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The Epistemological Ties That Bind: a Pragmatist Case Against Fewist Theories of Truth and Knowledge and the Implications for Feminet Science

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The Epistemological Ties That Bind: a Pragmatist Case Against Fewist Theories of Truth and Knowledge and the Implications for Feminet Science THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL TIES THAT BIND: A PRAGMATIST CASE AGAINST FEWIST THEORIES OF TRUTH AND KNOWLEDGE AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR FEMINET SCIENCE by Shaw Suzanne Clough M.A., University of Calgary, 1989 THESIS SUBMITTED JN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUiREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHZLOSOPHY Under Special Arrangements in the Faculty of Arts O Sharyn Suzanne Clough SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY June 1997 Al1 rights reserved. This work may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without permission of the author. .----..-. ----- y of Canada ducanada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographic Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395. nie Wellington Ottawa ON KIA ON4 Ottawa ON KIA ON4 canada Canada The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence allowing the exclusive permettant à la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or seli reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. Ia forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. The author retains ownership of the L' auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fkom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otheMtise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. ABSTRACT Ferninist claims that scientific activity is intimately involved with the oppression of women, often identiw aspects of the epistemology of science, or scientific method, as the prirnary culprit. In my dissertation 1try to persuade my ferninist colleagues that despite the important gains we have made through the criticism of science, Our fairly ment investment in an epistemological critique is yielding dirninishing returns. 1begin by examining the episternological reflections of a number of feminist critics of evolutionary biology, including Ruth Hubbard and Ruth Bleier. 1 then discuss the more general epistemological approaches of Evelyn Fox Keller, Sandra Harding and Helen Longino. There are a number of features of feminist episternology which make it ineffective as a method for adequately addressing the oppression of women by science. For example, feminist epistemological examinations of science have often involved essentialist claims about "women's" experience, and over-general conceptions of science as an institution. These problems are discussed throughout the dissertation. However, the principal focus involves the philosophical details of the feminist epistemologies themselves. Specifically, 1 focus on their reliance on a questionable model of human psychology, that 1 refer to as "representationaiism." My anti-representationalist approach is inspired by the work of two neo- pragamatist philosophers, Richard Rorty and Donald Davidson. For the purposes of this dissertation, representationalism is the view that beliefs are the subjective, representational end-product of a sensory process, in which the objects of our world are sensed and then screened through our subjective perceptual frarneworks (the filters of our values, worldview, and language). My concern is that the representational conception of beliefs as filtered representations of the world makes coherent a global scepticism about the tmth of our beliefs. Since, on this model. beliefs do not arise iii from direct access to the wodd, then they can be radicalIy wrong. Al1 of our representations might be completely inaccurate because they are fiitered through our perceptual apparatus, language, culmral worldview andor theory allegiance. Foiiowing Rorty and Davidson, 1 argue that episternologicai debates are premised on the coherence of global scepticism, and that, dut to the nature of the representationalist mode1 on which the debates are based, the battle with global scepticism is futile. Surveying feminist contributions to epistemoiogicai debates in science, 1 show bow these contributions invite the coherence of scepticism. In the end, each contribution either accepts scepticism, with retativist resignation, or attempts to defeat it with various claims to ubjectivity. While the latter response has proven futile, for both feminist and traditionai epistemotogists alike, the former response is equally problematic. Either way, issues of relativism and scepticism can be used against our well-justified claims that women are king hmedby science. In the latter haif of my dissertation 1offer a pragmatic alternative based on Davidson's philosophy of language. Davidson argues that, on a non-representationalist mode1 of language use, global scepticism is not a coherent option. His views undermine the motivation for participating in the epistemological debates that attempt to address scepticism as a coherent and ever-present concern. By undermining the motivation for these philosophical pursuits 1 hope to encourage my feminist colleagues to return to their important work in science and science criticism with the assurance that out concepts of "error" and "truth" are not always enemies that need feminist epistemological reconfiguration. Acknowledgements My thanks go first to my mother Darline Gough, and my mentor and friend Bj@m Ramberg. Their material, emotional, and intellectual support throughout this entire project has been a great source of strength for me. 1 have been lucky to be surrounded by many other generous and supportive colleagues and friends. 1 am forever thankful to Ian Hollingshead for getting me to Vancouver to start this project in the first place; to Hannah Gay for taking on an interdisciplinary task of immense scope and helping me to whittle it down to a manageable size; to the Philosophy of Psychology reading group at SFU, and especially Jeff Sugarman and David Harnmond, for introducing me to the work of Richard Rorty, and for providing a space where intellectual vigour and ski11 were encouraged and expected; to Dave Carter for suggesting that Bj@m Ramberg was someone 1 REALLY SHOULD MEET; to Lou Bruno for long philosophical conversations over very good food; to Sam (Vanda) Black and Paul Reniers for the links they helped me forge between feminist theory and the real world of labour politics; to Bernie Corneau whose love and support helped me cary this project to completion; and last, but not least, to Edne Sobstyl who has no idea how much her humour, grace and intellectual guidance have made this project much better than it would have been otherwise. Table of Contents Abstract iii Acknowledgements v I. Introduction 1.1 Epis temology defined 1.2 An important distinction remains 1.3 The feminist move from epistemology to Epistemology 1.4 Lessons from pragmn t is rn 1.5 Chapter highlights 1.6 Concluding remarks 2. Ferninist Episternology: Problems in Practise & Theory 2 6 2.1 Symptom: Scepticism; Diagnosis: Representationalism 3 2 2.2 The Epistemological failzrre to defeaf scepticism 3 8 2.3 Another look af correspondence 48 2.4 Surnmary 5 I 3. Feminist Epistemology and Evolritionary Theory 5 4 3.1 The Darwinian theo y of sexual selection 55 3.2 Blackwell: The Sexes Throughout Nature 63 3.3 Second-wave Epistemologists 68 3.4 Science, objectivity and masculini~ 79 4. Keller's Episternological Reflections on Gender & Science 4.1 Keller and psychoanalyfic object relations fheory 4.2 Object relations, objectivity and science 4.3 A mid-point review 4.4 Accepting biological deterrninism at whaf cost? 4.5 Complicating sex/gender 4.6 Object relations and feminist standpoint theoy 4.7 Representationalism continued in "The gender/science system" 5. From Objectivism to Relativism in Feminist Epistemology 113 5.1 Harding on objectivity II5 5.2 From objectivism to relativism 123 5.3 Longino and feminist science 127 5.4 Longino, underdetermination theory and relativism 1 3 O 5.5 Symptom: Relativism; Diagnosis: Representationalism 1 3 2 6. A Pragmatist, Davidsonian Alternative 137 6.1 "A reason for belief that isn 't evidence for belieft 139 6.2 Telling the sceptic to "go away" 147 6.3 Evaluating Davidson's escape from Epistemology 151 7. Feminist Science und Science-Criticism from a Pragmatist Perspective 159 7.1 Davidson on underdetermination theory 160 7.2 Feminist science without Epistemology 164 7.3 A pragmatist view of sex/gender categories 169 7.4 Summary 175 8. A Pragmatist Case Study: Back to the Theory of Evolution 8.1 A pragmatist view of biological function 8.2 The function of "(European) male superiority" 8.3 The function of menstruation 8.4 "The physiology of menstruation shows adaptive design" 8.5 The etiological account: Some concerns 8.6 A pragmatist prescription 8.7 Conclusion Works Cited 211 vii Chapter 1: Introduction Ferninist claims that the oppression of women is systemic in science, often identify the epistemology of science as the primary culprit. Three of the leading theorists who make this case are Keller (1982, 1983 [1978], 1985, 1987, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c), Harding (1986a, 1986b, 1990, 1991, 1993b) and Longino (1987, 1990, 1993a, 1993b). 1 agree with their claim that scientific inquiry, across disciplines and laboratories, often serves to hm rather than help h~rnankind.~Further, they are surely correct that not everyone has an equally likely chance of falling victim to this sort of hm, and that sexism is one of the best explanations of this inequality. The important work by this "second-wave"2 of Western feminists, has equipped yet a new generation of ferninists with a range of critical diagnostic tools for the investigation of oppression in science. However, the more 1 investigate, the less certain 1 have become that an examination of the epistemology of science will help us further the goal of eliminating the ham science causes. 1 will argue this point throughout the balance of rny dissertation, directly confronting the works of Harding, Keller, and Harding enumerates examples in The Science Question in Feminism (1986a, 20 - 22). See also Tavris, The Mismeasure of Woman (1992).
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