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Download Issue (PDF) ~o/ THE DEMOCRATIC LEFT April 19't~Vol. 111, No. 4 ~217 Edited by MICHAEL HARRINGTON .s Israelis, Palestinians and self-determination by SHLOMO AVINERI with the fact that the PLO is aiming at a completely The current flurry of diplomatic activity in the different solution. Whether through a "salami tactic" Middle East should not obscure the fact that the or through an outright "war of national liberation," fundamental conflict has not neared resolution. This all sections of the PLO are committed to the ultimate is a conflict between two national movements, each destruction of Israel. Not one voice has been raised laying claim to the same piece of land. One of these until now within the PLO suggesting that it will ac- movements, Israeli Zionism, accepts the other's claim cept the existence of Israel as a legitimate body poli- to self-determination. But none of the Arab parties tic in the Middle East. Because of this, the Israeli in the conflict has ever acknowledged Israel's right to moderate, who accepts the idea of national self- exist. That is the fundamental issue. determination on a universal scale as part of his social- The Palestinian Liberation Organization, in par- ist credo, who even accepts the establishment of a ticular, explicitly states in its charter (in paragraph (Continued on page 2) 20) that the Jews are not a nation, but merely a religious group, and hence have no right and no capa- city to sustain a body politic. Consequently, the PLO Notes from a political program calls for the establishment of a "secular" Palestine, in which "Moslems, Christians, and Jews" diary: March 1975 will live together, the implication being that the Jews, not being a nation, deserve only religious freedom. by MICHAEL HARRINGTON This perception has characterized the Arab attitude March 1. New York. The Democratic Socialist Or- to Jewish nationalism from its outset. The tragedy, ganizing Committee National Board meeting was the and intellectual scandal, of this position, is that it busiest we've ever had. Plans were discussed for an denies to the other side that very right-national self- organizers' school in the Midwest in June, a youth determination-thatit claims for itself. conference, a West Coast conference in the fall. There The PLO's denial of the Jews' right to national was a feeling that the opportunities for the Left are self-determination puts Israeli moderates in a tight grea~r than at any time in a generation. Moreover, a corner. On one hand, there is growing Israeli sympathy political consensus emerged in the course of the debate: for Palestinian self-determination, not only among that the times demand a greater emphasis on the intellectuals and journalists. The ruling Labor Party specifically socialist content of our politics. We remain, has gone a long way towards accepting the fact that of course, the partisans of the democratic Left and without solving the Palestinian problem, true concilia- we understand that the basic choice of 1976 will be tion cannot be achieved. Thus, the Israeli Labor between the mass liberal Left and the conservative Party's 1973 election manifesto explicitly spoke of a Right. But within that framework, everybody felt Jordanian-Palestinian solution to the Palestinian quest that the economic crisis is making socialist proposals for self-determination, though not of a separate West more relevant and necessary. Bank Palestinian state. This is a long way from In the middle of the meeting, I had to leave to go former Prime Minister Meir's hard-line statements over to a New Democratic Coalition conference at that "there are no Palestinians." Similarly, the present Chelsea High School. Morris Udall was questioned Prime Minister, Itzhak Rabin, has repeatedly stated by a panel of Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman, that it is incumbent upon Israel to help solve the Robert Browne, the black economist, and myself. On Palestinian problem. the whole, Udall made a much better impression on me On the other hand, the Israeli moderate is faced today than he had when he visited the New York delegation at the Kansas City mini-convention. In Shlomo Avineri, author of The Social and Political December he had rattled off a series of one-liners, Thought of Karl Marx, is Professor of Political Science some good, some bad, none serious. Today he re- and Dean of the Faculty of Social Science at the He- sponded to specific questions about domestic eco- brew University of Jerusalem. A volume of essays nomic problems with that informed expertise one finds edited by him on Israel and the Palestinians has been in a practiced Member of Congress. recently published by St. Martin's Press. (Continued on page 5) can be no doubt the Israeli government made a big Israel ... mistake by not stating publicly during the Palestinian (Continued from page 1) debate that it would negotiate with any Palestinian Palestinian entity on the West Bank and Gaza-at group which accepted Israeli existence, an offer the considerable cost to Israel - has great difficulty PLO would have refused to its own detriment), the dressing Palestinian grievances, has great difficulty Israeli government really can not negotiate with a in viewing the PLO as a partner in any future delib- group that explicitly denies Israeli self-determination. erations. It is because the PLO calls only for an What, then, of the Palestinians in the future? The exclusivist, one-sided self-determination, rather than immense publicity achieved by the PLO through its because of the Palestinians' terrorism, that the PLO legitimization by the UN has obscured the fact that is unacceptable from my own socialist point of view. the Palestinian community is not totally represented Yasir Arafat's speech at the United Nations only by Beirut-based guerrilla groups, for there are three confirms this view. Never in his speech did Arafat groups of Palestinians-those under Israeli rule on mention the name "Israel." He only referred to "Zion- the West Bank and in Gaza, those in Jordan east of ism" (within the formula of "Imperialism, Colonialism, the river, and the Beirut-based organizations. The and Zionism") and compared it to French colonialism great majority of the Palestinians, those in the West in Algeria and American imperialism in Vietnam. Bank and in Jordan proper, have basically opted for This puts the Israeli government in a difficult posi- the moderate, diplomatic solution. The West Bank tion. Leaving tactical disagreements aside (there population, for example, much as it would like freedom from Israeli occupation, and as much as it admires PLO-inspired hijackings and murders, is ultimately realistic and moderate and has not, over the years, For an independent Portugal given the PLO that kind of territorial base which a successful guerrilla organization needs for its victory. Recent events in Portugal are disturbing. The Jordanian monarchy has been thoroughly Pales- Parties to the right and to the left of the Por- tinized since 1970, and also represents the moderate tuguese Communists have been banned, and the Palestinian element, ready for a compromise with army has made it absolutely clear that this Israel and aware that it will have to live with the month's election will make little difference in how Jewish state as a neighbor. the country is ruled. As Flora Lewis reported in If the diplomatic moves with Egypt-and possibly the March 22 New York Times, leftists through- even with Syria-are to succeed, this moderate Pales- out Europe are upset by the political turns in tinian-Jordanian factor, pushed aside after Rabat, Portugal. In the words of one French Socialist, must return to center stage. Then a compromise solu- "There is no doubt that the Portuguese Socialist tion, more or less based on 1967 borders, plus security Party is hardest hit by what has happened in guarantees for Israel, may be worked out between Lisbon." Israel, Jordan and the moderate Palestinians of the For our part, we echo Mario Soares' hopes that West Bank. If by that time some of the less radical Portugal can achieve socialism on its own terms, groups within the PLO will change their intransigent that the last colonial power not "trade one impe- and exclusivist position, relinquish their non-accept- rialism for another." ance of Israel and join in the discussion, further steps toward true conciliation would be possible. But the But there can be no question that Portugal PLO in it present structure and its present ideological must solve its own problems without the "help" stance is not and cannot become an element of under- of the United States. James Buckley's crude standing. Peace can only be founded on mutuality and saber-rattling (we should seize the Azores and if reciprocity, not exclusivism and supremacy. D we fail, fire the Joint Chiefs of Staff) is predict- able and wrong. And the more "sophisticated" reasoning of Senator Hubert Humphrey is just as 11,wdeu.M, wrong. He wants us to use American power "to o{ support democratic elements in Portugal." The THE DEMOCRATIC LEFT way we helped "democratic elements" in Viet- Michael Harrington, Editor nam? In Greece? In Chile? In the Dominican Re- Jack Clark, Managing Editor public? Such monstrosities can not be justified Gretchen Donart, Production Manager on the basis that the Kremlin does it, too. People who helped to put this issue out: Humphrey and others who want to demonstrate Harlan Baker, David Bensman, Sheila Srown, Harry the United States' commitment to "democratic Fleischman, Marjorie Gel_lermann, Selma Lenihan, elements" would do better to urge that American Mark Schaeffer, Cynthia Ward. power not be used to maneuver in the internal Signed articles express the views of the author.
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