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1 CLH389 655289 What were the causes of the civil war between and ?

In many ways, Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus and Gaius were easily comparable in terms of their lives. The men were of a similar age when they were at their peaks of power, and both had unusual rises to prominence that led to glorious careers and tragic ends.

By the time Caesar came to prominence, Pompey was the established first man of the republic. He was a respected general from the start of ’s dictatorship, having raised legions from his estate workers to support Sulla’s march on .1 He became the ’s problem fixer, a role he would later fill for the republic. However he displayed an arrogance at this early stage in his career; when sent to to deal with Sulla’s enemies there, Pompey, who was equestrian and held no senatorial rank, demanded a . He even imitated his leader, by using his troops as a backing to force through his demands.2 When Lepidus, the who Pompey had supported, revolted in 79BC,

Pompey was granted propraetorian in order to aid in supressing him. Pompey also reportedly had Lepidus’ ally, Marcus the elder killed after he surrendered. 3 Pompey then gained consular imperium in Spain. However it was only after he returned from Spain to aid against the revolt and arguably stole the glory from Crassus that Pompey finally gained senatorial office; at the age of 35 he broke with tradition and constitution to become consul along with Crassus in 70BC. Pompey’s next two appointments added to his accustomed attitude to power; both in his campaign against the pirates and in the Third Mithradic War he was given immense power and control through the Lex Gabinia and the Lex Marilia respectively. After all his success, Pompey was hailed as the first amoung equals in Rome, a man seemingly without match. In retrospect, any form of resistance to Pompey can be seen as needless and self-destructive.

At age sixteen, Caesar was head of his house and closely allied to his uncle Marius, but this quickly went wrong following Marius’ defeat. Caesar went into hiding with the army to avoid violent

1 , Pompey, 6 2 Plutarch, Pompey, 13-14 3 Plutarch, Pompey, 16 2 CLH389 655289 repercussions from Sulla. When Caesar returned to the political scene, he was a supporter of Pompey, and the man may have served as an inspiration to Caesar. In Spain, Caesar gained prominence as a front man in Rome and demanded a triumph for his victories there, which was rejected. It was then that the was created and the power of the three combined gained Caesar his first consulship and his commands in . His actions in his first consulship, where he rode roughshod over tradition and constitution occasionally, made him enemies that would do everything in their power to destroy him. Ultimately this was the start of the Civil War against Pompey, and the one that would follow his .

The triumvirate itself was a big cause of the Civil War. When it formed, all three men had been foiled in their own particular requests. The agreement was that as the most powerful men of Rome they should ensure that “no political action be taken which did not suit any one of the three”.4 Pompey obviously was the established first man of Rome, Crassus was the richest man in the Republic and

Caesar was the rising star. The elder two tied themselves to the up and coming politician, attractive and promising. Caesar had served Pompey well in the past, and Pompey offered him a reconciliation his long-time enemy Crassus.5 The men saw Caesar’s potential and assuming that with their power they could reap the benefits.6 According to contemporary sources, using the support of his other two triumvirs, Caesar gained the consulship.789 This allowed the triumvirs to push through the legislation they wanted. The merger was one of mutual interest; it was unstable, but precariously balanced by mutual suspicion.10 However in the years following the original agreement in 60BC, the situations had changed. Caesar had covered himself in glory and prestige on campaign in Gaul, gaining the people adoration but he found himself under attack in the Senate. Pompey, the “great man” in 59BC, was also under attack from the Clodius; he was blockaded in his house and there are even rumours of assassination attempts. Pompey was also in a dispute with Crassus over the bequests of ,

4 , Caesar, 19 5 Gruen, 1969, 78 6 Plutarch, Crassus, 14 7 Plutarch, Pompey, 47 8 Plutarch, Crassus, 14 9 Dio, 37, 54 10 Gruen, 1991, 78 3 CLH389 655289 made worse by the long standing animosity between the two. However, Caesar did not mind this as he wanted Pompey isolated. was meant to equalise all three; between them, they divided up the equally. Caesar’s command was extended for five more years, with no option of discussion until 50BC; he also gained the ability to raise four new legions, men that would be loyal to him.

Pompey and Crassus were to get the consulship in 55BC and to gain commands in Spain and respectively with a similar prohibition on discussion, but Pompey was to stay in Rome due to his corn commission. The three men were equal and dependent on each other to keep their monopoly on power. And therefore if something went wrong, which it did, chaos would ensue.

Of course the breakdown of the triumvirate was one of the major causes of the Civil War. In 54BC

Pompey’s wife and Caesar’s daughter died. Marriage to Julia had been one of the ways Pompey and Caesar had cemented themselves to each other.11 Of course Pompey, the senior man of the

Republic, needed a wife for political reasons. Caesar assumed that his ally would willingly marry another one of his relatives, and so reaffirm their relationship; according to Plutarch Caesar even offered to divorce Calpurnia and marry Pompey’s daughter. However this is not what Pompey did; he rejected Caesar’s offers and married a woman from a separate family.12 While this could be forgivable, his choice of bride was a blow to Caesar; Cornelia Metella, the widow of Crassus son

Publius and daughter of Metellus , who was a strongly opposed to the triumvirate. Metellus had been consul with Pompey in 52BC and was the man responsible for persuading the senate to issue the ultimatum to Caesar. However before Pompey’s marriage to Cornelia, the triumvirate had technically ended already with the death of Crassus at the in 53BC. Metellus then saw his chance to manipulate Caesar’s absence from Rome and make his greatest ally Pompey into his greatest opposition.

11 Plutarch, Pompey, 47 12 Plutarch, Pompey, 55 4 CLH389 655289 Caesar was already in a precarious position before all of this.13 Obviously the renewed agreement of the triumvirate, Caesar’s position was secure for five more years and discussion was prohibited until

March 50BC; Caesars plan was then to remain in Gaul until 49BC and then return to stand for consulship. In 52BC, a of ten allowed Caesar to stand in absentia for the consulship of

49BC. However this plan was threatened by the increasing numbers of demands for Caesar to give up his office or be removed from it. This was accompanied by a series of which undermined his plans and position and made him dependant on Pompey’s friendship. Pompey passed a provincial law which meant that there had to be a five year moratorium between a man holding magistracy and a pro- magistracy. This obviously hampered Caesar’s plan; he could not go from being consul to being assigned a pro-consular province. This would mean he would have to wait for his chance to expand his reputation and wealth, and leave him in Rome where his enemies in the Senate would do everything to stop him gaining more power. However Pompey personally exempted Caesar from the

Gracchan consular provinces law that required personal attendance in Rome as a consul. Caesar was physically weakened when in 50BC he lost two of his legions in Gaul. Following the disaster Carrhae, there were concerns with security in and to soothe this, Pompey and Caesar were required to pledge a legion each. Caesar sent one of his legions from Gaul, but Pompey recalled one of the legions he had loaned to Caesar,14 so Caesar lost two whole legions from his forces in Gaul. What is worse is that these men did not go to Syria; in fact they never left . For Caesar, returning to Rome was looking formidable. This is possibly why he attempted to make conciliatory moves with the

Senate on several occasions, such as proposing a joint disarmament in 49BC, but these were rejected.

Pompey too lay at fault for the outbreak of the civil war, and according to Gruen, was the man responsible for the downfall of the old republic.15 If we examine the years following Lucca, Pompey held the consulship in 55BC and after that gained governorship in Spain from 54BC but remained in

Rome because of his corn commission. He is therefore in the perfect position to control what happens in the Senate when the riots occurred in 52BC. After the death of the Clodius at the hands of his rival,

13 Plutarch, Caesar, 29 14 Plutarch, Pompey, 57 15 Gruen, 1991, 72 5 CLH389 655289 Milo’s supporters, riots spread across the city. The Senate turned to Pompey to restore order and offered him a dictatorship. Pompey refused this post as it was against the constitution and instead accepted a sole consulship for the rest of 52BC. Being a constitutionalist, this meant that he had the freedom of actions that came with the position, he was single dominant figure in the republic, and yet he still made himself accountable for his actions. However, Edwards notes that Pompey allowed a state of affairs to come into existence where there was no government at all. In Pompey,16 he says

Plutarch does not suggest he is plotting to become dictator as this is inconsistent with the writer’s characterisation of him, but in Caesar,17 Pompey actually works to get himself made dictator*.

By 50BC, Pompey had turned the tables. For a brief moment Pompey had been dependent of Caesar’s popularity and power for his own survival, but following his consulship in 55BC Pompey strengthened his position again. His re-emerging dominance in the Senate meant he had control and

Caesar was dependant on him. Pompey further weakened Caesar’s position by repairing relationships with men who had previously opposed him as a triumvir. These men were still hostile to Caesar but were accepting of Pompey and his increasing dominance. The men who now turned to support

Pompey were the traditional majority, the , who opposed Caesar’s power and popularity with the people. Pompey felt so secure in his power that his arrogance returned; when asked what he would do is Caesar went to war against the Senate, Pompey responded “what would any father do if his son hit him?”. Pompey felt completely in control Caesar, and felt comfortable that if his former father-in-law stepped out of line in anyway, he would be dealt with in a way a disobedient or rebellious child is dealt with by a parent. However, it never appeared to be hostile. Looking at

Pompey’s actions, he acted in a way that would cement himself once again as leading man of Rome, consolidating relationships with hostile members of the Senate and assuming his usual role of problem fixer. As a consequence, Caesar becomes increasingly vulnerable; while this may be intentional to increase Caesar’s dependence on Pompey, it is not meant in a malicious or hostile manner, merely as a form of regaining control. There was a genuine bond between Caesar and

16 Plutarch, Pompey, 54 17 Plutarch, Caesar, 28 6 CLH389 655289 Pompey, thanks to Pompey’s affection for Julia, which can be seen by both men’s reactions after her death.

The classical Roman ideas of what an aristocrat and a member of the senate should act like and how other people should act towards him played its part in the outbreak of this Civil War, as it does in many contests between two high-ranking men. Both men had held the highest offices of the , and were used to being dealt with in a respectful manner benefiting men of their station.

Pompey’s status as the leading man of Rome was heavily under attack, and so when the opportunity came for him to prove himself again, following the chaos after Clodius’ death, he seized it with both hands. This was Pompey’s chance to show he was still the man to save Rome in a state of crisis. He was no longer as the greatest general Rome had to offer, that accolade had passed to Caesar, and it is easy to imagine that Pompey would have gently passed into old age resting on his former glories; the man saw himself as Rome and the republic. It is his sense of , what made an aristocrat an aristocrat, which means he had to continue his service to the Republic in a way that only he could do.

Caesar also claimed that Dignitas played it part in his actions. He claimed that the Senate had compromised his dignitas, and therefore he had to seek revenge for such and offence, which resulted in him crossing the to deal with his enemies in Rome. And with statements like that of

Pompey’s comparing him to a misbehaving child you can see why he felt his dignity had been offended.

When Sulla had made his constitutional reforms, he had made it so no one could do as he did and simply seize power. However his aims to prevent another Sulla failed as after his death, his reforms fell apart and were undone by individuals while the Senate did nothing to stop them. A major problem was that Sulla was too good an example for those who wished to seize power. When a crisis arose, such as the disputes following the veteran’s settlement, ambitious men, in this case Aemilius Lepidus, took advantage of the disorder and made their attempt at power. The carefully made legal system put in place by Sulla also fell apart as the Senate failed to take advantage of the opportunity to control legal matters; in the 70’s the law courts were characterised with a series of scandalous acquittals and 7 CLH389 655289 the restoration of the tribunate was definitely partly to blame for the failure of courts. Sulla had tried to restrict the tribunate as well as the , but neither could be restricted for long; The tribunate was too important an office to be restricted, and the equites formed a major part of Roman society and therefore could not be ignored. But ultimately the greatest problem for Sulla’s constitution was the rise of Pompey; he was the problem solver for the dictator and fulfilled that role for the Senate. He was ambitious and often had the opportunity to abuse his powers, many of which were given to him specially in different circumstances. However as a constitutionalist, He was of conservative mentality, and like others such as , or Marius before him, he was willing to countenance extraordinary measures, but only to assure his dignitas and pre-eminence within the confines of the establishment.18 It is strange therefore that his rise broke the constitution aimed at fixing the republic. This paved the way for Caesar’s rise; Caesar cleverly used the tribunate, using them to push through votes and laws, in ways that the Sullan constitution would have stopped had it been fully enforced. The fact that three men could control Rome in the way the triumvirate did proved that the Sullan constitution was not upheld, but neither was any form of constitution by 50BC; the

Senate had grown weak and its members concerns mainly focused on themselves.

Similar to Pompey, the vast majority of the Senate did not want war. They wished to reign in Caesar’s power, knowing that the longer he continued to expand his reputation, wealth and popularity with the people through his campaigns in Gaul the more power and therefore the more dangerous he would become. The issue is that in the Senate there was a core of men completely hostile to Caesar who wanted to destroy him. In 51BC Caesar failed to have his command in Gaul extended to 49BC. There was also the proposition to have him officially recalled, but this had been often called for and not granted presumably thanks to the agreement at Lucca. They weakened him physically at the same time as strengthening themselves by keeping the two legions that had come from Gaul to be sent

Parthia in Italy. Several attempts at compromising were made, but these were vetoed; Tribune Curio in 50BC proposed that both Pompey and Caesar should give up their commands at the same time, but this was vetoed. When Caesar proposed joint disarmament the idea was rejected and Metellus Scipio

18 Gruen, 1991, 72 8 CLH389 655289 proposed an alternative; that Caesar was to lay down his arms. This motion was passed in the Senate but vetoed by , who was at the time a tribune. After Caesar’s offers of compromise failed, late on attempts by prevent the situation worsening failed, opposed by men such as Cato and Scipio. On the 7th January 49BC the Senate passed the Ultimum, which put the republic in a state of defence. This led to Mark Antony and another tribune fleeing from Rome to

Caesar,1920 which gave him excellent material to inspire his troops in the justness of his cause.21 From that point, the Senate were beyond the point of return and had no choice but to appoint

Pompey to the supreme command at home.22

19 Plutarch, Caesar, 31 20 Caesar, Civil War, 1.5 21 Edwards, 1991, 91 22 Collins, 1953, 104 9 CLH389 655289 Word count: 2,883.

Bibliography

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Plutarch. Plutarch’s lives. Trans R. Waterfield (2008). Oxford University Press, New York.

Plutarch. Plutarch's Lives. Trans. B. Perrin (1916). Harvard University Press. London.

Collins, H. P. (1953): “Decline and Fall of Pompey the Great”, Greece and Rome. Vol.22 No.66, pp.

98-106.

Edwards, M. J. (1991): Plutrach, The Lives of Pompey, Caesar and Cicero. Bristol Classical Press,

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Gruen, E. S. (1969): “Pompey, the Roman , and the Conference of Luca”, Historia:

Zeitschrift fur Alte Geschichte. Pp71-108

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Pompey, Caesar. Edward Arnold, London.

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