Ukraine for the 2010 Presidential Election

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Ukraine for the 2010 Presidential Election The inTernationAl republicAn insTiTuTe AdvAncing democrAcy WorldWide ukrAine presidenTiAl elecTion JAnuAry 17, 2010 elecTion observation mission FinAl reporT Ukraine Presidential Election January 17, 2010 Election Observation Mission Final Report The International Republican Institute 1225 Eye Street, NW, Suite 700 Washington, DC 20005 www.iri.org This report is made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) under associate award number 121-A-00-09-00709-00, under leader with associates cooperative agreement number DFD-A-00-08-00350-00. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government. © 2010 International Republican Institute TAble oF conTenTs Executive Summary 3 I. Introduction 5 II. Pre-Election Period 7 A. Political Situation in Ukraine between 7 Presidential Elections B. Presidential Candidates 12 C. Campaign Period 13 III. Election Period 17 A. Pre-Election Meetings 17 B. Election Day 18 IV. Post-Election Outcome 23 V. Findings and Recommendations 25 VI. IRI in Ukraine 27 VII. Appendix 33 A. Delegation List for the January 17, 2010 Election 33 B. Delegation List for the February 7, 2010 Election 34 C. Preliminary Statement for the 36 January 17, 2010 Election D. Preliminary Statement for the 39 February 7, 2010 Election E. Delegation Announcement Release for the 42 January 17, 2010 Election F. Delegation Announcement Release for the 44 February 7, 2010 Election 2010 Ukraine Presidential Election 3 Executive Summary The International Republican Institute (IRI) received funding from the United States Agency for International Development to conduct an observation mission in Ukraine for the 2010 presidential election during the first round of voting on January 17 and, in the event that no candidate were to receive an outright majority, during a second round between the two candidates receiving the most votes. The second round took place on February 7. During both rounds, IRI deployed 10 teams to oblasts and cities of Ukraine to meet with the local election officials, campaign and political leaders, appropriate government officials, and to observe election activities. In both parts of the mission, IRI coordinated its activities with other international groups. After the first round of the presidential election, IRI’s delegation, along with most other international observation organizations, found that the election generally met international standards. After the second round of the election, IRI’s preliminary statement noted that despite a late amendment to the election law, which underscored the need for a comprehensive review of the legal framework, the election was nonetheless held in an open and transparent manner that allowed the candidates the opportunity to debate issues. In the runoff on February 7, 2010, opposition candidate Viktor Yanukovych received 48.95 percent and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko received 45.47 percent, a difference of approximately 900,000 votes. Refusing to concede the election, Tymoshenko argued that sufficient fraud had taken place to have altered the outcome. She filed suit in the Higher Administrative Court after the 4 The International Republican Institute Central Election Commission (CEC) officially declared Yanukovych the winner. However, after the court denied several of her requests to introduce witnesses and evidence, she withdrew her suit, effectively conceding the election. President Yanukovych was inaugurated on February 25, 2010. The pre-election environment maintained an open campaign atmosphere, preserved the freedom of the media, and the use of administrative resources was largely absent. Election Day was also free of evident violations. The atmosphere at polling stations was peaceful and calm, in spite of the fact that last minute changes to the election law made by Parliament, as well as the CEC’s decision to alter the rules regarding mobile ballot box voting raised concerns as to whether the rules could be implemented consistently by polling stations officials. Overall, Ukrainian voters were able to cast their ballots freely and their votes were counted according to the law, ensuring their right to vote. 2010 Ukraine Presidential Election 5 I. Introduction The Ukrainian presidential election of 2010 was Ukraine’s fifth since declaring independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. This election was also the first presidential election held in Ukraine since the events known as the Orange Revolution. The first round was held on January 17, 2010. Because no candidate received more than 50 percent of the vote, a second round was held on February 7, 2010, between Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and opposition leader and head of the Party of Regions Victor Yanukovych. Seven days after the election, the Central Election Commission declared Yanukovych the winner by a margin of 3.48 percent. To observe the election process, IRI deployed two election observation delegations, one for each round consisting of 22 and 24 members respectively, including representatives from Europe and the United States. Delegates monitored more than 100 polling stations during the first round and more than 100 during the second round in Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Lviv, Odesa, Zakarpattia and Zhytomyr oblasts, as well as the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. This report summarizes the pre-election, Election Day and post-election findings of IRI’s delegations, and makes recommendations for improvement of Ukraine’s election administration. 6 The International Republican Institute 2010 Ukraine Presidential Election 7 II. Pre-Election Period A. Political Situation Since 2004 Since the 2004 Orange Revolution, Ukraine has experienced constant and persistent political instability. The already politicized environment was further exacerbated by the severe global economic crisis, which paralyzed the Ukrainian economy in September 2008. The country also experienced the highest currency deflation, second only to Iceland, and political elites have been unable to compromise to pass critical legislation to reform the country economically and politically. For the past five years, Ukrainian leadership has been dominated by three main political figures. The first is former President Victor Yushchenko the winner of the 2004 election. The second is former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko who had previously been President Yushchenko’s ally during the Orange Revolution. The third figure is Viktor Yanukovych, who during this period led the largest faction in parliament, the Party of Regions. He lost the 2004 presidential election to Yushchenko. In 2006, significant constitutional changes were adopted which changed the structure and balance of power in the Ukrainian political system, transforming it from a presidential system to a parliamentary-presidential system. Although many of the powers previously under the President’s jurisdiction were transferred to the Prime Minister, many details of the shift were not specified. These ambiguities exacerbated tensions between President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Tymoshenko, 8 The International Republican Institute leading him to fire her just eight months into her premiership. Regularly scheduled parliamentary elections were held in March 2006. Yanukovych’s Party of Regions won the most votes with 32.14 percent, with the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYuT) coming in second with 22.29 percent. President Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine bloc received 13.95 percent of the vote. Since no single party received a majority of the votes, the parties sought to form a coalition; however, after months of negotiations, the formerly allied political forces, BYuT and Our Ukraine, were unable to forge a coalition. Meanwhile, the Party of Regions successfully formed a coalition with Socialist and Communist parties. That coalition nominated Yanukovych for the post of Prime Minister. On August 3, 2006, President Yushchenko approved his nomination to that post. Following parliamentary approval of Yanukovych, leaders of the Party of Regions, the Socialist Party and the Our Ukraine bloc signed a document entitled Universal Declaration of National Unity. In the document, Yushchenko and Yanukovych compromised on major policy issues, including the official status of the Russian language and Ukraine’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Universal Declaration of National Unity stated that the country’s future would be a European one, as a part of NATO, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the European Union. However, by the fall of 2006, Yanukovych reversed his position on NATO integration, delayed WTO membership and pursued a decidedly pro- Russian foreign policy. 2010 Ukraine Presidential Election 9 In March 2007, a number of Yushchenko’s supporters in parliament defected to Yanukovych’s coalition, prompting Yushchenko to dissolve parliament. This ended the tenuous power-sharing compromise between Yushchenko and Yanukovych. A political stalemate ensued between supporters of the two blocs, with Yanukovych supporters questioning the legality of Yushchenko’s decree dissolving parliament. The situation became increasingly contentious, culminating in confrontation between police forces in late May 2007. The police confrontation began when Internal Affairs Minister Vasyl Tsushko used riot police to take control of the General Prosecutor’s Office. Yushchenko responded by ordering the troops
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