Determinants of Party Unity in Europe

CEU eTD Collection

A dissertation submitted in partial of in the fulfillment A requirements for dissertation submitted t A comparative study of parliamentary parties in in parties twenty-thre comparative ofA study parliamentary Determinants Partyof Unity Europein Zsolt Enyedi (Central European University) Zsolt European Enyedi University) (Central CENTRAL EUROPEANCENTRAL UNIVERSITY Kenneth Janda (Northwestern University) Kenneth University) (Northwestern Janda Department of Political Science Science Political Department of Doctor of Philosophy Budapest, Hungary Budapest, Gabriela Borz Supervisors: March 2009

by by

e countries e countries he degree of ofhe degree

CEU eTD Collection

CEU eTD Collection published bypublished where except appropriate person, another acknowledgment May 2009 Budapest GabrielaBorz, the form references. of bibliographical confirm to previouslywritten contains the is that a thesis nomaterials This 2 STATEMENT anyin institutions. other confirm accepted to contains the is any that thesis nomaterials This othe for 1 STATEMENT

is made in is nd/or r degrees CEU eTD Collection To my mother and father To myand father mother

CEU eTD Collection

proposed and, consequently, to implement them. Fourthly,them.implement consequently,to and, proposed parliament, parties adapt and use their own tools in order to becom to order in tools own their use and adapt parties parliament, partisanship within the electorate or because of the converg the of because or electorate the within partisanship better addresses the complexities inherent in the issue of pa of issue the in inherent complexities the addresses better Empirically behavioral unity in Central Eastern Europe and Western Europe. Western and Europe Eastern Central in unity behavioral at uiy f eair Hg cnrlzto ad icpiay r disciplinary and centralization High behavior. of unity party attitudes of unity However, parliament. in be to going is party rdc ter uue eair n h lgsaue Te more The legislature. the in behavior future their predict my thesis shows that even if institutional conditions would not favor not conditions would institutional if even that shows thesis my development control and disciplinary rules in order to be unitary in the pa the in unitary be to order in rules disciplinary and control are there then par Somedemocracy. party achieved, internal of expense the at happens is democracy external that assumes one thesis allow me to conclude that some that conclude to me allow thesis i maintain and it enhance always will unity party consensus, these dimensions does not always guarantee the same level of uni of level same the guarantee always not does dimensions these tiue dvlp rte sol, h lte cn hne mor change can latter the mechanisms coercion of are applied. slowly, rather develops attitudes Consequently, whether whether Consequently, the differences between unity of behavior and unity of attitudes, of unity and behavior of unity between differences the a attitudes between distinction the consider to revised Theoretically ae ifrne n em o uiy f tiue i as si also is attitudes of unity of compared. are democracies terms in difference same E betweenattitudes of unity the in difference significant a Centr include to research party comparative for need the par of aspects all in different significantly not are regions all, I suggest that that suggest I all, theoretical several issues in comparative party politics, p doing While parties. political European for works which model in explaining unity of behavior. Ideological congruence is a good a is congruence Ideological behavior. of unity explaining in

hs edny cetae i a M i eetd ne oe lis open under elected is MP an if accentuates tendency unity This their be will lower the constituents, their representing olcl data. roll-call unit su expert of the surveys, elite on based measures behavior: of levels their and offer I institutions. political national parties and characteristics political European 187 about of attitudesof thereforeand indirectly onthe unity behavior. of that howe impact factors subsidySystemic age.system party and donations state of amount the are: behavior of unity the facto systemiconly The legislature. the in votingunity MPs’ sys electoral and parliamentarism, federalism, like factors, in earlier advanced propositions many against and expectations civn a ih ee o bhvoa unity. behavioral of level high a achieving ti tei peet a oiia coscuty oprsn bas comparison cross-country original an presents thesis this , r as rltd o nt o attds n uiy f eair W behavior. of unity and attitudes of unity to related also are , the thesis explains party unity from state and party pe party and state fromunity party explains thesis the , Firstly definitions I ru ta tee s o infcn dsrpnybten the between discrepancy significant no is there that argue I , at government party Secondly of political parties which regard them as unitary actors c actors unitary as them regard which parties political of , the results show the supremacy of party characteristics party of supremacy the show results the , paradoxes of representative democracy representative of paradoxes Abstract s n agr r o, eas o declining of because not, or danger in is Thirdly

te P’ ou o rpeetto does representation of focus MPs’ the , nd behavior. My PhD thesis builds on builds thesis PhD My behavior. nd olitics and democratic and olitics theory. of First various ways to measure party unity party measure to ways various al Eastern Europe. There is however is There Europe. Eastern al ty politics, and further substantiates further and politics, ty astern and Western Europe, and the and Europe,Western and astern

rvey I have conducted myself, and myself, conducted have I rvey the process of process the tem perform poorly in explaining in poorly perform tem ence of parties into a mainstream a into parties of ence rty unity because unity on one of one on unity because unity rty

rs with a positive direct effect oneffect direct positive a with rs rliament, to vote for the policies the for vote to rliament, pry eevs te eln on ceiling the receives, party a f eair n h parliament. the in behavior of ties apply high levels of central of levels high apply ties motne P alct to allocate MPs importance nfcn we od n new and old when gnificant ver, more strongly on the unity the on stronglymore ver, . hrl, h fnig o this of findings the Thirdly, t. is not a sufficient predictor of predictor sufficient a not is this, the thesis touches upon touches thesis the this, the party literature, systemic literature, party the rpdy hn intra-party when rapidly e , s nlecd y party by influenced as y, ls otiue s el to well as contribute ules This suggests that the two the that suggests This a conceptualization which conceptualization a ty on the other. Secondlyother. the on ty predictor of how united a united how of predictor ts. rspectives and advancesaand rspectives unitary party behavior in partybehavior unitary ntne i wih this which in instances e a unitary voting bloc. voting unitary a e Fourthly party formationparty d n a data raw on ed still persist. If persist. still cnrr to contrary , ie nt of unity hile ees of levels ould be ould and ,

CEU eTD Collection Appendix D Statistical tests tests Appendix D Statistical ...... 205 Appendix Party unity study 2007 C ...... 195 andcodingAppendix A Measurements ...... 181 Acknowledgments Acknowledgments ...... i REFERENCES ...... 209 Appendix B Party acronyms ...... 190 7. CONCLUSIONS...... 170 6. SYSTEMIC INFLUENCES ON PARTY ON INFLUENCES 6. SYSTEMIC UNITY...... 131 5. PARTY LEVEL EXPLANATIONS5. PARTYFORPARTY LEVEL UNITY IN EUROPE...... 95 DIFFERENTIATION BETW DIFFERENTIATION EUROPEAN A PARLIAMENTS. 4. PARTY UNITY IN NATIONAL 3. DATA AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS CONSIDERATIONS 3. DATA AND METHODOLOGICAL ...... 34 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK2. THEORETICAL ...... 8 1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1 tables of List ...... iv figures of List ...... iii 6.4 Conclusion 6.4 Conclusion ...... 166 6.3 Assessing offactors systemic the impact onunity ...... 155 6.2 Variables and data ...... 138 6.1 The structural case theoretical for explanations ...... 132 5.6 Conclusion 5.6 Conclusion ...... 129 5.5 Accountingchange over for the decade last ...... 123 and5.4 Partycharacteristics their impact onunity ...... 107 5.3 Variables and data ...... 105 explanations 5.2 The party case theoretical for level ...... 102 versus5.1 Party attitudes unity of of behavior unity ...... 96 4.4 Conclusion 4.4 Conclusion ...... 92 4.3 Patterns ofparty achieving Europe in unity ...... 75 of differentiation 4.2 An behavioral party East – West Europe? in unity ...... 64 and4.1 Behavioral indicators unity: dimensions ...... 55 3. 2Overviewgathering, data analysis and of quality data data ...... 48 and measurements 3.1 Concepts, operationalization ...... 34 2.3 Determinants of party unity...... 14 2.3 Determinantsunity...... 14 of party 2.2 Representative and democracy party unity ...... 11 of party2.1 Redefining unity concept the ...... 8 2.5 Deriving hypotheses 2.5 Deriving hypotheses ...... 30 2.4 Towards of model party unity an integrated ...... 25 2.3.2 Party level explanations for party unity for 2.3.2 Party level explanations ...... 22 party unity 2.3.1 Systemic of determinants ...... 15 EEN ANDEEN DEMOCRACIES?EAST WEST ...... 54 Table of Tablecontents of

CEU eTD Collection eeie teedul fo ter omns cntutv criticis constructive comments, their from tremendously benefited

nlecd y hnig n te rges f hs rjc oe the over project this of progress They the and enormous. thinking my been influenced has project this of development the to contribution pa political the politics, comparative ways in different interest my In instigated guidance. and inspiration their for Janda Kenneth both to gratitude of debt deepest my express to want I advisors. gr two of help the without finalized been have not could project The it. be to embark able but finish to theendeavor, PhD in experienc rewarding and challenging prime the that is way the I What by. advised be to and meet to privilege the had I have whom some of help the with reality become finally has thesis This the Intune project members for the recent elite surveys data surveys elite recent the for members project Intune the Halle Andreas to addressed also are thanks Many Europe. Eastern of part getting with help their for Tóka Gábor Easter and Enyedi Central on surveys expert additional other for Whitefield Po and Russia on data the for Carey John Europe, Eastern on surveys K Petr elites, European Western on data the for Thomassen Jacques Therefore setting. cross-country a for accomplish to impossible m for which subject a on data new gather was to and sets data project adequate this completing in tasks complex most the of One stimulation. Acknowledgments

the elite surveys in Central in surveys elite the te ad ttsis Their statistics. and rties used in this project. My My project. this in used extraordinary people people extraordinary rman and the rest of rest the and rman e is not to actually actually to not is e ad intellectual and m ws t thank to wish I have found along found have years. My work work My years. sl Eyd and Enyedi Zsolt any seemed to be be to seemed any to get access to to access get to Erp, Zsolt Europe, n eat mentors and mentors eat opecký for the the for opecký land, Stephen land, y have have y have have CEU eTD Collection aine n fr hi aaig upr. hy r te w persons two the are They support. amazing their for and patience political parties.political at fnne n uoe t Mrk yá, ntl Klk n Ma and Kulik Anatoly Rybář, Marek to Europe, in finance party nevr Te hv gvn e oe hn cud ae vr se ad des and therefore dedicated dissertation is this them. to asked ever have could I than more me given have They me endeavor. see to sacrificed who and most the it needed I when strength to addressed is gratitude My family. my thank to wish I Finally, spent dissertation. readingcommenting this and onearlier of drafts acknowle gratefully to wish I and colleagues great a been have who Ma Rosalind and Hetherington Stephen to appreciation My thesis. whole a the complete me helped and stimulating been have suggestions their b always have Pusca, Anca - Birmingham from and Horn, Daniel Lup, Unive European Central from colleagues with discussions The schools. and conferences like occasions various on comments gave also Ilonszki Espí Roberto Rush, Michael Krause, Deegan Kevin Litvay, Levente Lawrence Katz, Richard finalized. thesis this get me helped have and suggestions whose Biezen, van Ingrid like scholars distinguished rec to privilege the had I research the during stages various At ae fee mn isgt ad lrfctos n h Soa, Russian Slovak, the on clarifications and insights many offered have en asahr h hs epd get el ih omns n s and comments with deal great a helped has who Nassmacher Heinz Many Europe. in unity party on survey expert my during and start their for Benoit Ken and Roberts Andrew to addressed is gratitude ii my parents, for their for parents, my thanks also to Karl- to also thanks LeDuc, Erin Jenne, Erin LeDuc, ie edak from feedback eive contribution at the at contribution c Guin who Giuliani rco dge the time they time the dge ndola, Gabriella ndola, h gv me gave who uce i this in succeed nalysis and the and nalysis getos on uggestions good advice advice good rsity - Oana Oana - rsity e fruitful; een n Italian and cLachlan summer erved, CEU eTD Collection Figure the effective in of 6.3Variations parliamentary number parties Figure parliamentary ofparty in states 6.2Mean behavior 2007 unity ...... 145 1996 FigureFocusrepresentation of 6.1 ...... 142 Figurecentralization andchange programmatic 5.4Party the las over FigureLiberal and unity parties 5.3 of 2007 behavior ...... 114 (Rice'sFigure index) by family 1996 of party 5.2Unity behavior ...... 99 Figurebyattitudes 1996 family in of party 5.1Unity ...... 98 Figure and 2007 attitudes unity of of 4.6Unity behavior ...... 69 WesternFigurevoting Europein intention as 1996 4.5Party unity ...... 67 Figurevoting Central Eastern intention as 1996 4.4Party unity Europe ...... 67 and Figure Rice’sFactionalism index 4.3 ...... 62 and Figure expressedFactionalism voting dissent 4.2 ...... 61 FigureIntegrated of party 1.2 unity model ...... 29 of unity Figure achieving mechanism behavioral 1.1Party level ...... 26 Figure unity on party influences 6.4Systemic ...... 165 decade decade ...... 151 List List figuresof iii t decade decade t ...... 126 over the last over

CEU eTD Collection ofTable unity systemic effects 6.8Summary of behavior on variables ...... 167 of attitudes onunity Tableand effects 6.7Systemic party level ...... 162 Table unity 6.6Explaining of behavior ...... 157 Table on party 6.5Regulations finance 2006 ...... 154 dimensions Table 6.4Federalism ...... 149 Table of 6.3Outline the federalism indexes ...... 148 Index Table 6.2Executive/Legislative ...... 147 and systemsTable their dimensions 6.1European electoral ...... 144 unity partyTableeffects of 5.10Summary on behavioral ...... 129 changeTable of over thebehavior unity 5.9Explaining in the decade last ...... 124 Table 5.8Party unity model integrated ...... 122 unityTable attitudinal 5.7Centralization, correl and disciplinary measures per partyTable family 1996 5.6Mean centralization party ...... 116 regressionTable model 5.5Party characteristics ...... 112 andTable unityanalysis: party 5.4Anova family 2007 behavior of ...... 111 perfamily (experts assessTable party 5.3Unity 2007 behavior of valuesTable per index 5.2Mean party Rice family1996 ...... 109 Table correlations attitudes unity 5.1Factionalism, ofof and behavior unity ...... Table2007 based country ofparty 4.4Degrees behavior: ranking unity onthe of regional party 2007 Table and comparison Europe 4.3Aggregate in mean unity ...... 70 acrossTable 4.2Aggregateof Europe behavior unity ...... 65 andTable factionalism asparty (elite 4.1Behavioral votingunity intention expert surveyexpert ...... 74 List of TablesList of iv

ments) ments) ...... 110 ations ations ...120 surveys) surveys) 60 101 101 CEU eTD Collection programs” party unity into unity in terms of behavior and unity in terms of terms in unity and behavior of terms in unity into unity party parties are the instrument through which voters can influence politics. influence through votersparties politics. can are which the instrument aaim n ise a eot ht ttd “n fetv part effective “An stated: that report a issued and paradigm eod ta te ate pses ufcet nenl oein o ca to cohesion internal sufficient possess parties the that second, the which to programs bringforth to areable parties the that unity

Rinehart, 1950, pg. 1. pg. 1950, Rinehart, clarity that persists in many studies. In the present rese present the In studies. many in persists that clarity conceptua the is unity party on literature the with problem The unity a European across and countries. comparative conduct study to this focus to intend I why reasons the of one is This legislature. ba parties because Congress inside unity party explaining in scholars where States, United the in attention more received has parliame or systems, electoral and systems party organization, as such topics to additionally less or more it studied have they t to attention little paid have scientists political European 1 the governing party/parties a mandate for governing, and third, it it third, and governing, for mandate a party/parties governing the e at choice clear a voters gives it First, reasons. many for oiia Pris eae n o te rmr avcts f the of advocates primary the of one became Parties Political Asso Science Political American the ago, years eight Fifty APSA Committee on Political Parties, Parties, Political on Committee APSA ilb te ao ou f h rjc. hspoet concentr project This project. the of focus major the be will 1 . What they emphasized at that time was that achieving party achieving that was time that at emphasized they What .

1. 1. Introduction Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System Two-Party Responsible More a Toward

arch I separate the concept of of concept the separate I arch he concept of party unity and unity party of concept he lection time, second, it gives it second, time, lection y commit themselves and, themselves y commit ito’ Cmite on Committee ciation’s sse rqie, first, requires, system y ntary activity. The topic topic The activity. ntary ey xs otie the outside exist rely attitudes. attitudes. were more interested interested more were l overlap and lack of of lack and overlap l party decline, party decline, party responsible parties parties responsible makes sure that the that sure makes eerh n party on research ts n h overt the on ates r ot these out rry unity matters matters unity , New York: , Behavioral CEU eTD Collection predominate, united party behavior (particularly in the legisla the in (particularly behavior party united predominate, behavior of the party, how the party acts in the legislature, i legislature, the in acts party the how party, the of behavior parties will need to be compared across countries. Also the sel the Also countries. across compared be to need will parties Europea Those Europe. Eastern Central and Western from parties elite surveys. precis more availability, data to pertaining reasons with do to researc the Therefore analysis. the in inc democracies European to also order in 1996-2007 is used time-frame The legislatures. r have which parties relevant electorally the only investigates ava data and collection data to pertaining reasons For level. elite its to regards with legislature the outside party the of unity leg the in MPs the of behavior the only not explain to is goal the pa the of unity the about model integrated an proposes thesis This identifi and determinants unity. of party behavioral explains that model a construct to aims research the p where Europe, in Especially splits. experiences it if or eot n Lvr 07 cn lc tesle ad h pris n h l the on parties the f the by justified is selection country for criterion This continuum. and themselves place can 2007) Laver and Benoit Whitef and Rohrschneider 2006, al. et (Klingemann experts country the and in meaning, a has scale left-right the which in selected

the sense that the elite, masses elite, the that sense the policies, though only at the the at onlythough policies, f it is factionalized or not, or factionalized is it f h focuses on the political political the on focuses h ture) matters. Therefore matters. ture) rimnain systems arliamentarian ection of countries has has countries of ection ely the availability of of availability the ely peettvs n the in epresentatives islature, but also the also but islature, act that the political the that act rty per se, therefore se, per rty ilability the project the ilability cutis are countries n s h possible the es lude the new new the lude ield 2007, 2007, ield eft-right CEU eTD Collection voters reward or punish it at the polls as a team. Only if ea if Only team. a as polls the at it punish or reward voters toge acts party the if Only ambiguous. is mandate electoral c very the [unity] cohesion without because indeed and action effective the translating of incapable prove may they otherwise “because par The unity. party to related much very is representatives The in party Europe? unity of are What the determinants Research question: ihr n em o attd o i trs f eair i essentia is behavior, of terms in or attitude of terms in either theories government coalition and theory change party organization, liter the to contributes it because important is research The Research importance and justification:Research importance and and differencesacross Europe. possible in regions diff country, same the of parties the between differences find setti institutional national different of and styles organizational progress research the As unity. party of terms in countries and differe the at looking one, cross-national a is study The analysis. w countries the factors), cultural and structure, (elect state system, level state the at function that variables explanatory anal the Since parties. the inside unity of level the measure representation rmr uis f analysis of units primary Vtr’ hie ewe te ate ad h eeto o their of election the and parties the between choice Voters’ .

are political parties, since the major purpose is to to is purpose major the since parties, political are

ch candidate advocates the advocates candidate ch ysis will introduce some introduce will ysis erences across countries across erences hr s ta, a the can team, a as ther es, because of different of because es, ill become part of the the of part become ill ngs, I would expect to expect would I ngs, rl ytm political system, oral ties should be united united be should ties ature regarding party party regarding ature nces between parties parties between nces ir mandates into into mandates ir l for for l . Party unity, unity, Party . oncept of an an of oncept political political

CEU eTD Collection stability program into governmental policies”. program policies”. governmental into popularity is related to a positive party image. Lack of pa of Lack image. party positive a to related is popularity politicians in rival parties may wish to probe into in order in into probe to wish may parties rival in politicians Party unity is related torelated is unity Party Another aspect with which the topic is associated is is associated is topic the which with aspect Another only the party one factions. of parli has factions many has that party a when is occur may misrep when situation specific A 3). 1980: (Katz all” at mandate have to said be truly cannot election an met, is condition this unless copartisans his with act to trusted be can and policies same ochsv oe n pry oein s fco ta “nbe te pa the “enables that factor a is cohesion party and one noncohesive better govern to supposed is contends, 304) (1970: Ozbudun as party, (united) performance for predictor good a as regarded is cohesion group and h gvrmn o opsto se t eae s oeie entities cohesive as behave to seek opposition or government the oeec o pris n eln wt hr plc cocs ht the that choices policy hard with dealing in parties of coherence pre is It commitments. policy central its of sincerity the pol its in have may voters confidence less the divided, as itself p a more “The holding. office ultimately, and performance government elector party’s the name”, “brand party’s the 2002), (Boueck image eyes moderately et al. of 1999: at (Kitschelt least sophisticated voters” . Party unity is perceived as necessary to the delivery of of delivery the to necessary as perceived is unity Party . the parties’ public image public parties’ the

. Parties in the parliament, parties in in parties parliament, the in Parties . government performance and and performance government iey hs optne and competence this cisely rty unity can damage party party damage can unity rty amentarians who belong to to belong who amentarians to discredit a party in the in party a discredit to to carry them out […] out them carry to icy-making ability and and ability icy-making efficient government government efficient resentation of voters of resentation because a party’s party’s a because asmda and mass-media given anyone a anyone given 136,137). al expectations, expectations, al rty to enact its its enact to rty . A cohesive cohesive A . arty presents arty than a a than CEU eTD Collection between 1965-1997. between 1965-1997. highly be to found were voters the among unity party of perceptions unity parties, across and regions. countries diffe for accounts what also, and unity, party for conditions sufficient which assess to are, unity party behavioral of determinants the challengi more even is it level, European the at However, 350). 2008: (Janda 1990s late until up manifested parties American explain of disunity to trying constantly been have Scholars literature. the unit party on focus the with project, present the legislators, behavior the to attention more paid topic the on research the Since their electoral support. they if environment political and social the in changes to adapt and org some maintain must it continue, to is party a “if that argue an Rose survival. party for necessary is party the of cohesion m that suggests elections), contest to order in organization an maintain Research on Research h maue o pry ouaiy o te osraie n Labour and Conservative the for popularity party of measures the also showed that disunity has a damaging damaging a has disunity that showed also beha and ideologically more Americanvoters. of eyes the in value more having party homogeneous the 13); 2001: (Grynavski party” unified heavil more rely “voters that revealed studies empirical Some party declineparty (significant electoral decrease) and decrease) electoral (significant

5 effect on the party’s electoral success electoral party’s the on effect

y in Europe, will balance will Europe, in y y on the label of a more more a of label the on y party failure failure party d Mackie (1988: 540) (1988: Mackie d are the necessary and necessary the are cohesion” anizational , Berry, Goldman Goldman Berry, , h characteristic the of the American the of want to preserve to want ng to study what what study to ng correlated with with correlated Boucek (2001) (2001) Boucek aintaining the the aintaining et ees of levels rent (failing to to (failing parties parties viorally viorally . The The . CEU eTD Collection at uiy ofr tertcl n eprcl utfcto for justification empirical and theoretical offers unity, party party unity determinants at two levels: systemic and party, and systemic levels: two at determinants unity party n h uiy f eair uh oe hn tt isiuin d. h lat The do. institutions state than more much behavior of unity the on party level, broader a At operate. they which parties in frameworks political of characteristics organizational account a unity, party of model integrated an Ideveloped thesis this In andanalysis. the empirical ge data the about details offersmore appendix the while study, theoretical and empirical the summarizes section concluding The enha or unity party on effect restrictive a have which factors focus of chapter 4. The subsequent chapters 5 and 6 present in in present 6 and 5 chapters subsequent The 4. chapter of focus similariti regional and analysis country aggregate An study. of quality data the and employed methodology concepts, the discusses uni party explain to designed model integrated an advances then and presents 2 Chapter follows. as proceed chapters thesis’ The operate. different giventhe practice in realize to verydifficult is obs own maint also (1999) Katz and Farrell Bowler, later years Twenty our in place can we confidence of degree the in and identify limite are “we parliaments across rules and procedures voting that declared 257) (1980: Olson impossible. simply is discipline pa on comparison cross-national a that opinions early some against endeavor comparative comprehensive a be to aims research This

rules under which parliaments parliaments which under rules and further disentangle the the disentangle further and a theoretical overview of of overview theoretical a es or differences are the are differences or es hs atclr research particular this characteristics influence characteristics model which takes intotakes which model ained that a comparison a that ained nerated for the research the for nerated nce it in various ways. various in it nce d in the trends we can can we trends the in d and the institutional institutional the and detail the analysis of analysis the detail contribution of this of contribution given the variety of of variety the given t chso or cohesion rty hc wl go will which y Catr 3 Chapter ty. h overall the e impact, ter ervations”. ervations”. CEU eTD Collection rcie n rpeettv dmcay Te miia anal empirical The democracy. representative a in practice how state institutions and organizations like political parties ac parties political like organizations and institutions state how overa an offers This attitudes. of unity the on strongly more however, unity. party lowlevelsa of for compensate and behavior often of high of unity level disciplinary and centralization High attitudes. of unity influence part and parliamentarism system, electoral including factors of unity explaining in characteristics party of supremacy model My ideology. party within of congruence lower a w displaying attitudes, of unity of terms in Eur however visible Eastern is difference Central include to research party comparative for r a partypolitics, ofaspects all in significantly different two the that suggests This Europe. Western and Europe Eastern of unity of levels the between discrepancy significant no showed

nd further substantiates the needthe further substantiates nd behavior, while the systemic systemic the while behavior, y financing more directly more financing y ysis I have conducted conducted have I ysis tually work together in in together work tually rules contribute to a to contribute rules ith Eastern Europe Europe Eastern ith behavior in Central Central in behavior p. regional A ope. ll picture about picture ll egions are not not are egions lutae the illustrates ttitudinal ttitudinal CEU eTD Collection at cohesion party en odce o te oi, ih h ecpin f n tnaie study, tentative one of exception the with topic, the on conducted been implication the or unity party of importance the stating by party policy positions) or to roll-call voting solely. roll-callparty to voting or solely. positions) policy on it. There comparativeofon it. st no extensive asparty notheory such unity is and hr i a ocpul vra ad ofso ewe cnet sc as such concepts between confusion and overlap conceptual a is There definition, refer directly to measurements. referdefinition, directly to cl conceptual a offering of instead scholars, most and concepts, the overlooked is step one Often, them. for advanced measurement the to t these of definitions the to relates one first the literature; the latter studies are related only to party programmatic c programmatic party to only related are studies latter the A Latin or Europe Eastern Central on concentrated (2007) Carey (2004), Morge (2003), Kitschelt (2005), Chaisty (2002), Smyth and Kitschelt (1999), recent More paper. working a of stage the at remained which (1970), coal and systems, electoral organization, party issues, decline p political to refers unity party to related literature The the concept party2.1 Redefining unity of unitydesigned be whichexplain tested the will subsequent in chapters. to a advances further It unity. influence could which systemic characteristics investigates and representation, political to relation unity party for framework theoretical a presents chapter This

and at discipline party 2. 2. Theoretical Framework Ti cets w cmo polm i the in problems common two creates This .

arties and party systems, party systems, party and arties hree concepts and the second the and concepts hree s of all the specified factors specified the all of s ohesion (unity in terms of terms in (unity ohesion , discusses the concept in in concept the discusses , ition governments either either governments ition atr ad party and factors n integrated model model integrated n ly Kitschelt et al. et Kitschelt ly rfcto and arification when defining when

party unity, unity, party merica, but but merica, Ozbudun udy has nstern CEU eTD Collection atsn wo oe wt te at ln, n at vts uig a during votes party on line, party the with voted who partisans eairl xrsin n d nt eesrl ipy iiaiy i similarity imply necessarily not do and expression behavioral t used who 118) (1980: Janda line, same the On coexist. should preferences cohesion of that with interchangeably authors mentioned above the time, the of Most legislature. the inside vote MPs’ to refer unit party of concept the use (2003) Depauw and (2001), Parker (2001), Jenkins as defi 3) (2000: Mershon and Heller 3), (2003: Owens with vein similar a In the of majority a which “in vote Democrats (Parker a Republicans” 2001). of majority voting oppose unity party a as or 9) 2001: (Jenkins hy hr peeecs, n ifr ht nfriy n oig behavi voting in uniformity that infer and preferences”, share they of legislative roll-call voting conduct among representatives of representatives among conduct voting roll-call legislative of n attds when attitudes and p to more refer and cohesion, to approach another offer 1229) (2002: Smith prerequisite a are attitudes the that or correlated, always and behavior that show to advanced been has evidence no Furthermore, which votes, roll-call use they concept, the for measurements as ICPP w problem The members.” party of behavior and attitudes the the in cohesion party with “ as it defines Parties) Political (InternationalComparative equivalent as coherence party of On the other side, “ side, other the On positions”. onspecificorganization aagreement within party issue cohesive , all being presumed to mean exactly the same thing: “the a “the thing: same the exactly mean to presumed being all , hn t s md u o lk-idd epe h vt tgte beca together vote who people like-minded of up “made is it when party discipline party

they define define they [emphasis added] as measured by the uniformity uniformity the by measured as added] [emphasis at pormai cohesion programmatic party

at dsiln ad party and discipline party the degree of congruence in congruencedegreeofin the for behavior. Kitschelt and Kitschelt behavior. for ith these studies is that, that, is studies these ith concept is used by the by used is concept the same party… may party… same the s h “general the as verage percent of of percent verage ie session” given are mainly a a mainly are attitudes. n attitudes are attitudes or and in in and or he concept concept he references ne a party party a ne project voting voting y to to y use use CEU eTD Collection bring more theoretical and empirical justification for their empirical statembring for and justification theoretical more patterns. Although party discipline has been used more in relati in more used been has discipline party Although patterns. be a matter of organizational coercion more than of programmatic programmatic of than more coercion organizational of matter a be and party discipline as being different. The difference betwee difference The different. being as discipline party and c party about speak (2006) Roland and Noury Hix, (2002), Smith Kitschelt, Kits (1999), al. et Kitschelt (1999), Katz and Farrell Bowler, (1970), party and cohesion party between distinction a draw authors Few between exists that clarification about the or relationship concepts in 1) 2003: (Malloy unity” party to routes “overlapping are cohesion d both that or 3) 2000: Mershon and (Heller unity party of pa observations and discipline party both that mention briefly studies Recent others define discipline. exactly voting, floor in loyalty partisan denoting as cohesion use conti 1998) Smith b Remington, (Haspel, studies separation Some cohesion. and discipline clear no still is there legislature, the inside as 18; o ad cubn 19) n te eut s h Ms uiid vot unified MPs’ the is result the and 1993) McCubbins and Cox 1988; Marsh inside discipline tight in materialize may privileges) holding policy of loss defeat, F (electoral disobedience unity. of consequences party with interchangeably used are cohesion and discipline besides and, 2002) Rakušanova and (Linek parliament the inside vote unified used carrots and sticks the as to referred also is the Discipline vote party same the of “members when Mers disciplined are and contend, Heller as parties, Parliamentary 859). 2000: (Kitschelt

in order to maintain the maintain to order in the party (Gallagher and and (Gallagher party the etween the concept of of concept the etween n the above mentioned above the n ents. ents. eeis r f office of or benefits on to party behavior behavior party to on discipline. Ozbudun Ozbudun discipline. without too much too without -depth research to -depth h sm wy as way same the t chso are cohesion rty o (00 3) (2000: hon hl (2000), chelt iscipline and iscipline same way”. way”. same a o the of ear cohesion” ohesion ohesion nue to nue this, this, ing ing CEU eTD Collection by different party members (result behavior) and a relation a and behavior) (result members party different by party factionalism andparty otherwriting actionsfactionalism or such MPs’ le as petitions at, n cnie atn dsiln a a opnn o pry beha party of component a as discipline acting consider and party, eair I odr o vi ay ofso o cneta ad esrmn over measurement and conceptual or confusion any avoid to order In behavior. What needs to be clarified is that party discipline has two c two has party discipline that is clarified be to needs What of voting the inside legislature. di while members/representatives, party of preferences the that is subscribes, thesis this of author the which to concepts, ie ipsn dsilnr maue) I ohr od oe ol spea could one words other discipline organizational In measures). disciplinary imposing (i.e. otherwisewould not ways in do he act to obliging the other when is member one party representation their opinion with regards to their party policies, and part and policies, party their to regards with opinion their respecti representatives, party of convergence ideological the at uiy epesd ihr s tiue r s eair i e is behavior, as or attitude as either expressed unity, Party 2.2 Representative party unity democracy and encompasses more than the voting behavior of MPs in the legislature the in MPs of behavior voting the than more encompasses Behaviora legislature. the inside conduct party of uniformity denotes f raiainl icpie maig h dsilnr maue im measures disciplinary the meaning discipline, organizational of two aspects of it to be scrutinized: unity in terms of attitude of terms in unity scrutinized: be to it of aspects two conc the for overall made be to has clarification same The party. political laws bymeaning of on the same MPs voting similar this thesis clearly differentiates between party between differentiates clearly thesis this Vtr’ hie ewe te ate ad h eeto o their of election the and parties the between choice Voters’ . and acting discipline acting

. In my analysis I will use the concept concept the use will I analysis my In . unity of attitudesof unity y ept of party unity. There are There unity. party of ept scipline denotes uniformity denotes scipline omponents: similar actions similar omponents: unity of behaviorof unity of power within the party the within power of cohesion is in relation to to relation in is cohesion s and unity in terms of terms in unity and s vely the uniformity of of uniformity the vely snil for ssential –

wih represents which oe wti the within posed . It also includes also It . tters. tters. l party unity unity party l irl unity, vioral – which – political k of of k lap,

CEU eTD Collection orderin caninterests as advance (trustee), to an act they their ombudsman. or thei use can they (delegate), do to them told represented the what do distribution the characteristic, demographic the mirror can they of actions the for As MP. individual the or party, constituency the party the or citizens, whole a as parliament the be can individual representative The organization. party, the of voters citizens, of of citizens the all be can represented the answers: several quest every For 42) 2005: (Katz represented? the represent to order repres the is what and represent ask to going may is who represented, one what representation, to comes it when But 1999). al. et r is democracy Kitschel 2000a, Koole Heidar107,and 2002: Ankersmith 42, 2005: (Katz democracy modern that scholars between agreement is There onefactions. of the party parliamentaria has factions, many has that party, a when occur misrepr of instance specific A 3). 1980: (Katz all” at mandate have to said be truly cannot election an met, is condition this unless copartisans his with act to trusted be can and policies same ea if Only team. a as polls the at it punish or reward voters toge acts party the if Only ambiguous. is mandate electoral c very the [unity] cohesion without because indeed and action effective the translating of incapable prove may they otherwise “because par The unity. party to related much very is representatives

a country, particular groups particular country, a ch candidate advocates the advocates candidate ch esentation of voters mayvoters of esentation hr s ta, a the can team, a as ther entative going to do in do to going entative to carry them out […] out them carry to ns who belong to only only to belong who ns ties should be united united be should ties of opinions, they can can they opinions, of , the national party, national the , the representative, the ir mandates into into mandates ir ion there can be can there ion given anyone a anyone given r own judgment judgment own r epresentative epresentative oncept of an an of oncept membership s wo is who is: t t CEU eTD Collection potential electorate, while leaders of the party as membe as party the of leaders while electorate, potential represent of attainment the ensure to order in party political use ny n can f eeain wih s rm h vtr t ter e their to voters the from is which delegation, of chain one only pursue hn h tute Floig rm hs pry nt apas s ne a as appears unity party this, from Following trustee. the than the of representative as delegate the and 21) 2003: Bergman Müller, a more speak theorists democracy representative trustee, a or r the whether about debate established long a is there While 353).2004: the and citizens the between link the as acts which t MP individual is it case later the In programmes. party their repr through put parties political level national the at while voters, t or trustee di the is of MP the level, speak individual the can At representation. we Therefore lists. open or districts member a not is overall electorate the or constituency the in electorate betwee link the lists, electoral closed of case the In situation. impor an plays structure ballot The voting. been have citizens the part the to linked more is level individual the at Representation iey o ok nad twr te urn mmes” hrfr differ Therefore members.” current the toward inward, look to likely least at or whole, a as society the towards outward, look to likely g in party the of leaders that emphasize 5), (1994: Mair and Katz can of servants. civil continue the level upto chains the although 20), 2003: Bergman Müller, (Strøm, representatives h acutblt pnsmn o nt en r-lce. h present The re-elected. being not of punishment accountability the

rship organization are more more are organization rship ation and in order to avoid to order in and ation epresentative is a delegate delegate a is epresentative he party rather than the the than rather party he n the elected MP and the and MP elected the n bout delegation (Strøm, delegation bout snain n practice in esentation y or the MP for who for MP the or y overnment “are more “are overnment s close as in single single in as close s he delegate of his his of delegate he toward the party’s the toward est isd the inside cessity frn lvl of levels fferent tant role in this this in role tant tt (Kopecký state research will will research of delegation delegation of iie rather citizen n opinions ent lected lected CEU eTD Collection behavior inside the party and in parliament may depend on their per their on depend may parliament in and party the inside behavior organization or other party traits to party unity. As in most cas most in As unity. party to traits whic party other or literature organization the also and unity to institutions state links which discuss I determinants. its and unity party of overview theoretical This explanations. micro and macro or explanations, level party and cl be also could determinants the analysis, of level and arguments on Depending chapters. subsequent the in shown be will as impact, impac long-term or short-term their to according influence, negative acc classified be can unity party influence which factors The party unity 2.3 Determinants of game. were and the democratic rules with MPs of familiar fully the not Centra was democracy since 1990s the early the during behavior explaining legislators’ to relevant be may variable explanatory or party national the groups, interest or social specific voters the all voters, direct their - represent they exactly ersnain ptnil xlntr vral fr at b party for variable explanatory potential a representation perc MPs’ the consider therefore I process. representation the acknowl also I research this in democracy, representative a in are parties how about requirements normative the from Departing legislature. the affect may this party, the of faces the between overlap t of faces different between exist may representation about

the nation as a whole. This This whole. a as nation the he party and if there is an is there if and party he ording to their positive or positive their to ording , the constituency party, party, constituency the , at’ bhvo i the in behavior party’s edge the supply side of of side supply the edge ehavioral unity. MPs’ MPs’ unity. ehavioral eptions about political about eptions es, these factors have have factors these es, expected to behave to expected assified into system into assified in its early phases phases early its in section presents a presents section t, strong or weak weak or strong t, ception of whom of ception -at European l-East the scholarship scholarship the h relates party party relates h their specific specific their CEU eTD Collection been treated separately in relation to unity, the aim is to ar to is aim the unity, to relation in separately treated been ate (e 16: 3) eas o is eetaiig fet n t on effect decentralizing its of because 334) 1964: (Key parties parliamentarian), the type (structure) of state (federal (federal state of (structure) type the parliamentarian), parties count more than the local and regional parties in a unita a in parties regional and local the than more count parties that seems It governmental developed”. originally parties when prevailing the particularly organization, governmental parallel hois ihih te oe f h pltcl ytm ete pr (either system political the of role the highlight theories determining/influe in factors level state of role the emphasize ei te icsin ih the with discussion the begin I partywhich explains unity. ln te ae ie, pti (97 3) rud ht pry organi “party that argued 32) (1967: Epstein lines, same the Along Federalism party unity of 2.3.1 Systemic determinants (two-party,naturehalf or two-and-a s system multi-party of the party list to plurality district members single (from system generalizations. sufficient make to certainly and disunity for cause sufficient and only the be not may of lack a generated has federalism of presence the Maybe (O policies” national adverse oppose efficiently may government, dom to enough strong is that provided interest, local socio-economi a Thus, local groups. of claims the channeling “by diversity encourage regiona of result the as perceived usually is state of form s n o te atr otn lmd o te o chso i Amer in cohesion low the for blamed often factors the of one is ar lvl xlntos (systemic) explanations level macro

proportional representation), the the representation), proportional or unitary), the type of electoral of type the unitary), or l diversity and may further may and diversity l rive at an integrated model model integrated an at rive unity in US parties but it it but parties US in unity in a federal system, state state system, federal a in ncing party unity. These These unity. party ncing ry state. The federal federal The state. ry zbudun 1970: 355). 1970: zbudun the US case is not not is case US the he party system. system. party he ystems). zation tends to to tends zation which mainly which inate the state state the inate sdnil or esidential organization organization interest c ican CEU eTD Collection parliament nor the executive can put an end to the legal exi legal the to end an put can executive the nor parliament syste presidential in But cabinet. the change to and form to power be either a a either be party unity. party unity. partie political consequently, and, polity the in decentralized be that appears It centralization. party and federalism between government alaetr sses ed o at unity party to lead systems Parliamentary major enjoy legislature. not does it if even office in remain executive the the relationship between the legislative and executive authoritie executive and legislative the between relationship the unity party for importance have does that factor constitutional A existence of a formal federal structure does not necessarily not does structure federal formal a of existence result this for offered Tan that explanation The arguments. Key’s in is which power, of concentration and centralization party more rela reverse a found have 44), 2000: (Tan studies cross-national Recent hrfr frhr eerh s edd n re t caiy h i the clarify to order in needed is research further therefore empir on based not is explanation his Still, power. decentralize He looks at party cohesion legislature( partythe atinside Helooks cohesion w to observed be can members group situation, given 2 to in put side other the and power of out turned party their see tha mean also can but issues, particular on leaders their oppose this parliament, in party their against vote parliament the of me certain If 355). 1970: (Ozbudun government” the in confidence of questions

Ozbudun (1970: 305) uses party cohesion asa synony cohesion 305) partyuses (1970: Ozbudun .

In the case of parliamentary systems, the parliamentary m parliamentary the systems, parliamentary of case the In alaetr, rsdnil r sm-rsdnil om of form semi-presidential a or presidential parliamentary,

behavioral unity) and measures behavioral and unity)level roll-ca its by ork together for the group’s goals in one and the s the and one in goals group’s the for together ork

m for party unity and defines it as “the extent to to extent as “the defines it and unity forparty m 16

2 “by making a great many roll-call roll-call many great a making “by imply that power will also will power that imply stence of the other, hence hence other, the of stence federalism contributes to contributes federalism means not only that they that only not means pc o fdrls on federalism of mpact s. This structure mightstructure This s. t they are “willing to “willing are they t defeat the particular the defeat in the legislature is is legislature the in wl nt ae to have not will s t spot n the in support ity was that the very the that was cl vdne and evidence ical contradiction with with contradiction s nihr the neither ms, ajority has the the has ajority ll votes. votes. ll which, in a in which, tionship tionship ame way”. ame mbers CEU eTD Collection parliamentary democracy and argues that “parliamentary dem “parliamentary that argues and democracy parliamentary disc and cohesion of importance the acknowledges 94) (1997: Sartori party. extensive controlexecutive the partyand parliamentary leaders benefits of executive power exercised by their party and, of c of and, party theirby exercisedpower executive of benefits pr In state. parliamentarian a of conditions the under parliament majority government’s the when especially 11), 1965: (Ranney bill” in any of its many varieties – unless it is served by by served is it unless – varieties many its of any in This unity. behavioral party strengthen to instrument effective sys parliamentary the with associated dissolution of power The (Epstein 1956: position 361, 376). holdingwith a ministerial constit is body legislative the of membership USA, the as such pr some in comparison, By parliamentarians. its among offices distribut to power has the theparty majority of systems, the leadership is leadership party the to loyal remain to MP an for reason (Epst office in leadership its maintain to fails party the decide to behave against their party line, they might lose their lose might they line, party their against behave to decide par of question the is consider must MP each that aspect One unity. b for incentives rational provides instead government Parliamentary party. immediately consequences their for causing negative legisl party’s their against vote can legislators the however, against vote to choose parliamentarians few why for explanation one duration, and appropriate incentives) into being relatively cohesive relatively being into incentives) appropriate and duration, bee have that parties say, to is that original] in [emphasis

ein 1964: 56). Another rational Another 56). 1964: ein parliamentary fit fit parliamentary ourse, electoral fortune iffortune electoral ourse, n socialized (by failure, failure, (by socialized n ocracy cannot perform – perform cannot ocracy ht i parliamentary in that, over the parliamentary the parliamentary over tv porm without program ative utionally incompatible incompatible utionally share of the obvious the of share power may give the the give may power sdnil systems, esidential tem is seen as an an as seen is tem sdnil systems esidential and/or disciplined disciplined and/or ty loyalty. If they If loyalty. ty is small. This is This small. is e the ministeriale the hvoa party ehavioral their party in in party their ipline for for ipline parties, CEU eTD Collection party or moderate multiparty systems. Because the partie the Because systems. multiparty moderate or party party system or parliamentary system) has a bigger impac bigger a has system) parliamentary or system party party discipline is connected to parliamentary voting. connectedparty parliamentary is to voting. discipline parliamentary systems’”. Sartori is not very not Sartori what is in specific parliamentary part systems’”. bodies… [And] disciplined parties are a a are parties disciplined [And] bodies… can afford to vote against the act majority their if this party. caus canagainst of Even afford vote to parlia government, the in be always may spectrum ideological the incentives for behavioral party unity inside the legislature the inside unity party behavioral for incentives the typol (1990) Sartori’s mind in bearing multipartism, extreme In fra and voice exit legislators formcan will other express not whoparties. system party high to lead actually legislatures the in enforce to used rules the that argues and causation of chain the on brings (2008) Subramanian effect. joint a have factors two the (Epstein 1967, Sartori 1997), but it is still not clear which of the t the of which clear not still is it but 1997), Sartori 1967, (Epstein mainta to has party majority the because high be to expected sys parliamentary two-party In reversed. are fragmentation unity party relating arguments the considered, are dimensions other criterion numerical the besides when, But cohesion. intra-party p homogeneous more and smaller produce systems multi-party that ( Patterson and Loewenberg (1970), Schneier and Turner contradictory. syst political a within parties of number the Considering unity. systemparty of type The does not give any specific definition of party discipline either discipline party of definition specific any give not does that functions in a country has also been related to party to related been also has country a in functions that

18 necessary condition condition necessary

s situated in the center of the the of center the in situated s t on party unity, or whether or unity, party on t mnain bcue the because gmentation, are weaker than in two- in than weaker are mentary representatives representatives mentary in itself in government government in itself in a different perspective different a , he only specifies that that specifies only he , tems, party unity is is unity party tems, y means and cohesion ogy of party systems, systems, party of ogy o te wrig of ‘working the for ie fragmentation), (i.e. high party cohesion cohesion party high m te lis are claims the em, wo variables (two- variables wo arties with greater with arties to party system system party to es a reshufflees 99 argue 1979) CEU eTD Collection particular issue. Similarly to a two-party parliamentary two-party a to Similarly issue. particular alaetr/rsdnil ytm, hn h ifrne i re in inferences the then system), parliamentary/presidential s party a defining in if, evident: thus is predictions the between hs a, h primnain o te etr ate cn mani can parties center the of parliamentarians the way, this for prestige or power of loss a mean not does it cabinet, the of According to theorists of theorists to According on unsolved. influence system party of problem the leaves polari which change, as (such added are criteria numerical besides dimensions The 360). 1970: (Ozbudun system two-party the of case the in as unity, hi generate should that government in alternation of possibility the na bipolar the is It unity. party for incentives creates also op an and party major one or parties, of blocs two with system (1980) undertook an extensive study into the influence of preferential vot preferential of influence the into study extensive an undertook (1980) decl are candidates which in order the determine might party, that vote, preferenceseparaterepresentation, aproportional With and Shugart 1989). the at party the to the attached less MPs the makes case, constituency latter the in because, majority or plurality using member single than parties united more generate to expected proportiona list Party unity. party to related are structure magnit district the formula, electoral the 1995), Shugart and Carey electoral systems electoral

(Katz 1980, Taagepera and Shugart 1989, Shugart and Taagepera 1980, (Katz system, a moderate multiparty moderate a system, ture of the party system and and system party the of ture cast by electors choosing electors by cast rpeetto (R is (PR) representation l central level (Taagepera level central district systems (SMD) systems district et hi dset n a on dissent their fest posing bloc of parties, of bloc posing lation to party unity unity party to lation eainhp ih the with relationship the center parties. In parties. center the gh behavioral party party behavioral gh ared elected. Katz Katz elected. ared ude and the ballot ballot the and ude nt altogether unity se, other ystem, ing on party party on ing ain or zation, difference CEU eTD Collection alaet a b peitd rm itit antd, h possi the magnitude, district from predicted be can parliament propositions in the case of US, British, Irish and French partie French and Irish British, US, of case the in propositions rdcin rlt itapry hie o nr-at compet intra-party to choice intra-party relate predictions operationalized the concept as the level of faction of level the as concept the operationalized nt. e rud ht te atr o chso o disunity or cohesion of pattern “the that argued He unity. (the number of individuals claiming a share in lead numberclaiming ain share (the ofindividuals to approach His 4-5). (1980: legislature the inside intern lacks it when 3), (1980: team” a as together 3 hie n te itiuin f eore i te onr” Kt 18: 4. H 34). 1980: (Katz country” the in resources of distribution the and choice taki from refrain should politicians that assumed is it reputation, In reputation. party or personal to assigns legislator each assess to order develop in rules (1995) electoral on Shugart based model and theoretical Carey Katz, as lines same the along Working furthergeneralization. s too altogether was sample The Communists. French the and Gael Conservati British Democrats, US the only account ea into took analysis within parties parliamentary important the all consider not ass positively are disunity party and voting preferential indeed, empiri34).The 1980: ref resources” (Katz mobilizable electorally will fractionalism or factionalism party of pattern the t In factionalization. personalistic in manifested be will this “Indisunited. be to tend will parties parliamentary allowed, t whenever that were unity concerningparty expectations Katz’s maintainingcampaign separate organizations. candidat consequently and fortunes electoral candidate’s a determine

Katz used cohesion and unity as synonyms and accord and synonyms as unity and cohesion used Katz

alism existent inside the party and the leadership the and party the inside existent alism ership party). of the al conflicts and more precisely when parties vote t vote parties when precisely more and conflicts al ad pry nt ws oe n h bhvoa sd a side behavioral the on more was unity party wards

20 ing to him, we speak about cohesion when the “party the when cohesion about speak we him, to ing

to, hc, n un will turn, in which, ition, the case of small districts, small of case the 3 he case of large districts, districts, large of case he exhibited by a party in in party a by exhibited re t miti party maintain to order et h dsrbto of distribution the lect cal verification of these of verification cal s, led to the result that, result the to led s, ociated. But Katz’s did Katz’s But ociated. the relative value that that value relative the he preferential vote is vote preferential he bility of intraparty intraparty of bility ch country as his his as country ch g oiin and positions ng mall to generate to mall es’ behavior in in behavior es’ ves, Irish Fine Fine Irish ves, concentration he same way same he d a ed acts acts nd is is CEU eTD Collection oe rltos r h tp o pry ytm Tee s however is There system. party of type the or relations power at cmeiin a M dsrc mgiue gos s de te v the does so grows, magnitude] [district M as competition, party between the value of personal and party reputation. andbetween party reputation. of the personal value voting on the floor, are the parliamentary specificparliamentary the are floor, the on voting r end the for matter could which and considered not often variable, Another w policy party reelection.” over interests constituency vote to desire MPs’ w years, election in than years non-election in higher be to tends pa US, the in that, shows which 76) (1982: Janda and Harmel from evidence wher systems, all In ballot. the of value the on depending manners, reputation personal of value the “affects contend, 418) (1995: Shugart magni District (1980). Katz to compared prediction complex more is magnitude district the as far As vote). party-level a or vote intra-party single a cast voters (whether votes of types part entire across pooled are votes (whether pooling vote lists), over exercise leaders party that control (the control ballot of vote-se personal influence to considered they that factors the Among ht a ifune at uiy sc a te tt srcue the structure, state the as such unity, party influence may that constant keeps tested, empirically been not has it that fact model their However shrinks.” reputation personal of value the grows, intra-party no is there where systems in Conversely, reputation. oe cs fr niiul addts te pltcas ed o evaluate to need politicians then candidates, individual for cast votes elect the If platform. party the contradict would that actions

rules on the functioning of party of functioning the on rules the other systemic factors systemic other the ocre, hy fee a offered they concerned, instead of multiple votes multiple of instead ballot rank in electoral in rank ballot rl eut dpn on depend results oral hich may “reflect the “reflect may hich legislative-executive e o candidates), or ies optto, s M as competition, tude, as Carey and Carey as tude, hen running for for running hen alue of personal personal of alue eking is the lack lack the is eking oe empirical some tee s intra- is there e bsds the besides , n opposite in n decide and rty unity unity rty esult of esult CEU eTD Collection behave. A party-centered system of financing could uphold party uphold could financing of system party-centered A behave. party behavioral unity because like the state institutions or ot or institutions state the like because unity behavioral party party unity with clear causal mechanisms that explain it. I it. explain that mechanisms causal clear with unity party party characteristics: party size, party age, party party age, party size, party characteristics: party Micro level explanations explanations level Micro party unity for 2.3.2 Partyexplanations level favors b when be onvarious party,united to noclientelistic exchanged voting with subsidie of level high Similarly, system. candidate-centered a candidates (Katz 1996) and this may influence the way in which part which in way the influence may this and 1996) (Katz candidates organiza as parties the to directed be can financing campaign el the of irrespective parties, to given or campaigns, election c Subsidies unity. behavioral party explaining in role important ca used are funds the which in way the parties and magnitude their political resources, for s state which the dimension of a importance is considerable finance party that 2007) Kopecký (Biezen, schola Party parties. the and state the between link the shows ofmodel construct the to party aim conceptual a unity Europe. in with framework 90 Hre ad ad 18, ad ad ig 95 Nri 19, aa 2002). par a have not do but unity party to traits relate party These Hazan studies 1996, Norris 1985, King and Janda 1982, Janda and Harmel 1980, Party financing financing Party behavior are, expe is clear the of united and MPs the these strict more rules party the in stipulated be even can sometimes or orders standing groups parliamentary s euae b te tt cn e nte epaaoy variable explanatory another be can state the by regulated as PG) Te ue cn e xrse i te parliamentary the in expressed be can rules The (PPGs). (party level) for party unityparty for level) (party

rgn pry etaiain (Janda centralization party origin,

put emphasis on the political political the on emphasis put take further parts of their of parts further take rs have also emphasized also have rs s could generate a more more a generate could s ectoral campaign. Also, Also, campaign. ectoral her state level factors it it factors level state her tions or directly to the the to directly or tions n eea. Financial general. in unity, as opposed to to opposed as unity, ticular theory about about theory ticular an be restricted to to restricted be an statutes. The more The statutes. y representatives representatives y n all play an an play all n cted to be. cted be. to os the hows

ills. ills. for for CEU eTD Collection parliamentary representatives. Based on his theory, Maor (1997: 137) (1997: Maor theory, his on Based representatives. parliamentary following three hypotheses: “the more “the hypotheses: three following Concerning Party ageParty research thethe legislature in party party is or is size whether for relevant is what membership, party of size B for Except van and (Mair figures membership lower towards is trend current enha membership party small or large a if know not do We open. p on size party of impact the of question the Therefore unity. high large with both Party, Conservative British the or Party Communist a such examples many are there shows, 187) (1988: Panebianco as But small a maintaining by conflicts internal prevent to interest a in is it argues, 250) (1969: Kirchheimer As cohesion. internal favor organizat small A behavior. party in differences explain may ht raiain s ey motn fr h pltcl at i party political the for important very is organization that discipli party to Related theory. the fit could that examples of he law each for but empirically, tested not were that laws sys party and parties about theory extensive an has (1967) Duverger 19). of behaviorengaging valued in 1980: (Janda patterns the in reified becomes and process) institutionalization (party valu acquires it mature, more becomes party a As 19). 2000a: Koole exp is it cohesive more the party, the older the that so elite, was also associated with an increase in the political exp political the in increase an with associated also was the size of a party it has been argued that differences in party membershi arguedparty differences in hasparty that been it a of centralized centralized

[emphasis added] [emphasis number of party members. party of number the purpose of the present present the of purpose the ne, Duverger pointed out pointed Duverger ne, ion has been perceived to to perceived been has ion or not in government. government. or in not ected to be (Heidar and (Heidar be to ected fered carefully selected carefully fered ulc id while mind public erience of the party party the of erience nces unity, and the and unity, nces arty unity remains remains unity arty n controlling its its controlling n membership and membership tems, with many with tems,

the party is, the is, party the formulated the formulated ad stability and e party leaders’ leaders’ party ee 2001). iezen te Italian the s p p CEU eTD Collection political orientation”.political t that presumes government party Responsible government. party party system and checked if the leftist tendency of parties of tendency leftist the if checked and system party performance obligation, that is, who is to carry ou carry to is who is, that obligation, performance reliable empirical reliable indicators. cohesion its higher too general, incorporating behavioral and attitudin and behavioral incorporating general, too 4 Dalton (1985) also uses party centralization when relating party relating when centralization party uses also (1985) Dalton and made which theory generalization impede his limited. any further t for parties Labour and (Conservative case British the on only teste Maor cohesion.” its higher the extreme, ideologically more E Eastern Central the for but democracies, European Western the behaviora party’s a on ideology of influence the see to help would cohe high with associated also was extremism ideological if raiain o aheig ol; ii te organiz the (iii) goals; achieving the to for peculiar organization not values communal or societal is object the First, consensus. intra-party of angles ite teto hs en ad to paid been has attention Little more likely to project clear party cues and […] helps elite helps […] and cues party clear project to likely more centraliz a that suggests 294) (1985: Dalton Nevertheless, behavior. or asexpressed and ide either unity,centralization partyforward link to evide further no and further carried not was research the Still, agr voter-party of terms in supporters, their of representative partie organized centrally that show findings Dalton’s countries, nine elite Comparing organization. party hierarchical and centralized i action of unity their and parliament inside body unitary a as etoe erir Mo (97, rwn fo Dvre (97, tde the studied (1967), Duverger from drawing (1997), Maor earlier, mentioned

ar 19: 3) a a etnie eiiin f par of definition extensive an has 136) (1997: Maor 4 , the greater its leftist tendency, the higher its cohesion; cohesion; its higher the tendency, leftist its greater the ,

of consensus with respect to the following: (i) gen (i) following: the to respect with consensus of at ideology party t what duties.” However duties.” what t al elements at the same time, for which, it is diff is it which, for time, same the at elements al tos gas (v priiain n h organizati the in participation (iv) goals; ations’ organization under study; (ii) the means available available means the (ii) study; under organization

24 y oein”icsin o pry oein oe se cover cohesion party of cohesion:”discussions ty

n xliig at uiy As unity. party explaining in Maor’s definition is too broad and and broad too is definition Maor’s fostered high cohesion, and cohesion, high fostered s agree on a party’s general party’s a on agree s sion. A comparative study study comparative A sion. eement on policy issues. issues. policy on eement he period 1945-1995), period he -voters’ opinions from opinions -voters’ nce has been brought been has nce unity to responsible to unity he parties should act should parties he s often linked to a a to linked often s l unity, not only for only not unity, l tee hypotheses these d ological positions ological rp a well. as urope ed party “is “is party ed eral values, that values, eral ae more are s icult to find to icult British and the and n (v) on; to the the to veral CEU eTD Collection project contains data about political parties from all over the woall parties political from about project contains data prerequisite for behavioral unity. Those parties that have low att low have that parties Those unity. behavioral for prerequisite oiis none. hs i tr wl eetal big hg level high a bring eventually will turn in These announced. policies ig 95 ad n o te idns a ta lf pris r assoc are How parties discipline. administering left of levels that high with was and centralization findings the of one and 1985) King ICPP the from data using tested been have hypothesis Duverger’s eeomn, hr ae ay ntne i wih tiuia homogene attitudinal which in instances st many are early there the development, at and democracies post-communist of context the In an integrated2.4 Towards model party unity of cons to unity explains se. per of the party is aim the and party political the is analysis of unit disre are explanations of type these All elected. where they r the in development economic of levels the and backgrounds, l economic education their especially MPs, the unit for party variables for demographic explanations level individual other be also could There holds. hypothesis still i it parties), cartel and catch-all (towards transformation but parties, mass were parties the of most time, that At 1962. unity. page presentedgraphically is Theon the next figure mechanism in 1.1 a unity behavioral of level high a reach to order in centralization disciplinary strict with apparatus organizational an construct to

s questionable if Duverger’s if questionable s garded by this thesis as the as thesis this by garded rld in the period 1950- therld in period nowadays, given their their given nowadays, rc a oe which model a truct itudinal unity will try will unity itudinal esrs n high and measures project (Janda and (Janda project d mlmn the implement nd vl ad socio- and evels vr te ICPP the ever, gs f party of ages f behavioral of egions where where egions t i nt a not is ity ae with iated sc as such y . CEU eTD Collection ewe, n h oe ad attdnl nt, n o te te, organizational other, the on and unity, attitudinal hand, one the on between, ie gvrmn dfa, a olg te at t ices the In words the future. in other uniform ensure behavior to disciplinaryrules order in increase to party the oblige can defeat, government a like parliament the inside unity of lack the by characterized context the At both. of result the or rules, organizational disciplining the similarit attitudinal the of result the be can unityBehavioral ori its in of acertainly programmatic party than that lower purely attit high attitudi low a imply necessarily not with do linkages Clientelistic party t a in generate clientelistic should and linkages programmaticProgrammatic both be can parties that work to expected is mechanism Theunity. attitudinal no is there discipli that also and unity attitudinal for substitute a be can compensati The centralization. party or measures disciplinary Figure unityParty mechanism behavioral achieving level 1.1 of my model of party behavioral unity asserts that there is a com a is there that asserts unity behavioral party of model my Centr the for especially unity, behavioral achieve to order In

y of the party members, of members, yparty the of nal unity at all times, but times, all at unity nal nary measures are used if used are measures nary al East European parties, parties, European East al on means that discipline that means on , an unfortunate event, event, unfortunate an , pensation mechanism pensation under the assumption the under entation. etaiain and centralization er orientations. heir ae ie i a in time, same dnl unity. udinal , the , the

CEU eTD Collection preferences among the party members, in order to ensure unity t unity ensure to order in members, party the among preferences is the party leadership. Cox and McCubbins (2005) argue that despi that argue (2005) McCubbins and Cox leadership. party the is probab most The leadership? party the or members party the discipli and centralization the increase will party the within the is asked be to question the mechanism described above the From pa of theory the with government. odds at is this stipulates, 50) (2005: Janda as exp cannot coe externaldemocracy. democracy internal always and High levels of the at fulfilled be can process representation democratic ieaue drse mil te usin f drc ln betwe link direct a of question the mainly addressed literature b party on effect expected their impeding or facilitating in m dynamics intra-party and unity behavioral party from far the However, literature. party the within it on impact direct p of determinants institutional the on put emphasis been has There chapter in greaterinvestigated detail 4. in of unity party explaining in important more and higher be may a their longer, for existed have parties where Europe, Western be achieving in role larger a have may sticks and carrots the at lower a to due Europe, Central in that expected is It making. the in centralization party high of conditions in better setting leader the time same the At office. public with associated los or expulsion, warnings, like measures disciplinary are there di cause may which issues out filtering by setting agenda the

systemic variables are too too are variables systemic nary measures? Will it be it Will measures? nary ay play an important role important an play ay le answer to the question question the to answer le havioral unity, while in while unity, havioral a cnrl h agenda the control can ttitudinal homogeneity ttitudinal hvoa uiy Party unity. ehavioral scontent. Besides this, Besides scontent. titudinal homogeneity, titudinal s of various privileges various of s behavior. This will be will This behavior. he leader can control can leader he n h sse level system the en rcs o decision of process ne f intra-party of ense arty unity and their their and unity arty te diverse policy policy diverse te n: who exactly exactly who n: rliamentary xist and, xist CEU eTD Collection behavior which are either direct or indirect passing through the the through passing indirect or direct either are which behavior samefactors, unity). outcome lead (behavioral the to which f paths different be may there that show to seeks research the factors. organization party and homogeneity attitudinal variables: path-wa possible presents model The level. party and system determi possible comprises which 1.2), (figure unity party of model offers research This far. so work scholarly the by offered inst between connection clear party and organization party level, state the at arrangements no sections, above the in explained As features homogeneity. or attitudinal pa through unity behavioral the on factors systemic the of effect m there or features, organization party the of independently unity fa systemic institutional some that case the be may It unity. or in factor party intervening important an constitute may to These factors. importance much giving without unity party and factors

therefore a comprehensive a therefore behavioral unity has been been has unity behavioral ctors directly affect party affect directly ctors rom the systemic level systemic the rom ys to party unity of of unity party to ys achieving behavioral achieving sn ti model, this Using rty organizational organizational rty y e n indirect an be ay nants of it at the at it of nants two intervening intervening two ganizational itutional CEU eTD Collection

Figure 1.2 Integrated model of party unity

29 CEU eTD Collection body. body. explained in more detail in chapters 5 and 6. and 5 in chapters moredetail in explained hypothes these of versions refined A.More Appendix unityparty to relation to going are hypotheses and expectations general following the 1.2, m integrated the and discussed variables independent the Considering 2.5 Deriving hypotheses

5 awith reasoning short after each of them: a hypotheses derived general The democracy. representative a in mode fledged fully a be will result the test, this to subject chapters. subsequent the in refined further and discussed be will onthe partyopinions given theirgroup congruence pol of the legislature in expecte are cohesion programmatic high a with parties Most t expected measurements unity. of behavioral are centralization, of degree high a with Parties etaiain esrs n re t esr ter representatives their ensure to order in measures centralization expect are homogeneity attitudinal of level low a with Parties The same hypotheses and an overview of the factors the of overview an and same hypotheses The 1. 2. 3.

unity. unity. of level high a show also attitudes of unity high with Parties The higher the higher centralization, behavior.The the of the higher party unity Parties with low attitudinal homogeneity centralization. low Parties have strong with 5 . The theoretical and empirical case for each of these infer these of each for case empirical and theoretical The .

es and the reasoning behind each of them is is them of each behind thereasoning and es influencing unity are presented in table A2, table in presented unityare influencing l which explains party unity unity party explains which l d to behave as a united united a as behave to d o score high on all all on high score o After they have been been have they After cig s unitary a as acting ed to apply strong strong apply to ed e ulnd below outlined re dl n figure in odel be tested in in tested be behavioral icies. ences CEU eTD Collection oe sau (n oenet r n poiin. ate ta are that Parties opposition). in or government (in status power behavior than other parties. behavior parties. than other

on unity be therefore indirect. should facilitatingfact the be to expected is centralization above, the in As parties. these for behavior united highly a generate extreme-p ideologically inside democracy party internal Low the legislature. in behavior theunited MPs’ PPG the rewarding more yet restrictive more and stricter The parliament.expected in be to very united h bhvoa uiy n h primn i epce t vr acc vary to expected is parliament the in unity behavioral The et ate ae xetd o e oe etaie ad theref and centralized more be to expected are parties Left 7. 8. 4. 5. 6.

behavior. behavior. th higher the are, parties the extreme ideologically more The level of party behavioral unity. unity. party behavioral level of the representation, of understanding MPs’ the broader The the behavioral partythe unity. behavioral rules disciplinary the and rules PPG the stricter The more behavioral unity. more unity. behavioral government) in not those with (compared government in Parties Compared with other moreCompared parties, parties unity. left with have behavioral 31

or and the effect of ideology of effect the and or r mr uie i their in united more ore ae f ets parties leftist of case rls r, h more the are, rules s ris s xetd to expected is arties applied, the greater the applied, n oenet are government in rig o party’s a to ording eir unity of unity eir ihr the higher have have CEU eTD Collection eairl nt. h bhvoa uiy f nubn pris s exp is parties incumbent of unity behavioral The unity. behavioral broader show representation a unity to but low level of of understanding behavioral point of referencepoint of are expected party show a to level unit behavioral high

than parties unitaryexpected me in states. more to disunited federalism,pa with associated decentralization the Becauseof

in terms of their constituency voters and, consequently, to show a low a show to consequently, and, voters constituency their of terms in expect are districts member single in electedare who MPs higher a behavior. disunited for probability the si parties the bigger The seats. of share their to according MPs elected under open lists with preferential voting allowed a allowed voting preferential with lists open under elected MPs Parties with MPs who take the party program and the voters of voters the and program party the take who MPs with Parties

11. 12. 9. 10.

federal states. states. federal behavior their in united more are states unitary in Parties behavior than parties in semi-presidential states. parties or in presidential than behavior higher a have to expected are states parliamentary in Parties unity. unity. level low a show districts, member single in elected MPs behavioral unity. behavioral sh voting, preferential with lists open under elected MPs 32

ed to see representation just representation see to ed e n h lgsaue the legislature, the in ze rties in federal states are states federal in rties their party as the main main the as party their re expected to have a a have to expected re ow a low level of level low a ow than parties in parties than of behavioral behavioral of ce t differ to ected level of party of level y. nt of unity . . CEU eTD Collection behavioral unity. behavioral unity. behavior. behavior.

systems are expected to have higher party unity as opposed the new to systemsas demo unity higher are expected have to party st institutional higher relatively their given democracies, Older

groups promotefor and to the interests be of MPs certain disloyal their to l the state, the from received subsidies of amount the higher The erae h poest fr letlsi lnae ad c as act and linkages clientelistic for can propensity parties the decrease political donations of amount the on regulations State theseexpected show in hi to regimesespecially are incumbent parties parliam in confidence of vote the with associated power the Given partie way, indirect an in generate, to therefore and par attitudes cohesive highly generate to expected is fragmentation High 16. 14. 15. 13.

The older the The party the higher system party ademocracy, unity. the in h lre te mut f usde, h hge te at un party the higher behavior. the subsidies, of amount the larger The unity. higher the donations, party on restrictions the higher The unity of expected of is behavior unity to be. the higher the system, party a of fragmentation the higher The

pooe o party of promoter a ability and older party older and ability wt hg uiy of unity high with s ower the incentives the ower is n em of terms in ties gher unity. unity. gher entary regimes, regimes, entary eev may receive parties. parties. h party the cracies. cracies. party t of ity CEU eTD Collection o pry nt o bhvo a te cery eae o open to relate howeverwill furthertheoretical be tested. assumptions clearly they as behavior of unity party low strat leadership, issue, (ideological, factions theory, In splits. factions party of lack the party, same the of representatives eairl nfriy s bevd n legislative in observed is uniformity Behavioral party elite,parliament. or, more of the the precisely, members repre party By representatives. party of actions/conduct the in a defined unity behavioral party research is this The variable of dependent behaviorParty of unity measurements and 3.1 Concepts, operationalization theoretical overall partyframework Europe. in how showing works unity an and factors organization party and factors im the regarding answers some offer will parties European the a unity party of model integrated the of test The level. national w which factors other add and organization homogeneity) party ideological and the discipline within happens what on more focus also will earlier stated propositions st some perspective comparative the will only not behavior, of unity party and attitudes of unity distinct the on Based analysis. the to robustness more offer will with completed analysis statistical N large a with 6 and 5 proc and 4 chapter in overview country a with starts study This

3. Data 3. Data methodologicaland considerations 34

olcl votingroll-call in the party literature, but it it but literature, party the in specific examples, which examples, specific ad h lc o party of lack the and , gc ad pis denote splits and egic) nd its determinants for determinants its nd eeds further in chapter in further eeds portance of state level state of portance sentatives I mean the the mean I sentatives at bhvo. The behavior. party o bten party between ion odc among conduct n empirical and d rts i a in retest udy s uniformity s ork at the the at ork (imposing CEU eTD Collection at/onr cn rv t b sbetv. h mr iprat is important more The subjective. be to prove can party/country play an important role in the interpretation of the results i results the of interpretation the in role important an play ate, ic rl-al nlss s vial fr h stud the for available is analysis roll-call since parties, at fcin ad at slt. h dfeec bten spl between difference The splits. party and factions party on very important issues. Deciding which are the more important important more the are which Deciding issues. important very on cohesi party of levels low while issues unimportant on found be may of importance the a that possibility the is to this for reason The vote. legislators paid be to has attention that is data call me be to needs that object aspect One reporting. the verbal or observation upon depends reliability whose data to granted be can Therefore, the time period and the bills chosen to measure party measure to chosen bills the and period time the Therefore, f and legislature to legislature from differ may legislation legislators. accurately measured be can behavior as expressed unity Party orlow onunity when scores ofvery it behavior. attitudes, lowunity very of split indeed if testing of aim the with examples several split party on focus therefore not will thesis The party. each par permit not does however, partysplits of quantification unexpected The decisions. to due suddenly also but factionalism, onl not exacerbated occur may moreover splits Party splits. party to leading may factions party frequently, less occur splits party though Roll-call votes are manifestations of behavioral unity inside t inside unity behavioral of manifestations are votes Roll-call sa the of manifestations different are splits) party of lack votes, roll-call of (uniformity indicators mentioned above the All

olcl votesRoll-call can be examined statistically with more confidence than than confidence more with statistically examined be can 35

s happen when the party has a has party the when happen s n a research. The aggregate The research. a n high degree of party unity party of degree high o te eair f the of behavior the of y e vrrhn concept. overarching me o cuty o country. to country rom exist without necessarily without exist t ad atos s that, is factions and its s, but will only provide provide only will but s, he legislature similar to similar legislature he behavioral unity can can unity behavioral ntioned in using roll roll using in ntioned lack of factions and factions of lack ihn legislative within sues treated in the the in treated sues sus n which on issues a a eut of result a as y a unity score for score unity a on may be seen seen be may on ivity of visual visual of ivity sus o the for issues ty leadership leadership ty CEU eTD Collection party vote in the same way, which may be all “Yes”, or all “ all or “Yes”, all be may which way, same the in vote party in a party signifies zero cohesion. The index has value 1 when a when 1 value has index The cohesion. zero signifies party a in fifty was a that startinga measurement from scale of 100.The 0to this point obtained number the that, After voted. who members party of number on roll-call of each party majority cast the by ofdividing votes the number representative elected of group a of behavior the describe to cohesion) of (coefficient cohesion party of index The and calculatedas is follows: A Stuart by developed was index The index. Rice’s of name the under index mean the is unity party concerning literature the in index The record. public a usually are party, political each from indivi of positions voting the of records the meaning votes”, “Roll-call parties. within dissent identify to and salience their to according areas policy the rank however study unity party 2007 the in experts The importance. issue al not did Europe across available currently dataroll-call

boue ifrne ewe te ecnae f P vtn “ye voting MPs of percentage the between difference absolute 2002) and (2000 Carey by proposed was index score unity similar A research projects. 118) the by various which were considered voted bills all of index average “the shows formula the mean, a as Rice ' sin dex = N N " " YES Yes " " + − N N " No " No " " = %" Yes 36

" − %" No " (Rice 1928: 208-209) is useful useful is 208-209) 1928: (Rice low weighting on the basis of basis the on weighting low No”. If the index is taken is index the If No”. ot aos n used and famous most s. It is obtained by by obtained is It s. s” and those voting voting those and s” those which caused which those ll MPs of a certain a of MPs ll f oein used cohesion, of on” (Janda 1980: 1980: (Janda on” . It measures the the measures It . , were asked to to asked were , dual legislators dual . Rice in 1928, in Rice . is converted to to converted is by the total by total the -fifty split CEU eTD Collection party split off from the rest” (Ozbudun 1970: 306). But this measur this But 306). 1970: (Ozbudun rest” the from off split party flaws. it has measurements these of each But unity. party measuring indicat other developed also have topic, this on worked have who Scholars althoughare Hungary, some states, unicameral. like differe a under elected usually is hand, other the on House, Upper The b as regarded is it because MPs, the in of behavior choice legislative best the is House Lower The index. Rice of calculus the countr each in house lower the by voted bills the research, this In importance. have produces the equa all votes it thelike measure, an Rice as index, unweighted not coalition a or party a represent which MPs of number total the calc are nays and yeas of percentages the where bill, a on “no”

be onthemore same voting. than would side when one party for for scoregovernments coalition of case in where, Lowell’s Europe in systems the apply to use no of be vote would party it Therefore, cast parties both which in those “are specifies (1970: Ozbudun as votes, party “True” opposition. in one and government in one opposit the on depends it because system two-party a in applied n ah ie ta i, vt wee t es oetnh f h voting the of one-tenth least at where vote a is, that side, each on si same the me its of more or one-tenth which in one is on vote non-partya question; were voted who members its of nine-tenths than more

For example, For Lowell’s party votingparty Lowell’s 37 score dates from 1902 and is “one in which which in “one is and 1902 from dates score

eing more representative. representative. more eing example, majorities of majorities example, o opst sides”. opposite on s s own application and application own s ulated as shares from from shares as ulated of parties. However, parties. of ion of two parties – parties two of ion y are considered for considered are y ement can only be be only can ement mbers are found are mbers members of the the of members h multiparty the nt set of rules, of set nt assessing the the assessing e f the of de r for ors 36) l CEU eTD Collection party loyalty index is designed for and more useful in a two a in useful more and for designed is index loyalty party pr the with as But 78-79). 1951: (Turner regularity party perfect between the two parties, one governmentbetween opposition. in in and one the two parties, party. The present research will therefore use Rice’s index Rice’s use therefore will research present The party. Ric the with party) opposite the of majority a opposes party loyalty percentage calculated for each individual MP better MP individual each for calculated percentage loyalty oprn pry upr o nw n rtrig ebr o parli of members returning and new of support party us comparing more is and MPs individual for calculated indexes cohesion and votes a also is votes” unity “Party Congress. US the in Republicans opposition the reflect better to order in two the multiplies te vt-ae maue fr qaig at uiy are unity party equating for measures vote-based Other h idx f at loyalty party of index The

values from 0 to 100; zero indicating the lowest degree of loyalty t loyalty of degree lowest the indicating zero 100; to 0 from values rol on party own their of majority the opposed party other the of part own their with cast MPs the votes of percentage the equals of legislature the in behavior the assess to order in Turner (1951) of scores unity to -government single or unity to or opposition of in scores MPs. opposed as research, this in interest of are of scores Moreover systems. multiparty c have observed countries legislature the inside unity party for measure appropriate majority a times of percentage the by measured is and opposition whi to extent the shows (which score vote party the combines index and 1989) Wilson at uiy votes unity party or h idx f at orthodoxy party of index the (Hurley and Kerr 1997). The “party strength” strength” “party The 1997). Kerr and (Hurley 38

between the Democrats and and Democrats the between at strengthparty e index of party unity and unity party of index e -party system because the because system -party of party unity as a more a as unity party of elcste competition the reflects hybrid between party party between hybrid l call. The index takes index The call. l nieig ht most that onsidering y, when the majority the when y,

each MP. The index The MP. each evious indicator, the indicator, evious unity for each party party each for unity was of the government the of o the party and 100 and party the o party blocs - in in - blocs party mn fo each from ament ch parties are in in are parties ch

developed by by developed Hre and (Hurley fl for eful CEU eTD Collection factionalism at cmiain ciu, r ruig hs mmes hr a sens a share members whose grouping or clique, combination, party party leaders. leaders. party and with recognized leaders) recognized with and icril i te eair f h pry lt (ad 17: 110-111). 1970: (Janda elite party the of behavior the in discernible leaders issues, (ideology, dispute intra-party of manifestations resea present the in concept this of operationalization second The or even by party forbidden rules). Concerning the other measurements for party behavioral unity, unity, behavioral party for measurements other the Concerning

ideological orientations and with approximately the same strengt same the approximately with and orientations ideological leaders, while may be maybe Fact 33). 1960: (Zariski goals” their achieve to party- the within - collectively act to organized are and purpose common and identity defection/party switching and party splits need to be mentioned. P mentioned. be to need splits party and switching defection/party in considered not are which unity party of measures other for As members goals onmatters ofends. concerningparty the achievement and this case a party can be coherent on issues that are not the ob the not are that issues on coherent be can party a case this rather issues specific to attention give that factions concerns If a party split occurs at a time t, this may indicate low indicate may this t, time a at occurs split party a If resear for considered period time the and event the of timing the par of interpretation The entity. united a as behave longer no can they ofbut may t exacerbated a factionalism, result definitely be show not formal formal ees o h dvso o pris no aee fcin wt di with factions labeled into parties of division the to refers Leadership factionalism factionalism Leadership strategic (tactical) factionalism(tactical) strategic (officially recognized in the party statutes, with a separa a with statutes, party the in recognized (officially

or informal informal is generated by personal conflicts between the the between conflicts personal by generated is 39 (with no recognition from the party leaders leaders party the from recognition no (with

stems from disagreement between party from disagreement between stems behavioral unity at a time t-1 time a at unity behavioral than overall ideology. In ideology. overall than ject of debate between debate of ject factions ch (Janda 1980: 120). 1980: (Janda ch srtg) hc are which strategy) , h. ty splits depends on depends splits ty this research, party party research, this ions inside a party party a inside ions Issue factionalism Issue arty splitsarty c rfr t four to refers rch as a distinct bloc distinct a as te organization organization te e of common common of e are an “intra- an are hat the party hat the party Ideological

may or or may fferent

CEU eTD Collection party or (b) in accordance with heir own opinion. The first answ first The opinion. own heir with accordance in (b) or party accordance in (a) vote would they if asked are MPs the party, political parties were asked to rank parties on a five point point five a on parties rank to asked were parties political pertaining to the time period chosen and the data available, thes available, data the and chosen period time the to pertaining professor Janda at that time and the Doctoral Resea theDoctoral thattime at and Janda professor h 2007The A. Appendix presente are and identically less or more read surveys European T answer. latter the for applies opposite the while score unity resear of kind this for available information the enlarged surveys Other measurements that will be used for party behavioral unity behavioral party for used be will that measurements Other thesis’are comparative endeavor. this suitable for not attitudes or she has to vote, but holds an opinion which is different from the from different is which opinion an holds but vote, to has she or hypothet the In legislature. the inside behavior their about was addressed question the 2001), (Kopecký Republic Slovak and Czech Poland, sd o ms o te nlss netkn n hs hss Shlr sp Scholars thesis. this in undertaken analysis the of most for used visiting fellowship at Northwestern University in s in University Northwestern at fellowship visiting s expert The scale. unity the of operationalization same the is case The intervals. time certain considers that b therefore of is measure the andonce at all usually happen not do one from switch MPs when defections, Party period. given a in unity toget splits Party offe they t+1. concepts; static not time are switching defection/party at unity behavioral high also and

6 The Appendix C presents details about the expert s theexpert about details AppendixCpresents The of the MPs as tapped by elite surveys. In some countries such as such countries some In surveys. elite by tapped as MPs the of xet survey expert 6

n at unity party on

urvey was a collaborative effort, designed during m during designed effort, collaborative a was urvey 40 pring 2007. The collaboration and suggestions of suggestions and collaboration The 2007. pring

rch grant from CEU are gratefully acknowledged. acknowledged. gratefully are fromCEU grant rch ih pcfc usin o unity on questions specific with urvey and also a sample questionnaire with the with the questionnaire sample a also and urvey

for party splits. For reasons reasons For splits. party for scale of party unity. The The unity. party of scale r information about party about information r he questions in the West the in questions he with the opinion of the of opinion the with ical situation when he when situation ical ch and made possible made and ch e two measurements measurements two e er would mean high high mean would er are the are etter use in research in use etter i dti i the in detail in d party to another, to party e wt party with her one held by the by held one caiig in ecializing behavioral Hungary, Hungary,

a been has to MPs to y CEU eTD Collection possible for valid data to be gathered for almost 200 political p political 200 almost for gathered be to data valid for possible behavioral unity. In the elite surveys and in the expert survey p survey expert the in and surveys elite the In unity. behavioral periods of time, the early formation of lasting par lasting of formation early the time, of periods La and Europe Eastern in structuration system party h cntuto o a oprtv dt st n at uiy wih al ex forelite survey an than costly andconsuming less be to time less which unity, party on set the proved only Not parties. political European 187 incorporates data comparative a of construction the

it as an intervening variable which leads to party to whichleads variable anintervening asit 7 Determinants of behavioral party unity (operationalization and measurements behavioral (operationalization Determinants party of unity of and attitudes behavior. concep as unity party on data gathered has survey the importantly e the in not variables organizational critical on Europe Eastern a Europe Western from parties 132 for data collected survey The inside the polity. However this project does not fu not does project this However polity. the inside wi do to have cohesion programmatic party determine antedatin repression authoritarianism of nature the electo and provisions constitutional (besides it of o. ovrey a Ktcet n Smith and Kitschelt as Conversely, not. the for voted they whether of regardless citizens, all to costs di that programs policy pursue politicians that meaning linkages, the party buil High is of cohesion programmatic indicate levels that surveys deviation the ofvariable issue posit standard is MPs’ the 1996elite from measur The cohesion. programmatic party of form the in observed poss a considered is it and representatives represent party 2, of agreement chapter in mentioned I as attitudes, of unity Party attitudes Party of unity ishe e a (99, ishl ad mt (2002) Smith and Kitschelt (1999), al et Kitschlet

behavioral unity. unity. behavioral ties, the early professionalization of the civil se civil the of professionalization early the ties, 41 lly explain the party programmatic cohesion but use but cohesion programmatic party the explain lly extended for democracy of presence the system) ral tin America and identified as possible determinants possible as identified and America tin 7 g democratization. Other variables considered to to considered variables Other democratization. g 20: 29 cned “o lvl of levels “low contend, 1229) (2002:

and Kitschelt (2003) studied the programmatic programmatic the studied (2003) Kitschelt and th the economic situation and the education level level education the and situation economic the th present government or government present arty attitudinal unity is is unity attitudinal arty on-line expert survey expert on-line arties across Europe. across arties stribute benefits and benefits stribute be eemnn of determinant ible tualized in the form the in tualized nd 55 parties from parties 55 nd ding programmatic lite surveys. Most Most surveys. lite ample, but it made it but ample, s the ideological ideological the s ement for this this for ement together ions. rvices, rvices, ) : : s

CEU eTD Collection quartile range (the difference between 25(the difference quartile range to sensitive not is it Since measure. complementary a as used inte the deviation, standard Besides party. the rate people few attitudi party’s the of image real a bring not may and values) out to sensitive is it that is measure the of fault Another issue. sta party the where knowing not of result a as be also may this a assign respondents Ifthe space. issue salient a centerof issue mean whose parties of case the in interpret to difficult measure this using when addressed be to needs that qualification One politicians”. charismaor the highly of individual personal volatile cli either linkages: alternative of indicators are cohesiveness

their determinants operationalization: Systemic and institutional amongfor agreement over over stance. policy MPs party’s 90 percent a sc and among MPs, agreement percent or less represents 50 score 1 of period 2006/2007 the for cohesion) programmatic (party unity ideological eac for score a assign please 5 to 1 from scale a “On question: atti of unity party survey expert Janda Enyedi, Borz, the In measure.the faults of the former distribution of seats in parliament is determined on the basis basis the on determined is parliament in the seats of distribution with procedures and rules to refers system electoral The i eetrl ytm eetrl oml, itit magnitude, structure) district formula, (electoral system electoral (i) th 42 and 75

th percentile) may overcome some of some of percentile) overcome may party to the middle position, middle the to party entelist linkage formation linkage entelist tudes was tapped by the by tapped was tudes nal homogeneity if only only if homogeneity nal position is close to the to close is position of electoral results. The results. electoral of r-quartile range may be be may range r-quartile nds on that particular that on nds h party regarding its its regarding party h ir ( e extreme few (a liers help of which the the which of help ules te inter- the outliers,

is that it may be maybe it that is ore of 5 stands of 5stands ore ”, where a where ”, ballot ballot CEU eTD Collection rsdnil Rsi) Fr hs aibe h Ljhr (99, Krouw (1999), Lijphart the variable this For (Russia). presidential political parties entered in the competition. Ordinal voting perm voting Ordinal competition. the in entered parties political (cat structure vote the and mixed), or representation proportional lce i a osiuny, h eetrl oml (ige memb (single formula electoral the constituency), a in elected number (the magnitude district the to paid attention special with el the of dimensions fundamental the considers research present The terms of and attitudes behavior. pa influence consequently may which ele centered, party the or candidate if see to is purpose the variable, this employing In (Lij structure vote and size, chamber threshold, electoral magnitude, f electoral include system electoral an of dimensions fundamental

of the latter on party unity. b will relations executive-legislative of terms in systems Europe forclassification of criteria Budge(2000)and Keman Woldendorp, aoiy, o eipeieta rgms sc a Romania, as (such regimes semi-presidential to majority), parli from range regimes political level, European the At Categorical voting allows the expression of choice only for one one for only choice of expression the allows voting Categorical intra-party device to and this hinder competition. should andparty lead unity singl a of candidates the among preference relative a express have voters the voting, preferential Under preferences. voters’ parliamentarian) parliamentarian) i) ye f oiia rgm (rsdnil semi-pres (presidential, regime political of type (ii) 43

e used to analyze the impact the analyze to used e e party” (Katz 1980: 32), 1980: (Katz party” e amentarian regimes (the (the regimes amentarian trl ue ae more are rules ctoral its the expression of of expression the its Poland, France) or or France) Poland, of the candidates or candidates the of ordinal). or egorical h opruiy “to opportunity the of representatives representatives of rty unity, both in in both unity, rty phart 1994: 7, 8). 7, 1994: phart r itit, list districts, er rua district ormula, ectoral system, system, ectoral l 20) and (2003) el an political political an idential, idential, CEU eTD Collection eairl nt sne t s xetd o ae drc effect direct a have to expected is it since unity behavioral

discussed chapterfederal in statesare further 6. decentra actual the as such measures, Additional 186-188). 1999: (Lijphart form a have states the whether and decentralization criteria: taking decentralized), and (federal 5 to centralized) and (unitary arran be can variable The centralization. party and homogeneity least squares parties S those and Taagepera is fragmentation system party for of employed coalition a by formed is government the usually parties two than more are there states, European system, of majority multiparty a In governments. majority or minority form a are that parties major two by characterized is system parti of number the on based typology (1990) Sartori’s Considering l the on influence indirect an have to expected is structure State manner. game the of rules the learned have to expected are parties the long a in functions that system party a In regime. democratic syst party the since period the to refers age system Party 8 likely of unity.party reveal age to the system impact on i-th component (party) and N = the effective number theeffective = N and (party) i-thcomponent

The index has the following formula, N formula, following hasthe index The

Therefore, a distinction between old and new democracies in thi in democracies new and old between distinction a Therefore,

8 , for all countries after the legislative elections. , for after legislative countries all the (iv) type of party system: party system fragmentation, age party(iv) age fragmentation, type of party system: system state(iii) structure (federal/unitary)

s =1/ Σ(p =1/ i 44 2 ), where,p ), of political parties. political of

I = fractional share of votes or seats of the the seatsof or votes of share fractional = lways in parliament and get to to get and parliament in lways

mbgnt fnto i a in function to began em

n h pry attitudinal party the on hugart’s (1989) index of index (1989) hugart’s and behave in a unitary a in behave and established democracy, established l eea constitution federal al ged on a scale from 1 from scale a on ged n primn and parliament a in no con two account into es, a two-party two-party a es, Te measure The . rsn i the in present vl f party of evel s sense it is is it sense s lization in lization CEU eTD Collection ud’ structure funds’ party members and various donors and lead to a party more united united more behavior. party a to lead and donors various and members party be high to lead consequently could This corporations. business private f obtained were variable this for data The candidates). party at fnne ees to refers finance Party

h ntoa pry ras Cnrlzto rfr t mn aspect many to structure the of nationalization refers Centralization organs. party national the ma decision effective of concentration means centralization Party Party variables: organizational receive from the state during the year and during the electora the during and year the during state the from receive ih usde cud lo erae h poest o clienteli of propensity the decrease also could subsidies High edr ae o te dpnet n h cnrbtos f hi pry act party their of contributions the on dependent then not are leaders organiza party centralized a favor may this high, is subsidies If t centralization. party of through behavior effect unity on party ma finance Party behavior. legislator’s linkages, influencing in importance clientelistic completely replace to expected not Di oriented. clientelistic and programmatic both being parties unity party for important is finance Party received. subsidies t according scores assigned were sample my in countries The fi party and parties on laws the analyzing by and countries some (v) party finance (state subsidies, ceiling (v)(state party ondonations) subsidies, finance (i) party centralization (i) party centralization dsrbto t te at ognzto fr aaig r directly or managing for organization party the to (distribution

h aon (relative amount the , the , selection of the national leader national the of selection 45

magnitude ) of subsidies that parties parties that subsidies of ) rom secondary sources for for sources secondary rom from the perspective of of perspective the from rect state subsidies are subsidies state rect l campaign and to to and campaign l stic linkages between between linkages stic u t rdc their reduce to but he magnitude of state of state he magnitude tion since the party party the since tion o the magnitude of of magnitude the o king in the hands of hands the in king by a small number small a by hv a indirect an have y rest. the for nance , uh s the as such s, havioral unity. havioral vss r other or ivists n em of terms in the to to CEU eTD Collection by the national organs. The most obvious characteristic of a centr a of characteristic obvious most The organs. national the by parties with no stipulation about sanctions in their party statut party their in sanctions about stipulation no with parties and selection the leaders, top of

organization must have a primary role. In a centralized party,centralized Ina role. primary a have must organization national level of the party, and the and party, the of level national is communication of control the level, national the at promulgated and work different in countries. conne predicted the if verifying of aim the with centralization as these all consider I analysis, the In 108-109). 1970: (Janda figure or persons few a of hands the in concentrated is leadership the ebr wo eet rm h pry ie r cniee. h vari The considered. disciplina explicit have which parties from continuum, are a on considered line party the from defect who members re disciplinary to related those rules, intra-party the Among importance here is if they wereimportance actuallyparty official if used they here is the by or statutes party the in mentioned are rules disciplining whether t however inclines implem which party the is it ultimately because organization, balance the Overall legislatures. of rules Por (Sweden, constitution the in stipulated rules those have countries cons to 1995 (Döring whether factor party or systemic debate a as rules a disciplinary is There parties. by applied are they f the detail in asked disciplinarymeasures on question the survey h alcto o funds of allocation the party parliamentary groups)party parliamentary i) icpiig raiainl ue (icpiay measures, (disciplinary rules organizational disciplining (ii) of parliamentary candidatesparliamentary of o h lcl raiain i wih h national the which in organizations local the to disciplinary measures disciplinary 46

by the national organization, organization, national the by are settled and implemented and settled are pression applied to party party to applied pression policy ents them. Regardless of of Regardless them. ents ) considering that some some that considering ) ctions with party unity unity party with ctions es. In our 2007 expert expert 2007 our In es. not, what is of higher of is what not, s. s. requency with which with requency of a single powerful powerful single a of alized party is that that is party alized wrs h party the owards is also formulated formulated also is ider the PPGs’ PPGs’ the ider tugal) or in the the in or tugal) ry measures, to to measures,ry pects of party party of pects be il be will able made by the by made rules of of rules CEU eTD Collection rvlgs wthlig rmtos r vn xeln te fo te P the from them expelling even or promotions withholding privileges, National Council of the party and the National Convention. What is im is What Convention. National the and party the of Council National parliamentary party, if is establishes its own rules, or if or rules, own its establishes is if party, parliamentary party line. party representatives. The variable reflects the percenta the reflects variable The representatives. party Some party parliamentary groups may sanction rebellious memb rebellious sanction may groups parliamentary party Some

aibe s o e i, eaie o at uiy a P i i is PPG a unity, party to relative if, see to is variable the to accountable be can fraction parliamentary a Furthermore, PPGs. ih sae s h sadr ielgcl ieso acrig o whi to according dimension ideological standard the is scale right part which of heading the under families party major the as also This independent variableindependent This terms ofand behavior attitudes. unit more parties makes aspiration government or government into get more become parties whether arises question the although opposition, uni more be to expected are government in are that Parties unity. p for matter could opposition in or government in is party the Whether maintain a coalition government, then it can afford to have some MPs MPs some have to afford can it then government, coalition a maintain part the than more are mandates allocated the If House. Lower a tha trait a is legislature the within party a of size The (iii) (iii) party the legislature in size (v) party ideology (iv) power (government/opposition) status

is operationalized both as theas both operationalized is 47

t can influence the behavior of behavior the influence can t ge of seats held by the party in in party the by held seats of ge the party sets the rules for the for rules the sets party the

left-right party positions and positions party left-right dpnet rm t extra- its from ndependent party members at the at members party ies are grouped. Left- grouped. are ies ers byers e ta toe in those than ted y would need to to need would y ch one can infer infer can one ch defect from the the from defect united as they as united behavioral arty portant for this for portant

reducing their their reducing r, oh in both ary, PGs. PGs. CEU eTD Collection ate’ oiin n aiu ise. etrgt s eadd as regarded is Left-right issues. various on position parties’ based on experts’ judgments (Benoit and Laver 2007) and from other stud other from and Laver2007) and(Benoit judgments experts’ on based party statutes (factionalism), expert surveys from 2007 and eli and 2007 from surveys expert (factionalism), statutes party parties (Katz and Mair 1992), to which experts’ judgments, for bot for judgments, experts’ which to 1992), Mair and (Katz parties

niomn. n esrn ti vral, h rsac rle o dat on relied research the variable, this measuring In environment. have scholars militar abortion, as such issues, other include significanceto recently, More right). - inequality justified market, intervent state and distribution (egalitarian meaning economic an of very and 2000) Huber (Gabel, “superissue” of kind a as dimension, Party unity indicators were calculated using public records public using calculated were indicators unity Party and label organization party to pertaining variables the for dat of one and variables dependent and independent the for data extant on of consisted gathering data of process The data. analyzing c for both methods qualitative and quantitative combines research The gathering, data and analysis data of 3. 2Overview quality data affiliation. as well as dataset CMP latest the in covered year election estima left-right (CMP) project manifesto comparative use 2006). al. et (Klingemann manifestos election party of content the Substantive information already exists about party organizati party level about exists already information Substantive the define to used been have surveys stat expert Party and literature sources. secondary from obtained was index Rice the parliaments’ the on available either were votes Roll-call 48

web sites or, in some cases, cases, some in or, sites web two parts: one which relied which one parts: two y matters, gender, and the the gender,and y matters, the assigned party family party assigned the data (for roll-call votes), votes), roll-call (for data on on Western European Western on on party behavioral unity. unity. behavioral party e fo ms recent most from tes n vrl ideological overall an te surveys from 1996. from surveys te ion – left; and free and left; – ion For each country, I country, each For h East and West and East h ten the scale has has scale the ten f factionalism. of ts secondary utes, a from studies studies from a extended its its extended ollecting and and ollecting ies based on based ies a collection a CEU eTD Collection behavioral unity. Different factors may affect and determine p determine and affect may factors Different unity. behavioral role important an plays causation conjunctural that case the be direct or indirect effects of the independent variables on partyon variables independent the of effects indirect or direct integrate the on focuses analysis the step, this After Europe. levels different of attainment the influence might that factors t unveil to applied method the is analysis regression Multivariate are thesis extensively based. r final the which on unity party on survey expert Janda Enyedi, Borz, me while s expert (2006) Benoit’s Kenneth from obtained are centralization 2006), al. et (Klingemann program manifestos wer comparative positions and ideological 2002) Parties’ 1999). Kitschelt al. 1999; et al. Europe (Miller et (Kitschelt Europe Eastern Central elite the using measured was cohesion programmatic Party Thirteen Parties Survey in Expert Central and East of European Political S easil be cannot fromotherwise. Rohrschneider/Whit data also expert obtained Additional was that information more added have parties European and themselves place can elite political and electorate the empl meaningful to is continuum left-right The elites. partythe fo meaning a has scale Ce left-right the where and countries, European Western is research the of focus the mentioned, already As investigates countries. across variables between these interaction p analysis on focused political well as the as countries. Therefore, 49

political parties along it. it. along parties political behavioral unity. It may unity. behavioral oy when a large part of of part large a when oy surveys conducted for for conducted surveys mdl n tss the tests and model d arty unity in different in unity arty of party unity across across unity party of r both the voters and voters the both r arties, the thesis also also the thesis arties, urvey and our 2007 our and urvey in studying party party studying in tkn rm the from taken e e ot powerful most he sls f this of esults ntral Eastern Eastern ntral tates. tates. y accessed accessed y asures of of asures efield Western CEU eTD Collection oiy n primnay oiis xet wti ec o the of each within experts politics parliamentary and policy Party Unity Expert Survey 2007 Party Unity Expert Survey parties.political with a clear choice of answers on an ordinal scale from 1 to 5. Thir 5. to 1 from scaleordinal an answerson clearofchoice a with them of most and study my in variables key to pertained questions p all were questionnaires The expert. a every to country electronically each for prepared were questionnaires separate Secondly, xet wr ietfe i te esn o pry oiis exp politics party of persons the in identified were experts countries three severa undergone has process gathering data twenty The sample. European the in 2007 December and September of months conducted was unity party on survey expert Janda Enyedi, Borz, The of the an outliers. examination discoveredalso and patterns countr and parties specificthe of examination close a implies the the For robustnesscountry of level. anddescriptions the at partyboth by complemented is analysis statistical The comparison. valid of availability the of because also selected were countries Kingdom. United Slovakia, Romania, Russia, Portugal, Poland, Switzerland, Sw Spain, Portugal, Norway, Luxembourg, Italy, Ireland, Iceland, Hungary, Germany, Denmark, Republic, Czech Belgium, Austria, pa countries: political considers analysis statistical N’ ‘large The lo fr smerc oprsn ewe te etr ad h E the and Western the between comparison symmetric a for allow 1996 based: is analysis the which on periods time two are There

urn dt alw fr a for allows data current rties from the following following the from rties ies which integrate in the in integrate which ies erts, researchers, public public researchers, erts, repared in English. All All English. in repared osdrd countries. considered in-depth examples and examples in-depth and 2007, in order to to order in 2007, and dly, the survey was was surveydly,the were close ended, close were l steps. Firstly, the the Firstly, steps. l rne Finland, France, sen European astern analysis, this analysis, this between the the between d et off sent nd of my my of eden, The The CEU eTD Collection rate. rate. wi account on-line professional a via electronically administered on supervisors my both of names the with up dressed 10 www.surveymonkey.com. www.surveymonkey.com. 9 fr cent per percent 18 almost average on received survey expert T Laver2007). and (Benoit Europe Western in cent per 32 and Europe 23 of rate response a average an received survey expert Laver of were incentives financial no because especially studies, such aver to close relatively a received has Study Unity Party 2007 c already politics party on surveys expert other to compared a On Ireland. and Germany in answers 35 or ex 34 to three Luxembourg in from answers country, to country from varied respondents of number The whonot did experts all to answer first attempts. during the ma our eve posted were from reminders periodical months three the removed during Fourthly, automatically be to option the had expert each furthe receive to willing not were they however If wish. so should is survey the after country each in parties of scores summary fil a sending to and responses your of confidentiality the maintaining comm did we concerns, ethical any In remove to order e-mail addresses. the tied uniquely which survey the to link the provided have we mail is survey the that start the from told been have experts The Europ p in on expert an as participate to Unity them request respectfully Party on survey a conducting are we that expert survey. the in participation solicit to order in expert each to respondents. the to offered beenhave incentives financial no and h gtwy o poesoa acut uig survey using accounts professional for gateway The ie te at ht o iaca icnie wr o were incentives financial no that fact the Given

the thought that it would increase the response response the increase would it that thought the ffered to the respondents, the survey was also also was survey the respondents, the to ffered monkey as an on-line tool is is tool on-line an as monkey arty politics in their country. their in politics arty short and in the same e- same the in and short onducted in Europe, the Europe, in onducted t a ifre each informed has It age response rate for for rate response age 10 om the Central East Central the om th Survey Monkey Survey th opee, f they if completed, An e-mail was sentwas e-mail An e cn i Eastern in cent per ee. eot and Benoit fered. r emails from us, from emails r , n ta we that and e, survey to their their to survey he Party Unity Unity Party he it ourselves to it ry two weeks two ry containing e iling list. list. iling verage, perts’ 9 , CEU eTD Collection Data quality quality Data ratings. Finally, it should be mentioned that the correlation betw correlation the that mentioned be should it Finally, ratings. tend respondents the that suggests which 1.20, and 0 between was disagreem The 5. to 1 from scale a have questions our that given 3, coul we which responses, the of deviation standard maximum the answers, ex different 5 when situation hypothetical a in Statistically, related the not survey. expert estimates to is the number to of respondents re the that shows turn, in This respondents. of number the to related not disagree small the that establishes this variable, another associa is variable one in variance much how express correlations was responses the of deviations standard the and variable) each (assigned scores party between correlation The high. very r their of deviations standard the respondents, more or 5 were there Howev 35. to 5 from ranged respondents of number the in variation the exi disagreement when experts the among discrepancy of degree different by reported information the in agreement-disagreement of c relevant provide that experts of number the as such followed, scal adequacy-confidence the on 968) 1970: (Janda factors several quality, process the In 6. and 5 chapters in especially conducted been has onthe ofbasis The w revealed data results assessment reliable quality avai of number speaking was experts higher as surveyed well. the where Europe Western in higher slightly was table C, appendix (see altogether experts European West and

ment in the scores offered is is offered scores the in ment by the country experts on experts country the by C1). The response rate rate response The C1). et gv 5 different 5 give perts 0.11 (at sig. 0.01). As 0.01). sig. (at 0.11 oding, the proportion the oding, sts. Across countries, Across sts. een the voting unity unity voting the een ted with variance in in variance with ted ent among experts experts among ent esponses were not not were esponses of assessing data data assessing of experts, and the and experts, hich the analysis hich the analysis to agree in their in agree to liability of our of liability lable English English lable er, whether er, d obtain, is obtain, d were e CEU eTD Collection party unity along with other measures based on roll-calls or eli or roll-calls on based measures other with along unity party rel a survey expert the makes this all in All unity. behavioral basis the On 0.60. is index Rice the and survey expert the on based

ofas analysis. theof unit main party with party unity pos on report detailed a offer 6 and 5 chapters Then values. country on based comparison regional a and overview country a with analysis w the prepares which 4 chapter with further proceeds thesis The independent variables. stake at factors the considering by 6 and 5 chapters in tested al are effects indirect some explained, already was it as infl which factors possible as considered variables the of each t allows level party the at analysis regression Multivariate figurecorresponds already 1.2. theby variables to introduced and 1 model includes which 3) (model unity party of model integrated pr further thesis The unity. party for explanations systemic on partyexp on 1 model separate models: test chaptersindividually systemic and characteristics party of effect the testing chapters 1.2, figure by introduced model integrated the from Starting modeling issuesStatistical chapter. go the be next in examined thesewill all not measurements hand hand in esr gnrtd y h epr sre cn e rae a a as treated be can survey expert the by generated measure 53

atr o pry nt. The unity. party on factors so expected and that will be will that and expected so he test of direct effects of of effects direct of test he both as dependent and dependent as both uence unity. However, unity. uence te surveys. Whether or or Whether surveys. te iable tool to examine examine to tool iable lanations and model 2 model and lanations proxy measure for for measure proxy vds ts o the of test a ovides ay for the statistical statistical the for ay sible determinants determinants sible 5 and 6 focus on on focus 6 and 5 2 and mainly and 2 f hs the this, of aggregated CEU eTD Collection begin this analysis by discussing the strengths and weakness and strengths the discussing by analysis this begin behavior. The entire investigation presented in this chapter is is chapter this in presented investigation entire The behavior. roll-ca legislative from forms: many take can MPs of behavior

congruity of opinions with regards to their party policies, policies, party their to regards with opinions of congruity refers attitudes of terms in unity party While attitudes. as b as unity party between distinguish to is unity party towards chapter in explained previously As Europe. Western and Eastern countr and parties between differences any exploring of aim the achieving for patterns the of overview an presents further It p for measurements the of account detailed a offers chapter This ees o the to refers the last section aims to find common ways in which parties seek seek parties which in ways common find to aims section last the part of comparison regional a presents chapter this of section measur these for check reliability and validity a with continue aggregated data. generat unity of measurements direct or behavior towards attitudes mea other and factions party of existence the index, Rice’s in indicat by portrayed be can behavior overt elite’s party The defections other to parties. co MPs’ against declarations public faction, party formal or pa active to parliament, the in question a or petition a letter, 4. 4. Party unity in European national parliaments. A vr atos f h at P isd te eiltv arena legislative the inside MPs party the of actions overt between East Westand democracies? 54

to the party representatives’ party the to ors such as roll-call votes roll-call as such ors rticipation in an informal informal an in rticipation unity across Europe with Europe across unity at bhvoa unity behavioral party surements, such as MPs’ MPs’ as such surements, es of each indicator and and indicator each of es unity across Europe and and Europe across unity laus pry pis or splits party lleagues, ehavior and party unity unity party and ehavior arty behavioral unity. behavioral arty mns Te second The ements. differentiation l oig wiig a writing voting, ll e ars Central across ies ae o country on based to ensure unity of unity ensure to d y xet. I experts. by ed 1, my approach approach my 1, Ta overt That .

CEU eTD Collection eiin. hrl, at laesi srtge cn e changed be can strategies leadership party Thirdly, petitions. votes call Roll (inside the unity parliament) Voting indicators and dimensions unity: 4.1 Behavioral a cross-country valid ensure comparison. a is for basis there will inconsistencies these by caused bias possible for test sa the within or countries across either constant not is activity Furthermore time. election at revenge their take can candidates, p their express who those or districts member single in vote voters Such constituents. with unpopular is action proposed the if su MP and unity shatter can education) loans, student EU, (war, issues issue for account to need measures roll-call using comparisons The aresituations votes. rely accounted not for onroll-call which theby indexes parli Italian (the conflicts internal their given all, at vote policies, sensitive very some for that is measurement this of 145). 2006: Roland and Noury (Hix, superficial only is this reality relatively a show may voting after result The vote. negative a issues to given be can priority parliament, the in setting amendments and initiatives members’ private motions, day early othe by dissent voice to able are legislators Secondly, countries. m issues selected of importance the and 11) 2003: (Owens selective legi a in votes roll-call of sample the issues; all on called Firs ways. various in demonstrated be can measurement limited a are by no means a perfect measure of behavioral unity and t and unity behavioral of measure perfect a means no by are 55

which are less likely to result in in result to likely less are which slative session is unavoidably is session slative ament is an example). These These example). an is ament be carried out in order to to order in out carried be parties may not arrive at a at arrive not may parties me country across time. A time. across country me references by ranking the ranking by references o ht truh agenda through that, so united party, while in in while party, united , the rate of legislative of rate the , , questions writing and and writing questions , , especially those who those especially , r means; for example for means; r Lastly the drawback drawback the Lastly importance. Certain importance. , hy a nt be not may they t, pport, especially pport, y ifr across differ ay hat they are are they hat CEU eTD Collection behavioral unity. behavioral unity. prior approval from the: chairman of the parliamentary party parliamentary the of chairman the: from approval prior but holds an opinion which is different from the one held by his parl his by held one the from different is which opinion an holds but borrowed from political psychology, which argues that attitudes are a attitudes that psychology,which argues borrowedfrom political party it is factionalized without experiencing any splits, one could arg experiencingany splits, factionalizedparty without is it 12). It all depends on the actual moment that we look at them. At them. at look we that moment actual the on depends all It 12). ( parties split the to power and which conflict” “instruments of have division 1995) (Kopecky profile their define clearly to parties help inte an have to perceived be can factions that fact the Besides inside the parliament) Factionalism and (outside dissent voting Expressed dissent voting Expressed mainly in favor of not asking prior approval, that is considered to be consideredto is that approval, askingprior not of favor mainly in legi the If approval”. prior ask not would I or else, someone meeting, he follow his own opinion?”. Or “If you would ask a written question, w question, written a ask would you “If Or opinion?”. own his follow he parliamentary the of opinion the with accordance in vote then he should unity. The standard questions used for MPs all over Europe is: “If is: Europe over all MPs for used questions standard The unity. the in least at proxy, good a constitute does it but limitations situat hypothetical in parliament a in behavior future MPs’ to elite the in questions The 1989). Tetlock 1998, (Eysenck behavior future negative impact on the overall behavioral unity score. At moment moment At score. unity behavioral overall the on impact negative source of conflict has been eliminated. sourceconflict has of been for least at because, manner united more a in behave to expected party new the party, the of split formal a generate actually

ees o h Ms itne bhvo, n i a measure a is and behavior, intended MPs’ the to refers 56

and the remaining party are party remaining the and fcin ae lo en as seen also are factions , ions. The measure has its has measure The ions. , the parliamentary party party parliamentary the , ory, for party behavioral behavioral party for ory, grative function, and to and function, grative moment moment a low level of party of low level a an MP has to vote, to has MP an wie te main the while, a good prediction of good prediction of ue that they have a they that have ue slator response is response slator iamentary party, party, iamentary t+1 party or should should or party surveys point surveys ould you seek you ould we they when , Carty 2004: Carty 2004: t , when the when , CEU eTD Collection based on dimensions such as organization, coverage, and policy/ideology. T policy/ideology. and coverage, organization, as such dimensions on based at cnlc cn e ae o laesi, sus strategies issues, leadership, on based be can conflict party the existence of conflict either in terms of behavior or in term in or behavior of terms in either conflict of existence the facti consider (2005), Bettcher (1982), Hine (1976), Sartori by offered fac of Typologies unity. party attitudinal and behavioral both for fac party considering for justification theoretical is There views reducing thus the splits. danger of party be will factions as behavior of terms in united more party the institutionalization The informal. or formal be can which statute, st faction the add I approaches these To 33). 1960: (Zarisky goals” within bloc distinct a collectively-as act to organized are and com and identity common of sense a share members whose grouping or int “any meaning as factions to refer I factions, of typology cons who (1980) Janda and (1960) Zarisky from Drawing institutionalization. par to party from differ can What parliament. the outside from parliam the inside from factions party that case the usually formal a in legislature, the outside manifest also are and parliam inside operate factions Partyvoters. to obvious more votes roll-call the than behavior representatives’ party’s the closelyleadershiprelated is or issue fac factionalism ideological to interrelate are factionalism of types all contends, 1993) (1980, Janda by unity behavioral party of measurement The 57

party factions party tions as a dimension/element dimension/element a as tions ra-party combination, clique, combination, ra-party , simply because factions are factions because simply , ent reflect the party factions factions party the reflect ent ent among the party’s MPs MPs party’s the among ent r noml anr I is It manner. informal or , or tactics. However, as as However, tactics. or , ty is the degree of faction faction of degree the is ty the party-to achieve their their achieve party-to the s of attitudes. That intra- That attitudes. of s their express to allowed gives a better image of image better a gives tionalism. tionalism. of factions can make make can factions of inls, ie those like tionalism, ts n h party the in atus d. For example, example, For d. mon purpose mon nl conflict onal hese show hese tructed a tructed CEU eTD Collection but not necessarily complete disunity. Some scholars argue that argue scholars Some disunity. complete necessarily not but party behavioral unity and to use factor analysis as another tool another factoranalysisas use to and unityparty behavioral correlate to is this estimate to way One unity. behavioral is what if see to is objective main the as here interest of Inter reliability. and validity their check to is aim the unity, measurements the of description and operationalization the After same the ofassociated expressed voting lowlevels with dissent. measure to are indicators low two with these hand if in hand factionalism, go to expected are index Rice’s of values High keep parliamentto eyes. and the the party in public’s in united t m to finds leaders party the to up is it case party this In mechanisms. the that provided achieved, be can and sought, be will voter in image their and power of position their maintain to order in Janda and Tan Heo, (Harmel, parties” political most within life unit behavioral party of instance negative a is Factionalism mlyd s esrs f at bhvoa uiy I te concep the If unity. behavioral party of measures as employed voting intended and factionalism of level the scores, index Rice The multidimensional. is if the underlyingwhile theconcept reverse happens (Tac structure dimensional one only have and interchangeable almost are correlations mutual their thing, same the this measure indicators by suspect automatically made are interest, of concept portra to used are which indicators, Uncorrelated validity. construct 58

anage the factional battles and battles factional the anage y, in that it denotes low unity low denotes it that y, in nal and construct validity are are validity construct and nal h tre esrmns of measurements three the esrd s ned party indeed is measured , 1995: 7). Consequently,7). 1995: , to check for internal and internalcheckfor to factions are “a fact of fact “a are factions analysis. If all three three all If analysis. i one-dimensional, is t thing and also be be also and thing for party behavioral behavioral party for ey ih te are they high, very s’ eyes, party unity unity party eyes, s’ behavior are all all are behavior y the common common the y e appropriate he 19: 267), 1997: q ees of levels CEU eTD Collection party factions. Therefore, there is behavioral unity even when even unity behavioral is there Therefore, factions. party 631 of total a of out MPs 315 however, instances, all In lines. party indicator All earlier. mentioned as organization, parliamentary eairl nt. t a b ta rl-al oe ae oe ma a more are votes roll-call that be may It unity. behavioral or not, over 60 percentage points of the total number of MPs admitt MPs of number total the of points percentage 60 over not, or woul they Whether party. parliamentary their within subgroups the that declared points percentage 29.5 opinion, own their follow and would who those of Out factions. party no are there that declared who manife is unity party of Lack parliament. in voting when follow about decision their and the MPs, the between by association recognized as clear factionalism, no show 4.1 table the in figures The recognized vote depends other their that factors. final onvarious both deal factions party while parliament the inside only unity nedd eair i ams to ie hge, mn toe h admit who those among higher, times two almost is behavior) intended manifesting MPs of frequency the that is result unexpected The v would they declared but factionalism, of existence the acknowledged A party. parliamentary their inside exists factionalism declar openly voting, when opinion own their follow and dissent would 1996, in MPs those of points percentage 69.4 page, next the on 4.1 table From andprovides 6. The the surveychec expert finalreliability validity and unity party of assessments expert the to compared are unity diffe represent they correlated, highly not are measurements the i common a and analysis factor a in used be can measures these 59

iia pretg however, percentage similar in more detail in chapters 5 chapters in detail more in the party is factionalized. factionalized. is party the d have decided to defect defect to decided have d with the intra and extra- and intra the with tter of behavioral party party behavioral of tter ndex can be created. If created. be can ndex sted even among those among even sted high unity (in terms of of terms (in unity high o bhvoa party behavioral of s rent aspects of party party of aspects rent ed the existence of existence the ed hc oiin to opinion which toe the party line line party the toe k. k. (from CEE) who, CEE) (from re are no party no are re xsec of existence t aog the along ote interviewed h party the ed that ed CEU eTD Collection Note: the question on party sub-groups wastheparty on question Note: of sub-groups part because he felt he could not vote with the government on the matter of matter the on government the with vote not could he felt he because party their own within party). subgroups atoaimVtn neto Follow their Factionalism/Voting intention andTable factionalism asparty (elite 4.1 Behavioral votingunity intention iial Rbn ok eind i cbnt ot vr h Ia w Iraq the over post cabinet his resigned Cook Robin Similarly res MP, Labour Griffith, Nigel example, (for conscience their de MPs which on issues the (ii) behavior; of unity with compatible str or ideology leadership, makes consequently which factionalism nega a (in associated mainly is behavior of unity that reveals of type any with associated always not is and issues policy on that: be could this for Explanations MPs). the by expressed intende and (factionalism unity behavioral party for measurements statistical of limit the at correlation low very a is There TOTAL Party subgroups present Party subgroups non-existent e the admit voting when opinion party their follow who MPs the of 60.2% parli the in bodies unitary as vote parties existence, declared 1990s the in parties European Eastern Central the of most in life perc is factionalism that state can we Consequently 4.1). table compar (36.6% existence their deny who those to compared as factions,

% Within voting intention intention Withinvoting % intention Withinvoting % intention Withinvoting % % Within factionalism Withinfactionalism % Withinfactionalism % Withinfactionalism % own opinion own opinion 69.4% 32.9% 29.5% 26.9% 30.6% the CEE questionnaires df=12CEE chi-square=60.8 only; the 100% 193

depends depends 63.2% 48.9% 34.9% 51.9% 49.9% 100% 315 It

significance between the two the between significance

(i) behavioral unity depends depends unity behavioral (i) party opinion party opinion aments (in table 4.1 below 4.1 table (in aments eived as a common fact of of fact common a as eived Follow the tive direction) with with direction) tive factionalism. Chapter 5 Chapter factionalism. 36.6% 60.2% 21.2% 18.2% 19.5% 100% ge o Mrh 2007 March on igned 123 and regardless of its its of regardless and

vtn dset as dissent voting d tgc factionalism ategic fect relate more to to more relate fect the nuclear fleet. nuclearthe

r n 03 and 2003 in ar ed to 60.2% in 60.2% to ed surveys) surveys) sig.at 0.05 xistence of xistence 33.6% 64.5% 100% 100% 100% 100% Total 631

issue

CEU eTD Collection bills voted, while factionalism is a more dynamic, every-day dynamic, more a is factionalism while voted, bills behavior, with important consequences for the future of incumbent par incumbent of future the for consequences important with behavior, together. go always unitybeha party behavioral of measurements the below,figures Europ Eastern Central the in least at that, suggest results The vote. seen, will entirely how unitedly cannotpredict a party ge not does and process, frequent less a is parliament the in voting Besi the war). Labour opposed Party which represented of the the side esos r at meig, while meetings, party or sessions Figure 4.2 Factionalism and expressed dissentFigure voting and Factionalism 4.2 highestfactionalism. declared level of par the follows that unity voting of level highest the experiences Pol is example obvious most The opinions. own MPs’ on based intentions fact of terms in countries of ranking different a shows 4.2 Figure when opinion voting. they that said who MPs those of percentage the is dissent voting

Values 100 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 0 12.7 PL CZ SK HU HU SK CZ PL 58.3 Factionalism 50 61.3 Countries s xrse mr oel, n ihr parliamentary either in openly, more expressed is roll-call votes votes roll-call 34.4 61

47.9 r a ia mnfsain f elite of manifestation final a are 30.9 85.8 process, which, as we have have we as which, process, ve differently and do not do and differently ve a cs son n the in shown case ean will follow their own their follow will t recorded on all the all on recorded t y ie bt lo the also but line, ty ionalism and voting voting and ionalism des these, roll-call these, roll-call des factionalism dissentExpressed ties. Expressed ties. and, which and,

CEU eTD Collection Rice’s Figure and Factionalism index 4.3 countries are concerned). l (at unity behavioral party of index or factor a as measures justify not does coefficient correlation last the Consequently, 4.3. level the four the for between level party the at index Rice the and factionalism (0.29) correlation slight a t and and dissent, measures expressed index Rice’s the between (0.14) correlation low very expre and factionalism declared of level the between correlation above, mentioned As 4.2. figure from countries t CEE in compared measure intention as order ranking reversed a in again Poland, to voting compared of level higher a having Republic Czech the shows 4.3 Figure lowlevelswith of andline factionalism. go hand in hand f that intentions voting of levels high with hand in hand go to expected of levels High index. Rice’s and votes roll-call the with hand in hand the of any if see to is aim the measure, third the to ahead Moving

levels 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0 1 0.58 PL CZ SK HU HU SK CZ PL 0.4 0.61 0.87 countries 62 0.47

0.82 0.85 countries shown in figure figure in shown countries east as far as the CEE CEE the as far as east 0.8 previous measures go go measures previous sd oig dissent, voting ssed h uae f both of usage the Rice index are index Rice ollow the party the ollow f declared of rice index factionalism o the voting voting the o e ee of level he unity when when unity there is no is there

CEU eTD Collection votes, answered the following in chapters. consequence constraints internal a party as of because achieved or are constraints institutional unity voting of levels high the Whether ba the at be will survey, expert our from data using concept, systemat more A dissent. to intention declared verbally a is of manifested factionalism is or valued evenand theby conditions parties in se behavior, MPs’ of expression important most the is which voting, practi in related, be should concepts the theory in if Even converge. for indicators experimental the results, these of consequence a As early 1990s. uni voting roll-call of scores highest the of one had Germany this, their of opinion the follow definitely would they that declared who compared only to as16 per voting, when own judgment theythat would follow their percent 70 where Germany, is example striking de most The the levels. and levels index Rice the between found been has correlation Europeancountri Western the forrepeated was procedure same The unity are rejected as parts of a unity index. index. unity a of parts as rejected are factionalism and theand intention of dissent, of intention 63 Unity of behavior of Unity

as declared by the MPs, do not appearto not do MPs, the declared by as ic operationalization of the of operationalization ic as measured by roll-call roll-call by measured as i o frhr analysis. further of sis s qeto t be to question a is of the MPs declared MPs the of es in the sample. No sample. the in es party. Regardless of of Regardless party. ty in Europe in the in Europe in ty ce unity in roll-call roll-call in unity ce

at behavioral party m t b most be to ems clared dissent dissent clared where there of the the of cent cent CEU eTD Collection at sses eeomn ad ntttoaiain Tk 19, Kitsch 1997, (Tóka institutionalization and development systems party party unity of behavior. Table 4.2 shows an overview of party behavior party of overview an shows 4.2 Table behavior. of unity party s party the between differences of result a as parliament Ea 2007), of unity White of levels lower have to expected are and parties European McAllister 2007, Torcal and Mainwaring 2003, Kitschelt a transitions consolidation, democratic 2000b), Koole and Heidar 2001, (Kopecky literature the on Drawing regions. both in unity behavioral achieve possibl for search and Europe Western to compared as Europe C in unity ofaggregate provide party an image The two sections following Europe? in –West party East 4.2 An unity behavioral differentiation of means that the Eastern European MPs have a greater rooma formeans have the maneuver European that Eastern MPs bef countrie Western in 0.90 over values to compared as 0.80 around are Europe val index Rice of scores average The Europe. Eastern Central betwe unity voting in difference small very a is There regions. dissent within parties and arrives at a country ranking based on t on based ranking country a at arrives and parties within dissent whic areas policy of presentation a with continues then It 2007. and 1996 in a old as well as Europe, Western to Europe Eastern compares of unity party of account descriptive a with starts section This low result party in unity. resp and accountability the on impact negatively can volatility toge Europe Eastern in identification party Low unity. party of therefore are game, the of rules the to accustomed elites West Stable systems. democratic of MPs among experience and 64

ystems’ age and less knowledge less and age ystems’ expected to have higher levels levels higher have to expected nd new democracies, both democracies, new nd behavior across Europe, across behavior behavior when voting in voting when behavior en Western Europe and and Europe Western en ther with high electoral electoral high with ther onsiveness of MPs and and MPs of onsiveness e i Cnrl Eastern Central in ues he aggregate scores of scores aggregate he ern democracies, with democracies, ern e country patterns to to patterns country e n parliaments on al unity in both both in unity al l e a. 1999, al. et elt entral Eastern entral Eastern ore voting. ore voting. s, which s, cause h nd st CEU eTD Collection practice, the Rice index scores for Germany are quite high. Thi high. quite are Germany for scores index Rice the practice, Democracies conscience/opi own their follow would they that declared interviewed pe 70 Germany, in contrast, By scores. lowest the of one has Poland practi in but, party parliamentary the of that contradict would if even voting when opinion own their follow would they that declared number small A vote. they when happens actually what to opposite intent voting their as cases special are MPs Polish and German 2000. Wattenberg. P. wi Martin Power of distribution Changing The Contestation: M. David and Webb Paul E., Susan Scarrow, Sources: acrossTable 4.2 Aggregateof Europe behavior unity surveys, 2007 expert survey and own calculations. calculations. own survey expert and 2007 surveys,

Netherlands Switzerland Luxemburg Czech Rep.Czech emn 7. 7. 9. 18 30 .63 3.07 .32 1.87 3.67 96.7 0.10 78.1 99.93 72.1 50.0 Germany 7.0 Denmark oai 26 .54 2.69 Romania lvka 44 67 .5 .54 3.25 .42 16.7 3.07 34.4 Slovakia 70.0 30.9 Hungary egu 4. 1. 9.7 .6 .7 .56 3.47 2.26 95.87 17.5 42.5 Belgium otgl 08 54 .5 .62 3.95 15.4 30.8 Portugal Country Country owy . 4. 9.3 .7 .8 .15 3.48 1.77 97.53 43.1 7.0 Norway Sweden iln 6. 8.2 .9 .0 .31 3.10 2.59 88.62 69.0 Finland uti 9.3 .4 .2 .50 3.72 2.64 98.33 Austria cln 20 09 68 28 30 .74 3.00 2.83 96.88 30.9 2.0 Iceland rln 5. 1. 10 35 .34 3.50 0 100 13.8 53.8 Ireland oad 27 41 80 00 30 .47 3.00 0.05 58.00 34.1 12.7 Poland France usa 40 .6 .4 .99 3.34 0.06 94.0 Russia en 98 28 35 .7 . 0.6 3.3 1.77 93.5 22.8 39.8 Mean pi 2. 5. 39 .27 3.97 57.1 27.6 Spain tl 6. 4. 9. 14 34 .41 3.44 1.43 96.5 49.3 65.6 Italy K 92 04 29 .44 2.93 0.48 99.20 UK

. Oxford: Oxford University Press; John Carey and S and Carey John Press; University Oxford Oxford: .

F ollow ownollow opinion opinion voting voting when 00 08 65 15 36 .25 3.65 1.51 .65 96.57 .83 3.40 20.8 3.68 10.0 0.18 .67 99.01 3.30 .72 60.7 62.8 0.62 60.9 3.10 60.7 99.3 5.44 8.3 86.5 79.2 10.7 50.0

party view ate wtot Partisans without Parties Follow voting voting when

behavior behavior Unity of index) 73 64 30 .84 3.09 6.40 87.33 (Rice 1997 65

Farrell 2000: “From Social Integration to Electoral to Integration Social “From 2000: Farrell thin Political Parties.” In Dalton, J. Russell and and Russell J. Dalton, In Parties.” Political thin : Rice index Political Change in Advanced Industrial Industrial Advanced in Change Political SDs SDs am Depauw data archives, 1996 elite elite 1996 archives, data Depauw am

behavior behavior Unity of survey) survey) s could be explained by explained be could s (expert 2007 ce, the Rice index in in index Rice the ce, os r mr o less or more are ions rcent of the MPs the of rcent f oih MPs Polish of nion when, in in when, nion their opinion opinion their country survey) survey) (expert Within Within SDs SDs

CEU eTD Collection personal position and the party position on a particular bill. The country s The ona party particular bill. andpersonal position the position voted or on other specific circumstances.voted or onother specific on depend would vote their that admitted parliamentarians many that compens however, are, They bill. a pass to order in majority voting or party a that consider to is one if low very are figures the unity mean The 4.5. and 4.4 figures par their to according vote to propensities MPs’ of comparison A be completely say they what different.that actuallyand MPs what do can will it as also, but opinion own MPs’ the matched generally tha be could explanation One expected. than higher are index Rice’s as unity voting of figures the though, reality In voting. in opinion own tha declare MPs of percentage higher much a line, party the toe s who MPs of percent 23 approximately are there average on While the same is own as opinion the party opinion. m for fact in when opinions, own their follow to seeming GermanMPs That parties. German the within convergence attitudinal greater ae elrd ti wud apn vn n h cs o dsgemn b disagreement of case the in even happen would this declared, have voting when party their of opinion the follow would they that stated withi MPs surveyed of percentages the represent figures The or 4.2, theirareshown the scores survey by expert table index in lowe the Rice ac to comes it when but counterparts, Western their than higher expressed 66

by the MPs from Eastern Europe is is Europe Eastern from MPs the by a coalition of parties need a need parties of coalition a later be shown in chapter 5, 5, chapter in shown be later n each country, who have have who country, each n t they would follow their follow would they t ul oig nt as unity voting tual y ie s hw in shown is line ty ated for by the fact fact the by for ated would account for for account would t the party position position party the t on a bill. As they As bill. a on ay they would not not would they ay ost of them, their them, of ost h ise o be to issue the

cores shown in showncores in measured by by measured etween their their etween r. r. CEU eTD Collection in Western intention Figure voting Party as 1996 Europe unity 4.5 Central intention Figure Eastern 1996 voting Party as Europe unity 4.4

0.20 0.40 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60

Czech Republic Czech =126n 0.48 n=168 BE BE 0.30 =144n

FR 0.18

=308n 0.16 DE DE Hungary n=162 0.40 n=65 0.33 country

n=90 0.28 IT n=205 Poland

0.61 n=28 0.32 Mean = 0.44 = Mean LU

n=46 0.39 67 NL Mean =Mean 0.32

Slovakia n=96

n=52 0.41 0.58 PT PT

n=98 0.72 ES

Bars show means show Bars

N=noMPs of Bars show means

CEU eTD Collection parliament, both in 1996 as declared by them personally, and in 2007 as 2007 in and personally, them by declared as 1996 in both parliament, by the government for discussion in the Sejm wereactuallyreje the Sejm in discussion forgovernment theby and orde by bound not people, whole the of representatives be shall They e free, direct, general, in elected be shall Bundestag German tha stipulates constitution German the of with 38 line Article requirements. in only are answers MPs’ The later. decade one unity expertswhat to also and scores index actual Ricethe to opposition case the in even line party the follow 4.5), would they (fig. that declared MPs French and German of percentage low The experts. converge behavior highest the have MPs Dutch and Portuguese Spanish, terms of behavior and attitudes for all the twenty-three Europ twenty-three the all for attitudes and behavior of terms asses experts’ 2007 the illustrates page next the on 4.6 Figure yearsonly reached, Zubek two 2007). other percent compared in with (Goetz, percent eight alone 1998 in example, for but, basis frequent a on not is It period. that during parliament Polish the in manifested with consistent are assessments experts’ the and score index unity. voting on scores lowest the with Poland is outlier the Europe, the in points percentage five and ten between being small, very Euro Western In Europe. Eastern Central in exceptions some are ar unity partyfor scoressample the average, on that, observe p on 4.2 (table index Rice’s of values the at Looking categories. into gr can one level, aggregate the at behavior of unity comparing When responsible only to their conscienceresponsible their only to [emphasis added].” [emphasis 68

e quite high, although there there although high, quite e ean countries. The experts The countries. ean qual and secret elections. secret and qual cted or no final vote wasvote final no or cted sment on party unity in in unity party on sment only that MPs defected MPs that only index values. In Eastern Eastern In values. index of disagreement, is in in is disagreement, of h lgsaie turmoil legislative the pe, the differences are differences the pe, of the bills introduced bills the of have said about partyabout said have t “Members of the the of “Members t h constitutional the rs or instructions, or rs oup the countries countries the oup age 63), one can one 63), age hs o Rice low This h i 1996 in who assessed by by assessed nce in in nce CEU eTD Collection behavior and unity of attitudes for each party on a scale from one from scale a on party each for attitudes of unity and behavior c we when especially and regions two the between difference The differ regional the about chapter this of expectations initial group the in significant statistically is which difference Ea in 3.58 to opposed as Europe Western in scales point 5 the on 3.94 democr new the in than higher parties Western of unity attitudinal howeve experts, The page. next the on 4.3 table in shown are t means and test significance Anova The 3.21. is CEE of and 3.46 is countries aggre The countries. Eastern Central and Western the between unity differe prominent no is there region, by compared are countries When attitudes behavior unity of Figure of Unity and 2007 4.6 means five very means and high very lowunity unity. the assess to asked were sample our by considered country each in 11 The question wording of the expert survey is prese surveyis theexpert wordingof question The Mean 4 2 0 3 5 1

BE C Z DK

FR DE

IC IE country IT

LU 69 nted in Appendix C. C. Appendix in nted NL

PL PT 11 RO

comparison. This confirms the confirms This comparison. RU

SK ence in party unity levels. levels. unity party in ence ES SE acies – an average of of average an – acies CH ompare the old and old the ompare to five, where one where five, to

gate mean of WE WE of mean gate UK nce in behavioral in nce level of unity of of unity of level , vlae the evaluate r, stern Europe, Europe, stern he regional regional he attitudes behavior

CEU eTD Collection party representatives in Central Eastern Europe, and not for r for not and Europe,Eastern Central in representativesparty Table 4.3 Aggregate mean party unity in Europe and regional party 2007 Table and comparison Europe 4.3 Aggregate in mean unity comparisonvariables. onthese two statist the and behavior and attitudes of unity party of situation agg an presents below 4.3 table assessments, expert 2007 the on Based more andunity sticks rapidly carr be of attained can various behavior using e further This significant. not are latter the as behavior, of thethe democraticexperience with country’s rule. of length of muc unity very be to for appears elites party .04 of congruence ideological and .68 is behavior of unity for test significance are democracies new and old where 4.3 table (in attitudes of unity unity in emerged differences significant No category). same Europe East the to similar is democraci dictatorship with experience new considered are Portugal and (Spain compared are and old when maintained is difference regional and result same The prefer lower the for only therefore accounts game the of rules t or institutions democratic the with experience MPs’ of lack uni the in but behavior of unity the in not resides democracies, new e eorce;N1 33 3.64 3.33 New N=13 Democracies; Unity of Behavior Unity of Attitudes Unity of Attitudes UnityBehavior of uoenS .3 .49 2.79 4.50 3.77 .04 .33 2.64 3.85 3.58 3.97 3.94 3.34 .68 3.38 European SD 3.21 European min 3.46 European max European mean Anova new) (old vs. sig. Old Democracies; N=10 Eastern N=11 Europe; Western Europe; N=12 70

an countries which fall in the in fall which countries an egional differences in unity unity differencesin egional nhances the argument that that argument the nhances heir slow adaptation to the to adaptation slow heir ence homogeneity of the of homogeneity ence h under the influence of of influence the under h of behavior but only in in only but behavior of ical tests for regional regional for tests ical compared, the Anova the compared, ty of attitudes. The attitudes. of ty new democracies new s eas their because es regate regional regional regate tiue) The attitudes). ots. ots. CEU eTD Collection policy areas considered. The expectations are that unity of beh of unity that are expectations The considered. areas policy Party and unity policy areas process between unity of attitudes and centralization or discipli or centralization and attitudes of unity between process no osdrto we Ms at hi vt: h pry oiin the position, party the vote: their cast MPs when consideration into m because is This politics. national in importance high of issues ma behavior and attitudes in both unity, party of level the Europe, vot party all on than budget, the as such votes, key on lower slightly that shown have 1997) Kerr and (Hurley studies voting legislative US canandby this levels centr thebe of aggregate comparing observed party it way the regions, both in similar is unity behavioral if even res these stage, this At 5. chapter in out carried be will i mechanism dynamic the of test validation further A decade. Eas and democracies disciplinary more much applied New have particular in democracies regions. across compared are measures same The lower. significantly is attitudes of unity the where the is it and D) appendix in 5 and 4 3, tables (see Europe Western Eas officein party central the of hands the in decision-making significant reveals democracies) new vs. old and West vs. (East ap centralization party of comparison A centralization. consider this confirms partly which evidence bring 4.3 table in reported of unity on scores regional similar 2007 The unity. voting high achieve to as happen to predicted was This Europe. Western to compared hi is organization the party internal that the from inferred coming especially have I model, unity party the in 2, chapter In 71

ults lead to the conclusion that, conclusion the to lead ults hri atr uoe as Europe Eastern in gher tern Europe as opposed to to opposed as Europe tern avior slightly declines on declines slightly avior disciplinary when true is argument when we also we when argument ly more concentration of of concentration more ly pid n h argument the in mplied is achieved is different, is achieved is nary measures, in order order in measures, nary part of a compensation compensation a of part measures over the last last the over measures ore opinions are taken are opinions ore le i bt regions both in plied former region again region former ee o coercion, of level y depend on the the on depend y es. Likewise, in in Likewise, es. alization. alization. party unity is is unity party constituency constituency t European European t behavior behavior CEU eTD Collection oiy lo asd esos ihn h Seih oeae al P Rally Moderate Swedish The within tensions caused also policy position, and their own consciences, which may be different especial different be may which consciences, own their and position,

the periphery, the distribution of power from the state to regions to state the from power of distribution the periphery, the the versus nationalism Spanish Belgium. or Spain in divisions regional adde be can issues specific country policies, mentioned above the To betweendivisions express factions the neo-liberals and were conservative osqecs cue dset hn icse i te wds parliament. Swedish the in discussed when dissent caused consequences, nuclear particularly policy, Energyparties. within conflicts concer general raised only not issues environmental these, Besides countries. important most the cases, the of majority the in were, is tensions the 2007, in experts parliamentary and party the by indicated Euro East and Western both in parties within disunity to led also i partnership sex same the especially homosexuals, of rights the Besides Europe. over all parties, within dissent cause to integration, and enlargement EU economy, the in interference state spe state welfare taxes, like issues, Redistribution economic. pa amongst dissent highest the create which issues of types The parties. normally that disagreementissues within cause we experts country the why reason the is This country. to country certa to attached importance of degrees different to due appear i differences Regional rights. homosexuals’ example, for issues, 72

power and its environmental its and power se, the laws on the social social the on laws the se, se n aoto issues abortion and ssue dn ad h etn of extent the and nding issues in the respective the in issues , creates conflict within within conflict creates , rty elite are most often most are elite rty n party unity may also may unity party n n oiy ra from areas policy in re asked to rank the the rank to asked re us hc caused which sues are all issues prone issues all are pean countries. As As countries. pean arty (M) when the the when (M) arty bt lo internal also but n ly on controversial on ly nationalism of nationalism d, such as the the as such d, ed in voting. ed voting. in Defense CEU eTD Collection president Putin and how to tackle foreign policy, especially Russi especially policy, foreign tackle to how and Putin president exper country the by emphasized been has it as Though, parties. caus to experts by said also are divisions Regional parties. Party unity - country ranking Party - unity country ranking

high, high, or low unity. A value above 90 per cent for Rice’s index i index Rice’s for cent per 90 above value A unity. low or high, high, party of categories three into grouped be can countries survey, Ri of basis the on out set scores aggregate their to According as might Central Europe. in be Eastern dissent expected, more s to to reforms appropriate how of choice the and legacies, institutions democratic its and past communist the of Views Bundestag. is the in Bűndnis/Grűne the and SPD security the divided has Afghanistan in intervention of problem same The parliament. Dutch the in CDA D the example, for divided, have Afghanistan and Iraq in intervention secu Internal war. Iraq the during policy foreign plus violence, the and terrorism issues, immigration and rights minority/ethnic W in especially unity, low generate which issues new Relatively Ireland.of the in elected MPs by opposed largely Heathrow, to Airport Shannon of cessation the or closures, and downgrading hospital as such issues weapons of decommissioning as such issues on voting when defected MPs e The case. special a also is disagreements, party internal Northe in process peace the and partition the where Ireland, West. iareet ihn h Rsin ate i hw o oiin thems position to how is parties Russian the within disagreement 73

xpert survey reveals that Irish that reveals survey xpert e dissent within the Russian the within dissent e ce’s index and the expert expert the and index ce’s unity of behavior: very behavior: of unity ways to tackle terrorist terrorist tackle to ways ts, the major source of source major the ts, be carried out, caused, caused, out, carried be rity, nuclear arms and and arms nuclear rity, a’s relations with the with relations a’s sen uoe are Europe, estern s considered as the consideredas s sues and military military and sues rn Ireland causes causes Ireland rn mid-west region region mid-west le vis-à-vis elves 6 Pd and PvdA 66, services from from services rnte the trengthen or on local on or German CEU eTD Collection party unity. party unity. parliamentary votes. No party from our sample was given by by given was sample our from party No votes. parliamentary ecnae ons vrg vtn uiy ihr n etr Europe Western in higher unity voting average points percentage Note: The italics refer to the cases with the highe withthe thecases to refer italics The Note: with the highest deviations from the ideal point characterized b characterized point ideal the from deviations highest the with re basically 4.4 table in above shown category unity low The index. maxi with parties had country no similarly, and, unity on score p the from defect occasionally who MPs from and conflicts internal dif high relatively a with but parliament, in bills pass to and incumbent that mean still T category third the Europe. in portrayed values in unity party indeed is there that conclude can one 4.3), and 4.2 s data survey expert and roll-call survey, elite the on Based visible the regions; West T and unity. East party the of between level discrepancies low a cent per 80 below score any and hi a cent per 80 above unity, party of level high very a for threshold survey survey Table based country ofparty 4.4 Degrees behavior: ranking unity onthe of aggregate over scores 3.5. categ country unity high the and 3.5, and 3.3 between values has category sampl our in mean the below are which countries includes category table in shown as high and medium (low, categories three same the survey, expert our on based Similarly, 1996. in Europe Eastern

I. Very high unity II. High unity III. Low unity Low III. unity High II. unity VeryI. high Denmark, Austria, Sweden, Ireland Sweden, Spain, Portugal,Spain, Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, France, Italy,Norway,Belgium, France, Russia, Luxembourg, Russia, Switzerland, Czech RepublicSwitzerland, Germany st within country differences amongst parties. parties. amongst differences country within st 74

Iceland , ,

ficulty, resulting from some from resulting ficulty, hown in this section (tables (tables section this in hown countries were ranked in ranked were countries mum scores on the Rice the on scores mum Finland, Romania, parties manage to vote vote to manage parties Poland, Hungary,Poland, United Kingdom, y one hundred percent hundred one y xet te maximum the experts ifrne en 10 being difference 4.4). The low unity unity low The 4.4). e (3.3), the medium the (3.3), e Slovakia Slovakia ee r n large no are here presents the group the presents gh level of unity, of level gh hn n Central in than 2007 expert 2007 expert arty line in in line arty ory includes includes ory e low he CEU eTD Collection patterns in the different levels of party unity achieved across Europe. across ofpatterns the achieved party different in Europe. levels unity alaetr rgm) etoe i te rvos hpe. h m The chapter. previous the in mentioned regime) parliamentary Norway contexts institutional specific country to unity party relate gene the of light in presented is case Each survey. expert 2007 the scores index Rice the to mainly refer descriptions country The int eve in taking factors level party and systemic of combination existing Europe in unity voting of overview an gives section This The scores. i average country as caution with treated be to however, needs, grouping country The made by the party Congress and the national party leaders c leaders party national the and Congress party the by made Part concerned. is selection candidate as far as decentralized Norwegi the that except and factors are present institutional 171). the 2000: All Web (Scarrow, 97.53 was 1993-1994 period the in parties all for index fa systemicthe of most and parliament in unity party of level 4.3 Patterns of achieving party unity in Europe in party4.3 Patterns unity achieving of section. investigat be to is countries, among commonalities any are there whi in achieved, is unity behavioral How chapters. subsequent the in detai a for case the makes further Iceland.This and Republic Germ of cases the fits example, for This, upgrade. category wil they deviations, standard highest the with countries the from unity parties the exclude we if that, mean could which differences, em t vldt te yohss bu te soito betw association the about hypotheses the validate to seems within country differences are higher than higher are differences country 75

. They facilitate the search for search the facilitate They . led party analysis to follow to analysis party led ctors (list PR, unitary state, unitarystate, PR, (list ctors an not impose or veto the veto or impose not an with the lowest scores on scores lowest the with ry country in the sample. the in country ry any, Switzerland, Czech Czech Switzerland, any, laesi slcin is selection leadership y from late 1990s and to to and 1990s late from ean value of Rice’s Rice’s of value ean ral expectations that that expectations ral d n h following the in ed ch context, and if and context, ch between een a very high high very a een qaiy o a for qualify l acut the account o i bsd on based is t an parties arean parties country Farrell CEU eTD Collection party groups (PPGs). Traditionally, in the Nordic countries, PPGs countries, Nordic the in Traditionally, (PPGs). groups party e trbtd a lat ihu dtie cnieain t te fac the to consideration, detailed without least at attributed, be a parties Dutch factors. systemic and unity party between parliamentary party in the case of CDA (Christian Democra (Christian CDA of case the in party parliamentary Norway in unity behavioral party about speaking when considered O centralized. more is finances, of distribution the especially t surveyreveals expert 2007 Our centralization. party of aspect selection Candidate parliament. the for candidates of selection Netherlands vote against their party. Norwe because UK the of case the in as importance same the are whips Party level. central the at than level constituency part extra-parliamentary the by directed be to considered are N the Therefore 192). 2000: (Heidar made are decisions group internal i to and debates group theseimportance high to a attribute MPs i position party the down set which meetings group at taken are governments coalition frequent their of because mainly strong, very centralization) are encountered but, in the Dutch case, there are there case, Dutch the in but, encountered are centralization) C Party p forgeneral the Allconditions 152). 2000: Farrell and Web (Scarrow, the by decided is leader national the of election the and Party) (Labor PvdA For Democrats). (Centre CD and Party), i selection leadership Party centralization. of level medium a party multiparty a of framework the in working representation s electoral The regime. parliamentary a with state unitary also appears to correspond to the general predictions about the relationship about the general predictions correspond the to to also appears 76

re highly united, which could which united, highly re present but they do not have have not do they but present se ue i proportional is used ystem tic Appeal), VVD (Liberal VVD Appeal), tic y organization more at the at more organization y gian MPs are less likely to to likely less are MPs gian , however, is not the only only the not is however, , system. The parties have parties The system. hat decision-making, and and decision-making, hat ne aspect that should be should that aspect ne ntra-party opinion before ntra-party opinion other factors that must that factors other t that the country is a a is country the that t nrs ad members and ongress D’66 (Democrats ’66) ’66) (Democrats D’66 have been considered been have n the parliament. The parliament. the n is the parliamentary the is s decided by the the by decided s Plc decisions Policy . arty unity (except unityarty orwegian PPGs orwegian CEU eTD Collection be taken into account for explaining party unity; namely the w the namely unity; party explaining for account into taken be predicted institutional and party level factors. The experts experts The factors. level party and institutional predicted term the and PPGs by is unity p concerning hypothesesgeneral the to corresponds that country Another Irwin 1993, Andeweg 2000). As in the German system, the Dutch system i system Dutch the system, German the in As 2000). Andeweg 1993, Irwin t from defecting from MPs the restrain rules, their by which, p the of strength the is mentioning worth is that factor Another line party the to according vote to incentive an be can society in of membera is MP an that fact The 1990. after exists still to control (Hopkin 2001: 355) but even after primaries, the party l party the primaries, after even but 355) 2001: (Hopkin control to easy were for structures decision-making party the 1997, in primaries candidates of introduction the Before 1982. after government the precisel structure centralized highly and closed a adopted PSOE T centralization. party of level high very a generates system w combination in system party The (PP). Party People’s the 1996, Socialist the either being 1982 after formed government the with system party the Germany, or UK the of case the in As 1999). lists important very a playing leader partythe with centralized, closed with representation proportional list and monarchy regi autonomous into decentralized but state, unitary a of context the minor despite line, party the from defecting never almost as 2007 the PPG overthe PPG a the party whole. as Spain Spain hr te ey ih ee o pry nt ge hn i hn wt the with hand in hand goes unity party of level high very the where fractiocracy is often used to denote the ascendancy/dominance of of ascendancy/dominance the denote to used often is 77

role in the party life (Keating (Keating life partythe in role a party that represents a pillar pillar a represents that party a portray the Spanish MPs in MPs Spanish the portray he party line (Andeweg and (Andeweg line party he he powerful leadership of leadership powerful he eakened pillarization, that pillarization, eakened is a two-and-a-half type, type, two-and-a-half a is y in order to maintain to order in y rimnain groups arliamentarian ith the parliamentary the ith for party leadership leadership party for In conflicts. internal eadership remained eadership , parties are very very are parties , (SE o, after or, (PSOE) s ons, parliamentary ons, n nt o defect. to not and arty behavioral behavioral arty eetn the selecting s dominated s CEU eTD Collection below the overall European mean. below European mean. the overall countr the lowered this and disunited very as experts by portrayed “parliament being as defined often are groups parliamentary per cent for the following parties: CDU-CSU, SPD, FDP. One ex One FDP. SPD, CDU-CSU, parties: following the for cent per syste three-party (or system party two-and-a-half a being party whips. Another factor that contributes to unity inside parl inside unity to contributes that factor Another whips. party departments government’s federal the of most reflect parties, behavioral unity much higher than the European country average. country behavioral average. than the European much higher unity coincide with substantial aid from the state (Koole 1994), for whic for 1994), (Koole state the from aid substantial with coincide High discretion. their at available resources substantial the ultm Ms n spotn saf I 20 hwvr SD n te Grü the and SPD however, 2007 In staff. supporting and MPs full-time the i that discipline the from results it that is unity party of 1991 period the in unity behavioral of level The 1990s. early the in index hi very is unity party of level the parties, of decentralization w system, party a and federalism Despite unity. on federalism with their parliamentary party group’s chairpersons, a number a chairpersons, group’s party parliamentary their with le core the of part usually are chairpersons Their caucus. the before group party parliamentary the within conflicts resolve The decisions of the caucus are prepared by working groups which groups working by prepared are caucus the of decisions The ar decisions their and body decision-making highest the is caucus parliame each Formally, consensus. forms and unity maintain helps Germany The members. its of choices the constrain and control to able party parliamentary groupsparliamentary party is an exception to the scholarly inferences regarding the negat the regarding scholarlyinferences the to exception an is . The complex organization of the parliamentary party party parliamentary the of organization complex The . 78

s established or imposed inside imposed or established s gh, as shown by the Rice the by shown as gh, . These groups attempt to attempt groups These . r pry ope” with complex” party ary adership of a PPG along PPG a of adership of backbenchers and the and backbenchers of the issues are referred to referred are issues the hich is characterized as characterized is hich degrees of party unity unity party of degrees iamentarian groups, are groups, iamentarian ) ad ept the despite and m), planation for this level this for planation e binding on the MPs. MPs. the on binding e ntary party group’s group’s party ntary h reason, the party the reason, h vrl rsl i a is result overall soe o value a to score y , in the two major major two the in , ive influence of influenceof ive -1994 is 96.7 is -1994 ne were were ne CEU eTD Collection rmto wti te at. rvdd ht hy r nt nosset w inconsistent not are they that Provided party. the within promotion rebellion any and party the from expelled be can line party icpiay rules disciplinary us the and centralization, party of level medium a of context the In and Webb, (Scarrow, order list the change or selection veto impose, national the PD of exception the With Party. Labour the and PD FG, ratify and vote delegates local while candidates, of selection the f option the give FG and FF of statute the candidates, of selection (P Democrats Progressive and (FG) Gael Fine (FF), Fail Fianna parliament the by made is which selection, leadership of terms Irish The PPGs. the by or statutes party the in stated rules s by line party the follow to constrained are MPs high. very is the employed, is (STV) vote transferable single PR a Although in unity Party constitution, constitution, more frequent than in other countries in Western Europe. Those who de who Those Europe. Western in countries other in than frequent more the but Europe, Eastern Central in countries in than frequent more measures disciplinary the 2007, in experts country the by revealed with a high consensus when voting on the floor. What can be concluded from the from concluded be can What floor. the on voting when consensus high a with constit of area the in competition intra-partywhich in example i Ireland and unity party hinder not does PR-STV 1991). Blais 1980, Katz 1989, choice intra-party allows which system electoral an to unity t theories the with contradiction in is unity behavioral high very The every MP chooses to follow a tight discipline and to vote accordingeveryto a tight chooses and discipline the follow MP to party to li parliamentary party rulesparty parliamentary Ireland Ireland r ipsd n h Ms n te et f h pry ebr. As members. party the of rest the and MPs the on imposed are is higher than the average unity of the countries in our sample. our in countries the of unity average the than higher is are made by the PPGs themselves. As a result, a As themselves. PPGs the by made are 79

will harm their chances of of chances their harm will Taeea n Shugart and (Taagepera ate ae etaie in centralized are parties uency service can coexist coexist can service uency level of behavioral unity behavioral of level ary party in the case of of case the in party ary the selection in the FF, the in selection the trict party disciplinary disciplinary party trict or members to vote on vote to members or hat relate low party low relate hat D). Regarding the the Regarding D). Farrell 2000: 139). 2000: Farrell imposed were not not were imposed wr definitely were y party leaders can can leaders party o SV strict STV, of e fect from the the from fect t te party the ith ne. Irish s an s

CEU eTD Collection ate ad tog Ps Gray Nra, ehrad) Aog the Among Netherlands). Norway, (Germany, PPGs strong and parties part of the middle cluster, with a 3.30 unity score in 2007, just about t about just 2007, in score unity 3.30 a with cluster, middle the of part (pa with together encountered is unity behavioral party of level i trend observed The rules. working PPGs’ of importance the enhances c conjectural a of possibility the to points This present. is and, gotogether always not do unity, behavioral party foster organiz party and factors institutional that is observe, can one unit party of levels high with countries these scrutinizing After statutes. th fac by established organization rules disciplinary party party or be centralization to seem important More legislature. the unity affecting powerful negatively in not is PR-STV case that is France chapterin 3. count the (at hypotheses general the of most validates which case, behavio party high very of category first the in classified Farrell 2000: 172) and about the same level continued to exist after 1990. The country is country after is 1990.The continued exist to level the same about and Farrell 172) 2000: (Scar unity party for score 90.9 a was there 1968-1973 period the during of Regardless parties. united less favor to assumed are that n MF Mvmn fr rne stae hmevs n h opst s opposite the on themselves situate France) for (Movement MPF and Pop a for (Union UMP the while actions, MPs of convergence lowest are (Greens) Verts the and Democracy) French for (Union UDF The uni the among however differences noticeable areThere Europe. in prts mjrt-lrlt eetrl ytm n a se a and system electoral majority-plurality a operates 80

ausation for party unity and and unity party for ausation a uiy San s h only the is Spain unity, ral in some cases, the opposite opposite the cases, some in hs ntttoa context, institutional this e PPGs or by the party party the by or PPGs e ation factors believed to to believed factors ation mi-presidential regime regime mi-presidential y in our sample, what sample, our in y ry level) stated earlier stated level) ry ty of French parties. parties. French of ty of the parties in the parties the in the of the parties with the with parties the ty decentralized rtly) s that a very high high verya that s os lk party like tors, he average level average he ular Movement) Movement) ular or countries four row, Web and Web row, d. An ide. CEU eTD Collection power over the local party branches. In this country therefore, therefore, country this In branches. party local the over power parliamentarian fractions are kept under control (Mair 1994: 105). A 105). 1994: (Mair control under kept are fractions parliamentarian parliamentary group (De Winter and Dumont 2000: 127). and 2000: Winter Dumont parliamentarygroup (De matterto compared more determining in asparty the unity system-lev to pa national the decision, every in that is them for element common p French all for case the not is this but rules, disciplinary and l high their be can unity party behavioral high the for explanation Belgium h cniae. h peiet f h pry s sal vr po very usually is party the of president The candidates. the highly a applies system multiparty Belgian The 2007). in score 3.47 1995; and 1991 in cent per (88 unity party of level high a has Belgium situation actual the but parties disunited generate should system p a has country The vot preferential allows confirmed. which system, electoral representation not again is unity party and system Another exception to the influence of electoral system, the dece the system, electoral of influence the to exception Another n teey suc o pry icpie s hy eual a regularly they as discipline party of source a thereby and were presidents party and ministers most that is discipline Anothe them. of each with separately talking by behavior their the with line in defectors potential keep to try usually leaders must parliamentarians all which to discipline of vote a enforce a MPs rebelling to applied be may that sanctions of variety par the by administered discipline the is unity party the for and the possible negative influence of the federal system on par on system federal the influenceof negative possible the and is a case in which the hypothesis about the relationship bet relationship the about hypothesis the which in case a is 81

ties. Party statutes stipulate a a stipulate statutes Party ties. nd parliamentary groups can groups parliamentary nd members of the Parliament the of members party position and correct and position party ing. This type of electoral of type This ing. ttended meetings of their their of meetings ttended arliamentary parties. The The parties. arliamentary ty unity, is is unity, ty party-level factors seem seem factors party-level centralized selection of of selection centralized ntralization of parties,of ntralization evel of centralization of evel rty leaders have veto veto have leaders rty r aspect that favors favors that aspect r adhere. Party group group Party adhere. s h opst as opposite the is nother explanation nother ween the electoral the ween werful and the the and werful el factors. Switzerland roportional 5 unity /5

CEU eTD Collection parties (standard deviation of 0.84). The party with the highest unity highest the with party The 0.84). of deviation (standard parties hi also and Germany, or Norway France, in that than lower points parties and canton factions. The party has also a weak control ove control weak a also has party The factions. canton and parties pretg o vts at gis te at cmae wt vote with compared party the against cast votes of percentage a diss of degree The 1992-1997. period the in parties all for average In the In neighbor“secret” case of a vote. the in s to MPs their require may Switzerland) of Party Democratic For techniques. refined more use parties Swiss other The lists. be to MP respective the of failure the into translate above the with strict the often most line and 1990 in began party inthis of centralization not is MP an if measures strict takes that is experts, by declared as which, Party) People’s (Swiss 10 to 5 cent; per 85.03 was period 1991-1994 in parties all of mean a as i highparty of was levelunity the expectations, our contraryto State United the in as low be should discipline party consequently average which is explained by the very high difference in the unit the in difference high very the by explained b is which average score country mean a assigned experts 2007 In Italy. in score is Switzerland time same r the At the parties. disunited hypothesis, Katz’s to According candidates. certain against express and list the on candidates rank voters that means which represent proportional list is system electoral Swiss The United Kingdom United , party unity used to be high, with a 20.5 degree of dissent as an as dissent of degree 20.5 a with high, be to used unity party , 82

a federal state with decentralized decentralized with state federal a possibly the only Swiss party party Swiss only the possibly nominated again on the party the on again nominated to wt peeeta vote, preferential with ation n early 1990s. Rice indexRice early1990s. n how their ballots to their to ballots their how at. h poes of process The party. y of behavior amongst behavior y of s (Linder 1998). But, 1998). (Linder s ent was calculated as calculated was ent rfrne fr and for preferences measures mentioned measures ntne P (Social SP instance r its candidates and and candidates its r elow the European European the elow of behavior is SVP is behavior of hr hn h Rice the than gher s which were in in were which s sl sol be should esult percentage CEU eTD Collection at lyly I te K alaet te at lae decides leader party the parliament, UK the In loyalty. party t the of most throughout continued and century nineteenth the since behavior line.party the with accordance vote. In the former case, the MPs do not have to fo havenot to do MPs the case, former theIn vote. regards discuss further for arranged be will minister relevant the with awhip cannotIf rebel member persuade a serves. onwhichcommittees a a MP an of promotion the influence additionally can Whips 46). 2000: (Norton a two-line also the is MPs the are disciplining for weapon whips’ the Traditionally, There vote. to present be to expected are importance its show to times three underlined is item an which on whip The whip. three-line a by determined limits the within move system whip the and leader party the PPGs; all within making specialization and Hierarchy suspended. PPG the of membership follow to refuses adopted measures disciplinary the again, and, PPGs of organization pa around revolve this for Explanations high. remained still level Europe West other the to compared but, decades previous to compared unity behavioral of level the period, 1990-1997 the For increased. party own a voting parliamentarians of number the when 1970s the in changedhowever (Norton 47). cent 2000: per votes British wasin parliamentarians’ 0.5 only l the 1960s the in even but 1950s the in were levels highest The century. 12 about extre case, the prediction German as the survey2007 expert in however, legisnational candidatesfor of selection the veto or impose can part national that noteworthy also is It 352). 2001: (Hopkin 1997 to up 1990s An important distinction for the British case ist case the British for distinction Animportant

etaiain f power of centralization treln whip three-line a

12 , Party unity has been a feature of British parliamentary British of feature a been has unity Party

British parties maintained a high level in the early early the in level high a maintained parties British , he may have the whip “withdrawn” and his his and “withdrawn” whip the have may he , o be made between the whipped and the unwhipped unwhipped the and whipped the made between be o llow the party line. party line. the llow 83

determining if an MP can MP an if determining latures. According to the Accordingto latures. h plce. f n MP an If policies. the ion and persuasion. As As persuasion. and ion appeal to party loyalty loyalty party to appeal characterize decision decision characterize rty organization, the organization, rty and when members when and uses a written form, form, written a uses nd one-line whips. whips. one-line nd in order to assure to order in an countries, the countries, an evel of dissent dissent of evel MP, a meetingMP, The situation The situation gainst their gainst decreased decreased mely high high mely y leaders y wentieth nd the nd CEU eTD Collection party system, party centralization and, even more importantl more even and, centralization party system, party eid 96 eeld soe f 65 ecn, hc i hwvr aoe t above however, is which percent, 96.5 of score a revealed 1996 period Compared to the rest of Europe, of rest the to Compared parliamentary eachthat on its enforces members. party p determining in important more be to seem system electoral Other plurality. SMD uses which system electoral an of condition still can unity party that is shows UK the of case the What average. with cluster unity party low third the in UK the place T scores opposition. in or government in were they whether of withi regardless conflict and dissent of degrees various reported experts government against thus and constituency own their in closures hospital engage all Secretary, Home and Whip Chief chair, Party Labour f 2006 In scrutiny. withstand not does parties British the within unity after 1993, can be found in the in found be can after1993, It the in unity behavioral of lack the for Explanations well. as the to points clearly and caution with treated be to needs which sc high the explains This 2008). (Giuliani disagreements major to due c in discussed be to get never simply proposals legislative of attention drawn have scholars recently and parliament Italian usuall parties disunited 1993, Before period. that of score European low incentives for unity of attitudes and the catch-all nature of the of naturecatch-all the and attitudes of unityfor incentives low average score of party unity of behavior in 2007. The analysis of r of analysis The 2007. in behavior of unity party of score average nature of the party system party the of nature Italy falls into the category of countries that have an have that countries of category the into falls 84

. Extreme multipartism created multipartism Extreme . y, the disciplinary measures disciplinary y, the be achieved even under the the under even achieved be a score below the European the below score a arty unity, such as the two- the as such unity, arty ommittees or on the floor the on or ommittees to the fact that a majority majority a that fact the to alian parties, before and before parties, alian lack of attitudinal unity attitudinal of lack Christian DemocraticChristian n the major parties, parties, major the n i poet against protests in d oll-call votes in the in votes oll-call y characterized the characterized y factors besides the besides factors ore of Rice index Rice of ore heir party unity unity party heir or example, the example, or oiy The policy. he average average he CEU eTD Collection alaetr pry rus f h Iain eulcn (P republicans Italian the of groups party parliamentary rcdr utl 98 Te rcdr hs aiiae dsetn vts sim votes dissenting facilitated has procedure The 1988. until procedure eortc etaim o ogr applied. longer no centralism democratic the and discipline, party follow to obligation little was there obey to obliged were Party Communist Italian the of members grou parliamentary Whi Council. National the by own accepted be only must which regulations its Also, rules. its follow to members the except discipline, party concerning rules specific no had C Theunity. party of lack the for justification possible another off measures party disciplinary central the by disciplined and found be not could dissenters ru ise is w rgltos wih lo nld rls o dis for rules include also which regulations, own its issues group statute its in stipulated Party Democrat Social Italian di party of stipulation no had 1965 after (PSI) socialists Italian employed which but tiers proporti was which 1993 before system electoral the is disunity f Another possible. as voters many as attract to tried Party n trcig oe ad hs nac ter tts ihn h party the within status is variable context-specific their intervening enhance thus and votes attracting in could candidates way this In list. party a on candidate a to vote o te ak f at bhvoa uiy a the was unity behavioral party of lack the for Another 234). 1999: (Keating reform electoral 1993 the after annulled then preferences three (from vote–expression preference one to reduced Thi candidates. the from favors personal for exchange in given often whe south, the from mainly were voting preference express to chose

(Katz and Mair 1992) included in the Italian party statutes give statutes party Italian the in included 1992) Mair and (Katz preferential votingpreferential patronage

85 s n h cs o te omns at, the party, Communist the of case the in As . Voters could choose to give a preference preference a give to choose could Voters .

ert vote secret . It was shown that the electors who electors the that shown was It . n 91 ta ay parliamentary any that 1991, in I hd o euain; they regulations; no had RI) , present in parliamentarian parliamentarian in present , general commitment of the of commitment general actor in explaining party party explaining in actor hristian Democratic Party Democratic hristian party discipline, by 1979 by discipline, party general principles of the of principles general demonstrate their power power their demonstrate scipline in their statute. their in scipline onal representation in 2 in representation onal allowed before), and and before), allowed re these votes were votes these re p issues its own own its issues p le, in the 1950s, the in le, s practice was was practice s Bt another But . ice. The few few The ice. etr. The senters. explanation ply because because ply

CEU eTD Collection possible explanation for so many defections is that these parties for not did that explanation many so is possible defections rfrne ad h lc o dsilnr rls o te P, are MPs, the for rules disciplinary of lack the and preferences ae s ht o attdnl nt isd te ate, ih rega with parties, the inside unity attitudinal low that is case about concluded be can What 24). 2000: Menshon and (Heller scale right thei fromthem distinguish could that profile clearideological a overa and 2006) Deegan-Krausse 2002, (Grzymala-Busse parties successor i especially manifests which centralization, high quite exhibit C East the most that is concerning commonality The MPs. provisions of responsibilities constitutional and systems electoral the in however analysis in-depth An Poland. of exception the with similar, fragmentat system party state, unitary rules, PPG similar similar are factors systemic the of some Hungary, and Slovakia Pola specifically countries, European East Central the for As disunity.conducive behavioral to and Center, Democratic Christian the Renewal, Italian the were whi parties The interests. their served better that one another chang MPs Many 1999. in registered peak the with high, relatively the in fluidity aggregate of level The plurality. by distributed pe 75 and PR by allocated were parliament the in seats of cent rules: mixed to changed was system electoral The low. to average party 1993 the in system electoral the in change the after Even executives. conta regular maintain to commitment general a by bound only were 86

ion). Behavioral unity is also is unity Behavioral ion). ch registered high fluidity high registered ch r closest rival on the left- the on rival closest r nd, the Czech Republic, Republic, Czech the nd, period 1996-2000 was was 1996-2000 period (parliamentary regimes, (parliamentary nrl uoen parties European entral d t te P policy MPs the to rds nside the communist communist the nside nt sil remained still unity cn o sas were seats of cent r after 1993, 25 per 25 1993, after the factors most most factors the reveals differences reveals oz Iai. One Italia. Forza ed their party for for party their ed at that time have have at time that cts with party party with cts oe and roles h Italian the ll within within ll CEU eTD Collection parliament. The country score for 2007 given by experts is 3.25, just just 3.25, is experts by given 2007 for score country The parliament. a form could MPs five of group any that such were parliament parties among differences of category third the under fall countries these of most scores, according Although, reveals. survey expert our as parties, most Slovak fromconflicts the andparty some line. defections occasi means scale, our on which, 2007 in unity behavioral party for 3.07 average, on gave, experts The Poland. and Russia for available only lowe deal great a scores country average the make which case Slovakia). Party- Peoples’ (The LS-HZDS is party united least the centralize most the is time, same the at which, Democracy) SM is behavior of terms in party united most The mean. European maneuver to MPs for space leaves clearly This directives”. no exer to a They conviction. elected and conscience best their to be according and individually shall and citizens, the of the representatives that stipulates Constitution the of 29.2 Article party. their ensure to mechanisms for provide PPG. not does framework another constitutional form easily could they party their left MPs some Slovakian the by approved rules the 1996, Before 2000). Krause and (Malová s parliamentary the in or constitution Slovakian the in mentioned those provis ‘unfavorable’ other or vote preferential the by generated P vt aog h pry ie vn n odtos f nr-at com intra-party of conditions in even line party the along vote MPs within each country. It is the least united parties within each within parties united least the is It country. each 87

Movement for a Democratic Democratic a for Movement d party. On the other hand, other the On party. d unity, this is only due to due only is this unity, PG, which means that if that means which PG, r. Roll-call indexes are indexes Roll-call r. hn hy oe n the in vote they when os o nt, uh as such unity, to ions ER (Direction-Social ER cise their mandates mandates their cise MPs “shall be the the be “shall MPs to their aggregate aggregate their to a regional score of score regional a lo te current the Also, MPs’ loyalty to to loyalty MPs’ tanding order order tanding onal internal onal re bound by by bound re eo the below petition

CEU eTD Collection ois” P hv i ti wy cntttoa fedm f cin w action, of freedom constitutional a way this in have MPs bodies.” alaetr pry Ms rsrcin cnen aeil a material concern restrictions Most party. parliamentary parliamentary groups encourage defection and the formation of pa of formation the and defection encourage groups parliamentary The opposed socials-democrats to and democrats. Christian parliamentar their in more converge democrats civic and communists amon discrepancies high with but 3.10, is behavior of unity for score loyalty. party for expectations low generate could theory, disciplined for his or her voting in the Chamber of Deputies or Deputies of Chamber the in voting her or his for disciplined DeputyNo […] instructions. any by bound be not shall they so doing oath the Senat with conformity in and and person in office “Deputies their exercise that stipulates Constitution 1993 Czech the of 27.1 parliamenta other for than defectors the for lower much be will tha views different with fraction a forms group a such if happens speci are there 2004), (Kopecký group parliamentary a form to parliament of members 10 least at Although counterparts. European stricte are rules PPG The voting. preferential with system parliamentarians Czech The Hungarian parliamentary rules stipulate that at least at that stipulate rules parliamentary Hungarian The te cutis Bni 20) Seii Hnain alaetr rule parliamentary Hungarian Specific 2005). (Benoit countries other dr than rather system electoral mixed a implemented has which rules Ea only of the is Hungary sets Bulgaria, with different Together representation. two and thresholds electoral separate syst mixed-member a districts, of sets distinct three with Hungarian parliamentary system functions under a very complex electora complex very a under functions system parliamentary exhibit a high level of voting unity even within an electoral electoral an within even unity voting of level high a exhibit 88

15 seats in the parliament are are parliament the in seats 15 em, a two-round system, two system, two-round a em, d iaca bnft, which benefits, financial nd The 2007 average country country average 2007 The ta toe f hi East their of those than r fic restrictions as to what to as restrictions fic ry groups. Article 26 and and 26 Article groups. ry in the Senate, or in their their in or Senate, the in awing from examples of examples from awing they have taken and in in and taken have they rliamentary fractions. fractions. rliamentary tErpa country st-European are needed in order in needed are or Senator may be be may Senator or o proportional for ih a lat in least at hich, n those of the the of those n g parties. The The parties. g y actions, as as actions, y regarding s ors shall shall ors l system system l CEU eTD Collection party SZDSZ, which joined the MSZP in government after the 1994 el 1994 the after government in MSZP the joined which SZDSZ, party Polish FIDESZ, unity onaverage as although has ideological well increased its centralization party the unity, its maintain to order in split, experts in 2007 are similar to those of Hungarian parties. The parties. Hungarian of those to similar are 2007 in experts unity The index. Rice the of scores the by judging popular more the opinion, own their follow to or line partythe follow to voting: MPs gives This electorate”. the of instructions any by bound be not representati be shall “Deputies that stipulates Constitution Article group. a form to required being MPs 15 countries; European are PPGs the concerning rules Parliamentary list). the from expr to allowed were voters Polish elections 2001 (until systems wit shared characteristic a list; open PR a with system for mainly left members its of Many consequences. without not was lib from switched elections 1998 the won party and votes gained it theAlthough 2005). (Enyedi conservatism 1990s, mid the In FIDESZ. is nowadays the with party The low. relatively and 3.07, is behavior of unity a is. 2007 Hungarian The interest. party the with coincide necessarily bill a on voting when interest public the exactly what lib at MP an leaves which cases, Slovak or Czech Polish, the in found pr further no with interest”, public the in act Parliament of t specifies constitution fra Hungarian the of 20.2 party Article 246). 2005: (Benoit another form all could another, to party one from defected i This group. official an form to entitled be to order in required MPs are the least united in their voting behavior, in the context context the in behavior, voting their in united least the are MPs 89

h the Czech and Slovak electoral electoral Slovak and Czech the h ovisions or details such as are as such details or ovisions ves of the Nation. They shall shall They Nation. the of ves increased a great deal for for deal great a increased iia t te et f the of rest the to similar Public interest may not not may interest Public same occasional internal occasional same s why former MPs, who MPs, former why s later being apparently apparently being later verage score on party on score verage scores given by the the by given scores s to preferences two ess highest unity score score unity highest two options when options two 104 of the Polish the of 104 ections. After the the After ections. h ohr liberal other the . of a presidential presidential a of to together ction hat “Members hat erty to decide decide to erty rls to eralism this CEU eTD Collection parties (Grecu et al. 2003). Party parliamentary groups do not not do groups parliamentary Party 2003). al. et (Grecu parties semi-pres to close system a 2008), (until system proportional rsdnil diitain n dslyn, hrfr, hg level high a therefore, displaying, and administration presidential Romania votes. were stil from line defections the party but conflicts were reported theory should suppress unity) with a directly elected president president elected directly a with unity) suppress should theory Russia Russia resul a issue factionalism.exacerbated and leadership as decade, last the during splits several experienced from scores unity lowest the of one displaying Party Liberal wit 2.69, was 2007 in score unity country’s aggregated The rules. PPGs Deput of Chamber the of orders standing the in rules disciplinary There group. a form to order in necessary are MPs ten only low: size the Europe, Eastern and Central in cases other the in As impera any and people the of service the in be shall senators their of exercise the “in that stipulates constitution Romanian Art restrictions. any without another to party one from defections the by evidenced clearly behavior, MPs’ to relating regulations raiain f h pltcl ate a te eea lvl al level, ca federal the this at parties of political peculiarities the of The organization unity. damage theory, in least at federal a and practice) in presidential more (but constitution semi-presidential a system, electoral mixed a with coexist s n nsa cs i te es ta uepcel hg lvl o vot of levels high unexpectedly that sense the in case unusual an is displays a relatively low level of voting unity in the context the in unity voting of level low relatively a displays 90

state structure. This should, should, This structure. state tive mandate shall be null”. be shall mandate tive requirements for a PPG are PPG a for requirements our sample. The party has has party The sample. our huh otold y the by controlled though political system by the the by system political high number of MPs’ MPs’ of number high o acmltd and accumulated of t adt, euis and deputies mandate, is no mention of PPGs of mention no is but highly centralized centralized highly but identialism (which in in (which identialism l rare in parliamentary rare l in ae tit ue and rules strict have e o ohr distinct other or ies ce 9 f h 1991 the of 69 icle e rs fo the from arise se f centralization of of a closed list list closed a of h the National the h ing unity unity ing CEU eTD Collection political arena. As country experts agree, political partie political agree, experts countryarena. As political The c republic the of president the with power personalized of model Russ of character special the Secondly, MPs. its of convergence hig the has (ER) Russia United while behavior, of unity lowest the parti of scores unity the among difference large the Firstly, mentioning worth aspects a other are There index votes. “nay” of as recorded number Rice the account the into takes why one if and 0.93 from voting, 0.44 to when dramatically abstention of cases many so are expla This place. takes Duma the in vote actual the when abstain those for option One line. party the to according vote the impose wit rule majority simple two-third a with which, to (Remington, according procedure” rules “solidarity the under rules strict Russ the by factions called are (which PPGs The 2004). (McFaul and East Europe, old and new democracies, new and old Europe, East and from scores, partyaggregate unity of cross-countryFrom investigation the decided himself the elections. in headPutin to list the ER and leadership the by suppressed however was attempt The economy. st and redistribution like issues on turn different a take to wanted wi wing liberal left a create to undertaken was attempt an is it as surprising, not is it party united most the is ER admini presidential the favor to but programs, their implement to r vr pwru ad hi fntoig xlis h vr hg o hi or high very the explains functioning their and powerful very are syste presidential or state federal (i.e unity party favor not first pattern first is that whenever party decentralization and systemic factors factors systemic and decentralization party whenever that is 91

two two party unityparty also highly centralized. In 2005 In centralized. highly also s compete not for the possibility the for not compete s m) are encountered, the PPGs the encountered, are m) es. Yabloko is the party with party the is Yabloko es. hn h pry Te faction The party. the thin patterns who do not agree is to to is agree not do who ontrolling most of the of most ontrolling ate intervention in the in intervention ate ian constitution) have constitution) ian stration. The fact that that fact The stration. i te ato, they faction, the hin ins clearly why there there why clearly ins in the Russian case. Russian the in a dmcay s a as democracy ian mt 19: 472) 1995: Smith hest programmatic programmatic hest in 2007 president president 2007 in seem to emerge. to seem gh level of party of level gh both Western both bstentions which do which drops CEU eTD Collection behavioral unity (Germany, Norway, Switzerland). The Switzerland). Norway, (Germany, unity behavioral and new democracies were opposed. The hypothesis which linked partyThe syste were hypothesis opposed.and new democracies wa relationship same the as rule democratic with experience posit be to appears elites party of congruence ideological The in however, noticed, was difference significant A Europe. beha Eastern of terms in unity party of levels the in differences comparison regional the perspective, country aggregate the From survey.expert will chapters subsequent the in analysis in-depth the values, and unity party on scores survey expert our between found correlation basis the On values. index Rice the with hand in hand go really not to according or view party the to according vote to intention the a t underlined particularly have I index. unity party a construct in measurement every of weaknesses and strengths the emphasized or surveys elite votes, roll-call from either derived were which measureme possible with first dealt have I chapter this In 4.4 Conclusion of these weak, other is strong. traits is the centraliza party of strength the and rules PPGs of strength be to seems There Hungary). Slovakia, Republic, Czech France, stri less with and selection candidate and selection leadership ce party high with STV), vote, preferential formula, (plurality f less are theory, in which, systems electoral of association

second nts for party behavioral unity, unity, behavioral party for nts tion such that whenever one one whenever that such tion vior between Western and and Western between vior hat perceived factionalism, perceived hat s maintained when the old old the when maintained s ively related to a country’s country’s a to related ively be mainly focused on the the on focused mainly be vrbe o at unity party to avorable observed observed a trade-off between the the between trade-off a taiain n em of terms in ntralization ct PPGs rules (Ireland, (Ireland, rules PPGs ct expert surveys. I have have I surveys. expert showed no significant no showed the unity of attitudes. attitudes. of unity the MPs’ own views, do views, own MPs’ of a relatively high high relatively a of the Rice index Rice the pattern atmt to attempt n m age with agem with is an is CEU eTD Collection atrs nld cutis rm oh ein ad hs ugss ht f that suggests this and regions both from countries include patterns at uiy H6 hpe 2 a hrfr aty ofre. N confirmed. partly therefore was 2) chapter (H16 unity party at cnrlzto i sgiiaty ihr n eta Eas Central in higher significantly is centralization party policies. In Western Europe, a slightly higher level of disse of level higher slightly a Europe, Western In policies. country) was higher than the variance between countries. In order not not order In countries. between variance the than higher was country) (between countries within variance the sample, the in 23 the of out tha revealed levels behavior of unity of comparison cross-country The unity concerned. is least at entities, separate as regions two the treat not should nlec o ae soitd ih aiu lvl o pry nt. Ne unity. party of levels various with associated are or influence pos the in differences are there that show also behavior of unity the twopat attitudes, of unity difference the Apart the in regional from reforms. andmore economic institutional related to diss the Europe Eastern in while policy; asylum and immigration

ihr hn n h rs o te onre fo te ae ru. ha I group. same the from countries the of rest the in than higher unity and behavior of unity the where Spain, is this to exception only t as behavior of unity of level similar a but representatives ag ideological of level lower a have systems party younger economic and social, such as health care and social security, envi security, social and care health as such social, and economic unit for implications negative with and 2007 in important very Issues found newattitudes in democracies. for compensate would centralization high that argument my confirmed 93

en uoe Ti hs partly has This Europe. tern nt is caused by the laws on on laws the by caused is nt he older democracies. The democracies. older he as far as party behavioral party as far as reement amongst party party amongst reement ewer democracies with with democracies ewer ent was caused by laws by caused was ent ronment and energy and ronment il fcos which factors sible ve also shown that that shown also ve parties of the same the of parties etees h two the vertheless y of behavior were were behavior yof terns of achievingterns t in 18 countries 18 in t the low unity of of unity low the rhr research urther of attitudes are attitudes of o ae the make to CEU eTD Collection unity and unity. behavioral atti between relation the about discussion T detailed unity. a on incorporate impact their of strength the at and factors systemic nega or positive the on focused analysis chapters, subsequent the a detailed more A unity. at arrive to patterns two distinguished of overview general a offered chapter this level, aggregate of unity party about explanations exhaustive give to aiming Without a the with partyparties moreas countries, analysis across valid of t fallacy, ecological the of pitfalls the to vulnerable results 94

this clearly makes the case for case the makes clearly this the European countries and and countries European the nalysis is conducted in in conducted is nalysis tive impact of party or or party of impact tive he unit of analysis. of analysis. he unit uia (ideological) tudinal ee hpes also chapters hese behavior at the the at behavior CEU eTD Collection both Western and Central Eastern Western andboth Central Europe.

we only have party unity when parties are highly centralized? centralized? highly are parties when unity party have only we t democracy, representative and government party into translates hig that assume we If democracy. party internal of expense representative (i.e. democracy external of achievement the is democ of paradoxes the of one upon touches and democracyrepresentative part internal links which debate the to contributes analysis This rules. central party as such organizations, these within work at rules of point institutional the From legislature. the in size and status party’s the at and MPs, party specifically more members, programmati the at look I side organizational the From time. same and organizations as parties political consider I endeavor, this In f nlss s oiia pry n te xmls hc illust which examples the and party political is analysis of surveys. expert and surveys elite both on based been has and 2007, and 1996 anal The chapter. next the of focus the be will which factors compare unity explaining in bloc a al as will behave characteristics but variables, party to unity relating hypotheses the n will chapter The variable. dependent a as treated latter i and unity and attitudes of unity the between unity earlier made distinction for explanations level party with deals chapter This 5. 5. Party level explanations for party unity Eur in 95

ot only test against the data the against test only ot h party unity of behavior behavior of unity party h ae h rsls r from are results the rate overall ideology, power power ideology, overall ization and disciplinary and ization view, I investigate the investigate I view, ysis reported refers to to refers reported ysis d with the systemic systemic the with d o hw o party how show so of behavior, with the with behavior, of oevr o parties do Moreover as institutions at the at institutions as e usin s can is, question he eorc) t the at democracy) c cohesion of party of cohesion c dmcay and democracy y bid o the on builds t ope racy which which racy The unit unit The CEU eTD Collection between them. From one opinion to a specific action based on that that on based action specific a to opinion one From them. between par of level high a have they because entities united like behave prerequisite for the behavioral unity of MPs? Or, if not, is i is not, if Or, MPs? of unity behavioral the for prerequisite party traits in the party unity explanatory model, and it arr it and model, explanatory unity party the in traits party organizational including for grounds theoretical the further presents party decade,relateexactlyover and theypart how the to last traits for accounts chapter the of part last the while unity, behavioral rmtn b ter on edaos h ntoa itrs, pn oe pa some upon 73) interest,1988: (Ayling agreed” all are they which upon principle national the endeavors joint their by promoting similar lines, I explore unity of attitudes and behavior and advocat and behavior and attitudes of unity explore I lines, similar pref individual and politics intra-party on emphasis greater a Shepsl and Laver 2000, Garry and (Laver challenged been has assumption lat but 1990), Keman and Budge 1993, (Baron theories formation g coalition in actors unitary as perceived long been have parties definition,

cohesion or because of internal constraints that they encounter? Is a Is encounter? they that constraints internal of because or cohesion attitudes and unity of behavior when we compare political parties political compare we when behavior of unity and attitudes betwee distinction the on emphasis an with proceeds chapter The of attitudes? comp to order in behavior of unity party influence factors internal are to be tested. The third section ascertains the influence of influence the ascertains section third The tested. be to are sus Emn Bre eie a oiia pry s a oy f m of body “a as party political a defined Burke Edmund issues. do they what and say politicians what that show will section This attitudes behavior of 5.1 Party of versus unity unity 96

t the case that systemic or or systemic that case the t . ives at hypotheses which hypotheses at ives In keeping with Burke’s with keeping In party characteristics on characteristics party erences. Working along Working erences. the changes in several in changes the ensate for low unity low for ensate e a clear distinction distinction clear a e y unity. across Europe. It Europe. across opinion there is a is there opinion are two different two are ty programmatic programmatic ty factors and other and factors n party unity of of unity party n ttitudinal unity a a unity ttitudinal vrmn and overnment en united for for united en e 1990) by by 1990) e ely this this ely rticular rticular CEU eTD Collection parliament are free to vote as they want, in reality, the MP the reality, in want, they as vote to free are parliament which - party parliamentary the party, national the party, unity of behavior measured by the Rice index alone in figure 5.2. Ideolo 5.2. figure in alone index Rice the by measured behavior of unity comparis same the Similarly, 5.1. figure in Europe in families compar is surveys, elite the on based unity attitudinal 1996, of As sa the share who opinions. individuals like-minded of up made and united always not realize commonly than more reality distort can simplifications s research My behavior. in unity as same the not illus is attitudes page, next the on presented figures The representatives. t control they whereby apparatus the strengthened increasingly b or party their as opinion same the have they because either Even if nearly all Western and Central Eastern democracies a democracies Eastern Central and Western all nearly if Even efficiently. jeopar be will policies public into programs of translation process very the wishes he/she as vote to free is MP every St constitutions. national their in MPs their for freedom individual parliamentary Most paradoxes. its has process representation representat is democracy modern that agreement is there While or relatedinfluencepossible some countries, church in factors can of relations, the be unions trade these, Besides MP. individual an of decision vote the - factors intervening many with distance considerable

dized and will not take place place take not will and dized s vote in a united manner united a in vote s on is presented with the with presented is on democracies emphasize democracies ecause the parties have have parties the ecause ssume that members of of members that ssume can all alter the final final the alter all can d. Political parties are parties Political d. f ersnain and representation of hows, therefore, that that therefore, hows, s te constituency the rs, ive democracy, the the democracy, ive trate that unity in in unity that trate er parliamentary heir l,i rcie if practice, in ill, ed across party party across ed . . gical unity is is unity gical vn the even me me CEU eTD Collection based on MPs’ declarations from 1996 elite surveys, on the question of t of question the on surveys, elite 1996 from declarations MPs’ on based

Figure 5.1 Unity of attitudes by party family in party attitudes family by in Figure of 1996 Unity 5.1 oe te crs r i fgr 51 te ihr h uiy f attit of unity families. the higher the 5.1, figure in are scores the lower pol about views their in MPs party the are similar less the st the higher The positions. policy specific MPs’ the of deviation m therefore is attitudes in Unity areas. policy specific on attitudes as of 1996 when party family is taken into consideration. into taken is family party when 1996 of as attitudes a behavior of unity between difference the portrays 5.2 and comp 5.1 Afigures time. that at policies their around united much very were ecologis regional, ethnic the Especially Europe. in families ideolo party of levels different illustrates above 5.1 Figure

1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 (standard deviation of MP's policy attitudes) MP'sattitudes) (standardpolicy of deviation ecologist 1.19 communist 1.16 social democraticsocial 2.15 liberal 1.72 Christian democrat Christian partyfamily 1.77 conservative 2.18 nationalist 2.45

98 agrarian 2.85

ethnic regionalethnic 1.62 special issuespecial 3.87

easured by the standard standard the by easured ad omns parties communist and t c aes Teeoe the Therefore areas. icy gical unity across party party across unity gical Bars Bars show means nad deviations, andard ds ihn party within udes Although unity of unity Although

rsn f both of arison heir position position heir nd unity of of unity nd

CEU eTD Collection behavior and unity of attitudes are correlated at 0.40, they are not not are they 0.40, at correlated are attitudes of unity and behavior ewe pry aiis Vtn aog h pry ie appear lines party the along Voting families. party between because other outside agents impose unity, such as the church or the trade unions. unions. because unity, impose the church such agents the outside as trade other or

Figure 5.2 Unity of behavior partyFigure of familyUnity by 1996 (Rice's index) 5.2 important for MPs and for parties. It where for andparties. parliament important in for MPs is public voting in variation much not is There unity. voting about said be cannot par towards attitudes the in variation of lot a is there While ( restrictions institutional parties, respective the of status meas disciplinary or restrictions party voting: their in united m that factors other be could there presented, cases contradictory acros families party other the with compared when MPs their in lowest the have they but behavior their in parties united most iss special and agrarian The together. vary always not do they

100.00 5 0025. 0050. 0075. 0.00

ecologist 94. 96 communist 94. 33 social democraticsocial 94. 95 92. 52 liberal Christian democrat Christian partyfamily 92. 45 conservative 88. 19 nationalist 99 87. 25

agrarian 96. 16 ethnic regionalethnic 93. 77

special issuespecial 97. 37 like the electoral system) or or system) electoral the like ty ideology, the same thing thing same the ideology, ty ures imposed, the power power the imposed, ures attitudinal homogeneity attitudinal ue parties appear as the the as appear parties ue s to be indeed very very indeed be to s s Europe. In the two the In Europe. s policy decisions are decisions policy the same thing and thing same the k te P very MPs the ake Bars Bars show means scores

CEU eTD Collection party unity expert survey expert unity party between raw calculations of Rice index and the valu the and index Rice of calculations raw between government future against vote to threatened whips, party the with and discussions after even who, MPs Labour ago. the among rebellion caused years ten government same the by introduced was which rate the withdrawing by process taxation the changed 2007, June in Minister Br new the as Blair Tony followed who Brown, Gordon crisis, financial condit the In parliaments. national European in votes over dissent much abortion or homosexuals of rights social also and policy defense inte and enlargement EU rights, minorities’ redistribution, as such surprising not is result The unity. voting of lack a with association three types of factionalism considered, factionalism of types three ideolog to than behavior to more pertaining clearly unity, of lack the subs or leadership (ideological, factionalism that attestation of unity with correlated similarly not are but behavior of unity negat appear factionalism of types All consideration. into taken when two, the between difference the portrays 5.1 Table another. one they that means clearly which .38, at correlated (ideological) cetd ne o pry nt (.. ntne o ab of i when vote a disagreement ofinstances instances considered, (i.e. unity party of index accepted o many overlooking unity, voting of image clearer a Enyedi, Borz, The much. changed not has years ten after situation The ability deliverplatform. to the promised future for votes secure and policy shape will parties where a practice, into put platform policy parties’ a and ratified la in future the for experts of usage the validates 13 The expert scores on voting unity are correlated a correlated are unity voting on scores expert The 13 illustrates unity of behavior (voting) and unity of attitudes of unity and (voting) behavior of unity illustrates

rge comparative studies. Of course there is a diffe a is there course Of studies. comparative rge issue factionalism issue 100 s not actually reached in the House etc.). etc.). House in the reached actually snot t .60 with the Rice Index values from 1997, which 1997, from values Index Rice the with .60 t e judgments, but I expect the expert values to give to values expert the expect I but judgments, e stentions, types of votes considered, time period period time considered, votes of types stentions, f the problems the Rice index has as a generally generally a as has index Rice the problems the f

nd it is also in the parliament parliament the in also is it nd proves to have the highest highest the have to proves tantive) is an indicator for indicator an is tantive) cannot be confused with with confused be cannot elections based on their their on based elections attitudes. This is an is This attitudes. ively correlated with with correlated ively bills. The internal The bills. , as recent issues issues recent as , rto, taxation, gration, a hv caused have law factionalism is factionalism ten pence tax tax pence ten . u o the of Out y. h measure The negotiations negotiations ad 2007 Janda ts Prime itish os f a of ions rence rence

CEU eTD Collection ** correlation significant at 0.01 level; data sour level;data 0.01 at significant **correlation behavior behavior 06/07 essec o te atr fr xml i Asra FŐ or FPŐ Austrian in example for latter, the of persistence at cii ld o ‘’ un taey rm h gvrmn w government the from strategy turn ‘U’ a to led crisis party leadership for case the is same the and ideology, party overall atti of attitude unity of unity exclude not does with factionalism issue of existence than 5.1) table 0.01, at significant -.56 coefficient of unity with associated negatively more is factionalism Issue orminister a former partyleader. eithe formed groupings reformist Atlantic and traditionalists occ area this in conflicts The 2007. in divided still were they alone are policy other all on united is party the While factionalism. illustrative such another constitute Finland in democrats social The and form BZŐ, most of the FPŐ members and representatives agre representatives and members FPŐ the of most BZŐ, form and posi highly other with together party the leave Haider leader m which nationalists, the and populists the between conflicts from their in united not are members their that imply necessarily Table correlations attitudes unity 5.1Factionalism, ofof and behavior unity of measures those the easeby affected new to situation policy. meant the factionalism factionalism factionalism Ideological Leadership attitudes Unity of Unity of Issue Unity of behavior behavior 2006/07 -.438** -.437** -.569** N=178 N=174 N=175 N=174 N=174 .381** 1 factionalism Leadership -.437** -.391** N=182 N=182 N=174 N=182 N=178 .637** .702** ce: 2007 Borz, Enyedi, Janda party unity expert sur expert party unity Janda Enyedi, Borz, 2007 ce: 1 101

factionalism factionalism - -.402** N=174 N=182 N=182 N=182 N=178 .702** .877** .569 Issue Issue 1 ** r around a former foreign foreign former a around r tioned party personalities party tioned political beliefs. Apart Apart beliefs. political Z pris de not does parties, BZŐ behavior (correlation behavior factionalism as, on foreign policy policy foreign on as, -.439** -.345** ih hn introduced then hich N=174 N=182 N=182 N=182 N=178 Ideological .877** .637** s with respect to the to respect with s atoaim The factionalism. 1 e on stronger anti- stronger on e example of issue of example d te former the ade ur between the the between ur ue. The tudes. -.345** -.402** -.391** N=174 N=178 N=178 N=178 N=178 .381** attitudes Unity of 1 vey vey CEU eTD Collection at mmes n Ms hr smlr eif te te leve the then beliefs similar share MPs and members party behavior. The hypotheses to be to testedbehavior. are as follows. The presented hypotheses party characteristics such as party size, party origin, p origin, party size, party as such characteristics party ir lvl explanations level Micro party theoretical level for 5.2 The explanations case be tested.will pa and systemic major the where chapter next the and sections w restrictions systemic institutional or party from results of unity Whether different. be may environment institutional surrounding int their and concepts, distinct are behavior of unity and attitudes strengthens the this arg Overall, areasconcerned. the party policies agreement high fairly a and factionalism ideological and issue unite ideologically an as appear to practice in manages still leadershi of degree highest the exhibits survey, our from experts w Party National Front Belgian the is example clear Another for support more and enforcement, law stricter laws, immigration

The general expectation is that that is expectation general The (programmatic cohesion) also manifest high behavioral unity in parliam in unity behavioral high manifest also cohesion) (programmatic introduced in chapter two of this thesis with the aim of testing t testing of aim the with thesis this of two chapter in introduced which of others with together some unity party consider of model my I in above mentioned unity. party about theory particular a have not to traits party relate only studies These 2007). Rahat 2002, Hazan 1996, Norris 1985, King and Janda 1982, Janda and Harmel 1980, (Janda selection

pry ee) o pry unity party for level) (party ate wt a ih cr o uiy f attitudes of unity on score high a with parties 102

arty centralization or candidate or centralization arty

u epai o te political the on emphasis put l b caiid n h next the in clarified be ill d party, with low levels of levels low with party, d among its MPs insofar MPs its among ih acrig o the to according hich, heir effect on unity of unity on effect heir t lvl hypotheses level rty l of rebellion in a a in rebellion of l families in poverty. in families ument that unity in that ument p factionalism but but factionalism p party unity but do but unity party rcin ih the with eraction h factors the ent have been been have behavior behavior (H1).

If CEU eTD Collection prior to important voting in parliament, or after dissent has a has dissent after or parliament, in voting important to prior measure Disciplinary term. short the in least at parliament parliament will be quite low. Sometimes high cohesion can be ac be can cohesion high Sometimes low. quite be will parliament parties will contribute positively to the behavioral unity unity behavioral the to positively contribute will parties this kind of coercion cannot create unity of attitudes but could influenc could but attitudes of unity create cannot coercion of kind this codn t a at’ pwr status. power party’s a to according opposition. the in parties the than united espe will government in are which those body; unified a of image parti popularity, maintain and voters their keep to order In nonework, of probably these the most party a measures will spli suffer They convention. annual general party’s the or leadership party the pa the in stipulated clearly be can they Officially formal.

decision making at the party central office, central party the at makingdecision cohesion is more plausible than in Western Europe, a trade-offa Europe, Western in than plausible more is cohesion le lower a for prospect the where Europe, Eastern and Central well as unity behavioral on influence positive a have to expected rm uue oiain o te at lists. party the on nominations future from m they pr of united loss with warnings expulsion, stay as such measures disciplinary to order In 2002). (Harmel function they which in and adapt to variouscapabilities posses parties Political behavioral high unity order in centralization high show to expected are homogeneity attitudinal unity.achieve to order in place take could centralization (H3). (H3).

In order to maintain themselves in power, the the power, in themselves maintain to order In 103

therefore therefore

Disciplinary measures enforced by the the by enforced measures Disciplinary

eairl nt i epce t vary to expected is unity Behavioral a high degree of centralization is centralization of degree high a change given the environment changegiventhe rties’ statutes and decided by by decided and statutes rties’ (H4). As with centralization, with As (H4). Parties with a low level of of level low a with Parties s can either be informal or or informal be either can s es will try to preserve the preserve to try will es lready occurred. When When occurred. lready

between cohesion and cohesion between vel of programmatic programmatic of vel companied by strong strong by companied ivileges or removal or ivileges cially behave more more behave cially (H2). Especially in in Especially (H2). may be applied applied be may t. t. e behavior in a in behavior e to achieve to y apply ay CEU eTD Collection ate hv a hre rne f oiy ra t avct ad ofte and, advocate to areas policy of range shorter a have parties become more and more dependent on the resources coming from the state. comingbecome theand state. more from more on the dependent resources expe not them, of most have, Europe Eastern Central in parties alaet a as mte a i lre pris t a b can it parties larger in as matter also can parliament parliam in voting when behavior of terms in least at then behavior), especially those which are dependent on their leaders and which a which and leaders their on dependent are which those especially extreme- with cohesion high associate 34) (2002: Brichta and Pedahzur parliamenta their deter should parties these within democracy ideol that fact the from stems expectation The both. of terms in be unite more the are, parties the extreme ideologically more The hardly speak of mass parties in Europe nowadays. Moreover, eve Moreover, nowadays. Europe in parties mass of speak hardly M and (Katz parties cadre to parties mass from transit the behavior of terms in rest the tg Eyd 20) n ae ihr iig o pel o cat a to appeal to aiming either are and 2006) stage(Enyedi according to whichaccording to expecta old the (1967) Duverger and (1970) Ozbudun from Drawing scholars. e explored been not has unity party and ideology between link The the legislature in size their inversely to proportional know if they can run the risk of having MPs vote against government government against vote MPs having of Consequently, risk the run can they if know governme size, coalition and size party the on Depending agreement. incumbents will try to portray unity, if not on both dimensions of unit of dimensions both on not if unity, portray to try will incumbents

(H7). This unity can manifest either in terms of attitudes or in in or attitudes of terms in either manifest can unity This (H7). ate i gvrmn ae xetd o e ey ntd n parliame in united very be to expected are government in parties leftist parties are more centralized and therefore more united than united more therefore and centralized more are parties leftist (H6), is to be challenged by this thesis, especially given especially thesis, this by challenged be to is (H6), 104

(H5). (H5). mr dfiut o oe to come to difficult more e air 1996) such that we can we that such 1996) air ch-all electorate or to to or electorate ch-all d they are expected to to expected are they d in fo defecting. from rians terms of behavior, orbehavior, of terms n the newly formed formed newly the n xtensively by party by xtensively re not completely not re gcly extreme ogically ent. Party size in in size Party ent. , o internal low n, y (attitudes and (attitudes y t ate will parties nt right parties, parties, right rienced that that rienced bills. tion, nt, nt,

CEU eTD Collection Party behavioral unitybehavioral Party eairl nt i uiomt i te cin o pry representa party of actions the in uniformity is unity behavioral call votes, the expert assessments and another Rice opinion index index opinion Rice another and assessments expert the votes, call correlation between the Rice index based on roll-ca on based index Rice between the correlation 1998 (Riedlsperger m and cohesion authority his re-enforce to order in resign to threatened even expel who leader authoritarian an of example another is Austria, in fac to closed party the kept strength and dominance whose Pen, Le unde maintained cohesion high the was defeats, electoral its survive elect national the for candidates nominate to continuing in (FN), Front th of success the for argument (1995) Veugelers’ institutionalized. 15 14 t to parliamentarians the of responses the using created was the and discussed be to concepts major the presents section This data5.3 Variables and whygoing anotherideologicallyextreme ones is and be to this reason H7 is pa other in exist however, can, elements two Those centralization. leadership strong a upon based made been has unity and ideology Enyedi, Janda party unity expert survey. As mentioned in the previous the in mentioned As survey. expert unity party Janda Enyedi, Borz, 2007 the and coding own my sources, secondary from data other and 1996-97 elite using compiled been has database The Europe. Eastern West in democracies 23 from parties 187 on based is analysis The after increasing the number of cases with the expert surveyafter of the unity expert with cases the increasing number on party be on effects level party disentangle to aims analysis The The formula or Rice DIF is: (party_view-own_view)/ is: DIF Rice formula or The survey expert and survey the elite on details More was measured using the party scores of the Rice index on rol on index Rice the of scores party the using measured was

). ). This

nutv cneto bten extreme-right between connection intuitive 105 lls and Rice DIF (Pearson index is .43 at sig. at 0.02 indexis .43 (Pearson DIF Rice and lls questionnaires are to be found in the appendix. theappendix. found in be to are questionnaires

(party_view+own_view)*100. There is a isa There (party_view+own_view)*100. havioral unity prior to and to prior unity havioral he question of how they how of question he surveys from around around from surveys ie i parliament. in tives rties apart from the from apart rties r measurementsir (RiceDIF) e French National National French e led rebels and has has and rebels led r the leadership of leadership the r tionalism. Heider tionalism. ern and Central Central and ern chapters, party chapters, and high party party high and iti party aintain in Europe. Europe. in os n to and ions tested. tested. 15 which ). 14 l- . CEU eTD Collection The most important party factor tested for its impact on on impact its for tested factor party important most The (table D). any 1appendix the analysis country into introduce bias not did cons bills of numbers different the Consequently, comparable. are wa There sample. the t that attests which variables two in the between found relationship parties the of scores index Rice the in account into taken bills of number the correlate to was Europe compar were scores the if see to order in out carried was which our in countries the from part in only bills, of number different s existing the and scarce very is index Rice the about Data values. t and voting when opinion party the follow would MPs majority whose reveale is (.43) relationship positive a data, same the on Based values index Rice the and floor the on voting when opinion own their follow majority the which in parties those between relationship negative surveys elite the from data the level, party the at aggregated former the of faults the overlook and replace can that proxy good a large in later the of usage the justifies which .60, at correlated the of values The unity. behavioral party on assessments expert the on based results the shows chapter This party. opini their of opinion own their follow would they if and parliament, the in vote would

analysis, I consider all these aspects of party centralizati aspects party of I these all consider analysis, 108- 1970: (Janda figure powerful single a in or persons few of hands concentra the is party centralized a of characteristic obvious 106

on with the aim of verifying if the of aim on with unity is is unity cores were calculated on a on calculated were cores tion of leadership in the in leadership of tion comparative studies as studies comparative last two indicators are are indicators two last d between the parties parties the between d eel a expected an reveals sample. The first test test first The sample. he Rice index scores index Rice he Rice index and the and index Rice centralization every country with with country every able at all across across all at able indicator. When When indicator. n significant no s f P would MPs of drd n every in idered he Rice index Rice he 0) I the In 109). on or the the or on (-.39). (-.39). . The . CEU eTD Collection between the incumbents and the opposition, while opposition, the and incumbents the between otae b Dvre (97 19 11, hi cnrlzto ad discipli and centralization their 171), 169, (1967: Duverger by portrayed party executive predominance were to be considered evidence for for evidence considered be to were predominance executive party Disciplinary measures, Disciplinary The argument linking leftist parties and unity goes back to mass to back goes unity and parties leftist linking argument The their impact and 5.4 Party unity characteristics on (Klingemannleft project andet theby right a comparative manifesto pe These to references the reflect percentages. score L-R final the right to contributed of sum the from percentages left sub by+100, to -100 from interval an on calculated were latter The Left-Right and affiliation family party classic of terms osqec o to esn, n mcaia ad n social. one and mechanical one reasons, two of consequence stipul Duverger as voting, of uniformity and told” are you as “Vote and alone discipline and organized be to had people of masses “large usin n etaiain rm h eie uvy ed a follows: as MPs The policy?” party in say most reads the has who disagreement, survey elite the from centralization on c question European across work unity party with connections predicted the of the aboveon most tight controlprocesse from national headquarters the party centralizat on scores High finances. party the of distribution the sele the party, the in makingprocess decision the respectto the assess to way direct more a in asked were experts The expulsions, loss of privileges or verbal warnings. warnings. verbal or privileges of loss expulsions, social because “instead of uniting individualistic ‘bourgeois’, the Socialist pa ‘bourgeois’, Socialist the individualistic of uniting “instead because as revealed by the experts and author’s observations, refer observations, author’s and experts the by revealed as 107

Power statusPower party ideologyparty LR ielgcl positions. ideological (L-R) level of centralization with centralization of level ction of the candidates and and candidates the of ction the categories grouped as grouped categories the depicts the difference the depicts ’ responses appraising responses ’ made that possible”, that made ion equate with very very with equate ion Mechanical is measured both in in both measured is parties as they were they as parties high centralization. high tracting the sum of sum the tracting l. 2006: 5). 2006: l. cnae which rcentages ts aoe s a as arose ates, “In case of of case “In utis The ountries. e levels. ne because s. s. rties to to CEU eTD Collection at ognzto. icpie n te uhrtraim f leaders of authoritarianism the and Discipline organization. party utfcto fr hs eod et s h wa ascain (0.32) association weak the is test second this for justification scores left-right family individual dimension. onthe and scores parties’ same the to belonging p as themselves parties’ define would the they originally in changes possible for accounts test mani party additional from derived being position left-right the with unity, left-rig parties’ at looking out carried been has furthertest party the Besides parties. wing right or centre the than unity expect and left the on situated being as parties democratic l analysis the family, party a as origin their Considering unitycentrali andSecondly anybetween their furthercheck link for will it unity of level highest the have still parties leftist whether firs will analysis The unity. of level their be to expected Bie van and (Mair size membership and followers their of terms 2007) Mair and (Katz then since changed and evolved have parties mass the (Duverger time long been a for parties cadre of characteristic has and dispersion” individual the over advantage considerable p the of directions the to according block a as voted which groups, exa for setting parliamentary a In efficiency. towards way priority the hence discipline”; and institutions communal to given t by who masses, working-class the for essentially formed were

108

ooks at communist and social and communist at ooks 1967: 171). Considering that that Considering 171). 1967: ht position and their level of of level their and position ht in behavior or in attitudes. in or behavior in ed to have a higher level of level higher a have to ed mple, “the homogeneity of of homogeneity “the mple, t explore and distinguish distinguish and explore t heir very nature are nature very heir aiy fiito, a affiliation, family they have given to to given have they ewe te party the between arty leaders, was a a was leaders, arty ee en s the as seen were orm ee if even rograms at fml. A family. party e 20) s is so 2001), zen et dt. The data. festo zation level. zation , at least in least at , major CEU eTD Collection ae o te xet uvy eut, hw ta te wnyoe li twenty-one the that shows results, survey expert the on based parties), Russian Agrarian Party, Progressive Party of Icela of Party Progressive Party, Agrarian Russian parties), Table 5.2 Mean Rice index valuesTable per index 5.2 Mean party Rice family1996 hig centralization either compensate for to that. the exhibit not do they 5.6, table in further shown as time, same uni parties onattitudinal highest score revealedagrarian donot earlier, the influence status power explicit the of analysis the in further aspect as unity, of level high their for explanation an be could i been have time the of most for and decades last the for strong agrarian Nordic Both parties). (agrarian Sweden in and Norway in fam party to according behavior of unity the represents 5.2 Table of terms in Europe, in families party of comparison general A 16 Nor in Party Progress the Denmark, in Party Progressive Iceland, Wom The as such parties, issue special and agrarian the in found hi the Instead, times. all at lines party along voting not were pa their that shows which index, Rice of values highest the show not communists (i.e. parties leftist the expectations, to Contrary Nationalist Nationalist partyfamily Note: italics refer to the highest and lowest value lowest and highest the to refer italics Note: data source: 1996 elite surveys elite 1996 source: data Total Conservative democrat Christian Liberal Ethnic regional Communist democraticSocial Ecologist Agrarian Special issue The grouping into party families was done by the p the by was done families party grouping into The Mean Mean

93.03 87.25 88.19 92.44 92.51 93.76 94.32 94.95 94.96 96.16 97.36

N 109 s arty manifesto research group. group. manifestoresearch arty

78 11 13 13 15 2 3 8 5 5 3

Std. Deviation Std. 7.26 2.47 9.91 9.34 6.99 2.66 5.82 6.09 3.80 3.96 2.96 nd and the Centre Parties Centre the and nd or social democrats) do do democrats) social or ghest unity of voting is voting of unity ghest which will be explored explored be will which their unity of behavior behavior of unity their

n oig nt. As unity. voting on n government. This government. n beral parties in my my in parties beral way (single issue issue (single way parties have been been have parties en’s Alliance in in Alliance en’s ilies rliamentarians hest level of of level hest ty at the and 16 n 1996. in CEU eTD Collection behavior as revealed by the experts. The ethnic regional and the and regional ethnic The experts. the by revealed as behavior eogn t a at fml gop n Rc idx aus Te dif The values. index Rice and group family party a to belonging s infcn frprimnay nt. al 53prry the portrays 5.3 Table unity. parliamentary for significant is aforementi the of any to belonging whether therefore, is, question s parties issue special and communist parties, regional ethnic the while unity, parliamentary on score lowest the have dataset expert the for least at data that, means This 2007 significant. appears the against model the of test statistical the in However, values. Riceleast index as shown theby 1996 the in behavior voting their in united more parties the make not does party especially and family party between certain a to belonging Consequently, than group family party a within variation more the groups, between differences the than higher much are groups dif significant no showed D), appendix 9 (table analysis Anova The perfamily assesTable party 5.3 Unity 2007(experts behavior of the liberals, as 1996,are the in least united parties. t and parties nationalist the with along time, this highest score Nationalist Nationalist partyfamily Note: italics refer to the highest and lowest value lowest and highest the to refer italics Note: data source: 2007 Borz, Enyedi, Janda party unitye Janda Enyedi, Borz, 2007 source: data Total Liberal Agrarian democraticSocial democrat Christian Conservative Ecologist Communist Ethnic regional Special issue 3.40 3.00 3.14 3.17 3.35 3.37 3.45 3.61 3.66 3.95 4.07 Mean 18 12 15 4 N 175 21 10 29 28 22 16 110 s xpert survey xpert

.44 .52 1.5 .41 DeviationStd. .75 .73 .44 .52 .52 .70 .71

s, it makes a difference as as difference a makes it s, ee o at uiy of unity party of level

ad er h tp The top. the near tand sments) sments) he communists, while communists, he to the leftist parties leftist the to refore there is much much is there refore special issue parties issue special oned party families party oned ainls parties, nationalist family groups. groups. family ference between between ference ferences within within ferences pry family party , parliament, at parliament, CEU eTD Collection overall model (Table 5.5). overall 5.5). (Table model howeve is, families, party other the to compared as affiliation, e The behavior. of unity on scores highest the of one have nationalists uni party and parties extreme ideologically linking hypothesis The rejected. therefore is behavior of unity and left ideological not does be link the concerning hypothesis The unity. on impact significant left the to affiliation but scores, unity party their of families party have only Not test. final the in difference Table 5.4 Anova analysis: unity of behavior 2007 and party family andTable unityanalysis: party 5.4 Anova family 2007 behavior of groups havespecific onunityfamily a of significant impact party b to remains What statements. above the confirms 5.4 table from overall their for to belong parties families party which to only families the all partyFrom 2007. as behavior of of level onunity variables compa allow table the in displayed coefficients The 5.5. table regress OLS the for results The unity. behavioral on score final statis matters unity on lowest or highest score which families af the whether test to order in created were variables Dummy Sum of Sum party unitye Janda Enyedi, Borz, 2007 source: data groups Within family Party groups Between behavior* of Unity special issue parties issue special and, to a certain extent, the extent, certain a to and, 67.07 67.07 57.75 9.32 Squares 111

173 173 164 Mean 9 Df xpert survey survey xpert liberals .35 .35 1.03 Square unity score. Anova analysis Anova score. unity the left been outscored in outscored been left the ty, even if, for 2007, the 2007, for if, even ty, ring the effects of party of effects the ring filiations with the party the with filiations too, show a significant a show too, r, not significant in the in significant not r, tically for the parties’ parties’ the for tically same applies for the for applies same behavior. behavior. per o ae any have to appear ion are presented in in presented are ion tween parties of the the of parties tween e tested is which which is tested e F Sig. Sig. 2.94 F xtreme-right xtreme-right considered, .003 .003 CEU eTD Collection ainls .038 Nationalist party overlap Norway (FRP), United Russia (ER) and Party of Social Justice Justice Social of Party and (ER) Russia United (FRP), Norway party unity. Their relative small size in parliament coul parliament in size small relative Their unity. party t as taken be cannot issue single the and arena parliamentary *p<.1; *p<.1; **p<.05;***p<.00; source:Data Borz, Enyedi, Janda 2007 party unity study at etaiain .270*** .236*** -.065 .086 executive/parliamentary national .168** Party -.121* Party centralization Unityattitudes of .108 Power status Ethnic regional Special issue Coefficients Liberal Communist Party model characteristics regressionTable model 5.5 Party characteristics the all on vote do they Still, program. party the from defect to and issue major one around programs their concentrate mostly they hi with associated are parties issue special why reason The Dependent variable: unity behavior of 2007;R icpiaymaue -.222** Disciplinary measures ih h mi pry aiis Ti mks hm oee a resi a however them makes This families. party main the with comple not are they because 2006) al. et (Klingemann group research party issue special a as designated is them of Each Russia. Pr Ireland, in (SF) Fein Sinn behavior: of unity on scores assigned parties issue special four only however, are, There unity. high 112 2 =.28; Adjusted R

.033

d be the other explanation for for explanation other the be d 2 gh unity seems obvious as obvious seems unity gh = .23;= N=172; by the party manifesto manifesto party the by he full explanation for explanation full he bills which pass the pass which bills ul aeoy when category dual in our dataset with with dataset our in so are less likely likely less are so PS, lo from also (PSS), ges at in Party ogress tely compatible tely CEU eTD Collection protest party which focuses only on the short term unfavorable ec unfavorable term short the on only focuses which party protest party anti-immigration as solely seen be it can nor populist, Norway and the Netherlands. Apart from those issues, immigration issues, those from Apart Netherlands. the and Norway Netherlands. The sensitive issues concerning abortion, rights for hom for rights abortion, concerning issues sensitive The Netherlands. immigration question came on to the political agenda and it cannot be cannot it and agenda political the to on came question immigration role of the church has caused more disagreement in Eastern Europe ( Europe Eastern in disagreement more caused has church the of role odd ih aaoe. t a nihr e osdrd xrm right extreme considered be neither can It paradoxes. with loaded P Progress The Putin. president of needs the follows Russia United I Northern to politic salience huge attaches the and (IRA) Army Republican is Fein Sinn unity. party to relation in analyzed Franc in parties liberal within dissent caused integration and EU issues. drugs and abortion homosexuals, for rights social church, the r rights, ethnic spending, state welfare taxes, redistribution, experience parties liberal survey, our by evidenced As unity. betwe association negative the explain could conscience, of freedom ide and values liberal these Theoretically, 1957). Schock (Bullock, affe which decisions about consulted be to individual of rights the and m of rights the politics, in justice conscience, of freedom the values liberal - economy market the and self-governance inquiry, - themes main four on focused being as perceived classically liberali political While unity. acr behavioral low with parties associated liberal parties, issue special to opposition In andcircumstances Bjørklund (Andersen 1990). source of dissent within VVD (People’s Party for Freedom and and Freedom for Party (People’s VVD within dissent of source 113

e, Switzerland, Germany, Switzerland, e, eligiosity and the role of role the and eligiosity s Erp tn t be to tend Europe oss religious tolerance, free free tolerance, religious sm (Salvadori 1977) is is 1977) (Salvadori sm as it existed before the before existed it as inorities, civil liberties civil inorities, isn o ise like issues on dissent l ig f h Irish the of wing al onomic and political and onomic reland policy while policy reland Democracy) in the the in Democracy) and ideas relate to to relate ideas and comes as an extra an as comes arty in Norway is Norway in arty as, especially the especially as, within SZDSZ in in SZDSZ within osexuals and the and osexuals seen purely as apurely as seen ntoait or nationalist , n ieas and liberals en ct him or her or him ct enlargement CEU eTD Collection party and usually they all perform the same way when it comes it when way same the perform all they usually and party Figure 5.3 Liberal parties and unity of behavior unity 2007 Figure and parties 5.3Liberal theinside parliament. tha more have Switzerland and Denmark Belgium, countries. respective libe each for score behavior of unity average the show columns the acros parties liberal the within unity the compares 5.3 Figure Belgium.liberal parties in wit disunity caused have divisions regional while libe Poland, Romania, Hungary, the within disagreements to lead have institutions, democratic We ove ideas and issues, economy Market in Ireland. or Italy as such Europe countries catholic predominantly in and Romania) in PNL Hungary,

the parties on the left-right scale. The latter might be a be might latter The scale. left-right the on parties the ideolog the using out carried been has 6 hypothesis of test second The

Mean mean assesment of parliamentary unity 2006/2007

0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 Belgium 3.4

3 Denmark 3.3

2 France 3.7

1 Germany 3.6

1 Hungary 3.1

1 Iceland 2.1

1 Ireland 3.6

1 Italy 3.5

country 1 114 Luxembourg 4.0

1 Netherlands 2.0

1 Norway 3.4

1 Poland 2.7

1 Romania 1.7

1 better indicator of the party party the of indicator better Russia 1.7 1

s Europe. The figures in in figures The Europe. s Sweden 3.7 1

to unity of behavior behavior of unity to Switzerland 2.4

2 UK 2.8 a pry n the in party ral 1 ical position of position ical r strengthening r a pris of parties ral n one liberal one n 0 1 2 3

hin the hin stern CEU eTD Collection behavior (parliamentary unity) (table 12, appendix D). Party fa Party D). appendix 12, (table unity) (parliamentary behavior 3) (2006: al. et Klingemann families. party same the to belonging partyweakensfamilies whenrelevance of party discussing unity. the schol many by right own their in family party a considered even Specia behavior. of unity explaining in difference a make family and issue special the only 5.5, table in shown as but, significant the of any explain not does position left-right test, covariance par different on based groups various of behavior of unity mean the considered areindepende the of effect the covariance, of analysis statistical position left-right and family party When Beyme. su scholars other and Duverger by earlier mentioned hypotheses the t by assessed is it when or votes, roll-call the by measured e behavior, of unity the explain not does positioning left-right The grouped andare et 6). morality traditional al. 2006: (Klingemann together securi where Right), (for Burke Edmund of speeches and writings the tr capitalist the of hardships the with together welfare emphasi that writings Marxist in found were research manifesto categories L-R Similar analysis. factor through investigated Left–Rig the on categories specific The programs. published on a positioning ideological of interdependent parties makes scale party the program specific the of basis the on election each p measure they that is data manifestos party of strength unique ideologica between differences the down pins it because ideology

115

ansformation (for Left), and in in and Left), (for ansformation he experts. Both tests reject tests Both experts. he nt variables was tested on tested was variables nt to those generated by the the by generated those to as on o i. The it.” for down lays variance in the unity of of unity the in variance arty policy positions in positions policy arty nd has estimates based estimates has nd mily however appears however mily l issue parties are not not are parties issue l l positions of parties of positions l e nevnin and intervention ze ars and this further this and ars t ieso were dimension ht stipulate that “the “the that stipulate ty families. In the In families. ty

the liberal party party liberal the te we i is it when ither ch as Maor and Maor as ch n h same the in y enterprise ty, CEU eTD Collection parties. An intriguing finding is that, along with the communist communist the with along that, is finding intriguing An parties. Table 5.6 Mean party centralization per partyTable family 1996 5.6 Mean centralization party Europein (table 5.6). democ Christian within or parties conservative the within imposed simil is parties communist within manifested control leadership within control the descripti the fit not do parties Leftist parties. democratic than higher even structures, party national their of concentration similar a show parties conservative anddemocrats ol epc, omns ate apy ihr etaiain tha centralization higher apply parties communist expect, would the are parties issue central special while the centralized, moderately at controlled strictly most those amongst not are lea authoritarian their to due level central the at control highest parti nationalist expect, would one As Europe. across families centraliza the of overview comparative a offers the 5.6 Table by organs? imposed discipline more there is low, is unity ideological .40) coefficient (correlation unity voting in variance the with hand in hand of variance the of percent twenty only earlier, specified As

Nationalist Nationalist partyfamily Special issue democraticSocial Liberal Agrarian Ethnic regional Ecologist Conservative Communist democrat Christian data source: 1996 elite surveys elite 1996 source: data Total

Mean 67.56 44.50 60.50 62.69 63.13 65.43 68.02 70.34 70.50 72.00 91.90

100 23 12 13 18 N 3 3 6 6 9 7 116

Deviation 23.68 15.27 16.00 19.90 17.21 37.50 29.54 12.45 17.36 21.45 46.92 Std. Std.

on of Duverger anymore. The The anymore. Duverger of on es cnrlzd A one As centralized. least dooia uiy goes unity ideological ders. Agrarian parties parties Agrarian ders. parties, the Christian the parties, ar to the restrictions the to ar s hw y a the far by show es sca democratic social n ratic parties overall parties ratic power imposed by by imposed power ee bt r still are but level in nie party inside tion ainl party national h social- the . When When . CEU eTD Collection parliament, apart from within the special issue parties and parties issue special the within from apart parliament, oiin n the on position therefore confirm that unity of behavior is undeniably achieved par achieved undeniably is behavior of unity that confirm therefore and positive is behavior unity favors of central level at making the Concentration of decision behavior of unity on centralization of impact The of behavior. convergence programmatic parties’ by expressed as toget former, vary unity behavioral and unity attitudinal do only Not H2. and the in evidence sound is which unity, behavioral party on effect strong As portrayed in table 5.5, As portrayed 5.5, table in unity onbehavioral unity andattitudinal The effects centralization of aparty with and dictatorial of complex style leadership program s other and la Duverger the for compensate instead that parties Nationalist emphasized. leadership authoritarian and discipline the communists or social-democrats the as such parties, leftist the n ocuin wehr pry eog t a certain a to belongs party a whether conclusion, In the three last families (Table party 5.6). democr social centralization; of level same the about have Europe democrat Christian and conservative communist, while level, central the with highest the those exhibit instead parties Nationalist amongst centralization. not are parties left-wing expected, le their and families party between correlation no is There

etrgt scaleleft-right party centralization os o peit o is P wl bhv i the in behave will MPs its how predict not does 117

and attitudinal unityattitudinal at familyparty vel of centralization and, as and, centralization of vel the liberals. Furthermore, liberals. the also leads to more unity unity more to leads also disciplinary rules at the at rules disciplinary , do not any longer have have longer anynot do , ck of a clearly defined defined clearly a of ck . . have a positive and have a positive r a a specific a has or ats scoring below below scoring ats tly at the expense the at tly ihs lvl of level highest support of H1 of support ate across parties ut strong. quite e bt the but her . We can. We cholars CEU eTD Collection y h cnrl at, n eun o spotn te oenet Te c The government. the supporting for return in party, central the by oiymkn ad itiuin f eore. s u eprs decla experts our As resources. of distribution and policy-making alleged dubious financial dealings, has been offered a chance to to chance a offered been has dealings, financial dubious alleged been had who member, FF former A branches. local the of choice candidates appointed executive FF the cases, of number a in Ireland, immediately is dissent any that procedure selection candidate Itis MP. an becomeand nominated be will who decides which office i it legislature, the in MPs of convergence behavior highest the Spanish of case the In selection. candidate or distribution finance deci the in apply can Centralization democracy. party internal of centr more far are but selection candidate over branches local qui offer parties British major Both example. such one is Blair wit Briti the that reveals high survey 2007 Our process. decision-making also but democracy, party internal high of impression whic dimension, selection candidate the on low be can Centralization the to prospect her hostile her return. of were rather area, who part and MPs local of opinions the against completely went decision unity. make time the of most that office concent party central the at making the is it Ultimately, centralized. more are finances, of de very a especia and process, have decision-making the but also selection, candidate parties Norwegian The Labour. do than center finan more hold Conservatives the that is them differencebetween 118

s the difference for party party for difference the s te a lot of autonomy to to autonomy of lot a te sh Labour party under party Labour sh alized with respect to to respect with alized sion making process, process, making sion return to FF in 2007 in FF to return cial resources at the the at resources cial parties, which have have which parties, te at central party the s l h distribution the lly punished. Also in in Also punished. ain f decision of ration that were not the not were that rset o the to respect h also through the through also y members from members y expelled due to to due expelled red, the only only the red, nrl party entral gvs the gives h centralized CEU eTD Collection ecn o te ate ta ae o s ielgcly ntd als united ideologically so not are that parties the of percent centralof levels high have alsocases the percentof 86 parties, be discussed in the legislatures and, if possible, the issues issues the possible, if and, legislatures the in discussed be mechanism. control agenda an via place takes process The behavior. also a is trai partiesbut which increase with to of their behavior, unity Disciplinary measures measures Disciplinary eaie orlto bten icpiay esrs n uiy of unity and measures disciplinary between correlation negative l central the at decision-making of tightening the with hand in hand go do att in unity to direction opposite the in vary to though, appear, decade measures Disciplinary debates. later for postponed then are oein o civ uiy f eair Wti te ih nt o attitude of unity high the Within behavior. of unity achieve to cohesion mak partie for tool a only also not is latter the parties that and centralization cohesive highly that shows survey expert Our centralization, with line same the On accompaniedregardless is level,relatively of it levels its high by mos as, behavior of unity for sufficient not is alone unity ideological to points distribution This behavior. of unity their uphold to want that ide of weapon a only not therefore is Centralization centralization. s e ae en o a, oh etaiain n dsilnr rul disciplinary and centralization both far, so seen have we As accordancewhen the to party they are applied rules. in effect are they declared, MPs British the and experts country tha not is frequency Their H4. validate and parties by achieved controlled from the centre, party leadership decides most of the of most decides leadership party centre, the from controlled 119 icpiay measures disciplinary

which could cause dissent dissent cause could which s with low programmatic programmatic low with s ization, while almost 60 whilealmost ization, applied over the last last the over applied o have high levels of of levels high have o v we nee and needed when ive time on the issues to to issues the on time of centralization. of centralization. lo xli unity explain also attitudes shown in in shown attitudes ologically disunited disunited ologically t high but, as the the as but, high t es favor unity of of unity favor es t of the time and and time the of t t of those parties oft those e use of party party of use e itudes, but they but itudes, If decisions are decisions If the fact that that fact the gop of group s evel. The evel. CEU eTD Collection basis, although the government whips hold ministerial offices and are and offices ministerial hold whips government the although basis, been over the last decade. It is also confirmed that the m the that confirmed also is It decade. last the over been Centralization oee, tre o wis mnueig cuig gon e [o e r be] [to men “grown causing maneuverings whips’ of stories however, rebe possible of and leaders members party backbench their warn among whips discontent show, records the As 2002). Ettinghausen (Rush, as known are what through business parliamentary organize they their within holders office recognized also are whips Opposition aoal ad ermna t uiy f eair Te hp d nt have not do whips The behavior. of unity to they detrimental and that favorable show records the but rules, disciplinary institutionalized w recognition official TheirThey Europe. in case special a them Commons. makes structures government of House the in place takes b persuasion using by and warnings rules, disciplinary imposing of unity achieving of case unusual an are UK the in whips party The the in party whips of mechanism parliament UK disciplinary The unityTable attitudinal 5.7 Centralization, corre and disciplinary measures table in 5.7). correlation (positive from the central party headquarters the party, parliamentary the and executive party national the of usage the higher the parties, of unity attitudinal the lower ideologicall of weapon a be to them clearlyconfirms 5.7, table **p<.01;*p<.05, Data source:2007 Borz, Enyedi, Janda party unity study overlap Exec./parl. party Centralization measures Disciplinary Unity of attitudes Unityattitudes of N=180 N=180 N=174 N=174 N=178 N=178 N=178 N=178 .477** .165* .137 1 party overlap 120 Exec./parl. N=174 N=174 N=174 N=174 N=172 N=172 N=174 N=174

.165* -.355 .033 1 ore overlap there is between between is there overlap ore Disciplinary disciplinary measures has has measures disciplinary measures more decisions are made made are decisions more -.348** N=178 N=178 N=172 N=172 N=182 N=182 N=176 N=176 .477** y disunited parties. The parties. y disunited .033 1 party. Between them them Between party. “the usual channels” usual “the efore a vote actually actually vote a efore are an example of example an are llions. There are are There llions. therefore paid. therefore can be both both be can lations lations behavior by by behavior a statutory statutory a of attitudes educed to to educed -.348** ti the ithin N=178 N=178 N=174 N=174 N=176 N=176 N=178 N=178 Unity Unity .137* -.355 1 of of

CEU eTD Collection Incumbency effects on unity? Incumbency on unity? effects government eair o pris n poiin s culy lgty higher slightly actually is opposition in parties for behavior http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/1702514.stm http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/1702514.stm it.” do to trying for whips the I Afgha to. allowed wasn’t I in dissent, to wanted who war MP an am the “I declared: against vote a denied was polici he transport because and importantly, health Labour the against protested Marsden governm the Armstrong, Hilary by treatment his about complaining Liberal the to Party Labour the from 2001 in defected who MP an of enforcem the Paul unity. party to that detrimental also be can rules analysis, disciplinary my of results the to point reports 10). 2002: Ettinghausen (Rush, sticks” and carrots punishments, and rewards some suita in more room ’a accommodation in was it past office the (in out-post Westminster shattered and aborted careers tears,

17 s a b se i tbe . ad al 58 n h nx pg, whether page, next the on 5.8 table and 5.5 table in seen be can As discipli excessive that nevertheless instead of leading risky, restoring party to defections be example an therefore are whips the defec The freakery”. “control term the with mechanisms whipping a to started media British the scandals, these after Soon MEPs. breakawa small a Party; Conservative Pro-European so-called pa with along LabourMPs dissatisfied of number a ranks their into b of unity to regards with significant not statistically however compa group the parties, incumbent for 3.3 to opposed as (3.4 government BBC news,”Why Labour’s Marsden defected” by Nick R Nick by defected” Marsden Labour’s news,”Why BBC or not, does not affect their unity of behavior. The mean average average mean The behavior. of unity their affect not does not, or

17 As a result, the British Liberal Democrats welcomed Democrats Liberal British the result, a As 121 (last accessed June 2008) 2008) June accessed (last

obison, available at: at: available obison, Marsden is an example example an is Marsden ehavior). This suggests This ehavior). fcin f ex-Torry of faction y nary measures can can measures nary ble for suicide’), of of suicide’), for ble scae h Labour the ssociate than for parties in in parties for than rty members of the of members rty n o to many too of ent tors who accused who tors Democrats, after Democrats, party unity. unity. party ent Chief Whip. Whip. Chief ent was bullied by bullied was ate are parties s u, most but, es itn He nistan. distant unity of unity io is rison These These in in CEU eTD Collection party behavioral unity. If incumbent parties have a comfortable a have parties incumbent If unity. behavioral party a there considered, is size party when even However, parties. ainls .030 .061 National exec./parliam. party overlap Nationalist Note: Note: entries are standardized beta regression coefficients; nertdmdl Coefficients model Integrated they happen. can to always some dissent which allowby for always a margin h primn a i i rfetd n h pretg o se .168** of percentage the in reflected is it as .015 parliament the is relationship tenuous this in impact anhave could which aspect One .142* -.001 .099 subsidies State Fragmentation -.285** -.013 Ceiling ondonations .282** .240*** Executive/legislative balance of power .087 .187*** Ballot structure -.111* magnitudeDistrict Disciplinary measures .115 -.097 Party centralization Unityattitudes of Ethnic regional Special issue Liberal Communist Power status Table 5.8 Party unity model integrated byrewards sides. both are widely recognized inc and opposition both by followed is which trait a is unity that Dependent variable: unity behavior of 2007; N=161; R *p<.1, **p<.05,*p<.1, ***p<.01; source:Data 2007 Borz, Enyedi, partyJanda unity study; 122

2 =.35; Adjusted=.35; R t hl b te governing the by held ats ppears to be no effect on on effect no be to ppears majority, then there is there then majority, umbent parties and its its and parties umbent 2 = .28;= the party size in size party the CEU eTD Collection yai rltosi, ie epcal a toe ate whic conditions parties those at especially aimed relationship, dynamic theoretical 2 chapter in shown model The are. they strong how and not, or the if see to was aim be The model. unity party the relation in considered static the shown has chapter this in analysis The change for 5.5 Accounting over decade the last convergenceareas, (figure versa 5.4on andpage vice on policy 126). decade, last the over increased has centralization party more relationshi influential positive a shows centralization party and the in change quantified the predicted As behavior. in unity achieve two the between trade-off a indeed is there if show can unity rel their and decade last the over variables two the in change T examined. are decade last the over changes when section following variables two the between relation dynamic or trade-off Any test really two. relationship between the cannot years specific per analysis static a A centralization. tw the between correlation party negative a require would relationship and unity ideological between independence sa the confirmed analysis 2007 The rejected. been has H3 analysis, level the at and, unity behavioral party affect independently they varia two the between correlation no is there As unity. ideological centraliz betweenpartyrelation no showed analysis snapshot 1996 The

was that, given the relative young age of the party systems i systems party the of age young relative the given that, was x , see themselves in the position of adopting measures adopting of position the in themselves see , 123

f hr i ay dynamic any is there if n Central Eastern Europe, Eastern Central n ationship with behavioral with ationship will be explored in the in explored be will relationships are there are relationships p between them. The them. between p o variables. However variables. o the higher the MPs’ MPs’ the higher the variables in order to to order in variables of the 1996 snapshot 1996 the of we te variables the tween h, in the light of of light the in h, me relationship of relationship me bles it means that means it bles ideological unity ideological y . The prediction The . ation and party and ation e computed he ly implies a implies ly trade-off CEU eTD Collection parliament, they will increase their level of centralizati of level their increase will they parliament, very a at arrive to order in and, 4) chapter in evidence given been oh n etr Erp ad n eta Esen uoe te oe p more the Europe, Eastern Central in and Europe Western in both Note: entries are standardized beta regression coef regression beta standardized are entries Note: above mentioned model. The higher centralization has become over the l the over become has centralization higher The model. mentioned above argument the favor 5.9 table in presented analysis regression the central party and cohesion programmatic in decade last the over voting the in change the about information provides survey expert 2007 The rules. unity attitudinal of degree high very a have not will parties the betwee difference fundamental a however is There behavior. of unity tools are mechanisms disciplinary and centralization both shown, As .232** chang variable: dependent ***p<.01; **p<.05, *p<.1, .302*** over the decade last Disciplinary applied measures Change centralization party in Changeattitudes of unity in unit of analysis political parties; N=131; R N=131; parties; political analysis ofunit Data source: 2007 Borz, Enyedi, Janda expert survey expert Janda Enyedi, Borz, 2007 source: Data Variables Indicators Indicators Variables changeTable of over thebehavior unity 5.9 Explaining in the decade last have applied the decade. last been over discip fewer the 2007, by become has behavior of unity party higher logical a As parliament. the in voting when agreement its higher p policy and ideology of terms in become has party a homogenous more manner, obvious an In behavior. voting MPs’ and ideology in both increased, 2 =.20; Adjusted R Adjusted =.20; 124 ficients; ficients; on party unity; unity; party on e in unity of behavior over the last decade; decade; thelast over behavior of unity in e -.121*

2 =.18; =.18; on and apply more disciplinary disciplinary more apply and on (for which has already has which (for ization. The results of results The ization. united vote in the in vote united osqec, the consequence, n the two. While two. the n otae i the in portrayed linary measures measures linary arty unity has has unity arty for achieving achieving for ositions, the ositions, ast decade, ast unity the CEU eTD Collection be generated by the party leadership or the parliamentary p parliamentary the or leadership party the by generated be T centralization. its increase will party the unity, behavioral the desire be to re-elected. the conditions of low party ideological unity, in order to achieve the achieve to order in unity, ideological party low of conditions the Eur Eastern and Central for especially 2, chapter in earlier temporal or relation causal any implying without experts) of together vary attitudes of unity and centralization in changes correlati This 5.7). table in presented already (.13, values snapshot betw correlations the than D) appendix 6 table (.37, higher much are change the by showed correlations The cohesion. programmatic in h go decade last the over centralization party in changes The less need is for punishment. rewar organizational the to according more and behavemore MPs As reflect measures disciplinary whereas unity, for reward” of appears Centralization measures. disciplinary and centralization w mechanisms different two between T differentiate to help. us actions requires disciplinary reached is unity of level that until a above only works however This less. and less actions disciplinary and more get parties As increases. unity when anymore needed disciplinar that is one, plausible more the and other, the while part decrease to tends measures disciplinary using that is One contr for allows coefficient negative The negatively. it affect while unity affects positively centralization 5.9, table in shown t comes it when other, each with associated positively are they

125

a “culture of punishment”. punishment”. of “culture a arty and arise mostly from from mostly arise and arty ope, it is expected that in that expected is it ope, he change could normally could change he and in hand with changes with hand in and sequence. As suggested As sequence. adictory interpretations. interpretations. adictory (at least in the memory the in least (at disciplinary measures measures disciplinary o change over time as time over change o more united they need need they united more to produce a “culture a produce to uiy f behavior, of unity y y measures are not not are measures y ih ok behind work hich i interpretation his certain level and level certain in both variables variables both in d structure, there structure, d on suggests that that suggests on desired level of of level desired een their 2007 their een CEU eTD Collection parties do indeed change slowly. Some parties in Luxembourg, Icel Luxembourg, in parties Some slowly. change indeed do parties y h vrain n at cnrlzto oe te at decade last the over centralization party in variation the by at ielgcl nt. h satr lt rsns h par the presents plot scatter The unity. ideological party ae nrae ter rgamtc oein hl keig h sam the keeping while cohesion programmatic their increased have decade last the during occurred change much not that meaning change), no (val centre the in situated are parties remaining the of Most of unity of levels the by explained is centralization party in t in especially that, proposition initial my verifies this and (parties) cases observe can we figure the of corner upper Figure 5.4 Party centralization and programmaticdecade and FiguretheParty change over last centralization 5.4

affiliation. As observed, 13 percent of the variation in ideologic in variation the of percent 13 observed, As affiliation. as centralization party in change the illustrates 5.4 Figure programmatic cohesion change 4.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 1.00 1.00 Slovakia Romania CzechRepublic 2.00 France Luxembourg Luxembourg Netherlands France Poland change in change centralization party Iceland Switzerland Iceland Russia Poland Poland Luxembourg ehrad Netherlands Netherlands Switzerland 126 Slovakia France Iceland Portugal Sweden

Italy Romania 3.00 Russia UK Denmark Italy Italy Slovakia Italy France usaRussia Russia Slovakia UK Italy UK Poland UK Slovakia Slovakia Denmark Romania from Central Eastern Europe Europe Eastern Central from Switzerland hese countries, the increase the countries, hese explained by the change in in change the by explained Belgium ue 3 on both axes means axes both on 3 ue CzechRepublic . Especially in the right right the in Especially . UK attitudes within parties. within attitudes is n ter country their and ties 4.00 Switzerland Slovakia Slovakia al unity is explained is unity al and and Denmark and and RSq = Linear 0.136 Hungary Poland e level of of level e and that and Russia Russia 5.00

CEU eTD Collection parties and some exceptions in UK, Belgium or Italy), have ma have Italy), or Belgium UK, in exceptions some and parties he tried to falsify the party list party the falsify to tried he for motive The elections. in competitive more party the make to i major for asked and leadership central the criticized strongly fr expelled was (PRM), Party Romania Greater of member and h aoe etoe dsilnr measures. disciplinary mentioned above the for solution one centralization, Besides members. party individual of base factionalism avoid to trying are parties remaining the statute party their in acknowledged officially factionalism have of exception the with that, means This factionalism. leadership c moderately is warnings simple or privileges of loss expulsion, discip of occurrence The centralization. party strengthening of hand go always parties by applied measures disciplinary The l have but centralization theircohesion increased programmatic their etaiain wie tes msl fo Esen uoe (Slovak, Europe Eastern from mostly others, while centralization, 2008.May the of resignation the for asking are Party Romania 18 hand upholdingof in behavior. unity me disciplinary and centralization how emphasize and factionalism t determination c party’s of the highlight list example this the and measures on executive party central of position the account “500 de peremişti cer demisia de onoare a preşedint a onoare de demisia peremişti cer de “500

18 for the local elections in 2008 and did not take into take not did and 2008 in elections local the for 127 Greater Romania Party Leader”) in Leader”) Party Romania Greater elui PRM”(“500 members of The Greater Greater membersThe of eluiPRM”(“500

au oăii a oua lcl leader local popular a Comănici, Radu d on the personal attraction personal the on d in hand with the process the with hand in nternal reforms in order in reforms nternal linary measures such as such measures linary political parties which parties political om the party after he he after party the om the expulsion was the was expulsion the intained or decreased decreased or intained s, a large number of of number large a s, orrelated (.30) with with (.30) orrelated aod leadership avoid o asures go hand in in hand go asures evel. that problem are problem that niae. Such andidates. usa, Polish Russian, Adevarul 16 16 CEU eTD Collection parliament as a non-affiliated deputy, in November 2003 joined the Sl the joined 2003 November in deputy, non-affiliated a as parliament parliament as well. well. as parliament If disciplinary measuresdisciplinary If 20 zamestnania.html zamestnania.html http://zaujimavosti.sme.sk/c/1178255/ at accessible constitutio similar about discussions and Portugal, 19 sp had he after and, (ANO) Alliance Civic New the from first T more. offers which one the for going and job other any changing SME, Daily Slovak the in declared even and var on this did MP The opponents. its joined then but party, original not who MP, Slovak the of is example famous Another elections. local ma of position Bucharest the for candidate independent an as ran resig for candidacies), unsuccessful candidate previous two party (after elections a as run to nominated not was he that grounds the Par Democratic Social Romanian the of member former Oprescu, very A initiative. own their on party the leave will members more” 193). (Kulik 2007: to Only pragmatism. cynical Utter, list. third the the on and - another, tomorrow of – tomorrow bloc, electoral one of list the in today politicia “A elections, 2003 the about mentioned Gorbachev Mikhail as o faction frequently occurred cases Similar parliamentary Union). Christian and Democratic breakaway a is which Forum) (Free "Opaterny: Zmena strany? Ako zmena zamestnania", S zamestnania", zmena Ako strany? Zmena "Opaterny: stipu however are defection against measures Other 19 are not imposed by the party soon enough, the dissatisfied the enough, soon party the by imposed not are

128 nal amendments have taken place in the Romanian in the place taken have nalamendments Opaterny-Zmena-strany-Ako-zmena- lated in the country constitutions, such as inas such constitutions, country in the lated

20 ME (Slovak Daily), November 23 2003, 2003, 23 November Daily), (Slovak ME in 2003, that changing parties is like is parties changing that 2003, in recent example is Sorin is example recent ned from the party and party the from ned n sm tm i the in time some ent f SDKU (Slovak (Slovak SDKU f y PD h, on who, (PSD) ty e pr, nothing pork, get o i Jn 2008 June in yor in Russia where, Russia in he MP defected MP he ious occasions, ious obodne Forum obodne only left his his left only a after day my be may n the local local the CEU eTD Collection behavior. behavior. parties are not the most united, contrary to how party scholarship previous scholarship party how contrary to united, most the not parties are tr party between behavior. relationship the on chapter this in presented that while special issue parties are not considered a party a considered not are parties issue special while that of unity in variation the of part explains parties liberal t affiliation Only affiliation. family party traditional its on based predicted be cannot party political a of behavior The Table 5.10 Summary of party effects on behavioral unity unity partyTableeffects of 5.10 Summary on behavioral Table 5.10 summarizes the empirical evidence regarding the seven seven the regarding evidence empirical the summarizes 5.10 Table 5.6 Conclusion t expected generally are parties liberal that also and them, show also have I What measures. disciplinary applies also which and concentra process making decision a cohesion, programmatic high a out turns behavior of terms party in united a Europe, in average, On characteri party the at looking by explained largely becan s have I Europe. in unity party of model explanatory integrated has chapter this literature, organization party the on Drawing Power (incumbency) status at iei h eiltr Ngtv No Negative Party the legislature in size (Ideological extremism) (Ideologicalextremism) Disciplinary measures Positive Yes Yes Positive Disciplinary measures Ideological unity Positive Yes Yes Positive Ideological unity Party Ideology PartyIdeology Centralization Positive Yes Yes Positive Centralization (Left parties) (Left parties) Party factor

Predicted effect on unity ofPredicted effect onunity Negative Negative behavior behavior Positive oiie No Positive 129

behavior. It should be noted be should It behavior. stics and party organization. organization. party and stics family in their own right by right own their in family o special issue parties and and parties issue special o o express low unity of of unity low express o tested only part of my of part only tested its left-right position or position left-right its hown that party unity unity party that hown Effect Verified aits and unity of of unity and aits to be a party with with party a be to ted at the centre the at ted No No

i ta left that is n ly portrayed ly hypotheses CEU eTD Collection at shlr, ate i ti ctgr ae soitd wit associated are category this in parties scholars, party aao peetd n h itouto. t s ned t h expense the at indeed is It introduction. the in presented paradox

etaiain a epce, aos nt o bhvo ad validat and behavior of unity favors expected, as int Centralization, taken is parliament the in size party the when even not them, government in Whether intervene. di much without behavior their in united stay will parties may opposition, factors other seen, have we as high for prerequisite a not is it attitudes of unity High it. to contributes and behavior of unity with hand in hand goes unity Ideological part lost have relevance Europe. in families party that also and united, most the not conclusion the to leads This sense. traditional the in affiliation ma one that extent the to lately deal great a changed have t on based positions parties’ The others. than behavior in united more explaini in insignificant is parties of positioning Left-right wit associated are ideology liberal to close parties while detrimental to unity, in which casedetrimental another switch unity, to to which will in party. the MPs limite be to has use their of extent the expulsion, from apart Briti the as but behavior, of unity high to contribute also measures p takes process democratic external overall the that democracy 130

h low unity overall in Europe. Europe. in overall unity low h y question their party family party their yquestion h high unity of behavior, behavior, of unity high h unity of behavior because, behavior of unity g h sm pris are parties some why ng d if it is not to become become to not is it if d that leftist parties are are parties leftist that s h democratic the es ae Disciplinary lace. of internal party party internal of sh MPs declared, MPs sh of their overall overall their of fference between fference consideration. o heir manifestos heir positively or in in or CEU eTD Collection main focus of the chapter and party unity. It continues with a pres a with continues It unity. party and chapter the of focus main link which arguments theoretical the illustrates chapter This goals? seats objectives, or those policy being votes, obstacl as perceived are that influences environmental counteract internal of use make and adapt to able they are Or, individualism? loya discourages which system electoral an or work at system repres uni stay therefore vote, parties Can danger. in be personal to seems democracy the of cultivation and campaigning individual for membershi party declining of context a In policies. public into transla the and interests voters’ of articulation the guarantees representative of core the at is government representative a T not. or line party the follow to decision their and behavior MPs’ ins interac the other affect may system, electoral the like aspects, or provisions constitutional that argue works scholarly Many and their tests new impactfrom factors, the additional provides literature, h and assumptions tests and refines study the variable, synthetic introducingrepresentationfocus (roleand and attitudes of unity the percep of betwe distinction the from Starting variables. these considering unity partydeterminants of institutional with chapterdeals This instit the account into taking interact and act to expected are parties function,environmentThe the which m in more political the structured

6. 6. Systemic influences partyon unity 131

tion between political parties, political between tion utional structures at work. work. structuresat utional institutions which are the the are which institutions tion of political opinions political of tion and arrives at a model model a at arrives and democracy, since it it since democracy, p, increased tendency increased p, en unity of behavior of unity en ted despite a federal federal a despite ted es in achieving their their achieving in es

entation of the data, the of entation mechanisms which mechanisms he need for unity in in unity for need he t wie t favors it while lty ptee derived ypotheses on unity. unity. on tion) astion) a titutional ore they ore they entative CEU eTD Collection behavior in parliament. Representation is the key point in this me this in point key the is Representation parliament. in behavior alaet. h taiinl n mr rcn tertcl expect theoretical recent more and traditional The parliaments. Dutch, German or Australian MPs Australian or German Dutch, studi National representatives). (party partisans or trustee) poli mandate), (free trustees mandate), (imperative delegates f their influence can rules of set different a under elected MPs per is representation How behavior. legislative their shaping se representatives elected who distinguish to representation of therefore is It governance. democratic of feature essential systems electoral of dimensions the between link the explain to a delegates between distinction their and 2005) Miller 1959, al. et principle-age the use I 1989). Shugart and (Taagepera level central t attached less MPs the makes constituency the with relationship beca majority, or plurality using systems district member m generate to expected is representation proportional list relate being as structure ballot and magnitude district formula, elect the mention 1995) Shugart and Carey 1989, Shugart and Taagepera 1980, electora of theorists unity, of determinants level system Amongst structural theoretical for 6.1 The explanations case rules. centralizati party as such influences, a organizational unity to on contrast influences institutional chapter, the of part last the In E twenty-three in unity party on survey expert Janda Enyedi, Borz, surveys elite European 1996 the on based results the of discussion a and

(Searing 1984, 1991, Andeweg 1997, Patzelt 1997, Patzelt 1997, Andeweg 1991, 1984, (Searing 132

ore united parties than single than parties united ore es conducted on the British, the on conducted es s, n h lte cs, the case, latter the in use, significant for the process process the for significant ceived and valued by the by valued and ceived tico (mixed delegate and and delegate (mixed tico inal voting decision in in decision voting inal d to party unity. Party Party unity. party to d and the actual party party actual the and n n disciplinary and on nd trustees, in order order in trustees, nd tos e Ms as MPs see ations chanism as it is an an is it as chanism a iprat in important as e uropean countries. uropean te at a the at party the o nt theories (Eulau (Eulau theories nt sses (Katz systems l re presented in in presented re and the 2007 the and oral CEU eTD Collection party. e unity, party to linked more be to consider I which role partisan be shaped by institutional constrains. For the analysis pursued here pursued analysis the For constrains. institutional by shaped be atsn, ifrn lvl o rpeetto cn e distinguish be can representation of levels different partisans, than those who see themselves as representatives of the whole nati whole the of representatives as themselves see who those than l be to expected are constituency their of representatives as w MPs those this, from Following behavior. of terms in or attitudes constituency and consequently to show a low level of party behavioral behavioral party of level Therefore, low a show to consequently and constituency repres see to likely more are lists open under or districts be to expected is unity behavioral of levels different explain could which differences cross-country of MPs the by assumed roles representation the in differences (2001) approach according to which representation roles are strategi are roles representation which to according approach (2001) Strøm the follow I core, its at explanations structural social rol representation of perspective functional the on insisting Without all another, to orientation role one from years the over shifted emphasi the while that show 1996) McAllister and Studlar 1997, Damgaard

h idvda M, hc st te ikbten h ctzn ad the and citizens the between link the sets which MP, individual the i it level, later the In roles. representation above the having as a practice into representation put parties political level, w voters, his of politico or delegate trustee, the is MP an level, a principals between established links different Becauseof expected be to The narrower the focus of representation, the lower the level level the lower the representation, of focus the narrower The the higher the district magnitude, the higher the level of behav of level higherthe the magnitude, district the higher the (H9).

H) Ms h ae lce i snl member single in elected are who MPs (H8). 133

nd they can also be considered be also can they nd entation just in terms of their of terms in just entation nd delegates vs. trustees vs.trustees vs. delegates nd ess united in parliament in united ess (1997) and Műller et al. et Műller and (1997) the same party but also but party same the four roles can co-exist. can roles four s the party rather than rather party the s d A te individual the At ed. party unity. It is the the is It unity. party ie t h national the at hile on or of their own their of or on , I expect not only not expect I , ho see themselves see ho c choices that can that choices c te i trs of terms in ither tt (Kopecký state s wih has which es, ioral unity is unity ioral f party of unity. has s CEU eTD Collection party system. Blondel (1978: 151) agrees and observes that “federal that observes and agrees 151) (1978: Blondel system. party power, which is in contradiction with Key’s arguments. Similarly arguments. Key’s with contradiction in is which power, h Aeia pris Ky 16: 3) eas o te decentralizi the of because 334) 1964: (Key, parties American the f blamed been usually have that factorsthe of one is Federalism imp assumed to a time long for were structure) the state institutional poli the and structure state the system, electoral the Besides levelrepresentation behavioral andalow of unity to expected are districts member single in or allowed voting that is hypothesis the system, electoral dimen further model explanatory unity party the to add we If 353). 2004:

federalism impacts on party unity. There are clear empiric clear are There unity. party on impacts federalism unc still is It disunity. to due losses vote increased some from Lati in index Rice the of values the on federalism of effect no found contributes more to It partyappears federalism that centralizat re reverse investigati awithout centralization party and federalism between found has who (2000), Tan as such perspective, rec different more but valid, be to seem points above the all theory, In “empty vessels”. t reality in but parties decentralized creates only not which independent as and careers political for loci as both important, that simply is parties American of character the conditioning federalism about point fundamental most “the that contend also 27) (1994: arestrong organs provincial or stateparties’ the which in those MPs elected under open lists with preferential with lists open under elected MPs 134

(H10). (H10). al cases, such as Germany, as such cases, al he national parties become become parties national he tical regime (as parts of parts (as regime tical ion and concentration of andion concentration the states are extremely extremely are states the have a narrow focus of focus narrow a have est”. Katz and Kolodnyand Katz est”. ng party unity as such. such. as unity party ng or the low cohesion incohesion low the or lear, however, how how however, lear, ent studies show a a show studies ent , Carey (2007) has (2007) Carey , countries are also also are countries act on partyact unity. on decision-makers”, decision-makers”, n America, apart America, n ng effect on the the on effect ng sions of the of sions as a factor factor a as lationship lationship CEU eTD Collection party unity in terms of attitudes and behavior as opposed to unitarism to opposed as behavior and attitudes of terms in unity party party. Sartori (1997: 94) argues for the necessity of cohesion and di and cohesion of necessity the for argues 94) (1997: Sartori party. contr greater executive party the and leaders parliamentary system parliamentary the with associated dissolution of power parliamentary states are expected to show a higher level of part of level higher a show to expected are states parliamentary otaitr agmnsad idns h hptei that hypothesis the findings, and arguments contradictory decl party Democratic the of wing conservative the likewise, Ame for agenda conservative a around united more became party the and Pa Republican the of wing liberal the because 349) 2008: (Janda 2000 por unexpectedly state, federal a of example classic the ab mentioned arguments theoretical classic the to counter run which

eaiey oeie n/r icpie bde… Ad dsilnd pa condition disciplined necessary [And] bodies… disciplined and/or cohesive relatively incent appropriate and duration, failure, (by socialized been have served by by served many its of any in – perform cannot democracy “parliamentary This unity. behavioral party strengthen to instrument effective etr my ae norgd h frain f icpie partie disciplined of formation the encouraged have may century the in Commons of House the of power of rise the that out pointed (1987) for matter to perceived been long has legislative and executive ba state’s a as well as organization constitutional state’s A retested. compared to political parties operating in presidential regime presidential in operating parties political to compared pcfc n ht at chso mas n de nt ie n spe any give not does and means cohesion party what in specific parliamentary fit fit parliamentary for the ‘working of parliamentary systems.’” Sartori is not ve not is Sartori systems.’” parliamentary of ‘working the for [emphasis in original] parties, that is to say, parties that parties say, to is that parties, original] in [emphasis 135

trays more party unity after after unity party more trays fdrls leadsfederalism ol over the parliamentary the over ol lance of power between between power of lance s s that is regarded as the the as regarded is that (H12). It is mainly the the mainly Itis (H12). ined. Given all these these all Given ined. varieties – unless it is it unless – varieties y behavioral unity as unity behavioral y power may give the the give may power ii dfnto of definition cific party unity. Cox Cox unity. party vs it being into ives) scipline because scipline ove. Also USA, Also ove. rty disappeared rty

s. s. (H11) will be be will (H11) te ae a are rties Parties in in Parties nineteenth nineteenth

rica and, and, rica to

lower ry

CEU eTD Collection oiia sse, h cam bcm cnrdcoy Tre ad S and Turner contradictory. become claims the part system, of political number the consider we When unity. party to related been parliamentarism, the arguments relating party unity to party to unity party relating arguments the parliamentarism, eas te aoiy at hs o anan h gvrmn (Eps government the maintain to has party majority the because y te dfeecs tmig rm h isiuinl engineerin institutional the from stemming differences other by differentpart the intriguing is is What parliamentaryvoting. sees he that fact the for except either, discipline party parliamentary system) has a more pronounced impact on party party on impact pronounced more a has system) parliamentary party system is, the more unity in terms attitudes in of partyunity system andbehavior the expected more is, is legislature. Therefore the the Therefore legislature. part of strength and number the be can variable intervening Another whic relations power executive or legislative the only not Itis states. h nmrcl rtro, coas osdrd te dmnin sc as such dimensions other considered scholars criterion, numerical the whe But cohesion. intra-party greater with parties homogeneous more systems multi-party that argue (1979) Patterson and Loewenberg 97. t s tl nt la wih f h to aibe (two-par variables two the of which clear not still is It 1997). is unity party systems, parliamentary two-party In reversed.

differences are caused by other party or systemic factor systemic or party other by caused are differences questi The states. parliamentary European groupof the within variables considered in this analysis. My expectation is thatis expectation My analysis. this in considered variables same the whether and factors, two the of effect joint a is

type f at sse ta fntos n cuty a also has country a in functions that system party of 136

party discipline as connected to to connected as discipline party s such as the party system or system party the as such s can be argued about all the all about argued be can y unity levels encountered levels y unity the more fragmented the fragmented more the system fragmentation are fragmentation system h could matter for unity. unity. for matter could h on then is whether those those whether is then on unity, or whether there there whether or unity, xetd o e high be to expected produce smaller and smaller produce g of parliamentary parliamentary of g en 97 Sartori 1967, tein ies composing the composing ies chneier (1970), (1970), chneier e wti the within ies ty system or or system ty , ln with along n,

(H13).

CEU eTD Collection oeta adtoa poy esr cn e h sae regulations state the be can measure proxy additional potential ate, repcie f h eetrl apin As cam Also campaign. electoral the of irrespective parties, elect to restricted be can Subsidies unity. behavioral party parties will be less prone to the influence of business groups business of influence the to prone less be will parties donations political parties can receive. Consequently the expect the Consequently receive. can parties political donations state subsidies received is difficult to find for all the E the all for find to difficult is received subsidies state data comparable While 2003). (Walecki members party the from i financial of majority the while constituency the to attached so and parliamentaryconstituency differ,party a opinion opinion party contributions. its for benefits tax obtained which concern, Flick ill obtained CDU the where Germany, in 1980s late the in affair occur This donations. generous for exchange in favors policy claim the way in which the funds are distributed can play an importa an play can distributed are funds the which in way the their resources, financial The 3). 2005: (Johnston building” democracy gener process political in and politics, financing in groups self-inte the engaging and - campaigns between and during both - “P unity. party on effect its for considering worth variable a stat form of the in finance party the state, with link closer 2007) and their cart into transformation assumed their Given resources. financial political activity, optimal for number, in many or few Whether

the state the higher the level of party behavioral unity is expe is unity behavioral party of level the higher the state the behave. representatives party which in manner the influence ( candidates directly to or organizations as parties to directed given the existence of sufficient resources always being ava being always resources sufficient of existence the given clientelisti of level the that is hypothesis this behind logic 137

uropean countries considered, a considered, countries uropean ion campaigns, or given to to given or campaigns, ion roviding essential funding essential roviding ilable to parties. This way This parties. to ilable The more subsidies from from subsidies more The , for example, who could who example, for , Katz 1996), and this may this and 1996), Katz ly ae ia apcs of aspects vital are ally, lnae wl decrease will linkages c paign financing can be be can financing paign parties need sufficient need parties ation is that that is ation cted to be be to cted ncome is not derived derived not is ncome nt role in explaining in role nt egal funds from the from funds egal n h aon of amount the on els (Katz and Mair and (Katz els rest of citizens and citizens of rest Moreover, even if if even Moreover, n MP may feel not n MP n h aon of amount the on e i h Flick the in red magnitude and magnitude e subsidies issubsidies e (H14) the higher the . The The CEU eTD Collection be that that be candidates to directly go subsidies When parliament. in behavior eas Erpa cutis ae oty at cnee systems centered party mostly have countries European because parliamentary groups receive money for administration costs only, only, costs administration for money receive groups parliamentary alaetr gop, hc hwvr rvds ite rud o test for ground little provides however which groups, parliamentary h rsrcin o dntos o oiia pris te ihr the higher the parties, political to donations on restrictions the

oe hy ol b icie t dfc fo pry oiy n cases in Therefore line. party the with disagree policy completely constituents party from defect to inclined be could they more resource more The districts. member single in elected MPs e behavior, individualistic to lead can this headquarters, general control arguably, can, subsidies state the over control the has Who 2005, Smilov and Toplak 2007), with a few exceptions such as Switzerland Switzerland as such exceptions few a with 2007), Toplak and Smilov 2005, financing. party of systems centered Germany where the finances are directed to both the central party organi Germany the the finances both are directed to where mi some also are There candidates. the to directly goes money the in the decision making process, candidate selection, distribution of distribution selection, candidate process, making decision the in party of degree the are model the in considered variables level bel outlined are measurements their and level) individual the from (plus variables systemic The unity. party on survey expert the a by and surveys elite the from generated proxy a by index, Rice legislat the inside representativesparty of convergence conduct behavior, as expressed unity party is variable dependent The data 6.2 Variables and expected variation. Europe relationship in of due the lack to at cnee sses f iacn wl so hge uiy hn c than unity higher show will financing of systems centered party oee ti hptei cno b tested be cannot hypothesis this However 138

s those MPs control, the control, MPs those s focus of representation of focus centralization observed centralization the expectation would would expectation the ure as measured by the the by measured as ure direct measure from measure direct ow. The other party other The ow. the party and party party and party the instead of a party’s party’s a of instead xed models such as such models xed hc dnts the denotes which of finance (Grant (Grant finance of party finances and finances party pcal fo the from specially party unity unity party and Russia where Russia and hr his/her where n te above the ing zation and the zation where the the where andidate (H15).

CEU eTD Collection because of an overall disagreement. overall an of because between unity of behavior as measured by the Rice index and the and index Rice the by measured as behavior of unity between privileges. betvt o vsa osrain r ebl eotn. h relati The reporting. verbal or observation visual of objectivity reliability whose data to granted be can than confidence more with reac not do MPs which in times various the or abstentions account into an measurement its of accuracy the concerning 2000) (Krehbiel a raised has index Rice the chapters, previous the in discussed As actually do. say politicians what between difference clear a is there again, once which, measures two other the with weakly correlates f measure proxy The country. each in politics party on experts b and measurements unity party the validates survey expert the line defected voted and from against aclear thecount party who bill of the MPs i Rice The voting. when choice first their constituted above opinions were MPs party. their of views the on or party, the of voters vi the on judgment, own their on decision their base to inclined are they voti their about questions to answers MPs’ the to refers Europ variable Eastern and Western in surveys elite the from derived As index for assessing unity of behavior and on the other side justifi side other the on and behavior of unity assessing for index usa the validates side one on (0.60), experts country the by assessed the frequency of applying disciplinary measures, like expuls like measures, disciplinary applying of frequency the

Still, roll-call votes can be examined statistically examined be can votes roll-call Still, 139

they will do and what they they what and do will they ion, warning, and loss of loss and warning, ion, rings in the opinions of opinions the in rings rom the elite surveys elite the rom eyhg correlation high vely asked which of the the of which asked ng decision, whether decision, ng es the expert survey survey expert the es d its failure to take take to failure its d bring evidence that that evidence bring depends upon the upon depends unity of behavior behavior of unity e the dependent dependent the e lot of criticism criticism of lot e f h Rice the of ge dx fes a offers ndex w f the of ew h a vote vote a h , while CEU eTD Collection Focus representation of ditd hn nevee. ot rts Ms fr xml, a t say example, for MPs, British Most interviewed. when admitted desi political of degree some by influenced been have also may conscience. own their or constituency the others on party, the follow s on – interchangeable indeed are roles representation that means differ on voting when assumed be can roles representation different s interviewed, When roles. these all of mixture a or nation, whole the the party, their of representatives the being as themselves intereste are we practice In representatives. the of mandate a details provide not do constitutions European other nation, whole the of as parliament of members the mention clearly or void considered i any that stipulate clearly constitutions European some While highlights difference.above mentioned the 2007, and 1996 sets data both on them between 0.40 of correlation moderate a b sam the not definitely are they of but together go do unity of dimensions because or operate, they which in framework institutional the insi from come which carrots and stick the of because or pr members of convergence high the of because unitedly behave may party A latter. party as former the consider I and behavior betweenof unity party and attitudes distinction the make I introduction the in mentioned As esp Europe, across the subject. comparativedifficulty datagathering on reliable of unity party comparing for tool useful a as

Party unity of attitudes of unity Party is the actual ideological congruence of party members. members. party of congruence ideological actual the is 140

ir voters, their constituency, constituency, their voters, ir d only in whether MPs see see MPs whether in only d mperative mandate is mandate mperative rability, as some MPs some as rability, a determinant of the of determinant a the representatives representatives the de the parties and parties the de ecially given the the given ecially m ise they issues ome e thing. There is is There thing. e ome argued that that argued ome n il, which bills, ent Their responses responses Their t. h two The oth. eferences its its eferences hey are the the are hey nt of unity ot the bout which CEU eTD Collection 2007 with conducted have I interviews the of percent 75 in case the was have they bill the as such circumstances, the on depending changes they practice in but constituencies own their of representatives more informat for (CIT3-CT-2005-513421); 7 Priority 21 comes and second. thesignificant party program constituents for gives constituency the representing while program, party the i have voters party and party the Representing representation. associat range policy the from stems crystall them between difference more therefore becomes representation of focus narrow distincti initial My important. highly as nation entire the of the side, a constituency, other their of representatives as mainly themselves the On voters. party representing to important very importance as party the of representation the see who MPs representing to assigned importance 2a the from stemming table dimensions in shown (as analysis factor by verified dimensions two sur elite 1996 The roles. those between differences the at looking when is representatives the of minds the in blurred be may nation, whole party, the representing between difference the that fact The of a the country whole. as t of representatives as themselves see they primarily, that, nue eerh rjc fnne b te it Fram Sixth the by financed Project Research Intune 21 Te eann 2 pret f rts primnain intervi parliamentarians British of percent 25 remaining The .

141

ion see www.intune.it; www.intune.it; see ion ework Programme of the European Union, Union, European the of Programme ework heir party or of the citizens the of or party heir lso see the representation representation the see lso the party voters and the and voters party the n common representing common n on between broad and and broad between on wt te rcs of process the with e confess that the role the that confess primacy to issues issues to primacy further underlined underlined further to vote on. This This on. vote to sin similar a assign zd Te main The ized. each level. The The level. each apni D); appendix , British MPs in in MPs British MPs who see see who MPs wd declared ewed veys portray portray veys CEU eTD Collection parties. As voters can prefer one candidate or one party, the MP the party, one or candidate one prefer can voters As parties. foll and results electoral previous their of order the in ballot p the in parties The districts. several or all one, in presented the party executive (Andeweg 494). 2008: without votes preference election by acceptnot would they the effect to resi of letter undated an sign to had candidates their whereby s by enhanced further is This representation. of focus oriented there is no geographical representation (Andeweg 2008: 494). Lists of Lists 494). 2008: (Andeweg representation geographical no is there elec nineteen the of one in vote voters if Even system. electoral is result a such for explanation the example, for Netherlands The BelgiumSweden, aand with andprimacy the the party par of representing Ne the for except either, representation of dimensions underlying difference much not is there that shows page next the on 6.1 Figure

Figure 6.1 Focus of representation Figure of Focus 1996 6.1

14.00 10.00 12.00 4.00 0.00 2.00 6.00 8.00

Belgiu m CzechRep.

France Germany Hungary

Ireland Italy

Luxembourg

Netherlands 142

Poland

Portugal Slovakia

Spai n arliament are listed on the on listed are arliament Sweden gnation or a declaration a or gnation owed by a list of new new of list a by owed toral districts, overall districts, toral ome party practices practices party ome s have a more party more a have s h ntr o the of nature the between the two two the between hrad, Spain, therlands, represent constituency plus plus constituency nationrepresent party partyvotersplus represent candidates are candidates approval from from approval ty voters. In voters.ty

CEU eTD Collection rfrne oe cniae, rm akn te t cosn ot the out crossing to them ranking from candidates, over preferences preferencescould hinder intra-partycompetit to which andparty lead unity pa in seats of distribution the which of help the with procedures Electoral system

af f hm s oe lss wt dfeet as f loig vote allowing of ways different with lists, open use them of half the on 6.1 (Table considered countries European three twenty the of Out party” single a of candidates the among preference relative oppor the have voters voting preferential With preferences. voters’ allows instead voting Ordinal competition. electoral the in entered p or candidates the of one for only choice of expression the Cate allows ordinal). or (categorical structure vote representative the of and constituency), number (the magnitude district the to analysis was attention Special behavior. and attitudes of terms in both unity, and centered party or candidate are rules electoral the when is goal The 8). 7, 1994: (Lijphart results electoral of basis the on unchanged after one or more subsequent elections. It refers to to refers It elections. subsequent more or electora one the after indicates unchanged analysis this in system electoral The closed lists. closed lists. t elect which those than unity less show to expected are countries politica hypothesis, my to According Iceland). in (as candidates (district magnitude, ballot structure) magnitude, (district ballot 143

if they influence party influence they if rliament is determined determined is rliament to see what happens happens what see to rls ht remain that rules l tunity “to express a express “to tunity heir MPs from PR from MPs heir s o xrs their express to rs Kt 18: 32), 1980: (Katz pris n these in parties l the expression of expression the eetd n a in elected s the rules and and rules the olitical parties parties olitical voting gorical ad n this in paid next page), next ion. ion. disliked disliked CEU eTD Collection Table 6.1 European electoral systems and their dimensions and systemsTable their dimensions 6.1 European electoral preside a being Russia about doubt no is there While 2003). (Krouwel agreement Europ categorymany which as to scholars far between reached so no and concepts of definition the on depends classification there which (of presidential or semi-presidential to majority), parli from range regimes political level, European the At (presidential, semi-presidential, regime par Type political of (eds.). and Paul Mitchell 2008. Michael 2004. Josep. M. Colomer, Source: Russia since 1993 since1993 Russia Netherlands 2003 100-150 Open list Prop (2 tiers)-H (2 Prop list Open 100-150 2003 Netherlands Switzerland 1999 1-34 Multiple/cumulative Prop. – – d Prop. Multiple/cumulative 1-34 1999 Switzerland Luxembourg ‘03 23-21-9-7 Open list Prop-Hagenbach- Prop-Hagenbach- list Open 23-21-9-7 ‘03 Luxembourg Italy since 1993 1993 since Italy Czech Republic Republic Czech Germany 2002 496-656 496-656 2002 Germany 2001 Denmark Romania 2000 2000 Romania Slovakia 2002 5-150 Open list Prop.-Droop Prop.-Droop list Open 5-150 2002 Slovakia Hungary2002 Belgium 1999 2-33 Open list Prop (2 tiers)-d’Hondt/ (2 Prop list Open 2-33 1999 Belgium Portugal 2002 1-55 Closed list Prop. – – d’Hondt Prop. list Closed 1-55 2002 Portugal Norway 2001 4-15 Open list Prop. (2 tiers)-M. St-La tiers)-M. (2 Prop. list Open 4-15 Norway2001 Sweden 2002 2-40 Open list Prop. (2 tiers)-m.(2St-La Prop. list Open 2-40 2002 Sweden Finland 1999 1999 Finland uti 99 2 pnls Prop.(2-3tiers)-Hare/d’Ho list Open 42 Austria1999 Ireland 2002 3-5 Single transferable Proportional d Proportional transferable Single 3-5 2002 Ireland Poland 1997 Poland rne20 1 ige Majority/2 Single 1 2002 France Spain 2000 1-43 Closed list Proportional – d’Hondt d’Hondt – Proportional list Closed 1-43 2000 Spain Since 2005 Since2005 Since 2008 Since2008 Since2006 Since 2005 Since2005 UK 2001 1 Single Plurality Plurality Single 1 2001 UK Country Electoral magnitude Ballot Formula Formula Ballot magnitude Electoral Country Iceland 9 Open list Prop (2 tiers) tiers) d’Hondt (2 Prop list Open 9 Iceland 2002 2002 1998 2001 2001

1-30 Open list Prop.-d’Hondt Prop.-d’Hondt list Open 1-30 2 2 225 1 1 1 4-39 1 4-58 1 3-65 13.5 7.9 5-25 15-41 7-19 7-19 3-69 154 154 1 Handbook of Electoral System Choice. Choice. System Electoral of Handbook The Politics of ElectoralPolitics The Systems.of Closed list list Closed list Closed Single Double: Single Single list Closed Single list Closed Double: Single list Closed Double: List Open list Open list Open list Open Closed list list Closed list Open Closed List List Closed list Closed Single Double: 144

Oxford: Oxford University Oxford: Press. N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan; Gallagher, Macmillan; Palgrave N.Y.: mnain wih r the are (which amentarian LR-Hare LR-Hare Prop-Hare Plurality Parallel: Plurality Plurality Hare Prop.- Majority/2 Hondt tiers)-Droop/d’ (2 Prop. Parallel: prop-Hare P. d’Hondt Prop.- Laguë tiers)-m. (2 St. Prop d’Hondt Prop.- Droop Prop.- Prop. –m. St-Laguë –m. St-Laguë Prop. d’Hondt – tiers) (2 Prop. Prop. – Hare – Prop. - Hare Prop. Plurality liamentarian) liamentarian) are very few). Their Their few). very are ean regimes fall into fall into regimes ean ’Hondt nd nd round plurality plurality round plurality round roop are/d’Hondt are/d’Hondt ta regime, ntial Bishoff Bishoff a been has Hare Hare guë guë guë guë ndt ndt CEU eTD Collection oe o dsouin soitd ih h primnay eie w regime parliamentary the with associated dissolution of power alaetr rgms xii dfeecs n hi lvl of level their in differences exhibit regimes parliamentary re t cek o te eie mat n at uiy Hwvr m However, unity. party on impact regime the for check to order parliamentar or semi-presidential (presidential, categories classifi simple A parties. united highly generate to expected the in emphasized feature common the unity, party to relation In would incline an more a with elected but towards parliamentary regime p in happens what at looks one if semi-presidential, say definitely Romania in prevalent is executive of type what experts country is it that stipulates also 300) (1997: Baylis (1993). Skach and Stepan and (1996) Derbyshire and Derbyshire by presidentialism limited parliamentar considered is country later The example. for Poland, regime the classify they when disagree completely scholars factors thefigure responsible existence of di other for implies 6.2.This the Figure 6.2 Mean party unity of of in behavior parliamentaryunity Figure 2007 Mean states party 6.2 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 Belgium n=11 Czech Republic 3.5

n=5 3.1 Denmark n=8 3.7 Germany

n=6 3.1 Hungary

n=7 3.1

n=17 Italy 3.4 Luxembourg

n=5

3.4 Netherlands

n=10 3.7

Norway n=7 3.5

pinSpai n=9 4.0 145 Sweden n=7 3.7 Switzerland

n=9 3.1

n=8 2.9 UK

y) would seem sufficient in sufficient seem would y) s of Romania, Bulgaria or Bulgaria Romania, of s cation of regimes in three three in regimes of cation nt a i i son in shown is it as unity . While some experts some While . practice, the verdict verdict the practice, y by Baylis (1997), Baylis by y hich in theory is is theory in hich

literature is the the is literature not even clear to to clear even not rsdnil by presidential s European ost resident. resident. fference.

CEU eTD Collection propose a bill without allowing amendments and then to link the adopt the link to then and amendments allowing without bill a propose by the government since 1832 (Braziser 1988). In Germany and Spain Spain and Germany In 1988). (Braziser 1832 since government the by regarded as binding and defeat in a motion of confidence has been t been has confidence of motion a in defeat and binding as regarded a UK Inthe 1996). (Huber confidence of questions as aretreated i bills (i.e of types particular Romania), convention Netherlands, Norway, Kingdom, By Spain). and Portugal, Italy, Denmark, (Belgium, confi the clarify or establish also parliaments the of orders Spai and Portugal, Italy, France, Finland, Germany, in (i.e confidence make to of authorize theconvention. questions policies governments The constitutions ca procedures Confidence 1996). parliamentary by constitutions, the by ways: (Huberthree in authorized coalition the of survival the to permits systems parliamentary in used procedure confidence The the and executive the between power of balance The latter. the mea score positive a while parliament, over state of head and/or between implies score negative relationship A is. polity the in power the legislative balanced more the zero, to is score the Ap and 6.2 (table side executive the or legislative the on more is ba the whether to according values positive or negative has index The Budg and Keman Woldendorp, by created index executive-legislative the non-parlia or (parliamentary categories dichotomous the Besides countriesthe the European restcases with sample. of our in Ger compares one if unity party of level the for difference appear not does procedure explicit an non-conf such of of presence vote the However constructive of form the under exercised is confidence 146

dominance of government government of dominance many with Spain or both both or Spain with many dence vote procedures procedures vote dence standing orders or by by or orders standing pendix D). The closer closer The D). pendix legislative shows the shows legislative vote of confidence is is confidence of vote ns the dominance of of dominance the ns a ruling coalition to coalition ruling a etr) I employ I mentary), such as budgets as such reated as critical as reated n). The standing standing The n). executive and and executive lance of power power of lance o ae any make to ion of the bill bill the of ion h vt of vote the United n e (2000). (2000). e idence. idence. n be be n CEU eTD Collection political dimensions, all confirmed by factor analysis. “Fisca analysis. factor by confirmed all dimensions, political c party and homogeneity attitudinal on impact its through behavior aibe ue h Shedr ne, hc cmrss icl admi fiscal, comprises which index, Schneider the use I variable Lij besides decentralization, of picture detailed more a give 186-188) 1999: (Lijphart not or constitution federal formal a have states decentralizati criteria: two account into taking decentralized), centralized) (unitary and from 1 ona scale variable operationalized is ersnain (cnie 20: 3. icl eetaiain s mea is decentralization Fiscal 33). 2003: s governance, (Schneider of representation” function political the undertake to Finally, entities government control. central government to central which to degree the to refers decentralization relative possess entities government autonomy much how to refers gove decentralization Administrative non-central entities. to impact fiscal cede governments central much how to tt srcue s xetd o ae n niet nlec o the on influence indirect an have to expected is structure State State structure (federal/unitary) Table 6.2 Executive/Legislative Index Table 6.2 Executive/Legislative could it and dissimilarity unity. party in behavioral states, parliamentary the between differences I. Woldendorp,Bugde Keman, J. (2000 and Source: H. zc e. Iay . San 0 Spain 0.5 Italy 0 Rep. Czech emn 05 oad U -1 UK 0 Poland 0.5 Luxembourg Germany 0 Denmark ugr 15 otgl 0 Portugal 1.5 Hungary egu - Iead Rsi 0 Russia 0 Ireland -1 Belgium Country Country iln - Ntelns Soai 0.5 Slovakia 0 Netherlands -1 Finland uti -. Iead 1 oai 0 Romania -1 Iceland -0.5 Austria rne 15 owy Sizrad 0 Switzerland 0 Norway -1.5 France Dordrecht: Kluwer AcademicDordrecht: Publishers. Exec/Leg. Index Index Country Country ) Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945-1998), ) Democracies48 Party Governmentin (1945-1998), 147

Exec./Leg index See 0 Sweden 0 Country Country l decentralization refers decentralization l phart’s scores on this this on scores phart’s n n wehr the whether and on degree of unity of of unity of degree s allow non-central allow s con fr their for account entralization. The entralization. to 5 (federal and(federal 5 to itaie and nistrative non-central . In order to to order In . Exec.Leg political sured by by sured index c as uch rnment rnment

CEU eTD Collection political decentralization is identified by municipal and state and municipal by identified is decentralization political Political Science Political Lijphart, Arend. 1999. 1999. Arend. Lijphart, Data source: Schneider, Aaron 2003. 2003. Aaron Schneider, source: Data Table of 6.3 Outline the federalism indexes page.6.4 onthe next arecomparedand table in raw country per values bivaria where 6.3 table in presented is measures these all of t and revenues and grants subnational of percentage a as taxation, decentraliza administrative revenues; total of percentage a as s and expenditure total of percentage a as expenditure subnational b is observed correlation high only The federalism. to reference the using a when cautious be should one indexes suggests this and decentralization, decentralization the with correlate not does that seen tab the in index Lijphart’s at looking decentralizati by just However the government. as mostly it to refers and centralization, opera clear a provide not does it 1945-1996, period the for calculated limitations its has index Lijphart The state. federal any theorists federalism of most by regarded is Decentralization **level; corre 0.01 at significant **correlations Political decentraliz. Countries. Countries. “Political Institutions and Corruption. The Role of Role The Corruption. and Institutions “Political Admin decentraliz. (Gerring-Thacker) Fiscal decentraliz.Fiscal Federalism index ipatIdx -83* 56 .6 .300 .064 .576* -.803** 1 Lijphart Index orltos Lijphart Correlations (Schneider) (Schneider) (Schneider) New Haven and London: Yale University Press; Gerrin Press; University Yale London: and Haven New 34 (2): 295-330. 295-330. (2): 34 atrs f eorc. oenet om ad Perform and Forms Government Democracy. of Patterns .0* 1 .3* -13 -.405 -.153 -.538** 1 -.803** 56 -58* .3 .059 .132 1 -.538** .576* index 04 .5 .3 1 .029 1 .132 -.153 .064 30 .0* 09 09 1 .029 .059 -.405* .300 Studies in Comparative International Development. Development. International Comparative in Studies G. Thacker Federalism index index lations significant at 0.05 level; N=24 (countries) level;N=24 0.05 at significant lations 148 Unitarism and Parliamentarism.” Parliamentarism.” and Unitarism

descentraliz. (Schneider) Fiscal Fiscal g, John. and Strom C. Thacker 2004. 2004. Thacker C. Strom and John. g, in the sense that, as it is is it as that, sense the in descentraliz. (Schneider) te correlations are shown are correlations te elections. A validity test test validity A elections. as one major element of of element major one as Admin in a a indicators: as has tion n f h sse of system the of on ubnational revenues ubnational ten Lijphart’s etween part from fiscal fiscal from part le 6.3, it can be be can it 6.3, le tionalization of tionalization ransfers, while while ransfers, ance in Thirty-Six Thirty-Six in ance British Journal of Journal British index with index descentraliz (Schneider) 38 (3): 32-56. (3): 38 Political

CEU eTD Collection oiy uves eevd o hm ad iia rvneriig aut revenue-raising minimal and them, to reserved purviews policy owy .8 .6 .5 72.05 2 3 0.75 0.44 0.56 0.2 0.48 0.45 Norway Netherlands Countries. Countries. the elite surveys. surveys. the elite 1999. Arend. Lijphart, dimensions Table 6.4 Federalism those of unitary states. they where areas fiscal and administrative the for same the administrati fiscal, decentr political on highest score they While decentralization. of degrees different display constitution), (defi states federal the even that, confirms below 6.4 Table 304). characteristics opposite the has state (‘federal’) unitary legisl territorial elected independently no standing, constitutional no te state, unitary fully a “In bicameralism. also and structure constitutiona clear are which federalism, for criteria formal index both that is explanation The index. Gerring-Thacker’s and index UK 0.37 0.2 0.89 1 86.72 86.72 57.42 59.02 1 76.11 0.89 2 3 57.37 65 0.89 0.85 0.5 95.44 0.2 1 1 0.91 52.03 39.36 0.67 0.35 0.61 1.3 0.83 0.36 63.77 0.49 0.37 1 1 78.67 0.76 0.83 1 73.17 0.91 0.69 2003. Aaron 0.58 Schneider, 80.61 Source: 0.5 0.8 0.35 0.55 0.87 0.52 1.2 UK 74.76 60.42 0.8 Switzerland 0.16 0.67 2 85.11 Sweden 0.59 0.3 Spain 2 0.19 0.88 0.8 0.23 Slovakia 0.51 0.12 5 0.38 0.29 4.5 Russia 0.81 Romania 0.87 Portugal 0.38 0.36 0.67 Poland 0.49 0.62 0.64 0.63 0.3 0.4 0.62 0.38 Luxembourg 0.53 Italy 0.34 0.41 Ireland 0.66 0.52 0.29 0.59 Iceland 0.61 Hungary Germany 0.71 France 0.43 Finland 0.3 0.6 Denmark Rep. Czech Belgium Fiscal Austria Country New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Party Press. University Yale London: and Haven New zation 1996 1996 zation Decentrali atrs f eorc. oenet om ad Perform and Forms Government Democracy. of Patterns Studies in Comparative International Development. Development. International Comparative in Studies zation 1996 1996 zation Decentrali Administrative 149

zation 1996 1996 zation Decentrali Political centralization own calculations from from calculations own centralization ” (Gerring, Thacker 2004: 2004: Thacker (Gerring, ” l provisions on the federal the on provisions l rritorial units if any, have any, if units rritorial 1945-1996 1945-1996 Index Fed. Lijphart’s alization, the case is not is case the alization, show scores similar to to similar scores show ned in terms of their of terms in ned e n political and ve ature, no specific no ature, ance in Thirty-Six Thirty-Six in ance oiy A non- A hority. es consider the the consider es 1996 elite survey elite 1996 Party centralization Average 8 3: 32-56. (3): 38 CEU eTD Collection Party system fragmentation Netherlands, Poland, Ireland, Finland and the UK, figure 6.3 on the next pa next the on 6.3 figure UK, the and Finland Ireland, Poland, Netherlands, rgetto i Taeea n Suats 18) ne o lat s least of index (1989) Shugart’s and Taagepera is fragmentation employed t index legislature.Thethe in parties ofbehavior the parliam in size their and government in parties of number The systems multiparty the in common very are governments Coalition actuallyis practice. implemented in image detailed more and clearer a offer which index, Schneider the decentralizati the also and federalism on provisions of constitutional picture good a gives which index Gerring-Thacker the use I unity, betwe relationship the test to order in analysis, final the In various aspects theirand activity. necessarily not of decentralize b to choose can parties political similarly and dimensions various pol of degree ca countries provisions, federal constitutional highthe of regardless important a is What have otherwise. scores France lower and ordecentralization UK Italy, while (i Switzerland), decentralization of dimensions three all on high are countries Some dece and federalism of patterns different illustrates 6.4 Table

22 the i-th component (party) and N = the effective nu theeffective = N and (party) thei-thcomponent a parliaments in parties Germ of number effective the in declines Denmark, of exception the With unity. behavioral party manner affect could parliament in parties of number the as research approp is measure The elections. legislative after countries

The index has the following formula, N formula, following the has index The

s =1/ Σ (pΣ =1/ 150 mber of political parties. mberpolitical of i 2 ), where, pwhere, ),

i = fractional share of votes or seats of seats or votes of share fractional = cross Europe over the last last the over Europe cross riate for the needs of this of needs the for riate in a positive or negative negative or positive a in en federalism and party party and federalism en ent is expected to affect to expected is ent n decentralize or not on not or decentralize n o measure party system system measureparty o

taiaini Europe. in ntralization ehave the same way same the ehave on dimensions from dimensions on of how federalism how of to notice is that, that, is notice to cos Europe. across quares the formal formal the Russia, .e. 22 ge shows shows ge o all for itical any, CEU eTD Collection

4.00 6.00 8.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 parliament have reduced, but also that the vote/seat share of the of share vote/seat the that also but reduced, have parliament last decadelast parliamentary of number effective the in Variations 6.3 Figure n but eln i ae 00 wih en ta nt ny h nme o number the only not that means which 2000, late in decline abrupt an exp France and Hungary Luxembourg, Norway, Slovakia, Belgium, decade. diminished. Source: Michael Gallagher, Election Indices (http:/ Indices Election Gallagher, Michael Source:

A 1995.00

A 2.86 A 3.50 A Portugal

Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom United Switzerland Sweden 2.55 A Czech R 3.49 Belgium Austria rneGrayHnayIeadIreland Iceland Hungary Germany France

A 6.09 2000.00 year A Itay 3.54 A

4.29 2.61 A 3.41

A A A A A 5.30 2005.00

2.50 2.26 2.88 4.23 A

A A

2.56 5.06 3.38 4.15 1995.00 A A uebugNtelnsNra Poland Norway Netherlands Luxembourg

A A A 3.90 3.45 oai usaSoai Spain Slovakia Russia Romania

8.03 5.60 4.31 A 2000.00 year A A A

A 3.31 5.16 4.34 3.56 A A A 2005.00 A A 3.38

A 7.03 5.01 3.36 3.81 4.05 1995.00 A A A A 5. 2.90

A 42

151 A 4.15 6.30 A A 2000.00 year

2.13 /www.tcd.ie, last accessed January 2008) 2008) January lastaccessed /www.tcd.ie, 3.71 4.81 3.45 A

A A A

A A 2.17 2005.00 3.67 5.79 2.21 A 3.60 4.74 A A

2.46 3.10 5.54 A A A 4.04 A

4.54 Denmark 4.41 3.95 A A A

4.36 A 4.71 4.75 A 3.45 A A A 4.48 5.35

6.12 A A 3.71

A smaller parties has parties smaller 4.89 4.56 parties over the over parties 4.81 A f parties in in parties f

A Finland 4.88 A A

2.72 erienced A 2.95 3.00

A 5.15 A

2.48 A

A 3.60

A 3.38

A 4.93

2.53 4.26 A

3.03

CEU eTD Collection at finance, Party Party finance rx fr h pry iac vral. iis a apy to apply may Limits variable. finance party the for proxy levels of party fragmentation. experienc have which countries of groups the between appear should behavi dimensions: both on unity party of levels the in differences e in variable important an is fragmentation system party If

hrfr, ea lmt ad rhbtos moe o cnrbtos a contributions on imposed prohibitions and limits legal Therefore, of source the publiclydeclare to opinion public by and opposition Party Labour the where UK the in as such scandals political to iss another is disclosed are contributors of names the not or Whether 18).2005: F of case the is example An politics. influence to organizations contribut super-rich of ability the for reason campaigns, launch part the by allowed be may contributors large of number small pote for concern general a often is there large, at organization indivi any from discussion, under is contribution the When campaigns. to dome can they much how organizations, and how to apply which or rules are There international. individuals be can finance party to Contributors state to donations. may whichreceiveon donations parties addition in analy the in used have I that measure comparable and useful another perce as subsidies public of amount the from Apart campaign. ye the during state the from receive parties that subsidies s sd n h cret nlss rfr to refers analysis, current the in used as 152

xplaining party unity, then unity, party xplaining h relative the grgt aons r to or amounts aggregate ntial corruption. While a While corruption. ntial ar and during electoral electoral during and ar ntage of party finance, party of ntage ors and their personal their and ors y finance law to help to law finance y orza Italia (Johnston Italia orza its campaign funds. funds. campaign its was forced by the the by forced was ue that may lead lead may that ue pa a a good a as ppear sis is the ceiling the is sis ed high and low low and high ed r n attitudes and or magnitude contribute ul or dual tc or stic of CEU eTD Collection but, nonetheless, accountability to donors can also be weakened by lim by weakened be also can donors to accountability nonetheless, but, owy Ntelns Iead Hnay Gray Ceh eulc F Republic, Czech Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, f unions, trade businesses, to apply might contributing on prohibitions How much the donors can contribute also differs from country to country. In country Belgium, contribute country.can How to also from differs much the donors in b EUR are wage minimum 175.000 the times and 10 exceeding amounts Netherlands, where Portugal the in EUR 4.400 or Germany, in EUR 500 I in EUR 100 or France, in EUR 150 of amount smallest the from country, c from varies limit The banned. are donations anonymous where countries accountab and Transparency analysis. the in considered variables r bold in columns The financing. party on restrictions and regulations of situation comparative the illustrates page next the on 6.5 Table funds. fr coming those to comparison in donors from coming revenues overall of h Ln lvl Oel gnru sbiis a big ocrs ab organizati party the concerns with contact decreased and accountability bring can subsidies generous Overly level. Land the subvention same the revenues, national parties’ major the of quart a between amount which funds provides as example range middle Fi or Spain in like amounts generous very to UK, the in or Italy insi from region, the of regardless country, to country from varies am the table, the of column last the in shown As Austria. Denmark, etitos n at dntos Eape ae wteln, Swede Switzerland, are Examples donations. party on restrictions still are there that observe I 6.5, table in shown data the From and organizations. individuals of phase specific to or donors to funds, of categories specific

153

s also being available at available being also s countries with no legal legal no with countries on (Johnston 2005: 15) 15) 2005: (Johnston on European countries’ countries’ European nland. Germany is a a is Germany nland. gnificant amounts in amounts gnificant cmag, while campaign, a ount of subsidies of ount ility increase in in increase ility out a lack of of lack a out anned by law. by anned iting the share share the iting er and a third third a and er n, Slovakia, Slovakia, n, peet the epresent om public om ountry to to ountry reland to to reland inland, inland, oreign CEU eTD Collection otCmuit at Development. Party Post-Communist oai, kan (eilto ad oto mechanism control and (Legislation Ukraina Romania, Political Parties in New Democracies. Party Organiz Party Democracies. New in Parties Political rhetoric with reality.” with rhetoric Public Resources in Party-Building in Slovakia.” in Party-Building in Resources Public laws. laws. Perottino, Michel et al. 2005. 2005. al. et Michel Perottino, and Jurij Toplak 2007. 2007. Toplak Jurij and Biezen, Ingrid van. 2004 “Political Parties as Publ as Parties “Political 2004 van. Ingrid Biezen, Source: Idea report 2004 www.idea.org. Grant, Thom Grant, www.idea.org. 2004 report Idea Source: amla. ire Jn Lr Saad n Adr Wh Anders and Svasand Lars Jon, Pierre, Macmillan. Worldwide Navigating the Laws, Regulations and Prac and Regulations Laws, the Navigating Worldwide uuet: ntttl e oiii ulc; personal Publice; Politici de Institutul Bucuresti: Table on party 6.5 Regulations finance 2006 of be donations the more reported Electoral 1000must to than GBP Commission. ti same the At reports. annual their in 5000 GBP than more of donations Companies circumstances. some in donors by also and instance first b contributions of disclosure public the for exist provisions Kingdom, the In Italy. in 11.620 $ or 6.750, $ to increases amount the Ireland in while politica per 500 EUR of maximum a contribute to allowed is donor a Luxembourg ehrad Netherlands Switzerland √ √ √ √ Switzerland zc e Rep Czech emn Germany Denmark oai Romania Slovakia √ √ √ √ Slovakia Hungary egu Belgium otgl Portugal Country Country owy √ Norway Sweden √ √ √ √ Sweden Finland √ √ Finland Iceland √ √ √ √ √ Iceland Austria rln Ireland oad Poland rne France usa Russia pi Spain tl Italy K UK regulation regulation financing financing political political West European Politics European West parties parties Political Finance and Corruption in Eastern Europe. Eastern in Corruption and Finance Political No No for for Legislatie si mecanisme de control privind finantar privind control de mecanisme si Legislatie for disclosure disclosure for contributions contributions No provision provision No to political political to leso: sgt. iá, ae. 06 “oee b “Powered 2006. Marek. Ribář, Ashgate. Aldershot: parties parties of , 23 (3): 1-24. (3): 23 , Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politic Transition and Studies Communist of Journal ic Utilities”, Utilities”, ic icsin wt Kr-en Nsmce ad country and Nassmacher Karl-Heinz with discussions as. 2005. 2005. as. ation in Southern and East-Central Europe.East-Central and Southern in ation contributions contributions tices of National RegimesNational of tices No ceiling on on ceiling No tfed 20. Sae usde t pltcl parti political to subsidies “State 2000. itefield. 154 to political political to fr at fnne n ei, ooi, oai, Ukr Romania, Polonia, Cehia, in finance party for s parties parties

Roper, Steven D. and Janis Ikstend. 2008. 2008. Ikstend. Janis and D. Steven Roper,

√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ Party Politics, Politics, Party Lobbying, Government Relations, and Campaign Financ Campaign and Relations, Government Lobbying,

contributions contributions Ban on trade trade on Ban to political political to The transition period. transition The 10 (6): 701-722 (6): 10 parties parties unions ea partidelor politice in Cehia, Polonia, Cehia, in politice partidelor ea √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ . Oceana Publications. Smilov, Daniel Smilov, Publications. Oceana . √ √ √ √ √

√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √

anonymous anonymous to political political to donations donations . Biezen, Ingrid van. 2003. van. Ingrid Biezen, Ban on Ban parties parties l party per year, per party l te tt: h Rl of Role The State: the y y parties in the in parties y ut disclose must Houndmills: Palgrave Palgrave Houndmills: Aldershot: Ashgate. Aldershot: s me British me , 22 (3): 320–340. (3): 22 , Public Finance in Finance Public s Confronting es: United party finance finance party subsidies of party party of finance finance Public Public as % as 73.3 73.3 77.5 46.1 46.1 47.1 47.1 63.6 72.5 46.6 14.2 14.2 75 20 33 40 75 20 20 80 20 84 80 68 6 6 4

aine)

e , CEU eTD Collection eair Aoa en ru cmaios ae en lo are ot f out carried also been have comparisons group mean Anova behavior. being elected under beingelected cos ot ate i te wnytre onre cniee by considered countries twenty-three the in parties most across varia total p the of percent a 9 only explain in factors institutional behavior party the explaining in poorly perform factors ta in reported are behavior of unity explain which 3) (model model (model model characteristics party the with compared 1) (model s the considers which analysis statistical the of results The unity of and (table onthe attitudes behavior unity not 6.6). 6.7) of (table has an impact lists closed or open elected under are whether the MPs time, Appe 2 (table whatsoever lists closed or open of existence the has which voters, party and party the representing of importance icse ae rsne i tbe . ad . o ti scin Te sta The section. this syste of effects of the comparing allow displayed 6.7 coefficients and 6.6 table in presented are discussed the on based analysis regression multivariate the of results The unity systemic the impact6.3 Assessing of factors on the by deal great a explained is constituency the the representing in variance The behavior. their in defection manifest to likely t and constituents their towards responsibility of sense more indeed list electoral the on candidates the rank and choose to option Voters’ D).tables Appendix are in shown signif for test to order in structure ballot the like variables open or closed list closed or open (H10), while the opposite can be said about the saidabout becan opposite whilethe(H10), 155

icant differences (detailed differences icant mic variables on unity of unity on variables mic nce in unity of behavior of unity in nce sei fcos model factors ystemic ndix D). At the same the At D). ndix 2) and the integrated integrated the and 2) ifrne between difference no connection with with connection no ytmc factors systemic he latter are more more are latter he ble 6.6. Systemic 6.6. ble rimn. These arliament. gives candidates gives hs analysis. this importance of of importance only on the only on r dummy or ndardized ndardized CEU eTD Collection at uiy f eair Te fet f h dsrc mgiue fa magnitude district the of effect The behavior. of unity party parties need to maintain their popular base and to receive pr receive to and base popular their maintain to need parties lim this for 2007 in authorities state the by given justification it is stipulated by law that the amount must not exceed that that exceed not must amount the that law by stipulated is it percent (75 parties to offered subsidies state of amount highest wit country European the Luxembourg, In unitedly. behave to order in f state the on dependent totally become to need parties that (H14 is level unity behavioral their higher the state, the from poli subsidies more the 6.6, table in model integrated general the parliament inside manner united a in behave parties making in role stat the from receive parties subsidies of amount the as funding don on ceiling on regulation state of form the under finance Party of behavior morecentralization. through party manifests explai be will consider it As centralization. party are with association characteristics party the when model integrated di a in elected MPs more the words, other in magnitude, district (H10). expected as behavior of unity the on negatively impact preferential and open or closed is list electoral the Whether t with together (H9) unity behavioral on effect significant a have distr the only model first the in variables, systemic the of Out variance across unity in of Europe. behavior ei (twenty more explains model, level party the Comparatively,

156

ned later, its effect on unity unity on effect its later, ned or their financial resources financial their or voting is allowed does not not does allowed is voting ivate donations from their from donations ivate ict magnitude appears to to appears magnitude ict of their total income), total their of ). This does not mean not does This ). 5 ecn lmt The limit. percent 75 Instead, the larger the the larger the Instead, e, plays an important an plays e, it was precisely that that precisely was it strict, the higher the higher the strict, tical parties receive parties tical h pret o the of percent) ght d eas o its of because ed . As observed from from observed As . ations and public public and ations e aa i the in away des e at finance. party he h one of the of one h CEU eTD Collection Nationalist exec/parl.Nat. party Adjusted RAdjusted portent réglementation du financement des partis po partis des financement du réglementation portent Note: entries are standardized beta regression coef regression beta standardized are entries Note: Commission for the Constitutional Revision on thel on Revision Constitutional the for Commission Variables available at http://www.chd.lu/archives/ArchivesPor at available Ethnic regional Special issue Liberal Communist overlap icpiaymaue -.222** Disciplinary measures R at etaiain .270*** Party centralization Table unity 6.6 Explaining of behavior impacts positivelydonations a existence of a ceiling of on behavior onunity

ititmgiue .330*** .013 magnitudeDistrict structureBallot supporters Sig. nt fattds .236*** Unity attitudes of .024 subsidiesState *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01; N1=163; N2=172; N3=161; N3=161; N2=172; N1=163; ***p<.01; **p<.05, *p<.1, 23 -.045 Exec/leg relations Data source: 2007 Borz, Enyedi, Janda expert survey expert Janda Enyedi, Borz, 2007 source: Data rgetto -.002 Fragmentation eln ndntos .298*** Ceiling ondonations oe tts -.065 Power status Rapport de la Commission des Institutions et de la de et Institutions Commission la des de Rapport 2

2 23

. Judging from the significant coefficients in both models 1and models 3,theboth in bare. Judging the significant coefficients from Systemic impact Model 1 .033

.04 .04 .05 .09

157 ficients; ficients; litiques. 2007. (Report of the Institutional theofInstitutional (Report 2007. litiques. aw proposal for the settlement of party finance); finance); party of thesettlement for proposal aw tlet (accessed January 2009). 2009). January (accessed tlet Revision Constitutionnelle. Proposition de Loi de Proposition Constitutionnelle. Revision on party unity and own coding; coding; own and unity party on

Party Party level impact Model 2

.086 .168** .038 -.121* .108

.099 -.001 .00 .23 .28 .168** -.013 .015 .142*

-.285** Integrated model Model 3 .282** .087 .187*** .030 -.111* .115 .061 .240*** -.097 .00 .28 .35

s well.s CEU eTD Collection alaetr pry rus eev fnnil sitne f assistance financial receive groups party parliamentary power. A simple correlation between the federalism index and par and index federalism the between correlation simple A power. Whether the states are are states the Whether

ud, h poes s tl mr cnrle a te eta federa central the at controlled more still is process the funds, a candidates of selection decision-making, of terms In arguments. t consider we if state federal a for high unexpectedly is that centralizat of level similar a and unity behavioral of level high politi German the experts, German the by assessed As forms. fede and centralization between whatsoever association no is there ove party the within decision-making concerning declarations MPs’ me is centralization party when data, 1996 the from Also, H12. and H11 parliament a in behavior of unity party actual on effect direct hs en ta pris n eea sae cn e s centra as be can states federal in parties that means This re non-significant but negative a reveals analysis, this in 1996 of federal state does not necessarily imply that political political that imply necessarily not does state federal e the because important, very is practice in happens actually stat federal formal a between difference The level. regional compete can parties the mandates of number the increase will parties decentralized self-evi is It create countries. respective the of design institutional to state federal the of tendency a 151) (1978: Blondel since especially intriguing, appear results The the accounts of parliamentary parties. Offic Audit Federal the by exercised is funds these over professional control pay to used mainly is that money 30); 2000: (Saafeld eea o unitary or federal 158 ,

rsdnil r parliamentarian or presidential parties need to decentralize decentralize to need parties ie a pris n unitary in parties as lized e by constitution and what what and constitution by e dent that decentralization decentralization that dent rom the federal budget budget federal the rom cal parties exhibit quite aquite exhibit partiescal ion (except the Greens) the (except ion e rvos theoretical previous he for at the national and national the at for , which partly rejects rejects partly which , xistence of a formal formal a of xistence lvl Te German The level. l lation between them. them. between lation e, which scrutinizes which e, ty centralization, as centralization, ty tm fo the from stems d itiuin of distribution nd aim n l its all in ralism sserted that the that sserted r party policy, policy, party r tf. Central staff. asured by by asured a no has CEU eTD Collection policies in non-parliamentarythe in policies parliamentar as opposed to states parliamentary systems is statistically significant. In p In significant. statistically is systems parliamentary ideologica of determinants the of one as system parliamentary behavioral and attitudinal. When the same analysis is repeated repeated is analysis same the When attitudinal. and behavioral alaetr sae i or ape, h Aoa nlss o t for analysis Anova the sample), our in states parliamentary ten percentage points fewer MPs who do not agree with the overallagree the not with do who fewer MPs percentagepoints ten signifi is it but huge not is groups two the between difference agr less or percent (fifty 1 was party a for score lowest non-parliamentar in while policies), and ideology party on MPs among si (over 2 was received party a cohesion programmatic on score pa in parties between attitudes of unity in difference mean The has called parliamentary fit” “the parties. more sheds result This (H12).behavior unityof indirectlyaffects f ate fo nnprimnay tts Te nlss f the of analysis The states. non-parliamentary from parties of t opposed as states parliamentary in 2007 in attitudes of terms samp the in parties the haveranked all experts The attitudes. beha in unity for obtained are results same the data, survey rega states of groups two the between difference significant When treated as a dummy variable, whether parliamentary or non- or parliamentary whether variable, dummy a as treated When unity does hold. not federalis linking argument theoretical the Consequently, data. ICPP betweenpartydecentralizat relationship the theytestedwhen ( Janda and Harmel what with line in are findings These states.

159

arliamentary systems, the lowest the systems, arliamentary eement among party MPs). The The MPs). party among eement le as being more united in united beingmore as le vior, but not for unity of unity for not but vior, ion and federalism on theon federalism and ion rding party unity, either either unity, party rding cant, quantified in about in quantified cant, o the ideological unity unity ideological the o e 96 aa id no finds data 1996 he xty percent agreement percent xty 1982: 69) pointed out out pointed 69) 1982: rliamentary and non- and rliamentary light on whatSartorion light l unity and one that that one and unity l for the 2007 expert expert 2007 the for y ones. party ideology and and ideologyparty 07 aa shows data 2007 parliamentary (12 (12 parliamentary m with low party low with m sae, the states, y CEU eTD Collection National Liberal Party, forming the Democrat Liberal Part Liberal Democrat the forming Party, Liberal National wit together ideology of terms in unity their lost have parties Indirect paths towards unity of behavior of unity Indirect towards paths parties. This is not, though, a trend applicable to every single every to applicable trend a though, not, is This parties. parliamentary and non-parliamentary systems regarding both dimens both regarding systems non-parliamentary and parliamentary nt o attds tbe .) a tetd s dpnet variab dependent a as treated was 6.7) (table attitudes of unity path for check to order In behavior. their on extent lesser a to and towards more directed is effect their that seems it dimensions, sys party of type relations, legislative-executive structure, sy on literature party the in emphasis term long a Despite curre and former its criticizing each other public. in had constantly has latter the while split T PSD. and PNL especially years; last the over leadership factionalism experienced have parties Romanian of majority vast wi merged that party Romanian only the also is PD decade. last of number least the experienced has which (PD), Party Democrat par Romanian also and Party), National Slovak the of exception the lms Alac ad lms Lf Lbrl) See i another is Sweden Liberals). Left Flemish and Alliance Flemish excep the (with decade last the over ideology of terms in unity a perceived are example, for parties, Belgian countries. three f n h 19 dt, s poe t 20, hr ws o ifrne between difference no was there 2007, to opposed as data, 1996 the in If

also in the ideological unity when we look at the average score of score average the at look we when unity ideological the in also part in increase overall an noticed have experts The decade? parties of unity ideological the indeed has question: the askcan 160

y at the end of 2007. The 2007. of end the at y h Slovakian parties (with parties Slovakian h tem or electoral system system electoral or tem he former has suffered a suffered has former he tmc atr lk state like factors stemic y unity of behavior and and behavior of unity y party in all the twenty- the all in party s showing less and less less and less showing s MPs attitudinal unity attitudinal MPs increased over the last last the over increased le. Party attitudinal attitudinal Party le. in f Ecologists, of tion ways of causation, of ways conflicts over the over conflicts t edr openly leaders nt h slne from splinter a th the 187 political political 187 the ions of unity, one unity, of ions xml where example n ideological and is xet the except ties

CEU eTD Collection parties’ MPs to cultivate a personal vote in the single membe single the in vote personal a cultivate to MPs parties’ Mixed electoral system electoral Mixed betweencandidatesafter the electoral campaign. during and alt structure Ballot and cancel each other out. cum are systems electoral the of segments two the of influences p the that implies This unity. ideological on scores average show b of levels similar display parties, European the of rest parties, Hungarian and German system. electoral mixed a such op parties 2008) (until Russian and Hungarian German, PR. list closed a they as preferences policy their in converge to MPs of rest e would one nature; incentives double their Given unity. ideological

ofiin i tbe ., pn it hv a eaie nlec o th on intra- for provide influence they because precisely (H10), MPs of negative congruence a have lists open 6.7, table in coefficient by shown as hand, other the On centralization. party also and attitudes unity partyattitudinal to ideology. regards with deput the of eyes the in is constituency the of representation the - unity attitudinal and constituency the representing of importance be has relationship negative A factors. systemic environmental b all which fragmentation, and ballot electoral of type section, already as parliamentarism by affected directly is unity

lo mat o attdnl nt. lsd it R nacs uni enhances PR list Closed unity. attitudinal on impacts also would be expected to generate middle range values of party of values range middle generate to expected be would 161

ehavioral unity and indeed indeed and unity ehavioral discussed in the previous previous the in discussed re elected in districts with districts in elected re when compared to the to compared when r districts and, and the and and, districts r en found between the between found en elong to the group of of group the to elong ulative in these cases, cases, these in ulative ositive and negative and ositive ies, the lower their their lower the ies, the more important more the party competition competition party xpect part of the of part xpect ideological e the negative negative the erate under under erate y of ty CEU eTD Collection Fragmentation of the party systemparty the of Fragmentation behavior but in an indirect way again, via the unity of attitudes. attitudes. of unity the via again, way indirect an in but behavior Adjusted RAdjusted Note: entries are standardized beta regression coef regression beta standardized are entries Note: Data source: 2007 Borz, Enyedi, Janda expert survey expert Janda Enyedi, Borz, 2007 source: Data the coalition has a comfortable majority, there is still some still is there majority, comfortable a has coalition the g enters party one than more when Even not unity. behavioral on directly does it unity, ideological increases fragmentation high While (H13). uni the higher the consequently, and, cohesion) (programmatic attitudes parliament, a in are there parties more the that means which and parties parliamentary of number the between relationship ititmgiue .207** -.273*** magnitudeDistrict Model 1 Ballot structure Variables of attitudes onunity Tableand effects 6.7 Systemic party level N3=161 172; N2= N1=167; ***p<.01; **p<.05, *p<.1, Sig. eln ndntos -.131 Ceiling ondonations tt usde -.081 subsidies State xclgrltos -.014 Exec/leg relations rgetto .156* Fragmentation at aiy -.081 -.589*** -.020 .472*** R Party family Disciplinary measures Party centralization Power status 2

2 impact Systemic (.00) (.00) .08 .11

plays an important role in achieving party unity of of unity party achieving in role important an plays 162 ficients; ficients; on party unity and own coding; own and unity party on .096 -.229** Party level impact Model 2 (.00) (.00) .26 .28 -.200** .085 -.024 .159**

“space” left for defection for left “space” the higher their unity of of unity their higher the their unity of attitudes, of unity their model Integrated Model 3 (.00) (.00) .30 .35

-.065 -.527** .539*** -.040 There is a positive positive a is There

overnment and overnment ty of behavior behavior of ty impact CEU eTD Collection parties like Mastella's to gain seats in parliament. Among Among parliament. in seats gain to Mastella's like parties ha it made have would passed, if that, referendum election-law pending thei to regards with MPs among agreement percent 90 and (w 80 unity between ideological of value 4.55 2000, after parties parliamentary parties was quite high (4.5), the Rice index calculated for Denma for calculated index Rice the (4.5), high quite was parties have MPs who hold homogeneous opinions on most political issues. This re This issues. political most on opinions homogeneous hold who MPs have t in other each from themselves differentiate to try Parties the Danish Folketing. b of enhancement the for important more are fragmentation, system Thus (3.67). behavior of ideolog the besides factors, other unity that is case this in conclusion than lower much is (2.79) parties Danish his/ against voted MP unit 2007, in experts an by assessed was it as that However, Parliament. case the ever hardly was it means enhances ideological unity. While around 1996 the effective number of of number effective the 1996 around While unity. ideological enhances t inference the of outliers as appear parties Danish considered, government the of fall The government. the against voted and resigned ministe government a because mainly reform, law electoral over f consequences conf a on disastrous defeated was government Prodi the 2008, withIn parties. incumbent sometimes vote, they when defect MPs unity actual the to comes it when so, even but members its among ide for need the of aware more parties makes fragmentation high t validates also parliament Italian the in fragmentation High ideology) 2007. and in value only for of 3.68 behavior unity exa clear a is Netherlands The parties. incumbent the for even

163

erms of ideology and to to and ideology of erms the European countries countries European the he above findings. The The findings. above he mple of this, with 5.54 with this, of mple hat high fragmentation high hat ical unity or the party party the or unity ical ological convergence ological r, Clement Mastella, Clement r, y of attitudes within within attitudes of y which 99.93, was rk of behavior, Italian behavior, of ehavioral unity in in unity ehavioral parliamentary rder for small small for rder her party in in party her ih means hich idence vote idence disrupted a a disrupted lationship lationship party r r the or the CEU eTD Collection at plce. vrl hwvr pry udn, oh n h fr of form the in both funding, party however, Overall policies. party party’s unity of attitudes as both contenders favor different poli different favor contenders both as attitudes of unity party’s impac stronger much and positive a has subsidies, state and donations parlia of attitudes the on impact negative negligible almost t has donations, on ceilings of form the in state the by regulated hand with the contest over party leadership and becomes associat becomes and leadership party over contest the with hand aia ad h ohr oe oeae bt aog ih hs oe te cont the over this, with donorsparty established along but, moderate) more other the and radical pursuedthe policyreflectsatti low unity (which be to of strategies f only not did Aguirre, Esperanza and Rajoy leaders Mariano (PP), Popular the for contenders the example, for Spain In contributors. disclosure the around scandals the by evidenced be possibly could ideologica party’s a reduce to appear Portugal and France like partie to contributions unions’ trade on baneven and parties parties, to donations political to contributions on on ceiling impact Strict negative attitudes. a has donations on ceiling the analysis this In regardswith ideology. their to party scores percentagreement between 4,meaning 80and among is MPs over there 90 p assessed experts where Spain, and Portugal Switzerland, Sweden, Netherlands Luxembourg, in found are unity ideological of values highest s the all at not are correlated, mildly are they if even which, attit in unity between difference the to back points clearly

24 http://www.elpais.com/todo-sobre/tema/Espionaje/pol “Espionaje politico en la comunidad de Madrid.” In Madrid.” de comunidad enla politico “Espionaje 24 . The contest over the control of party donors goes hand in hand goes donors party of control the over contest The .

164

itico/Comunidad/Madrid (accessed March 2009) 2009) March (accessed itico/Comunidad/Madrid ElPais . available at: at: . available udes and unity in behavior, behavior, in unity and udes ame. The parties with the with parties The ame. etras oad the towards mentarians cies. Party funding, as as funding, Party cies. ed with a decrease in in decrease a with ed herefore a slight and slight a herefore l convergence. This This convergence. l a o anonymous on ban tudes as one is more tudes as one more is of the names of the of names the of arties with value with arties ight openly over over openly ight hip of Partido Partido of hip t on the MPs’ the on t s in countries in s elns on ceilings h uiy of unity the , Norway, , o of rol

CEU eTD Collection rcie Wie tt isiuin ifune h frain n cry and part of organization the representatives, party of preferences formation the influence institutions state While practice. propensity to behave unanimously in parliament, as it has been been has it as parliament, in unanimously behave to propensity

structures impact indirectly onvoting unity. w through factor intervening important most the indeed is attitudes c much causation of chain the makes attitudes and behavior in unity of parliame a in behavior of unity affect directly not does environment the that obvious is It attitudes. of unity via factors environmental partyarunity andFigure on of indirect behavior effects 6.4 shows the direct parliament. their pattern in of voting .) Ti gvs s mr dtie pcue bu hw ate ac parties how about picture detailed more a us gives This 6.7). of unity actual their explains it than more attitudes of unity operateparties political which in environment institutional The section. Figure 6.4 Systemic influences on party unity Figure party unity on influences 6.4Systemic

Preferential voting Preferential voting Parliamentarism Fragmentation Party finance Federalism

165

ies has more influence on influence more has ies behavior (Table 6.6 and 6.6 (Table behavior Unity of behavior Unity of behavior Unity of attitudes Unityattitudes of seems to explain party explain to seems shown in the previous previous the in shown nt. The separation The nt. tually operate in in operate tually tutr o the of structure learer. Unity of Unity learer. tliain of stallization hich systemic systemic hich ising from

CEU eTD Collection ewe isiuin, n te tiue ad eair f at repres party of behavior and attitudes the and institutions, between behavioral or the attitudinal dimension party dimension behavioral 6.6 and attitudinal (table 6.7). or unity the eair ti rltosi as epan wy h efc o di of effect the why explains also relationship this behavior, means This the that areelect moreproportional MPs electoral systems. directly affect party unity of behavior, their influence is stronger ont stronger influence is of their behavior, directlypartyaffect unity fa systemic the If Europe. in parties across behavior of unity e systemic the of summary a shows page next the on 6.8 Table nt uig h fcs f ersnain s snhtc variable synthetic a as representation of focus the using unity system link which hypotheses major some tested has chapter This 6.4 Conclusion of explaining unity of behavior. sys simple the to opposed as model integrated general the in away h rsls hw ht etaiain s nacd y ih district high by enhanced is centralization that show results The c on of factors systemic D effects present the Appendix in and 8 Tables 7 thr also place take behavior of unity the on effects Indirect it whether and impact negative or positive indirect, or direct is part on factors “environmental” mentioned above the all of impact other a using The theories. deductively principle-agent or others finance, party representation, at arrived have I while f systems, or systems electoral systems, parliamentary federalism, a such refined, and literature the from derived were hypotheses aig t h cnr. s etaiain s srn fco whic factor strong a is centralization As centre. the at making will parties more the rules, representation proportional list 166

ough party centralization. centralization. party ough ctors considered do not not do considered ctors is aimed at towards the towards at aimed is amnain f party of ragmentation tit antd fades magnitude strict concentrate decision decision concentrate ffects tested on party party on tested ffects facilitating the link link the facilitating ayi caiis the clarifies nalysis temic factors model factors temic uhls nt of unity upholds h ic factors and party party and factors ic toe concerning those s y unity, whether it it whether unity, y he attitudinal part attitudinal he entatives. Some Some entatives. ed under closed ed closed under magnitude in in magnitude hois on theories entralization. CEU eTD Collection ae o te neves odce wt Ms I ocue ht P’ focus MPs’ that conclude I MPs, with conducted interviews the on based party unity but in a negative way and only when MPs put their const their put MPs when only and way negative a in but unity party en lce udr pn it o i SD n ti epan their explains this and SMD in or lists open under elected been to attached more are who MPs of majority The parliament. aue f h bls n hc te ms vt o o o ohr pcfc ci specific other on or on vote must they which on bills the of nature pol the on either depends and changing constantly is representation r h nto hs o infcn efc o uiy f eair Gvn thi Given behavior. of unity on effect significant no has nation the or represe of focus the Whether D). Appendix 2, (table representation ou o rpeetto, s ecie b te ebr o a p a of members the by perceived as representation, of Focus of Table unity systemic effects 6.8Summary of behavior on variables (H4). pa of terms in opinions of congruence low to leads it but unity, voting has also Federalism positions. policy parties’ the on attitudes congrue more the parliament, a in are there parties more the thei of ideology the towards attitudes MPs’ on impact significant repre of focus MP’s an and federalism of existence the system, fragme system Party indirectly. active therefore and unity, of uni to detrimental is this more the constituency, their to relation rep of think MPs more The (H8). nation the or party the disregard Focus of representation (narrow) Negative Yes Yes Negative Focusrepresentation (narrow) of District magnitude (increase) Positive Partly (indirect) Partly (indirect) Positive magnitudeDistrict (increase) altsrcue(pn Ngtv No (indirect) Negative Ballot (open) structure

Ceiling on donations Positive Yes Yes Positive Ceiling ondonations alaetrs Pstv No (indirect) Positive Parliamentarism Systemic factor Systemic factor State subsidies Positive Yes Yes Positive subsidies State rgetto Pstv No (indirect) Positive Fragmentation eeaim eaie No (indirect) Negative Federalism Predicted effect on unity of behavior unity of behavior 167

nce there is between MPs’ MPs’ between is there nce ntation, type of political of type ntation, their constituency have have constituency their rimn, atr for matters arliament, o iet mat on impact direct no Effect Verified sentation, all have a a have all sentation, r party. Apparently, Apparently, party. r ntation is the party the is ntation resentation only in in only resentation icy areas or on the on or areas icy ituency first and and first ituency ted behavior in in behavior ted rsl, and result, s rty ideology ideology rty rcumstances hie of choice of CEU eTD Collection oiia pris eev fo te tt, h hge ter uni their higher the state, the from receive parties political alaet n ter cul tegh esrd n parliamentary in measured strength actual their and parliament T (H12). beliefs ideological their in united are that parties al donations on ceiling a of existence bare the way, marginal n aig ate bhv a uiay ois nie alaet T parliament. inside bodies unitary as behave parties making in plays finance Party parliament. a in behavior MPs’ explaining analys present the in described those like factors, systemic Contrary and partexpectations, against many advanced inferences the in to in besignifies to attitudes preserved (H13) more ofbyparties unity parties of number High unity. ideological explain we when only The power associated with a vote of confidence seems to generate to seems confidence of vote a with associated power The differe a makes only not or parliamentary are states Whether lowunity laterwhichinto will translate of behavior. competiti intra-party foster lists open while attitudes of C parties. political of congruence ideological the on directly pref a with open or closed is list electoral the Whether (H10). beh of unity the on directly impact not does structure ballot The representation couldbe not accounted for. deca last the over changes Possible data. 1996 against only tested of focus the about hypotheses the that mind in bearing interpreted lacks any significance for the MPs. MPs. the for significance lacks any vote. the of time the at important considered are which

25 The other possibility is that the questionaddress the isthat possibility other The

168 ed to elite during the surveys is totally redundant istotally surveys the during elite to ed

25 on and low ideological unity ideological low and on These results have also to be to also have results These he number of parties in a in parties of number he nce for unity of attitudes. attitudes. of unity for nce unity facilitate lists losed so impacts positively on on positively impacts so quite an important role important an quite erential vote, it impacts it vote, erential is, perform poorly in in poorly perform is, ty level (H14). In a a In (H14). level ty . . et i significant is seats representation were representation he more subsidies subsidies more he de in the focus of focus the in de vo a expected as avior the formation of formation the a parliament parliament a y literature, yliterature, and and CEU eTD Collection party can form and maintain its unity of attitudes and further and attitudes of unity its maintain and form can party parties. In order to achieve unity of behavior, implement their p their implement behavior, of unity achieve to order In parties. parliamentary the explaining when alone considered and isolated be party organization. policy program. policy program. and the parties also receive a substantial amount of financial a of amount andsupport fr also receive substantial the parties elected are MPs the and high moderately is fragmentation where a in emerge will behavior and attitudes of terms in party united environme institutional the only consideration into taking case, ideal an condition institutional ideal the show chapter this of conclusions The This chapter has shown that institutional constrains le from coming the state institutional that chapterThis has shown os o awy fvr at uiy te tcs f esain oe f come persuasion of sticks the unity, party favor always not does instit country the when but behavior, of unity high to leads attitudes exis it Where 5). chapter in shown have I (as warnings verbal or dec of mea centralization disciplinary finances, of distribution or selection to candidates’ relate latter The mechanisms. own their voters, their of eyes the into choice feasible a as themselves out to be beneficial, making parties vote in a united manner and and manner united a in vote parties making beneficial, be to out b democracy, representative for detrimental seem would state relati close a glance, first at Even (H15). behavior of unity

169

onship of a party with the with party a of onship ut in fact the effect turns effect the fact in ut parties also make use of of use make also parties its behavioral unity. In unity. behavioral its ts, high party unity of of unity party high ts, parliamentary system system parliamentary under closed list PR, list closed under sures like expulsion like sures rogram and portray and rogram rom the internal internal the rom implement their their implement s under which a which under s om the state. the state.om toa setting utional making, ision eair of behavior t a highly a nt, vel cannot vel cannot CEU eTD Collection Empirically empiricalMajor results ate ad hi lvl o uiy a te wr afce by affected were they as unity, of levels their and parties

theoreticallyempirically. and liter be can contribution The Europe. politics in unity party for model explanatory party the to contribution a brings thesis This issues important the the most respective in countries. major in were, unity low caused which issues the 2007, in experts, the Euro over all unity, low therefore and parties, within dissent cause i were integration, and enlargement EU economy, the the in interference and spending state welfare taxes, like issues, Redistribution factors. other various on depends also vote final their that interviews the during t MPs the Additionally, behavior. of unity for proxies acceptable decl those consequently,and, voting actual their and voting their about MPs’ between discrepancy expected the underscoring evidence new T scores. unity experts’ the with and values index Rice the with alone factionalism issue factionalism, of types various of out that roll- the or survey expert the surveys, elite the on based thesis in measured been has behavior of unity Party characteristics. , the thesis includes a cross-country comparison of 187 European poli European 187 of comparison cross-country a includes thesis the , 7. 7. CONCLUSIONS 170

the institutions or party party or institutions the call data. I have shown have I data. call ature by building an an building by ature aiu wy i this in ways various he analysis revealed analysis he is highly associated highly is hemselves declared hemselves pe. According to According pe. xet f state of extent quantified both both quantified ity of the cases, the of ity arations are not arenot arations ssues prone to to prone ssues circumstantial declarations tical CEU eTD Collection behave in parliament. However, ideological unity is not a sufficie a not is unity ideological However, parliament. in behave party politics, and further substantiates the need for party for need the substantiates further and politics, party oiia pris culy ok oehr n rcie A shor A practice. in together work actually parties political more the behavior. parties’ is united disciplinary the stricter The unity. behavioral of level high cont rules disciplinary and centralization High behavior. of unity pa the united how of predictor good a is attitudes of Unity behavior. of characteris party of supremacy the show results the Secondly, Eastern Europe. rejection of stereotypes of the two regions as being significa being as regions two the of stereotypes of rejection Europe Western and Europe Eastern Central in unity behavioral of discr significant no is there that shows analysis the Firstly, findings are theresulted empirical from which analysis presented be This offers an overall general picture of how state institutions institutions state how of picture general overall an offers This t beh the between differences major no of are there as effectively unity promotes rules, disciplinary and centralization through apparaorganizational representatives. amongst Party attitudes its ha consequently and program their clarify parties stab makes context A democracies. new the to compared when attitudes of unity democra European old that surprising not therefore is It attitudes. strongly more however, impact, latter The do. institutions state of unity influence characteristics party level, broader a At

171

research to include Central include to research behavior much more than more much behavior wo regions in this respect. this in regions wo epancy between the levels the between epancy rules of the PPGs are, the the are, PPGs the of rules smay f h major the of summary t ntly different in terms of terms in different ntly tics in explaining unity explaining in tics and organizations like organizations and tus on the other hand, other hand, the on tus ribute to achieving a achieving to ribute ve a higher unity of of unity higher a ve nt predictor of party of predictor nt , which justifies the justifies which , cies exhibit higher exhibit cies low. low. on the unity of of unity the on le institutional institutional le rty is going to to going is rty vo more avior CEU eTD Collection ballot structure have a significant impact on MPs’ attitudes t attitudes MPs’ on impact significant a have structure ballot the narrower The legislature. the in behavior future MPs predict process the see MPs how investigated also have I this, besides towards the final party unity of behavior. towards of behavior. unity the final party indirect an brings and ideology party the over opinions MPs’ of Federalism positions. issue parties’ the on attitudes MPs’ of t parliament, the in parties more the Apparently, party. their existence the fragmentation, system Party behavior. of unity the therefore and unity of dimension attitudinal the on more manifested is H beha behavior. of unity the on impact of direct a have not unity do factors systemic the is higher the received, subsidies of amount dona on ceiling the and receives party a that subsidy state of of unity the on effect direct positive a with factors systemic the in unity voting MPs explaining in poorly perform analysis, taken those as such factors, systemic literature, party the a propositions many against and expectations to contrary Fourthly, parliament. the in behavior accentuated elected under lists. is if an MP open of unity their be will lower the representi to allocate MPs importance more the representation, of focus MPs’ expected, As unity. party on has that effect what political for important is unity Party model. explanatory unity and party links theoretically it as thesis, this in considered l individual only the was representation of focus MPs’ the Thirdly,

172

into account by the present present the by account into systemic levels in the party the in levels systemic he higher the congruence the higher he behavior are the amount the are behavior leads to low congruence low to leads owards the ideology of of ideology the owards of federalism and the and federalism of of representation, and representation, of legislature. The only only The legislature. in. h hge the higher The tions. ng their constituents, constituents, their ng negative contribution contribution negative representation does representation vior, their influence their vior, This tendency is is tendency This ersnain but, representation dvanced earlier in in earlier dvanced evel factor to be be to factor evel indirectly on on indirectly ir focus of of focus ir owever, if if owever, CEU eTD Collection party, country and regional levels. Judging by the model-fit based model-fit the by Judging levels. regional and country party, be the test party used to order in unity model. atrs f at uiy cos uoen onre. The countries. European across unity party of patterns f searching the of aim with countries the European overview of presented an atclry mhszd h dsicin ewe uiy f behavior of unity between distinction the emphasized particularly based on party and systemic institutional characteristics. institutional systemic and party on based aa ag i nee. oee, h am f h mdl a t predic to was model the of aim the However, needed. is range data their trace to order in and fluctuant, very definition by are they considerat into taken not were These explanations. socio-demographic example for unity: influence could which factors the exhaustively not was thesis this in tested model explanatory unity party The The contributionsChapter unity. from effects institutional the disentangles thesis the data, 2007 In major concepts and their operationalization, the data quality and quality data the operationalization, their and concepts major rs-ainl esetv. n the In perspective. cross-national and very powerful PPGs. The PPGs. powerful very and not do that factors systemic decentralization, party of combination attitudes. On the basis of this distinction I advanced an explanat an advanced I distinction this of basis the On attitudes. hoeia prpcie ietfe te as ihn h party the within gaps the identified perspective, theoretical ytm ls fvrbe n hoy o at uiy ih ih part high with unity party to theory in favorable less systems hpe 4 chapter first chapter first

itoue psil maueet fr at uiy f eair a behavior of unity party for measurements possible introduced I justified the importance of party unity and the need to stud to need the and unity party of importance the justified second

eod chapter second pattern 173

observed was an association of electoral of association an was observed rvee pry nt i a in unity party reviewed I Chapter first pattern pattern first party effects on party party on effects party impact a much wider much a impact intended to explore explore to intended the methodology to to methodology the ory model for unity unity for model ory

, it does not include include not does it , ieaue ad I and literature, cnrlzto of centralization y three favor party unity unity party favor on the 1996 and and 1996 the on pry nt at unity party t n uiy of unity and discussed the discussed on ws a was found o because ion or general or y it in a in it y d I nd CEU eTD Collection party of onunity, analcharacteristics consideringas the the unit party rdce o te ai o is etrgt oiin r t traditi its or position left-right its on basis the on predicted rcs cnetae a te ete ad ple dsilnr m disciplinary applies and centre, the at concentrated process ie ta te ifrne i pry nt soe ae higher are scores unity party in differences the that Given c another offers example. Kingdom United of case the since Europe, Eastern not applies however, mechanism, This 2. chapter in introduced mechanism unity achieve to parties by used mechanism the support to evidence c This measures. disciplinary and centralization of level higher l the with parties European Eastern and parties European bet differs MPs among preferences ideological of homogeneity The significantthe unity of attitudes. differences in the regions, two the across behaviorofparty of levelsunity the in not are there While rules. PPGs strict less and making decision

between In shown, is associated with low unity in Europe while special iss special while Europe in unity low with associated is shown, Li behavior. of unity in variations explain part, in affiliation, l and parties issue special of case the in Only affiliation. aho. hv as epaie ta te eair f pltcl p political a of behavior the that emphasized also have I fashion. united in terms of behavior displays high programmatic cohesion, programmatic high displays behavior of terms in united ave On organization. party and characteristics party at looking hpe 5 chapter countries, the subsequent chapters then tested the influence of influence the tested then chapters subsequent the countries, age ta pry eairl nt cn e xlie subs explained be can unity behavioral party that argued I 174

iberal parties can party family family partycan parties iberal atter exhibiting on average a average on exhibiting atter beral ideology, as I have have I as ideology, beral rage, in Europe, a party a Europe, in rage, easures in a moderate moderate a in easures significant differences significant within ue parties tend to be to tend parties ue re are noticeable and arenoticeable re nttts pertinent onstitutes nl at family party onal a decision making making decision a ysis. onre than countries ry ant be cannot arty en Western ween f eair a behavior, of systemic and and systemic onfirmatory tantially by by tantially only to to only CEU eTD Collection party literature, systemic factors perform poorly in direc in poorly perform factors systemic literature, party ois nie h alaet Te oe usde ate rece parties subsidies more The parliament. the inside bodies party processoverall exe external democratic is the that democracy eair ad lo ht at fmle hv ls pr o their of part lost have families party that also and behavior, behavior than others. The parties’ position of based on their manife their on based of position parties’ The others. than behavior lef The scholars. party by right own their in family party Party finance plays quite an important direct role in making p making in role direct important an quite plays finance Party unit the on pronounced more and direct is factors systemic of impact sub state and rules PPG of exception the with parliament, a in mat pstvl o uiy f eair A iiil supin t assumption initial An behavior. of unity on positively impacts dona ceiling on a existence of the In way, a marginal unityhigher level. their Chapter 6 Chapter expected, and prolong the democratic paradox; it is indeed at the at indeed is it paradox; democratic the prolong and expected, uni favor measures disciplinary and Centralization behavior. their in sta will parties opposition, in or government in Whether former. the aas l latter are high without instances we there happens which seen, in have the high for prerequisite a not is it attitudes of unity High it. to contribute and behavior of unity with hand in hand goes attitudes of Unity Europe. turned out to be insignificant in explaining why some parties ar parties some why explaining in insignificant be to out turned This leads to the conclusion that leftist parties are not the mos the not are parties leftist that conclusion the to leads This part declared current their question may one that lately much so not are they that however noting worth is It behavior. in united most

showed that, contrary to expectations and against many inferences many against and expectations to contrary that, showed 175

tly explaining MPs’ behavior behavior MPs’ explaining tly t-right positioning of parties of positioning t-right unity of behavior because, behavior of unity arties behave as unitary as behave arties v fo te tt, the state, the from ive t highly united in their their in united highly t e more united in their in united more e sidies. However, the the However, sidies. overall relevance in in relevance overall expense of internal of expense y family affiliation. affiliation. family y rcised. rcised. stoes has changed has stoes y similarly united united similarly y ty of behavior as as behavior of ty y of attitudes. attitudes. of y a a closer a hat considered a a considered s positively s tions alsotions evel of evel of in the the in CEU eTD Collection rcs b icesn te edny f ate t vt i a unite a in vote to parties of tendency the increasing by process portray themselves as a feasible choice for their voters, pa voters, their for choice feasible a as themselves portray behavior. Federalism has no direct impact on unity of behavior. Ins behavior. of unity on impact direct no has Federalism behavior. par attitudinal the in more manifested is influence their behavior, in a parliament. In order to achieve unity of behavior, implement implement behavior, of unity achieve to order In parliament. a in beha the explaining when alone considered and isolated be cannot level constraints institutional that shown has thesis this all, in All on the party attitudes. unity of im list, the on candidates the over preferences express to voters comp intra-party for party provide that rules and electoral The ideology concerned. party overall as insofar congruence MPs’ low aff directly not do considered factors systemic the of most If their policyimplement programs. appe finance, party of perspective the from least at state, closer a fact, In questionable. is democracy representative for most would state the and parties political between relationship like measures disciplinary finances, of distribution or selection m decision of centralization to relate latter The mechanisms. own P’ tiue oe ter at plc pstos Hg fragme High positions. i direct no has and attitudes unityof on only positivelytherefore, policy party their over attitudes MPs’ con more the parliament, a in are there parties more part the showed their over convergence MPs’ on impact significant a have organiza federal the structure, ballot the fragmentation, system 176

ars to benefit the democratic the benefit to ars rties also make use of their of use make also rties oig rm h state the from coming likely be detrimental be likely mpact on the unity of unity the on mpact eainhp ih the with relationship tion of the state; all all state; the of tion pact negatively only only negatively pact xuso o verbal or expulsion etition by allowing allowing by etition gruence there is in in is there gruence ect party unity of of unity party ect kn, candidates’ aking, their program and program their ielg. s I As ideology. y d manner and to to and manner d o uiy Party unity. of t tto impacts, ntation tead it promotes it tead vior of parties of vior oiis are policies CEU eTD Collection politics. politics. but when a country’s institutional framework does not always favor favor always not does framework institutional country’s a when but oiie impact Positive the conclusion that, at least for the near future, democratic polit democratic future, near the for least at that, conclusion the polic implement and government a form to or elections win to either s and deterministic is It trait. party given a not therefore uni Party considered. parties parliamentary European the all in PPGs, the by or office central party the by either applied disciplinary or making decision of centralization high through Whether factors towardsderives ideological instead from directed is institutional negati the of Most manner. united a in behave to likely less were affiliate are that parties Only behavior. of unity party for There are no systemic or party characteristics with direc with characteristics party or systemic no are There also positively unity favor of behavior. PPGs of rules strict the from or donations party on ceiling a of rec subsidies state of amount the from measures, disciplinary of the sticks persuasiondimensions, from the come internal party organizat leads unity party ideological high exists, it Wherewarnings.

n eairl nt cm mr fo pry etaiain party centralization, party from more came unity behavioral on 177

unity of behavior is achieved is behavior of unity t and t ought by all parties in order order in parties all by ought d with the liberal ideology ideology liberal the with d to high unity of behavior, of unity high to eived, from the existence the from eived, negative consequences consequences negative . Special issue parties issue Special . ics will still be party be still will ics ty of behavior is is behavior of ty ve influence that that influence ve ies. This leads to leads This ies. unity. unity. unity in both both in unity ion. ion. measures,

CEU eTD Collection party unity from state and party perspectives and presents and perspectives party and state from unity party atsnhp ihn lcoae r h cnegne f ate i parties of convergence the or electorate within partisanship brings a further contribution and uncovers factors that promote or hinde or promote that factors uncovers and contribution further a brings Thomass 1987, (Katz enacted be to parties within decided policies rfrne. utemr, h uie bhvo o te at eie i elite party the of behavior united the Furthermore, preferences. ate fr gvrmns n ipeetplce. s hw y thi by shown As policies. implement and governments form parties for representation and party government. party and representationfor agree literature theory democratic and literature party Both Theoretical implications

not groups of individuals who act the same and (or because they) hold hold they) because (or and same the act who individuals of groups not beha and attitudes between distinction the consider to revisedbe could all, I suggest that that suggest I all, u touches thesis the and comparative democrtheoretical politics, party politics in issues this, doing While parties. political European osnu, at uiy il las e n o is eurmns as requirements its of one be always will unity party consensus, hte o nt at gvrmn i i dne (ar 08, eas o decl of because 2008), (Mair danger in is government party not or Whether Secondly especially 5. chapters 4and in stag every at given been has differentiation conceptual this for attitudes. of unity and behavior of unity between differences the actor unitary completely are parties that assumption standard b Conceptually, preferences. ideological common their of reflection adapt and use their own tools in order to become a unitary voting unitary a become to order in tools own their use and adapt parl a in behavior party unitary favor not would conditions institutional , , while party government party definitions of political parties which regard them as unitary actors actors unitary as them regard which parties political of theorists emphasize the need for unity in order for for order in unity for need the emphasize theorists 178 Theoretically

, this thesis aimed at explaining at aimed thesis this , on the need for party unity party for need the on a model which works for for works which model a s, this thesis has built on built has thesis this s, Substantial evidence Substantial bloc. Consequently Consequently bloc. en 1994), my thesis thesis my 1994), en atic theory. First of atic theory. t a mainstream a nto o te analysis, the of e long as political political as long s thesis, even if even thesis, s nt las a always not s rmvn the removing y vior. Parties are Parties vior. iament, parties parties iament, r party unity. unity. party r o several pon similar similar ining ining CEU eTD Collection at cnrlzto tn t poue ntr ato. nt o atti of Unity action. unitary produce to tend centralization party omto ad development and formation preferences and consensus of behavior.preferencesconsensus and based government, through which policies implemented by public s public by implemented policies which through government, based instrume main the as important still are parties political

representative democracy democracy representative some that conclude to me allow thesis this of findings the Thirdly, ae a nt e ad bu uiy f tiue. nocd disciplina Enforced attitudes. of unity about said be not can same v in at arrived be can behavior of Unity former. the on impacts di are attitudes of terms in unity and behavior of terms in Unity them. implement to propos policies the vote to parliament, the in unitary be to order a control central of levels high apply parties Some democracy. expens the at happens this which in instances are there achieved, new party formed and the old party that suffered the rupture wi rupture the suffered that party old the and formed party new spl party of consequences The splits. experience factionalism there relates thesis this of implication theoretical forth The has morewhile influenceparty on ofparty behavior. organization unity policy their as far as members party of unity theinfluences e institutional the seen, have we As above. from radically changed effe be can that something not is it and slowly rather changes rm at pltcas ecuae ad s anand y intra-pa by maintained is and encourages politicians, party from still persist. If one assumes that external democracy is is democracy external that assumes one If persist. still Pris ih o uiy f tiue ad exacerbated and attitudes of unity low with Parties . 179

nt of liberal democracy. Party- democracy. liberal of nt preferences are concerned, are preferences fore to the process of process the to fore its are such that both the both that such are its nd disciplinary rules in rules disciplinary nd ll have a much higher much a have ll ed and, consequently, and, ed tvl ipsd and imposed ctively arious ways, but the the but ways, arious fferent and the later the and fferent nvironment usually nvironment e of internal party party internal of e t uiomt of uniformity rty y esrs and measures ry ervants originate ervants ue, however, tudes, paradoxes of of paradoxes party CEU eTD Collection latter of whenchange coercion can intra-party mechanisms rapidly more f party when or occur splits party when change does former the par of process the in important more is behavior of unity while proces the to more applies attitudes of Unity attitudes. of unity

180

ty development. While development. ty o at formation party of s actions appear, the the appear, actions are used. are used. CEU eTD Collection plus the opinion of the party opinion plus voters; op party plus opinion own voter, party view judgment; own party; alaetr pry sol h te vt i acrac wt te opi the he ownparliamentary follow opinion?” his or should party with accordance in vote then he should party, parliamentary been across arrive applied at to order comparable in regions. scores I. ELITE 1996: SURVEYS ELITE I. CEE Questionnaire:CEE who of follow the their opinion national party; Coding: percentage MPs of L-R of positioning their MPs’ partyCoding onthe scal - Standard deviation 2. Party (attitudes) unity depends3. it 2. own opinion of the1. opinion parliamentary party held his by one different fromis the which an holds opinion vote, to but has an“If MP vi the follow yourparty; of voters the of view the follow Answers: your such in cases?” base inclined to decision you followingmost On decide which would beParliament must one of upon. the “In different views many concerning cases people matters the that have

WE Questionnaire:WE legislature; - (behavior) unity Party 1. and their response scales were different from one region to anothe to region one from different were scales response their and ( Kopecký for study Elite (1998); al. et Kitschelt for Study T Twente, of University Project, Research International Europe Political 1996, Parliament of Members of Study European Sources:

APPENDIX A Measurements and codingAPPENDIX and A Measurements – ideological congruence of party representatives –ideological of congruence party representatives

odc cnegne f at rpeettvs n the in representatives party of convergence conduct 181

2001). When the questions the When 2001). he Netherlands; Elite Elite Netherlands; he ew of yournational of ew inion; own opinion opinion own inion; r, multipliers have have multipliers r, Representation in Representation National in f the of nion e. CEU eTD Collection How important is it for you for represent it How to is important as a whole? the nation nationwide? youryou for who voted it Andparty, for how is voters all important represent to constituency? you forUsing represent it to is votersall scale, important i the same how 7- very1 - important; not important youyouryour for represent constituency the or who voters voted in party? you for is Could the the me, scale card, it using tell important of at the how bottom questionnaireCEE youryour your position position, partyparty position, voters’ Left; 1- 10–Right yourself onthe following and others scale?” right and left about talk people some matters political “In CEE Questionnaire:CEE representing constituencyparty and voters, the the the nation; the party, – representation of Focus 4. pernational executive; partyCoding: who percentage answer MPs of national executive? parliam the policy, party in say most the has who party, your In questionnaireWE 3. Party centralization right.” pol the from ranging scale a on party each place “Please CEE questionnaireCEE Coding per from answering of -percentage 3. 1 to MPs Average party little1 - very 7 - much; very acc you (Leadersyour ofwhen decisions?” are party) making political into groups mentioned the of each of opinion the take you do much “How WE questionnaire:WE

: :

: : :

– concentration of decision making at the central level making– concentrationcentral level of decision at the percentage of MPs ranking the importance of of importance the ranking MPs of percentage 182

tcl et t te political the to left” itical . Where would you place place you would Where . naypry r the or party entary

n your ount ount you to CEU eTD Collection h eeuie n te eiltv pwr i mr o ls bala less or computed by deducting more is powers legislative the and executive the index balance Executive-Legislative 5. VARIABLES: SYSTEMIC II. one? Agroup specific society; Which in Your party your the All people in constituency your the for All people who voted party the All people the country in great7 - of importance importance 1 - of little you to it How represent is to important groupsfollowing people: the of WE Questionnaire:WE you for represent it How to is important or gr professional social specific

(Parl>Gov) (HoS>Parl) govern; to vote of continue confidence to a condition is necessary c necessary is investiture of vote of: scores the addingby index (Gov>Parl) has HoS also executive powers; pa dissolve can HoS government, of formation the in involved directly is addin by index cumulative parliament; vis–a-vis state of head the p independent the indicating thus government of existence the of continuation ne b adn te crs f gvrmn cn goe h vt o confi of vote the ignore parliament;dissolve governmentcan (or PM) can government of: scores the adding by index etn t wih alaet s oiat vr oenet cumulative government; over dominant is parliament which to extent - etn t wih oenet s oiat vr alaet cumulative parliament; over dominant is government which to extent - etn t wih h ha o sae a ifune h cmoiin an composition the influence can state of head the which to extent -

(Parl>Gov) from the sum from the sum 183 etn t wih h rltosi between relationship the which to extent -

(HoS>Parl)+(Gov>Parl) ondition to govern and and govern to ondition cd te crs are scores the nced; g the scores of: HoS of: scores the g

oups? oups? ; ; rliament; rliament; ower of ower dence; d

CEU eTD Collection Table A1. the Relation between executiveTable legislative and 6. Districtmagnitude – Keman. Hans and Ian Bugde Jaap, Woldendorp, Source: 5 - federal and decentralized 4 -centralized federal and 3 - semi-federal 2 - unitary and decentralized 1 - unitary and centralized 9. Federalism index –Lijphart’s 8. Fragmentation: 0 –Closed 1 –Open structure 7. Ballot (1945-1998) uebug 0 0 1 0 1 Luxembourg ehrad 1 . 05 0 0.5 0.5 1 Netherlands wteln 0 1 1 0 0 Switzerland zc e. 1 0 1 1 2 Rep. Czech emn 2 . 1 0.5 0 1 1 0.5 0 2 1 Germany Denmark oai 2 1 0 1 1 2 Romania lvka 15 0.5 0 1.5 1.5 2 0 Slovakia 0.5 2 Hungary egu 15 . 15 -1 1.5 0.5 1.5 Belgium otgl 1 0 1 1 2 Portugal Country Country owy 0 0 1 0 1 Norway wdn 0 0 2 0 2 Sweden iln 05 . 1 -1 1 0.5 0.5 Finland cln 1 1 -1 1 -0.5 1 1 1 0.5 Iceland 1 Austria rln 2 . 15 0 1.5 0.5 2 Ireland oad 1 0 1 1 2 Poland rne . 1 -1.5 1 1 0.5 France usa . 15 0 0 1.5 1.5 Russia pi 2 . 15 0 1.5 0.5 2 Spain tl 2 05 0.5 0.5 1 2 Italy K 05 . -1 1.5 0.5 1 UK . Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Publishers. Academic Kluwer Dordrecht: . (Parl>Gov) effective number of parliamentary parties numbereffective of parliamentary parties average number of mandates per constituencyaverage per mandates number of

(HoS>Parl) 184

2000.

Party Government in 48 Democracies Democracies in 48 Government Party (Gov>Parl)

ExLegBal CEU eTD Collection means very high unity.” 2006/2007. Give a score from 1 to 5 for each party, “Please assess the level of parliamentary unity inside behavior:Party of unity SURVEY BORZ, VARIABLES III. JANDA ENYEDI, 2007 EXPERT 95 – Special issue 90 – Ethnic regional 80 – Agrarian 70 – Nationalist 60 – Conservative democrat 50 – Christian Liberal 40 – 30 - democrat Social 20 - Communist 10 - Ecologist 13. Party family 1 - government in government in 0 –not (incumbency)12. Government status partytotal funding subsidies (b) – 11. Party Public finance 1 –ceiling ondonations 0 –no ceiling ondonations (a) 10. Party donations on Restrictions finance

185 amount ofamount funding aspublic percentage of

where 1 means very low unity and 5 the (country X) parties as of CEU eTD Collection parliamentary votes parliamentary votes parliamentary votes parliamentary votes 3-agreement over among MPs 70% 2-agreement over among MPs 60% 1- 50% among or agreement less MPs period.” unity cohesion) (party the 2006/2007 for programmatic “Onforregarding a each from assign a scale 5 partyplease 1to score it attitudes: Party of unity 5-great increased a deal 4- increased somewhat 3- no change 2- decreased somewhat great1- decreaseda deal greatincreased a deal.” greatdecreaseda changed, deal, increased or not decreased somewhat, somewhat, Pleasechanged? assign scorewhich each specifies a party, for if unit “Over decade voting howof (1996-2006), the has the in parliament party unitypast of behavior: party unity in Change votes the 5 -party never and Nofrom internal MPs conflicts defect par in line never 4 - conflicts, Despite MPs internal minor defect in from line the party 3 – Occasional internal conflicts but MPs rarely MPs 3 –Occasionalbut from conflicts the party internal defect 2 - Some internal conflicts and MPs occasionallyfrom and2 - internal the MPs Some party defect conflicts line frequently and MPs 1 - in from line depart Much the internal party conflict

186

y has of voting line in in line s ideological ideological s liamentary liamentary in in

CEU eTD Collection great deal.” great deal.” somewha increased changed, not somewhat, decreased deal, great ce party if specifies which party, each for cha score a centralization assign party has how (1996-2006) decade past the “Over party centralization: in Change 4- high;1-medium; very 5- 2- very 3- low; low; high of partyselection the distribution as of of candidates, and 2006/2007.” finances centralizat of level the for party each to 5 to 1 from score a national top the to regard with party the within authority making of distribution and location the to refers power of “Centralization Party centralization: 5-great increased a deal 4- increased somewhat 3- no change 2- decreased somewhat great1- decreaseda deal greatincreased a deal.” greatdecreaseda changed, deal, increased or not decreased somewhat somewhat, Pleasechanged? assign scorewhich each specifies a party, for if id IDEOLOGICAL“OverUNITYof decade parti how (1996-2006) has the thepast of attitudes: party unity in Change 5-agreement over among MPs 90% 4-agreement over among MPs 80%

187

ntralization has decreased a decreased has ntralization ion in decision-making, in ion party organs. Assign Assign organs. party eological unity has unityeological has effective decision- effective t or increased a a increased or t gd Please nged?

es es CEU eTD Collection blocs within the party. Please rate each party as of 2006/2007 for 2006/2007 of as party each rate Please party. the within blocs personal attraction of individual leaders.” personal of individual attraction party external or party internal. Please try to specify to try Please internal. party or external party privileges overetc.) dissent the decade.” case last of in on disagreement of one or more substantive political issues.” on disagreement more issues.” substantive political or of one to organized groups intra-party as "factions" defining “Still factionalism(b) Issue great4- 5- a1- a 3- none lot deal some 2- little Pleaseofeach for of rate party 2006/2007 factionalism the as based extent groups may Factions party. the intra-party within blocs distinct as collectively as defined "factions," have parties “Some factionalism(a) Leadership Factionalism: 1- never rarely 3- 4- occasionally often 2- “The rules on parliamentary factions can differ from party t party from differ can factions parliamentary on rules “The measures: Disciplinary 5-increasedgreat a deal 4-increased somewhat 3-no change 2-decreased somewhat great1-decreased a deal

engaged in applying strict disciplinary rules to their MPs MPs their to rules disciplinary strict applying in engaged 188

if Slovak parties have actually have parties Slovak if pursue various objectives. various pursue act collectively as distinct distinct as collectively act o party and they can be be can they and party o lk eplin ls of loss expulsion, (like factionalism based factionalism raie t act to organized on the CEU eTD Collection overall ideology. overall ideology. factional of extent the for 2006/2007 of as party each rate Please (c) factionalism Ideological great4- 5- a1- a 3- none lot deal some 2- little Focus exp are government in Representation are that Parties factors Individual uni status Power on score high morecentr be to expected are Leftparties a with Parties attitudes of Unity attitudi of level low a with Parties Ideology Centralization rules Disciplinary rules/ PPG t state fromthe more subsidies The characteristics Party financing Party i system party the fragmented more The system Party pres.) (parl./ regime Political (unitary/federal) structure State choice) (intra-party system Electoral factors Systemic A2. overview Hypotheses Table 1-

none 2- little 3- some 4- a lot 5- a great 5-a a 3-none lot deal some 4- 2- little body. body. eairl nt a cmae t pltcl ate o parties political to compared as unity behavioral behavioral unity as compared to those operating in in operating those to compared as unity behavioral behavioral unity. unity. behavioral regimes. regimes. unity accordingly to their seats share. The bigger bigger The share. seats disunited a for probability higher the legislature, their to accordingly unity homogeneit makethem attitudinal party and the to attached representatives of level high a constructing centralization measures in order to keep their repr their keep to order in measures centralization unity. unity. higher the representation, of focus the broader The a rules legislature. in the behavior MPs PPGs the rewarding and restrictive more The sh to expected are states parliamentary in Parties t expected are states federal in parties Political but representation of understanding broader a have voti preferential with lists are open under elected MPs districts member single unity. behavioral party levelof low a show constituency their in of terms in elected just representation are who MPs unity behavioral party to relating Hypotheses score high on all factors of behavioral unity unity behavioral of factors high all on score disciplinary strict by supplemented centralization, termsbehavior. of

189

nal homogeneity are expected to apply strong strong apply to expected are homogeneity nal he higher the level of party unity. unity. party of thelevel hehigher ty of attitudes and a high degree of of degree high a and attitudes of ty s, the more parties will be interested in in interested be will parties more the s, ected to differ in terms of behavioral behavioral of terms in differ to ected alized and more united than the rest in in rest the than united more and alized behavior. behavior. o show a lower level of party party of level lower a show o esentatives acting as a unitary a as acting esentatives the level of party behavioral behavioral party of level the unitary states. states. unitary esrs ae xetd to expected are measures, act unitary. unitary. act voters and consequently to to consequently and voters ow a higher level of party party of level higher a ow ng allowed are expected to to expected are allowed ng , hc wl ke their keep will which y, to show a low level of of level low a show to perating in presidential presidential in perating re, the more united the the united more the re, the party size in the the in size party the ism based on its its on based ism expected to see see to expected CEU eTD Collection Belgium Belgium Austria France France Finland Denmark Czech Republic Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (Social Democratic Party of Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen (Finnish Suomen Puolue Democratic Social Party) Komunistická Strana Čech aKomunistická Party Strana MoravyBehemia Čech and (Communist of Christen-Democratisch &(Christian-Democratic Fle Christen-Democratisch Vlaams and Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (Union for a Popular Movement) UMP UMP Populaire (Union Union pour Popular for Movement) unMouvement a Česká Strana (Czech Democratic Social Sociálne Party) Demokratická

Table B1. List of party List acronyms B1. Table Krest’anská a Demokratická Unie (Christian and Democratic Union) DemocraticUnion) andKrest’anská Unie a (Christian Demokratická Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten (Flemish LiberalLiberalenVlaamse andDemocraten Democrats en (Flemish Svenska Folkepartiet i Finland (Swedish People's Party in Finland) Finland) Party (SwedishSvenska People's in Finland Folkepartiet i Bündnis ZukunftFutureBündnis (Alliancefor Österreich the of Austria) Enhedslisten - De Rød-Grønne (Unity ListEnhedslisten - Red-Greens) De - The (Unity Rød-Grønne Centre Démocrate Humaniste (Humanist Democratic Centre Centre) Démocrate Humaniste Venstre - Danmarks Liberale Parti (Denmark's LiberalVenstre (Denmark's Party)LiberaleDanmarks Parti - Suomen KristillisdemokraatitSuomen (Finnish Democrats) Christian Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party of Austria) FreiheitlicheAustria) Österreichs Party of (Freedom Partei Občanská Demokratická Strana (Civic Democratic Party)Strana Občanská Democratic (Civic Demokratická Socialistische Partij. Anders Partij. Socialistische Party.Different) (Socialist Konservative Folkeparti (Conservative People's Party) KonservativeFolkeparti (Conservative People's Party) Österreichische Volkspartei (Austrian Österreichische People’s Party) Volkspartei Nieuw-Vlaamse (New Alliantie Flemish Alliance) Kansallinen Kokoomus (National Coalition Party) Kansallinen Coalition (National Kokoomus Socialistisk Folkeparti People'sSocialistisk (Socialist Party) Mouvement Réformateur (Reform Mouvement Réformateur Movement) Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People's Party) Dansk People's Folkeparti (Danish Party) Socialdemokratiet (Social Democracy) Socialdemokratiet (Social Suomen Keskusta (Finnish Centre) Keskusta Centre) Suomen (Finnish Vlaams Interest) Belang (Flemish Vasemmistoliitto (Left Vasemmistoliitto Alliance) Radikale Venstre (Radical Left) Radikale (Radical Venstre Parti Socialiste (Socialist Socialiste Parti Party) Front National (National Front)Front National (National Strana ZelenýchStranaParty) (Green Perussuomalaiset (TrueFinns) Vihreä Liitto (Green Alliance) VihreäLiitto (Green Alliance) (The Flemish Left Liberals) (The Flemish Die(The Grünen Greens) Écologistes (Ecologists) Christian Democrats Christian APPENDIX B Party acronyms APPENDIX Party B acronyms Party name Acronym Acronym Party name Moravia) 190

Austria) mish) mish)

) )

KDU-ČSL ECOLO SPIRIT SPIRIT CD&V CD&V KSČM KESK N-VA N-VA ČSSD VIHR GRÜNE KOK KOK CDH VLD VLD VAS BZÖ BZÖ ÖVP ODS SPA SDP FPÖ SPÖ SFP SFP MR MR KD KD VB VB RV RV FN FN KF KF DF SD EL SZ SZ PS PS SF V

CEU eTD Collection Italy Italy Ireland Iceland Hungary Germany Germany Christlich DemokratischeChristlich Democratic(Christian UnionDeutschlandsUnion) Unionel'Europa-Popolari Eur Democratici per Unionfor (Democrat’s Christlich-Soziale Union BayernChristlich-Soziale in Bavaria) Unionin Social (Christian Unione dei Democratici Cristiani e Centro( di Cristiani Unione dei Democratici

Sozialdemokratische Partei DeutschlandsDemocratic (Social Party) Partito Rifondazione Comunista (Communist Comunista Rifondazione (Communist Refoundation Partito Party) Mouvement Démocrate (Democratic Movement/Union forMouvement French Démocrate (Democratic Movement/Union Democrazia e Liberta-La MargheritaDemocrazia(Democracyand Freedom) e Szabad Demokraták Democrats)Szabad Free (Alliance of Szövetsége Socialisti DemocraticiItalieni (ItalianSociali Socialisti Democratic Fidesz–Magyar Polgari Párt (Fidesz–Hungarian Civic Party) Fidesz–Magyar (Fidesz–Hungarian Party) Civic Párt Polgari Partito dei Comunisti ItalieniItalian dei (Party Comunisti Partito Communists) of Független (Independent Smallholders’ Party) Kisgazda Párt Vinstrihreyfingin - Grænt framboð (Left-Green Movement) framboðVinstrihreyfingin - (Left-Green Grænt Movement) Sudtiroler Volkspartei (South TyroleanParty) Volkspartei Sudtiroler (South People’s Parti Communiste Français Party) (French Communiste Parti Communist Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party) Freie (Free Party) Demokratische Partei Democratic Magyar Szocialista Párt (Hungarian Socialist Party) Magyar Party) Párt (Hungarian Socialist Szocialista Mouvement pour la France (Movement for France)Mouvement pour for la France (Movement RadicalParti (Radical deLeft) Gauche Party of the Bündnis 90/GRÜNE (Alliance 90/The Greens) Bündnis 90/GRÜNE (Alliance 90/The Greens) Sjálfstæðisflokkurinn (IndependenceSjálfstæðisflokkurinn Party) Framsóknarflokkurinn Party) (Progressive Federazione Federation) dei Verdi(Green MIÉP (Hungarian Justice and Life and MIÉP Party ) (Hungarian Justice Democratici di Sinistra (Left Democrats) Democratici Democrats) (Left Sinistra di Alleanza Nationale (National Alliance) Alleanza Nationale (National Frjáslyndi Flokkurinn (Liberal Party) Radicali Italieni RadicaliRadicals) (Italian Italia Values) Valori of (Italy dei Parti Socialiste (Socialist Socialiste Parti Party) Nouveau (New Centre) Centre Munkáspárt (Workers’ Party) Munkáspárt Party) (Workers’ Forza Italia (Forward Italy)Italia Forza (Forward Die LinkeLeftDie (The Party) Samfylkingin (Alliance) Samfylkingin (Alliance) Progressive Democrats Progressive Democrats Centrum (CenterCentrum Party) Les Verts Greens) (The Labour Party Labour Party Democracy) Green Party Fianna Fail FiannaFail Fine Gael Fine Gael Sinn FeinSinn 191

Union of Christian and Centre andUnion of Christian Centre sts) sts) ope) ope) MoDem/UDF GRÜNE UDEUR FIDESZ FIDESZ VERTS VERTS VERDI VERDI MUNK MUNK SZDSZ MSZP FKGP FKGP MIÉP MIÉP CDU UDC PdCI PdCI MPF CEN CEN LAB LAB CSU CSU PRG PRG PRC PDS FDP SPD SVP PCF PCF FSF FSF SSF SDI IdV IdV AN VG NC NC DL DS DS PD PD GP FG PS FF SF FF RI RI FI FI S S

CEU eTD Collection Netherlands Luxembourg Romania Romania Portugal Poland Norway Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei (Alternativ Democratic ReformparteiAlternativ Demokratesch (Alternativ Re Volkspartij voor Vrijheid enParty Democratie voorVolkspartij Vrijheid (People's Freedom for Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej (Self-Defence Polskiej Samoobrona of the Rzeczpospolitej Republic Lëtzebuergesch Sozialistesch Arbechterpartei Socialist Worker'sLëtzebuergesch Arbechterpartei Socialist Sozialistesch

Democrazia Cristiana per le Democracy (Christian Autonomie Democrazia for Cristiana per the Nuovo Partito Socialisto Party)Italian Socialisto Nuovo Partito Italiano(New Socialist Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (Reformed Political Party) Party) Staatkundig (Reformed Political Gereformeerde Partij Christen DemocratischChristen Democratic (Christian Appeal) Appèl Partido Comunista Português Party) Comunista Partido (Portuguese Communist Partido Ecologista Os Verdes (Ecological Party The Greens) Greens) EcologistaPartido Party The (Ecological Os Verdes Sojusz LewicySojusz Left DemokratycznejAlliance) (Democratic Chrëschtlech Sozial Vollekspartei (Christian Social Party) Party) Vollekspartei Chrëschtlech Social (Christian Sozial Movimento per Movimento (Movement l'Autonomia for Authonomy) Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (Freedom Party) en Democratie voorVolkspartij Vrijheid (Freedom Centro Democrático Social (Democratic Centro Democrático Centre) Social Social Det Norske Arbeiderparti (Norwegian Labour (Norwegian Det Norske Party) Arbeiderparti Partido Social Democrata Social Partido (Social Democratic Party) Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe People's Stronnictwo Polskie (Polish Party) Liga Polskich Rodzin (LeagueLiga Families) Rodzin of Polskich Polish Sosialistisk Venstreparti (Socialist Left Venstreparti (Socialist Sosialistisk Party) Kristelig Folkeparti (Christian People'sFolkepartiKristelig (Christian Party) Partij voor dePartij Dieren the(Party Animals) for Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice) Prawo(Law Sprawiedliwość i and Justice) Platforma Obywatelska Platform)(Civic Demokratesch Partei Democratic Party) Socialistische Partij (Socialist Party) (Socialist Partij Socialistische Partij van de Arbeid (Labour Party) vanPartij de Party) Arbeid (Labour Fremskrittspartiet (Progress Party) Party) Fremskrittspartiet (Progress Partido Socialista (Socialist Party) (Socialist Socialista Partido Christen UnieChristen Union) (Christian Democraten 66) 66 (Democrats BlocoBloc)(Left de Esquerda Senterpartiet Party) (Centre Lega (League Nord North) Groen Links Groen Left) (Green Déi Gréng (The Greens) Déi(The Gréng Greens) Venstre (Left) Høyre (Right) Høyre (Right) Authonomies) Democracy) Poland) Democrats) 192

form Party) form Party) Party) Party) of of and GRENG CDS-PP PvDA LSAP LSAP PvdD PvdD NPSI NPSI VVD VVD CDA ADR MpA PVV CSV CSV KRF KRF SLD SLD PEV PEV LPR SGP PSD SRP SRP FRP FRP PCP PCP PSL D66 PiS CU CU DC DC GL LN PO PO DP DP SV SV BE BE SP SP PS V H A

CEU eTD Collection Russia Switzerland Sweden Spain Slovakia Spravedlivaja Rossija - Rodina, Pensionery, Žizn'Spravedlivaja(Liberal -Democrat Pensionery, Rodina, Rossija - Spravedlivaja Rossija - Rodina, Pensionery, Žizn' (Just Russia -Žizn'Spravedlivaja Motherla(Just - Pensionery, Rodina, Rossija Rossijskaja Partija PensionerovRossijskaja (Russian Pensioners' Party-Party of Soci Kommunističeskaja Partija Rossijskoj Federacii KommunističeskajaParty Partija Rossijskoj (Communist of t Rossijskaja Obedinennaja (Yabloko Demokratičeskaja Rossijskaja - Partija Russian Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet (SocialSocialdemokratiska Democratic Workers' Arbetarepartiet Coalición Canaria NacionalistaCoalición (Canarian Canario - Partido Coalition)

L'udová Strana - Hnuti za Demockratické Slovensko (People's Party - DemockratickéL'udová za Hnuti Strana Slovensko - Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Worker's Obrero Socialista Español Partido (Spanish Socialist Party) Slovenská Demokratická a Democratic Kresťanská andSlovenská Demokratická Únia (Slovak Uniunea România din Democrată Maghiară Kresťanskodemokratické Hnutie (Christian Democratic Movement) Kresťanskodemokratické Hnutie Democratic (Christian Movement) Esquerra Republicana de CatalunyaLeft(RepublicanEsquerra of Catalunya de Republicana Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (Initiative for Catalonia Greens)VerdsIniciativa Catalonia (Initiative per for Catalunya Smer - SociálnaDemocracy) Demokracia - (Direction Social Convergència i Unió (Convergence and Union of Catalunya) Catalunya) Convergència and Unió(Convergence i of Union Miljöpartiet deMiljöpartiet Gröna Party, Greens) (Environment The Bloque Bloc)(Galician Nationalist Galego Nacionalista Partija Vozrozdenija Rosii (PartyPartija Vozrozdenija Rebirth) of Russia's Partidul Social-DemocratPartidul (Social Democratic Party) Magyar Party) Pártja (Hungarian Coalition Koalíció Agrarnaja Partija Rossii (Agrarian Agrarnaja of Partija Rossii Russia) Party Slovenská Národná Strana (Slovak National Party) (Slovak NationalSlovenská Národná Party) Strana Moderata Samlingspartiet (ModerateModerata Party) Samlingspartiet Rally Partidul Naţional LiberalLiberal Naţional (National Partidul Party) Eusko Alderdi Jeltzalea (Basque AlderdiEusko National Jeltzalea Party) Partidul România Mare(GreaterPartidul Romania Party) Folkpartiet LiberalernaFolkpartiet (Liberal People's Party) Sojuz (UnionPravych ofSojuz Forces) Rightist Sil Partidul ConservatorPartidul (Conservative Party) Kristdemokraterna (Christian Democrats)Kristdemokraterna (Christian Movement for a Democratic Slovakia) MovementDemocratic for Slovakia) a Partidul Democrat Partidul Party) (Democratic Edinaja Rossija (Unified Russia) Russia) (UnifiedEdinaja Rossija Partido Popular (People'sPartido Party) Izquierda Left) Unida (United Centerpartiet Party) (Centre Vänsterpartiet Party) (Left Hungarians Romania) in Russian Federation) Federation) Russian Democratic Party) Democratic Party) Pensioners, Life)Pensioners, Christian Union) Christian of Russia) Justice) 193

(Democratic Alliance of Alliance (Democratic Party) Party) ic Party ) ) he nd, nd, al JABLOKO JABLOKO SDKU-DS LS-HZDS EAJ-PNV EAJ-PNV UDMR SMER LDPR LDPR KPRF PSOE PSOE MKP MKP KDH KDH BNG PRM PVR PVR APR APR ERC PNL PNL SAP PSD SNS ICV PSS PSS SPS CiU CiU MP MP KD CC ER ER VP VP PD PD SR PC FP PP IU IU M M C C

CEU eTD Collection United KingdomUnited Christlichdemokratische VolksparteiChristlichdemokratische Democratic(Christian People

Sozialdemokratische Partei der (Social Schweiz Democratic Party of Eidgenössische Demokratische Union (Federal Democratic Union) Union (FederalEidgenössische Democratic Union) Demokratische Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei Party) (Freethinking Democratic Liberale (Liberal der Party of Schweiz Partei Switzerland) Grüne Partei der Schweiz (GreenGrüne Schweiz Partei der Party of Switzerland) Evangelische Volkspartei (Evangelical People's Party) (EvangelicalEvangelische People's Party) Volkspartei Schweizerische Volkspartei (Swiss People's (Swiss Schweizerische Party) Volkspartei Partei der Arbeit der Schweiz (LabourPartei der der Party) Arbeit Schweiz (SocialLabour Democratic and Party) (Democratic Party) Unionist (Scottish National Party) (Scottish (Conservative Party) (Liberal Democrats) (Liberal Democrats) (Playd Cymru) (Labour Party) (Labour Party) Switzerland) Switzerland) (Sinn Fein) (Sinn 194

's Party) 's Party)

SDLP SDLP CON EDU EDU DUP LAB CVP CVP EVP EVP SNP GPS FDP SVP PdA PdA LPS LD PC SF SP

CEU eTD Collection Table C1. Survey details C1. Surveydetails Table Time range: September - NovemberTime range: - September 2007. PartyBorz, Study Party Enyedi, Janda 2007- unity survey expert unity

United Kingdom United Kingdom Czech Republic Czech Luxembourg Luxembourg Netherlands Switzerland Switzerland Germany Denmark Country Romania Slovakia Slovakia Hungary Belgium Portugal Portugal Norway Sweden Sweden Finland Finland Iceland Austria Ireland Poland Poland France Russia Russia Mean Mean Spain Spain Italy APPENDIX C Party Unity Study 2007 Study PartyAPPENDIX Unity C respondents respondents Total Total 13.21 75.43 17.74 17.74 75.43 13.21 5 106 167 35 34 1 74 32 141 150 21 11 28 99 20 12 108 34 99 14 52 25 62 6 42 7 39 56 7 47 7 6 6 22 3 92 7 8 53 74 94 42 8 9 9 5 59 7 195

Total expertsTotal surveyed Response rate 20.35 20.35 11.86 14.14 15.09 12.16 11.90 28.37 28.37 34.37 19.85 13.33 11.53 28.00 12.12 11.29 16.66 15.38 10.71 31.48 33.01 31.81 (%) (%) 8.69 8.69 9.57 6.38 6.38

CEU eTD Collection the the mainWe in p issue the party dimensions system. h poet a a ra cmaaie hrce ad s and character comparative broad a has project The parties and their voting behavior in the parliament questions that follow regard a number of issues lik in views We on yourare asinterested par expert an Welcome to our Party Unity survey! 1. Your expertise is greatly appreciated. Thank you very much for taking the time to complete The questionnaire consists of only 13 questions. pertaining comments However questions. t open-ended

Party unity survey- Sample Questionnaire . e e party unity, party internal organization, the dis ties, party system and parliamentary activity in party system Slandactivity ties, parliamentary it. ay particular attention to the programmatic cohesio the ayto attention programmatic particular o anyo much are very welcomed. question m cmlx sus a b mse b te close-ended the by missed be may issues complex ome 1 tribution of power and ovakia. The n of

CEU eTD Collection 2. Party unity and policy areas

parties? 2. Could you specify which of these (or other) issues issue in the party system of Slovakia as of 2006/20 1. Here is a list of issues in European politics. P Other (please specify ) ) specify (please Other ) specify (please Other divisions -rural Urban divisions Regional legacies its and past Communist the of Views drugs) abortion, rights, women's , homosexuality (lifestyle, rights Social church) of (role Religiosity integration and enlargement EU (minorities) rights Ethnic institutions democratic strengthening : Democracy economy market versus State-run Economy: welfare ) spending state , (taxes issues redistribution Economy: ANO ANO KSS KDH LS-HZDS SNS MKP SDKU-DS SMER RedistributionEconomy: RedistributionEconomy: efr tt mre (ioiis) hrh abortion church) ) (minorities market state welfare spending ) economy economy ) spending txs, ess ihs rl f gy Cmuit r Communist (gays , (role of rights versus , (taxes sus tt-u Ehi Rlgoiy ihs h Urba the rights Religiosity Ethnic State-run issues 1- most important important most 1- c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j strengthening enlargement enlargement strengthening Democracy: EU EU Democracy: democratic and and integration institutions democratic 2- very important important very 2- 1

lease rate the importance of each 3- somewhat somewhat 3- important important

07. j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j usually cause dissent within the 4- a little important important little a 4- drugs ) its legacies legacies its drugs ) Social Views of of Views Social , past and divisions divisions past and , 5- not important at at important not 5- divisions divisions Regional all all ural ural n - - n

CEU eTD Collection 3. Degree of party unity in parliament

2. Over the past decade (1996-2006), how has unity 2006/2007. 1. Please assess the level of parliamentary unity i and 5 means very high unity. somewhat, or increased a great deal. decreasedsomewhdeal,great decreased a hasvoting parliament changed? Please assign a score for each SDK (Slovak Democratic Democratic ) Coalition (Slovak SDK New Citizen ) of (Alliance ANO ) Slovakia of Party (Communist KSS KDH LS-HZDS SNS MKP SDKU-DS SMER ) Movement Democratic (Christian KDH ) Slovakia Democratic a for Movement - Party (People's LS-HZDS National Party) (Slovak SNS Party) Coalition (Hungarian MKP Christian Union ) and Democratic (Slovak SDKU-DS Democracy) Social - (Direction SMER

Give a score from 1 to 5 for eachparty,form where5 1 toscore 1fromaGive from the party line in in line party the from 1- decreased a great 2- decreased decreased 2- great a decreased 1- parliamentary votes parliamentary votes votes parliamentary votes parliamentary frequently depart occasionally defect defect occasionally depart frequently 1 - Much internal internal Much - 1 conflict and MPs conflicts and MPs MPs and conflicts MPs and conflict deal deal j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j from the party line in in line party the from 2 - Some internal internal Some - 2 somewhat somewhat 1 from the party line in the party line in the party li party the in line party the in line party the from parliamentary votes parliamentary votes parliamentary votes parliamentary votes parliamentary internal conflicts but internal conflicts, MPs MPs conflicts, internal but conflicts internal MPs rarely defect never defect from never defect fr defect never from defect never defect rarely MPs 3 - Occasional Occasional - 3 3- no change change no 3- nside the Slovak parties as of j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j party, which specifies if unity of of party t nt changed, increased not at, 4 - Despite minor minor Despite - 4 4- increased 5- increased a great great a increased 5- increased 4- somewhat somewhat voting in the eans very low unityeansverylow conflicts and MPs MPs and conflicts 5 - No internal internal No - 5 deal deal votes votes ne in in ne om om

CEU eTD Collection

4. Nature and extent of party factionalism

Itsoverall IDEOLOGY. 3.Please rate eachparty as of 2006/2007 forthe e intraas"factions" definingStill 2. PERSONAL ATTRACTION OF INDIVIDUAL LEADERS. exte the2006/2007 forof as party eachPleaserate Fa party. the within blocs distinct ascollectively 1. Some parties have "factions," defined as intra ISSUES. factionalism based on disagreement of one or more S distinct blocs within the party. Please rate each p ANO KSS KDH LS-HZDS SNS MKP SDKU-DS SMER ANO KSS KDH LS-HZDS SNS MKP SDKU-DS SMER ANO KSS KDH LS-HZDS SNS MKP SDKU-DS SMER -nn 2 ite -sm 4 o 5- a great deal 4- a lot 3- some 2- little 5- a great deal 1- none 4- a lot 3- some 2- little 1- none deal great 5- a lot 4- a 3- some little 2- 1- none j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j - party groups organized to act collectivelyas act toorganized groupsparty 1

-party groups organized to act arty as of 2006/2007 for ctions may pursue various objectives. various pursue may ctions xtent of factionalismbased on UBSTANTIVE POLITICAL nt of factionalismtheof onbased nt

CEU eTD Collection 5. Programmatic cohesion

or increased a great deal. decreased a great deal, decreased somewhat, not cha changed? Please assign a score for each party, whic 2. Over the past decade (1996-2006) how has the IDE IDEOLOGICAL UNITY (party programmatic cohesion) for 1. On a scale from 1 to 5 please assign a score for SMER SMER SMER SMER SDK SDK ANO KSS KDH LS-HZDS SNS MKP SDKU-DS ANO KSS KDH LS-HZDS SNS MKP SDKU-DS 1-decreased a great 2-decreased 2-decreased great a 1-decreased gemn mn areetaog gemn mn agr among agreement among agreement among agreement 1- 5 0 % or less 2- over 60% over 2- less or % 0 5 1- deal somewhat somewhat deal MPs MPs MPs MPs MPs MPs MPs MPs MPs MPs j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j 1 3- over 70% over 3- 3-no change change 3-no each party regarding its h specifies if ideological unity has nged, increased somewhat 4- over 80% over 4- OLOGICAL UNITY of parties the 2006/2007 period. eement among agreement among among agreement among eement 4-increased 5-increased a great great a 5-increased 4-increased somewhat deal deal somewhat 5- over 90% over 5-

CEU eTD Collection 6. Party centralization

of the national executive who are also MPs. parliamentary party and the party national executiv 3.In general terms,please indicatethe current le or increased a great deal. decreased a great deal, decreased somewhat, not cha Please assign a score for each party, which specifi 2. Over the past decade (1996-2006) how has PARTY C decision decision 1. Centralization of power refers to the location a 2006/2007. organs. Assign a score from 1 to 5 to each party fo KDH LS-HZDS SNS MKP SDKU-DS SMER ANO KSS KDH LS-HZDS SNS MKP SDKU-DS SMER SDK ANO KSS KDH LS-HZDS SNS MKP SDKU-DS SMER - - aig slcin f addts ad h distributi the and candidates, of selectionmaking, making authority within the party with regard to th 1- very low: less than2- low: between 20% -erae ra 2-decreased 1-decreased a great 1- very low 2- low 3- medium 4- high 5- very high very high 5- 4- high medium 3- low 2- low very 1- 20% el somewhat deal j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j and and 4 0 % 1 40% and 6 0 % -mdu ewe 4 ih:bten 5- very high 4- high : between 3- medium : between 3-no change nd distribution of effective es if party centralization has r the level of centralization in e by estimating the percentage vel of overlap between the nged, increased somewhat 60% and 8 0 % ENTRALIZATION changed? e top national party n f at finances party of on -nrae 5-increased a great 4-increased oeht deal somewhat 80% s of as

: over

CEU eTD Collection 7. Disciplinary measures priviledges etc.) in case of dissent over the last engaged in applying strict disciplinary rules to th party external or party internal. 1. The rules on parliamentary factions can differ f ANO ANO KSS KDH LS-HZDS SNS MKP SDKU-DS SMER 1- never 2- rarely 3- occasionally 4- often 4- often 3- occasionally 2- rarely 1- never j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j Please try to specify if Slovak parties have actua 2 decade. eir MPs (like expulsion, loss of rom party to party and they can be lly

CEU eTD Collection 8. Comments

issues/scores/responses should be interpreted. things we may have missed in our survey or about ho 1. We would very much appreciate if you could pleas 3 e add comments about the w some CEU eTD Collection Number Pearson of roll-calls Correlation ersn:Alpol nyu onr -06 . .359 -.086 yourRepresent:constituency people All in yourRepresent:country people All in N Sig. calculated country per study; unity party Enyedi, Janda Borz, 2007 Source: Europeandemocracies East West vs. 2007 Table centralizationanalysis: and 3. Anova disciplinary measures iterations 3 in converged Rotation Normalization. withKaiser Varimax Method: Rotation Da Analysis; Component Principal Method: Extraction Represent: party All voters (focusTablecomponent of matrix representation) 2a. Rotated Number of roll-calls values Rice index structureTable focus analysis: ballot 2. Anova representation constitue vs. N Sig. values Pearson Rice index Correlation Correlations Table bias test 1. Rice index constituency ersn:Yu ainlpry . Represent: party Your national *represent *represent closed list closed list closed list Open or Open or et(=2) .6 2.02 3.56 (N=129) West at(=3 39 2.50 3.98 East (N=53) party nv i. .0 .00 .00 Anova sig.

en etaiain Disciplinary measures Centralization Mean

Between Between Within Within Within Within groups groups groups groups Total Total 2 1 284.3 213.6 squares Sum of Sum 288.9 288.9 APPENDIX D Statistical tests APPENDIX tests D Statistical 75.3 4.6

Df Df 89 21 68 88 20 68

N=parties N=parties 205

ta source: 1996 elite surveys surveys elite 1996 source: ta 73 .101 -.194 -.194 1

Square Square Mean 4.1 3.7 3.1 .2

88 .000 18.8 85 .717 .835 Sg Eta Sig F .848 903 -.027 Component Component 1 73 .101 ncy and party 1996 and partyncy 1996 9 .9 .9 8 .7 .8 .653 .216 885 Squared

Eta

CEU eTD Collection sour data centralization; party variable: Dependent .369** 1 .329** .369** .412** 1 1996 Tableparty centralization 7. Regression model Party centralizati s party unity Janda Enyedi, Borz, 2007 source data level;N=183 0.01 at significant .329** **correlation Unityattitudes of .412** Party centralization Unity of behavior 1 Unityattitudes of Unity of behavior Changes in ofTable changes decade last 6. Correlations the registered over s party unity Janda Enyedi, Borz, 2007 source: Data Old/Newin descriptiveTable and East measures 5. Party centralization study; unity party Enyedi, Janda Borz, 2007 Source: newOld vs. 2007 democracies Table centralizationanalysis: and 4. Anova disciplinary measures Representation constituency focus e eorce 40 05 28 5.00 2.82 0.56 4.02 New Democracies l eorce 35 06 20 5.00 2.00 0.63 3.53 Old Democracies etr uoe .6 .7 .0 5.00 2.00 0.57 3.56 Western Europe atr uoe .8 .7 .2 5.00 2.82 0.57 3.98 Eastern Europe l N13 35 1.99 3.53 Old (N=123) e N5) .2 2.51 4.02 New (N=59) ersnainfcsvtr -.163 Representation voters focus nv i. .0 .00 .00 Anova sig. etitoso oain -.151 ondonations Restrictions f.n.o pr.Pris -.187 Eff. Parties no. of parl. at nt fattds .100 Party of attitudes unity en etaiain Disciplinary measures Centralization Mean v it.Mgiue .680*** MagnitudeAv. distr. xcLg eain -.499** Exec-Leg. Relations oa 36 06 20 5.00 2.00 0.65 3.68 Total oa 36 06 20 5.00 2.00 0.64 3.68 Total eeaimidx .090 Federalism index Mean SD Minimum Maximum Maximum Minimum SD Mean Constant Constant Model Beta Standardized coefficients Beta coefficients Standardized Model

ce: 1996 elite surveys; R surveys; elite 1996 ce: tudy tudy tudy tudy N=parties N=parties 206

2 2 .378** =. 28; Adjusted R Adjusted 28; =.

/West Democracies; /West 2 =. 18 =. on on CEU eTD Collection *p<.1; **p<.05;***p<.00; standard errors in parenth errors standard **p<.05;***p<.00; *p<.1; s partyunity 2007 Janda Enyedi, Borz, source: Data N=169; 2007; centralization variable: Dependent centralization Table analysis: power 2007 11. Anova party vs. status centralization centralization structureTable ballot analysis: 2007 10. Anova party vs. centralization andTable party Riceanalysis: index family 9. Anova 2007 Tableparty centralization 8. Regression model status*party closed list closed list at iac Ciigo oain) .474*** Party finance (Ceiling ondonations) Open or Power *party groups Within family Party groups Between index* Rice

xclg eain .079 Exec-leg.Relations ititmgiue .430*** magnitudeDistrict Ballot structureBallot rgetto -.246*** Fragmentation

Adjusted R Adjusted oe Sadrie ofiins Standardized coefficients Model Between Between Sig Within Within groups groups Within Within R groups groups Total Total

2 2 . 2

81915.5 2029.5 645.8 24012.1 79886.0 squares squares Sum of Sum 23366.3 squares squares Sum of Sum

4061.385 4061.385 3534.553 526.832 (.00) (.23) . 26 .048

112 110 Df Df Df Df tudy tudy 72 71 2 esis esis 1

207

Square Square Square Square 1014.7 Mean 329.1 645.8 Mean 726.2

77 68 9 . .166 1.9 . .252 1.3 Sg Eta Sig F Sg Eta Sig F 51.979 51.979 58.537

14 .027 .164 17 .025 .157 1.126 .357 .357 1.126

Squared Squared Eta Eta

CEU eTD Collection study Enyedi,Data 2007Borz, source: party Janda unity R Table 12. Covariance analysis District magnitudeDistrict Unity of attitudes Unityattitudes of Exec/leg relations Corrected model 2 Fragmentation = dependent .44; unity variable: of behavior; Centralization Party finance Power status Party family Disciplinary LR position measures Intercept Source Type III Type Sum Source of Squares of Squares 19.609 1.13 2.89 1.44 4.53 .02 .84 .01 .02 .05 .99 .05

f Mean square Df 19 1 1 1 1 1 9 1 1 1 1 1

208

1.44 1.03 2.89 1.13 0.01 .84 .02 .02 .05 .99 .05 .50

11.03 3.936 4.31 3.22 5.52 3.77 .09 1.9 .05 .09 .19 .20 Sig F

.05 .81 .76 .65 .05 .65 .04 .75 .00 .07 .02 .00

CEU eTD Collection Andeweg, Rudy B. and Galen A. Irwin. 1993. 1993. Irwin. A. Galen and B. Rudy Andeweg, Cl New in Changes “Structural 1990. Bjørklund. Tor and Jørgen Goul Andersen, References nee, uy . 97 “oe pcaiain r oe wthn? Dut Switching? Role or Specialization “Role 1997. B. Rudy Andeweg, Andeweg, Rudy B. 2000. “Fractiocracy?: Limits to the Ascendancy of of Ascendancy the to Limits “Fractiocracy?: 2000. B. Rudy Andeweg, Ankersmith, 2002. Frank R. nee, uy . 08 “h Ntelns Te aciy f Proportiona of Sanctity The Netherlands: “The 2008. B. Rudy Andeweg, eot Kneh n Jculn Hye. 04 “ntttoa Cag ad Per and Change “Institutional 2004. Hayden. Jacqueline and Kenneth Benoit, Baylis, Thomas A. 1996. “Presidents versus Prime Ministers. Shaping Ministers. Prime versus “Presidents 1996. A. Thomas Baylis, yig Saly 1988. Stanley. Ayling, eot Kneh n Mcal ae. 2007. Laver. Michael and Kenneth Benoit, Benoit, Kenneth. 2005. “Hungary: Holding Back the Tiers.” In Michael Michael In Tiers.” the Back Holding “Hungary: 2005. Kenneth. Benoit, at Gop i Erpa Dmcais Pltcl ate bhn Clo behind Parties Political Democracies. European in Groups Party Progress Denmark Parties and in Norway.” Electorate and Executive.” Electorateand Executive.” Macmillan. Party Groups in Dutch Politics.” In Knut Heidar and Ruud Koole (eds.) Koole Ruud and Heidar Knut In Politics.” Dutch in Groups Party Oxford UniversityOxford 491-511.pp. Press. 2008. (eds.). Mitchell Paul and Gallagher London and New York: Routledge. LondonYork: New 89-106. pp. and Evolution of Poland’s Electoral System, 1989-2001.” 1989-2001.” System, Electoral Poland’s of Evolution Eastern Europe.” Publishers. Publishers. Routledge. Mitchell (eds.).Mitchell 396-427. The Politics of Electoral Systems of The Politics WorldPolitics dud uk: i Lf ad Opinions. and Life His Burke: Edmund Political Representation. Political The

Journal of Legislative Studies Legislative Journal of (48): 297-323. 209 at Plc i Mdr Democracies. Modern in Policy Party

Acta Politica h Pltc o Eetrl Systems. Electoral of Politics The uc Gvrmn ad Politics and Government Dutch Stanford: Stanford University Press. Stanford: Stanford University Press. .

Oxford: Oxford University Oxford Oxford: Press. The Journal of Politics Politics of Journal The 33(3): 195-217. 3 (1): 110-117. 3 (1): 110-117. odn Jh Murray John London: executive authority in in authority executive Gallagher and Paul Paul and Gallagher the Parliamentary Parliamentary the h P between MPs ch lity.” In Michael Michael In lity.” . Parliamentary Parliamentary sistence: the the sistence: eavages: the eavages: e Doorssed London: . London: London: Oxford: 6 (2): 66 . CEU eTD Collection ug, a ad as ea. 1990. Keman. Hans and Jan Budge, 1999. eds. Katz Richard and Farrell M. David Shaun, Bowler, Intra-Part of Dynamics and Structure “The 2002. Francoise. Boueck, Boucek, Francoise. 2001. “The Growth and Management of Factionalism in Long-Live in Boucek, of “The Factionalism Francoise. and Management Growth 2001. lne, en 1978. Jean. Blondel, 2003. van. Ingrid Biezen, 2000. von. Klaus Beyme, Biezen, Ingrid Biezen, Parties Utilities.” as “Political Public van. 2004. izn Igi vn n Pt Kpcý 20. Te tt ad h Partie the and State “The 2007. Kopecký. Petr and van Ingrid Biezen, li, nr. 91 “h Dbt oe Eetrl Systems.” Electoral over Debate “The 1991. André. Blais, ethr K Ei. 05 “atos f neet n aa ad tl: T Italy: and Japan in Interest of “Factions 2005. Eric. K. Bettcher, Parties." Endogenous and Formation "Government 1993. P. David Baron, Government Functioning in Twenty States Twenty Government in Functioning Thesis, London Science.Thesis, Economics and of Political School Italy, Comparing Parties: Dominant and Canada Britain, Japan”. Unpublis House. House. Public Regulation and Rent-Seeking in Contemporary Democracies.” Contemporary in Rent-Seeking and Regulation Public Motivational DimensionsMotivational of Factionalism.” (2): 235-254. (2): 235-254. Science Review Parliamentary Government andSociety Politics Perspectives on European Reconsolidation, 1789-1999Reconsolidation, Revi ew Southern and East-Central EuropeSouthern and East-Central . 12 (3): 239-60. . 12(3): 239-60. 87 (1): 34-47. 34-47. 87(1): oiia Pris A eun cs fr discontent? for case genuine A Parties: Political oiia Pris n e Democracies New in Parties Political Parliamentary Democracy. Democratization, Destabilization, Destabilization, Democratization, Democracy. Parliamentary . Columbus Ohio: Ohio Ohio: University. Columbus Press. . London:. Press. Macmillan ate ad eorc: olto Frain and Formation Coalition Democracy: and Parties . Houndmills: . Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. 210 . Oxford: University Oxford Press.

Party Politics Politics Party 3 (3): 453-493. 3 (3): nentoa Pltcl Science Political International Party Politics 11 (3): 339-358. . at Ognzto in Organization Party e raiainl and Organizational he at Dsiln and Discipline Party Pltc i Europe.” in Politics y London: Wildwood Wildwood London: . ulc Funding, Public s. American Political Political American

Party Politics Politics Party 10 (6): 701-22. 10 (6): 701-22. hed Ph.D.

d 13 CEU eTD Collection Brazier, Rodney. 1988. 1957. Schock. Maurice and Alan Bullock, Carey, John. 2000. “Party Unity in Legislative Voting.” 2000.“Party in Carey,Unity John. hit, al 20. Pry oein n Plc Mkn i Russia.” in Making Policy and Cohesion “Party 2005. Paul. Chaisty, Colomer, Joseph M. (ed.). 2005. (ed.). M. Joseph Colomer, Cox, Gary 1987. Cox, W. asn L Jme Jfey . ekn ad rc cike. 00 “Investi 2000. Schickler. Eric and Jenkins A. Jeffery Jamie, L. Carson, at, . ent. 04 “ate a Facie ytm: h Str The Systems: Franchise as “Parties 2004. Kenneth. R. Carty, Carey, John. 2007. “Competing principals, Political Institutions and Party Unit Institutions and Party Political principals, 2007.“Competing Carey, John. Čulik, 1999.“A Čulik, RepeatJan. of November 1989?” ae, on 20. Pris caiin, n te hla Cnrs i te 1990s.” the in Congress Chilean the and coalitions, “Parties, 2002. John. Carey, Cox, Garry W. and Mathew D. McCubbins 1993. McCubbins D. Mathew and Garry W. Cox, Carey, M. John, and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1995. “Incentives to Cult “Incentives to 1995. SobergShugart. Matthew and John, M. Carey, 299-318. Roots of Conditional Party Government.”Party Conditional of Roots American Political Science Association, San Francisco,American 30-Sept August Association, Science San Political York: New University Press. York Macmillan. Imperative.” York: Cambridge University 222-53. pp. Press. (eds.). Nacif Benito and Scott Morgenstern, of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA. of Science Atlanta, the GA. American Political Association, Voting.” the House a Rank of Ordering Formulas.” Electoral American Journal of Political Science Political of Journal American .

Berkeley: University Berkeley: California Press. of

Party Politics The Efficient SecretThe Efficient Constitutional PracticeConstitutional 10 (1): 5-24. 10(1): 5-24. Handbook of Electoral System ChoiceSystem Electoral of Handbook

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. UniversityPress. Cambridge: Cambridge The Liberal Tradition from Fox to Keynes to Fox from Tradition Liberal The 211

. Electoral Studies Studies Electoral Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the the of Meeting Annual the at presented Paper

Oxford: Oxford University Oxford Oxford: Press.

Legislative Leviathan. Party Government in in Government Party Leviathan. Legislative Central Europe Central Review Legislative Politics in Latin America. Latin in Politics Legislative 51 (1): 92-107. 51(1): 92-107.

Paper presented at the annual meeting meeting the annual at presented Paper 14 (4): 417-439. trhcl Organizational atarchical . Party PoliticsParty ivate a Personal Vote:Personalivate a

New York: Palgrave Palgrave York: New gating the Electoral Electoral the gating 1 (24). (24). 1 ember 2. 2. ember y in Legislativey in 11 (3): 11 . New . New New In CEU eTD Collection nei Zot 20. Pry oiis n otCmuit rniin” In Transition.” Post-Communist in Politics “Party 2006. Zsolt. Enyedi, Duverger, Maurice. 1967. 1967. Maurice. Duverger, Döring, Herbert (ed.). 1995. 1995. (ed.). Herbert Döring, egnKase Kvn 2006. Kevin. Deegan-Krausse, nei Zot 20. Te oe f gny n laae Formation.” Cleavage in Agency of Role “The 2005. Zsolt. Enyedi, Derbyshire, J. Denis and Ian Derbyshire. 1996. Derbyshire. Ian and Denis J. Derbyshire, Parliamentary in Discipline Party “Government 2003. Sam. Depauw, a, ln Rcad emn n Jh Cmbl. 1996. Campbell. John and German Richard Alan, Day, Represe Political and Parties “Political 1985. Russel. J. Dalton, MPs.” Danish of Roles Representation “The 1997. Erik. Daamgard, De Winter, Lieven and Patrik Dumont. 2000. “PPGs in Belgium: Subjects Subjects Belgium: in “PPGs 2000. Dumont. Patrik and Lieven Winter, De European DemocraciesEuropean Routledge. 106-130. pp. oiain” n nt edr n Ru Koe (eds.). Koole Ruud and Heidar Knut In Domination.” Legislative StudiesLegislative Palgrave Macmillan. Martin’s Press. Martin’s Press. London: Cartermill International Ltd.International London: Cartermill Political ResearchPolitical pp. 228-38.pp. ihr Kt (eds.). Katz Richard Slovakia andthe Czech Republic Annual Meeting of the Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA, August Science PA, Philadelphia, Annual Association, Meeting of the Political 1990s.” the in Kingdom United the and France, Belgium, of State Party Nine in Nations.” Elites .

London:Ltd. and Co Methuen 44 (5): 697-720. 44 (5): 3 (1): 79-90. Political Parties Political . Political Parties behind Closed Doors Closed behind Parties Political adok f oiia Parties Political of Handbook Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe. Western in Rule Majority and Parliaments lce Afnte: eorc ad at Cmeiin in Competition Party and Democracy Affinities: Elected Comparative Political Studies Studies Comparative Political .

Stanford: Stanford University Press. University Press. Stanford: Stanford . Their Organization and Activity in the Modern the in Activity and Organization Their 212 Political Systems of the Worldthe of Systems Political

oiia Pris f h World the of Parties Political alaetr Pry rus in Groups Party Parliamentary Lno: ae Publications. Sage London: . ntation. Party Supporters and and Supporters Party ntation. 18 (3): 267-299. 18 (3): 267-299. . London and New York: New and London .

Democracies: the Cases Cases the Democracies: Paper presented at the the at presented Paper uoen ora of Journal European William Crotty and and Crotty William The . New York: St. St. York: New . of Partitocratic Partitocratic of

New York: York: New Journal of of Journal 28- 31. 28- 31. . CEU eTD Collection algr Mcal n Mcal as (d.. 1988. (eds.). Marsh Michael and Michael Gallager, Gabel, J. Mattew and John Huber. 2000. “Putting Parties at Their Pla Their at Parties “Putting 2000. Huber. John and Mattew J. Gabel, yec, as 1998. Hans Eysenck, Epstein, Leon Epstein, D. 1967. pti, en . 94 “ Cmaaie td o Cnda Parties.” Canadian of Study Comparative “A 1964. D. Leon Epstein, Parties.” Parliamentary British of “Cohesion 1956. D. Leon Epstein, Eulau, Heinz, John C. Wahlke, William Buchanan and Leroy C. Ferguson 1959. “ 1959. Ferguson C. Leroy and Buchanan William Wahlke, C. John Heinz, Eulau, Giuliani, Marco. 2008. “Patterns of Consensual Law-Making in the Itali the in Law-Making Consensual of “Patterns 2008. Marco. Giuliani, Corru Institutionsand “PoliticalThacker 2004. C. Strom and John. Gerring, Michael and Coakley John In “Parliament.” 1999. Michael. Gallagher, ot, lu ad ue Rdsa. 07 “oenet Primn ad a Maki Law and Parliament “Government, 2007. Radoslav. Zubek and Klaus Goetz, Grant, Thomas. 2005. Thomas. Grant, Politics in the in Republic Ireland of Politics Science Review European Society and Politics European Society and Politics aiaig h Lw, euain ad rcie o Ntoa Regimes National of Practices and Regulations Laws, the Navigating Publishers. Publishers. Unitarism andUnitarism Parliamentarism.” Poland.” Oceana Publications. Perspective Science Data.” Manifestos Party from Positions Ideological Right The American Science Political Review of Theory the on Observations Empirical Some Representative. the Science Review 44 (1): 94-103. 44 Journal of Legislative Studies Legislative Journal of . The Secret Garden Politics of TheSecret 58 (1): 46-59. 46-59. 58 (1): 50 (2): 360-377. 360-377. 50 (2): Lobbying, Government Relations, and Campaign Finance Worldwide Finance Campaign and Relations, Government Lobbying, Political Parties in Western in Parties DemocraciesPolitical The Psychology of Politics. Politics. of Psychology The

13 (2): 1-25. . New Routledge. York: British Journal of Political Science Political Journal of British 13 (4): 517-538. 213 53 (2): 742-756.53 (2): .

London: Sage. addt Slcin n Comparative in Selection Candidate e Busik NJ: Transaction N.J.: Brunswick, New

American Journal of Political of Journal American .

New York: Praeger. York: New ce: Inferring Party Left- Party Inferring ce: an Parliament.” an

34 (2): 295-330. 34(2): American Political Political American mrcn Political American ption. The Role of Role The ption. dud Burke.” Edmund Gallagher (eds.) (eds.) Gallagher . New York: York: New . The Role of Role The South South ng in in ng CEU eTD Collection aa, evn . 02 “addt Slcin” n arne eu, Richa LeDuc, Lawrence In Selection.” “Candidate 2002. Y. Reuven Hazan, edr Ku ad ud ol. 00. Apoce t te td o Parliament of Study the to “Approaches 2000a. Koole. Ruud and Knut Heidar, apl Mse Toa F Rmntn See S Sih 19. “Electoral 1998. Smith. S. Steven Remington, F. Thomas Moshe, Haspel, Harmel, Robert. 2002. “Party Organizational Change: Competing Expl Competing Change: Organizational “Party 2002. Robert. Harmel, aml Rbr, k e, lxne C Tn n Kneh ad. 95 “Perfor 1995. Janda. Kenneth and Tan C. Alexander Heo, Uk Robert, Harmel, Harmel, Robert and Kenneth Janda. 1982. Janda. Kenneth and Robert Harmel, 2002. M. Anna Grzymala-Busse, Grynaviski, Jeffrey. 2001. “Party Unity and the Value of Party La Party of Value the and Unity “Party 2001. Jeffrey. Grynaviski, Romania of Preferences Policy “Mapping 2003. al. et Razvan Grecu, Communist Parties in East in Europe.Parties Communist Central London and New York: Longman. LondonYork: New and Paper presented at the Forth Annual Conference of Romanian Society Society Romanian Science, 25-28. September of Conference Annual Forth the at presented Paper Europe. Political and Analytical Challenges Analytical and Political Europe. Politics Politics ut ihr ad ednn Mle-oml (eds.). Müller-Rommel Ferdinand and Richard Kurt 143. edrhp Fcin ad at Cag: n miia Analysi Empirical An Change: Party and Factions Leadership, European Democracies. Political Parties behind Closed Doors Closed behind Parties Political Democracies. European Elections andVoting ip Nri (eds.). Norris Pippa Routledge. 4-23. pp. Groups.” In Knut Heidar and Ruud Koole (eds.). (eds.). Koole Ruud and Heidar Knut In Groups.” Party Cohesion in the Russian Duma.”Party the Russian in Cohesion August 30 - September 2. August 2. 30 - September Associat Science Political American the of Meeting Annual 2001 18 (1): 1-33. .

London: Sage Publications. Comparing Democracies 2. New Challenges in the Study of of Study the in Challenges New 2. Democracies Comparing eemn te omns Ps: h Rgnrto of Regeneration The Past: Communist the Redeeming Parties and their environment. Limits to reform? to Limits environment. their and Parties Journal of Politics Journal of 214 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cambridge: University Cambridge Press.

. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 119- pp. Press. University Oxford Oxford: . Parliamentary Party Groups in in Groups Party Parliamentary Political Parties in the New New the in Parties Political 60(2): 417-440. bels.” Paper delivered at the at delivered Paper bels.” . London and New York: York: NewLondon and . anations?” In Luther, In anations?” Pltcl Parties.” Political n s.” ion, San Francisco, Francisco, San ion, ntttos and Institutions et European West rd G. Niemi, Niemi, G. rd f Political of r Party ary mance, mance,

CEU eTD Collection i, io, bu Nuy n Grr Rln. 2006. Roland. Gerard and Noury Abdul Simon, Hix, i, io. 04 "lcoa Isiuin ad eiltv Bhvo: Ex Behavior: Legislative and Institutions "Electoral 2004. Simon. Hix, frame A Parties. European West in “Factionalism 1982. David. Hine, okn Jnta. 01 “rnig h Mmes ak n Democratizing in? Back Members the “Bringing 2001. Jonathan. Hopkin, Parliamentar in “Fluidity 2000. Mershon. Carol and William B. Heller, ue, . on 19. Te oe f ofdne n alaetr Democra Parliamentary in Confidence of Vote “The 1996. John. D. Huber, Huber, D. John and Ronald Inglehart. 1995. “Expert Interpretations of P of Interpretations “Expert 1995. Inglehart. Ronald and John D. Huber, Hurley, Patricia A. and Rick K. Wilson. 1989. “Partisan Voting Patte Voting “Partisan 1989. Wilson. K. Rick and A. Patricia Hurley, Heidar, Knut. 2000. “Parliamentary Party Groups.” In Esaiasson, Peter and K Inand Peter Esaiasson, Heidar,Knut. 2000. “Parliamentary Party Groups.” Hurley, Patricia A. and Brink Kerr. 1997. “The Partisanship of New Members i of Members New Partisanship “The Kerr. 1997. Brink and Hurley, A. Patricia 2000b. Koole. Ruud and Knut Heidar, ad, ent. 1970. Kenneth. Janda, Beyond Westminster ExperienceBeyond The Nordic andCongress. Democracies. Political Parties behind Closed behindDoors Closed Parties Democracies. Political Parties West European Politics American Science Review Political Selection in BritainSelectionSpain.” in and eiee a te nul etn o te mrcn oiia Scienc Political American Washington, 30-September August DC, 3. the of Meeting Annual the at delivered De of Chamber Italian the in Groups Parliamentary in Entries Locations 42Societies.” in 1977-1986.” 104 Parliament. Parliament. Defection the European in Parliament." th Houses.” . Beverly Hills: Sage. BeverlyHills: Publications. Legislative Studies QuarterlyStudies Legislative Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. Social SciencesSocial Quarterly Cneta Faeok o te oprtv Aayi o Political of Analysis Comparative the for Framework Conceptual A 5 (1): 36-53. 5 (1): 36-53. Party Politics Party Politics Party Politics 90 (2): 269-282. 215 alaetr Pry rus n European in Groups Party Parliamentary 1 (1): 73-111. 1(1): 73-111. World Politics 78 (4): 992-1000. 78 (4): 992-1000. 14 (2): 225-250. 14 (2):

7 (3): 343-361. Democratic Politics in the European European the in Politics Democratic . London. New Routledge. and York:

56: 194-223. 56: . Ohio: Ohio State University. Ohio State . Ohio: puties, 1996-2000.” Paper Paper 1996-2000.” puties, rns in the U.S. Senate, Senate, U.S. the in rns arty Space and Party and Space arty work for Analysis.” Analysis.” for work Pris Eis and Exits Parties: y nut Heidar (eds.) Heidar (eds.) nut plaining Voting Voting plaining Association, e n the 103n the cies.” Candidate Candidate rd and The The CEU eTD Collection az Rcad . n Ptr ar es) 1992. (eds.). Mair Peter and S. Richard Katz, az ihr .19. Pry raiainadFnne” n arne L Lawrence In Finance.” and Organization “Party 1996. S. Richard Katz, Janda, Kenneth, Jeffrey M. Berry and Jerry Goldman. 2008. Goldman. Jerry and Berry M. Jeffrey Kenneth, Janda, ad, ent 20. Gliok ad at Lw Hw uh a i Js Rig Just is Law Much How Law: Party and “Goldilocks 2005. Kenneth Janda, Kenneth.Janda, 1980. az Rcad . 97 “at Gvrmn ad t Atraie. I Ri In Alternatives.” its and Government “Party 1987. S. Richard Katz, ad, ent. 93 "oprtv Pltcl ate: eerh n Th and Research Parties: Political "Comparative 1993. Kenneth. Janda, Duverger’ Testing and “Formalizing 1985. King. S. Desmond and Kenneth Janda, Katz, Richard S. 1980. S. Richard Katz, 2005. Michael. Johnston, Jenkins, Shanon. 2001. “Party Voting in US State Legislature.” Paper Legislature.” State US in Voting “Party 2001. Shanon. Jenkins, Party Organizations in in Party Organizations Western Democracies, 1960-1990 presented at the 2005 American Political Science Association short Association Science Political American 2005 the at presented Party and American Governments: European Experiences. NewYork: Houghton Mifflin Company. Company.NewYork: Houghton Mifflin Parties in Emerging Democracies: Tools for Political development. development. for Emerging Tools Parties in Democracies: Political American Political Science Association. pp. 163-191. American Association. Science 163-191. pp. Political iitr (ed.) Finifter Parties.” on Political The Johns Hopkins University Hopkins The Johns Press. Niemi, Pippa Norris (eds.). (eds.). Norris Pippa Niemi, Perspective. esetvs Pltcl iac Plc, ate ad Democratic and Parties Policy, Finance Political Perspectives. Washington: National Democratic Institute for InternationalInstituteWashington: National Democratic for Affairs August 30-September 2. August 2. 30-September Sa Association. Science Political American the of Meeting Annual London: Sage 107-134. pp. Publications. oiia Sine Te tt o te icpie II Discipline the of State The Science: Political Political PartiesPolitical A Theory of Parties and Electoral SystemsElectoral and Parties of Theory A Comparative Political StudiesComparative Political oiia Pris n Dmcay n hoeia ad Practical and Theoretical in Democracy and Parties Political Comparing Democracies. Election and Voting in Global Global in Voting and Election Democracies. Comparing . A Cross-National Survey A Cross-National 216

at Ognztos A aa adok on Handbook Data A Organizations. Party 18 (2): 139-69. 18 (2): 139-69. . London: Sage Publications. London:Publications. . Sage The Challenge of Democracy of Challenge The Florence: EUI. . New York: Free Press. . New Free Press. York: . Baltimore and London: London: and Baltimore . presented at the 2001 the at presented .

. . hr S Kt (ed.). Katz S. chard course on Political on course Washington, D.C.: D.C.: Washington, oy" n d W. Ada In eory." eDuc, Richard G. G. Richard eDuc, n Francisco, CA. CA. Francisco, n Development. s Theories Theories s ht.” Paper Paper ht.” .

CEU eTD Collection az Rcad . n Rbr Kldy 19. Pry raiain a a E an as Organizations “Party 1994. Kolodny. Robert and S. Richard Katz, az Rcad . n Ptr ar 19. Cde CthAl o Cartel or Catch-All, “Cadre, 1996. Mair. Peter and S. Richard Katz, Keating, Michael. 1999. Michael. Keating, ishl, ebr, dna asedv, aolw akwk ad Gáb and Markowski Radoslaw Mansfeldova, Zdenka Herbert, Kitschelt, 1969. Kirchheimer, Otto. Katz, Richard S. and Peter Mair. 2007. “The Cartel Party Thesis Party Cartel “The 2007. Mair. Peter and S. Richard Katz, ishl, ebr ad eia mt. 02 “rgamtc at C Party “Programmatic 2002. Smyth. Regina and Herbert Kitschelt, Key, V. O. 1964. 1994. (eds.). Mair Peter and S. Richard Katz, Kitschelt, Herbert. 2000. “Linkages between Citizens and Politic and Citizens between “Linkages 2000. Herbert. Kitschelt, presented at the General Conference of the European Consortium f Consortium European the of Conference General the at presented Politics ate i Aeia Pltc. I Rcad . az n Ptr M Peter and Katz S. Richard In Politics.” American in Parties Western in Party Organizations in Democracies raie Cag ad dpain n at ognztos n etr Democra Western in organizations Party in Adaptation and Change organize: London: Sage Publications. London: Sage Publications. Pisa, September 6-8. SeptemberPisa, 6-8. Elgar. pp. 367-425. Elgar. 367-425. pp. Democracies. Major the otomns Pry ytm. optto, ersnain n Int and Representation Competition, Systems. Party Postcommunist Studies Studies Context?” Comparative in Russia Democracies. Post-Communist University Press. Cooperation. Cooperation. Comparative Political StudiesComparative Political 2(4): 524-34. 35 (10): 1228-56. 35 (10): 1228-56. Politics, Parties and Pressure Parties GroupsPolitics, Cambridge: CambridgePress. University The Politics of Modern Europe: the State and Political Authority in Authority Political and State the Europe: Modern of Politics The Politics, Law and Social ChangeSocial and Law Politics, n e. hlehm U ad otapo, A Edward MA: Northampton, and UK Cheltenham, ed. 2nd 33 (6/7): 845-880. 33 (6/7): 845-880. 217 How Parties Organize Parties How

. London: Sage Publications. London: Sage. Publications. .

New York: Thomas Y. Crowell. New Y. Crowell. York: Thomas .

New York and London:and YorkNew ians in Democratic Polities” Polities” Democratic in ians and its Implications.” Paper Implications.” its and . Change and Adaptation and Change air (eds.). (eds.). air A Rejoinder” A ? Comparative Political Comparative hso i Emerging in ohesion or Political Research. Political or or Tóka. 1999. 1999. Tóka. or py Vessel: mpty How parties parties How

Columbia Columbia er-Party Party cies.

CEU eTD Collection a America Latin in Competition “Party 2003. Herbert. Kitschelt, oek, er 19. Fcinls i Primnay ate and Parties Parliamentary in “Factionalism 1995. Petr. Kopecký, N the in Party Cadre Modern the of Vulnerability “The 1994. A. Ruud Koole, Kopecký, Petr. 2001. 2001. Petr. Kopecký, lnean Hn-itr Ade Vles Jdt Br, a Bde n Mic and Budge Ian Bara, Judith Volkens, Andrea Hans-Dieter, Klingemann, ui, ntl. 07 "usas oiia Pris De i te Sha the in Deep Parties: Political "Russia's 2007. Anatoly. Kulik, oek, er 20. Te zc Rpbi: nrnhn Proportional Entrenching Republic: Czech “The 2004. Petr. Kopecký, Krouwel, Andrew. 2003. “Measuring Presidentialism and Parliamenta and Presidentialism “Measuring 2003. Andrew. Krouwel, Krehbiel, Keith. 2000. “Party Discipline and Measures of Partisa of Measures and Discipline “Party 2000. Keith. Krehbiel, Organizations in Western in DemocraciesOrganizations (eds.). Mair Peter and Katz S. R. Success. (eds.). Mercle Peter and Lawson Kay Macmillan. (ed.). Colomer M. Joseph Parliament Institutionalization. Institutionalization. Parliament Political SciencePolitical Czech Republic: A concept and some Empirical Findings.” Empirical some and concept A Republic: Czech Oxford UniversityOxford Press. 1990-2003 OECD and Union European Europe, Eastern in Governments Europe. Divergence of Patterns, Similarity of Explanatory Explanatory of Similarity Patterns, of Divergence Europe. 151. coad 2006. McDonald. Philadelphia, AugustPhiladelphia, 27-31. Political American the of Meeting Annual the at delivery for Central and European Eastern Countries.” Boulder, London: Lynne Boulder, London: Publishers. Rienner Parliaments in the Czech and Slovak Republics: Party Competition and Competition Party Republics: Slovak and Czech the in Parliaments 44 (2): 212-227. 44 (2): apn Plc Peeecs I Etmts o Pris Elec Parties, for Estimates II. Preferences Policy Mapping Handbook of Electoral System Choice. System Electoral of Handbook How Parties Organize. Change and Adaptation in Party in Adaptation and Change Organize. Parties How Aldershot: Ashgate. . London: Sage Publications. SageLondon: . Publications. 218 hn ate Popr Te s o Electoral of Use The Prosper: Parties When Acta Politica Politica Acta

38 (4): 333-364. nship.” nd Post-Communist Eastern Post-Communist nd Democratization Variables.” o o te rsdn. In President." the of dow eortzto i the in Democratization rism: an Application to to Application an rism: cec Association. Science New York: Palgrave Palgrave York: New ersnain” In Representation.” American Journal of of Journal American

Paper prepared prepared Paper etherlands.” In etherlands.” 2 (1): 138- (1): 2 . Oxford: Oxford: . hael D. D. hael tors, tors,

CEU eTD Collection ipat Aed 1999. Arend. Lijphart, anaig ct ad ain Tra. 06 “at Sse Instituti System “Party 2006. Torcal. Mariano and Scott Mainwaring ipat Aed. 1994. Arendt. Lijphart, ae, ihe ad ent A Sese 19. Hw oiia Partie Political “How 1999. Shepsle. A. Kenneth and Michael Laver, idr Wl. 1998. Wolf. Linder, fr Positions Policy “Estimating 2000. Garry. John and Michael Laver, 1994. Ersson. O. Svante and Jan-Erik Lane, oa, il 19. Fcin ad atoaim n ugr’ Nw Party New Hungary’s in Factionalism and “Factions 1995. Bill. Lomax, Loewenberg, 1979. S. G. and Patterson Lewis, Paul. 1995. “Poland and Eastern Europe. Perspectives on Factions Factions on Perspectives Europe. Eastern and “Poland 1995. Paul. Lewis, Linek, Lukáš and Petra Rakušanova. 2002. “Parties in the Parliament. Why Parliament. the in “Parties 2002. Rakušanova. Petra and Lukáš Linek, Press. Thirty-Six Countries. Countries. Thirty-Six Societies Parliamentary Government. Democratization American Journal of Political ScienceAmerican Political Journal of Democratization London: Sage Publications. London: Sage Publications. Democratisation.” of Wave Third the after Theory System In Bowler, Shaun, David M. Farrell and Richard Katz (eds.). (eds.). Katz Richard and Farrell M. David Shaun, Bowler, In Form the and Discipline Party Cohesion, Party Slime: Primeval Sage Publications. Sage Publications. of Sciences of the Czech Republic. of Sciences the Czech of years 1998-2002.” 1998-2002.” years the in Groups Party Parliamentary Unity? in Act Parties do . Houndmills: Macmillan. Houndmills: Press. Swiss Democracy: Possible Solutions to Conflict in Multicultural Multicultural in Conflict to Solutions Possible Democracy: Swiss 2 (1): 125-138. 2 (1): 125-138. 2 (1): 102-125. 2 (1): 102-125. Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in in Performance and Forms Government Democracy. of Patterns Sociological Papers. Sociological at Sses n Eetrl Systems. Electoral and Systems Party New London:and Haven University Press. Yale Columbus Ohio: Ohio Ohio: University Columbus 23-53.pp. Press. Comparing Legislatures. Comparing 44 (3): 619-634. 619-634. 44(3): Politics and Society in Western EuropeWestern in Society and Politics 219 2 (9). Prague:(9). 2

Institute of Sociology, Academy Academy Sociology, of Institute Boston: Little, Brown. Boston: Chamber of Deputies in the in Deputies of Chamber xod Ofr University Oxford Oxford: Handbook of Party Politics Politics Party of Handbook ation of Governments.” Governments.” of ation nlsto ad Party and onalisation at Dsiln and Discipline Party s Emerged from the the from Emerged s m oiia Texts” Political om and Factionalism.” Factionalism.” and , When and How How and When , . London: . System.” System.”

CEU eTD Collection Twe in Membership “Party 2001. Biezen. van Ingrid and Peter Mair, Miller E. Warren, Roy Pierce, Jacques Thomassen, Richard Herrer Richard Thomassen, Jacques Pierce, Roy Warren, E. Miller Mair, Peter. 2008. “The Challenge to Party Government.” Government.” Party to Challenge “The 2008. Peter. Mair, Mershon, Carol, 1999. “The Costs of Coalition: A Five-Nation Comparison.” Comparison.” Five-Nation A Coalition: of Costs “The 1999. Carol, Mershon, McAlister, Ian and Stephen White. 2007. “Political Parties and Democ and Parties “Political 2007. White. Stephen and Ian McAlister, 1997. Moshe. Maor, McKenzie, 1964. R. cal Mcal n Pto N A Rao (d.. 2004. (eds.). Ryabov A. N. Petrov and Michael McFaul, Malová, Darina and Kevin Deegan Krause. 2000. “Parliamentary Pa “Parliamentary 2000. Krause. Deegan Kevin and Darina Malová, aly Jnta. 2003. Jonathan. Malloy, pp. 195-214.pp. Doo Closed behind Parties Political Democracies. n nt edr n Ru Koe (eds.). Koole Ruud and Heidar Knut In eorc. usa Ps-omns Pltcl Reform Political Post-Communist Russian Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Oxford Oxford: Press. 1999. Wessels. Bernhard and Esaiasson Washington, D.C. 211-234. British Experience.British Democracies, 1980-2000.” Government. (eds.). Katz Richard and Farrell M. David Shaun, Post-Communist Societies.” Post-Communist American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, August American 28-31. Association, Science Philadelphia, Political the at presented Paper Groups.” Party Parliamentary Canadian Columbus Ohio: Ohio University Press. pp. 227-269. Ohio University Ohio: 227-269. pp. Columbus Press. British Political Parties Political British Political Parties and Party Systems. Comparative Approaches and the and Approaches Comparative Systems. Party and Parties Political London and New York: Routledge. London and New Routledge. York:

“High Discipline, Low Cohesion? The Uncertain Patterns of of Patterns Uncertain The Cohesion? Low Discipline, “High Party Politics Party Politics Party Politics Party Politics . 2 220 Policy Representation in Western Democracies. Western in Representation Policy nd 7 (1): 5-21. 7 (1): 5-21. ed.London: Heinemann.

13 (2): 197-216. alaetr Pry rus n European in Groups Party Parliamentary rs. London and New York: Routledge. York: New and London rs. Party Discipline and Parliamentary Parliamentary and Discipline Party West European Politics Politics European West ewe Dcaosi and Dictatorship Between Crei Endowment: Carnegie . a, Sören Holmberg, Peter Peter Holmberg, Sören a, rty Groups in Slovakia”. in Groups rty annual meeting of the the of meeting annual ratic Consolidation in Consolidation ratic nty European European nty In Bowler, Bowler, In 31 (1-2): 31 CEU eTD Collection Norris, Pippa. 1996. “Legislative Recruitment.” In LawrenceLeDuc,In Richa Recruitment.” Norris, 1996.“Legislative Pippa. Norton, Philip. 2000. “The United Kingdom. Exerting Influence from within.” within.” from Influence Exerting “TheKingdom. United2000. Philip. Norton, Mitchell, Paul 1999. “Coalition Discipline, EnforcementMechanisms Discipline, 1999.“Coalition Paul Mitchell, Müller, Wolfgang C., Marcelo Jenny, Barbara Steiniger, Martin Martin Steiniger, Barbara Jenny, Marcelo C., Wolfgang Müller, 2004. Scott. Morgenstern, Olson, David. M. 1980. 1980. M. David. Olson, Ozbudun, Ergun. 1970. Ergun. Ozbudun, wn, . on 2003. John. E. Owens, Mode Principal-Agent of Evolution Political “The 2005. Gary. Miller, Panebianco, Angelo. 1988. 1988. Angelo. Panebianco, Präferenzen Verhalten und politisches Political Parties behind Parties Political DooClosed n Sbn Pes-ethl 2001. Preisl-Westphal. Sabine and and Ruud Koole (eds.). (eds.). Koole Ruud and Harper and Row. Harper and Row. CambridgeUniversity Press. Hills: California.Hills: Parliamentary Government ors (eds.). Norris Political SciencePolitical In Bowler, Shaun, David M. Farrell and Richard Katz (eds.). (eds.). Katz Richard and Farrell M. David Shaun, Bowler, In and the United States London: Sage Publications. London: Sage Publications. Legislatures: Purposiveness and Context.” and Purposiveness Legislatures: American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA. August PA. American 28-31. Association, Science Philadelphia, Political oprn Democracies Comparing

8 (1): 203-25. 8 (1): 203-25. Party Cohesion in Western Democracies: A Causal Analysis. Analysis. Causal A Democracies: Western in Cohesion Party

Epann Pry oein n Pry icpie n Democratic in Discipline Party and Cohesion Party “Explaining h Lgsaie rcs: Cmaaie Approach Comparative A Process: Legislative The Patterns of Legislative Politics. Roll-Call Voting in Latin A Latin in Voting Roll-Call Politics. Legislative of Patterns . Cambridge:University Cambridge Press. oiia Pris Ognzto ad Power. and Organization Parties: Political alaetr Pry rus n uoen Democracies European in Groups Party Parliamentary . Columbus Ohio: Ohio Ohio: University. Columbus 269-289.pp. Press. rs. London New 39-57.pp. rs. and York: Routledge. i ötrecice Agodee. Individuelle Abgeordneten. österreichischen Die . Vienna: WUV. WUV. . Vienna: 221 . lcin ad oig n lbl Perspective Global in Voting and Elections

Paper presented at the annual meeting of the the of meeting annual the at presented Paper oea, hlp Wilfried, Philipp Dolezal, and Intraparty Politics.” and ls.” at Dsiln and Discipline Party rd G. Niemi, Pippa Pippa Niemi, rd G. Annual Review of Review Annual In Knut Heidar InHeidar Knut .

e York: New Cambridge: Beverly Beverly merica . .

CEU eTD Collection Financial The Unity: Party of Price “The 2001. David. C.W. Parker, Patzelt, Werner J. 1997. “German MPs and their Roles.” their and MPs “German 1997. J. Werner Patzelt, Pedahzur, Ami and Avrham Brichta. 2002. “The Institutionalization of Extr of Institutionalization “The 2002. Brichta. Avrham and Ami Pedahzur, Remington, Thomas F., Steven S. Smith. 1995. “The Development of Parliam ofDevelopment “The1995. Smith. S. Steven F., Thomas Remington, any A 16. Cniae eeto ad at Chso i Bian n Uni and Britain in Cohesion Party and Selection “Candidate 1965. A. Ranney, uh Mcal n Cae tigasn 2002. Ettinghausen. Clare and Michael Rush, Rice, 1928. Stuart. oe Rcad n Toa Mci. 98 “o ate Prit r Fail? or Persist parties “Do 1988. Mackie. Thomas and Richard Rose, Rohrschneider, Robert and Stephen Whitefield. 2007. “Representation in 2007.“RepresentationNew in Stephen Whitefield. Rohrschneider, Democr and Robert idsegr Mx 19. Te reo Pry n uti: rm Protes From Austria: in Party Freedom “The 1998. Max. Riedlsperger, Right: Neo Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracie Established in Movements and Parties Populist Neo Right: (1): 55-78. (1): 55-78. Charismatic Parties: a Paradox?” Charismatic a Parties: Paradox?” of Politics 69(4): 1133-46.of Politics EasternIntegrationParty Post-Communist in Europe.” onEuropean Stances Martin’s Press. pp 27-44. Martin’s Press. pp27-44. Populism.” In Hans-Georg Betz and Stefan Immerfall (eds.). (eds.). Immerfall Stefan and Betz Hans-Georg In Populism.” Emerging Alternative Organizations. Organizations. Alternative Emerging oiia Parties.” Political Science Association. San Francisco, CA. August 30-September 2. Science San Francisco, 2. 30-September August CA. Association. Russia.” Washington. D.C. Politica American the of Meeting Annual the to presented Paper Hansard Society. Press. (eds.). Merkl H. Peter and Lawson Kay In Organizations.” Facing Legislative Studies Quarterly Studies Legislative Quantitative MethodsQuantitative Politics in

ae peetd t h Ana Meig f h Aeia Politica American the of Meeting Annual the at presented Paper Party Politics Party Politics 20 (4): 457-489. 20 (4): 457-489. 222 rneo, e Jre: rneo University Princeton Jersey: New Princeton,

pnn u te sa Channels Usual the up Opening . New York: Alfred A. Knopf. . NewKnopf. York: A. Alfred 8 (1): 31-49. The

Journal of Legislative Studies Studies Legislative of Journal h Nw oiis f the of Politics New The l Science Association. Association. Science l Power of America’s America’s of Power The Big Trade-off Trade-off Big The When Parties Fail. Fail. Parties When t Rdcl Right Radical to t eme Right-Wing eme s. entary Parties in entary Parties New York: St. York: New The Journal The Journal e States.” ted .

London: acies: acies: 3 l l CEU eTD Collection 1977. Massimo. Salvadori, atr, ivni 1976. Giovanni. Sartori, Sartori, Giovanni. 1997. Giovanni. Sartori, atr, ivni19. A yooy f at Sses” n ee Mai Peter In Systems.” Party of Typology “A Giovanni.1990. Sartori, cro, ua, . Wb, al n Dvd . arl. 00 “rm oil Int Social “From 2000. Farrell. M. David and Paul Webb, E., Susan, Scarrow, Schneider, Aaron. 2003. “Decentralization: Conceptualization and Measurem and Conceptualization “Decentralization: 2003. Aaron. Schneider, Smilov, Daniel and Jurij Toplak. 2007. Toplak. Jurij and Daniel Smilov, tpn Afe ad id Sah 19. Cntttoa Faeok a Frameworks “Constitutional 1993. Skach. Cindy and Alfred Stepan, Ins New the in Rationality and Rules, “Roles, 1991. D. Donald Searing, Searing, Donald D. 1984. “The Role of the Good Constituency Member and Member Constituency Good the of Role “The 1984. D. Donald Searing, Strøm, Kaare. 1997. “Rules, Reasons and Routines: Legislatives Roles Roles Legislatives Routines: and Reasons “Rules, 1997. Kaare. Strøm, American Science Review Political Dalton, J. Russell and Martin P. Wattenberg (eds.). (eds.). Wattenberg P. Martin and Russell J. Dalton, Pol within Power of distribution Changing The Contestation: Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies AdvancedChange in Industrial The Transition Period. The Transition Consolidation. Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism.” Parliamentarism versusConsolidation. Presidentialism.” Comparative International DevelopmentComparative International Representation in Western in Europe (eds.) Saafeld Thomas Müller, C. Wolfgang In Democracies.” Incentives, Outcomes. and European Party System York: St. Martin’sYork: Press. St. CambridgeUniversity Press.

in Great Britain.” Great in .

Comparative Constitutional Engineering. An Inquiry into Structures, into Inquiry An Engineering. Constitutional Comparative London: FrankLondon: Cass. ate adPry SystemsParty and Parties h Lbrl eey Oiis n Hsoia Development Historical and Origins Heresy: Liberal The Aldershot: Ashgate. .

Oxford: Oxford University Oxford Oxford: Press. 316-349. pp. London: Macmillan. The Journal of Politics Politics Journal of The Political Finance and Corruption in Eastern Europe. Eastern in Corruption and Finance Political 85 (4): 1239-1260. 85 (4): 1239-1260. 223 38 (3): 32-56. 38 (3): 32-56.

. Oxford: Oxford University Press. University Oxford . Oxford: Press. : : A Framework for Analysis for Framework A Parties without Partisans without Parties World Politics 47 (2): 348-381. Members of Parliament Parliament of Members (ed.). r in Parliamentary Parliamentary in 46(1): 1-22. itical Parties.” In Parties.” itical nd Democratic Democratic nd ent.” the Practice of of Practice the titutionalism.” titutionalism.” e York New . egration to to egration : : Studies in in Studies h West The Political . New New . CEU eTD Collection McAllisterIan and T. D. Studlar, 2003. (eds.) Bergman Tobjörn and Müller C. Wolfgang Kaare, Strøm, Taagepera, Rein and Mathew S. Shugart. 1989. 1989. Shugart. S. Mathew and Rein Taagepera, urmna, . ae. 08 “eeoig n Tsig Ter o L of Theory a Testing and “Developing 2008. Rajen. S. Subramanian, óa Gbr 19. Pltcl ate i Es Cnrl uoe" I Europe." Central East in Parties "Political 1997. Gábor. Tóka, aq Jcus 1997. Jacques. Tacq, hmse, aqe J A 19. Eprcl eerh no oiia R Political into Research “Empirical 1994. A. J. Jacques Thomassen, Turner, Julius. 1951. Julius. Turner, Tan, C. Alexander. 2000. 2000. Alexander. C. Tan, elc, hlp . 99 “tutr ad ucin n oiia Belief Political in Function and “Structure 1989. E. Philip Tetlock, Accountability in ParliamentaryAccountability in Democracies. eorce: hms n Perspectives and Themes Democracies: Home and Abroad: Essays in Honor of Warren Miller. Miller. Warrenof Honor in Essays Abroad: and Home Function. Function. Fragmentation.” University of thesis, Unpublished PhD Wisconsin-Madison. among legislators.” Australian Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien (eds.) (eds.) Tien Hung-mao and Chu, Yun-han Plattner, Press. 237-65.pp. Democracy or Failing Models.” In M. Kent Jennings and T.E. Mann (eds. Mann T.E. and Jennings Kent M. In Models.” Failing or Democracy Press. 93-134.pp. Pratkanis, Steven J. Breckler and Antony Greenwald (eds.). (eds.). Greenwald Antony and Breckler J. Steven Pratkanis, Determinants of Electoral SystemsDeterminants Electoral of Problem Analysis to Hopkins UniversityHopkins Press. of the of Impact Party Size. of Membership Hillsdale, NJ: LawrenceHillsdale, NJ: 129-151. pp. Elrbaum. Party and Constituency: Pressure on Congress. Congress. on Pressure Constituency: and Party utvrae nlss ehius n oil cec Research Science Social in Techniques Analysis Multivariate . London: Sage. Publications. Members, Organizations and Performance. An Empirical Analysis Analysis Empirical An Performance. and Organizations Members, . 1996. “Constituency Activity and Representational Roles Roles Representational and Activity “Constituency 1996. The Journal of PoliticsThe Journal of . New Haven and London: and University Press. . New Yale Haven 224 Aldershot: Ashgate. Aldershot: Blioe M: on Hpis University Hopkins Johns MD: Baltimore, .

Oxford: Oxford University Oxford Press. Oxford: Seats and Votes. The Effects and and Effects The Votes. and Seats 58 (1): 69-90. Ann Arbor: Michigan UniversityMichigan Arbor: Ann osldtn te hr Wave Third the Consolidating

n Larry Diamond, Marc F. F. Marc Diamond, Larry n System.” In Antony R. R. Antony In System.” tiue tutr and Structure Attitude epresentation: Failing Failing epresentation: Baltimore: The Johns Johns The Baltimore: gsaie Party egislative eeain and Delegation ). Elections at at Elections . From From CEU eTD Collection Walecki, Marcin. 2003. “Money and Politics in Central and Eastern Euro Eastern and Central in Politics and “Money 2003. Marcin. Walecki, aik, ahe. 90 “at Fcin i Cmaaie Politics: Comparative in Factions “Party 1960. Raphael. Zariski, eglr, on . ee. 95 “h Isiuinlzto o France’s of Institutionalization “The 1995. Peter. W. John Veugelers, Woldendorp, Jaap, Ian Bugde and Hans Keman. 2000. Keman. Hans and Bugde Ian Jaap, Woldendorp, 1970. Jr. Schneier V. E. and R. Turner, oiia Pris n Eeto Campaigns Election and Parties Political Observations.” Unpublished PhD thesis, DepartmentUniversity. thesis, Unpublished PhD Princeton of Sociology, 1945-1998 Electoral Assistance. Electoral Assistance. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. Hopkins Baltimore: The Johns . Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. . Dordrecht: Academic Kluwer Publishers. Midwest Journal of Political Science Political Journal of Midwest at ad osiuny Pesrs n Congress. on Pressures Constituency: and Party 225

International Institute for Democracy and and Democracy for Institute International Party Government in 48 Democracies Democracies 48 in Government Party 4 (1): 27-51. 4(1): 27-51. oe Preliminary Some pe.” In pe.” Front National.” National.” Front Funding of Funding