The Emergence of Parties in the Canadian House of Commons (1867-1908)

Home , 9th Canadian Parliament, Canadian Party, Party discipline, Unity (Canada)

The Emergence of Parties in the Canadian House of Commons (1867-1908).

Jean-Fran¸coisGodbout† and Bjørn Høyland‡

† Département de science polititque, Universitéde Montréal ‡Department of Political Science, University of Oslo

Conference on the Westminster Model of Democracy in Crisis? Comparative Perspectives on Origins, Development and Responses, May 13-14, 2013.

Abstract This study analyzes legislative voting in the first ten Canadian Parliaments (1867-1908). The results demonstrate that party voting unity in the House of Commons dramatically increases over time. From the comparative literature on legislative organization, we identify three factors to explain this trend: partisan sorting; electoral incentives; and negative agenda control. Several different empirical analyses confirm that intra-party conflict is generally explained by the opposition between Anglo-Celtic/Protestants and French/Catholic Members of Parliament. Once members begin to sort into parties according to their religious affiliation, we observe a sharp increase in voting cohesion within the Liberal and Conservative parties. Ultimately, these finding highlight the importance of territorial and socio-cultural conflicts, as well as agenda control, in explaining the emergence of parties as cohesive voting groups in the Canadian Parliament. This study explains the development of party unity in the Canadian House of Commons. We take advantage of the historical evolution of this legislature to analyze a complete set of recorded votes covering the first ten parliaments (1867-1908). This early period is of interest because it was during these years that the first national party system was established, the electoral franchise was limited, and the rules and procedures of the House were kept to a minimum. Since the Canadian legislature is an Anglo-American hybrid, it also affords the opportunity to explore the differences between the American and British parliamentary systems (Kam, 2009, 2001; Franks, 1987; Kornberg, 1967; Epstein, 1964). This form of government requires strong party discipline, while the sectional divisions coalesced by the federal structure, should lead us to expect a much looser American-style party organization (Epstein, 1964, p. 57). From a historical perspective, the Canadian House of Commons is also interesting because it integrates four former independent colonies—with their own partisan structure—into a new federal legislative system. Much like in the years after the creation of the European Union, we should find that over time, the regional ties between Members of Parliament (MPs) gradually weakened at the expense of partisanship (Hix, Noury and Roland, 2005; Haas, 1958). However, we should also find tensions between the unity of federal parties and the need for legislators from different regions to cater to the interests of their constituents (Lebo, McGlynn and Koger, 2007; Hix, 2002). We are primarily interested in determining what factors are most important in explaining legislative behaviour and the organization of the Canadian House of Commons. We begin by providing a brief historical overview of the political context in the years following Con- federation.1 We outline three groups of variables that we believe can explain the increase in party unity in the House of Commons: partisan sorting; electoral incentives; and negative agenda control. We also relate each of these factors to the literature on legislative organization more broadly. Although some researchers, such as Cornell (1963) and Hare (1973), have analyzed the composition of different legislative coalitions prior to Confederation to explain

1For a detailed account of elections and the political economy of Canada during this period, see Beck (1968) and Easterbrook and Aitken (1988).

1 the roots of the Liberal-Conservative party merger of 1854 (which later became the Conser- vative party), this study represents the first historical account of legislative voting and party unity in Canada.2 Our research also addresses the more general question of the development of legislative organization and party unity in Westminster style parliamentary systems. Since legislatures ultimately deal with the most important issues of the day, the historical analysis of parliamentary voting can provide researchers with a unique tool to effectively learn about the evolution of political conflicts. We believe that such an analysis is important in the Canadian context because contemporary parties tend to reflect the political cleavages of the periods in which they were first created (Liphjart, 1977; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967).

Party Unity and Confederation

Much like in the British case, it is generally assumed that party unity in the Canadian House of Commons was very weak in the years following Confederation (Carty, 1988). Indeed, the first few parliaments contained several Liberal or Conservative “loose fish” or “shaky fellows” who did not always support their own party (Kornberg and Mishler, 1976; Underhill, 1935; Reid, 1932). Figure 1 supports this assumption by displaying a conventional measure of party unity indicating the proportion of recorded divisions where a simple majority (.50) of the Conservative party voted against the Liberal party (solid line) in the first ten Canadian parliaments (1867-1908). The Figure also includes an additional measure of unity where at least .90 of one party voted against .90 of the other (dotted line). This last index identifies the proportion of highly partisan votes (see for example Brady, Cooper and Hurley 1979). The Figure illustrates an important surge in the number of partisan votes during the 4th Parliament while the proportion of majoritarian votes remains relatively constant over time. After the 4th term, the number of majoritarian and partisan votes in the Commons gradually converges. This is in sharp contrast with voting in the U.S. Congress during the same period.

2However, Eggleston (1988) wrote a Master’s thesis to analyze some aspects of legislative voting in the ﬁrst three parliaments. Massicotte (1989) also found that in the provincial legislature of Quebec, discipline was at its weakest in the years following Confederation.

2 Party Unity 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 Percentage of votes Percentage 0.2

Majority 50/50 Majority 90/90 0.0

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Parliaments 1st-10th (1867-1908)

Figure 1: The plots report two measures of party unity. The solid line represents the proportion of votes in a given parliament where .50 of one party voted against .50 of the other. The dotted line represents the proportion of votes where .90 of one party voted against .90 of the other.

At its highest point in 1902, the House of Representative had a comparable level of highly partisan votes of .64 (Brady, Cooper and Hurley, 1979). Still, the level of voting unity found in the Canadian House of Commons at the turn of the century is much higher than what we observe in the British Parliament (Lowell, 1908, table 2, p.77). How can we account for this increase in voting unity in the Canadian House of Commons? The literature on legislative voting generally explains party unity in terms of internal and external factors. Internal factors are associated with leadership and the centralized structure of legislative decision-making (Stephens and Brady, 1976; Brady and Althoﬀ, 1974). For example, when members of the government control the legislative agenda, they can often avoid splitting their caucus by preventing a divisive issue from coming to a vote (Cox and McCubbins, 2005, 1993). In addition, parties can use incentives such as patronage, committee assignments, or other legislative perks to promote member loyalty (Carey, 2009). External factors, such as who controls the selection of candidates as well as the importance of—and

3 access to—campaign resources for individual members, can also have an impact on legislative voting (Hix, 2004). Unfortunately, since both external and internal factors generally coexist simultaneously in a legislature, it is extremely difficult to disentangle between their individual effects. As Krehbiel (1993) points out, high levels of partisan voting could simply be explained by the cohesiveness of the preferences of members, independently of parties or the electoral process (see also Krehbiel, 2000). Some parties may even systematically oppose government proposals for strategic reasons, regardless of the preference of their members (Dewan and Spirling, 2011). In order to estimate the independent effect of these different factors on legislative voting, this study proposes an empirical strategy to determine the sequence of their occurrence in the House of Commons. We identify three types of events—ideological sorting, the modification of electoral laws, and the increasing control of the agenda by the governing party—to account for the rise in party voting unity over time. We are interested in determining whether the gradual economic integration of the Canadian provinces and the increasingly divergent views adopted by both parties on language and religion help explain the consolidation of the party system during this period. We also consider the possibility that electoral pressure, or the late adoption of the secret ballot and same day elections, reduced the number of independent minded legislators by increasing the benefits of being loyal to one of the two major parties. Finally, we are interested in finding out if, by increasing its control over the parliamentary process over time, the government could have changed the rules and procedures of the House in order to keep some of the most divisive issues from the legislative agenda. Since we use historical voting data in this analysis, we are able to establish precisely when these factors emerged and disentangle their independent effects on the development of parties as cohesive voting groups. The rest of the study is organized as follows. We begin by describing in more details the three different factors that can explain party unity in the Canadian House of Commons: ideological sorting; electoral incentives; and negative agenda control. Next, we present the empirical strategy, methodology, and data used to evaluate each of their contribution. We

4 also conduct three separate set of empirical analysis to determine what factor has the greatest influence on party unity. In the final two sections, we discuss the implications of our results and conclude. Ultimately, our study shows that the establishment of cohesive parties is not really about the increased value of party-labels during an election (e.g., Cox, 1987). Rather, we find that agenda-setting power and legislative tools have an important influence on legislative voting (e.g., Cox and McCubbins, 2005, 1993). However, this effect is conditional on the party being sufficiently ideologically cohesive in the first place (e.g., Aldrich and Rhode, 2005).

Ideological Sorting

Between 1867 and 1908, the Canadian House of Commons alternated from Conservative (1st–2nd and 4th–7th Parliaments) to Liberal governments (3rd and 8th–10th). We include in Appendix A a detailed breakdown of the election results for each parliament. The country also experienced unprecedented economic growth, with the expansion of railroads, first to the East and then to the West, and an important effort to colonize new territories and develop new markets. Originally constituted of four provinces in 1867 (Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia), the Dominion also grew in size, with the addition of Manitoba (1870), British Columbia (1871), Prince Edward Island (1873), the Northwest Territories (1887), Yukon (1901), and Alberta and Saskatchewan (1905). In the years immediately following Confederation, the Conservative and Liberal parties were not clearly defined as parliamentary groups. There was a Liberal-Conservative alliance led by John A. Macdonald who campaigned in favor of the union. His coalition was loosely based on four regional partisan groups from the former United Province of Canada: moderate Reformists and Tories from Ontario, and Conservatives (Bleus) and English mercantile interests from Quebec (Carty, 1988; Hamelin, 1965).3 In addition, several independent MPs may have at times joined the governing coalition on certain votes. Others, like Joseph Howe

3The Conservative party also relied heavily on speciﬁc provincial leaders to win elections. For example, John A. Macdonald and William McDougall for Ontario, George Etienne Cartier and Alexander Galt for Quebec, and Charles Tupper for Nova Scotia.

5 from Nova Scotia, became government supporters only after they joined the Cabinet. A similar regional organization was found within the Liberal party, which was roughly composed of former anti-Catholic radical Reformists, led by George Brown in Ontario, and Quebec Reformists, led by Antoine-AiméDorion. These factions remained relatively independent until a Liberal party leader was elected toward the end of the 1st Parliament. Finally, the two Maritime colonies, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, had their own partisan system independent of the parties found in the United Canada (prior to Confederation). One group campaigned in favor of the union, whereas the other was opposed to the project. This last group won the most seats in the first federal election and was composed of Liberal (New Brunswick) and Anti-Confederate (Nova Scotia) legislators. The presence of colonial interests in the legislature presupposes some level of regional conflict that transcends party lines, at least in the first years following Confederation. Because Canada is the product of a federal union between four former independent colonies, it is quite possible that on some votes, members from the same province were more likely to band together, and thus break party line. This split should be more likely to occur over localized or sectional interests affecting specific provinces. For example, the creation of a uniform currency and banking system in 1871 generated a lot of controversy because each former colony had to integrate their own monetary system (Easterbrook and Aitken, 1988). Furthermore, the fact that MPs had dual representation (e.g., they could occupy seats in both provincial and federal legislatures until 1874) probably served to strengthen the ties between provincial and federal interests. Finally, the presence of an Anti-Confederate party in Nova Scotia, and the reluctance of Maritime leaders to align with either one of the major parties in the 1st Parliament also guaranteed that regionalism played an important role in the House of Commons. Still, we should expect regional attachment to decline over time, especially because many of the most divisive issues, such as banking, currency, tariff, insolvency law, and major railway developments, were more or less settled by the end of the 3rd Parliament. It was after this term that the National Policy was introduced by the Conservative party. This policy proposed a comprehensive approach for promoting the expansion of the Canadian

6 economy and industrialization through higher tariffs, as well as an increase in trade and economic integration between the different provinces (Easterbrook and Aitken, 1988). Although the Conservative party led by John A. Macdonald was very successful on the economic front, several political events seriously weakened their support in the years following Confederation. Most of these issues were related to the role of the Catholic Church and language rights outside of the predominantly French speaking province of Quebec (Beck, 1968). While language conflict is generally associated with Quebec, this issue was not simply regional at the time, mainly because there was an important proportion of Catholics and French speakers outside of this province during the 19th Century. The problems for the Conservative party began shortly after the 1st Parliament when New Brunswick abolished confessional education, a right protected under the newly adopted Constitution. Several other conflicts over language and religion emerged in other parts of the country as well and, as a result, the division between French and English and Catholic and Protestant increased (Hamelin, 1965). This fundamental conflict has defined the colonial history of Canada, and it remained salient in the minds of the electorate well into the 20th century (Blais, 2005).4 Perhaps the best example of this struggle relates to the Manitoba (1869) and Northwest Territories (1885) rebellions of French and Aboriginal Metis against the influx of Anglophone Protestant settlers and the execution of their leader, Louis Riel, by a federal court. The culmination of this crisis occurred in 1890, when the province of Manitoba passed a law to abolish French as an official language and removed public funding for Catholic schools. Following the inactions of the Conservative government on this matter, Catholic voters across Canada realigned their votes toward the Liberals, led by Wilfrid Laurier, a French-Catholic representative from Quebec (Cairns, 1968). The primary consequences of this partisan realignment was that one province, Quebec, became de facto without effective political competition, while Catholic voters across Canada began to support the Liberal party disproportionately.5

4Note that English and French opposition was considered to be an ethnic conﬂict during this period of Canadian history. 5Since virtually all French MPs from Quebec are Catholic during this period, the inﬂuence of religion on legislative behavior is more likely to be associated with English speaking MPs. There is one exception in the

7 It is important not to underestimate the importance of religion in politics during the Victorian era in Canada. Both the Conservative and the Liberal parties were originally formed on the basis of religious alliances (i.e., the Catholic ultramontane with the established Protestant churches for the Conservative party, and the Catholic reformers and minor Protestants denominations for the Liberals), and these fragile coalitions were seriously put to the test after Confederation (Cornell, 1963). Partisan loyalty was often tromped by religious identity. Divisions on issues like divorce, marriage, temperance, education, and language could split the parties internally. As we will show in this analysis, the election of the ﬁrst French-Catholic Prime minister coincides with the end of intra-party division on these issues and the ﬁnal surge in the increase of party unity found in the House of Commons.

Electoral Incentives

Of course, the increase in party voting observed in the first few parliaments could also be explained by other factors, such as electoral reforms in the 1880s or the expansion of the suffrage in the 1900s. In his historical study of the evolution of legislative voting in the British House of Commons, Cox (1987) noticed that an important surge in party unity occurred after the enlargement of the electorate around the time of the Franchise Act of 1884. Prior to this reform, party unity was very weak in the English Parliament. In the first half of the 19th century, MPs generally enjoyed a great deal of liberty and private member business played an important role in shaping the legislative agenda. However, the rapid expansion of the British economy created new problems for the government and added pressure on the Cabinet to increase legislative productivity and its control of the agenda. Cox argues that since independent members now faced a much more complex electorate after the expansion of the suffrage in the 1880s, party leaders were able to trade some of their campaign resources in exchange for loyalty in the Commons. In the Canadian context, we cannot expect that the increasing number of voters and industrialization account for the emergence of party unity, at least prior to 1900. Indeed,

1st Parliament, the Huguenot Henri-Gustave Joly de Lotbitni`ere.French Catholics were also found in New Brunswick and Manitoba. There was about 8% of English speaking Catholics in the ﬁrst ten Parliaments.

8 Canada was still very much a rural country during the Victorian era, and the voting franchise remained highly restrictive and limited to a very privileged group (voters had to be men over 21 of certain financial means). During this period, the average winning candidate received around 1,400 votes; some even won by receiving less than a hundred votes. In addition, the property and income qualifications of the electorate varied according to provincial laws.6 In 1885, the Conservative government centralized the franchise, but adopted an even more restrictive requirement for voting by increasing property-based qualifications. The franchise act was once again modified in 1898 when the Liberal government removed any property and income qualifications to disqualify voters. After this point, just like in the British case, we must consider the possibility that candidates faced a more diverse (and larger) electorate to win office. Nevertheless, even if the earlier franchise was limited, it is also possible that eligible voters held their MPs accountable for their voting records. In the years following Confederation, debates and the result of recorded divisions were published at length in the major newspapers. Thus, we can infer like Cox (1987) that at least some qualified electors may have based their voting decision on the legislative behaviour of their representatives. Knowing this, an MP could have been influenced by electoral pressure, especially in highly partisan districts where voters expected their representatives to behave in a certain way. Thus, if Cox (1987) is right, we should find that MPs elected with a wide margin will be on average more loyal to their party. Of course, it is possible that some MPs were also rewarded for being independent from their party. We will return to this hypothesis in the empirical analysis. Finally, there is the possibility that election rules affected the behaviour of legislators. Elections in the first three parliaments were done in public by a show of hand and conducted over several weeks. The practice at the time was for the governing party to hold earlier elections in the most partisan districts in order to secure an important number of seats, and thus count on a bandwagon effect in the later more competitive races. Several of the candidates took advantage of this situation by waiting to align themselves with one of the two

6For example, tenants in New Brunswick were not allowed to vote, whereas voting in British Columbia required no property or income qualiﬁcations (Elections Canada, 2007).

9 major parties until they could predict the most likely winner. Reid (1932) assumes that once in Parliament, these “shaky fellows” tended to vote with the Cabinet to secure the patronage oﬀered by the governing party. On record, these men were aﬃliated with the majority party; but in practice, they remained highly independent. Thus, if Reid is right, we should also expect that the introduction of the secret ballot and same day election in the 3rd Parliament reduced the number of these independent minded MPs and contributed to consolidate party unity in the Commons.

Negative Agenda Control

The final factor that we believe could explain the increase of partisan unity in the Canadian Parliament is related to the legislative agenda. Cox and McCubbins (2005, 1993) outlined a theory to explain that a parliamentary majority can use strict party discipline or the legislative agenda to preserve loyalty among backbench members when difficult votes arise in the legislature.7 Since disciplining members is generally costly, party leaders may prefer instead to keep some of the most divisive issues from coming to a vote. For example, in the Canadian context, this negative agenda control implies that Cabinet could have, over the years, gradually increased its ability to prevent contentious bills on language or religion from reaching the floor for a vote. In the House of Commons, the evidence pointing towards an increase over time in the control of the agenda by the Cabinet is clear because we find some modifications to the legislative rules in the first years following Confederation. These changes were generally over the organization of the Orders of the Day. In the 1st Parliament, most of the business was evenly split between private member and government business.8 However, it became rapidly clear that the time allocated for government business was insufficient. Special rules to modify the calendar were adopted on an ad hoc basis to increase the government’s control of the

7Agenda control may take several forms, such as proposal power, gate-keeping power, and for the purpose of observed voting unity, the ability to decide whether a vote is recorded or not (Hug, 2010). 8“In 1867, private bills were debated on Mondays and for one hour each Wednesday and Friday evening, while notices of motions and public bills were considered on Wednesdays and Thursdays. Only Tuesdays and Fridays were reserved for Government Orders (Chapter 10 O’Brien and Bosc, 2009).”

10 legislative agenda (Bourinot, 1884). Over time, the duration and the number of these days dramatically increased.9 The procedure was eventually formalized in the 10th Parliament, when the government won the right to control the agenda for a majority of the sitting days in a session (O’Brien and Bosc, 2009). This is in sharp contrast with the British House of Commons where the executive dominance over public legislation was widely recognized by the 1860s (Cox, 1987). Figure B1 in Appendix B provides some evidence of the increasing amount of government business on the legislative agenda by showing the distribution of recorded divisions by types of votes in the first ten parliaments. It is also important to note that the government’s ability to control the agenda in Canada is not comparable to the American or British cases. Like in Westminster, all government bills introduced in the Commons had to be debated by a committee of the whole House (the same was true for supply or ways and means resolutions). Any member could propose an amendment to the motion of moving into such a committee. Unlike in Britain, these amendments could be over any abstract motions.10 The committee of the whole could also consider in detail the content of most bills after the second reading (O’Brien and Bosc, 2009). Much like in Westminster (but unlike in the U.S. Congress), very few bills were ever sent to standing or special committees to be studied (Cox, 1987). The Canadian House of Commons operated under an open rule that permitted any number of amendments to be proposed once a bill—government or private— reached the floor. This legislative process basically remained unchanged for the first 100 years after Confederation. So even though the government may have increased its hold on the legislative agenda, the opposition (or backbench members) had ample opportunities to modify government bills or introduce divisive issues in the debates of the Canadian House of Commons. 9For example, the Hansard records reports that the number of days in a given week devoted to government business could be moved from two, to three, to four, to five or even six days in the later parliaments when sittings occurred on Saturdays. Of course, these changes tended to occur later in the legislative session. However, government business generally took precedent on Thursdays as early as a month after the beginning of a new session. 10This was also the case in the English Parliament before 1878 (Bourinot, 1884, p.478)

11 Empirical Strategy

In this study, we assume that legislative voting is influenced by several factors: partisanship; colonial and regional attachments; language and religion; electoral pressure; and by the legislative agenda. We include what we believe are the most likely variables that have the potential to organize legislators along distinct and coherent voting blocs. The difficulty lies in disentangling between their different effects. In order to counter this problem, we propose to take advantage of the sequence of events that characterized the development of the Canadian House of Commons. As we saw earlier, parties were much looser coalitions in the years following Confederation. Unlike the British case, the mass expansion of the franchise did not occur until the 20th century, and districts were never made to be of equal size (Cox, 1987, p. 169). We do know, however, that the secret ballot and same day elections were adopted by the 4th Parliament. The reform of the civil service was not completed until 1918, so patronage remained a prerogative of the governing party in all of the period under study (Ward, 1963). In terms of the functioning of the legislature, we know that the government increased its control of the legislative agenda gradually over the years (O’Brien and Bosc, 2009). However, most of the other rules in the Commons remained unchanged. There were no standing committees until 1906, and all bills had to be debated in the committee of the whole House where any member could introduce amendments. Finally, the process of going into the committee of supply allowed members to introduce amendments to the motion that “the Speaker do now leave the Chair” to obtain concessions from the executive on any matter within the jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada.11 Our empirical exploration begins with an analysis of the individual determinants of party loyalty. This is done in order to evaluate the effects of elections and electoral competition on legislative voting. Recall that Reid (1932) argued that same day elections and the introduction of the secret ballot increased partisan unity in the Canadian House in the 4th Parliament.

11Today, this process is the equivalent of Supply (or opposition days) in the Westminster systems when the opposition controls the agenda.

12 If Reid is right, we should expect party loyalty to be lower for members elected later in the campaign (e.g. the “loose fish” argument) in the first three parliaments. Recall, also, that Cox (1987) argued that the rise in party oriented voting in the electorate may have incited MPs to be more loyal in highly partisan districts. We will be able to verify this claim by looking at the relationship between election results and party loyalty in this analysis as well. In the second part of the empirical study, we focus on the partisan sorting argument. To consider the possibility that both the reduction in sectional and later religious conflicts explain the increase in the level of party unity found in the Canadian House, we employ a scaling methodology to map legislators and their votes in a series of multidimensional geometric models. This technique was developed by Poole and Rosenthal (2007, 1997) and used to analyze legislative voting in the United States as well as several other democracies (e.g., Hix and Noury, 2011). Poole and Rosenthal found that legislative voting in Congress is primarily organized along a two-dimensional spatial map where the first dimension corresponds to the ideological opposition between the left and the right, and the second dimension is related to issues that divide parties internally. The content of these cross-cutting issues is generally associated with regional conflicts such as the debate over slavery, and later civil rights, or the western based movement of bimetallism. In the Canadian context, the first dimension of voting should capture the level of support toward the governing party (Godbout and Høyland, 2011) while the second dimension should be related to intra-party divisions, just like in the American case. We expect that issues with the potential to split both major parties internally in the House of Commons will be related to the three most important cleavages in Canadian politics: regional interests, religion, and language (Blais, 2005). Finally, in the third part of the empirical study, we present a brief content analysis of the most divisive votes in order to determine if cross-cutting issues disappear from the legislative agenda. The detailed results of the content analysis, as well as a series of spatial models for each parliament, can be found in Appendices C and D. However, before proceeding with the analysis, we describe below the legislative voting data used in this study.

13 Data

We collected data on all recorded divisions (i.e., roll-call votes) for the first ten parliaments of the Canadian House of Commons between 1867 and 1908. Table 1 reports the legislative profile of each parliament. The number of recorded divisions ranges from 50 in the 2nd parliament (which ended early because of the Pacific Railway Scandal) to 295 in the 1st parliament. In the Canadian House of Commons, a division will not be recorded in the Journals unless at least five members make the request. This rule remains valid today.12 The number of MPs in the data also fluctuates between 215 in the 2nd Parliament and 262 in the 7th Parliament. The reason for the variability is twofold. First, the number of representatives increases and some MPs were replaced during several parliamentary terms. And second, the number of seats also changed with the addition of new provinces and territories.

Legislative Proﬁle, 1st–10th Parliaments.

Parliament Election MPs Votes Prime Minister Party Majority size

1st 1867 239 295 Macdonald Conservative .56 2nd 1872 215 50 Macdonald Conservative .50 3rd 1874 251 138 MacKenzie Liberal .63 4th 1878 236 152 Macdonald Conservative .65 5th 1882 241 221 Macdonald Conservative .63 6th 1887 245 133 Macdonald Conservative .57 7th 1891 262 128 Macdonald† Conservative .54 8th 1896 247 97 Laurier Liberal .55 9th 1900 245 103 Laurier Liberal .60 10th 1904 250 115 Laurier Liberal .65

Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the ﬁrst ten Canadian Parliaments. †After his death, Macdonald was successively replaced by John Caldwell Abbott, John Thompson, Mackenzie Bowell, and Charles Tupper.

Overall, the legislative voting data contains 1336 divisions. In order to identify the possible presence of religious conﬂicts in the House of Commons, we also coded the religion

12Rule 84 in the 1868 version of the “Rules, orders and forms of proceeding of the House of Commons of Canada adopted by the House, in the ﬁrst session of the ﬁrst Parliament.”

14 (Catholic, Protestant and other) and language (French or English) of each MP by consulting the online versions of the 1851, 1871, 1881 and 1891 Canadian censuses, the Dictionary of Canadian Biography online, and the Canadian Parliamentary Companion.13 In this study, we assume that religion is a fundamental aspect of a member’s ideology which is independent of party. Of course, we cannot determine the intensity of individual religious beliefs. However, given the significance of religion in the daily lives of MPs during 19th century Canadian politics, we can easily assume that faith influenced legislative behaviour on certain votes. Indeed, the Catholic and Protestant churches were very active in politics during the Victorian era, especially on issues related to education and language rights. It was not uncommon at the time for clergymen to preach politics from the pulpit, and for the more established faiths to attempt to directly influence the legislative behaviour of elected MPs.14

Analysis

Figure 2 shows the development of party unity for diﬀerent types of recorded divisions, as captured by the Rice index (Rice, 1925). The Rice index is obtained by taking the average of the absolute value of the diﬀerence between the percentage of Ays and Nays in all the votes for a given party in a legislative term. We report the score for each major party but also for the Cabinet (i.e. the percentage of Cabinet member voting together).15 The plots in Figure 2 demonstrate that voting unity increased over time. It is also much higher for

13Every possible effort was used to match MPs with their publicly released census records. The religious affiliation of Canadian citizens is recorded in the census (as well as district, adress, name, gender, age, country of birth, origin, occupation, and marital status). Because the census is organized by households, the names of spouses, parents, siblings, and children, were sometime used to cross-validate religious affiliation. In some cases, biographical information, obituaries, or school affiliation were used to cross-reference the religion of MPs. Overall, we were able to confirm the religion of .98 of all MPs. 14For example, several protestant MPs resigned over the handling of the Manitoba school question by the Conservative party, while several Conservative MPs from Quebec resigned over the handling of the Northwest Rebellion (Beck, 1968). 15We recognize the limit of this measure. For example, Desposato (2005) demonstrates that such scores may inflate the loyalty for smaller parties. However, both the Liberal and Conservative parties elect an important number of MPs and we care mainly about the increase of unity over time. Furthermore, the unweighted Rice-score has clear substantive interpretation. We also acknowledge that such scores do not reflect the underlying ideological cohesiveness of a party, as they are a function of the issues that are voted on, and the recording of individual voting decisions on those votes (Hug, 2010).

15 the Cabinet, followed by government votes, then by non-government public motions or bills (what we label opposition votes), and finally by private bills. Note that at the time, private bills included such issues as divorce and proposals to incorporate businesses. Since Westminster style parliamentary systems provide the most incentives for members to be loyal when they are forming the government, we find that unity is much higher if a party won a majority of the seats. Notice, for example, that the voting unity of the Conservative Party declines when they are in the opposition for the first time in the 3rd Parliament.

Rice Index, All Rice Index, Government 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6 Index Index 0.4 0.4

0.2 Cabinet 0.2 Cabinet Conservative Conservative Liberal Liberal 0.0 0.0

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Parliaments Parliaments 1st-10th (1867-1908) 1st-10th (1867-1908)

Rice Index, Opposition Rice Index, Private 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6 Index Index 0.4 0.4

0.2 Cabinet 0.2 Cabinet Conservative Conservative Liberal Liberal 0.0 0.0

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Parliaments Parliaments 1st-10th (1867-1908) 1st-10th (1867-1908)

Figure 2: The points in the plots report Rice index in each parliament for the Cabinet, the Conservative and Liberal Parties by type of divisions. The divisions can either be related to government business, opposition motions (which include all public bills and motions), or private bills. The lines are Loess curves following the trend of the data.

While being in the majority seems to improve the level of cohesiveness for the ﬁrst Liberal

16 government in the 3rd Parliament, it cannot be the whole story because party unity continues to increase after this term. At the end of the period, we note that both parties are able to present a cohesive force in the vast majority of the votes. Our goal in the remaining of this analysis is to explain how they reached this point.

Individual Level Analysis

In this section, we analyse the individual determinants of partisan loyalty. Table 2 shows the results of a series of Tobit regressions in each parliament where the dependent variable measures individual loyalty towards the Cabinet. In this analysis, we use two-limit Tobit regression models because our measure of loyalty is censored outside of the 0 to 1 boundaries (Long, 1997).16 Since party lines were often blurred in the post-Confederation House, the dependent variable indicates the proportion of time an individual MP voted with the majority of the Cabinet in a given parliament and measures government support. Because we are primarily interested in establishing whether electoral pressures has any influence on legislative behaviour, the main independent variable of interest in this model is the percentage of vote an MP received in an election.17 Electoral support is also interacted with a dummy variable indicating whether an MP is a member of the governing party (Liberal or Conservative, depending on the term). Finally, we add several other control variables, such as the region where the MP was elected, Cabinet position, participation in House votes, new member, and service in the colonial assemblies. In addition, the models control for the day of the election in the first three parliaments as well (when elections were held at different dates).18

16Saltzman (1987) employs this model to study rates of support for pro-labor legislation. 17MPs elected by acclamation were removed from the analysis. The results do not change substantively if we include these cases in the analysis. 18The coding of the variables is as follow: Electoral margin represents the percentage of vote received by the candidate. Quebec, Maritime, and the West are regional dummy variables (coded 1 or 0), where the baseline category is Ontario (we use senatorial regional divisions). Government is coded 1 if the MP was aﬃliated with the governing party in a given term, 0 otherwise. Ministry is coded 1 if an MP was in the Cabinet during a parliament, 0 otherwise. Participation in vote indicates the voter turnout rate of an MP in a given legislative term (we removed from the analysis MPs who participated in less than .10 of the votes). New member is coded 1 if the MP is elected for the ﬁrst time in the House of Commons (this variable is excluded from the 1st Parliament), 0 otherwise. Colonial is coded 1 if the MP was previously elected in a

17 Tobit models of government loyalty, 1st–10th Parliaments. 1st N=128 2nd N=143 3rd N=136 4th N=212 5th N=198 β (se) β (se) β (se) β (se) β (se) (Intercept) .550* (.140) .750* (.153) .430* (.192) .120 (.163) .089 (.064) Electoral margin -.082 (.197) -.341 (.248) .085 (.338) .151 (.318) .396* (.164) Days -.008* (.002) -.001 (.002) .003 (.004) – – – – Participation in votes .139* (.077) -.161* (.100) -.121 (.071) .004 (.057) -.136* (.055) Ministry .147* (.043) .082 (.052) .179* (.044) .061* (.028) .072 (.028) Colonial .023 (.024) -.115* (.038) -.041 (.044) -.016 (.022) -.015 (.021) 1st term – – -.082* (.031) .008 (.041) .008 (.024) .024 (.018) Government .493* (.133) .377* (.176) 333* (.187) .794* (.157) .876* (.078) Government × margins -.027 (.214) .252 (.308) .184 (.329) -.231 (.315) -.397* (.173) Maritime .217* (.045) .217 (.062) .046 (.044) .023 (.026) .029 (.023) Quebec -.038 (.021) -.117 (.030) -.143* (.040) .028 (.024) -.008 (.023) West – – .459 (.093) -.162 (.141) .279 (.100) .022 (.030) Log(scale) -2.126* (.092) -1.804* (.092) -1.736* (.096) -1.935* (.129) -2.177* (.146) th th th th th 18 6 N=219 7 N=203 8 N=213 9 N=227 10 N=222 β (se) β (se) β (se) β (se) β (se) (Intercept) .236* (.089) .334* (.193) .036 (.098) .175 (.099) -.023 (.161) Electoral margin .032 (.170) -.307 (.357) .286 (.196) .177 (.181) .284 (.271) Participation in votes -.016 (.060) -.056 (.045) .091 (.069) -.137* (.050) .002 (.062) Ministry .090* (.028) .027 (.024) .028 (.035) -.007 (.026) .048 (.068) Colonial -.005 (.039) .087 (.077) .169* (.138) -.058 (.024) .043 (.079) 1st term .020 (.023) -.008 (.021) .033 (.023) -.043* (.022) -.001 (.026) Government .651* (.099) .741* (.190) .792* (.099) .906* (.106) 1.023* (.166) Government × margins -.082 (.182) .146 (.354) -.229 (.209) -.137 (.218) -.232 (.328) Maritime .020 (.026) -.002 (.021) .018 (.034) .018 (.019) .001 (.026) Quebec .011 (.030) .069* (.032) .002 (.020) .016 (.033) .161* (.058) West .024 (.017) .026 (.027) -.108* (.043) .033 (.043) -.004 (.025) Log(scale) -1.935* (.136) -1.929* (.195) -1.916* (.102) -2.012* (.191) -1.860* (.181)

Table 2: The table analyzes the determinants of individual level loyalty scores toward the Cabinet. The reference category is members of the opposition. The model is a Tobit regression with censoring at 0 and 1. The standard errors are robust to heteroskedaticity. * indicates z-value > 1.96. The results of table 2 highlight the fact that electoral pressure has no significant effect on the probability of voting with the government. The most consistent finding is that members of the governing party are more likely to be loyal to the Cabinet. Ministers also tend to be more loyal, but this effect declines over time as the influence of parties increases. The only evidence we find that election results influence partisan loyalty is in the 5th Parliament. In this term, both the percentage of vote and the interactive variable (vote × government) are significant (z > 1.96). Although the sign of the interactive variable is negative, the cumulative effect of electoral pressure remains positive for government members (i.e., percentage of vote + government + percentage of vote × government). Therefore in the 5th Parliament, higher vote margins imply higher levels of support toward the Cabinet, but more so for members of the majority. This finding is explained by the results of the election, which was really divisive in terms of national unity, mainly because of the decision to hang Louis Riel. If we control for the religious affiliation of MPs in the model, we find that the relationship between voting and partisan loyalty disappears. The results also show that there is no difference in loyalty between newly elected and incumbent members. Therefore, we find no evidence that the increase in partisan loyalty is explained by the gradual replacement of “loose fish” members. The same is true when we consider the expansion of the voting franchise in the 8th Parliament; we fail to confirm that electoral pressure influences legislative behaviour after this term. We also note that members who previously served in colonial assemblies—and thus could rely more on their local standings to get elected (Tavits, 2009)—were more likely to oppose the government. Finally, the effect of the timing of the election is only confirmed in the 1th Parliament (the number of days between the first election and the election of an MP). In this term, MPs elected at a later date were less likely to support the Conservative government. Overall, the regression analysis fails to show that electoral pressure systematically influences legislative voting. This finding holds for all but one of the ten parliaments under study. colonial assembly, 0 otherwise. Finally, we add the variable Days which reports the timing of the election for an MP in the first three parliaments (i.e., number of days in which the election was conducted after the first poll). This variable ranges from 0 to 83 days.

19 These results are in sharp contrast with the conclusion of Cox (1987), who found that the expansion of the voting franchise was one of the primary explanation for the development of party unity in Victorian England. Although Cox’s expectation is that MPs elected in highly partisan districts are more likely to be pressured to support their party in the legislature, we must also consider the possibility that electoral security provides some incumbents with a greater level of independence from their caucus and that partisan disloyalty might be rewarded by voters in certain constituencies. Unfortunately, we cannot directly test this two-effect hypothesis because we do not have an independent measure of district partisanship in our dataset (i.e., the proxy for district partisanship is election results which are determined by other factors as well). However, the fact that we do not find any significant influence of voting on party loyalty in the 1st Parliament confirms, at least for this term, that electoral safety does not influence legislative behaviour. Since all of the MPs in this parliament were elected for the first time, their non- existing voting records in the House of Commons could in no way have influenced the results of the election.19 For a majority of candidates in 1867, district partisanship was defined in terms of support or opposition toward Confederation. Since we find that Conservative members who won by a wide margin were not more likely to support Macdonald in the 1th Parliament, we can conclude that electoral pressure did not affect party loyalty in this term.

Party Level Analysis

In this section, we analyze the spatial model of legislative voting in each parliament. In order to determine the nature of cross-cutting issues in the legislature, we obtain the locations of all legislators using a binary discrete choice model. We use Poole (2005, 2000) standard Optimal Classification (OC) model to calculate the fixed locations of all MPs from the voting data to maximize the proportion of correctly classified votes in a given legislative term.20 The interested reader should consult Poole (2005) for a detailed account of the Optimal Classification

19It is possible that candidates who served in the colonial assemblies could enjoy an advantage. This explains why we control for prior legislative service in the model. 20We use Poole’s OC package in R (Poole, Lewis, Lo and Carroll, 2009).

20 methodology and Godbout and Høyland (2011) for an application in the Canadian House of Commons.21 We have chosen Optimal Classification because the model is non-parametric and no ex- plicit utility function is specified (beyond the assumption of single-peakness). Indeed, whip- ping and party line votes violate some of the more fundamental assumptions of the spatial theory of legislative voting (Rosenthal and Voeten, 2004). Therefore, in the context of the British Parliament (Spirling and McLean, 2007, 2006) and the Canadian House of Commons (Godbout and Høyland, 2011), one cannot be certain that the location of standard scaling techniques are related to the ideological orientation of MPs as in the U.S. Congress. Per- haps in the first few parliaments, when party unity was much weaker, one could interpret the first dimension as a representation of the left-right ideological continuum. However, the division between members may not have been necessarily related to economic redistribu- tion. Rather, the ideological conflict after Confederation in Canada was between toryism and radical-liberalism, and over protective tariffs and free trade. Given that party unity dramatically increases in the 4th Parliament, we do not assume that the coordinates on the first dimension represent the ideological orientation of MPs on these issues. Rather, like Hix and Noury (2011) and Rosenthal and Voeten (2004), we expect the first dimension of legislative voting to account for the level of support toward the governing party.22 The presence of a strong second dimension of legislative voting in earlier Canadian parliaments is a little more difficult to interpret. Indeed, the absence of a multi-party system (i.e., the Anti-Confederate party collapsed by the end of the first term) presupposes at least some level of intra-party divisions for votes to break party lines. As we explained above, we expect

21We have pre-processed the data to exclude lop-sided votes (i.e., in which all but five MPs vote similarly on a motion). Legislators who participated in fewer than 25 votes were also dropped from the data since their estimates were associated with a large degree of uncertainty. To ensure identification, the locations of two legislators were fixed. The leader of the government (e.g., Macdonald or MacKenzie) was fixed as polarity on the first dimension, and the leader of the French Canadian opposition (e.g., Dorion or Laurier) was fixed as polarity on the second dimension. 22This is explained by the fact that the Cabinet has to maintain the confidence of a majority of the legislature in a parliamentary system, and that opposition parties are more likely to vote against the government regardless of whether they support the Cabinet or not. Hence, legislators who always support (oppose) the governing party will be located at one of the extremes, while those who sometime vote with the government will be located near the middle. The gap between both groups should widen as party unity increases.

21 that colonial attachment and religious/language identifications will have a strong influence on the behaviour of elected members and offer some incentives for legislators to defect and support what they assume is in the best interests of their constituents. Thus, we can think that MPs from the same province (e.g., a coalition Liberals and Conservatives from Quebec) or who share the same religion (e.g., Conservative and Liberal Catholics) could form alliances on certain votes. On the other hand, the opposition toward Confederation and the union of the colonies is so intertwined with the Conservative party during this period that we suspect this legislative conflict will be associated with the first dimension (and thus linked with the main division between parties).

Classiﬁcation Percentages and Percentage Reduction in Errors, 1st–10th Parliaments.

PCC APRE PCC APRE PCC APRE >.20 Parliament 1 dim 1 dim 2 dims 2 dims diff diff diff Gov

1st .878 .597 .907 .719 .029 .122 .223 .829 2nd .934 .835 .988 .971 .054 .136 .220 .182 3rd .911 .723 .951 .849 .040 .126 .225 .419 4th .953 .841 .968 .895 .015 .054 .112 .118 5th .948 .847 .966 .899 .018 .052 .077 .059 6th .931 .815 .962 .897 .031 .082 .135 .111 7th .970 .917 .987 .964 .017 .047 .086 .091 8th .962 .879 .982 .944 .020 .065 .134 .571 9th .985 .955 .991 .973 .006 .018 .039 .000 10th .987 .897 .995 .972 .006 .075 .096 .909

Table 3: Fit statistics: PCC = percentage correctly predicted, APRE = average proportion reduction in error, >.20 the proportion of votes where : APRE 2 dim − APRE 1 dims >.20, Gov = Proportion of government sponsor votes in the >.20 category.

In order to determine the importance of the dimensions of voting in the Canadian Par- liament, table 3 compares the model fit of the Optimal Classification algorithm for a one and a two-dimensional model. The main finding of this analysis is that the relevance of the first dimension increases over time. In the first term, the one-dimensional model predicts .88 of all voting decisions correctly, while the two-dimensional model improves the proportion

22 of correctly classified decisions by .03, to .91. By the 5th term, the one-dimensional model correctly predicts .95 of all individual voting decisions while a two-dimensional model improves the classification by .02, to .97. Finally, in the last Parliament, the one-dimensional model correctly predicts .99 of all the votes while the two-dimensional model predicts .995, an almost perfect fit. This last result confirms that a single dimension is now sufficient to account for virtually all legislative votes.23 Figures C1–C6 of Appendix C illustrate how the different parties are organized spatially in two-dimensional models of legislative voting. The dots in these plots show the two-dimension coordinates of legislators obtained with the Optimal Classification algorithm. Each parliament is represented in three distinct groups of figures that identify legislators by their party affiliation (Conservative, Liberal, or other), region of constituency (Maritime, Quebec, On- tario, West), and religion (Protestant, English-Catholic, and French-Catholic). The spatial models clearly demonstrate that the Parliament of Canada is organized along two polls: the first dimension clusters parties into coherent groups, while the second dimension appears to separate members from the same party into different regional coalitions, at least in earlier years. Later, the second dimension seems to have polarized Catholic and Protestant MPs the most, especially around the 6th Parliament. However, in order to verify that the subject of second dimension votes are related to local or religious interests and to get a better sense of the issues being debated in the Commons, the next section analyzes the content of all the bills and motions that split the parties internally during this period.

Content Analysis

In this last section of the analysis, we report the content of the issues that divide both parties internally by identifying all of the recorded votes in which the diﬀerence in the aggregate proportional reduction in error (APRE) between the second and the ﬁrst dimension of voting is greater than .20. This is the procedure suggested by Poole and Rosenthal (2007) to

23We also report the Aggregated Proportion Reduction in Error, which indicates how much the OC algorithm compares to a benchmark model (in this case the smallest number of Ayes or Nays for each vote). This measure is 1 if there is no classiﬁcation error in the model, 0 if the number of spatial model error equals the value of the smallest number of Ayes or Nays. For a discussion see Poole and Rosenthal (2007, p.36).

23 recognize second dimension votes in the U.S. Congress.24 Our data shows a total of 203 votes that meet this criteria (or roughly .15 of all votes). We identified three main topics related to the second dimension: religion; economy; and democratic reform. Appendix D provides a summary for each of these votes.25 We also report in the eight column of the previous table (table 3) the APRE contribution to the second dimension of voting in each parliament. Not surprisingly, the results show that the proportion of second dimension votes in the House of Commons declines over time (>.20 diff). However, before analyzing the content of the second dimension votes in greater detail, we offer a brief description of the issues most likely to divide MPs on the first dimension of voting. About .49 (655 votes) of all the recorded divisions fall in this category (i.e., the APRE difference is 0). In terms of content, .38 of these votes are related to budgetary resolutions. We also find several divisions on public works and railway development (.13), which were at the time official economic government policies. Another .23 of the votes are related to miscellaneous bills introduced by the Cabinet. In fact, more than .75 of all of the first dimension votes are directly related to motions introduced by the government, whereas the majority of the remaining votes relate to amendments made by the opposition over the budget. Therefore, we can conclude that most of the first dimension votes correspond to issues associated with government policies that opposed both major parties. Looking now at the content of the second dimension, we find that about .40 of the votes are associated with religious issues, such as marriage and divorce, schooling, language, temperance, and the Northwest rebellion.26 In the years following Confederation, divorce bills were considered free votes (or votes of conscience), and all Catholics were generally opposed to this practice (e.g., H01S1V29). Other issues, like the incorporation of the Orange associ-

24The higher the value of the APRE, the better the classification fit of the spatial model; hence a large difference between the first and second dimension fit implies that the introduction of a second dimension significantly improves on the voting predictions of MPs. 25The table shows the title of the bill or motion debated, the type of issue, the original sponsor, and the question being voted on (amendment, motion, etc.). 26At the time, both the upper and lower houses had to support a private bill to end a specific marriage because no federal divorce law existed. Divorce is considered a federal legislative power in the Constitution, mainly to protect the rights of the English Protestant minority of Quebec (Leckey, 2006). The Fathers of the Confederation knew that granting divorces in the mostly Catholic province would have been very unlikely, and this explains why it remains a federal power today.

24 ation of British America, caused a similar uproar between Catholic MPs (H05S1V05). Not surprisingly, the prohibition of Catholic and French language education in several provinces outside of Quebec represents another divisive set of issues (e.g., H06S4V06). In these votes, Catholic MPs from both parties banded together to support their church. An additional example of a religious vote relates to the expulsion of Louis Riel from the House in the 3rd Parliament because of his role in the Northwest rebellion (H03S1V02).27 We also find that .47 of the second dimension votes concern specific local issues (such as payments to provinces, the admission of new provinces or territories, farming, railways and telegraphs, local industries, amendments to duties and tariffs, constitution or federalism, and banking or bankruptcies). Cox (1987, p. 56) explain that in the Westminster system “[i]t has long been accepted that part of the job of the MP was to promote and protect the local economic interest of his constituents”. Hence, whenever the government supported a more aggressive tariff on staples like corn (H01S1V51), or tobacco (H01S1V53), or transferred payments to a specific province (H01S4V53), the economic interests of different constituencies represented by the same party could have been in direct conflict. Railways were another local issue that could potentially split both major parties internally. The selection of specific routes (e.g., H03S2V25), or the location of railway stations (e.g., H04S3V40), once again, may have weakened unity when the choices were between two constituencies with representatives from the same party. Banking and bankruptcy is another frequent category of second dimension votes, mainly because it opposed the financial sectors of Montreal, Toronto, and Halifax (Easterbrook and Aitken, 1988). As we indicated earlier, one of the first task of the federal government was to create a common banking and currency system (e.g., H01S4V11). Therefore, most of the conflict over economic issues occurred in the first years after Confed- eration, until it was finally resolved by the 4th Parliament when an agreement was reached over the establishment of a federal financial system.

27A ﬁerce defender of the rights of French speaking Catholics, who were mostly Metis (people of mixed European and Aboriginal blood), Riel and his supporters were opposed to the colonization of Rupert’s land (i.e., formally part of Manitoba) by English speaking settlers. Although Riel was successfully elected to the federal Parliament in 1873 and again in 1874, he was expelled from the House following a motion introduced by Mackenzie Bowell, a grandmaster of the Orange order of Canada in the 3rd Parliament for his participation in the Red River rebellion.

25 The last category of vote is democratic reform: modifying the Senate, the suffrage, the justice system, the procedures of the House, and civil servant salaries. This group of divisions corresponds to .11 of second dimension votes. Democratic reforms always had the potential to divide the Conservatives because the party was formed after a merger between Tories and moderate reformists prior to Confederation. Several reform bills were introduced in the House of Commons over the years, most notably to abolish dual representation in provincial and federal legislatures (e.g., H01S4V42), to make the Senate elective (H03S2V06), to create the Supreme court of Canada (H03S2V30), and to amend the criminal code (H08S4V06). Once again, the interest of same party members had the potential to be in direct opposition when certain party members had dual representation and other did not. The same is true about the salaries of MPs. Several wealthy legislators were opposed to any form of financial compensation for their service because they believed it would “corrupt” the legislature. Surprisingly, we find a striking similarity between the content of second dimension votes in the Canadian House and second dimension votes in the U.S. Congress identified by Poole and Rosenthal (2007, p.58-61). Aside from slavery, which can be compared to the religious conflict in Canada (Kornberg, 1967), we also find votes on the U.S. currency, congressional pay and benefits, tariffs, the judiciary, banking and finance, and public lands or public works. Although the interpretation of the first dimension of voting is different in Canada and the U.S., it seems that outside of race and religion, a similar set of issues divided parties internally in these two federations during the 19th century.

Discussion

Now that we have identiﬁed the content of the three main categories of votes that split the parties internally, we can focus on explaining the roots of the decline in the second dimension of voting observed in the Canadian House of Commons. To begin, because there is a reduction in the number of recorded divisions in later legislative terms, one could argue that fewer votes imply fewer opportunities for members to dissent. The problem with this argument is that the APRE contribution of the second dimension in the 2th Parliament—a term where there

26 was the lowest number of divisions—is roughly equal to what we observe in the 1st and 3rd Parliaments (when there were significantly more votes). The other potential explanation is that over time, the legislative agenda might have contained fewer divisive issues. This could potentially be explained by two factors. First, like we saw with banking, once the federal Cabinet finally adopted a legislation to regulate the financial sector, a status quo point was introduced in the Commons, and subsequent governments did not have to act on this potentially divisive issue. The second factor relates to negative agenda control (Cox and McCubbins, 1993, 2005). In this case, the government could have eventually gained sufficient power to keep the same type of divisive issues from the legislative agenda altogether. This last explanation is not totally in line with our results. If we look at the last column of table 3, we see that the proportion of second dimension votes identified by the APRE classification related only to government motions or bills (as opposed to private members bills) declines over time. However, this trend is not monotonic. In several terms (e.g., 1st, 3rd, 8th and 10th) the proportion of government votes explained by the second dimension actually increases. It was above .90 in the last parliament.28 The previous number does not totally fit with the negative agenda control story. If it did, we would have found a notable reduction in government votes on the second dimension (Crespin, Rohde and Vander Wielen, 2011). Perhaps the last piece of the puzzle has to do with parties and religion. This explanation ties in with the ideological sorting argument presented above. Religion is probably the best indicator of the broad ideological positioning of legislators available to us from this period. Unlike in the U.S. case, we cannot conceptualize a member’s ideology directly with a measure of legislative behaviour, such as DW-NOMINATE scores (e.g., Poole and Rosenthal, 2007), since we know that party pressure influences voting in Westminster systems (Spirling and McLean, 2007). However, we can use religion as an independent measure of ideology to determine whether Catholics or Protestants sorted out into specific party groups over time.

28The main issues was over the Lord Day’s Act and the establishment of the province of Alberta.

27 Figure 3 shows the proportion of all Catholic and Protestant MPs elected in the House of Commons for both parties in each legislative term. The plot on the left demonstrates the gradual decline in the number of Catholics MPs in the Conservative Party, whereas, the plot on the right shows that more than .90 of Catholic MPs were elected under the Liberal banner at the end of the period. Although there is a majority of Protestant MPs in both parties, almost all Catholics are Liberals by the 1900s. This concentration of French speaking MPs in the Liberal party basically remained unchanged for the next ninety years.

Proportion of Catholics in Liberal and Conservative Parties Proportion of all Catholic/Protestant in the Liberal Party

Conservative Catholic Liberal Catholic 1.0 1.0 Liberal Catholic Liberal Protestant 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6 Percentage Percentage 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Parliaments Parliaments 1st-10th (1867-1908) 1st-10th (1867-1908)

Figure 3: The plots show the proportion of Catholics in the Liberal and Conservative parties (left) and the proportion of Catholics and Protestants (as a proportion of all MPs) that are members of the Liberal party (right).

It is possible then that as the proportion of Liberal Catholic MPs increased, the likelihood that religion could be used to divide this party internally declined. Once Catholics made up almost half of the Liberal caucus, the leadership had a strong incentive to avoid votes on religious issues. A case in point: we only ﬁnd one divorce vote after Laurier became Prime Minister (H10S1V05). This recorded division is not associated with the second dimension of voting because all Catholic Liberal MPs from Quebec (including the Prime minister) simply abstained from voting. In fact, the most divisive parliament in terms of religious conﬂict (the 6th Parliament, see Figure C6 in the Appendix) shows that both parties had the same

28 proportion of Catholic and Protestant members.29 This ﬁnal result highlights the importance of religion as an indicator of a member’s ideology. By using an MP’s religious aﬃliation, we have been able to identify an independent measure of ideology in the post-Confederation House of Commons and found that Catholics sorted gradually toward the Liberal party. We also found, by using the spatial model of legislative voting, that religious issues, like language and education, were most likely to be associated with the second dimension of voting and split both major parties internally. However, once Catholic members migrated toward the Liberal party, we saw in table 3 that the importance of the second dimension of voting declined while party unity increased.

Conclusion

This study presented the first systematic analysis of legislative voting in the Canadian House of Commons in the years following Confederation. Our primary goal was to identify the sources of the dramatic increase in party unity found in this legislature. From the literature on legislative organization, we identified three potential factors that could explain this trend: partisan sorting, electoral pressure, and negative agenda control. We began by demonstrating that electoral pressure does not have a strong influence on party loyalty in earlier Canadian parliaments. We analyzed the determinants of Cabinet support and did not find that election results and the introduction of the secret ballot and same day election in 1878 had any significant impact on legislative voting. We did find confirmation that members elected at later dates were less likely to support the government, but this was only the case in the 1st Parliament, when party lines were not clearly defined at the time of the election. In the second part of the analysis, we focused on the agenda control and party level explanations to account for the increase in partisan unity over time. Using spatial models of legislative voting, we saw that the post-Confederation House of Commons

29In another set of analysis, we also ﬁnd that the average Rice index on all of the second dimension votes in the 10th Parliament was 95% for the Liberals and 69% for the Conservatives. It would appear that in this context at least, the cabinet was able to maintain unity by using the agenda to divide the few remaining Catholic members in the opposition.

29 was organized along a two-dimensional space, where the first dimension represented the level of support toward the government and the second dimension was related to issues that divided parties internally. Our analysis showed the declining importance of this second dimension over time, especially after Wilfrid Laurier became Prime minister in the 8th Parliament. When we considered the topics related to the second dimension of voting in a content analysis of the recorded divisions, we found that certain issues like religion, regional interests and democratic reforms were most likely to split the parties internally. The analysis also demonstrated that the level of regional conflict in the House of Commons remained an important predictor of legislative behaviour, at least in the first three parliaments. Once Canada adopted a unified banking system, completed the transcontinental railway, and sorted out the question of bankruptcy, the amount of controversial issues on the government’s agenda was greatly reduced. We did find that religious and language were more likely to divide parties internally over a longer period of time. However, once most Catholic MPs were elected under the Liberal banner at the turn of the century, both issues stopped being relevant to explain second dimension votes. Finally, our study offered some mixed evidence to support the negative agenda control thesis of Cox and McCubbins (2005, 1993). We did find that the number of government sponsored motions and bills explained by the second dimension of voting declined abruptly in earlier parliament (this is in line with the previous argument on regional economic conflicts). However, we saw that in later legislative terms, the proportion of controversial issues introduced by the government increased again, most notably in the 10th Parliament. This is not really surprising since the time allocated for government business in a legislative session also increased during this period. What is more important to note is that the number of controversial issues with the potential to split the governing party internally declined abruptly. This is what we observed in the last parliament controlled by the Liberals. Overall, our study highlights an interesting finding. The franchise and elections does not appear to be strongly related to changes in legislative behaviour (Cox, 1987). Agenda control is not the whole story either (Cox and McCubbins, 2005, 1993). Perhaps it is easier for the

30 executive to control the agenda when governing party members have homogenous preferences. This conjecture is in line with the conditional party government thesis of Aldrich and Rhode (2005). Since Catholic MPs were increasingly elected under the Liberal banner around the turn of the century, members of this party were more likely to share common religious values. Therefore, the Liberal majority may have been “more willing to create strong powers for leaders and to support the exercise of those powers in specific instances (Aldrich and Rhode, 2005, p.10).” This explains why an important number of modifications to the rules of the House of Commons occurred in the 10th and 11th Parliaments when the Liberals controlled the government. These new rules strengthen the agenda power of the Cabinet, notably by formally increasing the proportion of government business in the agenda and by curtailing debates prior to the adoption of a bill. Our study has hopefully highlighted the origins of the influence of religion in the Canadian Parliament. The overall number of Catholics in Canada (including Quebec) fluctuated around .40 from 1870 to 1960. In the census of 1871, .17 of all households in Ontario were Catholic. In 1881, this group made up about .12 of the total population of Ontario, and around .22 of the population of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia respectively. Macdonald saw the growing importance of this segment of the electorate. He even selected Hector Langevin (a French- Catholic) as his own successor. However, John Thompson (an English-Catholic) was chosen instead because Langevin was involved in a scandal at the time of Macdonald’s death. When Charles Tupper, the last Conservative Prime Minister of the 7th Parliament, finally decided to take remedial actions in favor of the Catholic clergy on the Manitoba school question, it was too late. Orangist and Catholic ministers had already resigned from the Cabinet over the outcome of the crisis. The importance of religion as a cross-cutting cleavage is sufficient to predict the subsequent realignment observed around the time of Laurier’s first government in the 8th Parlia- ment. After this election, the Liberals consolidated their gains in Quebec, while the Conser- vatives controlled a majority of federal seats in Ontario until the end of World War I. Our results suggest that voters gradually sorted into the two main parties on the basis of religion,

31 mainly because of the growing anti-Catholic and anti-French position of the Conservative party. The previous analysis also suggests that this realignment is an important factor for explaining the growing party unity found in the House of Commons. We conclude by highlighting the fact that several scholars have noted that the electoral success of the Liberal party in the 20th century stems in great part from the support of Catholic voters (Blais, 2005). Still, researchers have been unable to explain how and why this success has been achieved. Our analysis has hopefully provided a compelling explanation for the linkage between the Liberal party and Catholic voters.

32 References Aldrich, John H. and David W. Rhode. 2005. “The Logic of Conditional Party Government: Revisiting the Electoral Connection”. Unpublished Manuscript. Beck, J. Murray. 1968. Pendulum of Power: Canada’s Federal Elections. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada. Blais, André.2005. “Accounting for the Electoral Success of the Liberal Party in Canada Presidential address to the Canadian Political Science Association London, Ontario June 3, 2005.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 38(4):821–840. Bourinot, Sir John George. 1884. Parliamentary Procedure and Practice, with an Introduc- tory Account of the Origina an Growth of Parliamentary Institutions in the Dominion of Canada. Montreal: Gazette Printing Company. Brady, David W. and Phillip Althoff. 1974. “Party voting in the U.S. House of Representa- tives, 1890-1910: Elements of a Responsible Party System” Journal of Politics 36: 753-775. Brady, David W., Joseph Cooper and Patricia A. Hurley. 1979. “The decline of party in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1887-1968.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 4: 381-409. Cairns, Alan C. 1968. “The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921-1965.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 1(1): 55-80. Carey, John M. 2009. Legislative Voting and Accountability. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- sity Press. Carrubba, Clifford J., Matthew Gabel, Lacey Murrah, Ryan Clough, Elizabeth Montgomery and Rebecca Schambach. 2006. “Off the Record: Unrecorded Legislative Votes, Selection Bias and Roll-Call Analysis.” British Journal of Political Science 36(11):691–704. Carrubba, Clifford, Matthew Gabel and Simon Hug. 2008. “Legislative Voting Behavior, Seen and Unseen: A Theory of Roll-Call Vote Selection.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 33(4):543 – 572. Carty, R.K. 1988. Three Canadian Party Systems: An Interpretation of the Development of National Politics. In Party Democracy in Canada: The Politics of National Party Con- vention, ed. George Perlin. Prentice Hall Canada Inc. pp. 15–30. Cornell, Paul G. 1963. The Alignment of Political Groups in Canada 1841-1867. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Cox, Gary W. 1987. The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cox, Gary W. and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Berkeley: University of California Press. Cox, Gary W. and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Crespin, Michael H., David W. Rohde and Ryan J. Vander Wielen. 2011. “Measuring Vari- ations in Party Unity Voting: An Assessment of Agenda Effects.” Party Politics first published online on July 8, 2011.

33 Desposato, Scott. 2005. “Correcting for Small Group Inflation of Roll-Call Cohesion Scores.” British Journal of Political Science. 35(4): 731–744. Dewan, Torun and Arthur Spirling. 2011. “Strategic Opposition and Government Cohesion in Westminster Democracies.” American Political Science Review . 102(2): 337 - 358. Easterbrook, William Thomas and Hugh G.J. Aitken. 1988. Canadian Economic History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Eggleston, Stephen D. 1988. Party Cohesion in the Early Post-Confederation. Vancouver: Master of Arts thesis, University of British Columbia. Elections Canada. 2007 A History of the Vote in Canada. Ottawa: Chief Electoral Officer of Canada. Epstein, Leon D. 1964. “A Comparative Study of Canadian Parties.” American Politcal Science Review 58(1):46–59. Franks, C.E.S. 1987. The Parliament of Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Godbout, Jean-Francois and Bjørn Høyland. 2011. “Legislative Voting in the Canadian Parliament.” Canadian Journal of Political Science. 44(2): 367 - 388. Haas, Earns B. 1958. The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-57. Standford University Press. Hamelin, Jean. 1965. Aper¸cude la politique canadienne au XIXe siècle. Québec: Revue Culture. Hare, John E. 1973. “L’Assembléelégislative du Bas-Canada, 1792-1814, députation et polarisation politique.” Revue d’histoire de l’Amériquefran¸caise 27(3): 361–395. Hix, Simon. 2002. “Parliamentary Behavior with Two Principals: Preferences, Parties, and Voting in the European Parliament.” American Journal of Political Science 46(3): 688– 698. Hix, Simon. 2004. “Electoral Institutions and Legislative Behavior: Explaining Voting- Defection in the European Parliament.” World Politics 56(1): 194–223. Hix, Simon, Abdul Noury and Gerard Roland. 2005. “Power to the Parties: Cohesion and Competition in the European Parliament, 1979-2001.” British Journal of Political Science 35(2): 209-234. Hix, Simon and Abdul Noury. 2011. “Government-Opposition of Left-Right? The Institu- tional Determinants of Voting in Legislatures” Unpublished manuscript. Hug, Simon. 2010. “Selection Effects in Roll Call Votes.” British Journal of Political Science 40(1):225 – 235. Kam, Christopher J. 2001. “Do Ideological Preferences Explain Parliamentary Behavior: Evidence From Great Britain and Canada.” Journal of Legislative Studies 7(4):89–126. Kam, Christopher J. 2009. Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics. Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press. Kornberg, Allan. 1967. Canadian Legislative Behavior: a Study of the 25th Parliament. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Wilson.

34 Kornberg, Allan and William Mishler. 1976. Inﬂuence in Parliament: Canada. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Krehbiel, Keith. 1993. “Where’s the Party?” British Journal of Political Science 23(2): 235–266. Krehbiel, Keith. 2000. “Party Discipline and Measures of Partisanship.” American Journal of Political Science 44(2): 212–227. Long, Scott J. 1997. Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables. London: SAGE. Lebo, Matthew J., Adam J. McGlynn and Gregory Koger. 2007. “Strategic Party Govern- ment: Party Inﬂuence in Congress, 1789 - 2000.” American Journal of Political Science 51(3):464 – 481. Leckey, Robert. 2006. “Profane Matrimony.” Canadian Journal of Law and Society 21(2):1– 23. Lowell, A Lawrence. 1908. The Government Of England Volume II. New York: MacMillan Company. Lijphart, Arend. 1977 Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven: Yale University Press. Lipset, Seymour M. and Stein Rokkan. 1967. “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction.” In Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives, eds. Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan. New York: Routledge. pp. 1–64. Massicotte, Louis. 1989. “Cohesion et Dissidence a l’Assemblee Nationale Depuis 1867.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 22(3):505–521. O’Brien, Audrey and Marc Bosc. 2009. House of Commons Procedure and Practice, Second Edition. Ottawa: House of Commons. Poole, Keith. 2000. “Non-parametric Unfolding of Binary Choice Data” Political Analysis 8(3):211–237.

Poole, Keith T. 2005. Spatial Models of Parliamentary Voting. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Poole, Keith, Jeﬀrey Lewis, James Lo and Royce Carroll. 2009. OC Roll Call Analysis Software. Technical report University California Los Angeles. CRAN repository. Poole, Keith T. and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting. New York: Oxford University Press. Poole, Keith T. and Howard Rosenthal. 2007. Ideology and Congress. 2nd revised edition ed. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Reid, E. M. 1932. “The Rise of National Parties in Canada.” in Party Politics in Canada, ed. E. G. Thorburn. Scarborough: Prantice Hall. 1967. Rice, Stuart A. 1925. ‘The Behavior of Legislative Groups.” Political Science Quarterly 40(1):60–72. Rosenthal, Howard and Erik Voeten. 2004. “Analyzing Roll Calls with Perfect Spatial Voting: France 1946-1958.” American Journal of Political Science 48(3): 620 - 632.

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36 Appendix A

Canadian Federal Election Results, 1867-1904.

Parliament 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th Election 1867 1872 1874 1878 1882 1887 1891 1896 1900 1904 Conservative 100 99 65 134 133 122 117 86 79 75 Liberal 62 95 129 63 73 80 90 117 128 139 Anti-Confederate 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 National 0 0 0 1 1 3 2 0 0 0 Other 0 6 12 8 4 10 6 8 6 0 Total 180 200 206 206 211 215 215 213 213 214

Table A1: Election results. Source: Library of Parliament.

A1 Appendix B

Figure B1 provides some evidence of the increasing amount of government business on the legislative agenda by showing the distribution of recorded divisions by types of votes in the first ten parliaments. The plot does not capture all the bills and motions debated in the legislature (some of them were adopted by unanimous consent, or by unrecorded hand divisions). However, it does provide us with an idea of the distribution of votes on what were probably some of the most divisive issues of the time. The three lines in the plot report the proportion of recorded votes that were originally related to either government business, private member’s business (which include all public bills and motions introduced by non-cabinet members), and private bills (affecting individuals or specific groups). We can clearly see that the majority of recorded votes in the Commons is largely associated with the government. The overall proportion of government vote is high at first, then seems to decline gradually and later expand again at the end of the period. The gains made by the government also appear to be mostly at the expense of private member business. At the time, the recorded journals did not make a difference between opposition and private member business. Most of the motions made in this category were by the opposition party members (and their leadership). However, we also find amendments and public bills introduced by backbench MPs. This basically means that any member could present a motion or a bill on a matter of national interest (jus generale publicum) (O’Brien & Bosc, 2009). As with the British Parliamentary procedures, these public bills introduced by backbench members could not raise taxes, or spend public money. However without an analysis of the actual content of these votes, it is impossible to determine whether the capacity of the government to control the agenda has actually warded off potential divisive issues from the agenda.

Question of Origin, Sponsor

Government 1.0 Private Member Private Bill 0.8 0.6 Index 0.4 0.2 0.0

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Parliaments 1st-10th (1867-1908)

Figure B1: The points in the plot report the proportion of recorded votes in each parliament related to government business, private member’s business (which include all public bills and motions), or private bills for individuals or groups. The Lines are loess curves following the trend of the data.

B 1 Appendix C

The plots show over time a division between the opposing Liberal and Conservative parties. How- ever, we do find some cross-pressured legislators, as well as an important number of Liberal MPs who voted with the Conservative government (i.e., the opposite is not true) in earlier legislative terms. In the first three parliaments, almost all of the dissenting Liberals were either from British Columbia or Manitoba: these MPs were elected in the two new provinces and opted to side with the governing party and support the federally funded transcontinental railway (Hamelin, 1965). How- ever, these “moderate” government supporters appear to have sorted out between the two major parties over time. As we get closer to the end of the period, most of these ministerial MPs have disappeared from the House, and this fact is reflected by the results found in table 3 of the main text. We do find that regional conflict plays an important role in the organization of the House in the 1st Parliament. In this legislative term, MPs from the Maritime provinces and Quebec are clustered together at the top of the spatial model. This is not surprising if we consider that Nova Scotia and New Brunswick sent a delegation strongly opposed to Confederation following the first election. However, the regional distribution of MPs rapidly loses a significant cohesive pattern after this term. The only clear exception is with Quebec MPs who remain mostly clustered in the positive range of the second dimension of voting, at least until the 9th Parliament. Hence, the second dimension does not appear to be wholly regional in nature A third group of plots demonstrate that it is rather the religion of the MPs that divide parties internally. The fact that most Catholics are representing the predominantly French province of Quebec explains why so many of these MPs are polarized on the second dimension. However, we also find an important number of English Catholics near the top of the plots as well. The opposition between Catholics and Protestants is especially important in the 5th and 6th Parliaments, which saw an increase of confessional division after the relative hiatus of the 4th Parliament when the Conser- vative party returned to power. Indeed, the spatial plot for this parliament shows that MPs from Quebec were not polarized on the second dimension. The legislative focus of this legislative term was primarily on the national economic policy. In this term, 72% of Quebec MPs were Conservative and thus supported the government—as opposed to 46% in the 3rd Parliament (numbers from Beck (1968, 35-45)). Finally, the spatial analysis shows that virtually all Quebec and Catholic MPs were elected under the Liberal banner in the last two parliaments. Indeed, by the 9th legislative term, there is no more evidence of internal division within the Conservative and Liberal parties. Once again, these results are confirmed by the findings presented in table 4 of the main text, which show the very small contribution of the second dimension in the model.

C1 Partisan Division, 1-5 Parliaments

1st Canadian Parliament 2nd Canadian Parliament 1.0 1.0

●● ● ● ● ● ● ● 0.5 ● 0.5 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ●●●● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ●● ● ● ●●●● ● ●● ●●●● ●● ●

0.0 ● ● ● 0.0 ● ●●●●●●● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ●●● ● ●●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ●●● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Intra−Party Division Intra−Party Division Intra−Party ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● −0.5 −0.5

Liberal Liberal ● Conservative ● Conservative Anti−Confederate Third Party ● Independent ● Independent −1.0 −1.0

−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0

Cabinet Support Cabinet Support

3rd Canadian Parliament 4th Canadian Parliament 1.0 1.0

● ● ● ● ●● 0.5 0.5 ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ●●●●●● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ●●● ● ●● ● ●● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ●●●●●● ● ● ●●● ● 0.0 0.0 ● ●● ● ● ●●● ● ●● ● ●● ● ●● ●●● ● ● ● ● ●●●● ●● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ●● ● ● ●●● ● ● ● ● ●● Intra−Party Division Intra−Party Division Intra−Party ● ●● ● ● ● ●●● ● ● ● ● ● ●●●● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ●●● ● ● ● −0.5 ● ● −0.5 ● ● ● ● ● Liberal Liberal ● ● Conservative ● Conservative Third Party Third Party ● Independent ● Independent −1.0 −1.0

−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0

Cabinet Support Cabinet Support

5th Canadian Parliament

1.0 ●

● ●● ● ● ●● ● ● ●

0.5 ● ● ● ●●● ● ● ●● ●● ●● ●● ● ● ● ●●●● ●● ● ●●●●●● ●● ●●●● ●●● ● ● ●●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●●● 0.0 ●● ● ●●● ●●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●●● ●● ●● ●● ● ●●● ●●●●

Intra−Party Division Intra−Party ● ● ● ●● ●●● ● ●●●●●● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● −0.5

● ● Liberal ● Conservative Third Party ● Independent −1.0

−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0

Cabinet Support

Figure C1: The plots are based on optimal classiﬁcation scores. The location of the legislators indicate their optimal location given their voting behavior on all votes from the 1st Parliament to the 5th Parliament. C2 Partisan Division, 6-10 Parliaments

6th Canadian Parliament 7th Canadian Parliament 1.0 1.0

●

● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 0.5 0.5 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ●● ●●● ● ●●●● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ●●●● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ●● ●●● ●● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●●●●●●●●●●●●●●● ●● ● ● ●● ● ●●● ●●●●●●● 0.0 ●●● ● ● 0.0 ● ● ●● ● ● ● ●●● ● ● ● ●●●●●●●● ● ● ● ●● ●● ●● ●● ● ● ● ●● ● ●●●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

Intra−Party Division Intra−Party ● Division Intra−Party ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

−0.5 ● −0.5 ● ●● ● ●● Liberal Liberal ● Conservative ● Conservative Third Party Third Party ● Independent ● Independent −1.0 −1.0

−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0

Cabinet Support Cabinet Support

8th Canadian Parliament 9th Canadian Parliament 1.0 1.0

●

● 0.5 0.5 ●

● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●●●●●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ●●●● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ●● ●●●● ●●● ● ● ● ● ●●●●● ●● ● 0.0 ● 0.0 ●●●●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ●● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Intra−Party Division Intra−Party Division Intra−Party

● ● −0.5 −0.5

Liberal Liberal ● Conservative ● Conservative Third Party Third Party ● Independent ● Independent −1.0 −1.0

−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0

Cabinet Support Cabinet Support

10th Canadian Parliament 1.0 0.5

●

● ● ● ●● ● ● ●● ● ●●●●● ● ● ● ●●●●●● ● ●

0.0 ● ●● ● ●●

●

Intra−Party Division Intra−Party ●

● −0.5

● ● Liberal ● Conservative Third Party ● Independent −1.0

−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0

Cabinet Support

Figure C2: The plots are based on optimal classiﬁcation scores. The location of the legislators indicate their optimal location given their voting behavior on all votes from the 6th Parliament to the 10th Parliament. C3 Regional Division, 1-5 Parliaments

1st Canadian Parliament 2nd Canadian Parliament 1.0 1.0

●●

● ● ● ● 0.5 0.5 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ●●●●●●●● ● ● ● ● ●●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ●● ●●●● ● ● ● ●●● ● ● ●●●● ● ● 0.0 ● ● 0.0 ●● ● ● ● ●●● ● ● ● ● ● Intra−Party Division Intra−Party Division Intra−Party −0.5 −0.5

● Quebec ● Quebec Ontario Ontario Maritime Maritime West West −1.0 −1.0

−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0

Cabinet Support Cabinet Support

3rd Canadian Parliament 4th Canadian Parliament 1.0 1.0

●

● ●

● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 0.5 0.5 ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ●●●●● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ●●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●●● ● ●

0.0 ●● 0.0 ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ●●●● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Intra−Party Division Intra−Party Division Intra−Party ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ●

−0.5 −0.5 ●

● Quebec ● Quebec Ontario Ontario Maritime Maritime West West −1.0 −1.0

−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0

Cabinet Support Cabinet Support

5th Canadian Parliament

1.0 ●

● ●● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ●

0.5 ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ●●● ●● ● ●●● ●●●●● ● ● ●●● ●● ● ● ●

0.0 ● ● ● ● Intra−Party Division Intra−Party ●●

● −0.5

● Quebec Ontario Maritime West −1.0

−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0

Cabinet Support

Figure C3: The plots are based on optimal classiﬁcation scores. The location of the legislators indicate their optimal location given their voting behavior on all votes from the 1st Parliament to the 5th Parliament. C4 Regional Division, 6-10 Parliaments

6th Canadian Parliament 7th Canadian Parliament 1.0 1.0

●

● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●●●● ● ● 0.5 ● 0.5 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●●●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●●● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 0.0 ● 0.0 ● ● ●● ● ● ● ●●

Intra−Party Division Intra−Party ● Division Intra−Party

● ● −0.5 −0.5

● Quebec ● Quebec Ontario Ontario Maritime Maritime West West −1.0 −1.0

−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0

Cabinet Support Cabinet Support

8th Canadian Parliament 9th Canadian Parliament 1.0 1.0

● ● 0.5 0.5 ●● ●

● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ●●●● ●● ●● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●●●● ●●● ●● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● 0.0 ● 0.0 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Intra−Party Division Intra−Party Division Intra−Party

● ● −0.5 −0.5

● Quebec ● Quebec Ontario Ontario Maritime Maritime West West −1.0 −1.0

−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0

Cabinet Support Cabinet Support

10th Canadian Parliament 1.0 0.5

● ●● ● ●● ● ●●● ●●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

0.0 ●● ● ●

● ●

Intra−Party Division Intra−Party ●

● −0.5

● ● ● Quebec Ontario Maritime West −1.0

−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0

Cabinet Support

Figure C4: The plots are based on optimal classiﬁcation scores. The location of the legislators indicate their optimal location given their voting behavior on all votes from the 6th Parliament to the 10th Parliament. C5 Religious Division, 1-5 Parliaments

1st Canadian Parliament 2nd Canadian Parliament 1.0 1.0

● ● ● ● ● 0.5 0.5 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ●● ●●●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●●●● ● ●●●● ● 0.0 ●● 0.0 ● ● ● ●

● Intra−Party Division Intra−Party Division Intra−Party −0.5 −0.5 ● Fr.Catholic ● Fr.Catholic Catholic Catholic Protestant Protestant ● Unknown ● Unknown Other Other −1.0 −1.0

−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0

Cabinet Support Cabinet Support

3rd Canadian Parliament 4th Canadian Parliament 1.0 1.0

●

● ●

● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

0.5 ● ● 0.5 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ●●●●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 0.0 0.0 ● ● ● ●● ●●● ● ● ●●●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Intra−Party Division Intra−Party Division Intra−Party ● ●● ● ● ● ● ●

●

−0.5 −0.5 ● ● Fr.Catholic ● Fr.Catholic Catholic Catholic Protestant Protestant ● Unknown ● Unknown Other Other −1.0 −1.0

−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0

Cabinet Support Cabinet Support

5th Canadian Parliament

1.0 ●

● ●● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ●

0.5 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ●●●● ●● ● ●● ●●● ● ● ● 0.0

● Intra−Party Division Intra−Party −0.5 ● Fr.Catholic Catholic Protestant ● Unknown Other −1.0

−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0

Cabinet Support

Figure C5: The plots are based on optimal classiﬁcation scores. The location of the legislators indicate their optimal location given their voting behavior on all votes from the 1st Parliament to the 5th Parliament. C6 Religious Division, 6-10 Parliaments

6th Canadian Parliament 7th Canadian Parliament 1.0 1.0

●

● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●●●● ● 0.5 ● ● 0.5 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ●●●● ● ●● ● ● ●●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●●●● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 0.0 0.0

● Intra−Party Division Intra−Party Division Intra−Party

● ● −0.5 −0.5 ● Fr.Catholic ● Fr.Catholic Catholic Catholic Protestant Protestant ● Unknown ● Unknown Other Other −1.0 −1.0

−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0

Cabinet Support Cabinet Support

8th Canadian Parliament 9th Canadian Parliament 1.0 1.0

● ● 0.5 0.5 ●● ●

● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ●● ● ●● ●● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 0.0 0.0 ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Intra−Party Division Intra−Party Division Intra−Party

● −0.5 −0.5 ● Fr.Catholic ● Fr.Catholic Catholic Catholic Protestant Protestant ● Unknown ● Unknown Other Other −1.0 −1.0

−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0

Cabinet Support Cabinet Support

10th Canadian Parliament 1.0 0.5

● ●● ●● ● ●● ●●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

0.0 ●● ●

●

Intra−Party Division Intra−Party ●

● −0.5 ● ● Fr.Catholic Catholic Protestant ● Unknown Other −1.0

−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0

Cabinet Support

Figure C6: The plots are based on optimal classiﬁcation scores. The location of the legislators indicate their optimal location given their voting behavior on all votes from the 6th Parliament to the 10th Parliament. C7 Appendix D: Second Dimension Divisions

Vote Date APRE Title Issue Sponsor Question H01S1V02 12.11.1867 0.316 Supply-reform Democratic Reform Government Speaker Leaves the Chair Amendment to the Report of the Committee of the whole Hose to consider certain proposed Resolutions for the incorporation of Rupert's Land and the Northwest Territory with H01S1V03 12.12.1867 0.485 Canada Province Government Opposition Amendment H01S1V04 12.14.1867 0.459 Ways and Means Resolutions (duty) Duty/Tariffs/Trade Government Opposition Amendment H01S1V07 12.18.1867 0.308 Bill respecting the inland revenues Duty/Tariffs/Trade Government Opposition Amendment H01S1V09 12.19.1867 0.333 Bill respecting Banks (interests) Banking Government Opposition Amendment H01S1V17 04.30.1868 0.206 Resolution Nova Scotia-Grievance Province Government Opposition Amendment H01S1V18 04.30.1868 0.364 Resolution Nova Scotia-Grievance Province Government Government Amendment H01S1V23 05.01.1868 0.700 Resolution duty reform Duty/Tariffs/Trade Government Opposition Amendment Civil H01S1V26 05.05.1868 0.361 Resolution salary governor general service/Military/Management Private Member Pubic Bill An act for the relief of Joseph Frederick H01S1V29 05.06.1868 0.370 Whiteaves Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill An act for the relief of Joseph Frederick H01S1V36 05.13.1868 0.313 Whiteaves Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill Bill respecting the Militia and Defence of Civil H01S1V41 05.15.1868 0.219 the Dominion of Canada service/Military/Management Government Government Amendment Bill respecting the Militia and Defence of Civil H01S1V45 05.16.1868 0.286 the Dominion of Canada service/Military/Management Government Government Amendment Bill respecting the Militia and Defence of Civil H01S1V46 05.16.1868 0.269 the Dominion of Canada service/Military/Management Government Government Amendment Bill imposing Duties of Customs and the H01S1V51 05.18.1868 0.409 Tariff of Duties payable under it Corn Duty/Tariffs/Trade Government Government Amendment Bill imposing Duties of Customs and the H01S1V53 05.19.1868 0.857 Tariff of Duties payable for Tobacco Duty/Tariffs/Trade Government Opposition Amendment Bill imposing Duties of Customs and the H01S1V54 05.19.1868 0.375 Tariff of Duties payable for Tobacco Duty/Tariffs/Trade Government Opposition Amendment Bill respecting Insurance companies H01S1V55 05.20.1868 0.250 (provincial juridiction) Constitution/Federalism Government Opposition Amendment Bill to confirm and give effect to a certain agreement between the government of Canada and the Great H01S2V02 05.12.1869 0.333 Western Railway Company Railways Government Government Amendment H01S2V06 05.19.1869 0.579 Reciprocity-US Duty/Tariffs/Trade Government Government Amendment Act for the Relief of John Horace H01S2V12 05.26.1869 0.245 Stevenson Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill Resolutions respecting the acquisition of the Territory and the other rights of the Hudson's Bay company in Rupert's H01S2V13 05.28.1869 0.667 Land Province Government Opposition Amendment H01S2V15 06.03.1869 0.300 Resolutions funding hospitals Quebec Constitution/Federalism Private Member Government Amendment H01S2V19 06.04.1869 0.306 An Act respecting Patents of Invention Duty/Tariffs/Trade Government Government Amendment H01S2V29 06.13.1869 0.667 Act to the affairs of Nova Scotia Province Government Resolution H01S2V37 06.16.1869 0.714 Act to the affairs of Nova Scotia Province Government Opposition Amendment Civil H01S2V40 06.18.1869 0.386 Supply-resolutions-Warden salary service/Military/Management Government Government Amendment Bill respecting Banks and Banking H01S3V17 04.05.1870 0.375 (interests) Banking Government Opposition Amendment Bill respecting Banks and Banking H01S3V19 04.07.1870 0.429 (interests) Banking Government Opposition Amendment Bill respecting the Canada Central H01S3V25 04.20.1870 0.514 Railway Company Railways Government Opposition Amendment H01S3V26 04.20.1870 0.500 Bill respecting the Canada Central Railways Government Opposition Amendment

D1 Railway Company Civil H01S3V27 04.20.1870 0.268 Resolutions Civil Service Retirement service/Military/Management Government Opposition Amendment H01S3V32 04.22.1870 0.262 Bill respecting interest Banking Government Opposition Amendment H01S3V33 04.22.1870 0.262 Bill respecting interest Banking Government Second Reading H01S3V46 04.30.1870 0.211 Ways and means, Duty Coal-Coke Duty/Tariffs/Trade Government Government Amendment H01S3V49 04.30.1870 0.405 Ways and means, Duty Tobacco Duty/Tariffs/Trade Government Opposition Amendment H01S3V05 03.17.1870 0.286 Resolutions Renewing Charter Banks Banking Government Government Amendment Civil H01S3V50 05.04.1870 0.245 Resolutions Civil Service Retirement service/Military/Management Government Opposition Amendment Act to establish and provide for the Government of the Province of H01S3V59 05.10.1870 0.286 Manitoba Province Government Opposition Amendment Act to establish and provide for the Government of the Province of H01S3V61 05.10.1870 0.269 Manitoba Province Government Government Amendment Act to establish and provide for the Government of the Province of H01S3V62 05.10.1870 0.298 Manitoba Province Government Opposition Amendment Act to establish and provide for the Government of the Province of H01S3V63 05.10.1870 0.286 Manitoba Province Government Government Amendment Act to establish and provide for the Government of the Province of H01S3V65 05.10.1870 0.325 Manitoba Province Government Government Amendment Act to establish and provide for the Government of the Province of H01S3V66 05.10.1870 0.342 Manitoba Province Government Opposition Amendment Act to establish and provide for the Government of the Province of H01S3V67 05.10.1870 0.293 Manitoba Province Government Government Amendment Act to establish and provide for the Government of the Province of H01S3V69 05.10.1870 0.341 Manitoba Province Government Government Amendment Act to establish and provide for the Government of the Province of H01S3V70 05.10.1870 0.324 Manitoba Province Government Opposition Amendment Act to establish and provide for the Government of the Province of H01S3V71 05.10.1870 0.353 Manitoba Province Government Opposition Amendment Supply Bill for Granting to Her Majesty, certain sums of money required to defray the expenses of the Publication service, for the financial year Amendment not to pay for military H01S3V72 05.11.1870 0.308 expedition in NWT Province Government Opposition Amendment Bill to establish one uniform currency H01S4V11 03.17.1871 0.320 for the dominion of Canada Banking Government Opposition Amendment H01S4V12 03.22.1871 0.643 Supply Resolution Duty Duty/Tariffs/Trade Government Government Amendment H01S4V13 03.22.1871 0.273 Supply Resolution Duty Duty/Tariffs/Trade Government Opposition Amendment Bill to amend the Acts relating to duties H01S4V34 04.04.1871 0.579 of Customs Duty/Tariffs/Trade Government Government Amendment Bill to amend the Acts relating to duties H01S4V35 04.04.1871 0.674 of Customs Duty/Tariffs/Trade Government Opposition Amendment Bill to amend the Acts relating to duties H01S4V36 04.04.1871 0.486 of Customs Duty/Tariffs/Trade Government Opposition Amendment Bill to make temporary provision for the election of Members to serve in the House of Commons of Canada Dual H01S4V42 04.08.1871 0.211 representation Democratic Reform Government Opposition Amendment Constitution of committee for inquiry H01S4V47 04.10.1871 0.422 Murder Thomas Scott NWT/Manitoba Rebellion Government Opposition Amendment H01S4V05 03.13.1871 0.688 Debt -Quebec Province Private Member Address to Governor

D2 General

H01S4V53 04.11.1871 0.273 Resolution Admission BC Province Government Opposition Amendment Resolution Supply Restitution for the H01S4V54 04.12.1871 0.385 Murder Thomas Scott NWT/Manitoba Rebellion Government Speaker Leaves the Chair Resolution 21 Supply Restitution for the H01S4V57 04.12.1871 0.417 Murder Thomas Scott NWT/Manitoba Rebellion Government Government Amendment Address to Governor H01S4V06 03.13.1871 0.360 Debt -Quebec Province Private Member General Address to Governor H01S4V07 03.13.1871 0.733 Debt -Quebec Province Private Member General Resolution Disallow Nw Brunswick Address to Governor H01S5V25 05.29.1872 0.310 School Law Religion Private Member General Resolution Disallow Nw Brunswick Address to Governor H01S5V26 05.29.1872 0.421 School Law Religion Private Member General Bill respecting the Canadian Pacific H01S5V27 05.31.1872 0.333 Railway (location) Railways Government Opposition Amendment Bill respecting the Canadian Pacific H01S5V28 05.31.1872 0.800 Railway (location) Railways Government Opposition Amendment An act for the relief of John Robert H01S5V33 06.03.1872 0.250 Martin Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill An act for the relief of John Robert H01S5V34 06.03.1872 0.250 Martin Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill Bill to readjust the representation in the H01S5V53 06.10.1872 0.238 House of Commons (Montreal riding) Province Government Opposition Amendment Bill to render Member of the Legislative Councils and Assemblies of the Provinces […] ineligible for sitting or voting in the House of Commons of H02S1V05 03.27.1873 0.314 Canada Democratic Reform Private Member Public Bill Bill to render Member of the Legislative Councils and Assemblies of the Provinces […] ineligible for sitting or voting in the House of Commons of H02S1V06 03.27.1873 0.288 Canada Democratic Reform Private Member Public Bill That the article published in the newspaper called the Morning Freeman […] is a scandalous false and malicious H02S1V09 04.18.1873 0.556 libel […] upon the honor of the House Democratic Reform Private Member Motion Bill to extend the provisions of the H02S1V12 04.21.1873 0.625 Grand Trunk Arrangements Act of 1862 Railways Government Second Reading H02S1V13 04.24.1873 0.400 Act for the Relief of John Robert Martin Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill H02S1V14 04.24.1873 0.400 Act for the Relief of John Robert Martin Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill H02S1V15 04.30.1872 0.375 Act for the Relief of John Robert Martin Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill H02S1V16 04.30.1873 0.375 Act for the Relief of John Robert Martin Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill H02S1V17 05.02.1873 0.397 Act for the Relief of John Robert Martin Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill H02S1V18 05.02.1873 0.397 Act for the Relief of John Robert Martin Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill H02S1V20 05.03.1873 0.488 Insolvency Act Bankruptcy Government Opposition Amendment Question: That Louis Riel […] having been charged with murder Manitoba- H03S1V02 04.16.1874 0.406 amnesty […] NWT/Manitoba Rebellion Private Member Government Amendment Question: That Louis Riel […] having been charged with murder Manitoba- H03S1V03 04.16.1874 0.492 amnesty […] NWT/Manitoba Rebellion Private Member Motion Bill to make further provision for the management of Permanent Building Civil H03S1V07 05.20.1874 0.690 societies in the Dominion of Canada service/Military/Management Government Government Amendment Bill to provide for the construction of H03S1V08 05.20.1874 0.600 the Canadian Pacific Railway Railways Government Opposition Amendment Report of the Committee on the Question Arising out of the North-West H03S2V01 02.13.1875 0.217 Territories troubles Lépine Pardon NWT/Manitoba Rebellion Government Opposition Amendment

Report of the Committee on the Question Arising out of the North- West Territories troubles Lépine H03S2V03 02.24.1875 0.696 Pardon Expulsion Riel NWT/Manitoba Rebellion Government Opposition Amendment H03S2V06 03.01.1875 0.250 Resolution Senate Reform Democratic Reform Government Motion H03S2V11 03.13.1875 0.283 Relief of Henry William Peterson Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill Bill to provide for the construction of a line of railway from Esquimalt to H03S2V25 03.29.1875 0.266 Nanaimo in BC Railways Government Opposition Amendment Bill to provide for the construction of a line of railway from Esquimalt to H03S2V26 03.29.1875 0.266 Nanaimo in BC Railways Government Third Reading Bill to establish a Supreme Court and a Court of Exchequer for the H03S2V30 03.30.1875 0.300 Dominion of Canada Democratic Reform Government Opposition Amendment Supply Resolution 41Repay Expense H03S2V34 04.02.1875 0.259 DA Smith NWT NWT/Manitoba Rebellion Government Opposition Amendment Bill to repeal the insolvency Act in H03S4V01 02.28.1877 0.220 Canada Bankruptcy Government Speaker Leaves the Chair H03S4V04 03.16.1877 0.500 Act for the Relief of Mary Jane Bates Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill H03S4V05 03.19.1877 0.522 Act for the Relief of Walter Scott Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill Act for the Relief of Martha Jemima H03S4V07 03.23.1877 0.509 Hawkshaw Holiwell Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill H03S4V08 03.23.1877 0.419 Act for the Relief of Walter Scott Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill H03S4V09 03.23.1877 0.440 Act for the Relief of Mary Jane Bates Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill Act for the Relief of Martha Jemima H03S4V13 03.26.1877 0.438 Hawkshaw Holiwell Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill H03S4V14 03.28.1877 0.350 Act for the Relief of Walter Scott Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill H03S4V15 03.28.1877 0.378 Act for the Relief of Mary Jane Bates Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill Act for the Relief of George H03S5V05 03.27.1878 0.314 Frothingham Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill H03S5V06 03.27.1878 0.288 Act for the Relief of Hugh Hunter Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill Act for the Relief of John H03S5V08 03.29.1878 0.380 Frothingham Johnston Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill H03S5V10 04.03.1878 0.356 Act for the Relief of Hugh Hunter Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill H03S5V13 04.09.1878 0.679 Supply-Duty Duty/Tariffs/Trade Government Speaker Leaves the Chair An act for the relief of Victoria H03S5V17 04.10.1878 0.379 Elizabeth Lyon Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill An act for the relief of Victoria H03S5V19 04.12.1878 0.413 Elizabeth Lyon Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill An act for the relief of Victoria H03S5V22 04.17.1878 0.545 Elizabeth Lyon Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill H03S5V24 04.26.1878 0.385 Supply-Duty Duty/Tariffs/Trade Government Speaker Leaves the Chair Question: subsidy granted to the H03S5V33 05.07.1878 0.290 Canadian Pacific Railway Railways Government Motion Bill taxing the rate of Interest in H04S1V10 04.28.1879 0.698 Canada, and Prohibiting Usury Banking Private Member Public Bill H04S1V11 04.29.1879 0.384 Insolvency Act Bankruptcy Private Member Public Bill H04S1V12 04.29.1879 0.379 Insolvency Act Bankruptcy Private Member Public Bill Bill to repeal the Insolvency Laws now in force in the Dominion of H04S1V14 05.05.1879 0.377 Canada Bankruptcy Private Member Public Bill Amend Bill to repeal the Supreme H04S2V03 02.26.1880 0.345 and Exchequer Court Act Democratic Reform Private Member Public Bill Bill to legalize Marriage with the H04S2V04 03.04.1880 0.368 Sister of a Deceased Wife Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill Bill to legalize Marriage with the H04S2V07 03.31.1880 0.407 Sister of a Deceased Wife Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill

Fisheries vested in the Federal H04S2V09 04.07.1880 0.333 Government Constitution/Federalism Private Member Motion Insolvent Act of 1875 and Amending H04S3V33 02.04.1881 0.206 Acts Bankruptcy Government Government Amendment Bill to repeal the Supreme and H04S3V35 02.10.1881 0.641 Exchequer Court Act Bankruptcy Private Member Public Bill H04S3V37 02.15.1881 0.259 Canada Temparence Act of 1878 Prohibition Private Member Public Bill H04S3V40 03.07.1881 0.275 Toronto Railway Railways Private Member Private Bill H04S3V45 03.11.1881 0.455 Supply-Duty Duty/Tariffs/Trade Government Speaker Leaves the Chair An act to enlarge and extend the powers of the Credit Foncier Franco- H04S4V04 03.20.1882 0.429 Canadien Banking Private Member Private Bill An act to incorporate the Board for the Management of the Temporalities Fund of the Presbyterian Church of Canada in connection with the H04S4V11 04.03.1882 0.543 Church of Scotland Religion Private Member Private Bill Bill to consolidate and amend the Acts relating to the Montreal H04S4V16 04.17.1882 0.275 Telegraph Company Local Industry Private Member Private Bill Bill for amending the Acts relating to the Trust and Loan Company of H04S4V18 04.21.1882 0.382 Canada Banking Private Member Private Bill Bill to incorporate the Loyal Orange H05S1V05 03.19.1883 0.318 Association of British America Religion Private Member Private Bill Bill to incorporate the Loyal Orange H05S1V12 04.16.1883 0.716 Association of British America Religion Private Member Private Bill Bill Respecting the sale of Intoxicating Liquors and the Issue of H05S1V24 05.22.1883 0.316 Licenses Provincial licenses Prohibition Private Member Public Bill Bill Respecting the sale of Intoxicating Liquors and the Issue of H05S1V25 05.22.1883 0.327 Licenses Provincial licenses Prohibition Private Member Public Bill H05S2V18 03.05.1884 0.323 An act for the relief of John Graham Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill Bill to incorporate the Loyal Orange H05S2V27 03.17.1884 0.750 Association of British America Religion Private Member Private Bill H05S2V29 03.19.1884 0.393 An act for the relief of John Graham Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill In the interest of the economy, it is unadvisable to continue the system of paying out of the public funds a body of Official Reporters and Translators of the Debate of this H05S2V39 04.02.1884 0.279 House Language/Education Government Opposition Amendment H05S3V09 02.27.1885 0.359 Bill respecting Carriers by land Railways Private Member Public Bill An act for the relief of Amanda Esther H05S3V11 03.09.1885 0.300 Davis Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill An act for the relief of Alice Elvira H05S3V13 03.23.1885 0.275 Evans Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill Bill to further amend the Canada H05S3V16 04.08.1885 0.235 Temperance Act of 1878 Prohibition Private Member Public Bill Bill to further amend the Canada Temperance Act of 1878 (medical + H05S3V19 04.13.1885 0.204 religious exemptions Prohibition Private Member Public Bill That this House feels it is its duty to express its deep regret that the sentence of death passed upon Louis Riel, convicted of high Treason, was H05S4V04 03.25.1886 0.423 allowed to be carried into execution NWT/Manitoba Rebellion Private Member Motion Bill to amend the Animal Contagious H05S4V16 04.28.1886 0.611 Diseases Act Farming Private Member Government Amendment H05S4V27 05.10.1886 0.212 An act for the relief of Flora Birrell Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill

Bill to amend the Dominion Elections H05S4V28 05.10.1886 0.286 Acts, 1874 (Franchise) Democratic Reform Private Member Public Bill An act for the relief of Marie Louise H06S1V14 06.10.1887 0.500 Noel Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill That in the opinion of this House it is expedient to prohibit the manufacture, importation and sale of intoxicating liquores, except for sacramental, medicinal, scientific and H06S1V16 06.13.1887 0.378 mechanical purposes […] Prohibition Private Member Motion Bill to amend the Canada H06S2V08 04.26.1888 0.318 Temperance Act Prohibition Private Member Public Bill An act for the relief of Eleonara H06S2V13 05.14.1888 0.618 Elizabeth Tudor Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill H06S3V06 02.20.1889 0.479 An act respecting cruelty to animals Farming Private Member Public Bill H06S3V11 02.28.1889 0.522 An act respecting cruelty to animals Farming Private Member Public Bill H06S3V12 02.28.1889 0.511 An act respecting cruelty to animals Farming Private Member Public Bill An act respecting Queen's College at H06S3V14 03.13.1889 0.600 Kingston Language/Education Private Member Private Bill Bill to amend the Charter of Incorporation of the Great North- H06S3V16 03.20.1889 0.411 West Central Railway Company Railways Private Member Private Bill Supply-Settlement of the Jesuits' H06S3V18 03.29.1889 0.692 estates Religion Private Member Motion An act for the relief of William H06S3V23 04.15.1889 0.200 Gordon Lowry Divorce/Marriage Government Speaker Leaves the Chair Bill to further amend the Revised Statutes of Canada respecting the North West Territories […] that the official use of the French and English H06S4V06 02.18.1890 0.629 languages […] Language/Education Private Member Public Bill H06S4V11 02.27.1890 0.494 An act respecting cruelty to animals Farming Government Government Amendment Bill to incorporate the Grand Orange H06S4V12 03.03.1890 0.210 Lodge of British America Religion Private Member Private Bill Bill to incorporate the Grand Orange H06S4V13 03.03.1890 0.773 Lodge of British America Religion Private Member Private Bill Bill to incorporate the Grand Orange H06S4V14 03.03.1890 0.217 Lodge of British America Religion Private Member Private Bill Act for the relief of Hugh Forbes H06S4V27 04.21.1890 1.000 Keefer Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill Supply-Settlement of the Jesuits' H06S4V32 05.01.1890 0.219 estates Religion Private Member Motion That in the opinion of this House, the time has arrived when it is expedient to prohibit the manufacture, importation and sale of intoxicating H07S1V09 06.24.1891 0.857 liquors for beverage purposes Prohibition Private Member Motion An act for the relief of Adam H07S1V13 07.20.1891 0.522 Russworm Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill Bill further to amend the Acts respecting the North-West H07S2V11 05.11.1892 0.576 Territories Province Private Member Public Bill An Act for the relief of Herbert H07S2V12 05.16.1892 0.484 Rimmington Mead Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill That is expedient to place corn on the H07S3V05 03.01.1893 0.387 free list Duty/Tariffs/Trade Private Member Motion An Act for the relief of Caroline Jane H07S4V04 05.09.1894 0.581 Downey Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill An act for the relief of James H07S4V22 07.13.1894 0.367 StGeorge Dillon Divorce/Marriage Private Member Private Bill Bill further to amend the Acts respecting the North-West H07S4V26 07.17.1894 0.286 Territories Language/Education Government Opposition Amendment

D6 The privilege of voting for candidates for membership thereof, should be extended to women possessing the qualifications which now entitle men H07S5V04 06.05.1895 0.319 to electoral franchise Democratic Reform Private Member Motion That in the opinion of this House, the time has arrived when it is expedient to prohibit the manufacture, importation and sale of intoxicating H07S6V02 02.24.1896 0.326 liquors for beverage purposes Prohibition Private Member Motion Votes and Proceeding Should Correctly Show the Proceedings and H07S6V11 04.04.1896 0.500 transactions of the House Procedure Private Member Motion Bill to secure the better observance H08S3V04 03.23.1898 0.235 of the Lord's Day Religion Private Member Public Bill Bill respecting the Ontario and Rainy H08S3V08 03.28.1898 0.200 River Railway Company Railways Private Member Private Bill Bill further to secure the safety of H08S3V13 05.09.1898 0.222 Railway employees and passengers Railways Private Member Public Bill Bill to incorporate the Supreme Grand Lodge of the Sons of England H08S3V15 05.25.1898 0.214 Benefit Society Religion Private Member Private Bill Committee Quorum be reduced from H08S4V01 04.18.1899 0.611 Eleven to Seven Members Procedure Government Government Amendment Bill to amend the Criminal Code, 1892, so as to make more effectual provision for the punishment of H08S4V06 05.10.1899 0.520 seduction and abduction Criminal code Private Member Public Bill Supply: this House insists on the principle of the sovereignty and the independence of Parliament as the basis of British Institutions and the safeguard of the civil […] South H08S5V02 03.13.1900 0.625 African War Boer War Government Speaker Leaves the Chair That the maximum rate of a passenger traffic on any of the H08S5V05 03.26.1900 0.308 railways to be […] Railways Government Speaker Leaves the Chair All books shall be open to inspection H08S5V06 03.26.1900 0.421 by the Government Railways Government Speaker Leaves the Chair No Chinese person shall be employed in the construction or operation of H08S5V07 04.09.1900 0.300 the railway Railways Private Member Private Bill Bill respecting the Grain Trade H08S5V12 05.30.1900 0.444 Inspection District of Manitoba Railways Government Third Reading Supply-Exemption from taxation of the said land grant end Canadian H08S5V26 06.21.1900 0.667 Pacific Railways Government Speaker Leaves the Chair Bill to amend the Railway Act, land H08S5V33 07.06.1900 0.303 drainage Railways Government Opposition Amendment Committee on the Bill relating to an agreement between the Government of Manitoba and the Canadian Northern Railway Company, H09S1V13 05.07.1901 0.400 respecting certain railways Railways Government Opposition Amendment That the third reading of the Bill (Bill to incorporate the Brockville and Sault Ste Marie Railway Company) be H09S1V17 05.17.1901 0.300 proceeded with forthwith Railway Private Member Private Bill Bill to incorporate the Bishop of the Russo-Greek Catholic Church for the North America and Aleutian Islands, and each of the parishes and missions of the said Church in Manitoba and the North-west H09S2V15 05.12.1902 0.206 Territories Religion Private Member Private Bill Bill to incorporate the Canadian H09S3V18 07.28.1903 0.222 Telephone and Telegraph Company Local Industry Private Member Private Bill

D7 Bill respecting the Ottawa Electric H10S1V03 03.29.1905 0.255 Company Local Industry Government Opposition Amendment Bill to establish and provide for the Government of the Province of H10S1V08 07.05.1905 1.000 Alberta Province Government Opposition Amendment Bill to establish and provide for the Government of the Province of H10S1V10 07.05.1905 1.000 Alberta Province Government Government Amendment Bill to establish and provide for the Government of the Province of H10S1V11 07.05.1905 1.000 Alberta Province Government Government Amendment Bill to establish and provide for the Government of the Province of H10S1V12 07.05.1905 1.000 Alberta Province Government Opposition Amendment Bill to establish and provide for the Government of the Province of H10S1V14 07.06.1905 0.375 Alberta Province Government Opposition Amendment Bill to establish and provide for the Government of the Province of H10S1V15 07.06.1905 1.000 Alberta Province Government Opposition Amendment Bill respecting Annuities for certain privy councillors, and respecting the Civil H10S2V06 05.10.1906 0.889 Senate and the House of Commons service/Military/Management Private Member Public Bill H10S2V22 07.06.1906 0.786 Bill respecting the Lord's day Religion Government Government Amendment H10S2V23 07.07.1906 0.786 Bill respecting the Lord's day Religion Government Opposition Amendment H10S2V13 03.03.1908 0.400 Bill respecting the Lord's day Religion Government Opposition Amendment