful that cattle breeding was almost developed everywhere in Gabon and the numbers of the animal population
52 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 3: Summary of despatches 1970-1972 on technical aid to Gabon, from Glen Babb, 31 December 1972, appendix 2. 53 South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 7: OGAPROV, 1973/1974 budget, from Norman Best to Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 16 May 1973. 54 South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 9: Memorandum on future financing of OGAPROV project, from Julian Thomas, Paris 14 November 1973.
145 had increased significantly. The following tables present the development of cattle breeding in 1975 and the increase of the animal population from 1975 until 1985.
Table 4: Animal population distribution in Gabon (1975) Region Cattle Sheep Goats Etuaire 53 4000 4000 Haut-Ogooué 1700 3000 4000 Moyen-Ogooué - 4500 5000 Ngouni 340 10000 11000 Nyanga 151 5500 6000 Ogooué-Ivindo 24 4000 5000 Ogooué-Lolo 21 3500 3000 Ogooué-Maritime - 1500 3000 Woleu-Ntem 138 11000 11000 Total 2427 47000 52000 Source: http://www.fao.org/wairdocs/ILRI/x5537E/x5537e00.HTM (25 August 2006) and Ministere de l’agriculture de l’elevage et de l’economie rurale, Direction de l’Elevage et des l’industries animales, (Ministry of agriculture, breeding and rural economy, Direction of breeding and animal industry), Gabon, 1975 annual report: Activities of 1975, Libreville. 1975.
Table 5: Changes in the numbers of cattle, sheep and goats in Gabon (1975-1985) Year Cattle Sheep and Goats 1975 (a) 2427 47000 1976 (b) 2852 112000 1981 (c) 6180 136225 1985 (d) 17391 186000 Source: http://www.fao.org/wairdocs/ILRI/x5537E/x5537e00.HTM (25 August 2006); (a) Food and Agriculture Organisation of United Nations (FAO) study on Gabon, 20 February 1980; (b) Ministere de l’agriculture de l’elevage et de l’economie rurale, Direction Generale de l’Elevage, (Ministry of agriculture, breeding and the rural economy, Direction general of breeding), Gabon, 1981 progress report, Libreville 1980; (c) Ministere de l’agriculture de l’elevage et de l’economie rurale, Direction Generale de l’Elevage, (Ministry of agriculture breeding and the rural economy, Direction general of breeding), Gabon, 1985 fifth plan, 1984-1988, Assessment- objective-Strategy-cost, internal document, Libreville 1985.
Table 4 shows the animal population distribution in Gabon during the year of 1975 and Table 5 shows changes in the numbers of cattle, sheep and goats in Gabon from 1975 to 1985. From
146 these tables, it is clear that cattle breeding had grown significantly in Gabon. Numbers of cattle increased from 2.427 in 1975 to 17.391 in 1985; sheep from 47.000 in 1975 to 96.000 in 1985.55
Moreover, this success resulted in African leaders and the European Development Fund expressing an interest in OGAPROV.56 In addition, it was also mentioned that the Belgian authorities, having noted the success of OGAPROV, proposed taking it over and running it as a service to the Gabonese, with a more general cattle development project financed by them. This was confirmed to Dr Boyazoglu by the Director of OGAPROV, Kounda Kiki. President Bongo apparently replied to them that he was perfectly satisfied with the present management of OGAPROV, and that he would like them to rather start another Belgian financed operation elsewhere, but that they could not think of taking over the OGAPROV project, which was a technical success and for which he wanted no change whatsoever, with regard to both the responsible authorities and the people managing the project.57 Following the OGAPROV meeting held in Libreville at the Gabonese Ministry of Agriculture on 20 November 1976, President Bongo approved an additional 1 million Rand to his annual contribution of R200.000. Consequently, South Africa, through the Department of Foreign Affairs, became sceptical about President Bongo’s attitude. Due to this, South Africa’s financial participation in the project gradually started to decrease, to R150.000 annually (1976/1977).58
South Africa’s financial participation in the project continued until 1982, as indicated by the report on a visit to France and Gabon by South African officials. During this visit, the OGAPROV Board had a meeting to estimate expenditure for 1983. The meeting was held in Libreville on 3 November 1982. The most important among the matters that were discussed was the estimates of expenditure for 1983. In fact, in the preamble to the estimates of expenditure, it was explained that the main activities during 1983 included continuation of the breeding and
55http://www.fao.org/wairdocs/ILRI/x5537E/x5537e00.HTM (25 August 2006); Ministere de l’agriculture de l’elevage et de l’economie rurale, Direction de l’Elevage et des l’industries animales, (Ministry of agriculture, breeding and the rural economy, Direction of breeding and animal industry), Gabon, 1975 annual report: Activities of 1975, Libreville 1975 and OGAPROV progress report, 1985. 56 South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 9: Memorandum on future financing of OGAPROV project, from Julian Thomas, Paris, 14 November 1973. 57 South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 7: re: visit to Gabon: 19-23 November 1976, from Dr Boyazoglu to Brand Fourie, Paris, 3 December 1976, p. 3. 58 South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 13: OGAPROV, final estimate of expenditure 1975/1976 from Julian Thomas to Albie Burger, Paris, 15 May 1975.
147 multiplication programme on Okouma and Lékédi Sud; research on nagana and pasture problems; and the installation of farmers on Lékédi Nord.59
It is important to remember here that Dr Jacobs, a veterinary surgeon from South Africa, visited Okouma ranch from 2 to11 November 1972. He examined two imported bulls. Both were found to have a low proportion of red blood cells. He treated both for nagana. He assumed that the bulls that had died earlier had died of nagana as no inoculations had been done and the presence of the disease in the area had not been suspected. He examined the other Ndama cattle on the ranch for nagana. Almost all were negative as they were immune to the disease generally, but some cows were found to be carrying trypanosome parasites. It was as a result of this that Dr Jacobs came to the conclusion that the other bulls had died of nagana. Due to this, it was decided to do research on this disease.60
According to the above-mentioned, the anticipated expenditure was summarised as follows: CFA Franc (millions) Routine expenditure Okouma and Lékédi Sud: 162, 48 Research (mainly pastures): 48, 96 Research (nagana): 3, 50 Technical assistance (Republic of South Africa): 50, 00 Total: 264, 96, Say 265, 00 = 883.333 Rand. Note: 1 Rand = 6 French Franc = 300 CFA Franc. It was anticipated that these funds would be provided mainly by the Gabonese Government.61
To conclude this section dealing with the OGAPROV project, it is evident that South Africa’s technical assistance in Gabon was a great success that could be considered as a demonstration of South Africa’s ability to help African countries and to show its real desire to participate in the development of the African continent.
59 South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 13: OGAPROV, report on visit to France and Gabon, 22 October to 11 November 1982, by JA Thomas, Paris, November 1982. 60 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 3: Summary of despatches 1970-1972 on technical aid to Gabon, from Glen Babb, 31 December 1972, appendix 2. 61 South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol.13: OGAPROV, report on visit to France and Gabon, 22 October to 11 November 1982, by JA Thomas, Paris, November 1982.
148 6.7 The Gabon Railway Project The first Gabon railway project was proposed by Count Savorgnan de Brazza himself in the 1890s, when railways in Africa were a la mode, and it was followed by a series of plans in the years before 1914 which never materialised: some even envisaged a rail link with Bangui (Central African Republic). The idea was abandoned with the building of Moyen-Congo railway from Pointe Noire to Brazzaville (1925-1932), and was only resuscitated in the mind-1950s, when it was clear that there was a large deposit of high grade iron ore in the Mékambo region in east Gabon. In 1958, an international consortium called Somifer was set up in order to exploit the Mékambo iron ore, with Bethlehem Steel of Pittsburg holding the largest interest (50%), and the rest of the capital divided between European companies (34% by French companies). It was clear that a railway as well as a mineral port would have to be built to exploit the iron ore.62
After the independence of Gabon (17 August 1960), President Léon Mba (first President of Gabon) took the Gabon railway project known as Transgabonais for his account. During the period of the construction of the cable car and railroad for linking Moanda’s mines to the Congo- Océan, Mba monitored the work with impatience and enthusiasm. Then, suddenly, at the time of the inauguration in 1962, instead of expressing satisfaction and his thanks, he gave in to one of his famous rages, explaining that this connection made Gabon dependent on the Congo, that it was scandalous and inadmissible. Neither he nor his successor, President Bongo, stopped to consider that the transport of the ore had to be operated through the Gabonese national territory by this famous Transgabonais railway.63
In the mind-1960s there were a series of studies which took into account the possibility of using the railway for exploiting large areas of virgin forest in central Gabon. In 1965 Gabon undertook to find the funds to build the railway. 64 In 1968, President Bongo had newly come to power, after a short period as Vice-President under the ailing Léon Mba. The new President was looking for a way to make his mark, and the prospect of a vast central focus for development like a railway had obvious appeal, so he took the Transgabonais project as his own personal project and did everything for its success.
62 Africa confidential, 18 July 1975, p. 5. 63 J. Foccart and P. Gaillard: Foccart parle, vol. 2, p. 125. 64 Africa confidential, 18 July 1975, p. 5.
149 The Gabonese Government believed that building the railway in Gabonese territory was the only valid way to ensure the development and economic progress of the country. It therefore gave top priority to the project in order to provide Gabon with a rapid, regular and cheap means of communication and large transport capacity. The project was designed to permit, during the first phase of construction and comprising the section between Owendo and Booué, a start on intensive utilisation of the third forest zone, which was inaccessible at the time. In a later phase the track would be extended to Bélinga and the large iron deposits there would be worked at an annual rate of 15 to 20 million tonnes. The Government believed that the railway was necessary, if not indispensable, for its development policy, with all that this implied regarding diversification of the industrial activities directly or indirectly linked with or induced by the development of these natural resources.65
However, this ambitious and gigantic project did not have real economic justification since the connection by means of Point-Noire existed. Therefore it was very difficult to find the finance for it. While France expressed its incapacity to finance the project alone, the World Bank refused to take part in the financing. Germany, Italy, and the Funds European of development were extremely reticent to this project.66 President Bongo presented his railway project to several countries in Europe and conducted the negotiations himself. After a two-day meeting with lending institutions and representatives of the Common Market in Brussels, he was confident enough that the construction of the Transgabonais railway would become a reality.67 But after technical studies of the mining and the railway had been completed, the World Bank, which had also been asked to participate in the financing of the project, made an initial evaluation of its economic and especially its financial advantages. Its report reached the conclusion that the construction of a heavy railway designed to carry 15 to 20 tonnes of iron ore per year between Owendo and Booué should not be undertaken immediately. This conclusion was based on the uncertainty concerning the opening of the Bélinga-Mékambo mine, the high level of investment required, the low profitability, the existence of a less onerous alternative, and the possible
65 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 3: Comments on the Gabon Railway Project, 6 June 1973, p. 1. 66 J. Faccart and P. Gaillard: Foccart parle, vol. 2, pp. 125-126 and P. Péan: Affaires Africaines, pp. 122-123. 67 The Economist, 28 July 1973, p. 52.
150 consequences of financing the railway for the execution of other urgent development projects in Gabon.68
With financial support not being available for the project, the conclusion was that the project would not get off the ground if the World Bank withdrew financial support. The World Bank believed that there was only a very small chance that the Bélinga mine would be open before 1990. It indicated that the line would be a money loser until the Mékambo iron ore deposits in the north-eastern corner of Gabon were exploited. Moreover, the total investment for the railway, port and road facilities had been estimated at 64450 million of CFA Franc, about 232 million US dollars. The Commission believed that it would be possible to achieve considerable savings in the projected cost of the project. They estimated that total investment could be reduced to 48628 million of CFA Franc, about 175 million US dollars, so timber exploitation alone could, to start with, ensure adequate profitability, without prejudice to the future role of the railway, which was to transport 15 to 20 tonnes of iron ore per year once the mine opened.69
As a matter of fact, the World Bank President, S. McNamara, informed President Bongo on 6 February 1973 that the World Bank was not in a position to provide the necessary financial backing for building the Transgabonais railway. The World Bank verdict was strong and irreversible. The President, R McNamara, estimated that building roads in the whole country would cost a third of the price. In reply, President Bongo announced that he would build the Transgabonais railway with or without the World Bank. Concerning this matter he said: “I affirm it in front of you, with or without the World Bank the Transgabonais railway will be done, it will be done in one way or another, with one or the others. And if it were necessary to make a pact with the devil for that, we will make a pact with the devil.”70
Bongo’s reaction may have been right, but it seems that he went too far by promising to make a pact with the devil. It suggests that Bongo had personal ambitions beyond the official reasons given for building the Transgabonais railway. Despite all the disadvantages of the project pointed
68 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol.3: Comments on the Gabon Railway Project, 6 June 1973, p. 2. 69 Ibid. p. 3. 70 P. Péan: Affaires Africaines, p. 120.
151 out by the World Bank (such a project was unnecessary at this time for Gabon, who needed more ports and road facilities for less money than the railway), Bongo persevered.
In this I agree with P Péan’s assumption that Bongo’s obstinacy is explained by the fact that Bongo already entertained the idea that his railway would go to his home province, Haut- Ogooué, in order to connect it permanently to Gabon. This region was in fact joined to Moyen- Congo (the Congo-Brazzaville region) until 1946. Haut-Ogooué’s wealth was traded via Congo- Brazzaville. Populated by Bongo’s ethnic clan (the Batékés), Haut-Ogooué was largely turned towards Congo-Brazzaville where the big concentration of Batékés is found. Thus, helped by France, Bongo decided in secret to change the initial project for the Transgabonais railway and to adapt it to his new vision.71
Haut-Ogooué’s economic dependence did not please Bongo. As predicted by the World Bank, due to the fact that there was a very small chance of the Bélinga mine being opened before 1990 (it is not built yet and the mine still not open), the line from Booué to Bélinga certainly did not have the priority that Bongo had in mind. He may have decided to put the manganese and uranium ores in exploitation but trade via Congo, as his first objective, which also interested France for its atomic bombe. Therefore, it was more realistic and necessary for him to bring the Transgabonais railway to Haut-Ogooué in order to facilitate the communication between Haut- Ogooué and Libreville, the capital of Gabon.
This assumption was justified by Bongo himself when he said that the realisation of this project “has become the main project in my preoccupations.” He told his people that he had met indifference, hostility, hesitation and reticence. Although there were many obstacles, the project would become a reality.72 That is why President Bongo staked much on this project, which he saw as a symbol of prestige, both for Gabon and himself.73 Due to the fact that World Bank withdrew financial support for the project, other financial sources saw the line up to Booué (330 km) as a viable project. They stressed that it would provide an immediate outlet for the vast timber reserve in Gabon’s rain forest. So far, only wood that could be floated down rivers was
71 P. Péan: Affaires Africaines, p. 121. 72 To the Point, 25 August 1973, p. 38. 73 The Economist, 28 July 1973, p. 52.
152 exploited. It was felt that an extension to the ore deposits, some 220 km further on, could always be built later. South Africa was prepared to provide financial support along with an equal amount from the European Common Market and the remainder could be met by other governments and private and international banking organisations.74
In February 1972, CJ Miller, an official of Roberts Construction Company Limited, visited Gabon, and had discussions with Paul Moukambi, Minister of Finance in the Gabonese Government, and President Bongo, in connection with South African participation in the Transgabonais railway project.75 Resulting from these discussions, Miller wrote to AJF Viljoen (African Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs) on 6 May 1972, setting out details of the Project. While phase one (Owendo to Booué, 330 kilometres) was estimated to cost approximately R90.000.000 including some tunnelling, bridges and the supply of ten locomotives and 200 wagons to carry logs, no technical details were available for phase two (Booué to Bélinga, 225 kilometres). Phase three (Booué to Moanda, approximately 223 kilometres) was to be constructed to facilitate the export of manganese ore, which was mined in the Moanda area.76
Miller suggested to the Department of Foreign Affairs to immediately consider the possibility of making an offer of finance and construction to the Gabonese government for phase two. He requested consideration by the South African Government of a loan on Government to Government basis as an alternative to South African participation in this project. The project in its entirety was obviously of a magnitude greater than any one country could finance, and, in fact, greater than any one Construction Company could execute. Both the construction and the financing would, therefore, be carried out on a consortium basis. In his letter, Miller indicated the terms that were being offered by other countries (France, Canada, West Germany, Italy, the United States, the World Bank and the European Development Fund) and that he felt that a soft
74 To The Point, 25 August 1973, p. 38. 75 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 2: Re: Transgabonais railway project, from C. J. Miller (Roberts construction company limited, International division) to A. J. F. Viljoen (DAF, Africa Division), Johannesburg, 28 July 1972. 76 Ibid., 6 March 1972.
153 loan, a loan at special rates and conditions, would enable South Africa to participate on a competitive basis. 77
In addition, he suggested that Pretoria should try to undercut the loan conditions offered by others by offering a loan of R5.000.000 repayable over a period of 15 years at an interest rate of 5½2% (five-and-a-half percent) or less. He informed Pretoria about the meeting between the interested countries that was held in Libreville to study the technical and financial aspects on 9 and 10 December 1971. It appeared with some disappointment that South Africa had shown no interest in the Transgabonais railway project until this date was expressed at this meeting.78
On 28 March 1972, AJF Viljoen took the matter to Brand Fourie, who then contacted the South African Treasury regarding the financing of the project. The Treasury, through its Secretary for Finance, did not reveal any enthusiasm for such a project. Moreover, the Secretary for Finance felt that the South African authorities should not encourage a private South African construction firm to offer or solicit a request for a soft loan from the Gabon Government. Therefore, Roberts Construction had to be advised to apply for the normal export credit facilities available to all capital goods exporters and to this extent would be free to either lead or become a member of a construction consortium. His impression was that a project of this kind definitely looked like a bottomless pit as far as capital requirements were concerned.79
After this failure, Roberts Construction, through James Owens and Company [Pty.] Limited, submitted an application to the Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation (CGIC) of Africa Limited for a credit facility for the Gabonese railway project on 10 May 1972. CGIC replied, saying that, without commitment at this stage, Roberts Construction was able to offer a loan facility with financial credit to a maximum of R10.000.000; a contract directly with, or guaranteed by the Government of Gabon; a payment formula of 5% on contract signature, 10%
77 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 2: Re: Transgabonais railway project, from C. J. Miller (Roberts construction company limited, International division) to A. J. F. Viljoen (DAF, Africa Division), Johannesburg, 6 March 1972. 78 Ibid. 79 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol.2: trans-Gabon project, from the Secretary for finance at the Treasury to Brand Fourie, 3 July 1972.
154 on completion, and 85% in half-yearly instalments over ten years from completion of contract; a minimum South African content of 60%; and an interest rate of 6.5%.80
Although these terms were indicated to Roberts Construction without commitment, it nevertheless enabled the company to make the necessary approaches to the Gabonese government. Resulting from this, JJ Bouwer, General Manager of the Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation of South Africa wrote to President Bongo on 13 April 1973 to inform him that his company had finalised the necessary arrangements and obtained the necessary assistance and authorisations, including those of the South African Government, to enable Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation to offer its facilities to Roberts Construction Company Limited and the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Limited (IDC). This would enable Roberts Construction to tender for participation in the Gabon Railway project from Owendo to Booué to the contract value of R15.000.000 (approximately 4.950.000.000 CFA Franc). The IDC had to negotiate a loan covering 85% of the amount with the Gabonese authorities. Repayment would commence four years after the project’s completion and the interest rate was set at 6.5%.81
A meeting of the commission for the opening of bids for the pre-selection of contractors admitted to participate in the restricted call for tenders for the Transgabonais railway line took place in Libreville from 20 to 21 November 1973. South Africa was present at this meeting with other interested parties (the Gabonese Government and its railway authority, Canada, France, Italy, West Germany, the United States and the European Development Fund). Representatives of South Africa were JK Mitchell (IDC), JJ Bouwer (CGIC) and JAJ Owens (Interpreter).82
According to the report of the meeting, the Chairman noted, when the offer of Roberts Construction of South Africa was opened and discussed, that Roberts was bidding alone and enquired whether it was their intention to go into consortium with any of the other approved bidders at a later stage. The South African delegation confirmed that this was envisaged and that Roberts Construction would open discussions with certain other groups once the approved list of
80 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 2: Re: Transgabonais railway project, from C. J. Miller (Roberts Construction Company Limited, International division) to A. J. F. Viljoen (DAF, Africa Division), Johannesburg, 28 July 1972. 81 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 3: Letter from J. J. Bouwer to President Bongo, Johannesburg, 13 April 1973. 82 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 3: Export finance-Gabon, November 1973.
155 pre-selected bidders was made known. In order to speed up the proceedings, and in view of the fact that delegates from lending countries were attending as observers, the Chairman proposed that detailed consideration of the bids should be left to OCTRA’s (the Gabonese railway office’s) own selection committee during the afternoon and that delegates could have an opportunity of fuller discussion when OCTRA’s list of pre-selected bidders was tabled the following day.83
The meeting then passed to the fixing of the amounts and conditions of aid funds and loans for the project. Delegates from each country were asked to state or reconfirm the amounts and terms of their financial assistance. South Africa confirmed its financial assistance as follows: Export credit equal to 85% of R15 million, repayable over 10 years from project completion (4 years from date of contract) at 6.5% p.a. (60% of R15 million tied to SA supplies).84 The participation of Roberts Construction in the Transgabonais railway project became public knowledge through press reports in 1974 when the SABC external news service reported that the South African firm of Roberts Construction had been awarded a sizeable part of a multi-million Rand contract for the construction of the trans-Gabon railway line.85
The Star’s Africa News Service said that South African interest had been stimulated by President Bongo’s declared alignment with Ivory Coast President Felix Houphouet-Boigny’s quest for dialogue with Pretoria. President Bongo had repeatedly rejected armed conflict with South Africa in favour of a more peaceful pragmatic approach. There had frequently been talk that South African money would help build a proposed international airport at Franceville, the President’s hometown in the hinterland, which he hoped would become the industrial capital. The Gabonese leader was certainly not averse to entering into business agreements with white South Africans whom the OAU insisted should be boycotted.86
In 1974, the project was allotted to the French consortium Eurotrag and Roberts Construction gained a small contract to build bridges. The building project, one of largest of the world, started in 1975. By January 1983, the first section was inaugurated by Presidents Bongo and the French
83 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 3: Export finance-Gabon, November 1973, p. 2. 84 Ibid. 85 SABC external news service commentary, 28 June 1974. 86 The Star Johannesburg, 1 May 1974.
156 President Mitterrand. Three years later (1986), section three was completed.87 But section two of the project was not realised. No indication as to why section two was cancelled could be found. But the above are the conditions under which South Africa, through Roberts Construction, participated in the construction of the Transgabonais railway.
It should be noted that, whatever South Africa’s participation in the Transgabonais railway project was, this involvement was a success. In fact, South Africa was one of partners of Gabon who saw the Transgabonais railway as a viable project. This therefore gave hope and courage to the Gabonese Government to continue the project after the withdrawal of the World Bank. Its success is illustrated by the fact that the Transgabonais railway little by little became indispensable to the Gabonese economy, as Gabon lacked a reliable road network. Moreover, the access to the hinterland also became essential for the provisioning of the rural population, who had moved closer the stations to sell their products, and therefore was vital for the national economy. The single Gabonese railroad which connects Libreville to Franceville, 650km to the south-east, makes it possible to transport wood and manganese, two of the more important sources of income for Gabon, after oil, to the capital. This strategic axis, which was state property until its privatisation in 1999, constituted the only means of transport of manganese extracted at open-cast mines in the area of Franceville to the ore tanker port of Owendo (Libreville).
6.8 Other development projects Following this detailed presentation of South Africa’s involvement with Gabon from the early 1970s in the fields mentioned above, I am going to examine other development projects in which South Africa became involved in Gabon, such as housing projects and the improvement of Gabonese airports. Regarding the housing project, the South African Department of Foreign Affairs was informed in August 1971 by the firm LTA Limited that it had negotiated a housing project with the Gabonese Government.88 LTA’s motivation for this project was not indicated. However, it seems that, with Gabon becoming involved with South Africa, it was understandable
87 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 4: Gabon from Johan Pretorius, Pretoria, 21 November 1974, and P Péan: Affaires Africaines, pp. 123-124. 88 R. Pfister: Apartheid South Africa’s Foreign Relations with African States, 1961-1994, p. 156.
157 that private companies would become interested in investing in Gabon, but to do so they needed the blessing of South African authorities in order to be protected and supported in case they had to face problems.
The LTA contract to erect prefabricated houses was to the value of more less R6.000.000.89 The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) was approached by LTA for the financing of the project, in which the Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation (CGIC) acted as insurer. During a previous visit by LTA officials to Gabon, the usual terms of finance under the scheme were conveyed to the Gabonese Government. But the LTA later expressed reservations regarding certain of the terms relating to the initial cash payment of 20% of the contract value. After negotiations, the IDC informed the Gabonese Government that it had reconsidered the terms which were conveyed to Gabonese authorities. The contract price for supplying and erecting these houses was estimated at R6.1 million in respect of 1.000 housing units. The contract stipulated two stages of completion, each in respect of 500 units. The IDC, in reconsidering the issue, lowered the initial payment to 10% in cash upon signing of the contract. A further amount of not less than 5% had to be paid prior to completion, with the remaining 85% to be repaid in 10 annual instalments commencing one year after the completion of the project. In addition, the loan was granted at the low interest rate of 6.5%.90
By 16 May 1972, eight prototypes had been erected in Libreville for demonstration purposes.91 When LTA was ready to start construction of the housing units, the company was unexpectedly informed that President Bongo wished to cancel the arrangement for reasons which were not clear. Apparently he felt that the houses were too expensive and not suitable for Gabon. In March, the DFA was asked by President Bongo to use its good offices to get LTA to withdraw. Consequently, LTA took precipitate action with the purpose of being paid within three months for the eight prototypes houses built for demonstration purposes.92 Finding himself in an
89 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol.2: LTA Ltd housing project, from F. Vijoen to Paul Kruger, Pretoria, 2 August 1972. 90 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol.2: Housing project, official letter from J. van der Walt (IDC Secretary) to Mbouy Boutzit ( Gabonese Minister of Economic Affairs, Commerce and Industry), Johannesburg, 6 August 1971. 91 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol.2: Re: prefabricated houses, from J. M. Collet to Hennie, Libreville, 16 May 1972. 92 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 2: LTA Ltd housing project, from F. Vijoen to Paul Kruger, Pretoria, 2 August 1972.
158 embarrassing situation, Bongo approached Mauricheau-Beaupré for help, who brought the matter to Van Tonder. Thus, to get President Bongo out this situation, the DFA undertook negotiations with LTA.93 After negotiations, the Chairman of LTA, Dr Hendrik Olivier, assured the DFA that the LTA would cooperate.94 For its part, the LTA contacted other parties, such as Credit Guarantee, who were angered by the cancellation of the contract and they solved the matter during July 1972. The problem was put down to a misunderstanding.95
The last payment was finally made to LTA by the Gabonese Government in November 1972. M De Klerk (CGIC Managing Director) wrote to JP Chassang (Union Gabonaise de Banque), thanking him for transmitting the amount of R37.530 to the Jeppestown Branch of the Standard Bank for the account of LTA Limited. In addition, he informed him that Jan Bouwer from CGIC was to fly to Libreville on 28 November 1972 and, amongst other matters, wished to call on Chassang to convey apologies to him personally.96 From the above, it is clear that the housing project failed despite the building of prototypes in Libreville and Franceville. This failure can certainly be explained by the fact that Steyn (Secretary of Commerce) right at the beginning, on the return of the South African economic mission to Gabon (12-18 April 1970), indicated that this type of housing was unsuitable for Gabon.
In pursuing its objective of assisting Gabon in its development by providing technical aid and financial facilities, South Africa concluded a loan agreement with the Government of Gabon on 13 September 1975. South Africa agreed to a loan, in South African Rand, of R 3.000.000 to Gabon, who accepted on the terms and conditions indicated and stipulated in the loan agreement. The total amount of the loan was to be drawn by Gabon within a maximum of one year, commencing on the date of the signing of the agreement, and the interest rate was fixed at 4% per annum, calculated in arrears on 30 June and 31 December of each year, on the total amount outstanding under the loan agreement. The proceeds of the loan were used principally for developing the airport facilities, including oil storage facilities, at Libreville and Franceville in
93 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 2: LTA Ltd housing project, from Norman Best to F. Vijoen, Pretoria, 20 July 1972. 94 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 2: LTA Ltd housing project, from F. Vijoen to Paul Kruger, Pretoria, 2 August 1972. 95 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol.2: Letter from Machiel de Klerk (Managing Director CGIC) to J. P. Chassang (Union Gabonaise de Banque), Johannesburg, 7 August 1972. 96 Ibid., 27 November 1972.
159 Gabon.97 Up to 31 December 1980, the Gabonese Government was up to date with the repayment of the loan. Two payments (R321.000 and R112.000) were made in December 1980 and the other payments were due on 30 June 1981.98
The South African policy to assist Gabon in its development that was initiated at the beginning of the 1970s did not change its focus throughout. Thus, loan agreements concluded between South African and Gabon during the 1980s stated that, on 30 October 1980, an amount of R80.000 was agreed by South Africa for the supply and installation of a pineapple canning factory in Gabon. The factory came into operation in June 1981.99 On 19 January 1984, South Africa loaned R2.300.000 to Gabon at an interest rate of 3 % per annum for the erection of certain structures (not specified in the document) in Gabon.100 In 1984, an amount of R800.000 was loaned to Gabon by South Africa for the building of barracks and a hangar.101
6.9 Conclusion To conclude this chapter, it is necessary to restate that its purpose was to examine South Africa’s foreign policy regarding Gabon. It is clear that Gabon had been in contact with South Africa since 1969. After the Gabonese Government expressed its wish to see South Africa involved in the process of the development of Gabon, South Africa saw Gabon’s appeal as an opportunity and possibility to materialise its détente policy through Gabon. South Africa therefore decided to prove its good intentions concerning its relations with African countries despite its racial policy and became involved in Gabon through military assistance, technical aid and development projects.
Officials from South Africa visited Gabon and officials from Gabon visited South Africa quite regularly. These visits were mainly undertaken in connection with agricultural technical assistance materialised by the OGAPROV project, but the South African Government made
97 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 14: Loan agreement entered into by and between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the Republic of Gabon, Libreville, 13 September 1975. 98 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 12: Gabon: relations with South Africa, 23 August 1982, p. 2. 99 Ibid., 10 September 1982, p. 4. 100 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 17: Loan agreement entered into by and between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the Republic of Gabon, Libreville, 19 January 1984. 101 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol.17: Gabon: Loan for barracks and hangar, G. R. W. Babb, 27 June 1984.
160 loans of large sums of money to be used for diverse projects in Gabon to the Gabonese Government. Over all, South Africa’s involvement in Gabon was a real success. The OGAPROV project included in South Africa’s foreign policy to Gabon symbolises this success. This victory was achieved, in spite of South Africa’s isolation due to the apartheid policy. Gabon did not fear to make contact with South Africa at that time, despite the recommendations of OAU.
However, South Africa’s motivation to establish the sustained interaction with Gabon discussed in this chapter was based on the need to break out of its international isolation and find opportunities to play an important role in Africa. This took place against the background of the South African government’s apartheid policy: South Africa had engendered strong hostility inside and outside the country and the 1960s were problematic for South Africa’s efforts to gain recognition and acceptance of this policy. The newly independent African states had also become extremely hostile to the Republic and international criticism became increasingly vigorous, leading to South Africa’s isolation from the international community.
It is in this political climate that South Africa decided to set up its détente policy with the goal of safeguarding itself and breaking its isolation. After a lot of soul-searching on this matter, South Africa concluded that, to extricate itself from isolation, it was necessary to normalise its relations with black African countries whose endeavours had mainly been responsible for this isolation. In this context, if African states were to accept South Africa with its apartheid policy, the major Western powers would also recognise South Africa as they would find themselves under less pressure from black African countries to break off ties with Pretoria. To achieve such objectives, state and private apparatus were necessary.
South Africa hoped that economic cooperation would acquire a functionalist dynamic, thereby producing regional and continental interaction. For the Foreign Service officers, aid and technical assistance was the key to ending South Africa’s isolation. South Africa therefore offered aid and technical assistance to the black African countries that were free to contact the Republic, such as Gabon. According to what the above, it seems clear that South Africa’s involvement in Gabon was not merely pragmatic expediency or only a humanitarian action.
161 Beyond the pragmatic expediency or humanitarian scene, the ultimate aims were economic and political.
South Africa visualised immense economic benefits accruing to its relations with Gabon in particular and with African states in general, if it could manage to exploit the riches of other African states and also create a vast market for its exports. Finally, South Africa visualised political benefit from its relations with African states, such as safeguarding itself, breaking out of its isolation and opening up opportunities to play a significant role in international politics through the projection of power on the African continent. Moreover, South Africa thought that improving relations with Gabon would provide publicity about South Africa’s ability and capacity to help African countries, in order to bring other countries into contact South Africa.
The Gabonese faced a moral dilemma in accepting South Africa’s aid and technical assistance. In fact, the Gabonese public was not enthusiastic about interaction with South Africa. The lack of enthusiasm was founded on the fact that the Gabonese, like other black African people, perceived the apartheid policy as the willingness of white people to degrade black people, which were seen as a crime against humanity. This made it morally unacceptable to cooperate with South Africa in any field despite the advantages such cooperation could bring to Gabon. Unfortunately the political system in Gabon could not permit the Gabonese public to manifest its disagreement. Thus the choice between the moral problem posed by the apartheid policy and the advantages that interaction with South Africa could bring to the country was in the hands of the Gabonese government.
After the soul-searching, and taking into account the economic advantages that South Africa could provide, Bongo and his government chose to be realistic by getting involved with South Africa, despite the apartheid policy. Gabon, through President Bongo, argued that contact with South Africa was realistic and of primary importance for peace on the African continent. Bongo believed that force could not solve the problem of apartheid, but that peace could contribute to the harmonious coexistence and development of South African society. South Africa was too rich and powerful ever to change its racial policy because of pressure from outside, and less so from the African countries. As African countries were newly independent, the first thing to do
162 was to build and keep the African unity necessary for development. Thus, all African States needed to work towards this goal, especially those that were recording economic success, such as South Africa. African States, first of all, had to remove the spectre of war with South Africa, which would be a catastrophe for the whole continent. Moreover, with Gabon already having ties with South Africa, South Africa’s aid and technical assistance were welcomed because they concretised the existing unofficial commercial relations.
To sum: Gabon saw it as impossible to change the apartheid policy with the use of force and armed struggle. Trade embargoes were certain to fail because Western powers could not stop trading with South Africa. The considerable economic advantage that Gabon could gain through interaction with South Africa seems to have been the greater argument to accept aid and technical assistance from South Africa. Taking into account these aspects (security and peace on the continent, the economic advantages that South Africa could provide), Bongo chose to be realistic by getting involved with South Africa despite the apartheid policy. So, what was the situation in the Ivory Coast while South Africa was scoring success in Gabon due to its foreign policy concerning that country?
163 CHAPTER SEVEN: SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY REGARDING THE IVORY COAST
7.1 Introduction During Houphouet-Boigny’s Presidency, the Ivory Coast was a country with one of the best images of all African countries in the outside world: it was stable, relatively uncorrupted, economically viable, and ruled by a President who enjoyed a considerable reputation in Africa and abroad for wise leadership and sensible policies.1 Similar to Gabon, a particularly important element of South African foreign policy towards the Ivory Coast was the emphasis on the promotion of technical cooperation and on South Africa’s ability to provide this country with assistance in such fields as agriculture and in investment projects. In fact, given the various obstacles to political and diplomatic relations between South African and these two countries, Pretoria saw technical cooperation and the provision of aid as an important channel for communication and, moreover, as a possible forerunner to the eventual establishment of formal relations.2
The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr H Muller, however, remarked that President Houphouet- Boigny did not want to accept aid or cooperation from South Africa for fear of being dubbed a lackey by the other African leaders.3 Contact therefore remained at a superficial level, as can be seen in the developments described in this chapter. Contact concerned fields such as cooperation in scientific research, participation with regard to nature conservation and the establishment of a mining school.
Given the fact that the Ivory Coast, in contrast to Gabon, showed little interest in accepting South African aid for fear of other African countries seeing the dialogue policy as economic ambition and the betrayal of African Unity, it is evident that there can be no relevant material regarding South African technical assistance or development projects in the Ivory Coast. The purpose of
1 South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Relations with the Ivory Coast: Participation in scheme for the establishment of a mining school, from P. R. Killen, 22 April 1983. 2 D. Geldenhuys: The diplomacy of isolation, p. 14. 3 South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Relations with the Ivory Coast: Participation in scheme for the establishment of a mining school, from P. R. Killen, 22 April 1983.
164 this chapter, nevertheless, is to examine South Africa’s foreign policy regarding the Ivory Coast during the time this country was advocating dialogue with South Africa. South Africa’s involvement in development projects in the Ivory Coast, such as cooperation in scientific research, participation regarding nature conservation and the establishment of the mining school, will therefore be analysed.
7.2 Scientific cooperation South Africa, in the promotion of its détente policy in the Ivory Coast, which was based on the judgement that this country held such political influence in African political matters that South Africa’s ambition of being accepted by the continent could be achieved by securing the joint support of the Ivory Coast and Gabon, saw one of its firms establish contact with Francophone African countries.
In fact, it was reported that two representatives of Roberts Construction, called on Robert Montgomery on 13 August 1971 to inform him that Roberts Construction had recently developed contacts with French-speaking West African countries, amongst them the Ivory Coast. The objective of such contacts was to participate in the development projects of these countries. In the Ivory Coast case, a project for the establishment of a sugar mill seemed to interest Roberts Construction. Montgomery replied that, from a political point of view, there was no objection to this firm approaching these countries because the Ivory Coast, like Gabon, had shown that they were in favour of the principle of dialogue with South Africa. But he was not in a position to comment on the economic aspects of the projects or on the availability of capital. He suggested that Roberts Construction approach the Industrial Development Corporation.4 In fact, Montgomery’s response was a kind of tacit political approval given to Roberts Construction. But, given the importance of such projects, the matter needed to be analysed seriously by the Industrial Development Corporation in order to give pertinent advice regarding its objectives and feasibility.
4 South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol.1: Roberts Construction: development projects in the Ivory Coast, Pretoria, 13 August 1971.
165 After that, officials from South Africa visited the Ivory Coast and vice versa. Thus, in the course of events, Ivorian Minister of Information, Dona-Fologo, undertook a trip to South Africa in September 1975. Dr Bella Keita, Ivorian Director of Scientific Research, who was in the delegation, used this opportunity to make contact with several South African authorities, amongst them the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). On 6 April 1976, the Secretary of the South African Department of Foreign Affairs wrote to A Jaquet, President of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, about a proposed visit to South Africa by Bella Keita in the company of the Ivorian Ministers of Agriculture and Mines.5 In response, Dr FJ Hewitt, Deputy President of the CSIR, replied positively to the correspondence from the DFA on 20 April 1976,6 and Dr Bella Keita, accompanied by the Minister of Agriculture and the Minister of Mines, paid an official visit to South Africa on 16 July 1976.7
Following B. Keita’s visit, it was observed that the South African sugar industry was suffering serious losses because of a stem borer insect called Eldana Saccharina. All programmes used to combat Eldana had failed and an investigation into the possibility of using biological control methods was set up. In the course of eight years’ work on Eldana no naturally-occurring parasites were encountered in South Africa,8 but South African authorities had undertaken considerable correspondence with a French entomologist who was actively engaged in research projects concerning Eldana saccharina. In the course of the 1970s, South African entomologists received specimens of parasite material that appeared helpful in combating Eldana, from the Ivory Coast. As this insect also was a serious pest in maize as well as sugar cane in West African countries, it was considered to send someone to the Ivory Coast to investigate the potential of a programme to resolve the problem.9 The Ivory Coast appeared to be a good parasite hunting ground, and this offered South African entomologists the opportunity to pursue a programme of
5 South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Proposed visit of Dr Bella Keita to South Africa, letter from the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the President of the CSIR, Pretoria, 6 April 1976. 6 South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Proposed visit of Dr Bella Keita to South Africa, Reply letter from the CSIR to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 20 April 1976. 7 South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol .8: Note from P. R. Killen to the Secretary of the DFA regarding the Visit of Dr B. Keita, Pretoria, 5 July 1976. 8 South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Letter from P. A. Donovan, Assistant Director of South African Sugar Association Experiment Station, to Ms C. F. S. von Hirschberg, Director General at the DFA, 2 October 1980. 9 South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol.3: Dr Carnegie’s visit to the Ivory Coast, 20 August 1979.
166 biological control in the Ivory Coast. The fact the Ivory Coast was in favour of the principle of dialogue with South Africa, made cooperation appear easy and promising.
As a consequence, the South African Chief Entomologist, Dr AJM Carnegie, took an exploratory trip to the Ivory Coast from 26 July to 5 August 1979. During his stay in the Ivory Coast, he visited several research institutions such as the Institute of Cotton and Exotic Textiles Research (IRCT). No commercial sugar cane was grown in the area and the entomologists at this institute on the outskirts of Bouaké were largely concerned with insect pests of maize and rice, but also sugar cane. Eldana was an important pest of maize in the Ivory Coast; growing maize plants were attacked, and cobs as well as stalks were heavily damaged.10 From Dr Carnegie’s visit, it appeared that the Ivory Coast could be a most promising source for the supply of parasites for Eldana.
Negotiations based on the necessity of scientific and technical cooperation between the Ivory Coast and South Africa commenced after Carnegie’s visit to the Ivory Coast. South African authorities reached their objective with the fullest cooperation of many individuals and institutes, including the staff of the South African Embassy in Paris, the Director of the Plant Protection Research Institute in Pretoria (Dr Dave Anneke) and French scientific organisations when the Ivory Coast government gave its blessing to the project for scientific and technical cooperation between the ORSTOM (Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique Outre-Mer) laboratory of Bouaké and the South African Sugar Association Experimental Station. This cooperation brought success to the Ivorian as well as to the South African sugar industry.11
7.3 Nature conservation With regard to technical aid to the Ivory Coast, a promise was made by South Africa to donate animals for a game park and an amount of R16.000 was set aside in the 1978/79 estimates of expenditures. The South African Secretary of the DFA on 14 July 1976 agreed to regard this
10 South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol.3: Dr Carnegie’s visit to the Ivory Coast, 20 August 1979. 11 South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Letter from P. A. Donovan, Assistant Director of South African Sugar Association Experiment Station, to Ms C. F. S. von Hirschberg, Director General at DFA, 2 October 1980, and South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Ivorian Ministry of Scientific Research’s letter of approval regarding the establishment of Scientific and technical cooperation between SASAES and ORSTOM, 4 August 1980.
167 matter as technical aid. Meanwhile, the Ivorian Minister of Nature Conservation and two wildlife experts, with a team of game rangers, were invited by the South African officials to visit South Africa in August 1977. The team of game rangers was supposed to study elephant control technicalities in South Africa. The estimated cost of this visit amounted to R16.000 and this was authorised by the South African Secretary of the DFA on 3 June 1977.12 By taking the expenditure of the visit for its account, South Africa proved its enthusiasm and seriousness with regard to helping the Ivory Coast in this matter.
Further to the Ivorian officials visit to South Africa, the Ivorian authorities learnt emergency measures to resolve conflict between elephants living in the agricultural zone and farmers, as killing the elephants was not the solution. The Head of the World Bank project of the National Park of Azagny discussed the matter with Dr Hall-Martin (Senior Research Officer at the Kruger National Park of South Africa) and Dr Anderson, both head biologists at the Kruger National Park of South Africa. In this park, the immobilisation of elephants with narcotics and their transfer by helicopter had been practised for many years.13 Such methods appeared to be useful in the matter concerning the Ivorian elephants.
At the meeting of the African Elephant and Rhino Specialist Group held in Zimbabwe 1981, Hall-Martin, who was acting as the Southern African regional representative, met Dr Harald H Roth, a member of the Elephant Specialist Group and a technical adviser to the Ivory Coast Government in the Ministry of Water and Forests. They discussed the objectives and feasibility of a visit by Hell-Martin, accompanied by Paul Bosman, to the Ivory Coast, with special reference to elephant management and conservation. On 22 January 1983, Hell-Martin and Bosman visited the Ivory Coast. This technical mission was at South Africa’s expense.
The objectives of the mission were to see and briefly study the forest elephants of the Ivory Coast in their natural habitat, which is the rain forest. In addition, South African experts familiarised themselves with conservation and management problems concerning elephants in the Ivory Coast, both within the National Parks and in the areas destined for agricultural
12 South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: 1978: Annual review of relations with the Ivory Coast. 13 South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 10: Communiqué of the Ivorian consul of Ministers, 15 December 1982.
168 development outside the Parks. They also demonstrated how to immobilise an elephant bull from a helicopter, showing the technique to the Ivorian staff of the Azagny National Park, and to fit the animal with a radio transmitter collar so that its daily movements could be monitored.14 Judging by the expertise of members of staff and the objectives of the mission, it is clear that the South African authorities were very serious about the problem.
Roth submitted Hall-Martin and Bosman’s visa applications and other documentation, which was approved by the Ivorian Minister, Christian L Zagote, and his colleagues on the Conseil de Ministres (Ministers Council). The Ivorian authorities were fully satisfied to welcome South African nature conservation experts. Such a mission presented a real hope for definitively resolving the elephant problem and President Houphouet-Boigny generously and enthusiastically endorsed the mission. They travelled to Abidjan by South African Airways, which had been given permission to disembark them, on 22 January 1983. They stayed in the Ivory Coast until 15 February 1983 and spent six days in the Azagny National Park, four days in the National Park of Tai, four days in the National Park of Comoe and two days in the Classic Forest of Go. The rest of their time was spent in Abidjan.15
Minister Christian L Zagote received them on the 9th February and, following some discussion with him, they showed a series of colour slides illustrating elephant management in South Africa. During the discussions with the Minister it was agreed that Hall-Martin would submit a report on the visit giving his impressions of the situation and making some firm proposals as to actions which could be taken with regard to the elephant population of the Ivory Coast. The Minister authorised the use of an Ivory Coast Air Force helicopter, which was used for reconnaissance of the Azagny area and the Go Forest. At the National Park of Tai, they observed that Tai contained the largest intact primary rain forest and the largest single population of forest elephants still surviving in West Africa. The park also supported a viable and still diverse community of other rain forest animals, including rare species such as Jentink’s duiker, zebra duiker and pygmy hippo. Tai has been recognised as a world-ranking cultural and scientific asset and has been designated a World Heritage Site by UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and
14 South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol.11: Report on a visit to the Ivory Coast with special Reference to elephant management and conservation, from Dr Anthony Hall-Martin to G. R. W. Babb at DFA, 14 April 1983. 15 Ibid.
169 Cultural Organisation) as part of its “Man and the Biosphere” programme.16 Due to its scientific value, it was therefore important to protect this park by a special statute.
Three of the mission’s four days in Tai were spent walking in the Park with guides and porters. Their sightings of wildlife were disappointing (one bush pig and several groups of monkeys) and this was almost certainly due to the very high level of poaching and other human activities such as gold digging in the Park. On their way they intercepted a light truck in the peripheral protection zone of the Park and the guide, Jacques, arrested the three occupants with the supplies which they were to deliver to poachers and gold diggers in the Park. These consisted of about 1.500 kg of rice, 200 kg of flour, 100 kg of sugar, 100 litres of peanut butter, salt, torch batteries, cigarettes, canned milk and other provisions.17 The amount of food confiscated indicated the size of the illegal community operating in the Park. The fact that the delivery was made in daylight, on a well-used timber extraction road, indicates that these people had no fear of discovery or arrest. This confirms that no serious effort was apparently made to exercise control over the Park. The poachers were therefore operating freely and decimating the wildlife stocks of the Park.
Regarding the National Park of Comoe, the visit was preceded by a meeting with the Warden, Koulibaly Azuamana, at his headquarters in Bouna. Koulibly was able to provide the team with details of the Park and to point out some of the management problems that he faced, including poaching pressure on the elephant population. The team spent four days in Comoe and saw large numbers of antelopes of various species, numerous buffalo, warthogs, monkeys and a few lions, as well as elephants. From the air it was clear that the elephant population was concentrated in the forest patches of this area. Some of these forests showed severe elephant damage and degradation. There were fewer signs of elephant utilisation of the savannah communities between the Comoe area forest and the forest patches. The limited observation indicated that the elephants kept to the densely forested areas as a strategy for protection from poaching. They only
16 South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol.11: Report on a visit to the Ivory Coast with special Reference to elephant management and conservation, from Dr Anthony Hall-Martin to G. R. W. Babb at DFA, 14 April 1983. 17 Ibid.
170 appeared in more open areas at night. According to the Warden, there also was a concentration of elephants in the Boutourou Mountains.18
According to Dr Anthony Hall-Martin, the Azagny National Park, like Tai, showed many signs of illegal human activity varying from firewood collection to crab trapping and shooting of monkeys and duiker. The team observed forest elephants, forest buffalo and pygmy hippo. They saw a total of 30 elephants. The animal populations that were observed included nine (30%) adult bulls, nine (30%) adult cows, ten (33%) immature animals and two (7%) calves estimated at less than three years of age. These figures were insufficient to support firm conclusions as it was not known which segment of the population was affected by poaching. Nevertheless, the large proportion of immature animals indicated some recruitment and that the population was probably viable.
The last stop of the visit was the Classic Forest of Go. This area of primary rain forest and raphia swamp to the west of the Bandama River was investigated as it supported a viable elephant population. However, part of it had been declassified to provide land for people who were to be moved out of the Azagny Park. The establishment of a settlement and agricultural plantations in an area supporting elephant (as well as buffalo and pygmy hippo) would immediately create conflict between wildlife and agriculture.
The elephants of the Go forest had for many years been considered a problem on the oil palm plantations at Lanhow. A ditch was dug along part of the boundary some years previously to keep the elephants out. However, poor maintenance had resulted in this ditch no longer being effective. A suggestion was made to capture the Go elephants and to move them to Azagny and this proposal was also assessed on site. As in the other parks that were visited, heavy signs of poaching of wildlife were found. This included eight gunshots heard during one five-hour period of walking through the forest. In fact, taking into account the importance of protecting the wildlife and the danger to people in cohabiting with elephants, the suggestion to move these people had mutual benefit. At the end of the visit, it was stated that the larger mammals of the
18 South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol.11: Report on a visit to the Ivory Coast with special Reference to elephant management and conservation, from Dr Anthony Hall-Martin to G. R. W. Babb at DFA, 14 April 1983.
171 forest zone were rapidly being eliminated. Law enforcement within, and patrolling and control of National Parks and other protected areas that were investigated, was inadequate. Habitats in National Parks were still intact and largely undisturbed, with high conservation status.
Despite the degree of poaching experienced, the animal populations of the Parks had the potential to recover and to thrive, if given protection. Poaching was selective in the Comoe National Park and only elephants seemed adversely affected. A second effect was that the elephants had concentrated in a limited area of forest, which they were destroying. The future development of tourism in Azagny and Comoe depended heavily on the maintenance of viable elephant populations as a major wildlife attraction. There was therefore a compelling case to be made for a better ecological monitoring system to be developed, which could provide information on the status and movements of animals and vegetation changes. The large-scale capture and translocation of forest elephants was not a realistic practical proposition,19 simply because it was not realistic or possible to protect all the remnant elephant populations in the Ivory Coast.
A decision was therefore taken to abandon some populations, to exterminate those causing major damage to agriculture and to effectively protect those which had potential for maintaining a viable population in the long term. The criteria that were to be used in deciding this included the size of elephant population, the size of suitable habitat available and the level of conflict (alternative uses for the land). According to the fact that there were few prospects for effective capture and translocation of forest elephants, it may have been feasible, however, to capture elephant calves in threatened areas where adults were shot and to translocate them to national parks such as Tai or Azagny. As the regular aerial and ground monitoring of animal populations and plant communities in Azagny and Comoe needed to be instituted as soon as possible, and the necessary expertise was available in the Kruger National Park, Dr SCJ Joubert was prepared to visit the Ivory Coast to set up such a project.20
19 South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol.11: Report on a visit to the Ivory Coast with special Reference to elephant management and conservation, from Dr Anthony Hall-Martin to G. R. W. Babb at DFA, 14 April 1983. 20 Ibid.
172 Examining the South African experts of Nature conservation and wildlife mission to the Ivory Coast, it appears clear that this mission permitted them to investigate all problems that the Ivorian Nature conservation and wildlife experts were facing and to make pertinent recommendations in order to solve these problems. As poaching was the most important single issue facing park managers in the Ivory Coast, input of advice on a practical game ranger level was expected to do much to improve the position.
A visit by an experienced game ranger from South Africa to Comoe, Azagny and Tai was more than necessary. In fact, such a visit could prove to be helpful to Ivorian park supervisors by providing practical guidance. In addition, relevant expertise would also assist in identifying some of the basic failures in the existing management structure that contributed to the poor anti- poaching performance of park staff. Besides the poaching issue, the protection of remnant elephant populations required serious attention.
Following this technical mission to the Ivory Coast, officials from South Africa visited the Ivory Coast and Ivory Coast officials visited South Africa quite regularly and the recommendations made during Hall-Martin’s visit was taken into account. Visits were mainly in connection with the management, development and modernisation of nature conservation. Thus, conscious of the mutual benefits to the Ivory Coast and South Africa that could result from the development of friendly relations and cooperation between the two parties, particularly for nature conservation, the government of South Africa and the government of the Ivory Coast decided to improve their cooperation.
A cooperation agreement regarding the technical management of the Abokouamékro Game Park, which came into force on 9 September 1990, was signed on 26 July 1990. The subject of this agreement concerned the joint development of the Park by the two parties, particularly through the establishment and the preservation of fauna composed of various species of wild animals of local or foreign origin allocated to the Park by the Ivory Coast. Technical assistance by South Africa permitted the achievement of the two main objectives, which involved the following:
173 The optimal development of the diversity of species and of the populations of the Public Faunistic Heritage, with consideration of the ecosystem of the Park and particularly its sanitary environment insofar as it affected animal health and well-being, and maintaining the ecological and sanitary equilibrium in the Park and in the Ivory Coast. It was stated that the conditions and the modalities for achieving the objectives mentioned above would be defined in a multi-annual programme for the technical management of the Park, which would be agreed upon by the two parties, at the latest two months after the communication to the Ivory Coast of a proposal by South Africa. Every two years, the parties would examine and adopt, if necessary, the Management Programme.21
From this agreement, it is clear that the South Africa’s technical aid to the Ivory Coast regarding nature conservation was successful. With this agreement, as promised, South Africa managed to donate a Game Park to the Ivory Coast. This agreement acted as a consecration of the relations existing between South Africa and the Ivory Coast since 1970, despite the fact that Houphouet- Boigny initially did not want to accept aid or cooperation from South Africa for fear of being dubbed a lackey by other African leaders.
7.4 Establishment of the mining school in the Ivory Coast Jacques Soustelle, Director General of the French Secret Service22 undertook a visit to French- speaking Africa from 4 to 15 January 1983 and visited the Republic of Congo Brazzaville, Guinea Conakry and the Ivory Coast. Prior to his departure to the Ivory Coast, he was informed that the Mayor of Abidjan-Cocody, Usher-Assouan, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, had proposed a project for constructing houses (600 houses), for which he requested co-financing and co-participation on the part of South Africa and France. The Ambassador, J Van Dalsen, Director General of Foreign Affairs in Pretoria, agreed in principle to this project and Soustelle took up contact with CGIC about this operation. During a lunch with President Houphouet-Boigny, Soustelle informed him accordingly. The president requested a halt to the operation, for two
21 University of Stellenbosch, J. S. Gericke Library, South African Government Publication SP Number 11/1990: Cooperation agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the Republic of the Ivory Coast regarding the technical management of the Abokouamékro Game Park, Abidjan, 26 July 1990. 22 http://lionelcoutinot.club.fr/occupation/ch5.html (10 April 2007)
174 main reasons: He did not wish his country’s guarantee to be engaged in this specific project. He agreed that the principle of a Franco-South African co-financing operation for a project of national interest should be maintained and assigned to part of the University of Yamoussoukro, which he was building in the country’s central area. 23
As the Ivorian President did not want aid or cooperation from South Africa for fear of seeing his dialogue policy reduced to economic trade, it was necessary to see such a project as co-financed and co-participated by South Africa and France. Implicating France was of mutual interest: France’s presence could protect the Ivory Coast against attacks from other African countries. Besides this, it provided an opportunity for France to control what was going on between South Africa and this country. In this regard, France did not appoint a simple representative, but a Secret Service Director to follow the coordination of this project.
For such joint financing, the President of the Ivory Coast more specifically desired the creation of a Faculty of Mine Technology at the University of Yamoussoukro. The building budget of this University was estimated at about one hundred million dollars and he wished it to be undertaken over three financial years (1984, 1985 and 1986). In this respect, President Houphouet-Boigny wished the South African Government to provide the Ivory Coast with a loan to the order of 50 million dollars, distributed over three years, with the understanding that a similar loan could be accorded by the French Government. It was understood that, for the success of the project, French and South African construction firms would take part in the operation under an ad hoc consortium.24 Given South Africa’s ability to provide efficient technical assistance and financial aid to the Ivory Coast and following the evolution of events, the Ivorian President started to be flexible with regard to the earlier policy based on the refusal to accept aid or cooperation from South Africa.
The President of the Ivory Coast did not exclude South African professors from lecturing in mining techniques at this Faculty. Ivory Coast candidates for a professorship could be sent to South Africa to perfect the same techniques, which they could then teach at the Faculty.
23 South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Jacques Soustelle’s visit to French-speaking Africa, from Jacques Soustelle to Ambassador Du Plooy and Dr Boyazoglu, Paris 8 November 1983. 24 Ibid.
175 Therefore, President Houphouet-Boigny asked Soustelle to follow up the coordination of this project between the two governments. He wished 1983 to be dedicated to getting the necessary co-financing under way and to preparing the study programme, as soon as the financing was assured in principle from both the South African and French sides. He wished these two points to be established by the end of 1983.25 After returning to France, Soustelle informed the officials at the Embassy in Paris of President Houphouet-Boigny’s proposal regarding the establishment of a mining school in the Ivory Coast. Thereafter, the project was discussed in Paris. 26 It seems that the President of the Ivory Coast, by proposing South Africa to participate with France in financing the establishment of a mining school Faculty at Yamoussoukro University, departed radically from his previous attitude about accepting aid from South Africa for fear of being a target of other African leaders accusing him of dividing African Unity for economic reasons. This implied that the Ivory Coast could no longer hold South Africa at arm’s length.
According to the South African authorities, the opportunity to get a foot in the Ivory Coast’s door at this stage and before President Houphouet-Boigny died, offered various possibilities. Free access by South Africans to the Ivory Coast could be expected. South African expertise in an area in which South Africa was one of the world leaders (mining) could be permanently stationed in West Africa. An exchange on an academic and technological level could follow. South Africa’s influence in the mining sector could be extended beyond the frontiers of the Ivory Coast to where rich resources were exploited by all the neighbouring territories (especially Ghana, Upper Volta, and Niger).27 In consequence, it would be difficult for the Ivory Coast to alter this situation if South African aid was effective. In such an economic climate, the invitation by the President of the Ivory Coast and the overtures he made could not be rejected or ignored. In fact, the establishment of positive and practical relations with a country in Black Africa of the status of the Ivory Coast seems to have been of vast importance to South Africa.
In this regard, it was explained in the departmental policy document called South Africa’s Foreign Policy that Africa played a relatively determining role, at that negative time, in South
25 South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Jacques Soustelle’s visit to French-speaking Africa, from Jacques Soustelle to Ambassador Du Plooy and Dr Boyazoglu, Paris 8 November 1983. 26 South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Relations with the Ivory Coast: Participation in scheme for the establishment of a mining school, from P. R. Killen, 22 April 1983. 27 Ibid.
176 Africa’s foreign policy interaction (p.42). The expertise that had been developed in South Africa with regard to problems that were unique to the rest of the continent could be applied purposefully to forge and strengthen ties (p.43). Given this situation, as well as the willingness to act beyond its borders, South Africa had the potential to play an important and leading role in Africa in the economic and technical, as well as other fields. Although South Africa’s contact with the rest of Africa was largely based on trade, the Republic would utilise any contact that could occur with regard to all countries (p.57).28 The request from President Houphouet-Boigny therefore required very serious consideration.
The immediate reaction to the enquiry passed on through Soustelle was that the sum involved was beyond South Africa’s capacity (i.e. R50 million as a loan over three years, viz. R17 million per annum). South Africa made it clear from the beginning that it could not become financially bound on the scale envisaged but was prepared to examine to what extent it could contribute, and to see over what period aid could extend.29 In this particular case, South Africa had everything to gain by showing an immediate interest in the invitation by President Houphouet-Boigny and by using the expertise at its disposal to make a study of Ivory Coast needs, to give pertinent advice and make suggestions. Apart from the immediate benefit of being involved in such a project it could provide an opportunity for South Africa to make a valid contribution to the development of the Ivory Coast.
Discussions were therefore held with the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs, who gave the assurance that South Africa could rely on their cooperation. They would examine the situation to determine the nature and extent of the help they could offer. It was recommended that South Africa reply through Soustelle that it would like seriously to consider putting its expertise at the disposal of the Ivory Coast and by giving advice. It was forcibly recommended that South Africa offer its services in helping with training in the mining sphere. It was stated that discussions with the South African Foreign Minister on, the principle of a loan from South Africa to the Ivory Coast would take place on December 1983. From January to March 1984,
28 South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Departmental policy document: South Africa’s Foreign Policy, December 1980. 29 South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Relations with the Ivory Coast: Participation in scheme for the establishment of a mining school, from P. R. Killen, 22 April 1983.
177 negotiations between the two governments on the amount and conditions of the loan would be initiated. This loan might be made through a trustee Bank (e.g. one of the main Swiss Banks). The realisation of the project decided upon by the Ivory Coast government should be entrusted to a consortium of French and South African companies headed by a French enterprise of public works. The trustee Bank would make the payment according to a chronogram determined by the Ivorian authorities and the French-South African consortium. 30
After approval of the above scheme by the South African authorities, the technical studies would begin in April 1984. Earth-moving and building operations might begin early in 1985 and completion would be scheduled for mid-1987; No payments would have to be made in 1984, except an amount of roughly eight to ten percent of the total, which would have to be put at the disposal of the Ivory Coast authorities as from April 1984, in order to enable them to pay for the technical studies. The rest of the loan would be used from the beginning of 1985 until the completion of the project.31
Tacking into account the above-mentioned, it appears that South Africa managed to change the radical attitude of the Ivory Coast President regarding aid from or cooperation with this country. Before the projects discussed above, South Africa’s relations with the Ivory Coast were characterised mainly by polite dialogue, but lack of economic involvement on both sides, because the Ivorian President did not want to have his policy seen as economic ambition. By accepting South Africa’s participation in the Ivorian development projects, President Houphouet- Boigny renounced his previous attitude of refusing aid from South Africa. The establishment of the mining school faculty in the Yamoussoukro University was therefore given serious consideration by South African authorities. South Africa consequently participated efficiently in the short term in this project. As in the case of other projects, South Africa once again demonstrated its good intentions in assisting African countries with their development and the advantage of its détente policy.
30 South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Relations with the Ivory Coast: Participation in scheme for the establishment of a mining school, from P. R. Killen, 22 April 1983. 31 South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 10: Telegram no. 808 from South African Embassy of Paris to the DFA, 8 November 1983.
178 7.5 Conclusion In comparison with Gabon regarding the military assistance, the contact with the Ivory Coast could not be termed as a most significant success for South Africa. In fact, with the Ivory Coast, the military’s role appears to have been curbed after the Nigerian Civil War, but this did not automatically allow South Africa, via the DFA, to establish itself in the Ivory Coast more prominently than during that war.
As far as technical cooperation and investment projects were concerned, there previously had been some contact between South Africa and the Ivory Coast. In fact, officials from South Africa visited the Ivory Coast and vice versa, with the aim of discussing technical aid or investment possibilities, but most of the initiatives launched by the two parties unfortunately left no trace to indicate how the projects ended. It seems, however, that one of the reasons why these projects were not developed was due to the President’s initial fear of seeing his dialogue policy reduced in accusations of economic profit. He therefore did not show great enthusiasm for cooperating with South Africa. Due to this, it seems evident that, contrary to Gabon, there were no significant successes concerning South African foreign policy in the Ivory Coast beyond the issues of the natural conservation and the mining school projects.
Apart from the isolated success recorded with the cooperation on nature conservation and, to a lesser extent, scientific cooperation, it would seem that South Africa failed to set up projects or provide assistance to the Ivory Coast. Such “failure” finds its foundation on the fact that Houphouet-Boigny’s policy regarding South Africa was mainly based on the principle of refusing aid from this country for fear of being dubbed a lackey. The sources that were consulted suggest that contact with South Africa remained at a superficial level mainly because the Ivorian President did not want to appear to be a “lackey of Pretoria”.
179 CHAPTER EIGHT: POLITICAL AND TRADE INFLUENCE ON SOUTH AFRICA’S RELATIONS WITH THE IVORY COAST AND GABON
8.1 Introduction Relations between South Africa and the Ivory Coast, in the first instance; and Gabon and South Africa, in the second instance, date back to the 1960s. The international isolation of the Republic of South Africa and the opening of contact with South Africa through dialogue in the early 1970s constitute focal points in these relations. Indeed, during the National Party rule (between 1948 and 1994), South Africa was the object of concerted international isolation due to its apartheid policy. Attempts to officially expand political, economic and diplomatic contact abroad before 1990 were limited.
However, President Houphouet-Boigny, supported by President Bongo, had astounded African and international public opinion by announcing in 1971 that he foresaw the possibility of a dialogue between Africans and South Africa in the interests of both peace and Africa’s economy. Since then, South Africa has developed excellent relations of friendship and cooperation with the Ivory Coast and Gabon.
Despite the fact that trade with South Africa was officially banned during the time of apartheid, some South African produce was freely available in Ivorian and Gabonese markets. In accordance with these friendly relations, an important number of exchange developments between South Africa, the Ivory Coast and Gabon were recorded in the economic and political fields. Such exchanges had contributed partly a feeling of not really being isolated. Thus, the end of the apartheid policy, the first universal franchise elections and the inauguration of Nelson Mandela as the first black South African Head of State in May 1994 enabled this country to extend its representation abroad, particularly in Africa.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the political and trade exchange influence regarding South Africa’s relations of friendship with the Ivory Coast and Gabon. In other words, this chapter focuses on the role played by political and trade exchanges in these relations. To do so,
180 the chapter starts with the examination of President Bongo’s official consultations with FW de Klerk regarding the Southern African issue after de Klerk became President of South Africa. These consultations highlighted the political climate of friendship between Gabon and South Africa. As a matter of fact, Pretoria’s political cooperation with Gabon by the end of the 1980s seemed to be excellent as attested by the negotiation of Namibia’s independence. Following such a dynamic, South Africa paved the way to diplomatic relations with other African countries, among them Gabon and the Ivory Coast. The political climate appeared to be favourable to improving trade exchange. Since then, business ties were initiated and trade exchange increased constantly until the establishment of full diplomatic relations was achieved. Since 1994, following upon the election of Nelson Mandela as Head of State, South Africa has broken the chains of the apartheid system that for so long had crippled the future of many generations. In the conclusion, this chapter makes some suggestions about what the future is likely to hold for these relations.
8.2 Political influence The Ivory Coast and Gabon’s policy of dialogue with South Africa contrasted sharply with the anti-apartheid stance that was common across the continent. In the early 1970s, despite OAU recommendation to isolate South Africa due to its apartheid policy, Houphouet-Boigny and Bongo, motivated by the conviction that the only peaceful solution and the logical way to deal with the apartheid issue was to open dialogue with South Africa. Since then, the Ivory Coast and Gabon have had excellent relations with South Africa, which have been marked by the exchange of visits at ministerial level.
As far as Gabon is concerned, President Bongo initiated official consultations with FW de Klerk on the Southern Africa issue, after De Klerk had become President of South Africa.1 The FW de Klerk presidency brought about some important political changes in South Africa. In the first case, the president’s brother, Willem de Klerk, was a founder of the anti-apartheid Democratic Party, which advocated a non-racial democracy for South Africa. Willem de Klerk described his
1 Gabonese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5E.1.1: Evaluation of the Southern African situation, Note from Mr. André Smith, Director of African Affairs, to the Foreign Affairs Minister. Ali Bongo, Libreville le 7 September 1990.
181 brother as open-minded, pragmatic, and very much inclined to find solutions for South Africa. Secondly, De Klerk, at the outset of his presidency, seemed to associate himself less with the security and military branches of the government, which had always favoured greater repression, and more with the economic and foreign policy offices, which were more interested in South Africa’s standing abroad. Finally, there was de Klerk’s undoubted loyalty to the National Party. When South Africa faced hard times in the 1980s, so did the party. Even PW Botha believed that South Africa had to adapt or die, and his halting steps toward reform split the party between those who wanted to strengthen and those who wanted to reform apartheid. Having inherited this fragmentation, De Klerk may have believed that the way to save the party was to attract reformers, many of them English-speaking, who had hitherto supported other groups.2 Such factors might have had some effect on the political changes in South Africa.
In many ways, FW de Klerk inherited an environment not dissimilar to that of his predecessor. Although he initially continued the visits to black African states begun by Botha, his approach was different. Recognising that South Africa’s international position could not be improved without internal political accommodation, De Klerk set out to achieve just that. Therefore, he embarked on the most radical period of political reform yet seen in South Africa. This had enormous foreign policy ramifications. His initial actions (the change in emphasis towards civilian input into The National Security Management System, the immediate reduction in the National Service period from two years to one, etc.) were followed by the dramatic un-banning of the liberation movements and the release ultimately of all political prisoners.3 From the above- mentioned it is evident that De Klerk made fundamental changes to the South African political processes and accelerated the elimination of apartheid.
Such a decline of the apartheid policy therefore reinforced the policy of dialogue that guided the Ivory Coast and Gabon. They were convinced that the apartheid issue could not be dealt with by means of an armed struggle or by isolating South Africa. For them, a peaceful solution was the only logical way to deal with this apartheid, because, contrary to war and violence, peace is seen to illustrate that a society, a government or an individual has and maintains relations of
2 http://www.answers.com/topic/frederik-willem-de-klerk (05 June 2007). 3 G. Mills: The wired model, South Africa, foreign policy and globalization, pp. 251-252.
182 friendship and brotherhood with a neighbour. Peace is a sine qua non condition for the pursuit of happiness and the development of African people. Such an environment is the unique context for them to develop their continent. Thus, taking into account the values of peace and the benefits of a peaceful environment, the Ivory Coast and Gabon, by developing relations of friendship and brotherhood with South Africa, showed their good intentions of promoting the kind of environment in Africa that was necessary to extricate the continent from problems linked to underdevelopment and poverty.
Following this dynamic, South Africa and Gabon cooperated and brought together their efforts for the independence of Namibia. President Bongo had always been preoccupied with the Southern Africa issue. During an interview with the press on his return from the USA, he (at the OAU meeting on 19 June 1981) promised that he would not fail to draw the attention of other African Heads of State to the opportunity of organising free elections for all parties concerned in Namibia as soon as this territory became independent.4 In the course of events, President Bongo received Sam Nujoma of SWAPO from 28 to 30 April 1984. During the meeting, Nujoma appealed to President Bongo to mediate in the Southern Africa issue and to make overtures to the other moderate countries in Africa, in order to obtain the independence of Southern African countries. Nujoma told President Bongo that neither the progressive countries of Africa nor the United Nations was able to help Namibia.5 Therefore, due to President Bongo’s relations with South Africa, it seems evident that his involvement in this matter was of prime importance.
Nujoma’s appeal to President Bongo received a favourable response, but on condition that SWAPO no longer presented itself as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people. He asked for a cessation of hostilities with immediate effect among the opposed parties. He recommended that all parties come together (and particularly South Africa, without whom a solution could be impossible) in order to arrive at a common understanding as far as future steps (notably elections and independence) were concerned. As a final condition, President Bongo demanded the creation of a provisional government to decide on the constitution of Namibia, the formation of parties and the modalities for the elections. The period of existence for this
4 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 12: Gabon: Relations with South Africa, 9 October 1982. 5 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 17: South West Africa: Offer of Mediation by President Bongo, 16 May 1984.
183 provisional Government was of little consequence but President Bongo was led by the French “Loi Cadre” (Provisional constitution) for African countries of 1956, and he saw in this a parallel for South West Africa. After Nujoma pledged his agreement to all these conditions, President Bongo promised to attempt to arrange a meeting between Nujoma and Minister RF Botha in Libreville at any time.6
In the same context, Gabon started informal discussions with the South African Government after the commencement of the presidency of FW de Klerk, who had favoured internal political talks, especially with the Black majority represented by the African National Congress (ANC), the South African Communist Party (SACP), the Inkatha Freedom Party of Mangosuthu Buthelezi, etc. Foreign relations with African countries were not put aside during De Klerk’s presidency. President De Klerk brought with him a new impetus.7 Indeed, during his presidency, on 7 May 1990, he and a government delegation had their first formal meeting with Mandela and representatives of the ANC, who had once been denounced by the government as terrorists. Both leaders reported the meeting to have been amicable, and each stated his regard for the integrity of the other. Mandela reported that they were closer to one another. Both leaders were well aware that years of repression had produced many dangerous forces that could at any time sabotage the results of that meeting and its hope for South Africa’s future. But De Klerk’s role as the catalyst in changing the course of South Africa’s history seemed secure.8
The most significant act of his presidency was the liberation of Nelson Mandela in February 1990, after having been in jail for about 27 years. In 1991, segregationist laws were abolished. In 1994, Blacks were granted the right to vote. It must be borne in mind that the success of Blacks in gaining the right to vote was conditioned by some success in the Convention for the Democratisation of South Africa (CODESA) negotiations which started after 1991 between the National Party (NP) and the majority among whom there was the ANC of Nelson Mandela. It must also not be forgotten that the OAU put pressure on South African authorities in order to
6 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 17: South West Africa: Offer of Mediation by President Bongo, 16 May 1984. 7 Gabonese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5E.1.11: Presentation of Credit Letter by Willem Steenkamp, first South African Ambassador in Gabon, to the Gabonese Foreign Affairs Minister, Libreville, on 29 January 1993. 8 http://www.answers.com/topic/frederik-willem-de-klerk (05 June 2007).
184 hasten socio-political overtures that would help South Africa to become a State of Law. 9 Following the above-mentioned, it can be asserted here that the crucial role played by President Bongo in this peace process proves the high level of political cooperation that existed between South Africa and Gabon. Besides this, Bongo demonstrated his ability to promote a culture of peace by focusing on the search for a peaceful solution concerning the Namibian issue.
In addition, according to President De Klerk, South Africa, in 1990, was engaged in the irreversible process of establishing a multiparty system without racial discrimination. Therefore, the Republic set up a kind of “Marshall Plan” in order to encourage economic improvement in Southern Africa. In this regard, South Africa planned to establish agreement with Europe, concerning a common market, and with the United States, with the aim to develop trade relations with these two important economic pools, which seemed very promising. At the same time, the Republic initiated partnership contact with African countries in order to prepare the field for opening diplomatic relations with such countries. Taking into account the economic benefit that Gabon could obtain from such a “Marshall plan”, Gabonese authorities decided to cooperate fully with South Africa.10 As a consequence, South Africa took advantage of this context of overture to pave the way to diplomatic relations with African countries, among them Gabon.
The South African Foreign Affairs Minister, on 20 February 1991, sent the draft text regarding a visa agreement between the Governments of South Africa and Gabon to his Gabonese counterpart. The project was accepted by the Gabonese authorities but needed to be adapted to the Gabonese laws and regulations.11 On September 1991, Gabonese political authorities paid a visit to South Africa in order to harmonise the visa agreement project. In 1992 (28-29 October) the South African Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Renier Stephanus Schoeman headed an important delegation to Gabon in order to officially open diplomatic relations between South Africa and Gabon with an exchange of resident Ambassadors. The mission was successful. South Africa had established official diplomatic relations with Gabon. The two countries opened
9 Gabonese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5E.1.11: Presentation of Credit Letter by Willem Steenkamp, first South African Ambassador in Gabon, to the Gabonese Foreign Affairs Minister, Libreville, on 29 January 1993. 10 Gabonese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5E.1.1: Evaluation of the Southern African situation, Note from Mr. André Smith Director of African Affairs to the Foreign Affairs Minister, Ali Bongo, Libreville, 7 September 1990. 11 Gabonese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5E.1.2: Gabonese Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bongo’s letter to his South African counterpart, Libreville, 28 February 1991.
185 Embassies. The Gabonese Embassy in South Africa (first francophone African Embassy in South Africa) was created with the blessing of the European community. This led the German Ambassador to say that Gabon would contribute to change in South Africa.12 In consequence, South Africa had ended its official political and diplomatic isolation.
With South Africa managing to initiate and develop political cooperation with these two countries, high-level official state visits were initiated by both sides. As a consequence, Gabonese and Ivorian officials who had visited the country returned to their own countries with positive ideas about South Africa, so that they were able to add their voice to Houphouet-Boigny and Bongo’s call to African countries to get involved with South Africa. In order to realise their good intentions to normalise and improve their relations with South Africa, the Ivory Coast and Gabon had for most of the time abstained from voting against South Africa in the United Nations General Assembly. Whereas 54 resolutions against South Africa were adopted by the United Nations General Assembly between 1978 and 1984, Gabon, for example, abstained from voting three times.13 The result was that South Africa did not really remain an international pariah and the way was cleared for the Republic to establish diplomatic relations in the heart of black Africa.
After the liberation of Nelson Mandela on 11 February 1990 and the abolition of the apartheid policy rules in June 1991, South Africa’s relations with the Ivory Coast and Gabon took a new direction. Judging the political changes operating in South Africa to be satisfactory, the Ivory Coast and Gabon respectively established full diplomatic relations with South Africa in May and on 15 October 1992. In this year, South Africa’s political and diplomatic isolation officially came to an end.
12 Gabonese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5E.1.15: Gabonese Embassy in South Africa: Report of Activities of August 1993. 13 South African DFA,1/178/3 vol. 12: Gabon: relations with South Africa, 9 October 1982
186 8.3 Trade exchange influence 8.3.1 Ivory Coast business ties with South Africa By the year 1976, the Ivory Coast Government’s friendly relations and profession of brotherhood with South Africa appeared to have moved from the simple policy of promoting dialogue to establishing business ties. In fact, the Ivory Coast had received 20 businessmen from South Africa on 7 June 1976. Their arrival and departure were not announced officially since their trip was regarded as a private visit by businessmen. They left Abidjan on a commercial flight to Johannesburg on 11 June 1976. The leader of the group, Jacob Muhlala, Director of the World Tours Africa, , told the media that the main object of their visit, the first of its kind to any African state, was to explore areas of trade and cooperation between South African businessmen and their Ivorian counterparts. During their stay in Abidjan, they held discussions with the Ivory Coast Chamber of Commerce on matters relating to import/export trade and cooperation. The Ivorian Ministry of Tourism and the Ivory Coast Tourist Association exchanged views with the delegation on opportunities for promoting tourism. Muhlala, a central figure in the discussions, said that many of his country’s people, especially women, were prepared to spend vacations outside South Africa with their families and friends, thereby making tourist trade between the Ivory Coast and South Africa a viable venture.14
Such a vision could be based on the fact that the Ivory Coast seemed to be the country with the best international image in the minds of South Africans due to its policy of dialogue with South Africa. Muhlala added that his group and other businessmen seemed to be interested in developing their own tourist resorts in South Africa so as to attract tourists from Africa and the World at large. Such an exchange would enable many people to see aspects of South African culture, arts and civilisation. The delegation showed great interest in Ivorian agricultural industries. They visited a number of institutions connected with agricultural production, marketing and craft centres. They said they had learnt a lot from their trip.15 Afterwards, South Africa’s business links with the Ivory Coast took a new turn with the development of commercial relations as presented in Table 1, below.
14 Africa 59, July 1976. 15 Ibid.
187 In the course of events, having been invited to Umtata by Digby Koyana, Clement Anet Bile, the Vice-President of the Ivory Coast National Assembly, while en route to Umtata, spent a couple of days in South Africa from 29 September 1978. Although this stop-over was regarded as a private visit, the South African Department of Foreign Affairs used the opportunity to discuss various matters of mutual interest with him. Due to these discussions, Anet Bile came to strongly support the policy of dialogue with South Africa. He was obviously well-informed on African affairs. He thought it was a tragedy that the most advanced country in Africa was cut off from the continent. During the conversation, Anet Bile expressed keen interest in improving trade between the two countries and volunteered to lead a trade group to South Africa if arrangements could be made for this delegation to meet with suitable people in South Africa. It appeared from the conversation that he often travelled as a guest of the Government in other countries and the Department of Commerce was accordingly asked whether it would be willing to accept a trade group from the Ivory Coast as internal guests.16
A year later, on 11 January 1979, Anet Bile wrote to the South African authorities regarding the willingness of the Ivory Coast to have contact with South African businessmen in the field of banking, hotels and agriculture.17 But such a suggestion needed Government’s approval. In response, on 9 March 1979, the Secretary for Commerce and Consumer Affairs wrote that “I agree that such a visit would be to the advantage of both countries and wish to confirm that this Department would have no objection to receive the delegation as internal guests”. 18
The response was positive, due to the fact that South African authorities certainly felt that closer economic ties with the Ivory Coast could give a boost to President Houphouet-Boigny’s repeated calls for dialogue. They took account of the fact that, once in their country, they would be able to
16 South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 10: Visit of Ivory Coast Vice President of National Assembly to South Africa, from Mr Graham J. Barbour to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 3 October 1978, and South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Invitation to Ivory Coast trade delegation to South Africa, letter from C. von Hirschberg, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to Secretary for Commerce and Consumer Affairs, Pretoria, 1 May 1979. 17 South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Anet Bile Clement’s letter to Graham J. Barbour, ref. 1/129/3, Abidjan 11 January 1979. 18 South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Proposed Visit by Ivory Coast trade delegation to South Africa, from Graham J. Barbour, Secretary for Commerce and Consumer Affairs to C. von Hirschberg, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 9 March 1979, and South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Invitation to Ivory Coast trade delegation to South Africa, letter from C. von Hirschberg, Secretary for Foreign Affairs to Secretary for Commerce and Consumer Affairs, Pretoria, 1 May 1979.
188 add their voice to that of the supporters of South Africa. It was therefore recommended that Anet Bile be advised that South Africa would welcome a visit by tradesmen. As Anet Bile had corresponded with Graham J. Barbour about this matter, the latter informed him on 23 May 1979 that the South African Ministry of Commerce and Consumer Affairs had indicated that it would welcome a visit by a trade delegation from the Ivory Coast under Anet Bile’s leadership and that it would be pleased to receive the members of such a delegation as their guests for the duration of their stay in South Africa.19 After having received the South African authorities’ approval for such a trade mission, the arrangements were set up. Due the high level of seriousness on both sides, the outcome of this visit was improved trade relations between South Africa and the Ivory Coast.
The evidence of this is illustrated by the fact that, in the following year, the Managing Director of the United Technical Equipment Company Ltd. based in Johannesburg informed the Director Export Promotions of the Department of Industries, Commerce and Tourism that his company had recently opened an office in Abidjan on 1 February 1982. The company had therefore obtained a certain amount of confirmed business in the Ivory Coast for goods manufactured in South Africa.20 The United Technical Equipment Company Ltd approached an Ivorian company called SONACO, the largest converter of Kraft paper into corrugated containers at that time, as representatives of South African Paper and Pulp Industries. This company purchased Kraft products to the value of 20 million US dollars per annum from the United States of America. But during discussions, Emissah Kouao (General Director of SONACO) indicated his willingness to place 25% of his Kraft requirements with South African companies for manufacturing and shipment.21
Following the visit of the 20 South African businessmen to the Ivory Coast on 7 June 1976 and Anet Bile’s trade mission to South Africa, trade relations between the Ivory Coast and South
19 South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Letter from Mr Barbour to Mr Clement Anet Bile with reference to a proposed visit by an Ivory Coast trade delegation to South Africa, 23 May 1979, and South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol.3 : Invitation to Mr Clement Anet Bile, Vice-President of the National Assembly of the Ivory Coast to South Africa, letter with Barbour’s letter addressed to Clement Anet Bile attached, from C. von Hirschberg, Secretary for Foreign Affairs to South African Ambassador in Paris, Pretoria 13 July 1979. 20 South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 10: W P Siviter, Managing Director of UTE Co. Ltd, letter to Director Export Promotions of the Department of Industries, Commerce and Tourism, Johannesburg, 1 February 1982. 21 Ibid.
189 Africa, which were insignificant between 1969 and 1976, continuously increased until 1994. According to Von Hirschberg, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the trade balance was very much in favour of the Ivory Coast from 1969 till 1979 and the main import was coffee, cocoa and timber, while the main exports concerned meat.22 According to Table 6, below, this situation continued until 1988, changing in 1989.
22 South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Letter from C. F. G. Von Hirschberg, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to Mr G. J. Barbour, Secretary for Commerce, Pretoria, 23 February 1979.
190 Table 6: South Africa’s trade with the Ivory Coast
South Africa’s South Africa’s Year Exports to the Ivory Imports from the Trade balance Coast Ivory Coast 1969 0.126 3.868 -3.742 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 0.129 8.934 -8.805 1975 1976 1977 1.433 26.502 -25.069 1978 3.308 21.795 -18.487 1979 3.364 23.275 -19.911 1980 2.089 22.931 -20.842 1981 1982 1983 6.395 13.219 -6.824 1984 1985 12.744 23.582 -10.838 1986 21.223 54.798 -33.575 1987 1988 26.802 27.382 -0.58 1989 44.652 25.395 19.257 1990 48.774 44.153 4.621 1991 66.491 49.801 16.69 1992 83.462 46.514 36.948 1993 97.892 58.9 38.992 1994 52.833 85.705 -32.872 Source: South African DFA files; Foreign Trade Statistics and Monthly Abstract of Trade Statistics. Pretoria: Department of Customs and Excise, 1992; the Industrial Development Corporation provided the figures for 1988- 1994. Figures for South Africa’s total export and import: The Europa World Year Book. London: Europa Publication, 1961-1994; The Statesman’s Year-Book: Statistical and Historical Annual of the States of the World. London: Europa Publication, 1961-1994; Roger Pfister: Apartheid South Africa’s Foreign Relations with African States, 1966-1994, Appendix B, p. 396 Appendix C, p. 400 and Finansies en Tegniek, 4 October 1991 in South Africa and Africa within or apart? by Adebayo Adedeji, Cape Town, 1996.
191 Regarding South Africa’s trade with the Ivory Coast, it seems clear from Table 6 that imports were more important than exports from 1969 until 1988. In fact, during this period, South Africa exported goods to the Ivory Coast to the value of about 64.223 million Rand while its imports from the Ivory Coast came to about 226.286 million Rand. However, this trend was reversed in the period from 1989 to 1993. Exports increased and reached a maximum level of 341.271 million Rand while imports declined drastically to about 224.763 million Rand.
Consequently, the trade balance, with a few exceptions, was negative for South Africa. It is evident that the value of South Africa’s imports was generally greater than the value of the country’s exports. This can be explained by the fact that South Africa’s foreign policy with African countries such as the Ivory Coast and Gabon was not based on profit, but on financial and technical assistance in project development.
8.3.2 Gabon’s trade exchange with South Africa Gabon maintained trade links with South Africa, for the most part exporting wood and importing foodstuffs. South African experts spent many years prospecting for oil in Gabon. Like the Ivory Coast, Gabon allowed its territory to be used to ship South African supplies into Biafra. In the autumn of 1971, Libreville, the capital of Gabon, seemed the most likely venue for a conference of the group of states that supported dialogue with South Africa. Since then, Gabon has maintained economic ties with South Africa, but has shown little interest in dealing with South Africa politically.23 Indeed, Gabon, an active member of third world and non-aligned organisations, was opposed to South Africa’s apartheid policy and therefore set aside South African politics.
Although Gabon formally disapproved of South Africa’s apartheid policy and, concerning 54 resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly from 1978 to 1984, despite relations between the two countries, had voted against South Africa in 50 instances had abstained three times and was absent once, there was regular contact on the official level between the
23 A. Urnov: South Africa against Africa 1966-1986, p. 78.
192 countries.24 Coming from an African country, the abstentions were really amazing. But such an attitude was not surprising because these countries were involved with South Africa. On 29 January 1980, Gabon acceded to the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. But categorical verbal assurances were, however, given to JA Thomas of the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries by Colonel H Jules (French SDECE agent in Gabon and personal advisor to President Bongo on all matters of delicate nature, particularly at an international level) that South Africa should not expect any negative action concerning Gabon’s accession to the convention.25 However, it appeared that it was merely a matter of political expediency in the face of international and, particularly, third world opinion and pressure in the matter.
In the course of events, in order to increase commercial relations with Gabon, South African authorities invited South African exporters to participate in the economic mission to Gabon in 1983. A preliminary date, from 12 to 17 October 1983, was set down for the visit. It was stated that the mission should consist of a member of the Export Promotion Directorate of Commerce and the department of Foreign Affairs plus five others. It was recommended that Department of Foreign Affairs act as coordinator of the visit.26 The mission finally took place from 7 to 11 November 1983. The delegation included GJJ Breyl (Chief Director, Industries and Commerce); A Kallos (Kallos Exporters); J Bauret (Kallos Exporters); D Milton (Engineering Management Service); J Franklin (Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation); B Loots (South African Freight Air Administrative Manager), and GRW Babb (Foreign Affairs and Information). In Libreville, the group was met on arrival by P Cauvin, advisor to President Bongo, and conducted to the Hotel Dialogue.27
The first meeting was held at the Presidential Palace at 16:00 on Monday, 7 November 1983. The Gabonese delegation consisted of Marcel Kiki (Director of the Political Bureau of the Precidency); Oligui (Director of Civil Aviation); Boulamatari (Commercial Advisor of the
24 South African DFA,1/178/3 vol. 12: Gabon: relations with South Africa, 9 October 1982. 25 Ibid. 26 South African DFA, 1/178/3 vol. 15: Proposed visit to Gabon: Commercial mission from Glenn Robin Ware Babb (Head of North and Central Africa to DFA) to P. R. Killen (Deputy Director Union Buildings), 15 September 1983. 27 South African DFA, 1/178/3 vol. 15: Proposed visit to Gabon: Commercial mission from Glenn Robin Ware Babb (Head of North and Central Africa to DFA) to P. R. Killen (Deputy Director Union Buildings), 22 November 1983.
193 Presidency); Wanys (Secretary General of Finance); Eyamba (Director General of the Bank for Public Debt); Colonel Doumbeleny (President Bongo’s Security adviser) and P Cauvin. After the delegations were introduced, P Cauvin provided a brief background concerning past relations between Gabon and South Africa, mentioning OGAPROV specifically. The various interests of the members of the mission were then worked into a programme which included: civil aviation and air links; importation of wood to South Africa; housing and a visit to the sites; the operation of the finance institutions of Gabon; and purchase of fresh produce from South Africa.28
Another meeting took place at the Directorate of Civil Aviation of Gabon in Libreville at 10:00 on Tuesday 8 November 1983. Present were P Cauvin, JL Doumangé (Air Gabon Cargo Director), B Loots, J Franklin, AE Loubser, GJJ Breyl and the Gabonese Civil Aviation Director. During the meeting, the question was specifically whether Gabon would be prepared to accept the despatch of freight from South Africa to Gabon by South African companies. A categorical assurance was given that such freight could be sent to Gabon on the following conditions: that South African freighters could serve Gabon; that, if they were to land in Libreville, foreign registration would have to be ensured for the aircraft, though, for Franceville, South African registered craft could land freely; that the service need not to be regular but could be irregular or ad hoc as freight became available.29 This permission was certainly granted on the understanding that Gabonese companies could benefit from loading freight in South Africa.
B Loots gave a summary of South African Freight Air’s operations, saying that the company only owned Hercules freight aircraft which were short haul and had 19½-tonnes capacity. They wished to collaborate with the Gabonese and he suggested three possible solutions for the introduction of a service. First of all, he proposed a small service shared by South African Freight Air and a Gabonese company to obviate the problem of a non-South African registration. He added that South African Freight Air could charter a plane registered in Botswana and even leaving from Botswana, if necessary.
28 South African DFA, 1/178/3 vol. 15: Proposed visit to Gabon: Commercial mission from Glenn Robin Ware Babb (Head of North and Central Africa to DFA) to P. R. Killen (Deputy Director Union Buildings), 22 November 1983. 29 South African DFA, 1/178/3 vol. 16: Annexure A of Report of Visit to Gabon: Commercial mission from Glenn Robin Ware Babb (Head of North and Central Africa to DFA) to P.R. Killen (Deputy Director-General Union Buildings), 22 November 1983.
194 Regarding the second possible solution, he said that a “wet lease” could be offered to Air Gabon Cargo, of a plane which would include crew, maintenance and service. In this case, Air Gabon Cargo could register that plane in Gabon and operate where and as they wished. But insurance would have to be satisfactory for the owners and a share of the operation profits would revert by agreement to South African Freight Air. The Air Gabon Cargo Director pointed out that the plane would have to satisfy verities inspection as well as South African control for insurance and the South African Freight Air Administrative Manager said this would pose no problem. The lease would cost R65.000 per month, plus crew and maintenance expenses and minimum flying hours would be 140. Thereafter the cost would increase by R5.000 per 10 hours to 170 hours, which was the maximum. They wondered if there was enough work for such a plane. The Air Gabon Cargo Director wanted to know whether the lease included fuel, to which the South African Freight Air Administrative Manager replied in the negative, saying fuel prices were lower for companies like Air Gabon Cargo than for South African Freight Air. Concerning the third possible solution, a “dry lease” in which the plane would be leased to Air Gabon Cargo without crew but with maintenance by South Africa, the cost and insurance would be the same. 30
In taking account of the South African suggestions, the Gabonese side offered to register a South African plane in Gabon with the second possible solution to permit onward carriage of goods out of Gabon by the South African craft. It was later pointed out by the Air Gabon Cargo Director that this could only be undertaken to destinations where Air Gabon and its pool partners did not have rights, such as Chad. The South African Freight Air Administrative Manager pointed out that freight charges would possibly be prohibitively high, around R2.00 per kilogram, because the plane would undoubtedly be returning empty. The Air Gabon Cargo Director replied that the Air Gabon Cargo DC-8 offered a cheaper service. It seemed at first sight that, to kick off, the first solution (ad hoc service) would be the best way to initiate the route. The South African Freight Air Administrative Manager and the Air Gabon Cargo Director were to meet in private to discuss possibilities.
30 South African DFA, 1/178/3 vol. 16: Annexure A of Report of Visit to Gabon: Commercial mission from Glenn Robin Ware Babb (Head of North and Central Africa to DFA) to P.R. Killen (Deputy Director-General Union Buildings), 22 November 1983.
195 After the meeting, P Cauvin told Babb that he believed that the leasing agreement between Air Gabon Cargo and Affretair (Air Zimbabwe) for the DC-8 would shortly come to an end since Air Zimbabwe was stealing customers from Air Gabon Cargo. This was then a fourth solution which involved the leasing of a more suitable plane by Air Gabon Cargo from SAA (South Africa Airways), for example a Boeing 707. This could obviate SAA Civil Aviation’s objection to Air Gabon Cargo flying from Europe, as well as provide a cheaper service. It was also stated that South Africa should examine the opportunity of transporting passengers since Gabon had little to export by air.31
Regarding importation of wood and purchasing of hardwoods, discussions were held with President Bongo’s Commercial Advisor on the same day (8 November 1983). GJJ Breyl had a specific enquiry concerning import of semi-worked wood and sleepers. A South African importer required some 60.000 cubic meters of hardwood per year delivered in two monthly loads of 10.000 cubic meters. President Bongo’s Commercial Advisor had undertaken, at the first meeting, to obtain details from the Societe Nationale Gabonaise du Bois (SNBG), the nationalised wood distributors.
He produced a copy of the price, quality and volume list of the SNBG to the South African representative. The names of the woods were given in local terminology and the importer might not have been familiar with this, but President Bongo’s Commercial Advisor indicated that wood was used for sleepers. He advised the importers to make direct contact with the exporter. He also provided a list of softwoods which the Gabonese were anxious to export. GJJ Breyl undertook to bring this to the attention of importers.32
Another meeting was held on the same day with the Public Debt Bank. In this meeting, the bank’s Director explained that South Africa’s loans were dealt with discreetly and separately by the bank and, despite hiccoughs in repayments, these had not been subject of to any delays. The
31 South African DFA, 1/178/3 vol. 16: Annexure A of Report of Visit to Gabon: Commercial mission from Glenn Robin Ware Babb (Head of North and Central Africa to DFA) to P.R. Killen (Deputy Director-General Union Buildings), 22 November 1983. 32 South African DFA, 1/178/3 vol. 16: Report of Visit to Gabon: Commercial mission, from Glenn Robin Ware Babb (Head of North and Central Africa to DFA) to P.R. Killen (Deputy Director-General Union Buildings), 22 November 1983.
196 International Monetary Fund (IMF) had imposed a ceiling on loans for 1984 and the Gabonese did not wish to increase the service of debt until 1985. Any loans granted had required a moratorium until then. He said that loans obtained by President Bongo were not included in this limitation.
It was pointed out that debt service had decreased annually for the previous three years, and the Gabonese Government usually obtained soft terms. J. Franklin, the representative of the South African Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation, asked about the per capita income and the Public Debt Bank Director replied that, although this was the highest in Africa at about 2.000 dollars per year, one should not forget that projects such as roads and rails cost six times what they did in other countries. The Director elaborated on the creditworthiness of Gabon and mentioned the main creditors (the principal amongst whom was France).33
As to imports from Gabon, GJJ Breyl had received information on wood and was given a further list of products by President Bongo’s Commercial Advisor, who explained that the exporter would have trouble in meeting an order of 10.000 cubic meters every two months. D Milton had been able to see what possibilities there were for collaborating in the field of housing and would be making an estimate for the near future. President Bongo’s Commercial Advisor pointed out that the visit was exploratory but that it nonetheless had achieved its aims. He said that follow-up visits would take place and further developments could be expected. In all, all parties expressed their satisfaction and the mission returned on 11 November 1983.34
33 South African DFA, 1/178/3 vol. 16: Report of Visit to Gabon: Commercial mission, from Glenn Robin Ware Babb (Head of North and Central Africa to DFA) to P.R. Killen (Deputy Director-General Union Buildings), 22 November 1983. 34 Ibid.
197 Table7: South Africa’s trade with Gabon
South Africa’s South Africa’s Year Exports to Gabon Imports from Gabon Trade Balance 1969 0.049 0.001 0.048 1970 0.067 0.069 -0.002 1971 0.109 0.051 0.058 1972 0.028 0.015 0.013 1973 0.292 0.084 0.208 1974 0.046 0.22 -0.174 1975 1976 1977 0.584 0.002 0.582 1978 0.22 0.246 -0.026 1979 1.599 0.482 1.117 1980 1981 0.127 0.047 0.08 1982 1983 1984 1985 5.105 4.487 0.618 1986 7.748 2.675 5.073 1987 7.574 3.108 4.466 1988 8.018 5.804 2.214 1989 5.735 6.452 -0.717 1990 7.57 8.263 -0.693 1991 9.226 8.888 0.338 1992 13.989 3.825 10.164 1993 21.966 4.66 17.306 1994 13.463 0.416 13.047 Source: South African DFA files; Foreign Trade Statistics and Monthly Abstract of Trade Statistics. Pretoria: Department of Customs and Excise, 1992; the Industrial Development Corporation provided the figures for 1988- 1994. Figures for South Africa’s total export and import: The Europa World Year Book. London: Europa Publication, 1961-1994; The Statesman’s Year-Book: Statistical and Historical Annual of the States of the World. London: Europa Publication, 1961-1994; Roger Pfister: Apartheid South Africa’s Foreign Relations with African States, 1966-1994, Appendix B, p.396 Appendix C, p.400 and Finansies en Tegniek, 4 October 199, in South Africa and Africa within or apart? by Adebayo Adedeji Cape Town 1996.
198 In examining South African trade with Gabon it is clear, from Table 7, above, that the trade balance, with a few exceptions, was positive from 1969 to 1994. The value of South Africa’s exports generally was greater than the value of its imports. Exports to Gabon had reached a maximum level of approximately 22 million Rand.
In addition, Table 6 and Table 7 clearly show that South Africa’s trade with the Ivory Coast and Gabon increased considerably during the time that these countries were advocating dialogue with South Africa. Overall, it can be concluded that the current account of South Africa from 1969 to 1994 was in deficit with regard to trade with the Ivory Coast, while it was in surplus with regard to Gabon. Trading with Gabon seemed less significant than with the Ivory Coast (in value).
In conclusion: it is evident that South Africa’s friendly relations with the Ivory Coast had been influenced by trade exchange affects which contributed to help the Republic to have business ties outside its borders, despite its status of international pariah. As a counterpart, South Africa participated actively and efficiently in the development of the Ivory Coast and Gabon through aides and technical assistance. The Ivory Coast and Gabon since then have become two of South Africa’s important African economic partners.
8.4 Conclusion To conclude this chapter, it is necessary to restate that its purpose was to examine the political and trade influence regarding South Africa’s relations with the Ivory Coast and Gabon. Upon finding itself as an international pariah because of its apartheid policy, South Africa realised that its international position could not improve without continental and internal political accommodation. Thus, the government embarked on a deliberate policy of building bridges into black Africa. As a result, the Ivory Coast and Gabon agreed to become involved with South Africa in this adventure. Since then, South Africa’s relations with these two countries have been influenced by political and trade aspects. Mutual political cooperation had been achieved regarding the independence of Southern African countries and the initial political talks for the democratisation of South Africa. Meanwhile trade relations increased constantly. Indeed, South
199 Africa’s trade relations with the Ivory Coast and Gabon, though insignificant at the beginning, had increased constantly until 1994.
South African exports were not matched by reciprocal imports of goods from the Ivory Coast and Gabon. The result was that a large deficit was recorded on the balance of trade, but Tables 1 and 2 in section 3, above, indicate that this trade increased rapidly between 1985 and 1994. This relative increase can be seen as proof of South Africa’s growing acceptance in these countries. South Africa’s political relations with these two countries also largely improved. This prepared the way for this country to establish diplomatic relations with black Africa States. Although Pretoria, according to Bernard K Yao, already had an unofficial Embassy in Abidjan as long ago as September 1988, with the former First Secretary of the South African Embassy in Paris, the diplomat Albert Warnich, as the head of office.35
After the liberation of Nelson Mandela, on 11 February 1990, and the abolition of Apartheid in June 1991, South Africa’s relations with the Ivory Coast and Gabon took a new turn. Judging the political change operating in Southern African and especially in South Africa to be encouraging and of a nature to justify diplomatic relations, the Ivory Coast and Gabon established full diplomatic relations with South Africa in May and October 1992, respectively. That year, then, saw South Africa break out of its international political and diplomatic isolation and open itself to opportunities playing an important role in Africa. These relations proved that South Africa could break out of the blockage of isolation imposed by the international community. Besides this, South Africa’s internal reform confirmed that internal security could never have been achieved by regional or international repression. South Africa managed to end its isolation through the processes of political cooperation, negotiation and compromise.
Since then, South Africa has made significant progress towards overcoming the legacy of the politically and economically fragile race-based system which denied full rights to the majority of its people. Six years after Mandela’s election, South Africa was by far the most advanced democracy in Africa. South Africa has also demonstrated commitment to democratic governance and peaceful political change, thanks to its level of industrial and economic development in
35 B. K. Yao: Cote d’Ivoire Afrique du Sud, l’aboutissement du dialogue, pp.145-150.
200 comparison to other African states. The end of apartheid has allowed South Africa to end its previous international isolation. The country’s new government aspires to both a position of regional political leadership and one of influence in international organisations. South Africa also has emerged as one of Africa's leading trading nations and a source of foreign investment in Africa.
Taking into account all these factors, it appears necessary that South Africa assist other African states to eradicate poverty in Africa, guarantee continental unity and security and develop the concept of inter-African cooperation based on a strong sense of brotherhood, faith and mutual respect. Due to their historic ties with South Africa, the Ivory Coast and Gabon now also have a unique opportunity to build a new order together with South Africa, an order necessary for their development and the benefit of their own peoples. To succeed, all partners have crucial roles to play. Thus, strong political, socio-economic and technical commitments need to be ensured at the highest level in their cooperation with one another.
On the political level, South Africa should help the Ivory Coast and Gabon to find a formula to prevent and extricate themselves from problems linked to underdevelopment and poverty, such as political disorder and corruption. To do so, an effort must be made to set up a State of Right with strong and efficient democratic institutions. In fact, the incapacity of the Ivory Coast and Gabon to produce and sustain strong and transparent democratic principles and public institutions which everyone can trust constitute an obstacle to the implementation of democracy and the promotion of socio-economic development. South Africa, in its relations with the Ivory Coast and Gabon, should therefore enforce and promote a State of Right, democratic principles, and the practice of good governance.
On the socio-economic level it seems clear that the most important aspect with regard to perspectives emerging from South Africa’s relations with the Ivory Coast and Gabon concern future socio-economic relations. With development being based on human resources, human labour is the beginning and the end of any development process. Therefore there is no doubt that education constitutes the cornerstone of any development process. Education aims at creating conscientious citizens capable of efficiently assuring their future. It is evident that there cannot
201 be peace, health, democracy and development without education. As a matter of fact, extensive cooperation between South Africa, the Ivory Coast and Gabon is necessary in the education sector.
Concerning trade and finance, it is clear that restrictive banking practices and meagre trade financing facilities will be two of the constraints in South Africa’s trade with the Ivory Coast and Gabon. Thus, the governments of these three countries should establish appropriate trade financing mechanisms, such as financial institutions and professional interest associations, to operate between South Africa, the Ivory Coast and Gabon, or closer cooperation with chambers of commerce, in order to facilitate trade.
202 CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION
This study constitutes an analysis of South Africa’s relations with the Ivory Coast and Gabon, which took place within a framework characterised by Pretoria’s apartheid policy and the strong opposition to this policy from the OAU. Should we, after having explored these relations, conclude that the Ivory Coast and Gabon were wrong simply by being right too soon in getting involved with South Africa when the African community as well as the International community had called for the isolation of this country due to its apartheid policy?
If the final result, as it is asserted in politics, constitutes the only criterion of success, we can conclude that the Ivory Coast and Gabon had failed in their efforts to convince Black African States to follow their peaceful approach vis-à-vis South Africa through not producing any positive result. In this regard, a DFA report noted that representatives of the Ivory Coast said in interviews in June 1978, that they had concluded that their peaceful approach to South Africa had produced no significant change.1
In addition, Denise August, the Ivorian Minister of State, declared: “One of the principal hopes for dialogue which was launched in 1971 by the Ivory Coast’s President Houphouet-Boigny, was that it would spur increased racial tolerance and positive inter-racial contact. We hoped that the South African whites would understand the need for change. But it seems that they did not understand. Vorster’s government has told us they cannot make changes without facing a revolution”.2 This clearly suggested that the strategic objective had failed. Such a failure finds its roots in the fact that the Ivory Coast and Gabon appeared to the African community as dividers of African Unity. Of course, by following their convictions, they did not show respect for the OAU and had shown their lack of solidarity with the other African countries. In fact, the diversity of the ethnic groups composing the African states was the leitmotiv for their leaders in being sensitive and more attentive to all political actions that seemed closely or distantly related
1 South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 9: Annual review of relations with Ivory Coast, December 1978, p. 1. 2 Africa research bulletin, 30 June 1978.
203 to racism, as all African constitutions adhere to the principles of human rights and accept the Charter of the United Nations.
Better still, they declared illegal any racial discrimination, and have based the government of states on the strict legal equality of the citizens. It was difficult, therefore, for African leaders to admit that South Africa’s apartheid policy could really guarantee the wellbeing of black South African people. Thus, when the OAU was founded, African leaders across the continent saw the danger posed by racial decolonisation in Africa. Consequently, South Africa’s issue became one of the biggest challenges that the OAU had to overcome.
While taking into account the arguments of the majority of African states in refusing any contact with South Africa, the Ivory Coast, supported by Gabon, recommended dialogue with South Africa at the end of 1970. Such a proposition nourished an underlying controversy within the OAU. Of course there was complete unanimity amongst OAU Member States about the end of apartheid and racial discrimination in South Africa. But by the end of 1971 the OAU rejected the Ivorian proposal to engage in dialogue with South Africa and recommended full liberation of Southern Africa by supporting liberation movements such as the ANC. It was therefore admitted clearly that the OAU was ready to give its support to an armed struggle.
If the Ivorian and Gabonese policy of dialogue failed due to the lack of solidarity in the Organisation of African Unity, of which these two countries gave proof, it nevertheless obliged the OAU to face up to an alternative: Could Africans continue to vote in favour of declarations of war against South Africa, or was it simply not more realistic to use the tactic of discussion in order to resolve the South African apartheid issue while preserving the peace of the continent? President Houphouet-Boigny and President Bongo seriously questioned the use of violence by the peoples of Africa.
For them, contrary to war and violence, peace seemed to be the way in which a society, a government, an individual could illustrate having and maintaining relations of friendship and brotherhood with a neighbour. Peace is more than simply absence of violence. The advantages of peace are quite tangible. They are real and concrete. They are shown in an improved quality of
204 life and greater prosperity for those who, like African people, who are most in need. Peace is precious. In Africa in particular, the home of so much the world holds dear, it has been absent for too long. A peaceful environment provides the unique context needed for the survival of mankind. A peaceful environment is necessary for humanity in order to satisfy its basic needs. Without peace, we cannot enjoy life’s pleasures. Peace is a sine qua non condition for the pursuit of happiness and the development of society and mankind.
According to Frederico Mayor, former Director General of UNESCO, a durable and sustained peace is the prior condition to the yielding of any human being.3 Peace therefore becomes the essential key objective in any society, the ultimate precious good for any people and the unique and indispensable environment for development and the implementation of democratic institutions. It should be a crucial preoccupation for the peoples of Africa whose survival is already threatened. And this explains why President Houphouet-Boigny and President Bongo tried seriously to promote the culture of peace in Africa.
They saw a culture of peace as a setting up of values which reflect and support user-friendliness based on the principles of tolerance and solidarity; which reject violence and are inclined to prevent conflict while attacking the major causes of conflict; which resolve problems by way of dialogue and negotiation. In this respect, President Houphouet-Boigny and President Bongo committed themselves to full respect for the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law. For them, the commitment to peaceful settlement of conflict was the best way to deal with the South African issue. To do so, adherence by the African community to the principles of tolerance, solidarity, cooperation, dialogue and understanding at all levels of society was more than necessary.
In these times, with Africa characterised by armed conflict, political turmoil and economic problems, only a small number of countries, Gabon being one of them, have remained an exception. Gabon indeed, is one of the few countries of the Black continent that is still stable and lives in peace within and outside of its frontiers, because Gabon has never been at war.
3 J. Ping: Mondialisation, Paix, Démocratie et Développement en Afrique: L’expérience Gabonaise, p. 11.
205 Naturally, this atypical and unusual situation is not free from hazard, but it finds its roots in Gabon’s foreign policy. Gabon has always advocated peace between peoples and has constantly favoured dialogue, consultation and participation of all parties concerned in differences of opinion or conflict situations. Gabon has always cultivated and maintained relations of friendship and brotherhood with its neighbours and the world at large. Gabon’s foreign policy has always been based on strict respect for international law in loyalty to the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations.
Let us remind the reader that the international law calls on the international community to respect the national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of each state, and to not interfere in the domestic affairs of states. These principles have been the foundation of international law since the seventeenth century, and theoretically are known and accepted by all. As codified in the Charter of the United Nations, the Bangdoung conference of 24 April 1955 in its final announcement restated the same principles, which are intended to allow all states to break free from fear of the other and mistrust, thus, allowing the peoples of the world at large to promote the values of peace, such as tolerance, mutual acceptance of differences, dialogue, and brotherhood. Gabon’s policy of peace and dialogue vis-à-vis South Africa during apartheid was the result of its deep and strong attachment to and consideration of ideals such as dialogue, tolerance and peace among peoples.
To the above-mentioned question and due to the way South Africa came to end its apartheid policy, we wish to affirm that the Ivory Coast and Gabon simply were wrong in being right too soon by becoming involved with South Africa when the African community and International communities were calling for the isolation of this country due to its apartheid policy. It is evident that armed struggle, which entails the use of violence or force was not the best choice, because it could only have benefited the most powerful, which was South Africa. The best choice indeed was that of dialogue, negotiation and peace. This was the route that the Ivory Coast and Gabon followed. And history today shows that the Ivory Coast and Gabon were right, simply because it was by the dialogue and not by war that South Africa put an end to the policy of apartheid
206 According to Napoleon Bonaparte, the former French Emperor, in Napoleon: Man of Peace,4 the truth goes through three stages. First, it is ridiculed; second, it is violently attacked; finally, it is accepted as self-evident. In other words, the truth is undeniable, incontrovertible. Mischief may attack it and ignorance may deride it, but in the end it is accepted. The Ivorian and Gabonese policy of dialogue with South Africa has followed all these stages. Today there is no doubt that the Ivory Coast and Gabon were right to advocate dialogue with South Africa.
The governing National Party and the African National Congress, like the Ivory Coast and Gabon, when they decided to advocate dialogue with South Africa early in 1970s, eventually realised the impossibility of changing circumstances in South Africa by using force and an armed struggle. Increasing local and international pressure on the government, as well as the realisation that apartheid could neither be maintained by force forever, nor overthrown by the opposition without considerable suffering, may have led both sides to the negotiating table. The consequence was that the apartheid system in South Africa was ended through a series of negotiations that took place between 1990 and 1993. These negotiations took place between the governing National Party, the African National Congress, and a wide variety of other political organisations. The negotiations resulted in South Africa’s first multi-racial election in 1994, which was won by the African National Congress.
Taking into account the advantages of the culture of peace, it is more than necessary for all African nations and the international community at large to persuade themselves of the value of peace and to assist countries like Gabon in its efforts to promote peace in order to prevent conflict to create a peaceful world.
4 http://www.napoleon-series.org/ins/c_weider.html (20 April 2007).
207 APPENDIXES
A. The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa
B. Charter of the Organisation of African Unity
C. Visit of South African Prime Minister Vorster to the Ivory Coast
D. The “mission of peace” of the Ivorian Information Minister, Laurent Dona-Fologo, in South Africa
E. Principal contracts of weapons concluded between France and South Africa
F. Visit by Professor Christian Barnard and Dr Jack Peen to Gabon
G. List of South African Foreign Affairs officials who have worked at the embassies in France, the Ivory Coast and Gabon
208 Appendix A
THE LUSAKA MANIFESTO ON SOUTHERN AFRICA
1. When the purpose and the basis of States’ international policies are misunderstood, there is introduced into the world, a new and unnecessary disharmony, disagreements, conflicts of interest, of different assessments of human priorities, which provoke an excess of tension in the world, and disastrously divide mankind, at a time when united action is necessary to control modern technology and put it to the service of man. It is for this reason that, discovering widespread misapprehension of our attitudes and purposes in relation to Southern Africa, we, the leaders of East and Central African States meeting at Lusaka, on 16 April, 1969, have agreed to issue this Manifesto.
2. By this Manifesto we wish to make clear, beyond all shadow of doubt, our acceptance of the belief that all men are equal, and have equal rights to human dignity and respect, regardless of colour, race, religion, or sex. We believe that all men have the right and the duty to participate, as equal members of the society, in their own Government. We do not accept that any individual or group has any right to govern any other group of sane adults, without their consent, and we affirm that only the people of a society, acting together as equals, can determine what is, for them, a good society and a good social, economic, or political organization.
3. On the basis of these beliefs we do not accept that any one group within a society has the right to rule any society without the continuing consent of all the citizens. We recognize that at any one time there will be, within every society, failures in the implementation of these ideals. We recognize that for the sake of order in human affairs, there may be transitional arrangements while a transformation from group inequalities to individual equality is being effected. But we affirm that without an acceptance of these ideals - without a commitment to these principles of human equality and self-determination - there can be no basis for peace and justice in the world.
4. None of us would claim that within our own States we have achieved that perfect social, economic and political organization which would ensure a reasonable standard of living for all
209 our people and establish individual security against avoidable hardship or miscarriage of justice. On the contrary, we acknowledge that within our own States the struggle towards human brotherhood and unchallenged human dignity is only beginning. It is on the basis of our commitment to human equality and human dignity, not on the basis of achieved perfection, that we take our stand of hostility towards the colonialism and racial discrimination which is being practiced [practiced] in Southern Africa. It is on the basis of their commitment to these universal principles that we appeal to other members of the human race for support.
5. If the commitment to these principles existed among the States holding power in Southern Africa, any disagreements we might have about the rate of implementation, or about isolated acts of policy, would be matters affecting only our individual relationships with the States concerned. If these commitments existed, our States would not be justified in the expressed and active hostility towards the regimes of Southern Africa such as we have proclaimed and continue to propagate.
6. The truth is, however, that in Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia, Namibia and the Republic of South Africa, there is an open and continued denial of the principles of human equality and national self-determination. This is not a matter of failure in the implementation of accepted human principles. The effective administrations in all these territories are not struggling towards these difficult goals. They are fighting the principles; they are deliberately organizing their societies so as to try to destroy the hold of these principles in the minds of men. It is for this reason that we believe the rest of the world must be interested. For the principle of human equality, and all that flows from it, is either universal or it does not exist. The dignity of all men is destroyed when the manhood of any human being is denied.
7. Our objectives in Southern Africa stem from our commitment to this principle of human equality. We are not hostile to the administration of these States because they are manned and controlled by White people. We are hostile to them because they are systems of minority control which exist as a result of, and in the pursuance of, doctrines of human inequality. What we are working for is the right of self-determination for the people of those territories. We are working
210 for a rule in those countries which is based on the will of all people and an acceptance of the equality of every citizen.
8. Our stand towards Southern Africa thus involves a rejection of racialism, not a reversal of the existing racial domination. We believe that all the peoples who have made their homes in the countries of Southern Africa are Africans, regardless of the colour of their skins; and we would oppose a racialist majority government which adopted a philosophy of deliberate and permanent discrimination between its citizens on grounds of racial origin. We are not talking racialism when we reject the colonialism and apartheid policies now operating m those areas; we are demanding an opportunity for all the people of these States, working together as equal individual citizens, to work out for themselves the institutions and the system of government under which they will, by general consent, live together and work together to build a harmonious society.
9. As an aftermath of the present policies, it is likely that different groups within these societies will be self-conscious and fearful. The initial political and economic organizations may well take account of these fears, and this group self-consciousness. But how this is to be done must be a matter, exclusively for the peoples of the country concerned, working together. No other nation will have a right to interfere in such affairs. All that the rest of the world has a right to demand is just what we are now asserting, that the arrangements within any State which wishes to be accepted into the community of nations must be based on an acceptance of the principles of human dignity and equality.
10. To talk of the liberation of Africa is thus to say two things. First, that the peoples in the territories still under colonial rule shall be free to determine for themselves their own institutions of self-government. Secondly, that the individuals in Southern Africa shall be freed from an environment poisoned by the propaganda of racialism, and given an opportunity to be men, not White men, Brown men, Yellow men or Black men.
11. Thus the liberation of Africa for which we are struggling does not mean a reverse racialism. Nor is it an aspect of African imperialism. As far as we are concerned the present boundaries of the States of Southern Africa are the boundaries of what will be free and independent African
211 States. There is no question of our seeking or accepting any alterations to our own boundaries at the expense of these future free African nations.
12. On the objectives of liberation as thus defined, we can neither surrender nor compromise, we have always preferred, and we still prefer, to achieve it without physical violence. We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill. We do not advocate violence, we advocate an end to the violence against human dignity which is now being perpetrated by the oppressors of Africa. If peaceful progress to emancipation were possible, or if changed circumstances were to make it possible in the future, we would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change. But while peaceful progress is blocked by actions of those at present in power in the States of Southern Africa, we have no choice but to give the peoples of those territories all the support of which we are capable in their struggle against their oppressors. This is why the signatory States participate in the movement for the liberation of Africa under the aegis of the Organization of African Unity. However, the obstacle to change is not the same in all the countries of Southern Africa, and it follows therefore that the possibility of continuing the struggle through peaceful means varies from one country to another.
13. In Moçambique [Mozambique] and Angola, and in so-called Portuguese Guinea, the basic problem is not racialism but a pretence that Portugal exists in Africa. Portugal is situated in Europe; the fact that it is a dictatorship is a matter for the Portuguese to settle. But no decree of the Portuguese dictator, nor legislation passed by any Parliament in Portugal, can make Africa part of Europe. The only thing which could convert a part of Africa into a constituent unit in a union which also includes a European State would be the freely expressed will of the people of that part of Africa. There is no such popular will in the Portuguese colonies. On the contrary, in the absence of any opportunity to negotiate a road to freedom, the people of all three territories have taken up arms against the colonial Power. They have done this despite the heavy odds against them, and despite the great suffering they know to be involved.
14. Portugal, as a European State, has naturally its own allies in the context of the ideological conflict between West and East. However, in our context, the effect of this is that Portugal is
212 enabled to use her resources to pursue the most heinous war and degradation of man in Africa. The present Manifesto must, therefore, lay bare the fact that inhuman commitment of Portugal in Africa and her ruthless subjugation of the people of Moçambique [Mozambique], Angola and so- called Portuguese Guinea are not only irrelevant to the ideological conflict of power politics, but also diametrically opposed to the politics, the philosophies and the doctrines practiced [practiced] by her Allies in the conduct of their own affairs at home. The peoples of Moçambique [Mozambique], Angola and Portuguese Guinea are not interested in communism or capitalism; they are interested in their freedom. They are demanding an acceptance of the principles of independence on the basis of majority rule, and for many years they called for discussions on this issue. Only when their demand for talks was continually ignored did they begin to fight. Even now, if Portugal should change her policy and accept the principle of self- determination, we would urge the liberation movements to desist from their armed struggle and to co-operate in the mechanics of a peaceful transfer of power from Portugal to the peoples of the African territories.
15. The fact that many Portuguese citizens have immigrated to these African countries does not affect this issue. Future immigration policy will be a matter for the independent Governments when these are established. In the meantime, we would urge the liberation movements to reiterate their statements that all those Portuguese people who have made their homes in Moçambique [Mozambique], Angola or Portuguese Guinea, and who are willing to give their future loyalty to those States, will be accepted as citizens. An independent Moçambique [Mozambique], Angola or Portuguese Guinea may choose to be as friendly with Portugal as Brazil is. That would be the free choice of a free people.
16. In Rhodesia the situation is different in so far as the metropolitan Power has acknowledged the colonial status of the territory. Unfortunately, however, it has failed to take adequate measures to reassert its authority against the minority which has seized power with the declared intention of maintaining White domination. The matter cannot rest there. Rhodesia, like the rest of Africa, must be free, and its independence must be on the basis of majority rule. If the colonial Power is unwilling or unable to effect [affect] such a transfer of power to the people, then the people themselves will have no alternative but to capture it as
213 and when they can. Africa has no alternative but to support them. The question which remains in Rhodesia is therefore whether Great Britain will reassert her authority in Rhodesia and then negotiate the peaceful progress to majority rule before independence. In so far as Britain is willing to make this second commitment, Africa will co-operate in her attempts to reassert her authority. This is the method of progress which we would prefer; it could involve less suffering for all the peoples of Rhodesia, both Black and White. But until there is some firm evidence that Britain accepts the principles of independence on the basis of majority rule and is prepared to take whatever steps are necessary to make it a reality, Africa has no choice but to support the struggle for the people's freedom by whatever means are open.
17. Just as a settlement of the Rhodesian problem with a minimum of violence is a British responsibility, so a settlement in Namibia with a minimum of violence is a United Nations responsibility. By every canon of international law and by every precedent, Namibia should now have been a sovereign, independent State with a government based on majority rule. Rwanda and Burundi, Togoland and Cameroon were German colonies. It was a matter of European politics that when the mandatory system was established after Germany had been defeated, the administration of South West Africa was given to the White minority Government of South Africa, while the other ex-German colonies in Africa were put into the hands of the British, Belgian or French Governments. After the Second World War every mandated territory except South West Africa was converted into a Trust Territory and has subsequently gained independence. South Africa, on the other hand, has persistently refused to honour even the international obligation it accepted in 1919 and has increasingly applied to South West Africa the inhuman doctrines and organization of apartheid.
18. The United Nations General Assembly has ruled against this action, and in 1966 terminated the Mandate under which South Africa had a legal basis for its occupation and domination of South West Africa. The General Assembly declared that the territory is now the direct responsibility of the United Nations, and set up an ad hoc committee to recommend practical means by which South West Africa would be administered, and the people enabled to exercise self-determination and to achieve independence.
214 19. Nothing could be clearer than this decision, which no permanent member of the Security Council voted against. Yet, since that time no effective measures have been taken to enforce it. Namibia remains in the clutches of the most ruthless minority Government in Africa. Its people continue to be oppressed, and those who advocate even peaceful progress to independence continue to be persecuted. The world has an obligation to use its strength to enforce the decision which all the countries co-operated in making. If they do this there is hope that the change can be effected without great violence. If they fail, then sooner or later the people of Namibia will take the law into their own hand. The people have been patient beyond belief but one day their patience will be exhausted. Africa, at least, will then be unable to deny their call for help.
20. South Africa is itself an independent, sovereign State and a member of the United Nations. It is more highly developed and richer than any other nation in Africa. On every legal basis its internal affairs are a matter exclusively for the people of South Africa. Yet, the purpose of law is people and we assert that the actions of the South African Government are such that the rest of the world has a responsibility to take some action in defence of humanity.
21. There is one thing about South African oppression which distinguishes it from other oppressive regimes. The apartheid policy adopted by its Government, and supported to a greater or lesser extent by almost all its White citizens, is based on a rejection of man's humanity. A position of privilege or the experience of oppression in the South African society depends on one thing which it is beyond the power of any man to change. It depends on a man’s colour, his parentage and his ancestors. If you are Black you cannot escape this categorization, nor can you escape it if you are White. If you are a Black millionaire and a brilliant political scientist, you are still subject to the pass laws and still excluded from political activity. If you are White, even protests against the system and an attempt to reject segregation will lead you only to the segregation and the comparative comfort of a White jail. Beliefs, abilities, and behaviour are all irrelevant to a man's status; everything depends upon race. Manhood is irrelevant. The whole system of government and society in South Africa is based on the denial of human equality. The system is maintained by a ruthless denial of the human rights of the majority of the population and thus, inevitably, of all.
215 22. These things are known and are regularly condemned in the United Nations and elsewhere. But it appears that for many countries international law takes precedence over humanity; therefore no action follows the words. Yet even if international law is held to exclude active assistance to the South African opponents of apartheid, it does not demand that the comfort and support of human and commercial intercourse should be given to a Government which rejects the manhood of most humanity. South Africa should be excluded from the United Nations agencies, and even from the United Nations itself. It should be ostracized by the world community. It should be isolated from world trade patterns and left to be self-sufficient if it can. The South African Government cannot be allowed both to reject the very concept of mankind's unity and to benefit by the strength given through friendly international relations. Certainly Africa cannot acquiesce in the maintenance of the present policies against people of African descent.
23. The signatories of this Manifesto assert that the validity of the principles of human equality and dignity extend to South Africa just as they extend to the colonial territories of Southern Africa. Before a basis for peaceful development can be established on this continent, these principles must be acknowledged by every nation and in every State there must be a deliberate attempt to implement them.
24. We reaffirm our commitment to these principles of human equality and human dignity and to the doctrines of self-determination and non-racialism. We shall work for their extension within our own nations and throughout the continent of Africa.
______Adapted from Al J. Venter (1977): Vorster’s Africa Friendship and Frustration, pp. 378-386. This Manifesto was adopted by the Conference of East and Central African States, held in Lusaka in April 1969. It was subsequently approved by the Heads of States and Government of the OAU in September 1969, and then endorsed by the UN General Assembly in November of the same year in resolution 2505 (XXIV).
216 Appendix B
CHARTER OF THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY
Addis Ababa, May, 1963 We, the Heads of African States and Governments assembled in the City of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; CONVINCED that it is the inalienable right of all people to control their own destiny; CONSCIOUS of the fact that freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples; CONSCIOUS of our responsibility to harness the natural and human resources of our continent for the total advancement of our peoples in spheres of human endeavour; INSPIRED by a common determination to promote understanding among our peoples and cooperation among our States in response to the aspirations of our peoples for brotherhood and solidarity, in a larger unity transcending ethnic and national differences; CONVINCED that, in order to translate this determination into a dynamic force in the cause of human progress, conditions for peace and security must be established and maintained; DETERMINED to safeguard and consolidate the hard-won independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our States, and to fight against neo-colonialism in all its forms; DEDICATED to the general progress of Africa; PERSUADED that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to the principles of which we reaffirm our adherence, provide a solid foundation for peaceful and positive cooperation among States; DESIROUS that all African States should henceforth unite so that the welfare and well- being of their peoples can be assured; RESOLVED to reinforce the links between our States by establishing and strengthening common institutions; HAVE agreed to the present Charter.
217 ESTABLISHMENT
Article I 1. The High Contracting Parties do by the present Charter establish an Organisation to be known as the ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY. 2. The Organisation shall include the Continental African States, Madagascar and other Islands surrounding Africa.
PURPOSES
Article II 1. The Organisation shall have the following purposes: (a) to promote the unity and solidarity of the African States; (b) to co-ordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; (c) to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence; (d) to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa, and (e) to promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 2. To these ends, the Member States shall coordinate and harmonise their general policies, especially in the following fields: (a) political and diplomatic cooperation; (b) economic cooperation, including transport and communications; (c) educational and cultural cooperation; (d) health, sanitation and nutritional cooperation; (e) scientific and technical co-operation; and (f) cooperation for defence and security.
218 PRINCIPLES
Article III The Member States, in pursuit of the purposes stated in Article II, solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to the following principles: 1. the sovereign equality of all Member States; 2. non-interference in the internal affairs of States; 3. respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence; 4. peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration; 5. unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring States or any other State; 6. absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent; 7. affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.
MEMBERSHIP
Article IV Each independent sovereign African State shall be entitled to become a Member of the Organisation.
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MEMBER STATES
Article V All Member States shall enjoy equal rights and have equal duties.
Article VI The Member States pledge themselves to observe scrupulously the principles enumerated in Article III of the present Charter.
219 INSTITUTIONS
Article VII The Organisation shall accomplish its purposes through the following principal institutions: 1. the Assembly of Heads of State and Government; 2. the Council of Ministers; 3, the General Secretariat; 4. the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.
THE ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT
Article VIII The Assembly of Heads of State and Government shall be the supreme organ of the Organisation. It shall, subject to the provisions of this Charter, discuss matters of common concern to Africa with a view to coordinating and harmonising the general policy of the Organisation. It may in addition review the structure, functions and
Article XIV 1. Each Member State shall have one vote. 2. All resolutions shall be determined by a simple majority of the members of the Council of Ministers. 3. Two-thirds of the total membership of the Council of Ministers shall form a quorum for any meeting of the Council.
Article XV The Council shall have the power to determine its own rules of procedure.
220 GENERAL SECRETARIAT
Article XVI There shall be an Administrative Secretary-General of the Organisation, who shall be appointed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. The Administrative Secretary General shall direct the affairs of the Secretariat.
Article XVII There shall be one or more Assistant Secretaries-General of the Organisation who shall be appointed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.
Article XVIII The functions and conditions of services of the Secretary-General, of the Assistant Secretaries-General and other employees of the Secretariat shall be governed by the provisions of this Charter and the regulations approved by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.
1. In the performance of their duties the Administrative Secretary General and the staff shall not seek or receive instruction from any government or from any other authority external to the Organisation. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organisation.
2. Each member of the Organisation undertakes to respect the exclusive character of the responsibilities of the Administrative Secretary General and the Staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.
221 COMMISSION OF MEDIATION, CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION
Article XIX Member States pledge to settle all disputes among themselves by peaceful means and, to this end, decide to establish a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, the composition of which and conditions of service shall be defined by a separate Protocol to be approved by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. Said Protocol shall be regarded as forming an integral part of the present Charter.
SPECIALISED COMMISSIONS
Article XX The Assembly shall establish such Specialised Commissions as it may deem necessary, including the following: 1. Economic and Social Commission; 2. Educational and Cultural Commission; 3. Health, Sanitation and Nutrition Commission; 4. Defence Commission; 5. Scientific, Technical and Research Commission.
Article XXI Each Specialised Commission referred to in Article XX shall be composed of the Ministers concerned or other Ministers or Plenipotentiaries designated by the Government of the Member States.
Article XXII The functions of the Specialised Commissions shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the present Charter and of the regulations approved by the Council of Ministers.
222 THE BUDGET
Article XXIII The budget of the Organisation prepared by the Administrative Secretary General shall be approved by the Council of Ministers. The budget shall be provided by contributions from Member States in accordance with the scale of assessment of the United Nations; provided, however, that no Member State shall be assessed an amount exceeding twenty per cent of the yearly regular budget of the Organisation. The Member States agree to pay their respective contributions regularly.
SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF CHARTER
Article XXIV 1. This Charter shall be open for signature of all independent sovereign African States and shall be ratified by the signatory States in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
2. The original instrument, done if possible in African languages, in English and French, all texts being equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Government of Ethiopia which shall transmit certified copies there of to all independent sovereign African States,
3. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of Ethiopia, which shall notify all signatories of each such deposit.
ENTRY INTO FORCE
Article XXV This Charter shall enter into force immediately upon receipt by the Government of Ethiopia of the instrument of ratification from two-thirds of the signatory States.
223 REGISTRATION OF THE CHARTER
Article XXVI This Charter shall, after due ratification, be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations through the Government of Ethiopia in conformity with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
INTERPRETATION OF THE CHARTER
Article XXVII Any question which may arise concerning the interpretation of this Charter shall be decided by a vote of two-thirds of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation.
ADHESION AND ACCESSION
Article XXVIII 1. Any independent sovereign African State may at any time notify the Administrative Secretary-General of its intention to adhere or accede to this Charter. 2. The Administrative Secretary General shall, on receipt of such notification, communicate a copy of it to all the Member States. Admission shall be decided by a simple majority of the Member States. The decision of each Member State shall be transmitted to the Administrative Secretary-General, who shall, upon receipt of the required number of votes, communicate the decision to the State concerned.
MISCELLANEOUS
Article XXIX The working languages of the Organisation and all its institutions shall be, if possible, African languages, English and French.
224 Article XXX The Administrative Secretary-General may accept on behalf of the Organisation gifts, bequests and other donations made to the Organisation, provided that this is approved by the Council of Ministers.
Article XXXI The Council of Ministers shall decide on the privileges and immunities to be accorded to the personnel of the Secretariat in the respective territories of the Member States.
CESSATION OF MEMBERSHIP
Article XXXII Any State which desires to renounce its membership shall forward a written notification to the Administrative Secretary-General. At the end of one year from the date of such notification, it not withdrawn, the Charter shall cease to apply with respect to the renouncing State, which shall thereby cease to belong to the Organisation.
AMENDMENT OF THE CHARTER
Article XXXIII This Charter may be amended or revised if any Member State makes a written request to the Administrative Secretary-General to that effect; provided, however, that the proposed amendment is not submitted to the Assembly for consideration until all the Member States have been duly notified of it and a period of one year has elapsed. Such an amendment shall not be effective unless approved by at least two-thirds of all the Member States.
225 In Faith Whereof, We, the Heads of African States and Governments, have signed this Charter.
ALGERIA MALI BURUNDI MAURITANIA CAMEROON MOROCCO CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC NIGER CHAD NIGERIA CONGO (Brazzaville) RWANDA CONGO (Republic Democratic of Congo) SENEGAL DAHOMEY (Benin) SIERRA LEONE ETHIOPIA SOMALIA GABON SUDAN GHANA TANGANYIKA GUINEA TOGO IVORY COAST TUNISIA LIBERIA UGANDA LIBYA UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC MADAGASCAR UPPER VOLTA
______Adapted from Z. Cervenka (1969): The Organisation of African Unity and its Charter, pp. 231-239.
226 Appendix C
VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER VORSTER TO THE IVORY COAST Yamoussoukro 1975
Vorster inspects a guard of honour at the airport in Yamoussoukro
Vorster and President Houphouet-Boigny enter the President’s palace. Behind are General Hendrik van Bergh (Head of the Bureau for State Security) and Dr Eschel Rhoodie (South African Secretary for Information) ______Taken from The Star, 15 May 1975
227 Appendix D
THE “MISSION OF PEACE” OF THE IVORIAN INFORMATION MINISTER, LAURENT DONA-FOLOGO, IN SOUTH AFRICA September 1975
South African and overseas newsmen at a press conference given by Laurent Dona- Fologo on his arrival in South Africa ______Taken from Rand Daily Mail, 11 September 1975.
228 Appendix E
PRINCIPAUX CONTRATS DARMES CONCLUS ENTRE LA FRANCE ET L’AFRIQUE DU SUD (Principal contracts of weapons concluded between France and South Africa)
Matériels terrestres 1961 : Automitrailleuses AML Panhard (plusieurs centaines)
Aeronautique 1962 : 30 Hélicoptères Alouette 1963 : 16 Mirages III 1964 : 3 Mirages III 1965-66 : 50 Hélicoptères Alouette ‘’ ‘’ : 16 Mirage III 1966 : 4 Mirage III 1966-67 : 16 Helicopteres Super Frelon 1968 : 3 Mirage III ‘’ ‘’ : 5 Helicopteres Alouette III 1969 : 9 Avions de transport Transall " : 16 Helicopteres Puma 1969-70 : 16 Helicopteres Alouette III 1971 : 1 Mirage III 1972 : 10 Mirage III 197? : Mirage F-1 197? : Helicopteres Puma
Missiles 1963 : 48 AS 30 ‘’ ‘’ : 96 Matra R 530 1965-66 : 48 AS 30 ‘’ ‘’ : 96 Matra R 530 1970 : Crotale-Cactus 1972 : R 550 Magic 1973 : Anti-char Milan et AS 12 1976 : SS 11 ‘’ ‘’ : 30 Exocet
Marine 1970 : 3 Sous-marins Daphne 1975 (?) : Sous-marins Agosta
______Adapted from the Arms trade with the Third World, International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Stockholm, 1971, and M. Brzoska and T Ohlson, Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1971/85, SIPRI, Stockholm, 1987
229 Appendix F
VISIT OF PROFESSOR CHRISTIAN BERNARD AND DR JACK PENN TO GABON Libreville 1969
During their visit, the two doctors were shocked by the conditions of victims of the Biafra war. ______Taken from Perspective, the South African monthly review, January 1969
230 Appendix G
LIST OF SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFFICIALS WHO HAVE WORKED AT THE EMBASSIES IN FRANCE, THE IVORY COAST AND GABON: 1969-1994
Babb, Glenn Robin Ware Hanekom, Hermann Albert 1969-1967. Third Secretary, Embassy, 1981-1985. Counsellor, Embassy, Paris Paris 1971. Second Secretary, Embassy, Paris Jaquet, André 1975-1977. Counsellor, Embassy, Paris 1973-1976. Press and Cultural Affairs Attaché, Embassy, Paris Best, Norman John 1968-1970. Minister Plenipotentiary, Loubser, Antonie Eduard “Anton” Embassy, Paris 1982-1983. Minister Plenipotentiary, Embassy, Paris Boyazoglu, Jan George 1969-1979. Counsellor (Agricultural- Marx, Johan Technical), Embassy, Paris 1988-1990. Consul-General, Consulate- General, Marseilles Burger, Albertus Beyers Fourie “Albie” 1990-1993. Minister Plenipotentiary, 1969(October)-1974. Ambassador to Embassy, Paris France, Paris Morton, AC Burger, Dr AWM 1979. Consul-General, Marseilles 1991. Ambassador to France, Paris Paterson, CE Du Plooy, Dr RA 1991. Representative, Abidjan 1981. Ambassador to France, Paris 1993. Ambassador to the Ivory Coast, 1987. Ambassador to France, Paris Abidjan Geldenhuys, Hendrick Albertus “Hennie” Shearar, Jeremy Brown 1987-1991. Ambassador to France, Paris
231 1978-1980. Minister Plenipotentiary, 1992. Ambassador to Gabon, Libreville Embassy, Paris Van Dalsen, Johannes “Hans” 1980-1981. Ambassador to France, Paris Steenkamp, WP ______Adapted from History of the South African Department of Foreign Affairs 1927-1993, published by the South African Institute of International Affairs, 2005, pp. 665-708; and R. Pfister. “Apartheid South Africa’s Foreign Relations with African States, 1961-1994” (Ph.D. diss., Rhodes University, 2003), 387-39
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South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 1: Roberts Construction: development projects in the Ivory Coast, Pretoria, 13 August 1971.
South African DFA 1/179/3, vol. 1: Telegram No 172 from South African Embassy of Paris, 29 September 1971.
South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 4: Letter from Albie Burger to Norman Best, 29 October 1971.
South African DFA 1/178/4, vol. 1: The technical assistance to Gabon summary of dispatches 1970/72.
235 South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 4: Report on informal meeting held at South African Embassy in Paris on 25/26 January 1972, from Dr Boyazoglu, Paris, 16 February 1972.
South African DFA/1/178/3, vol. 1: The Roberts Construction Company Limited report on the political and financial strength and future political development of Gabon, 1972.
South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 2: Re: Transgabonais railway project, from CJ Miller (Roberts Construction Company Limited, international division) to AJF Viljoen (DAF, Africa Division), Johannesburg, 6 March 1972.
South African DFA, 1/179/4, vol. 2: Vorster’s letter to President Houphouet-Boigny, Cape Town 8 March 1972.
South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 5: The OGAPROV project during 1971/72 and prospects for the future, from Dr Boyazoglu, Paris, April 1972.
South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 2: Re: prefabricated houses, from JM Collet to Hennie, Libreville, 16 May 1972.
South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 2: Trans-Gabon project, from the Secretary for Finance at the Treasury to Brand Fourie, 3 July 1972.
South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 2: LTA Ltd housing project, from Norman Best to F Viljoen, Pretoria, 20 July 1972.
South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 2: Re: Transgabonais railway project, from CJ Miller (Roberts Construction Company Limited, international division) to AJF Viljoen (DAF, Africa Division), Johannesburg, 28 July 1972.
South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 2: LTA Ltd housing project, from F Viljoen to Paul Kruger, Pretoria, 2 August 1972.
236 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 2: Letter from Machiel de Klerk (Managing Director CGIC) to JP Chassang (Union Gabonaise de Banque), Johannesburg, 7 August 1972.
South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 2: Letter from Machiel de Klerk (Managing Director CGIC) to JP Chassang (Union Gabonaise de Banque), Johannesburg, 27 November 1972.
South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 3: Technical aid to Gabon, Glenn Babb, 31 December 1972.
South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 3: Technical aid to Gabon, from Glen Babb, 31 December 1972.
South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 3: Summary of dispatches 1970-1972 on technical aid to Gabon, from Glen Babb, appendix 2, 31 December 1972.
South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 6: Report on medical aid to Gabon from Glenn Babb to Norman Best, Pretoria, 15 February 1973.
South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 7: OGAPROV, 1973/1974 budget, from Norman Best to Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 16 May 1973.
South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 3: Letter from JJ Bouwer to President Bongo, Johannesburg, 13 April 1973.
South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 3: Export finance – Gabon, November 1973.
South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 9: Memorandum on future financing of OGAPROV project, from Julian Thomas, Paris, 14 November 1973.
South African DFA 1/179/3, vol. 1: Mail from Agence France-Presse to the Department of Information in Pretoria, 4 October 1974.
237 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 4: Gabon from Johan Pretorius, Pretoria, 21 November 1974.
South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 13: OGAPROV, final estimate of expenditure 1975/1976 from Julian Thomas to Albie Burger, Paris, 15 May 1975.
South Africa DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 5: Special permission No. 276/SGAC, Republic of Gabon, General Secretary of Civil Flying, 9 June 1975.
South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 14: Loan agreement entered into by and between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the Republic of Gabon, Libreville, 13 September 1975.
South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 7: Award of the Order of Good Hope to Jean Muxart, from Jan Boyazoglu to Brand Fourie, Paris, 23 November 1975.
South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Proposed visit of Dr Bella Keita to South Africa, letter from the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the President of the CSIR, Pretoria, 6 April 1976.
South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Proposed visit of Dr Bella Keita to South Africa, reply letter from the CSIR to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 20 April 1976.
South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 8: Note from PR Killen to the Secretary of the DFA regarding the visit of Dr B Keita, Pretoria, 5 July 1976.
South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 7: Re: visit to Gabon: 19-23 November 1976, from Dr Boyazoglu to Brand Fourie, Paris, 3 December 1976.
South African DFA/178/3, vol. 8 and 11: South African Airways official notes, AIR/S19/222; AIR/S19/12, 25 March 1977.
238 South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Annual review of relations with the Ivory Coast, 1978.
South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 10: Visit of Ivory Coast Vice-President of National Assembly to South Africa, from Graham J Barbour to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 3 October 1978.
South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 9: Annual review of relations with Ivory Coast, December 1978.
South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Anet Bile Clement’s letter to Graham J Barbour, ref. 1/129/3, Abidjan, 11 January 1979.
South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Letter from CFG von Hirschberg, Secretary for Foreign Affairs to Mr GJ Barbour, Secretary for Commerce, Pretoria, 23 February 1979.
South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Proposed visit by Ivory Coast trade delegation to South Africa, from Graham J Barbour, Secretary for Commerce and Consumer Affairs to C von Hirschberg, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 9 March 1979.
South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Invitation to Ivory Coast trade delegation to South Africa, letter from C von Hirschberg, Secretary for Foreign Affairs to Secretary for Commerce and Consumer Affairs, Pretoria, 1 May 1979.
South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Letter from Mr Barbour to Mr Clement Anet Bile with reference to a proposed visit by an Ivory Coast trade delegation to South Africa, 23 May 1979.
South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Dr Carnegie’s visit to the Ivory Coast, 20 August 1979.
239 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 10: July 1980.
South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Invitation to Mr Clement Anet Bile, Vice-President of the National Assembly of the Ivory Coast to South Africa, letter with Barbour’s letter addressed to Clement Anet Bile attached, from C von Hirschberg, Secretary for Foreign Affairs to South African Ambassador in Paris, Pretoria, 13 July 1979.
South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Ivorian Ministry of Scientific Research approval letter regarding the establishment of scientific and technical cooperation between SASAES and ORSTOM, 4 August 1980.
South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 12: Summary of South Africa’s relations with Gabon, Pretoria, 20 August 1980.
South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Letter from PA Donovan, Assistant Director of South African Sugar Association Experiment Station, to Ms CFS von Hirschberg, Director General at the DFA, 2 October 1980.
South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Departmental policy document: South Africa’s Foreign Policy, December 1980.
South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 10: Ivory Coast relations with South Africa, September 1981.
South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 10: WP Siviter, Managing Director of UTE Co. Ltd, letter to Director Export Promotions of the Department of Industries, Commerce and Tourism, Johannesburg, 1 February 1982.
South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 12: Gabon: relations with South Africa, 23 August 1982.
240 South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 12: Gabon: relations with South Africa, 10 September 1982.
South African DFA, 1/178/3 vol. 12: Gabon: relations with South Africa, 9 October 1982.
South African DFA, 1/178/4, vol. 13: OGAPROV, report on visit to France and Gabon, 22 October to 11 November 1982, by JA Thomas, Paris, November 1982.
South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 10: Communiqué of the Ivorian Counsel of Ministers, 15 December 1982.
South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 11: Report on a visit to the Ivory Coast with special reference to elephant management and conservation, from Dr Anthony Hall-Martin to GRW Babb at DFA, 14 April 1983.
South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Relations with the Ivory Coast: Participation in scheme for the establishment of a mining school, from PR Killen, 22 April 1983.
South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 15: Proposed visit to Gabon: Commercial mission from Glenn Robin Ware Babb (Head of North and Central Africa to DFA) to PR Killen (Deputy Director Union Buildings), 15 September 1983.
South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 3: Jacques Soustelle’s visit to French-speaking Africa, from Jacques Soustelle to Ambassador du Plooy and Dr Boyazoglu, Paris, 8 November 1983.
South African DFA, 1/179/3, vol. 10: Telegram no. 808 from South African Embassy of Paris to the DFA, 8 November 1983.
241 South African DFA, 1/178/1, vol. 1: Report of Samancor Metals and Minerals Limited Mission to Gabon, 17 November 1983.
South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 16: Report of visit to Gabon: Commercial mission from Glenn Robin Ware Babb (Head of North and Central Africa to DFA) to PR Killen (Deputy Director Union Buildings), 22 November 1983.
South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 17: Loan agreement entered into by and between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the Republic of Gabon, Libreville, 19 January 1984.
South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 17: South West Africa: Offer of mediation by President Bongo, 16 May 1984.
South African DFA, 1/178/3, vol. 17: Gabon: Loan for barracks and hangar, GRW Babb, 27 June 1984.
1.4 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ OAU/1960s: The OAU Charter.
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ South Africa/1960s: Official correspondence to Philippe de Luze, French Ambassador in South Africa, 17 February 1969.
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ OAU/1960s: Lusaka Manifesto, 1969, 7th article.
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ OAU/1960s: Lusaka Manifesto, 1969, 12th article.
242 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ OAU/1960s: Lusaka Manifesto, 1969, 20th article.
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ Ivory Coast/1960s: Telegram No 75, from French Embassy of Zambia, March 1969.
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Hubert Dubois’s message No 258/DAAM from French Embassy in the Ivory Coast to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris, Abidjan, 17 June 1969.
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ Gabon/1960s: South African mission to Gabon, from Maurice Delauney to Maurice Schuman, Libreville, 3 October 1969.
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ OAU/1970s: Telegram No 380/385 from French Embassy of Zambia, 31 August 1970.
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ Ivory Coast/1970s: President Houphouet-Boigny’s press conference, Abidjan, 28 April 1971.
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ Ivory Coast/1970s: Telegram No 868 from French Embassy of Ivory Coast, 18 June 1971.
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ Ivory Coast/1970s: Telegram No 513/523/R from French Embassy of Ivory Coast, 24 June 1971.
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ Ivory Coast/1970s: Telegram No 21047-048/DD from French Embassy of Ivory Coast, 7 July 1971.
243 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ Ivory Coast/1970s: Telegram No 21468-75/DD from French Ministry of Foreign Affairs to French Embassy of Ivory Coast, 4 October 1971.
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ Ivory Coast/1970s: Telegram No 706-708/R, from French Embassy of Ivory Coast, 7 October 1971.
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ Ivory Coast/1970s: Telegram No 21588-591/DD from French Embassy of Ivory Coast, 20 October 1971.
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ Ivory Coast/1970s: Telegram No 21909-910/DD from French Embassy of Ivory Coast, 29 November 1971.
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ Ivory Coast/1970s: Telegram No 354 from French Embassy of South Africa, 16 May 1975.
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, /DAAM/ Africa Levant/ Ivory Coast/1970s: Official communiqué from the Ivory Coast’s Democratic Party, 9 September 1975.
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Letter No. 380 AR/HIS from Isabelle Richefort (Head of the Department of Historic Archives at French Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to Emmanuel Ndzend Nyangone, Paris 19 January 2005.
1.5 Gabonese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives Gabonese DFA, 5E.1.1: Evaluation of the Southern African situation, note from Mr André Smith, Director of African Affairs, to the Foreign Affairs Minister, Ali Bongo, Libreville, 7 September 1990.
Gabonese DFA, 5E.1.2: Gabonese Foreign Affairs Minister, Ali Bongo’s letter to his South African counterpart, Libreville, 28 February 1991.
244 Gabonese DFA, 5E.1.11: Presentation of credit letter by Willem Steenkamp, first South African Ambassador in Gabon, to the Gabonese Foreign Affairs Minister, Libreville, 29 January 1993.
Gabonese DFA, 5E.1.15: Gabonese Embassy in South Africa: Report of activities of August 1993.
2. Unofficial 2.1 Newspapers, News Agencies, Journals, Annual Reports, Newsletters, and Magazines Africa No 59, July 1976. Africa Confidence, 14 May 1971. Africa Confidential, Vol.12 No.10, 14 May 1971. Africa Confidential, Vol.16 No.11, 6 June 1975. Africa Confidential, Vol.16 No.14, 18 July 1975. African Communist, No.46, 1971. Afrique Express, November 1969. African Journal, Vol.10, 1971. African Journal, 2 July 1971. Africa Research Bulletin, Vol.29 No.10, October 1969. Africa Research Bulletin, Vol.7 No.11, 6 November 1970. Africa Research Bulletin, Political Social and Culture Series (1970-71). Africa Research Bulletin, Vol.8 No.6, July 1971. Africa Research Bulletin, 30 June 1978. African Report, June 1968. Agence France-Presse, 11 July 1970. Agence France-Presse, November 1970. Agence France-Presse, 19 May 1971. Agence France-Presse, No1820, 22 October 1971. Agence France-Presse, 17 July 1975.
245 American-African Affairs Association, Vol.4 No.3, December 1970. Die Burger, 29 June 1971. Fraternité Matin, 23 April 1971. Fraternité Matin, 4 October 1971. Fraternité Matin, 23 March 1976. Fraternité Matin, 1980. Jeune Afrique, No.467, 10-18 December 1969. Jeune Afrique, No.515, 1970. Jeune Afrique, No.478, 3 March 1970. Jeune Afrique, No.493, 16 June 1970. Jeune Afrique, No.540, 11 May 1971. Jeune Afrique, No.563, 9 October 1971. Jeune Afrique, No.564, 30 October 1971. Journal of Third World Studies, Vol.14 No.1, 1997. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, Vol.17, 1970. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, Vol.18, 1971-1972. Legum, C.: South Africa courts its neighbours. (The Washington Post, 8 November 1970). Le Figaro, 15 June 1971. Le Monde, 6 October 1970. Le Monde, 6 November 1970. Le Monde, 20 March 1971. Le Monde, 15 May 1971. Le Monde, 21 May 1971. Le Monde, 27 August 1974. L’Union, 23 March 1978. Mail and Guardian, 17 March 1995. Perspective, the South African monthly review, January 1969. Rand Daily Mail, 11 September 1975. République Française, Journal officiel de l’Assemblée Nationale, 25 June 1984. SABC external news service commentary, 28 June 1974.
246 Southern African Record No.6, September 1976. South African Yearbook of International Affairs, 2001/2002. The Argus, 1 December 1989. The Citizen, 2 December 1989. The Economist, 28 July 1973. The Round Table, April 1975. The Star, 1 May 1974. The Star, 15 May 1975. The Star, 27 May 1988. To the Point, 25 August, 1973. To the Point, 6 December 1974. To the Point, 7 January 1977.
2.2 Websites
247
2.3 Articles in Academic Journals Abbott, A. B.: Soviet Involvement in Africa. (Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.17 No.2, 1979).
Abrous, A.: OAU and arms sales to South Africa. (Indian Centre for Africa, Vol.11 No.1, 1971).
Anglin, G. D.: Zambia and Southern African ‘détente’. (Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Vol.30 No.3, 1975).
Aluko, O.: France and South Africa. (Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Vol.12 No.4, 1990).
Atangana, M. R.: French capitalism and nationalism in Cameroon. (African Studies Review, Vol.40 No.1, 1997).
Bernetel, P.: Dialogue on dialogue. (African-American Institute, Vol.20 No.6, 1975).
Biarnes, P: Cote-d’Ivoire, nouveau plaidoyer pour une politique de dialogue avec l’Afrique du Sud. (Revue Française d’Etudes Politiques Africaine, No.65, 1971).
Burgess, J.: Dialogue is dead long live Africa. (African development, Vol.7, 1973).
Chenu, F.: Perspectives et limites du dialogue avec l’Afrique du Sud. (Revue Française d’Etudes Politiques Africaine, No.74, 1974).
248 Culverson, D. R.: The policies of the anti-apartheid movement in the United States, 1969- 1986. (Political Science Quarterly, Vol.111 No.1, 1996).
David, S. R.: Soviet involvement in Third World coups. (International Security, Vol.11 No.1, 1986).
Dalcauton, C. D.: Vorster and the politics of confidence, 1966-1972. (Journal of the Royal African Society, Vol.75 No.299, 1976).
De la Gueriviere, J.: La conférence de l’OUA. (Revue Française d’Etudes Politiques Africaine, No.67, 1971).
Gaddis, J.L.: The Rise, Fall and Future of Détente. (Foreign Affairs, Vol.62 No.2, 1984).
Geyser, O.: Détente in Southern Africa. (African Affairs, Vol.75 No.299, 1976).
Giniewski, P.: Le dialogue s’amorce entre Pretoria et l’Afrique Noire. (Revue Française d’Etudes Politiques Africaines, No.70, 1971).
Grey, Robert D.: The Soviet presence in Africa: An analysis of goals. (Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.22 No.3, 1984).
Markwich, R.D.: Peaceful coexistence, detente and third world struggles. (Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.44 No.2, 1990).
Martin, G.: The historical, economic, and political bases of France’s African policy. (The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.23 No.2, 1985).
Mugomba, Agrippah T.: The Rise and the Fall of “Pax Suid-Afrika”: A historical analysis of South Africa’s Black African Foreign Policy. (Kenya Historical Review, Vol.3 No.1, 1975).
249 Noel, M.: L’évolution des relations économiques entre l’Afrique du Sud et la France. (Revue Française d’Etudes Politiques Africaine, No.74, 1972).
Normandy, E.: South’s Africa policy of détente: A bibliographic essay. (Africana Journal, Vol.10 No.4, 1979).
Ogunbadejo, O.: Soviet policies in Africa. (African Affairs, Vol.79 No.316, 1980).
Price, R. M.: Pretoria’s Southern African strategy. (African Affairs, Vol.83 No.330, 1984).
Stultz, N. M.: The apartheid issue at the General Assembly: Stalemate or gathering storm? (African Affairs, Vol.86 No.342, 1987).
Verlet, M.: L’impérialisme Français dans le Monde. (La nouvelle revue Internationale, No.20/1, 1977).
Yao, Bernard K.: Ivory Coast-South Africa the outcome of dialogue. (Revue juridique et politique indépendance et coopération, Vol.45 No.2, 1991).
Yashpal, T.: South Africa and the OAU: the dialogue issue. (Kenya Historical Review, Vol.3 No.2, 1971).
250 Secondary Sources
Books and dissertations Adedeji, A.: South Africa and Africa: within or apart? Sadri Books, Cape Town, 1996.
Alden, C. and Martin, G.: France and South Africa: towards a new engagement with Africa. Pretoria Book House, Pretoria, 2003. Aluko, O.: The Foreign policy of African States. Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1977.
Amate, C.O.C.: Inside the OAU, Pan-Africanism in practice. St Martin’s Press, New York,1986.
Bach, D.C.: La France et l’Afrique du Sud: Histoire, mythes et enjeux contemporains. Karthala, Paris, 1990.
Ballinger, R. and Gerrit, O.: Détente in Southern Africa: two views. South African Institute of International Affairs, Braamfontein, 1976.
Bell, C.: The Diplomacy of Détente: The Kissinger Era. Martin Robertson, London, 1977.
Barber, J.P.: South Africa’s foreign policy, 1945-1970. Oxford University Press, London, 1973.
Berhanykun, A.: The OAU and the UN: Relation between the African Unity and the United Nations. Africana Publishing, New York, 1976.
Bissell, R. E.: Apartheid and international organizations. Westview Special Studies on Africa, Colorado, 1977.
Baulin, J.: La politique Africaine d’Houphouet-Boigny. Eurafor-Press, Paris, 1980.
251 Carlsnaes, W. and Muller, M.: Change and South African External Relations. International Thomson Publishing, Johannesburg, 1997.
Cervenka, Z.: The Organization of African Unity and its Charter. Hurst, London, 1969.
Cervenka, Z.: The unfinished quest for unity: Africa and the OAU. Friedmann, London, 1977. Cervenka, Z.: The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970: History of the War. Selected Bibliography and Documents. Bernard & Graefe, Frankfurt, 1971.
Chipman, J.: French power in Africa. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1989.
Chukwunedu Aguolu, C.: Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970: An Annotated Bibliography. Hall and Co., Boston, 1973.
D’Oliveira: Vorster, The man. Ernest Stanton publishers, Johannesburg, 1977.
Du Pisani, J. A.: The development and application of separate development in the B.J. Vorster-era: the homeland policy, 1966-1978 (Die ontplooing van afsonderlike ontwikkeling tydens die B.J. Vorster-era: die tuislanddeleid, 1966-1978). Ph.D. diss., University of the Orange Free State, 1989.
Faligot, R. and Krop, P.: La piscine: les services secrets français, 1944-1984. Seuil, Paris, 1985.
Foccart, J. and Gaillard, p.: Foccart parle, Entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard,Vol.1. Fayard/Jeune Afrique, Paris, 1995.
Foccart, J. and Gaillard, p.: Foccart parle, Entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard,Vol.2. Fayard/Jeune Afrique, Paris, 1997.
252 Geldenhuys, D.: The diplomacy of isolation: South African foreign policy making. Macmillan South Africa, Johannesburg, 1984.
Hargreaves, J.D.: Decolonisation, French and British styles. St Martin’s Press, New York, 1995.
Kissinger, H.A.: Diplomacy. Simon & Schuster, New York, 1994. Legum, C.: Dialogue: Africa’s great debate. Rex Collings, London, 1972.
Legum, C.: Vorster’s gamble for Africa: How the search for peace failed. Rex Collings, London, 1976.
McLean, T. V.: West Africa’s council of entente. Cornell University Press, New York, 1972.
Metrowich, F.R.: Towards dialogue and détente. Valiant Publishers, Johannesburg, 1975.
Mills, G.: The wired model, South Africa, foreign policy and globalization. Tafelberg, Cape Town, 2000.
Nandjui, P.: Houphouet-Boigny, l’Homme de la France en Afrique. l’Harmattan, Paris, 1995.
Nolutshungu, S.C.: South Africa in Africa: study in ideology and foreign policy. Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1975.
Pean, P.: Affaires Africaines. Fayard, Paris, 1983.
Pfister, R.:“Apartheid South Africa’s foreign relations with African states, 1961-1994.” Ph.D. diss., Rhodes University, 2003.
253 Pfister, R.: Apartheid South African and African states, from pariah to middle power, 1961-1994. Tauris Academic Studies, London, 2005.
Ping, J.: Mondialisation, Paix, Démocratie et Développement en Afrique: L’expérience gabonaise. Harmattan, Paris, 2002.
Urnov, A.: South Africa against Africa, 1966-1986. Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1988. Venter, Al J.: Vorster’s Africa Friendship and Frustration. Stanton, Johannesburg, 1977.
Venter, D.: South Africa and black Africa: some problem areas and prospects for rapprochement. Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria, 1980.
Verschave, F.X.: La Franceafricaine, le plus long scandale de la République. Stock, Paris, 1998.
Wheeler, T.: History of South African Department of Foreign Affairs, 1927-1993. South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 2005.
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