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Activist Philosophy of Technology: Essays 1989-1999

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Activist Philosophy of Technology: Essays 1989-1999 ACTIVIST PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY: ESSAYS 1989-1999 Paul T. Durbin 1 ACTIVIST PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY: ESSAYS 1989-1999 Contents Chapters 1. INTRODUCTION: A GENUINELY PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY 2. PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 3. HOW TO DEAL WITH TECHNOSOCIAL PROBLEMS 4. SOME POSITIVE EXAMPLES 5. BIOETHICS AS SOCIAL PROBLEM SOLVING 6. ENGINEERING ETHICS AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 7. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 8. PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY EPILOGUE Introduction Many authors of collections of essays, often under the prodding of editors or publishers, attempt to turn a set of essays into a coherent book. Unfortunately, judging from reviews of the results, it is almost always clear to the reader where the seams are. No matter how much effort to the contrary, it is always clear to an astute reader -- and especially to readers in a specialized field who are already familiar with a good bit of the work in question -- where a particular essay begins and ends, as well as how it does or doesn't mesh well with what precedes or follows. So I am not even going to try that here. What I offer here and in three separate volumes is a collection of essays, and I won't try to hide the fact. I think there is coherence, at least in overall 2 point of view, but I don't claim more than that. I don't want, however, to ignore totally what it is that those seeking a coherent volume are looking for; they want what they are publishing or editing to be a real book. To solve the problem, I am going to try something that I haven't seen done elsewhere. I am going to treat this set of essays as if I were editing the essays of someone else. There are examples to follow there; indeed, practically every famous author, after his or her death, is the object of such a venture. A disciple, a family member, a literary executor or someone with similar interests decides that the thoughts spread over time of that author merit publication in a single volume or set. I'm not claiming that my writings deserve such treatment -- now before or even after my death -- but it's a model to be followed. What I have done for that purpose is to collect essays that were written over a period of twenty years and put them together as a reflection of my developing point of view over that period. At first I tried to combine everything in a single volume; now I treat three sets of essays as three separate volumes. I will leave it to the reader to decide whether my approach was a good choice or not. But for me, it is the only honest option open to me, short of starting from the beginning and writing three new books, beginning to end. And that admittedly more difficult chore, even if I were to undertake it, would not actually reflect a developing point of view as well as I think these sets of essays do. Here is the way I have collected my essays, introducing each one as if I were introducing the essays of someone else. This volume is introductory throughout. It includes the essays that I first put together as "Activist Essays in Philosophy of Technology: 1989-1999," and put on my Philosophy Department website as far back as 2000. However, in this revision, I eliminate two of the essays from that set, because they reappear in different versions later and because they fit better under a later theme. The separate second set of essays, “Activist Philosophy of Technology: Essays 1999-2009, will take two steps forward: Part One attempts to elaborate on and enlarge the first four chapters here, trying to develop the original foundations in as clear a fashion as I can at this point in my life. Part Two attempts to advance some central themes in this first set of essays, deepening my insights about the need for a broader social responsibility perspective in a whole range of professional fields. One way it does that is to add examples of new fields not covered here. At one point, I thought about including a Part Three in that second set. Instead, I have now created a third volume, which introduces the most topical part of my recent essays, with a focus on the related themes of sustainable development and globalization. 3 This first set of essays begins with an introduction with a history. A long time ago, in my contribution to the conference I set up at the University of Delaware in 1975 (Durbin, 1978), which would lead to the founding of the Society for Philosophy and Technology, I had argued for an opening in the would-be field for an American Pragmatist approach. I based my version more on the thought of George Herbert Mead than on the better-known John Dewey. It took almost twenty years for me to produce a book along those lines: my Social Responsibility in Science, Technology, and Medicine (1992). Then, a short time later, when Carl Mitcham, my primary collaborator in establishing SPT, was editing -- along with Leonard Waks – a volume of Research in Philosophy and Technology on the topic, "technology and social action," they invited me to do a lead essay. What I wrote, "In Defense of a Social-Work Philosophy of Technology," borrows shamelessly from early chapters of Social Responsibility. So the history of the development of my thinking on what I see as the best approach to a philosophy of technology -- an activist approach as legitimate philosophizing -- shows a continuity from the very beginning in 1975 to almost the end of the century, in 1999. This first chapter here appeared, as the leadoff essay, "In Defense of a Social-Work Philosophy of Technology," in Carl Mitcham, ed., Research in Philosophy and Technology, volume 16: Technology and Social Action (1999). Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION: A GENUINELY PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY Without apology, in this chapter I espouse a piecemeal, public-interest-activism approach to philosophy of technology. It is modeled after the social ethics of G. H. Mead (1934, 1936, 1964a, 1964b) and John Dewey (1929, 1935, 1948). As I have said elsewhere (Durbin, 1992), that may not satisfy many philosophers, but the situation reminds me of the old saying of Winston Churchill: A piecemeal approach to social problem solving may seem the worst sort of ethics for our technological age -- except for all the rest. "Professional ethics," in one form or another, has become something of a mainstream activity, both in certain segments of academe and in certain circles within professional associations. Conferences involving an amazing array of professional disciplines and associations have been held at the University of Florida, and there is an Association for Practical and Professional Ethics, based at Indiana University, that runs regular meetings -- equally well attended -- every year. Carl Mitcham (1998?) and Leonard Waks (Mitcham and Waks, 1997) have lamented the fact (as they see it) that this growing body of literature includes all too few explicit references to the centrality of technology in generating the problems that applied and professional ethics practitioners address. Mitcham and Waks admit that biomedical ethics, engineering ethics, and computer ethics often, perforce, address issues related to technology and particular technological devices -- computers themselves, but also artificial intelligence, etc., in the case of computer 4 ethics. But, Mitcham and Waks complain, "the technological" in these cases is all too often subordinated to the ethical (often to very traditional ethics) rather than transforming ethics. I believe there is something to be said for the Mitcham/Waks complaint. However one defines technology -- whether in terms of new instrumentalities or devices or processes, or in terms of so-called "technoscience" (that peculiar admixture of science and engineering and other technical expertise with capitalism or modern goverance so common in our era) -- the phenomena associated with contemporary technologies or technological systems ought to have a central place in contemporary discourse. And that means they should have such a place in ethical and legal discourse -- and therefore also in the discourse of those philosopher/ethicists concerned with real-world issues in our technological society. In this book, I take it for granted that academic ethicists have at least made a beginning in taking note of technosocial problems. What I advocate is that they should take greater notice of these issues. And I am urging them to do so in an activist fashion. Some philosophers have claimed that academic ethicists have a special claim to contribute to the solution of the sorts of technosocial problems I have in mind. I dispute that claim if it assumes that philosophers can claim a special expertise in these areas. In my opinion, we are all involved in technical decisions: the experts who are involved directly with them, those who hire or otherwise deploy the experts, citizens directly or indirectly impacted by the decisions, and the entire democratic citizenry who pay the taxes that support the ventures or benefit the corporations involved in them in myriad ways or who must often pay (not only through taxation) for the foulups so often associated with large technological undertakings (and not only with technological disasters). Technical expertise is often central to the creation of technosocial problems -- but also to their solution or at least remediation. Corporate or governmental expertise is also involved. Citizens can become experts, but they continue to have a legitimate democratic voice when they do not. Philosophers in general, and ethicists in particular, often gain their own expertise -- most commonly in arriving at legal or political or social consensus on technosocial issues.
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