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Robert Brandom's Publications Books Robert Brandom’s Publications Books: 1. A Spirit of Trust: A Reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology Harvard University Press, 2019 ISBN#9780674976818 German translation in preparation for Suhrkamp Verlag Chinese translation in preparation. French translation in preparation. 2. In the Space of Reason: Inferentialism, Normative Pragmatism, and Metalinguistic Expressivism The 2018 Dewey Lectures at Fudan University, Shanghai, China Ning Sun, Jing Zhou, Yuanfan Huang, Jie Wen, translators Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2019 ISBN：9787208158337 1 3. Heroism and Magnanimity: The Post-Modern Form of Self-Conscious Agency The Aquinas Lecture, 2019 Marquette University Press, 2019 ISBN#978-0874621938 4. Wiedererinnerter Idealismus Suhrkamp Verlag, 2015 ISBN#978-3-518-29704-9 5. From Empiricism to Expressivism: Brandom Reads Sellars Harvard University Press, 2015 ISBN#978-0-674-18728-3 2 6. Perspectives on Pragmatism: Classical, Recent, and Contemporary Harvard University Press, 2011 ISBN#978-0-674-05808-8 Japanese translation forthcoming from Keiso Shobo. Heechul Ju, Takafumi Kato, Nayuta Miki, Ryo Tanaka (trans.) 7. Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas Harvard University Press, 2009, 248 pp. ISBN#0-674-03449-X La Raison en Philosophie: Donne vie aux idées French translation of Reason in Philosophy Traduit par le Groupe de travail Brandom: Solal Azoulay, Sofia Batko, Adrien Carpentier, Pierre-Henri Castel, Maxime Diveu, Ulysse Jacquin, Carlos Malache Silva, Vincent Mussat, Pierre-François Mouraud, Manon Poinsignon, Valentin Rio et Adèle Rugini Ithaque, 2020 ISBN 978-2-490350-08-7 3 8. Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism (The 2006 Oxford John Locke Lectures) Oxford University Press, 2008, 240 pp. ISBN#0-199-54287-2 Między mówieniem a działaniem nowość: W stronę analitycznego pragmatyzmu (Polish translation of Between Saying and Doing) Marcin Gokieli (trans.), Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2012 ISBN#978-83-01-17279-4 4 9. In the Space of Reasons: Selected Essays of Wilfrid Sellars Edited with an Introduction by Kevin Scharp and Robert Brandom. Harvard University Press, 2007, 528 pp. ISBN#0-674-02498-2 10. Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality Harvard University Press, 2002, 430 pp. ISBN#0-674-00903-7 11. Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism Harvard University Press, 2000 (paperback 2001), 230 pp. ISBN#0-674-00158-3 (cloth), #0-674-00692-5 (paper) 5 Begründung und Begreifen: Eine Einfuhrung in den Inferentialismus (German translation of Articulating Reasons) Eva Gilmer (trans.), Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt 2001 ISBN#3-518-58308-5 La articulación de las rezones: Una introducción al inferencialismo (Spanish translation of Articulating Reasons) Eduardo de Bustos & Eulalia Perez Sedeño (trans.), Siglo XXI (Veintiuno) de España Editores, Madrid 2002 ISBN#84-323-1105-7 Articolare le Ragioni: Un'introduzione all'inferenzialismo (Italian translation of Articulating Reasons) Carlo Nizzo (trans.), Il Saggiatore, Milano 2002 ISBN#88-428-0958-6 6 L'Articulation des raisons (French Translation of Articulating Reasons) Claudine Tiercelin and Jean-Pierre Cometti (trans.), Les Editions du Cerf, Paris, 2009, 237 pp. ISBN#978-2-204-08355-3 Articulando Razões: Uma Introdução ao Inferencialismo (Portuguese translation of Articulating Reasons) Agemir Bavaresco, Eduardo Garcia Lara, Juliano do Carmo (trans.), ediPUCRS, Porto Alegre, 2013 ISBN#978-85-397-0273-2 Japanese translation of Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism Translated by Hirofumi Saito in series Great Works: Invitation to Contemporary Philosophy, supervised by Nobuharu Tanji Shunjusha, Japan. 2016 7 Chinese translation in preparation. 12. Rorty and His Critics Edited, with an Introduction (includes "Vocabularies of Pragmatism") by Robert Brandom Blackwell's Publishers, Oxford, July 2000 ISBN#0-631-20981-6 (cloth), #0-631-20982-4 (paper) Chinese translation in preparation. 13. Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind by Wilfrid Sellars Robert B. Brandom (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1997 With an Introduction by Richard Rorty and Study Guide by Robert Brandom ISBN#0-674-25154-7 (cloth) #0-674-25155-5 (paper) 8 O Empeirismos kai H Philosophia tou Nou (Greek translation of Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind) Christos Marsellos (trans.), Hestia, 2005, 239 pp. ISBN#960-05-1225-6 Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (Japanese translation) Iwanami Shoten Publishers, Tokyo, 2006, 240 pp. ISBN#4-00-022752-1 Empirismo e a Filosofia da Mente (Portugese translation) Editora Vozes, Petrópolis, 2008, 176 pp. ISBN#978-8532637437 Chinese translation in preparation for Shanghai Translation Publishing House 9 14. Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment Harvard University Press (Cambridge) 1994. 741 pp. ISBN#0-674-54319-X 9 (cloth), #0-674-54330-0 (paper) Chinese translation in preparation. Expressive Vernunft: Begründung, Repräsentation und diskursive Festlegung (German translation of Making It Explicit) Eva Gilmer and Hermann Vetter (trans.), Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt, 2000, 1001 pp. ISBN#3-518-58283-6 Hacerlo Explícito (Spanish transation of Making It Explicit) ángela Ackermann Pilári and Joana Rosselló (trans.), Herder, Barcelona, 2005, 943 pp. ISBN#84-254-2243-4 10 Rendre explicite I (French transation of Volume I of Making It Explicit) Anne-Gaëlle Argy, Gilles Bouttier, Élise Domenach, Goufrane Mansour, Sabine Plaud, Bertrand Rouge, Ludovic Soutif and Isabelle Thomas-Fogiel (trans.), Les Éditions du Cerf, Paris, 2010, 505 pp. ISBN#978-2-204-08353-9 Rendre explicite II (French transation of Volume II of Making It Explicit) Isabelle Thomas-Fogiel (trans.), Les Éditions du Cerf, Paris, 2011, 1148 pp. ISBN#978-2-204-08354-6 15. The Logic of Inconsistency with Nicholas Rescher Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1980, 174 pp. ISBN#0-631-11581-1 11 Articles: 1. “Rorty on Vocabularies” in Revisiting Richard Rorty, Pedro Góis Moreira (ed.), Vernon Press 2020, pp. 1-23. 2. “Remembering Richard Rorty: An Interview with Robert Brandom” in Revisiting Richard Rorty, Pedro Góis Moreira (ed.), Vernon Press 2020, pp. 251-262. 3. Some Strands of Wittgenstein's Normative Pragmatism, and Some Strains of his Semantic Nihilism” forthcoming in Disputatio: Philosophical Research Bulletin, special issue: Linguistic and Rational Pragmatism: The Philosophies of Wittgenstein and Brandom, 2019. 4. “The Commitment to Inference: A Conversation with Robert Brandom” Interview by Ivan Ivashchenko Sententiae, Volume XXXVІІІ, Issue 2, 2019. 124-150 ISSN 2075-6461 https://doi.org/10.22240/sent38.02.124 5. “Hegel and Analytic Philosophy” Analysis (Madrid) 23 (2): 1-20, 2019 6. “Vernunft, Ausdruck, Perspektive. Drei Leitideen von Leibniz—damals und heute,” in Theatrum Naturae et Artium—Leibniz und die Schauplätze der Aufklärung [Sächsische Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, in Kommission bei S. Hirzel, Stuttgart/Leipzig, 2019], pp. 46-66. 7. “Freiheit und Bestimmtsein durch Normen” pp. 61-90 in Parodoxien der Autonomie, mit texten von Robert Brandom, Judith Butler, Thomas Khurana, Christoph Menke, Terry Pinkard, and Sebastian Rödl. Thomas Khurana, Christoph Menke (Hg.) in der Reihe Freiheit und Gesetz August Verlag, 2019. 8. “From Logical Expressivism to Expressivist Logic: Sketch of a Program and Some Implementations” Nous: Philosophical Issues, Volume 28, Issue 1, October 2018, (a volume devoted to the philosophy of logic), pp. 70-88. 9. “From Logical Expressivism to Expressivist Logic: Sketch of a Program and Some Implementations” reprinted in Ondrej Beran, Vojtech Kolman, Ladislav Koren (eds.) From Rules to Meaning: New Essays on Inferentialism (Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy). 10. “Towards Reconciling Two Heroes: Habermas and Hegel” [Argumenta: The Journal of the Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy 1,1 July 2015: 29-42] (appeared September, 2016). 11. “Categories and Noumena: Two Axes of Sellars’s Thought” in D. Pereplyotchik and D. Barnbaum (eds.) Sellars and Contemporary Philosophy [Routledge, 2017]. 12. “Sellars’s Metalinguistic Expressivist Nominalism”, in James O’Shea (ed.) Wilfrid Sellars and His Legacy [Oxford University Press, 2016]. 13. Turkish translation of “The Pragmatist Enlightenment”: “Pragmatist aydinlanma” in Felsefelogos: International Refereed Journal of Philosophy (Istanbul) 62 2016/3, pp. 61-77. 14. Bosnian translation of “Inferentialism and Some of Its Challenges.” 12 15. “Zur Versöhnung zweier Helden: Habermas und Hegel” in Philip Hogh, Stefan Deines (Hg.) Sprache und Kritische Theorie” [Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York, 2016], in the series Frankfurter Beiträge zur Soziologie und Sozialphilosophie. Pp. 253-274. 16. “Den Abgrund reflektieren. Vernunft, Genealogie und die Hermeneutik des Edelmuts” in Westend: Neue Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, 01, 2015. Pp. 1-26. 17. “Freiheit und Bestimmtsein durch Normen” in Thomas Khurana und Christoph Menke (Hg.) Paradoxien der Autonomie [August Verlag, 2015], pp. 61-90. 18. “Die Bedeutung von komplexen Zahlen für Freges Philosophie der Mathematik” in Bastian Reichardt und Alexander Samans (Hrsg.) Freges Philosophie nach Frege [Mentis Verlag, Münster, 2014] pp. 195-216. 19. “Some Hegelian Ideas of Note for Contemporary Analytic Philosophy” Hegel Bulletin 35 (1): 1-15, 2014. 20. "An Arc of Thought: From Rorty's Eliminative Materialism to His Pragmatism" in Richard Rorty: From Pragmatist Philosophy to Cultural Politics, Alexander Gröschner, Colin Koopman, and Mike Sandbothe (eds.), Bloomsbury, 2013, pp. 23-30. 21. "Some Post-Davidsonian
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