Michael Jaffee Patterson Independent Project 2/1/13 Pompey, the Great Husband Abstract: Pompey the Great’s traditional narrative of one-dimensionally striving for power ignores the possibility of the affairs of his private life influencing the actions of his political career. This paper gives emphasis to Pompey’s familial relationships as a motivating factor beyond raw ambition to establish a non-teleological history to explain the events of his life. Most notably, Pompey’s opposition to the special command of the Lex Gabinia emphasizes the incompatibility for success in both the public and private life and Pompey’s preference for the later. Pompey’s disposition for devotion and care permeates the boundary between the public and private to reveal that the happenings of his life outside the forum defined his actions within. 1 “Pompey was free from almost every fault, unless it be considered one of the greatest faults for a man to chafe at seeing anyone his equal in dignity in a free state, the mistress of the world, where he should justly regard all citizens as his equals,” (Velleius Historiae Romanae 2.29.4). The annals of history have not been kind to Pompey. Characterized by the unbridled ambition attributed as his impetus for pursuing the civil war, Pompey is one of history’s most one-dimensional characters. This teleological explanation of Pompey’s history oversimplifies the entirety of his life as solely motivated by a desire to dominate the Roman state. However, a closer examination of the events surrounding the passage of the Lex Gabinia contradicts this traditional portrayal. Pompey is not the character so conventionally portrayed but rather an individual influenced by his familial ambitions. Although scholars confine Pompey to a character of unconquerable political ambition, the inclusion of Pompey’s personal affairs in the analysis of history reveals that his aspirations for familial success at times surpassed the political. Passed in 67 BCE, the Lex Gabinia appointed Pompey to a special command against piracy. Endued with imperium infinitum, Pompey had dominion over the entirety of the Mediterranean extending inland for 50 miles.1 The severities of the times warranted the exceptional command. For, earlier that year, pirates had sacked Rome’s port city of Ostia.2 By this time, the city of Rome had outgrown its agricultural capacity and was dependant upon the importation of Egyptian grain. 1 Plutarch Pompey 25. 2 Dio Roman History 36.23.5. 2 The activities of the pirates had halted commercial trade in the Mediterranean and prevented the grain supply from reaching the city.3 Rome’s urban poor were the most afflicted by the abrupt spike in grain prices and faced the threat of starvation. The daily affairs of the city were interrupted as hunger and civil unrest multiplied. Under such circumstances was the Lex Gabinia introduced. Indeed, Pompey’s command was not unique but rather the revival of an earlier commission for the same purpose. In 74 BCE, the praetor Marcus Antonius had assumed a failed command against the pirates with the same designation of imperium infinitum.4 In both cases, on account of the pirates’ prolificness, the task of their defeat demanded a command that extended beyond the boundaries of a single province to encompass the entirety of the Mediterranean.5 The nature of a command against the pirates necessitated the exceptional power of imperium infinitum. As Rome’s most decorated general, Pompey was naturally the first choice for such a command. Prominent for his restoration of the Tribunate as well as the fame of being the only equestrian to have ever celebrated even a single triumph, not to mention two, Pompey was one of Rome’s most popular politicians.6 It was apparent that Pompey was the most qualified general for achieving the immediate restoration of the grain supply and that the Roman populace would no doubt demand that Pompey assume the command against the pirates.7 Thus, the young Tribune Aulus Gabinius 3 Appian The Mithridatic Wars 63; Dio Roman History 36.20; Plutarch Pompey 25. 4 Velleius Historiae Romanae 2.31.4. 5 Appian The Mithridatic Wars 63; Dio Roman History 36.20; Plutarch Pompey 24. 6 Plutarch Pompey 14, 21. 7 Dio Roman History 36.23. 3 proposed the Lex Gabinia for the political gain of simultaneously championing the popular cause and strengthening his public association to Pompey.8 Indeed, despite the Lex Gabinia’s open-ended proposal that the general be chosen from among the ex-consuls, the masses immediately clamored for Pompey’s appointment.9 Pompey’s military successes were so well known that many felt that the mere name of Pompey would end the war.10 The desperation of the people was so great and their support of Pompey’s candidacy so strong that, faced with political opposition, they rushed the Senatorial assembly with the intention of killing any who opposed the motion.11 Eventually, fearful of the Roman mob, the Senate scheduled the bill for a vote.12 However, there is no indication that Pompey was complicit in the proposal of the Lex Gabinia. Upon hearing the proposed commands, Pompey delivered a speech recognizing the honor of his consideration but nevertheless asked the assembly to elect another man.13 Furthermore, Pompey excused his behavior by indicating his preference for the private life, “Allow me to remain undisturbed and to attend to my own business, so that now at last I may bestow some care upon my private affairs,” (Dio Roman History 36.26). However, consistent with Pompey’s characterization as a megalomaniac, ancient and modern historians alike dismiss Pompey’s statements as insincere. Dio provides us with the two most repeated explanations for the 8 Dio Roman History 36.23.4; Velleius Historiae Romanae 2.31.2; Plutarch Pompey 25. 9 Dio Roman History 36.23-24. 10 Plutarch Pompey 26. 11 Dio Roman History 36.24.2. 12 Plutarch Pompey 25. 13 Dio Roman History 36.25. 4 unction of Pompey’s speech.14 Either that Pompey wished to avoid the jealousy of his fellow Senators or to enhance the glory of the command by appearing to receive its appointment against his will.15 However, both these explanations contradict the egotism of unrelenting ambition. Firstly, an aspiring autocrat would welcome jealousy rather than avoid it. Secondly, the exceptionality of the command already constituted such glory as to make the manner of its appointment inconsequential. Finally, if indeed desirous for the command, it would be irrational for Pompey to risk appointment with feigned opposition; he needed only to express approval and his popularity with the mob would assure his selection. However, they say that actions speak louder than words and Pompey’s subsequent conduct confirms the validity of his speech. With the vote for the Lex Gabinia postponed until the following day, Pompey fled the city to be with his family at his country estate.16 In silent rebellion, Pompey chose to be absent while poised to receive the highest honor of his political career. Furthermore, upon receiving the news of his appointment, Pompey avoided celebration and returned anonymously to the city under the cover of darkness.17 Although dismissed by the sources, Pompey’s opposition to the Lex Gabinia becomes intelligible in the context of his private affairs. By the time of the Lex Gabinia’s proposal in 67 BCE, Pompey had been absent from politics for three years. In 70 BCE, he was elected to the consulship in the wake of his second triumph.18 14 Dio Roman History 36.24.6. 15 Dio Roman History 36.24.6. 16 Plutarch Pompey 26. 17 Plutarch Pompey 26. 18 Plutarch Pompey 14, 21, 22. 5 Although he secured the consulship with ease, having bypassed the cursus honorum, he was inexperienced in the affairs of Roman politics. 19 Indeed, Pompey lacked not only oratorical skills but also a basic understanding of the procedures of the Roman Senate.20 Finding difficulty in advancing his political agenda from within the Senate itself, he became dependant on the support of the masses and restored the Tribunate to its pre-Sullan power.21 However, this instigated a competition for popular appeal between Pompey and his colleague Crassus, fracturing their relationship and preventing any further political achievements.22 The experiences of Pompey’s first year as a Senator must have been frustrating at the least. Upon conclusion of his term in office, he retired from public life, refusing requests to appear in court and only infrequently visiting the forum.23 Pompey’s absence from politics represents his affinity for the private life, as expressed in his speech three years later. Pompey’s habit of, “frequently neglecting and ignoring public business in order to gratify his wives,” provides a rare insight into the relationship between Roman spouses.24 Indeed, love best explains Pompey’s valuation of familial ambition above political. Although marriages among the Roman elite functioned primarily as a means of forming political alliances, this does not negate the 19 Plutarch Pompey 22. 20 Aulus Gellius Noctes Atticae 14.7; Seneca Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales 11.4. 21 Plutarch Pompey 21. 22 Plutarch Crassus 12. 23 Plutarch Pompey 23. 24 Plutarch Pompey 2. 6 possibility of love. 25 Cicero’s letters to Terentia from his exile provide insight into the doting relationship that could develop between a Roman husband and his wife, “If these misfortunes are permanent, I truly desire to see you, light of my life, as soon as possible and for you to remain in my embrace, since neither the gods whom you have cultivated so virtuously nor the men whom I assiduously served have rendered us our proper return,” (Cicero fam.