Special Warfare The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80–04–1 September 2004 Vol. 17, No. 1 From the Commandant Special Warfare

Following the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, the atten- tion of the nation and of the world was focused on the activities of U.S. special-oper- ations forces in Afghanistan. During that same time, other U.S. Army special-opera- tions forces, or ARSOF, were diligently train- ing a counterterrorist force in the Philip- pines, as well as countering insurgent and terrorist forces there by implementing secu- rity-assistance, civic-action and humanitari- an projects. Although those efforts were suc- cessful, they were overshadowed by Opera- tion Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and they remain largely unpublicized. Unlike other issues of Special Warfare that their lives depend upon the training that we contain articles from a variety of authors, give them. We must do more than train to this issue contains only articles written by standard. We must be receptive to new ideas members of the Historian’s Office of the U.S. and responsive to changing operational Army Special Operations Command to requirements. We must harness new tech- record the role of ARSOF in the Philippines. nologies and training methodologies such as Based upon interviews with ARSOF Soldiers digital and Web-based learning to keep pace who served at all levels of the operation, the with a new, dynamic generation of warriors articles paint a comprehensive picture of coming to join our brotherhood. ARSOF’s activities and provide observations There has never been a more rewarding regarding the uses of ARSOF in combating time to be in Army special operations than insurgency and terrorism. now. Our Soldiers have an important job, and While those observations reveal some their skills have never been in greater areas that may require greater attention in demand. They have never received more future operations, they validate the training recognition or greater support, and they have of Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psycho- never been more successful. Our challenge is logical Operations Soldiers — training con- to ensure that we train enough of these quiet ducted at the JFK Special Warfare Center professionals to continue the success of and School. ARSOF on the battlefield, whether it is in Since June, it has been my honor to com- widely publicized engagements such as those mand the Special Warfare Center and School, in Iraq or in obscure operations such as those the world’s best special-operations training in the remote jungles of the Philippines. center and institution. Not only do we produce the Army’s special-operations warriors who have the skills needed to win on today’s bat- tlefield, we also instill the flexibility that will allow them to remain relevant in the battles of the future, and we provide the doctrinal and Major General James W. Parker policy support for that elite force. We must never forget that we are training Soldiers who will go into combat, and that PB 80–04–1 Contents September 2004 Special Warfare Vol. 17, No. 1

Commander & Commandant Major General James W. Parker Features Editor 2 Why the Philippines?: ARSOF’s Expanded Mission Jerry D. Steelman in the War on Terror Associate Editor by Dr. C.H. Briscoe Janice L. Burton 4A Century of Turmoil: America’s Relationship Graphics & Design with the Philippines Bruce S. Barfield by Dr. Cherilyn A. Walley 12 Multiple Insurgent Groups Complicate Philippine Security by Dr. C.H. Briscoe and Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Downey 15 Rugged Terrain Makes Philippine Islands Haven for Insurgent Groups by Dr. C.H. Briscoe 16 Balikatan Exercise Spearheaded ARSOF Operations

V E R TAS in the Philippines I R T A E S LI B E T by Dr. C.H. Briscoe Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare 26 Wanted Dead or Alive: Psychological Operations Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission During Balikatan 02-1 is to promote the professional development of special- operations forces by providing a forum for the examination by Dr. C.H. Briscoe of established doctrine and new ideas. Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do 30 Civil Affairs: A Weapon of Peace on Basilan Island not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented by Dr. Cherilyn A. Walley in other official Army publications. Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and 36 Impact of the Semipermissive Environment should be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare, on Force-Protection in Philippine Engagements USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28310. Telephone: DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147. Special by Dr. Cherilyn A. Walley Warfare reserves the right to edit all material. Published works may be reprinted, except where 42 Special Forces Training Exercises Continue Balikatan Mission copyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare and the authors. by Dr. Cherilyn A. Walley Official distribution is limited to active and reserve special-operations units. Individuals desiring private 46 Rescuing the Burnhams: The Unspoken SOCPAC Mission subscriptions should forward their requests to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government by Dr. C.H. Briscoe Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Special Warfare is also available on the USASOC internal web 52 112th Signal Battalion Opens the ‘Big Pipe’ During Balikatan 02-1 (https:asociweb.soc.mil/swcs/dotd/sw-mag/sw-mag.htm). by Dr. Kenn Finlayson By Order of the Secretary of the Army: 55 Reflections and Observations on ARSOF Operations Peter J. Schoomaker During Balikatan 02-1 General, United States Army by Dr. C.H. Briscoe Chief of Staff Official: Departments 58 Enlisted Career Notes Joel B. Hudson 59 Officer Career Notes Administrative Assistant to the 60 Foreign SOF Secretary of the Army 62 Update 0418208 Headquarters, Department of the Army 64 Book Reviews Why the Philippines?: ARSOF’s Expanded Mission in the War On Terror

by Dr. C.H. Briscoe

n March 2001, in response to a request relationship, the operational capabilities of from the Philippine government, a mil- the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or AFP, Iitary training team composed of Sol- declined rapidly. That military erosion diers from the 1st Special Forces Group allowed latent insurgencies, some of which arrived in the Philippines to begin training had ties to international terrorism, to flare a national counterterrorist force. to the point that they posed a threat to the viability of the Philippine government. In November 2001, members of Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF, began participating in Exercise Balikatan 02-1, again assisting in the training of Philippine forces to counter insurgency and terrorism. Following the exercise, ARSOF conducted post-Balikatan training, humanitarian and security-assistance missions. Although post-Balikatan missions ended in late 2003, some of the missions continue today, as United States troops provide security- assistance training and conduct mainte- nance programs with the AFP. As part of its charter to document ARSOF’s participation in past and present operations, the Office of the Historian, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, has interviewed ARSOF Soldiers who participat- U.S. Army photo ed at all levels of operations in the Philip- An SF Soldier shows a Fil- After the United States turned Clark Air pines. The articles in this issue of Special ipino soldier how to adjust Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Station Warfare, written by the USASOC historians, the sights on his weapon. over to the Philippines in June 1991, com- explain the missions of ARSOF in the Philip- Common tasks such as bined training of the U.S. and Philippine pines from March 2001 to late 2003 and pass sight-adjustment were military had ended, and U.S. security-assist- along observations that may benefit ARSOF often neglected by Filipino Soldiers in future operations. soldiers prior to their train- ance funding for the Philippines had been ing by SF Soldiers. significantly curtailed. In the ensuing dec- The ARSOF mission of November 2001, ade, without U.S. support and the benefits of originally combined by the Special Operations a U.S.-Philippines professional military Command, Pacific, or SOCPAC, and the U.S.

2 Special Warfare Philippine soldiers practice map reading during train- ing in basic infantry skills provided by U.S. Special Forces Soldiers during Exercise Balikatan. USASOC Historical Archive Pacific Command, or PACOM, with Exercise that cell-telephone text messaging can Balikatan in the Joint Chiefs of Staff-spon- have on force-protection measures. sored Cobra Gold combined exercise series, In the end, the missions of SF, PSYOP, CA, underwent several permutations. At one time, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regi- it was referred to as “America’s Second Front ment and the 112th Signal Battalion in sup- in the Global War on Terrorism.” port of SOCPAC and PACOM in the Philip- Unfortunately, that sobriquet was some- pines established an acceptable American what misleading, because the resultant military presence in the Southeast Pacific and hybrid exercise was principally training re-established professional military relation- assistance conducted primarily in the semi- ships, both worthy objectives for future permissive combat environment of Basilan ARSOF missions in the Pacific region. Island, which has become the primary refuge for the most active terrorist elements in the Author’s note: The articles in this issue of Philippines. For more than a decade, Basilan Special Warfare would not have been possible Island has been a live-fire environment for without the emphasis provided by Lieutenant the AFP. Colonel Dennis J. Downey, deputy commander In light of the uncertain environment of the 1st SF Group and former commander of and the aggressive actions taken by terror- Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philip- ists against U.S. citizens, the standing pines. Downey provided regular updates on the “train, advise, assist and maintain” mis- Philippines mission, a good cross-section of sion originally assigned to the 1st SF officers and NCOs — from detachment- to bat- Group subtly transformed from unconven- talion- and group-level — for interviews, as tional warfare to foreign internal defense well as briefings and documentation. He also and development, leaving the ARSOF reviewed the articles in this issue for accuracy. ground campaign best explained by using His chronology of U.S.-Philippines relations the counterinsurgency model, which is proved invaluable. Thanks are also due to most often associated with Special Forces Major Robert A. Culp, S2 of the 1st SF Group, missions during America’s war in Vietnam. for his help with the rules of engagement and The ARSOF benefits gained in the Phil- for his classification reviews of the articles. ippines ranged from the validation of Spe- cial Forces, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs training, to the reinforcement Dr. C.H. Briscoe is the command histori- of the importance of information opera- an for the U.S. Army Special Operations tions and the demonstration of the impact Command.

September 2004 3 A Century of Turmoil: America’s Relationship with the Philippines

by Dr. Cherilyn A. Walley

n order to understand the con- the U.S. came into possession of the then declared the Philippines inde- text of current United States Philippines as well. pendent and himself head of the Imilitary operations in the Phil- Unfortunately, the U.S. acquired new government. Much to his dis- ippines, it is necessary to review not only the Philippine Islands may, when the U.S. VIII Corps more than 100 years of America’s from its victory over Spain but also landed, U.S. officials arranged for a military and political involvement the Philippine Insurrection. The relatively peaceful surrender from in Philippine affairs. Philippine Insurrection began in the Spanish governor general, Fer- Beginning in 1898, during the 1896 when Emilio Aguinaldo and mín Jáudenes, and occupied Mani- Spanish-American War, and ending his guerrillas declared war on la themselves. in 1992 with the closing of the last Spain. The U.S. temporarily allied American officials shut Aguinal- American base, the U.S. main- with Aguinaldo, encouraging him do out of negotiations and refused tained a visible military presence to besiege Spanish troops in Mani- to recognize his government as in the Philippines. During that la while Commodore George legitimate. Having effectively trad- same 94-year period, U.S. partici- Dewey and the U.S. Navy’s China ed places with the Spanish, the pation in Philippine politics ranged fleet destroyed Spain’s antiquated Americans found themselves sur- from actual governance during the armada in Manila Bay. rounded by Filipino revolutionar- first half of the 20th century to Aguinaldo, led to believe that his ies. While neither side was particu- Cold War patronage during the sec- efforts would be rewarded with larly anxious to resume fighting, ond half. Considering the legacy of Philippine independence, kept the the U.S. government was deter- U.S. military and political pres- Spanish trapped in Manila until mined to exercise sovereignty, and ence, the Philippines is under- U.S. ground forces arrived in June the Filipino guerrillas were equally standably sensitive to sovereignty 1898. Ever the optimist, Aguinaldo determined to be independent. issues and to possible U.S. influ- Fighting resumed along the Mani- ence in Philippine domestic affairs. la perimeter on Feb. 4,1899.1 Instead of capitalizing on the Philippine Insurrection inherent strengths of his guerrilla Much of the political “baggage” of units, Aguinaldo formed the Philippine-American relations Republican Army to fight the U.S. dates from the Spanish-American troops in conventional style. Ini- War. The U.S. fought the war to win tially, the U.S. Army was able to Cuba’s independence from Spain. dominate the main population cen- But because the U.S. was obliged to ters easily, but it lacked sufficient defeat Spain’s fleet in the Philip- National Archives troops to control rural areas. In pines, which Spain also claimed, Emilio Aguinaldo (seated, third from right) November 1899, with the arrival of and other Filipino insurgent leaders. U.S. reinforcements, the U.S. Army

4 Special Warfare began using its now superior strength to defeat the Republican Army. In the face of U.S. conven- tional superiority, Aguinaldo returned to guerrilla warfare.2 By April 1900, the war had become one of insurgency and counterinsurgency efforts. The Fili- pino revolutionaries and the Amer- ican Soldiers alike fought to win allegiance and support from the populace. The Army focused on instituting civil government and on improving the lives of the common people, usually working through local leadership.3 Recognizing the value of benevo- lence to pacification, the Army instituted civic-action programs. National Archives Beginning in Manila and then In this 1900 photo, Philippine insurgents pray before surrendering. spreading afield to other major population centers, reform pro- successful in areas far removed troops. In response to the grams focused on expanding the from Manila and the larger cities, increased violence, and in keeping infrastructure for transportation, in which U.S. Army garrisons were with President William McKin- education and public health in an stationed. In those remote areas, ley’s re-election promise to remain effort to raise Filipino standards of revolutionary civil-military officers in the Philippines, on Dec. 20, living. New railroads, bridges, controlled villages, collected taxes, 1900, Major General Arthur roads and telegraph and telephone gathered supplies for guerrilla MacArthur placed the Philippines lines strengthened the economy troops and influenced local govern- under martial law. Under the and forged commercial interde- ments. They enforced their control stricter policy, the Army began pendence among the islands. through executions and property imprisoning, deporting and even Convinced that education was destruction.5 executing captured guerrilla lead- more effective than troops in pre- By September 1900, the guerril- ers.6 In the field, Army patrols venting further uprisings, the U.S. las were sufficiently organized to hounded insurgent bands, denying Army organized a public-school increase the pressure on U.S. them rest and sanctuary and iso- system to reduce illiteracy. The lating them from the villages, military public-health assault on where more numerous and better- disease virtually eliminated small- organized garrison troops were pox and bubonic plague, and it stationed to provide security. U.S. reduced the infant mortality rate. troops captured Aguinaldo in Although these programs were March 1901, and on April 19, often conducted with an arrogant 1901, the former revolutionary ethnocentrism typical of Western issued a proclamation accepting civilization of the day, they earned U.S. rule of the Philippines.7 Filipino admiration.4 Anticipating the collapse of the The guerrilla insurgents, on the weakened Philippine insurgency, other hand, used terrorism to the U.S. created the Philippine counter the attractive American Commission to assume the legisla- policies. The guerrillas established tive and executive functions of the shadow governments to control vil- government in areas under Ameri- lagers and to mete out punish- USASOC Historical Archive can control. In July 1901, McKinley ment. The system of terror and U.S. Soldiers talk to Filipina women during appointed William Howard Taft, invisible governments was most operations in the early 1900s. who was head of the commission,

September 2004 5 governor-general of the Philip- the Christian parts of the country pines. In August, the commission were essentially secure.8 According established the Philippine Con- to the American measures of suc- stabulary. Separate from the U.S. cess — the accomplishment of Army-controlled Filipino Scouts basic pacification objectives, the and the municipal police, the con- development of solid U.S.-Philip- stabulary, led by American officers, pine relations and the adoption of maintained law and order in paci- many American democratic insti- fied areas. The U.S. Army contin- tutions by the Filipinos — the need ued to exercise control in the for war was over. unpacified areas, concentrating its efforts where guerrilla bands were A new enemy still active. Muslim Moros in the Sulu Archi- The final Army pacification cam- pelago, however, continued fighting paigns on Samar Island and in for another 11 years on Mindanao Batangas Province turned brutal and the adjacent islands.9 Unassoci- after an American infantry compa- ated with the “insurrectos” of 1899- ny was massacred at Balangiga, 1902, the Moro groups sought to Samar, in September 1901. In defend their traditional practices of response to the massacre, the slavery, tribal warfare and Islam. USASOC Historical Archive Army adopted tactics of “no-quar- The U.S. organized a “bamboo Captain John J. Pershing was one of the ter fighting,” crop and livestock army” that comprised U.S. Army, leaders of the Philippine “bamboo army.” destruction and the forcible reloca- Filipino Scout and constabulary tion of 300,000 civilians to concen- companies and was led by future passed the Philippine Bill of 1902, tration camps. American military icons like John J. permanently establishing a Philip- By April 1902, the rogue guerril- Pershing and Douglas MacArthur. pine civil government that includ- la leaders Lukban and Malvar had The bamboo army began operations ed an elective assembly. Philippine surrendered, and Samar Island against the Moros in 1902 and politicians continued to strive for and Batangas Province had been fought a series of arduous cam- independence, even as they worked pacified, ending Aguinaldo’s dream paigns. While these jungle cam- peaceably with the American civil of an independent republic. On paigns influenced a new generation governor and the appointed Philip- July 4, 1902, when President of Army officers, the battles with pine Commission, which was ini- Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed an the Moros were much like 19th-cen- tially dominated by Americans. In end to the Philippine Insurrection, tury clashes with Native Americans 1901 the commission included in the western U.S.10 three Filipinos, and by 1913, Filipi- By 1915 the Moro Province had nos filled the majority of civil- been pacified to the point that on administrative positions, including March 22, Governor Frank W. Car- five of the nine seats of the Philip- penter was able to convince the pine commission.12 sultan of Jolo, Jamalul Kiram II, to In 1916, Congress passed the relinquish his rights to political Jones Act, which openly stated that rule. With that agreement, America intended to grant Philip- Moroland came completely under pine independence once a stable U.S. rule, if not into complete inte- government was fully established. gration with the Philippines’ To that end, the appointed Philip- Christian majority.11 pine Commission was disbanded and replaced by the elective Philip- A new era pine Senate. The Philippine Beginning with Taft in 1901, U.S. Assembly was also renamed the Library of Congress presidential appointees governed House of Representatives. In an Soldiers of the Philippine Constabulary the Philippines for 34 years. On effort to appease Moro separatists stand in formation in Manila, 1907. July 1, 1902, the U.S. Congress in the South, two seats in the Sen- ate, and nine in the House of Rep-

6 Special Warfare resentatives, were reserved for appointees who represented the non-Christian populace. The Amer- ican civil governor retained veto power, and U.S. citizens had immu- nity from Philippine legislation, but the Philippines was moving toward self-rule.13 In March 1934, Congress passed the Tydings-McDuffie Act, which presented a 10-year plan for the transition to Philippine independ- ence. In spite of certain restric- tions, the new law did provide a road map to independence. As required by the law, a constitution- al convention convened in July 1934, and on Feb. 8, 1935, the con- vention approved the Philippine Constitution. On Sept. 17, 1935, in fulfillment of the second requirement of the Library of Congress Tydings-McDuffie Act, a national Members of the Philippine Legislature during the 1920s. election was held. Manuel L. Quezon was elected president, was established on Nov. 15, 1935, ment cooperation with the Japan- and his former rival, Sergio marking the beginning of what ese, a considerable resistance Osmeña, was elected vice-presi- was supposed to be a 10-year movement developed among the dent. This pattern of selecting transition to independence.14 farming classes.15 vice-presidents from the opposi- Although as many as 75 Philip- tion party continues today. The World War II pine guerrilla groups organized, Commonwealth of the Philippines The march to independence was very few coalesced because the delayed slightly when the Japan- numerous islands isolated the ese attacked the Philippines on groups and because many groups Dec. 8, 1941. In spite of valiant had self-serving agendas. Most efforts by U.S. and Philippine groups received very little U.S. troops in such battles as those on materiel support. the Bataan Peninsula and on Cor- One of the best-organized regidor, the U.S.-Philippine forces groups, the communist Hukbala- had all been captured or had sur- haps (People’s Army to Fight the rendered by May 1942. The Philip- Japanese), or HUKs, savaged rivals pine government, still led by Que- in central Luzon who opposed their zon and Osmeña, went into exile in post-war plans. In addition, Christ- the U.S. Those political leaders left ian guerrillas seldom sided with in the Philippines walked a fine the Muslim Moros on Mindanao. line between collaborating with the Still, the first priority for all groups Japanese and cooperating just was the expulsion of the Japanese enough to mitigate the effects of occupation forces. Only after the occupation on the populace. Japan Japanese were defeated and the sought to enlist Filipino support by Philippines was back on the road to declaring Philippine independence independence would the guerrillas National Archives in October 1943. In spite of Japan- return to their individual causes, A Philippine guerrilla scout during World ese efforts, and in spite of govern- which ranged from land reforms to War II. Moro sovereignty.16

September 2004 7 Traditionally, the U.S. had and “arms, ammunition and imple- dence. Economic reforms with focused on the northern islands, ments of war.” The act also allowed great symbolic importance, includ- especially Luzon, in building Pacif- him to detail officers and enlisted ing a land-redistribution program, ic defense bastions like Corregidor. men from the U.S. Army, Navy and were initiated. Magsaysay Despite greater attention being Marine Corps to assist the Philip- presided over civic-action projects given to liberating the north by pine armed forces. In 1947, the that were designed to improve the General Douglas MacArthur in Joint United States Military Advi- lot of the rural population.19 1945, the southern islands became sory Group, or JUSMAG, was To enlist allied support for the strategically important because established to fulfill this assistance United Nations’ effort in Korea, they served as staging bases for mission, a role it maintains to this Congress extended military assist- U.S. aircraft attacking Japanese day.18 In addition, responding to ance another year, authorizing $16 forces on Borneo. However, the Russia’s growing influence in East- million for Korea and the Philip- southern airfields at Zamboanga, ern Europe, Congress approved pines, with specific language that Mindanao and Sanga Sanga, off $27,640,000 in military assistance addressed the HUK guerrilla Tawi-Tawi Island, proved invalu- for the Philippines, Iran and South insurgency.20 Congress’s attempt able when the Allies experienced Korea as part of the Mutual at winning support was not lost on unexpected delays in getting newly Defense Assistance Act of 1949. Magsaysay, and the Philippines captured Japanese airstrips on was among the first countries to Borneo operational. At about the Military advisory groups send an expeditionary force to same time, a loosely organized In September 1950, Ramon Korea, establishing a legacy with Muslim guerrilla “division” from Magsaysay was appointed by the the U.S. military in Korea. the southern islands fought along- Philippine president as secretary In 1951, the U.S. and the Philip- side the Americans on Mindanao.17 of national defense. He quickly pines signed the Mutual Defense began implementing programs Treaty, which formed the founda- Philippine independence that attacked the causes, as well as tion of U.S.-Philippines relations Almost a year after the war the symptoms, of insurgency in the up through the 1980s.21 At home, ended, on July 4, 1946, the Philip- Philippines, relying heavily on Magsaysay won a landslide victory pines proclaimed its independence, JUSMAG assistance. Military and became president in 1953. He per the Tydings-McDuffie Act, and reforms protected the peasants used the armed forces to support Manuel Roxas was inaugurated as from the Philippine armed forces his civic-action campaign, while he the first president of the republic. and the HUKs alike. Political continued to rely on JUSMAG for Roxas’ election signaled to the reforms ensured honest elections monetary and training support. By HUKs and other peasant groups and worked to recapture confi- 1953, JUSMAG officers even that the elites were once again in accompanied AFP troops as control of the government and that “observers.”22 land reforms would not be forth- The HUKs, who had never been coming. The HUKs subsequently able to mount a strong ideological disinterred their hidden weapons crusade, began to lose support and proceeded to incite a rebellion because the programs of Mag- on Luzon, promising overdue saysay’s Economic Development social, economic and political Corps offered more land and social reforms that the newly independ- reform than the communists were ent government and its supporter, likely to deliver. The HUK rebellion the U.S., would not produce. had virtually ended by December In 1946, in response to the new 1955, when Congress authorized communist insurgency, the U.S. U.S. forces and appropriated funds Congress passed the Philippines specifically for counterinsurgency Military Assistance Act, authoriz- efforts in the Philippines.23 ing the president to provide Philip- In March 1957, during his sec- pine forces with military instruc- USASOC Historical Archive ond term in office, President tion and training, maintenance Philippine president Ramon Magsaysay Magsaysay was killed in a plane services for military equipment, presided over a number of beneficial reforms. crash on Cebu. Vice President Car- los P. Garcia became president in a

8 Special Warfare subsequent election, and in 1959 insurgents regain much of the influ- basis of their personal loyalty, not he renegotiated the status of some ence they had lost under their ability, and by encouraging a U.S. military installations in the Magsaysay. Muslim secessionists in corrupt patronage system at every Philippines. The agreement ceded the southern Philippines were also level. The resulting AFP dealt to the Philippines a considerable causing trouble, and an aura of law- harshly, and ineffectively, with the amount of land that had been lessness permeated the country. growing communist and Muslim reserved by the U.S. for military Turning the situation to his insurgencies, often resorting to bases but left unused. In 1965, Fer- advantage in September 1972, brutal tactics in dealing with civil- dinand E. Marcos replaced Garcia Marcos suspended the constitu- ians, which served only to as president of the Philippines. Re- tion, declared martial law and strengthen the insurgencies the elected in 1969, Marcos ruled as a imposed censorship. The measures AFP was trying to quell.26 dictator from 1972 until his deposi- The U.S. maintained close ties tion in 1986.24 with the Marcos regime, even as During Marcos’ second the two countries renegotiated Marcos regime trade and defense agreements. In Under Marcos, a number of term, a combination of 1979, the U.S. and the Philippines events significantly affected Phil- political corruption, seri- signed another amendment to the ippine relations with the U.S. mili- Military Bases Agreement of 1947, tary. In the mid-1960s, the U.S. ous economic problems, emphasizing Philippine sovereign- completed negotiations concerning ty over the bases and again reduc- the status of U.S. military person- decaying social programs ing the bases’ total area. Marcos nel and bases in the Philippines. In and human-rights abuses finally ended martial law in 1981, 1965, provisions similar to the and he was overwhelmingly re- NATO Status of Forces Agreement helped communist insur- elected president that year. were adopted to settle issues of Although the well-publicized criminal jurisdiction over U.S. mil- gents regain much of the assassination of opposition leader itary personnel. A 1966 amend- influence they had lost Benigno Aquino Jr., on Aug. 21, ment to the original 1947 agree- 1983, escalated domestic turmoil ment establishing U.S. bases in the under Magsaysay. Mus- and invoked formal complaints by Philippines moved the expiration the U.S. government, senior Ameri- date for U.S. base rights to 1991.25 lim secessionists in can officials, congressmen and the In addition to renegotiating the southern Philip- military, preoccupied with per- terms for U.S. military presence in ceived Soviet threats, continued to the Philippines, Marcos deployed a pines were also causing support the Marcos regime. civil-affairs brigade task force to In February 1986, anxious to supplement U.S. war efforts in trouble, and an aura of reaffirm U.S. support for his Vietnam for three years. The task lawlessness permeated regime, Marcos held an early pres- force was comprised of an engineer idential election. To his astonish- construction company, a mecha- the country. ment, although the regime-friendly nized infantry company and an National Assembly ratified the cor- artillery battery (for security). Con- rupt election results, various rebel tinuing a pattern of assistance that were supposedly instituted to factions united in protest. Between had been established during the counter the insurgencies, but they Feb. 22 and 24, the ranks of pro- Korean War, this act of support also effectively controlled the polit- testers grew to include religious garnered additional economic aid ical opposition. With the country officials, children and even military and military assistance for the under martial law, Marcos and his officers. Philippines. allies exploited their new power Finally tiring of Marcos, the U.S. During Marcos’ second term, a and practiced “crony capitalism,” threatened to suspend all foreign combination of political corruption, economic strategies designed to aid to the Philippines unless Mar- serious economic problems, decay- make them rich while ostensibly cos stepped down, and U.S. ing social programs and human- enacting critical land reforms. Embassy officials quietly boycotted rights abuses helped communist Marcos also undermined the the inauguration. Realizing that he AFP by promoting officers on the no longer had U.S. support, Marcos

September 2004 9 and his wife, the infamous Imelda, bat-ineffective and politicized the insurgent groups. While some abandoned the capital and left the AFP had become and how inade- insurgent groups later entered country in defeat.27 quate U.S. assistance had been to into peace agreements with the change the situation.30 government, the more radical A new leader With U.S. base rights due to groups refused to negotiate, turn- With Marcos’ self-imposed exile, expire in 1991, Aquino’s govern- ing instead to banditry and terror- opposition candidate Corazon ment began negotiations with the ism. In May 1998, Joseph Estrada Aquino took office as president of U.S. in 1990 to define future mili- was overwhelmingly elected presi- the Philippines, an office that she tary relations between the Philip- dent. His term in office was quick- had rightfully won in the elections. pines and the U.S. ly stigmatized by allegations of Aquino successfully fought off Philippine concerns over sover- corruption, and in January 2001, numerous coup attempts over the eignty had been increasing for Estrada was forced from office and next few years, sometimes with decades, and they were height- replaced by his former vice-presi- U.S. military support. Following ened by the awareness that sover- dent, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. As Aquino’s accession to power, the eignty prerogatives that the U.S. well as inheriting a faltering econ- U.S. Congress twice boosted aid to accorded Panama in the Canal omy, Arroyo faced aggressive ter- the Philippines. House Resolution rorist threats in the south, where 4515, of July 2, 1986, provided an the Abu Sayyaf Group and the additional $100 million in econom- Moro National Liberation Front, ic support funds, or ESF, and $50 as well as other splinter groups million in military assistance. On with Islamist agendas, were Oct. 20, 1986, the minimum ESF becoming increasingly bold in for the Philippines was set at $200 their kidnapping and bombing million for 1987.28 campaigns. Despite U.S. programs of foreign internal defense, or FID, during Decline of the Philippine army Aquino’s term in office, the prob- The 1990s were a period of lems of insurgency grew. A recalci- uncertainty in U.S.-Philippine rela- trant government bureaucracy USASOC Historical Archive tions, and America reduced its purposely delayed critical political Philippine President Gloria Arroyo speaking security-assistance funding signifi- improvements and economic mea- to the United Nations. cantly. As a result, the Philippine sures, exacerbating serious social military declined measurably in problems and furthering insur- Treaty settlements had not pre- terms of its operational capabili- gent causes. The AFP, while seem- vented American intervention in ties, logistics, professionalism and ingly incapable of combating that country in 1989. In 1991, the morale. The Philippine govern- insurgencies, attempted four U.S. announced plans to close ment’s 1999 ratification of the Vis- coups against President Aquino. Clark Air Force Base, initiating a iting Forces Agreement restored Still, Congress continued to sup- turnover of the base to Philippine protections to U.S. military person- port the Aquino government. military and civilian interests. Fil- nel during combined exercises and In 1989, U.S. support to the ipino insurgents’ threats to evict raised the possibility of resuming Philippines included $124 million American forces from perpetually exercises in the Philippines as part in ESF, $125 million in military leased bases increased pressure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Cobra assistance and the promise of $50 for the handover, and the June Gold training series in the Pacific million for land reform if the Phil- 1991 eruption of Mount Pinatubo theater.32 ippine government could create a hastened the departure of the U.S. In 2001, President Arroyo suitable program. In 1990, Con- military. By late 1992, the U.S. requested U.S. help in suppressing gress appropriated $40 million for had closed all its military installa- the continually escalating insur- developmental assistance and tions in the Philippines.31 gent threat in the south and agreed $125 million for military assist- In 1992, Fidel Ramos succeeded to allow U.S. forces to train Philip- ance,29 but the murder of U.S. ser- Aquino as president of the Philip- pine troops to be more effective in vicemen during the base-rights pines. In accordance with his plat- the new Global War on Terrorism. negotiations revealed how com- form of unification, the Ramos When U.S. special-operations administration began talks with

10 Special Warfare forces arrived in the Philippines, Public Law 329, 731, 733; Senate Report No. they carried, in addition to their 1068, 1991-2003, and Senate Report No. rucksacks, the baggage of more 703, 2250, 2277. 21 Walter G. Hermes, The United States than 100 years of military and Army in the Korean War: Truce Tent and political tensions between the two Fighting Front (Washington, D.C.: Center of allies. Military History, 1992), 68-69; Billy C. Mossman, The United States Army in the Korean War: Ebb and Flow November 1950- July 1951 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Dr. Cherilyn A. Walley is a histo- Center of Military History, 1990), 24, 26, 29. rian on the staff of the USASOC 22 Smith; Marion, “Opening the Second Historian’s Office. Front.” 23 Greenberg, 104-11. 24 Notes: Collins, 121-22. 25 1 Alan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For Dolan, 49-62. 26 the Common Defense: A Military History of Dolan, 48-49. 27 the United States of America (New York: The Dolan, 52-55. 28 Free Press, 1994), 299-300. Collins, 197-98; Dolan, 55-62. 29 2 Brian McAllister Linn, The U.S. Army 100 Statute 710 at 726 (Public Law 99- and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine 349); 100 Statute 3341, 3341-214, and 3341- War, 1899-1902 (Chapel Hill: The Universi- 21 (Public Law 99-591). 30 ty of North Carolina Press, 1989), 12-17. Collins, 197-98. 31 3 Linn, 21-22. Collins, 197-98. 32 4 Millett and Maslowski, 307. Brigadier General Donald C. Wurster, 5 Linn, 17-19. interview with Forrest L. Marion at Camp 6 Linn, 23-25. Zamboanga, Republic of the Philippines, 31 7 Gregorio F. Zaide, Philippine Political March 2002, stored in the classified and Cultural History, Volume II: The Philip- archives of the USSOCOM History Office. pines Since the British Invasion (Manila: Philippine Education Company, 1956), 224. 8 Millett and Maslowski, 311-13. 9 John M. Collins, America’s Small Wars (Dulles, Va.: Brassey’s, 1991): 91-92. 10 Millett and Maslowski, 337-38. 11 Zaide, 245-46. 12 Zaide, 240-45; Ronald E. Dolan, ed., The Philippines: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.:Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1993), 32-33. 13 Dolan, 32-33. 14 Zaide, 313-18; Dolan, 38-39. 15 Dolan, 38-41. 16 Collins, 111-12. 17 Robert Ross Smith, The United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacif- ic: Vol. 10: Triumph in the Philippines (Washington, D.C., 1963); Forrest L. Marion, “Opening the Second Front: Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, January- August 2002,” USSOCOM classified draft history of JTF-510, stored in the classified files of the USSOCOM History Office, MacDill AFB, Fla. 18 U.S. Code Congressional Service, 1946, Public Law 454, 306; Lawrence M. Green- berg, The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a Successful Anti-Insurgency Oper- ation in the Philippines, 1946-1955 (Wash- ington, D.C.: Analysis Branch, U.S. Army Center of Military History), 99-102. 19 Collins, 121-22. 20 U.S. Code Congressional Service, 1949,

September 2004 11 Multiple Insurgent Groups Complicate Philippine Security

by Dr. C.H. Briscoe and Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Downey

or more than a century, the Philip- People’s Army, or NPA, which was founded pines has struggled with unrest. in 1969. As the successor to the Hukbala- FToday, that unrest continues as vari- hap, or HUK, insurgency of ous ethnic, religious and political factions the 1940s and 1950s, the compete for control of the country, often NPA has always sought to using terror as a means to their end. overthrow the Philippine Four main insurgent factions, along republican regime. Although with various splinter groups and crimi- the NPA has been engaged nal organizations spread throughout the in peace talks since 1986, it continues republic’s more than 7,000 islands, cur- guerrilla operations, primarily on Luzon rently threaten the Philippines. Claim- Island. The group also claimed responsibil- ing that all the factions are actually ity for the assassination of U.S. Army “money-seeking thugs” rather than ideo- Colonel Nick Rowe, founder of the special- logically oriented insurgents, the Gov- operations Survival, Evasion, Resistance ernment of the Republic of the Philip- and Escape Course, in 1989. The NPA pines, or GRP, officially refers to all maintains a small presence in northern insurgent groups as “bandits” rather Mindanao, but it has done little in the pre- than as terrorists or rebels. That stance dominantly Muslim southern Philippines. enables the GRP to refuse any interna- tional antiterrorism assistance that Moro National Liberation Front might conceivably infringe on Philippine The Moro National Liberation Front, or sovereignty. MNLF, was founded in the 1960s to push for In spite of official protests to the con- Moro autonomy in the southern Philippines. trary, the Philippines are indeed both a In 1972, under the leadership of Nur Misuari, target and a producer of terrorism. It is the group esca- this latter role, more than any other rea- lated its efforts son, that has recently focused the attention to the level of of the United States military on the south- guerrilla war- ern Philippines. fare. After more than two New People’s Army decades of The most serious insurgent threat in the armed conflict, the MNLF and the GRP Philippines is the militant arm of the Com- signed a peace agreement in 1996, signal- munist People’s Party, known as the New ing the MNLF’s metamorphosis from an

12 Special Warfare armed faction to a political entity. The activities, the MILF has been conducting peace agreement called for the creation of peace negotiations with the GRP since the Autonomous Region in Muslim Min- 1997, and it signed a formal peace agree- danao, or ARMM; the appointment of Nur ment in 2001. Misuari as governor of the ARMM; and the integration of 5,500 ex-guerrillas into the Abu Sayyaf Group Armed Forces of the Philippines, or AFP, The U.S. has been most concerned with and the Philippine Navy. the emergence of the third major insurgent Many in the MNLF, however, felt faction in the southern Philippines, the betrayed by Misuari’s peace negotiations, Abu Sayyaf Group, or ASG. Abdurajak Jan- taking particular umbrage at the conces- jalani, a teacher influenced by fundamen- sions he had negotiated for himself. Over tal Islamism, founded the group between the next five years those dissatisfied mem- 1990 and 1992. Janjalani, a radical MILF bers of the MLNF pushed for Misuari’s dis- unit commander who had fought in missal as governor. In April 2001, the GRP Afghanistan in the late 1980s, adopted the finally removed Misuari on charges of graft nom de guerre Abu Sayyaf (Father of the and corruption. That act prompted other Sword) from a celebrated Afghan resist- members of the MNLF who were loyal to ance leader, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. Misuari to form the Misuari Renegade Originally organized to fight against the Group, or MRG, which began conducting Philippine government in the cause of an terrorist attacks in Jolo and Zamboanga. independent Muslim rule for Basilan, Jolo In the wake of these attacks, Misuari fled and Tawi-Tawi, the ASG has also become to Indonesia, where he was subsequently an extortion and kidnap-for-ransom gang. arrested, returned to the Philippines, and In assuming the revolutionary struggle for imprisoned on Luzon. While the MRG con- Muslim independence, the ASG sought to tinued its bombing campaign and became gain the attention of other Islamic coun- involved in attacks on the AFP, the MNLF tries and to garner the international fund- continued its primarily political activities.1 ing that was provided to the MNLF prior to the establishment of the ARMM. The ASG Moro Islamic Liberation Front also maintains tenuous ties to al-Qaeda.2 In 1978, MNLF members who were dis- In 1992, the ASG launched its first oper- gusted with Nur Misuari’s leadership of the ations, mainly bombings in the Zamboanga group broke away to form the Moro Islamic area of Mindanao. The following year, in Liberation Front, or MILF, and continued addition to bomb attacks, the ASG began militant resist- its signature activity: kidnapping foreign- ance against ers for ransom. The AFP, focused on the the Philippine larger MNLF and MILF groups, did not government. consider the ASG to be a legitimate threat The MILF has until the spring of 1995, when a well-exe- become the cuted attack devastated the Christian strongest and town of Ipil. Fifty dead civilians and sol- most active insurgent group in the south- diers, as well as more than 100 wounded, ern Philippines, as well as the most vocally changed the AFP’s and the U.S. Pacific anti-American. Although Mindanao is its Command’s assessments of the ASG. The primary area of operations, the MILF has group’s more than 100 attacks soon elevat- support cells based on Basilan Island. Dur- ed it to regional-threat status with the U.S. ing 2002, terrorists with links to the MILF Pacific Command. repeatedly bombed Manila’s business dis- Periodic well-coordinated major attacks trict and transportation system. The MILF continued until December 1998, when has recently been linked to the Indonesia- members of the AFP killed Janjalani dur- based Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist organi- ing a shootout on Basilan Island. As a tes- zation. In spite of its continued terrorist tament to his importance to the GRP, Jan-

September 2004 13 jalani had been the country’s most wanted Indonesia-based Jamaah Islamiya and ele- man, with a “dead or alive” reward of 1.5 vating the organization’s fight to a higher million pesos. His demise most likely level — Islamic jihad.4 Shortly afterward, prompted the transition of the ASG from the group’s bombing campaign escalated an ideologically motivated organization dramatically. into a primarily kidnap-for-ransom group The ASG has ensured that it would that also used bombings to extort money become the primary focus of the Philip- from the local population in a terrorist ver- pine government’s antiterrorism atten- sion of the protection racket.3 tion in recent years by conducting high- visibility kidnappings of Western foreign- ers. To build notoriety, the ASG has held Originally organized to fight against the Philip- American hostages on Basilan with impunity, and it has even beheaded some pine government in the cause of an independ- of its victims. It is the ASG with which U.S. forces have had to contend most ent Muslim rule for Basilan, Jolo and Tawi-Tawi, directly as they have conducted military the ASG has also become an extortion and kid- training and civic-assistance missions in the southern Philippines. nap-for-ransom gang. In assuming the revolu- tionary struggle for Muslim independence, the Dr. C.H. Briscoe is the command histori- ASG sought to gain the attention of other an for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. Islamic countries and to garner the internation- Lieutenant Colonel Dennis J. Downey is the al funding that was provided to the MNLF prior deputy commander of the 1st SF Group and is to the establishment of the ARMM. a former commander of Joint Special Opera- tions Task Force-Philippines.

In early autumn 2002, the ASG initiated Notes: a month-long bombing campaign on Min- 1 1st SF Group Philippine Islands brief for historian (January-December 2002), dated 5 May 2003, in the danao. The campaign eventually spread to classified files of the USASOC History Office, Fort Manila and other parts of the Philippines Bragg, N.C. in response to increased AFP patrols. On 2 Abu Sayyaf Group Primer, 27 April 2000, last Sept. 19, 2002, two bus bombs were found updated 27 September 2001, from Forrest L. Marion, in southern Mindanao — one was defused, “Opening the Second Front: Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, January-August 2002,” USSO- but the other, in Zamboanga, exploded and COM classified draft history of JTF-510, stored in the killed a guard. Eight days later, ASG classified files of the USSOCOM History Office, leader Khadaffy Janjalani (brother of MacDill AFB, Fla. Abdurajak) appeared on Radio Mindanao 3 Marion, “Opening the Second Front.” and called for a Muslim offensive against 4 Classified interview with Lieutenant Colonel Duane Dillard (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 6 U.S. forces in the Philippines. The Pak- May 2003, Fort Lewis, Wash., tape recording in the istan-educated leader called on “all believ- classified files of the USASOC History Office, Fort ers in the oneness of Allah and who fear Bragg, N.C. the day of judgment to do their sacred duty to protect the interest of Islam and strike at its enemies, both foreign and local.” After promising attacks against Ameri- can civilian and military targets in retalia- tion for continuing government offensives against rebels, Janjalani announced that the ASG would change its name to Islamic Movement, thereby affiliating with the

14 Special Warfare Rugged Terrain Makes Philippine Islands Haven for Insurgent Groups by Dr. C.H. Briscoe

he Republic of the Philippines, located in Southeast Asia, compris- Tes 7,107 islands that are bounded by the Philippine Sea on the east and the South China Sea on the west. The Philip- pines lie south of Taiwan, northwest of Malaysia and north of Indonesia. The Philippines’ largest island, Luzon, is home to the capital city, Manila. The nation’s second largest island is Min- danao. Approximately 250 miles to the northwest of Mindanao is Palawan, a resort area that became widely known in 2001 following the kidnapping of 20 indi- viduals, including two American mission- aries, Gracia and Martin Burnham. Defense Mapping Agency Extending south from the Zamboanga The topography of Basilan causes most of the island’s res- Peninsula of Mindanao is the Sulu Arch- idents to live along the perimeter of the island. The rugged ipelago, which includes the islands of interior provides good defenses for guerrilla groups. Basilan, Jolo and Tawi-Tawi. During the ongoing Global War on Terrorism, the palm-tree plantations predominate, and United States military’s interest has casaba melons are grown in adjacent focused primarily on the island of Basi- fields. Inland, a triple-canopy jungle is lan, only 12 miles south of Zamboanga. prevalent, resulting in good natural Basilan measures approximately 40 cover and concealment, as well as in good miles east to west and 25 miles north to defensive areas for guerrilla forces. south. Basilan is also part of the Autonomous Because of the topography of the Region in Muslim Mindanao, a self-gov- island, most of Basilan’s residents live in erning territory populated predominant- the lower elevations, along the perimeter ly by Muslims. of the island. In fact, the majority of the 330,000 residents live in and around the major cities. Dr. C.H. Briscoe is the command histo- The perimeter of the island is almost rian for the U.S. Army Special Operations entirely cultivated. Rubber, coconut and Command.

September 2004 15 Balikatan Exercise Spearheaded ARSOF Operations in the Philippines

by Dr. C.H. Briscoe

he Global War on Terrorism, Philippines, or AFP, to combat or GWOT, brought a new terrorism and restore popular TUnited States military pres- confidence in the national gov- ence to the Philippines. The U.S. ernment. In a number of inci- military had conducted large dents during July and August peacetime joint training exercises 2000, the ASG kidnapped anoth- in the Philippines during the early- er 30 hostages, including U.S. cit- to-mid 1990s, including the suc- izen Jeffrey Schilling. The inci- cessful Balikatan exercise, until it dents prompted PACOM to offer was dropped from the Cobra Gold training help to the Government series after 1995. With the increase of the Republic of the Philip- in insurgent activity in the south- pines, or GRP. ern Philippines during the late 1990s, the U.S. began to follow Mobile training teams Philippine military activities with of confronting terrorism in the In September 2000, Admiral renewed interest. Philippines and refocused U.S. Dennis C. Blair, commander of efforts to help the Philippine mili- PACOM, accompanied by officers Terrorist activity tary enhance its capabilities and from the Special Operations When U.S. citizens became its joint operability. Command, Pacific, or SOCPAC, targets of the Abu Sayyaf Group, or In April 2000, the ASG threat- traveled to Manila to brief lead- ASG, leaders of the U.S. Pacific ened to kill Americans in the Phil- ers of the GRP and the AFP on Command, or PACOM, began to pay ippines and then seized 20 Western the concept of a mobile training special attention to terrorist fac- foreigners at a resort in Sipadan, team, or MTT, designed to train tions and to develop strategies for Malaysia. These two developments and equip a company-sized unit helping the Philippines deal with compelled PACOM to closely track to respond to the escalating ter- threats to its internal stability. all terrorist groups and to begin rorist threat. President Joseph Even before terrorists attacked developing strategies for combat- Estrada rejected the American the U.S. on Sept. 11, 2001, ing terrorism in the region. offer of assistance, but when Balikatan had been revived, and Focusing on the Philippines as Estrada was forced out of office in the U.S. military was already train- a historic ally and as a critical January 2001, his replacement, ing Philippine troops to more effec- theater for the struggle against Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, proved tively combat terrorism in their terrorism, PACOM began to look to be much more amenable to own country. The events of 9/11, at training-assistance options de- PACOM’s offer of assistance. however, emphasized the necessity signed to upgrade the capabili- Under Arroyo’s leadership, the ties of the Armed Forces of the

16 Special Warfare GRP invited PACOM to send an the terrorist group raided the Dos countering ASG terrorism. MTT to train the AFP in more Palmas Resort on Palawan Island, The TCAV team, after visiting effective counterinsurgency tech- kidnapping 17 Filipinos and three Manila, Zamboanga and Basilan, niques in the southern Philippines. Americans, including missionaries reconfirmed the deficiencies that In March 2001, Company B, 1st Martin and Gracia Burnham. affected the AFP’s ability to con- Battalion, 1st Special Forces duct effective combat operations Group, out of Okinawa, began TCAV visit against terrorist groups: A mar- training the first AFP light reac- After the LRC completed train- ginal communications structure, tion company, or LRC. ing in July, it was sent south to ineffective civil affairs, limited LRC training was conducted in Basilan Island, the ASG’s sanctu- mobility and a lack of the intelli- phases in order to develop soldiers’ ary and its staging base for the Dos gence fusion needed to support tactical skills at the individual Palmas raid. operations.3 level before progressing to squad, Unfortunately, the LRC’s com- platoon and company tactics and to mand and control, or C2, had not Combating terrorism live-fire field operations. been clearly established before During November and December departure, which drastically 2001, SOCPAC and its components reduced the company’s effective- worked to develop a training ness. Attempting to address the package that would improve the C2 issue, Brigadier General Don- AFP’s capability to conduct inter- ald Wurster, commander of SOC- nal defense and thereby combat PAC, and Colonel David terrorism. Fridovich, commander of the 1st In addition to the TCAV’s recom- SF Group (now a brigadier gener- mendations, the planners had a al), scheduled a meeting for Sept. grim logistics and maintenance 11, 2001, to discuss incorporating assessment from PACOM focusing a terrorist coordination and on the key AFP mobility systems, assistance visit, or TCAV, into the including aircraft, trucks and USASOC Historical Archive initial-planning survey for Exer- naval patrol craft. The assessment A Philippine SF soldier takes aim during a cise Balikatan 02-1. found many of the assets to be training exercise. The meeting’s emphasis shift- under-supported, with repairs tak- ed abruptly, however, with that ing longer than they should have “Since the vast majority of day’s terrorist attacks in the U.S. because of a lack of parts and American instructors teaching The SOCPAC staff quickly know-how. leadership, professional ethics, focused on identifying al-Qaeda Because the state of its mobility responsibility and small-unit tac- connections in the region in systems severely hampered the tics were SF noncommissioned order to help PACOM develop its AFP’s ability to conduct effective officers, the young Philippine Southeast Asian GWOT cam- operations, any effort to upgrade sergeants and junior officers in paign plan. The TCAV planning the AFP’s capability would have to the LRC quickly grasped the was left to Fridovich, and the include a long-term logistics and advantages of empowered leaders assessment trip was pushed back maintenance-support plan.4 at all levels. That was a real suc- to October.2 Evidently the GRP gave serious cess story,” said Major Marty The SF-heavy TCAV included attention to the SOCPAC/PACOM Cromwell (pseudonym) of the 1st planners from the 1st SF Group, recommendations. During Presi- SF Group.1 Naval special-warfare units and dent Arroyo’s Nov. 19-23, 2001, Despite their students’ improve- the Air Force’s 353rd Special visit to Washington to meet with ments, the SF trainers assessed Operations Group. While the President George W. Bush, the two the AFP’s tactical capabilities as planners considered military national leaders affirmed their weak, and their equipment as poor. interdiction to be important, the intent to continue working on a It was obvious why terrorist groups majority of the AFP belonged to vigorous, integrated plan for were enjoying success against the the army, and the anticipated strengthening the AFP’s capabili- AFP. mission of the exercise would be ty to combat terror and protect The ASG’s superiority was dri- to train and advise the AFP in Philippine sovereignty. ven home on May 27, 2001, when

September 2004 17 One of the keys to bringing Philippine troops up to speed was ensuring that they had up- to-date equipment, like this body armor being issued to Philippine soldiers. USASOC Historical Archive The plan included a robust pack- killed and 100 wounded, while ment. “It was a unique mission, age of training, assistance and just over 100 insurgents were because in one sense SF was mobility equipment. After Presi- killed during the week the bat- ‘training, advising, assisting and dent Bush pledged to provide $100 tles lasted.5 maintaining,’ but the location million in military assistance was a combat zone where AFP (including a C-130 transport air- JTF-510 soldiers were fighting the Abu plane and 30,000 reconditioned M- In response to the terrorists’ Sayyaf Group,” observed 16 rifles) and $4.6 billion in eco- aggression, PACOM activated a Cromwell.7 nomic aid, Arroyo agreed to allow standing joint task force, JTF- the U.S. military to deploy to the 510, that would plan and prepare Gearing up Philippines to “advise and assist to implement the first phase of While the SF companies and the AFP.” Operation Freedom Eagle as part teams began their UW mission Arroyo also undercut the ter- of Exercise Balikatan 02-1. In planning, the staff of the 1st SF rorists’ political support by sus- deference to the Philippines’ sen- Group began preparing a state- pending Nur Misuari, leader of sitivity to sovereignty issues, the ment of requirements for support- the Moro National Liberation 1st Battalion, 1st SF Group, mod- ing the GWOT in the tropics with Front, or MNLF, from the gover- ified its initial plan. Rather than all three of the group’s battalions. norship of the Autonomous use Exercise Balikatan as a It would be a major environmental Region in Muslim Mindanao, or springboard for conducting a shift for the two battalions based ARMM. combined unconventional-war- at Fort Lewis, Wash. In response to his dismissal fare, or UW, campaign against Those battalions found that they by President Arroyo, Misuari terrorism in the Philippines, U.S. lacked items necessary for conduct- declared war against the GRP forces would advise and assist ing operations in a tropical combat on Nov. 19. Four hundred the AFP in internal defense and zone: multiband interteam radios MNLF fighters loyal to Misuari development.6 (PRC-148s); mobile satellite anten- formed the Misuari Renegade The SOCPAC and PACOM nas; additional PRC-112 radios; Group and attacked the AFP staffs labeled their effort the and individual jungle uniforms, airfields on Jolo and at Zam- GWOT Southeast Asian Cam- boots, field equipment and body boanga City. Although the AFP paign, a name that connoted their armor. The battalions were forbid- successfully defended both air- regional and long-term involve- den to purchase the equipment fields, 60 AFP troops were

18 Special Warfare using operations funds, so they had advise, assist and maintain” mis- with the Philippine headquarters to rely on the standard supply sys- sion, Fridovich planned to use SF elements down to the battalion tem. Because special-operations companies from all three battal- level. FOB 11, commanded by Lieu- elements already engaged in OEF- ions, rotating the forward-operat- tenant Colonel Douglas Mandarin Afghanistan received a higher pri- ing-base, or FOB, mission, as well (pseudonym), acted as the back- ority from the U.S. Special Opera- as the companies, every six- bone of the Army special-opera- tions Command, or USSOCOM, months. FOB 11 planned for the tions task force, or ARSOTF, of U.S. Army Special Operations first hand-off and redeployment JTF-510 and was aligned with the Command, or USASOC, and the period to be from May 1 through 1st Infantry Division (Forward) or U.S. Army Special Forces Com- June 15, 2002.9 Task Force Comet (Forward), at mand, or USASFC, most new After the Christmas holidays, Isabela, Basilan, when it arrived equipment arrived after the SF the advance echelons, or on Feb. 12. With the ADVONs detachments were already in the ADVONs, of the 2nd and 3rd Bat- already in place, the remainder of Philippines. talions’ companies began deploy- the 1st Group personnel began One exception to the late supply ing to Okinawa to coordinate bil- deploying into Basilan on Feb. 17, situation was the individual emer- lets and training areas for the 2002, getting Phase I of Exercise gency medical package, an item forthcoming SF detachments. The Balikatan under way.12 that proved to be most critical. SF teams, three per company, The ARSOTF was also responsi- The 24-hour helicopter medical rotated through the northern jun- ble for the two SF detachments evacuation plan was “soft” for life- gle training area and the various (180 at Isabela and 150 at Lami- threatening injuries or wounds, firing ranges as part of their UW tan) that supported the 103rd because of the unreliability of the mission prep. The 1st SF Group’s Infantry Brigade Army Task UH-1 Huey helicopters of the Phil- ADVON, which included a C2 ele- Group Thunder, which controlled ippine Air Force, or PAF, during ment, “slices” of the headquarters the northern half and southeast- the day, and basic time-distance and headquarters company and ern sector of Basilan, and SF B- issues for the MH-47Es of the the general-support company, detachment 120, which supported Army, which were supposed to and two more detachments for the 2nd Marine Brigade Task handle night rescues. force protection, followed them. Group Tornado at Maluso in the Aircraft of Company E, 160th By Jan. 28, 2002, the group tacti- southwest sector. Special Operations Regiment, cal operations center, or TOC, was The detachments were located were initially based at Mactan fully operational on Okinawa.10 throughout the area of opera- Air Base, Cebu, with the C-130P tions, or AO. SF Detachment 114 aerial refuelers of the 351st Spe- Exercise opening was located at Abungabung with cial Operations Wing based 350 On Jan. 29, Fridovich with his the 1st Marine Battalion Landing miles north of Basilan Island. group C2 pilot team flew directly Team. SF Detachment 125 was Both locations were too far from from Kadena Airbase, Okinawa, to posted in the north central part the area of operations to make Edwin Andrews Air Base in Zam- of Tornado’s area of operation, night extractions practical. The boanga, Mindanao. Two days later, with the 5th Marine Battalion PAF Hueys were much closer — on the official opening day of Exer- Landing Team, and SF Detach- only 20 minutes flight time away cise Balikatan, SF detachments ment 126 advised the Marine at Zamboanga, Mindanao — but 112 and 134 joined the 1st SF Force Reconnaissance Battalion the aircraft were unreliable, and Group commander to provide at Libak. their pilots had no training in antiterrorist protection and force SF Detachment 143 was night operations.8 protection for the C2 element, the assigned to advise the Civil Aug- Anticipating approval of the JTF-510 ADVON on Basilan. These mentation Force Geographical counterterrorism mission, Fridovich detachments would later rotate Unit, or CAFGU, at Mahebal. SF decided to establish his initial stag- between the Quick Reaction Force Detachment 153 advised the 32nd ing base at Torii Station, Okinawa. and the Zamboanga forces training Infantry Battalion at Tipo-Tipo, This would allow the SF detach- mission.11 and SF Detachment 163 supported ments to focus on mission prepara- In order to establish rapport the 18th Infantry Battalion from tion and to train in the jungle with the AFP, the three companies Yacan. SF Detachment 134 was before they deployed to the Philip- and their detachments were based tasked to “train, advise and assist” pines. Facing a long-term “train, the LRC. Other detachments were

September 2004 19 assigned to the infantry and camp perimeter further out — in helping to meet the needs of Marine battalions for a one-year beyond hand-grenade range — and the populace on Basilan. To that rotation on the island.13 to clear fields of fire all around. end, the teams were tasked to The Philippine soldiers then built conduct security assessments of Force protection fighting bunkers to defend the all the Basilan villages. Because the AFP had very little camp, and they staked and The SF Soldiers were also told to in the way of heavy firepower, the stretched barbed wire along the determine the needs of the popu- SF teams had to provide their own outer perimeter. Those simple lace by surveying at least 60,000 of force protection. Heavy-weapons improvements greatly enhanced the 350,000 residents on the fire support for the AFP brigades force protection for the SF teams island.17 The JTF furnished a 70- and battalions stationed on Basi- and the Philippine military. The question survey form, heavily ori- lan consisted of two pre-Vietnam AFP later contracted bulldozers to ented toward civic and humanitar- War vintage M-101 105 mm how- build marksmanship ranges and ian programs, with a March 31 itzers. Each fired a single round to further improve the camp assessment-completion date. To daily into the AO as harassment defenses. While they waited for fulfill the security aspect of their and interdiction fire. Additional the ammunition, the Soldiers took mission, the SF teams developed firepower for the battalions con- advantage of down time by teach- force-protection plans for each vil- sisted of a variety of 81 mm mor- ing basic individual tactical skills lage that would support future tac- tars (the tubes, base plates and and schooling the junior officers tical offensive operations. sights had been manufactured in and sergeants in leadership, plan- In a survey of more than 100 three different countries), and a ning and defensive measures.16 communities, the SF detachments few Simba armored personnel car- Shortly after it arrived, JTF- found that the Christian villages riers that had inoperable guns.14 510 changed the ARSOTF’s prior- were relatively safe, and that Phil- The teams consequently relied on ities from making tactical assess- ippine forces rarely visited Muslim their HMMWV-mounted MK-19s ments of the AFP’s needs for villages. AFP units would not enter and .50-caliber heavy machine counterterrorism training to a Muslim stronghold without over- guns. improving the legitimacy of the whelming strength, because they Unlike the SF units preparing GRP through the use of the coun- wanted to be prepared to fight the for Afghanistan, the 1st Group Sol- terinsurgency model, or COIN. entire village, not just the ASG or diers did not receive additional PACOM was determined to get MNLF fighters hidden inside.18 ammunition on Okinawa for use in the Philippine military involved The SF teams “expected to shoot or qualifying on the heavy-gun sys- tems, nor did they receive M-240 machine guns, claymore mines for self-protection or smoke grenades for marking medevac landing zones. Balikatan was still catego- rized as a training exercise, so SF Soldiers got off the MH-47Es on Basilan carrying only 5.56 mm M-4 carbines, M-203 grenade launch- ers, 9 mm Beretta automatics and hand grenades.15 Base-camp security was greatly enhanced after the arrival of the SF teams. Because many of the Philip- pine soldiers had their families liv- ing with them, the Americans stressed the necessity of providing more secure living conditions for women and children. They encour- aged the soldiers to push the outer USASOC Historical Archive A Philippine soldier moves through Basilan Island’s dense foliage while on patrol.

20 Special Warfare months, and the maps were more than 40 years out-of-date. Vital language skills were also lacking on the teams. Among the 1st SF Group personnel who ini- tially deployed to the Philippines, only two Soldiers were of Filipino descent. While their Tagalog lan- guage skills were useful with Chavacano, a combination of Taga- log and Spanish, they helped little with the Tausug and Yacan dialects that are common to Basilan and the southern Philippines.22 Training the AFP Once the teams had taken appro- priate force-protection measures, they were able to focus on their pri- mary mission: training the AFP. U.S. Army photo The SF Soldiers’ initial operational American aviators train Philippine soldiers in casualty evacuation during the Balikatan exercise. assessments of the tactical profi- ciency of the AFP battalion ele- to be shot in the Muslim villages.19 tion and to warn him of potential ments confirmed the findings of In spite of improvements to the guerrilla activity. Because more the PACOM TCAV in mid-October security situation, SF teams often than 5,000 former MNLF fighters 2001. Those assessments formed found themselves having to had been integrated in the AFP as the basis of a long-term military- depend on local AFP for force pro- part of the Tripoli Accords in 1996, training strategy for correcting the tection. In the north central area the compromising of current opera- AFP’s tactical shortcomings on of the Task Group Thunder AO, SF tions was an ever-present danger, Basilan. The basic concept for Detachment 184, led by Captain and Ordeñez used his own agents training was that the detachment James Brown (pseudonym), was to try to counter that threat.21 commanders, team sergeants and based with the AFP’s 10th The SF teams were initially intelligence sergeants would focus Infantry Battalion at Calvario. unable to contribute much in the on teaching the military decision- The primary focus of the battalion way of intelligence resources. Nei- making process; the planning and commander, Lieutenant Colonel ther current information nor intel- execution of basic joint operations; Ray Ordeñez, was the Christian ligence came down from the battal- the simple fusion of various town of Lantawan, an ASG breed- ion to the detachments operating sources of intelligence in planning ing ground and hometown of the on Basilan — JTF-510’s intelli- future operations; and the method Hapilon brothers, two well-known gence focus was elsewhere. With for exploiting emerging situations. guerrilla leaders.20 Ordeñez kept the exception of occasional close- The rest of the team would teach track of what was happening in hold photo imagery, the team com- the basics: troop-leading proce- his AO by providing troops for vil- manders could contribute little to dures, rifle marksmanship, map- lage security and by employing the AFP battalion commander’s reading and land navigation and intelligence agents. His security planning efforts besides intelli- individual combat-lifesaving skills. arrangement with Lantawan’s gence fusion. Because the Philip- From fire team through platoon mayor was to keep squad-sized pines had been off PACOM’s “radar level, they instructed the troops in elements in the outlying villages screen” for almost 10 years, up-to- small-unit tactics, live fire, maneu- on a rotational basis to augment date map sheets (1/50,000 scale) ver and immediate-action drills. CAFGU personnel. were not available when the teams Training progressed through com- In addition, Ordeñez maintained deployed. The most current tactical pany level following the crawl- a number of intelligence operatives maps arrived after the SF teams walk-run methodology. Progress in the villages to collect informa- had been “on-station” nearly two

September 2004 21 was impeded by the fact that each “company” available for training operations consisted of only 20 sol- diers, with the balance of the com- pany, the NCOs, being detailed to supervise CAFGU detachments and to fulfill other responsibilities. As part of their training pro- gram, SF teams accompanied AFP troops on patrols as often as possi- ble, which was permitted only dur- ing the last 415 days of JTF-510’s presence in Zamboanga. As SF Detachment 184, attached to the AFP 10th Infantry Battalion, found out, patrolling could be more USASOC Historical Archive complicated than expected. At his SF teams were welcome on AFP patrols because they could call for casualty evacuations using battalion headquarters, Ordeñez their satellite telephones. kept a company-sized strike force ready to act on intelligence leads. approved by the JTF. Thereafter, lifesaving. With the extra medical The strike force served as his pri- the detachment commander need- and casevac support provided by mary agent for attacking the ASG, ed only telephonic approval from SF teams, the AFP soldiers more and it received the majority of the the company commander. The solu- willingly engaged the enemy.25 training provided by Detachment tion allowed SF teams to accompa- 184. Conducting split-team opera- ny AFP troops on seemingly spur- CAFGU training tions, half of the detachment of-the-moment operations.24 SF teams also trained members taught individual and collective Despite the fact that Basilan had of the CAFGU. Each week, one or training, while the other half been a live-fire situation for more two members of the CAFGU accompanied the battalion’s than a decade, the Philippine sol- would attend the individual and patrols. diers and marines stationed there collective training with the 10th Split-team operations were sup- were not proficient jungle fighters. Battalion elements. These village portable because the AFP units They were certainly no match tac- civil guards wore mixed uniforms rarely conducted operations after tically for the guerrilla forces oper- and carried a variety of older dark.23 Still, the necessity for SF- ating from the remote areas of American military rifles: Vietnam detachment personnel to have the Basilan. A typical firefight resulted War-era M-14s, World War II-vin- JTF’s approval before accompany- in one AFP killed and three AFP tage M-1 Garands and even pre- ing the infantry battalion com- wounded; many of the casualties World War I M-1903 Springfields. manders on each operation became were the result of friendly fire. Disbanded in the early 1990s for an administrative nightmare for ASG casualties were light unless alleged human-rights violations detachment commanders. To pre- the guerrillas resorted to conven- during the Marcos regime, the clude compromise, the AFP battal- tional tactics. SF teams were wel- CAFGUs had been resurrected in ion commanders typically kept come on AFP patrols, not only remote areas, like Mindanao, movement plans to themselves because they were trainers, but where the AFP presence was until just before departure. also because they could call for reduced. Because the SF teams could not casualty evacuations, or casevacs, CAFGU personnel were autho- participate in operations without using their satellite telephones. rized to carry weapons and ammu- permission from the JTF, they were Staff Sergeant Ronald Vandergrift nition only when “in uniform.”26 unable to go on missions when they (pseudonym), an SF Detachment Two AFP NCOs supervised each had only five minutes notification, 184 medic, applied his combat-life- CAFGU detachment. By regulation, and their credibility was called into saving skills and administered the NCOs controlled all CAFGU question. FOB 11’s solution was to intravenous fluids after the fire- ammunition — in response to an write an all-encompassing concept fights, and he was eventually able incident in which CAFGU person- of operations and get it pre- to train the Filipinos in combat-

22 Special Warfare nel shot and killed their AFP super- stayed there. SF Detachment 186 16 rifles that had been promised by visors.27 The next scheduled orien- quickly assessed the battalion’s President Bush would do much to tation training for CAFGU troops level of training, equipment and improve AFP combat effectiveness was months away, so SF Detach- soldier morale. The officers were at the tactical level. ment 143 conducted a “train the tactically proficient, but because Instead of improving the battal- trainer” class for the more senior enlistment terms were indefinite ion’s overall readiness, however, members of the CAFGU: those 30 to in the Philippine army and the 55th Infantry Battalion com- 40 years of age. Training that group marines, the sergeants were basi- mander wanted SF Detachment proved to be difficult, because while cally just older soldiers. When offi- 186 to select, organize and train a the group members were receptive cers were not around, no one was in reconnaissance platoon of 30 sol- to the training, they proved to be charge. In addition, “the M-16 rifles diers to act as his strike force. The complacent about their regional- could not be zeroed — rear-sight more experienced SF Soldiers on guard responsibilities. adjustment knobs and the front the team prepared a training pro- The CAFGU veterans, most of post sights were frozen solid. gram to accomplish this. They whom were illiterate, had little hope started with basic rifle-squad tac- and regarded their peacekeeping tics and rehearsed immediate- role as meaningless. To compound The AFP emphasizes action drills that would prepare matters, U.S. Title 10 restrictions property control, not the platoon for combat operations. prevented the Americans from con- Then, while refining collective tac- ducting training using their unit maintenance. When a tical training, they focused on indi- basic load of ammunition. The AFP vidual soldier skills, including com- had no .30-caliber ammunition for soldier enlists, he is bat lifesaving and basic NCO lead- the CAFGU M-1 rifles and 1903 issued a basic set of ership. They selected the best Springfields and only belted 7.62 marksmen for sniper training.31 mm ammunition for the M-14s. In equipment, including In May 2002, intelligence the end, the SF trainers resorted to reports indicated that two Ameri- conducting small-unit tactical train- ammunition, for which can missionaries who had been ing in patrolling and reconnaissance. he is ever after respon- kidnapped by the ASG in May SF Detachment 186, assigned to 2001, Martin and Gracia Burn- advise the 55th Infantry Battalion sible, and for which he ham, had been moved from Basi- at Isabela, was based at Sugpan- lan to Zamboanga del Norte, some gan in the mountainous center of must account — down distance from Zamboanga City. the island. It had a much different to the last bullet — upon AFP Major General Glicerio Sua experience from Detachment 184, directed the staff of the AFP’s 1st according to Staff Sergeant Vance leaving the AFP. Infantry Division to develop plans Wood (pseudonym), although the for finding and rescuing the Burn- two teams were in the same north- Equipment and weapons mainte- hams, and Operation Day Break central AO. While Isabela had nance was not in the AFP lexicon,” began. 50/50 mix of Christians and Mus- Wood stated.29 The Burnham rescue became lims, the majority of the villages in The AFP emphasizes property all-encompassing for the AFP: the mountainous interior were pre- control, not maintenance. When a Blocking ASG resupply and dominantly Muslim. Because the soldier enlists, he is issued a basic escape routes required all ele- 55th commander considered all set of equipment, including ammu- ments of the AFP to get involved interior roads to be “ambush nition, for which he is ever after in the operation. Several of the alleys,” he insisted that the Ameri- responsible, and for which he must battalions from Basilan that had cans travel in their pickup trucks account — down to the last bullet — been preparing for major combat with Simba APC escorts in the upon leaving the AFP. Such an operations against the ASG were front and rear.28 arrangement discourages handling reassigned to mainland Mindanao The 55th Infantry Battalion the equipment, even for cleaning to hunt for Abu Sabaya, the ASG maintained three company-sized and maintenance.30 (The PACOM leader holding the kidnapped camps. While platoon-sized combat logistics and maintenance assess- Americans. As a result, many of patrols went out daily, they avoided ment in September 2001 had cited the SF detachments on Basilan the low areas because the ASG the same problems.) The 30,000 M- were left with only remnants of

September 2004 23 the units that they had been teams aggressively tackled their lance, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel tasked to train. extended mission in the remain- Lucero, the battalion commander, ing weeks of Balikatan. Having went to civil authorities to obtain Advisory teams authorized acquired ground-truth awareness a warrant for Sabaya’s arrest, as Secretary of Defense Donald about the operational capabilities required by law. Lucero was pri- Rumsfeld’s long-awaited order of the infantry companies, the marily responsible for the 18th allowing American SF teams to teams were ready to move against being the AFP’s “best infantry advise and assist AFP company- the ASG, but they bumped into a battalion,” and he was widely level tactical operations came conservative JTF that screened considered to be incorruptible. shortly after the Burnham rescue concepts of operations, or His proper actions in this case, mission. When the PACOM execu- CONOPs, closely to mitigate risk. however, compromised the mis- tion order arrived on July 1, 2002, CONOP approvals took between sion, because they allowed cor- it was somewhat anticlimactic to 24 and 48 hours, often negating rupt officials to leak information permit “advisory teams down to the exploitation value of intelli- about the raid to the ASG. Sabaya company level,” because the Amer- gence leads.34 was long gone when the 18th ini- ican hostage situation had been The commander of SF B- tiated its raid.36 resolved. By then, the official end Detachment 170, Major Clark date for Exercise Balikatan 02-1 Saunders (pseudonym), stated Balikatan ends was little more than a month away, that SF Soldiers actually per- While the JTF-510 headquarters and the JTF was already hard at formed the role of trainer and continued to “draw down” during work planning its redeployment. adviser for company field opera- August after the formal closing cer- The SF teams had four weeks to tions where “the guys were in the emony for Exercise Balikatan 02-1, train and advise at the company thick of it.” The major advantage the remaining SF detachments on level and to accompany units on of working with the rifle compa- Basilan provided security for patrols against the remaining ASG nies in the field was that after humanitarian assistance-funded on Basilan. The PACOM command- ascertaining strengths and weak- projects that were still ongoing: er had retained the approval nesses, the SF Soldiers could The drilling of several deep-water authority to expand advisory work more assertively train the units wells, and the conducting of site to the ASG home islands of Jolo and effectively advise the leaders. surveys for schools and medical and Tawi-Tawi.32 When the Americans began rou- clinics to be constructed later in In retrospect, Wurster had a tinely participating in AFP com- the year. While the SF Soldiers more pragmatic view of the pany operations, morale for both were no longer officially advising expanded mission: “Significant groups rose: The SF Soldiers were and assisting the AFP units on tactical success” in the Philip- anxious to “get in the fight,” and Basilan, the rapport they had pre- pines in the few weeks remaining the Filipinos patrolled more viously established helped to main- was not realistically achievable, aggressively because the U.S. Sol- tain the government’s positive and the possibility of killing some diers had the ability to call for relationship with the people, a ASG terrorists did not outweigh helicopter casevacs.35 relationship that was critical to the the risks to American advisers. Early in April, a raid by the triangular COIN model. When the The SOCPAC commander wanted AFP’s 18th Infantry Battalion on Joint Special Operations Task to impress on the AFP the value the house of the mayor of Tubu- Force-Philippines was formed in of unity of planning efforts, of ran demonstrated the positive late August 2002, Wurster kept SF rapid adaptation to current intel- results of the mission planning B-detachment 170 and four SF A- ligence and of fused operations and rehearsals stressed by SF B- detachments on Basilan to contin- from brigade down to company detachment 150. Unfortunately, ue “overwatching” the HA projects level, because the joint opera- the raid also demonstrated how in progress.37 tions center would know exactly the pervasive corruption in the Even as Osama bin Laden and where all the ground forces were. AFP and GRP could negate tacti- his terrorist group were preparing This was not a change from his cal improvements. According to to attack the U.S., the Philippines original long-term AFP training agent reports, the mayor was har- were already experiencing an and education focus.33 boring the most outspoken ASG increase in domestic terrorism. Still, the tactically-oriented SF leader, Abu Sabaya. Having Concerned with a sudden upsurge placed the house under surveil-

24 Special Warfare in Islamist activity in the southern 12 Brown and Wood interview; Eagle Free- 30 Schwartz interview. Philippines, leaders of PACOM and dom brief. 31 Brown and Wood interview. 13 32 SOCPAC capitalized on a change of 1st SF Group Philippine Islands brief for Marion, “Opening the Second Front.” historian (January-December 2002), dated 5 33 Marion, “Opening the Second Front.” Philippine leadership, as well as May 2003, hereafter cited as 5 May 2003 34 Classified interview with Staff Sergeant the outpouring of support after brief; classified interview with Captain Michael Carter and Master Sergeant James 9/11, to expand their fight against Eldon Williams (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Upchurch (pseudonyms) by Lieutenant terrorism to the Philippines. Briscoe, 6 May 2003, Fort Lewis, Wash., tape Colonel Forrest Marion, 28 February 2003, recording in the classified files of the Fort Lewis, Wash., tape recordings in the USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, N.C., classified files of USSOCOM History Office, hereafter cited as Williams interview; clas- MacDill AFB, Fla. Dr. C.H. Briscoe is the command sified interview with Major Edward 35 Classified interview with Major Clark historian for the U.S. Army Special Dougherty (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, Saunders (pseudonym) by Lieutenant Operations Command. 7 May 2003, Fort Lewis, Wash., tape record- Colonel Forrest Marion, 28 February 2003, ing in the classified files of the USASOC Fort Lewis, Wash., tape recording in the History Office, Fort Bragg, N.C., hereafter classified files of the USSOCOM History Notes: cited as Dougherty interview. Office, MacDill AFB, Fla., hereafter cited as 1 Classified interview with Major Marty 14 Brown and Wood interview; Eagle Free- Saunders interview. Cromwell (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe dom brief. 36 Dougherty interview. and Dr. Kenn Finlayson, 20 June 2003, 15 Forrest L. Marion, “Opening the Second 37 Saunders interview. MacDill AFB, Fla., tape recording in the Front: Operation Enduring Freedom-Philip- classified files of the USASOC History pines, January-August 2002,” USSOCOM Office, Fort Bragg, N.C., hereafter cited as classified draft history of JTF-510 stored in Cromwell interview; classified interview the classified files of the USSOCOM Histo- with Lieutenant Colonel Duane Dillard ry Office, MacDill AFB, Fla.; Brown and (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 6 May Wood interview. 2003, Fort Lewis, Wash., tape recording in 16 Classified interview with Sergeant First the classified files of the USASOC History Class Peter Kenshaw (pseudonym) by Dr. Office, Fort Bragg, N.C., hereafter cited as C.H. Briscoe, 6 May 2003, Fort Lewis, Dillard interview. Wash., tape recording in the classified files 2 Dillard interview; classified interview of the USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, with Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Mandarin N.C., hereafter cited as Kenshaw interview. (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 23 May 17 Brown and Wood interview. 2003, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording in the 18 Brown and Wood interview. classified files of the USASOC History 19 5 May 2003 brief. Office, Fort Bragg, N.C., hereafter cited as 20 Brown and Wood interview. Mandarin interview. 21 Classified interview with Captain 3 Mandarin interview. Edward Wilkins, Captain James Brown and 4 Mandarin interview. Staff Sergeant Vance Wood (pseudonyms) by 5 Dillard interview. Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 6 May 2003, Fort Lewis, 6 On order, in support of Operation Free- Wash., tape recordings in the classified files dom Eagle, FOB 11 was to conduct UW of the USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, operations in the southern Philippines N.C., hereafter cited as Wilkins interview. through, by and with the AFP to assist the 22 Brown and Wood interview; classified GRP in the destruction of terrorist organi- interview with Major Robert Conrad (pseu- zations and separate the population from donym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 18 August 2003, those groups. JSOTF-P, “Enduring Free- Fort Lewis, Wash., tape recordings in the dom-Philippines brief,” undated. classified files of the USASOC History 7 Cromwell interview. Office, Fort Bragg, N.C., hereafter cited as 8 Mandarin interview; classified interview Conrad interview. with Captain James Brown and Staff 23 Brown and Wood interview. Sergeant Vance Wood (pseudonyms) by Dr. 24 Brown and Wood interview; Cromwell C.H. Briscoe, 6 May 2003, Fort Lewis, interview. Wash., tape recording in the classified files 25 Brown and Wood interview. of the USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, 26 Brown and Wood interview. N.C., hereafter cited as Brown and Wood 27 Classified interview with Sergeant First interview. Class Mark Schwartz (pseudonym) by Dr. 9 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group, C.H. Briscoe, 19 April 2004, Fort Lewis, briefing (undated), “Operation Eagle Freedom Wash., tape recording in the classified files (S),” copy of briefing in the classified files of of the USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, the USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, N.C., N.C., hereafter cited as Schwartz interview. hereafter cited as Eagle Freedom brief. 28 Brown and Wood interview. 10 Eagle Freedom brief. 29 Brown and Wood interview. 11 Eagle Freedom brief.

September 2004 25 Wanted Dead or Alive: Psychological Operations During Balikatan 02-1

by Dr. C.H. Briscoe

sychological operations are an inte- or ASG, in the southern Philippines. gral part of any program of coun- In the wake of 9/11, the Army special- Pterinsurgency, and the Exercise operations forces, or ARSOF, community Balikatan-related campaign of unconven- focused on Islamist terrorists around the tional warfare conducted by United States world. The battalion of the Fort Bragg- Army special-operations forces in 2002 was based 4th Psychological Operations Group no exception. oriented on the U.S. Pacific Command, or In spite of a challenging operating envi- PACOM, focused its research efforts on countries with significant Muslim popula- tions and concentrated on developing appropriate target-audience analyses. Even as the 4th POG began targeting Muslim extremist groups in the southern Philippines, it sent a small military/civil- ian mission-planning cell to Hawaii to assist the staffs of PACOM and the Spe- cial Operations Command, Pacific, or SOCPAC, in developing the proposal for a regional campaign of the Global War on Terrorism. A large part of the resulting campaign plan focused on the Philippines as a criti- cal theater of operations in the Pacific region. The initial concept of operations called for a six to 10-person PSYOP ele- ment to support JTF-510, which was USASOC Historical Archive based at Zamboanga on the southern The “wanted” poster, a ronment, including media-driven force lim- island of Mindanao, and a tactical PSYOP product of the 4th POG, itations and residual Philippine suspicion detachment, or TPD, headquarters and was key in driving ASG of psychological operations, or PSYOP, three tactical PSYOP teams to support terrorists from the caused by abuses under the Marcos the U.S. forces operating on Basilan island of Basilan in the regime, PSYOP personnel were able to con- Island, just south of Zamboanga. Philippines. tribute to the effort to rescue two American The PSYOP element that the 4th POG missionaries, Martin and Gracia Burn- sent to the Philippines was a skeleton ham, from the terrorist Abu Sayyaf Group, operation: It had little print capability,

26 Special Warfare performed communication and research negativity toward ARSOF activities con- primarily through laptop-computer con- tributed to an already hostile operating nections and carried only small, portable environment in the Sulu Archipelago. The loudspeakers.1 media had to be taken into account as Although the 4th POG had developed a ARSOF conducted information activities rapport with the psychological-warfare in support of the counterinsurgency cam- personnel of the AFP during the annual paign. Despite the fact that JTF-510 oper- Balanced Piston and Balikatan exercises, ated a press center and embedded Philip- they could not use that rapport to fill pine journalists with AFP elements in PACOM’s lack of information on the Phil- Basilan, the activities of the Muslim guer- ippine media. The Philippine psychologi- rillas did not generate any significant dis- cal-warfare personnel were more interest- approval within the local population.3 ed in the Communist People’s Army — the One of the PSYOP Soldiers, Andrews, Hukbalahaps, or HUKs — the oldest, was able to establish a rapport with his largest and best-organized terrorist group host-nation counterparts by drawing on his in the Philippines, which operated primar- language abilities and his previous experi- ily throughout the central and northern islands. Fortunately, the primary Southeast Asia analyst in the 4th POG, Nate Godwin (pseudonym), had been staying abreast of the activities of Muslim insurgents in the southern islands and was well-versed in the ideologies and methods of the Moro National Liberation Front, or MNLF, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, or MILF, and the ASG.2 While Captains Roger Oswald and Cathy Hines (the TPD commander) worked with the 1st Special Forces Group, U.S. Army photo first at Fort Lewis and then at the 1st SF Two Filipino children read the “wanted” flyer. The flyer was Group’s initial support base on Okinawa, prepared by the 4th PSYOP Group as a means of gaining the remainder of the PSYOP element information about the ASG, an insurgent group that was deployed to the Philippines to prepare a holding two American missionaries for ransom. PSYOP support plan. On Jan. 23, Major Dan Helms and Sergeant Chuck Andrews ences in the Philippines. He had spent two (pseudonyms) briefed the plan to the years living and working with residents of deputy commander, the J3 and the Leyte and Samar, and he had learned to PSYOP staff officer at SOCPAC, Major communicate in Tagalog, Ilocano, Cebuano Rebecca Sims (pseudonym), the former and Waray-Waray, which gave him credi- commander of the Headquarters Support bility with natives and Americans alike. Company of the PACOM battalion. Andrews’ time in the Philippines also had In addition to developing and staffing given him an insight into the culture that the PSYOP annex to the operations plan, came in useful to both the PSYOP team or OPLAN, for Freedom Eagle, the opera- and the JTF staff. tion that comprised all operations against The initial idea for stimulating a flow of the ASG, the PSYOP team also had the new information about the kidnapped task of developing an appropriate strate- missionaries was to saturate the southern gy for handling the Philippine media. Philippines with baseball-type “trading Some segments of the Philippine media cards” of the ASG leaders to obtain infor- have a decidedly anti-American bias. The mation on their whereabouts as part of media loudly objected to the presence of the FBI’s “Rewards for Justice” program. U.S. Soldiers on Philippine soil. Media After collecting photos of prominent ASG

September 2004 27 leaders, Andrews used computer software but time was of the essence.”5 to create layouts for printing individual Having worked with the State Depart- trading cards. ment’s regional print center in Manila He realized that “wanted” posters would since Exercise Balikatan 1999, Andrews be more effective and simpler to produce. was familiar with the administrative The posters would enable the team to and financial details of preparing prod- simultaneously publicize the role of all the ucts.6 After getting approval, the PSYOP ASG leaders involved in the Burnhams’ team of only two people had 96 hours in kidnapping, instead of relying on chance to which to produce 3,000 large, glossy, get people to see every photo. After review- color posters and 15,000 color picture ing the legal implications, PACOM agreed leaflets featuring the top-ranking ASG to support the initiative as part of its com- leaders. The task took a considerable mand-information program, as long as the amount of scrambling, but it was done in posters were clearly marked as being prod- 72 hours, allowing the American ambas- ucts of the Department of State Diplomat- sador to announce the program at a spe- ic Security Service. The resulting tips on cial press conference on May 29, 2002. A the fugitives’ whereabouts had to be han- photo of Ambassador Frank Ricciardone holding an ASG wanted poster made the front page of the Manila-based Philip- The fact that cell-phone usage was wide- pine Daily Inquirer, and the story was carried by most Philippine news media spread throughout the Philippines was both outlets for a week. a challenge and an advantage to the U.S. in SOCPAC’s intent had been to do a “media blitz” — to distribute 3,000 posters its operations against the ASG. Virtually at the press conference and 24 hours later to saturate the Sulu Archipelago with six every Filipino had a cell phone, and covert focused leaflet drops. But just as the toll- text messaging of U.S. forces’ movements free Rewards for Justice telephone num- ber began to ring steadily with calls, and had already proved to be a major challenge text messages and e-mail traffic began to to force protection on the islands. flow, the follow-up air delivery of leaflets ran into legal problems.7 When the State Department assumed dled by the American Embassy, and indict- responsibility for the posters, the project ments had to be issued by the Justice planners no longer had the authority to Department before the posters could be use Department of Defense military air- publicly released.4 craft to transport and disseminate the For Andrews, it was an opportunity, in leaflets. The final legal determination his words, to “fulfill every PSYOPer’s was that the State Department had to dream — to design, produce and distribute reimburse DoD for the use of its aircraft. products in combat and see the results.” Brigadier General Donald Wurster, the “It would be the biggest success of my SOCPAC commander, considered the military career,” he said. “It blew the whole prompt delivery of the leaflets to be [standard] PSYOP production process out essential to sustaining the momentum of of the water,” but the desired results were the Rewards for Justice program: Ameri- achieved in the limited time allotted. The can lives were at stake. wanted posters and leaflets had to be Just as he had done to get critical printed in numerous dialects common to equipment to the Philippines in order to the southern Philippines. A Chavacana start the training of the national counter- woman, Carol Landers (pseudonym), terrorist Light Reaction Company in May helped with the translations into Tausulg, 2001, Wurster authorized the transport Yacan and Chavacano. Andrews observed, mission to be taken “out of hide” by using “They weren’t the best linguistic products, training flying hours. The State Depart-

28 Special Warfare ment paid a nominal $1 fee for the MC- likely that the PSYOP team’s efforts con- 130 flight, and the leaflets were distrib- tributed to the rescue. uted almost on schedule.8 Unfortunately for Andrews, distribution meant kicking the leaflets and posters out Dr. C.H. Briscoe is the command histori- of the airplane, and that did not occur an for the U.S. Army Special Operations until after his rotation. The closest he got Command. to seeing the project through, as had been his dream, was constructing the Notes: makeshift leaflet drop boxes and accumu- 1 Classified interview with Major John Matsumoto (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 7 January 2004, Fort lating the necessary static lines from the Bragg, N.C., tape recordings in the classified files of 1st SF Group. He had to be satisfied with the USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, N.C., here- 85 percent of his dream. Staff Sergeant after cited as Matsumoto interview; classified inter- Andy Keltner, Sergeant Al Norman and view with Staff Sergeant Weldon C. Andrews (pseudo- Major Bob Watson (pseudonyms) received nym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 9 January 2004, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recordings in the classified files of the the honor of actually distributing the USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, N.C., hereafter leaflets.9 cited as Andrews interview. The fact that cell-phone usage was wide- 2 Andrews interview. spread throughout the Philippines was 3 Andrews interview; classified interview with Lieu- both a challenge and an advantage to the tenant Colonel Douglas Mandarin (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 23 May 2003, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape U.S. in its operations against the ASG. Vir- recording in the classified files of the USASOC Histo- tually every Filipino had a cell phone, and ry Office, Fort Bragg, N.C. covert text messaging of U.S. forces’ move- 4 Andrews interview. ments had already proved to be a major 5 Andrews interview. challenge to force protection on the islands. 6 Andrews interview. 7 Matsumoto interview. In the case of the Rewards for Justice pro- 8 Matsumoto interview. gram, however, the easy access to cell 9 Andrews interview. phones facilitated the passing of confiden- 10 Gracia Burnham, In the Presence of My Enemies tial tips (verbally or by text message) to the (Wheaton, Ill.: Tyndale House Publishers, 2003), 246, phone numbers listed on the posters and 254. leaflets. The concept of offering money for infor- mation sat well with the Filipinos, too. The proffered rewards appealed to a culture in which a large portion of the population lives below the subsistence level. The exchange of money for information could work for the greater good in a poverty-rid- den society. The AFP rescued Gracia Burnham on June 7, 2002.10 The ASG had already moved the Burnhams and Deborah Yap, another hostage, from Basilan Island to a location north of Zamboanga City, on the island of Mindanao, sometime in April 2002, so it is debatable whether or not the reward posters and leaflets were the key to determining the whereabouts of the captives. Considering the timing, however — the operation took place less than two weeks after Ambassador Riccia- rdone promoted the wanted poster at his press conference in Manila — it is quite

September 2004 29 Civil Affairs: A Weapon of Peace on Basilan Island

by Dr. Cherilyn A. Walley

he entrenched nature of the terrorist pines were made during the post-9/11 flurry and criminal elements on Basilan of activity at the headquarters of PACOM TIsland in the Philippines led the and the Special Operations Command, United States to apply the counterinsur- Pacific. Company B of the 96th Civil Affairs gency, or COIN, model to its efforts of uncon- Battalion immediately began making plans ventional warfare, or UW, in the region. with the 1st Battalion of the 1st Special The COIN model emphasizes the relation- Forces Group, which is stationed in Oki- ships between the populace and the govern- nawa. By January 2002, the 96th had orders ment, between the populace and the insur- to send a CA team to the Philippines via gents, and between the military and the Okinawa. On March 10, 2002, several CA insurgents. In order to strengthen the crucial teams flew from their home at Fort Bragg, relationship between the populace and the N.C., to Okinawa, where they were attached Government of the Republic of the Philip- to the 1st Battalion, 1st SF Group.1 pines, or GRP, U.S. Army special-operations Before the CA teams even arrived in the- forces, or ARSOF, undertook a number of ater, 1st Battalion, 1st SF Group, kicked off Civil Affairs, or CA, projects on the island. Balikatan 02-1. In February 2002, SF per- Because of a force cap imposed by the U.S. sonnel, including a number of SF detach- Pacific Command, or PACOM, in response ments, had deployed to Zamboanga and to to restrictions of the GRP, which were a Basilan Island in order to train troops of response to public and political concerns the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or about possible violations of Philippine sov- AFP, in counterterrorism tactics. Joint ereignty, very few CA specialists were actu- Task Force 510 retained control of the ally deployed to the island. The CA effort operations of all U.S. special-operations was supplemented by activities of the Naval forces, or SOF, in the Philippines, and in Construction Task Group, or NCTG, com- late February or early March, the task prising Navy Seabees and Marine engi- force ordered the SF detachments to shift neers, and of Army Special Forces opera- their focus from making security-focused tional detachments. In addition to building assessments of the Basilan villages to con- schools, bridges and piers, improving roads ducting a general humanitarian survey and upgrading numerous water systems, that dealt with socio-economic trends and ARSOF personnel treated thousands of Fil- living conditions. The goal was to sample ipinos as part of medical civic-action pro- 60,000 of the island’s 350,000 residents by grams, or MEDCAPs, and dental civic- March 31 and to use the information to action programs, or DENTCAPs. place SF teams and AFP forces where they The plans for a CA mission to the Philip- could best strengthen the relationship

30 Special Warfare A map of Basilan Island shows some of the humanitarian-assistance projects that were planned during Exercise Balikatan 02-1. USASOC Historical Archive between the government and the people.2 CA assessments had been done: a complete The CA teams were prevented from fully CA survey was needed. To that end, the deploying to Basilan Island by PACOM’s team sergeant, Nelson, based himself in force cap. The Philippine press was sensi- Isabela, and Thomas and Larsen took a tive to the presence of American forces in two-week whirlwind tour of the island.4 the Philippines, insisting that their pres- The two spent one week surveying the ence was a violation of the Constitution of west side of the island, from Lantawan the Philippines. Because of the force cap, down through Sumisip, and one week sur- only one of the slated CA teams, CAT-A23, veying the east side, from Lamitan down to was able to deploy to Basilan Island. Sev- Tipo-Tipo. The survey revealed that no non- eral other CA teams were broken up, with governmental organizations, or NGOs, had some members left on Okinawa while oth- worked on Basilan since 1999, and that ers deployed to Zamboanga, on Mindanao. most of the islanders lived in distinctly sub- On March 24, 2002, three members of CAT- standard conditions. The insurgents had A23, Sergeant First Class Derek Thomas, driven away all schoolteachers and medical Master Sergeant Nelson and team medic personnel outside the predominantly Chris- Roger Larsen, (pseudonyms) arrived by tian villages of Lamitan and Isabela, leav- helicopter on Basilan Island. Two other CA ing the majority-Muslim islanders without Soldiers from CAT-A23 found berths on a adequate health care or educational oppor- boat with the Marines, where they could tunities. The water was not safe to drink, wait until spaces on the island opened up.3 and there was little or no electricity. When CAT-A23 arrived outside Isabela, Isabela, the largest city, was subject to it discovered that it had much more work brownouts, and in Lamitan, electricity was to do than had been originally indicated. sparse. Maluso and Sumisip had one or two The information the team had received private generators each, which provided spo- prior to deployment was that over the radic electricity to a few residents. By the years, the island had been repeatedly time the CA specialists returned to Isabela, assessed for humanitarian projects, and they had a much better idea of the projects that the CA teams would simply need to they needed to plan and execute. Upon their start planning and completing projects. return to Isabella the ship with the other CA The reality was that hardly any detailed team was given permission to land, and the

September 2004 31 number of CA Soldiers on the island doubled.5 from his personal abilities than from his While the primary CA mission was official position. The officer had grown up on humanitarian assistance, or HA, the teams the island, in Lamitan, and spoke all of the had to operate in the hostile environment island languages, which made him an of an island that so favored the Abu Sayyaf invaluable liaison for the CA Soldiers. Per- Group, or ASG, that the AFP used it as a haps even more useful were the officer’s con- live-fire training center. Thomas and nections with the local leadership. He Larsen, both SF-qualified, were in full seemed not only to know everybody of sig- agreement with the guidelines for force nificance, regardless of their religious or protection set down by JTF-510. The teams political affiliation, and he was respected as generally traveled in convoys of at least an incorruptible arbitrator. His presence four vehicles, one of which usually sported assured cooperation and safety, even in a mounted M-240B machine gun as a visu- ASG-controlled areas of the island.8 al, and actual, deterrent. The SF teams’ A telling example of the AFP marine standard operating procedure for entering officer’s influence, and the way that he Muslim villages was facilitated CA involvement on the island, to enter “guns up,” was his mediation of a conflict on a small recognizing that outlying island between a camp of the such villages often Moro Islamic Liberation Front, or MILF, harbored insurgent and two local village chiefs, according to forces. Even MED- Thomas. Thomas and a number of SF Sol- CAPs could be tar- diers, the officer and some of his own gets of ASG attacks, marines, rowed over to the island in small so AFP and SF per- boats. The Soldiers set up a MEDCAP in sonnel maintained a the center of one of the villages (whose close watch at all people had abandoned it out of fear of the gatherings.6 MILF), in order to entice the villagers Because of force- back with the offer of free medical care. protection require- Once the MEDCAP was concluded, the ments, the CA teams concerned parties met with the AFP remained close to the marine officer. When it became clear that SF teams as they the warring parties would not make peace conducted their plan- themselves, the officer indicated that if ning and execution. they did not work out a viable truce, he CAT-A23’s usual rou- would return with his entire battalion of tine was to travel marines and force them to get along. In from the forward Thomas’ words, everyone shook hands operating base in and agreed to a truce, albeit reluctantly.9 USASOC Historical Archive Isabela down to the A survey conducted by the SF detach- One of the primary CA advanced operating base in Maluso and to ments echoed many of the CA team’s conclu- projects was ensuring stay with various SF detachments in the sions regarding the state of the island’s residents had potable area for three to four days at a time, then humanitarian services. Using the data col- water, which was accom- move on to Sumisip and do the same. Once lected by the SF detachments on Basilan, the plished in part by drilling the assessments and plan were complete, JTF staff and AFP leadership developed wells. the CA teams would return to Isabela and plans of action for addressing the most press- turn in their reports.7 ing concerns of the populace and set priori- An important part of CA work is making ties for providing resources. Highest on the contacts among the local populace. The most list was the desperate need for potable water important connection Thomas made on to reduce the high childhood death rate Basilan was an officer in the AFP marines. caused by waterborne diseases. The next pri- He was the CA liaison for the AFP marine ority was improving local medical facilities battalion located in the southern part of and establishing clinics in areas where none Basilan Island, but his value stemmed more existed.

32 Special Warfare The third priority was improving the unauthorized water diversion) to bring transportation infrastructure: providing water to a distribution point. The pipe sys- all-weather roads, building and improving tem had the added advantage of being bridges and linking existing roads to create repairable by local Filipinos, unlike the a viable perimeter road that would help technologically advanced pump systems. commerce and would expand markets for Unfortunately, Thomas said, many of the agricultural products. These priorities gravity-fed systems were later downgraded became the focus of JTF and AFP efforts to wells. Either solution, however, was a during the early months of Exercise vast improvement of local water resources Balikatan, when infrastructure improve- and positively affected the island.12 ments benefited U.S. trainers and advisers Medical improvements were also a priori- and contributed to force protection.10 ty for ARSOF teams. Once PACOM In addition to planning humanitarian approved the MEDCAPs in the summer of projects, Thomas and Larsen were tasked 2002, they proved to be the most successful to act as CA liaisons with the Navy CA program on the island and were con- Seabees. Thomas noted that while the ducted not only by the CA teams, but also by Seabees were excellent at construction, SF detachments in the field. By the time SF they had little training in dealing with the Detachment 186 rotated out of the Philip- populace. The CA team would step in to pines, its members had arranged and sup- settle disputes or conduct preliminary ported between 20 and 25 MEDCAPs and negotiations between the Seabees and local DENTCAPs. Sergeant First Class Jack Wal- landowners or leaders. The CA Soldiers’ lace (pseudonym), an SF medic, also held a skill at working with the locals smoothed regular “sick call” for the local populace with the way for the Seabees a number of times, the help of AFP medics he had trained. It such as when the Seabees needed to ask a became a standard practice for SF medics to local farmer for permission to temporarily offer medical care to anyone who needed it.13 store some bridge-building equipment on The MEDCAPs were also ARSOF’s most his land. Thomas appreciated the opportu- effective tool in building good relations nity to prevent problems rather than to with the populace. Staff Sergeant Roger have to react to a bad situation, and the Madison (pseudonym), SF Detachment partnership between CA and the Seabees 114, was instrumental in taking heroic was beneficial to all concerned.11 measures to save a critically ill Muslim While the NCTG and the CA contingent baby. Madison administered lifesaving both placed potable water at the top of treatment until the JTF could arrange to their priority lists, they favored different transport the child to a hospital in Zam- solutions to the problem. The Seabees, boanga. In spite of everyone’s best efforts, whose area of responsibility included most of the eastern side of the island, favored wells as a solution to the islandwide prob- lem of polluted water. CA Soldiers are trained to assess situations according to the Special Operations Imperatives, which include ensuring that applied solutions are culturally appropriate and sustainable in the long-term. Thomas and Larsen con- cluded that gravity-fed pipe systems would last longer and would be more economical in the long run. While the wells had to be dug several hundred feet deep and required expensive USASOC Historical Archive and relatively fragile submersible pumps MEDCAPS proved to be the most successful CA program to operate, the gravity-fed pipe system and went far in winning the hearts and minds of the people. relied on simple pipes (buried to avoid

September 2004 33 the baby died in the hospital; however, dhist relief organization called Tzu Chi Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Mandarin assisted as well, and in the Christian village (pseudonym) noted, “The people from of Guisao, 718 people were treated. In the Geong, on the southern coast, were eter- Muslim area of Mariqui, a shantytown built nally grateful for the SF team’s gallant over the waters of Zamboanga harbor, SF efforts. From that time forward, the SF and AFP medical personnel treated 2,334 team could do no wrong in that area.”14 patients. Unfortunately, the ASG immedi- Less dramatic efforts were likewise ately countered the good feelings engen- rewarded with good feelings and accep- dered by the MEDCAPs with further terror- tance from the locals. One Muslim village ist bombings. leader expressed his deep gratitude In spite of the ASG’s retaliatory mea- when a medic removed a large, rusty sures, the MEDCAPs improved lives and fishhook from his five-year-old grand- won hearts wherever they were held. Vil- daughter’s thigh. A Christian village’s lagers in Tuburan were so won over that mayor was similarly grateful when an SF they warned U.S. and AFP forces of medic set the broken foot of one of the impending ASG attacks, realizing that if the American and AFP troops withdrew, the villagers would no longer benefit from In spite of the ASG’s retaliatory measures, the their humanitarian assistance.16 When SOF personnel deployed to the MEDCAPs improved lives and won hearts southern Philippines in 2002, they were wherever they were held. Villagers in Tuburan tasked with fighting the Global War on Terrorism by training a foreign military to were so won over that they warned U.S. and counter domestic terrorist threats, and to win local support for the Philippine gov- AFP forces of impending ASG attacks, realiz- ernment (and indirectly for the U.S.) by ing that if the American and AFP troops with- improving living conditions on Basilan Island. In the face of a hostile insurgent drew, the villagers would no longer benefit force, and hampered by lack of manpower and support, ARSOF nevertheless man- from their humanitarian assistance. aged to accomplish their training and humanitarian missions. village’s small children. By engendering The medical contributions alone justified positive feelings among the locals, the the SF and CA teams’ efforts, as by Novem- MEDCAPs became an effective force-pro- ber 2003, more than 30,000 people had tection measure. received treatment through ARSOF-spon- In September 2002, ARSOF achieved an sored MEDCAPs and DENTCAPs. In addi- impressive MEDCAP record on Basilan, tion to the medical programs, however, CA seeing 687 patients at Libug on Sept. 5; and SF teams improved water sources, 537 in Lumbang on Sept. 8; and 786 in the designed public-sanitation systems, con- Tubaran area on Sept. 9. On Sept. 11, SF tributed to infrastructure upgrades and personnel conducted the largest ever planned numerous other life-improving MEDCAP on Basilan Island, treating 1,028 projects. Each success and show of interest patients in one day. The next day, they saw in the well-being of the local populace 867 in Magcawa.15 served to further the ARSOF mission in Some of the most concerted MEDCAP the region.17 efforts, however, were performed in an effort The NCTG also accomplished its mission to offset the ASG’s influence. After the ASG of supporting the ARSOF training efforts. kidnapped four Mindanao State University By the end of their 60-day deployment, teachers on Sept. 13, ARSOF and AFP per- Navy Seabees had cleared, graded and com- sonnel simultaneously held two MEDCAPs pacted a 3,000-foot by 60-foot C-130-capable in large villages near Zamboanga City, serv- runway, and they had cleared eight heli- ing both Christians and Muslims. A Bud- copter landing zones used by the military

34 Special Warfare for further counterinsurgency and antiter- rorism efforts in the Philippines.

Dr. Cherilyn A. Walley is a historian on the staff of the USASOC Historian’s Office.

Notes: 1 Interview with Sergeant First Class Derek Thomas (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 5 December 2003, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording and notes in USASOC Classified Archives, Fort Bragg, N.C., here- after cited as Thomas interview. USASOC Historical Archive 2 Classified interview with Captain James Brown An SF medic’s removal of a rusty fishhook from a village and Staff Sergeant Vance Wood (pseudonyms) by Dr. leader’s granddaughter’s thigh won the leader’s support. C.H. Briscoe, 6 May 2003, Fort Lewis, Wash. Tape recording in the classified files of the USASOC Histo- ry Office, Fort Bragg, N.C., hereafter cited as Brown for casevacs. Seabees also repaired and and Wood interview; JSOTF-P Enduring Freedom- improved 80 kilometers of road, connecting Philippines briefing, n.d., in the classified files of the more overland routes to the all-weather USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, N.C. 3 Thomas interview. perimeter road, which enabled ARSOF and 4 Thomas interview. AFP troops to travel more quickly. The 5 Thomas interview. NCTG erected four bridges and built a pier 6 Thomas interview; Brown and Wood interview. at Lamitan to enable ARSOF resupply and 7 Thomas interview. to generally improve the port. In addition to 8 Thomas interview. 9 Thomas interview. the surface improvements, the Seabees also 10 1st SF Group Philippine Islands brief for historian drilled three much-needed deep-water (January 2002 through December 2002), 5 May 2003, in wells, which not only supported ARSOF per- the classified files of the USASOC History Office, Fort sonnel but also improved the lives of the Bragg, N.C. populace.18 11 Thomas interview. 12 Thomas interview. The purpose of having ARSOF in the 13 Brown and Wood interview; Thomas interview. southern Philippines was to reduce the 14 Classified interview with Lieutenant Colonel Douglas impact of terrorism in that area and in Mandarin (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 23 May the Southeast Asia region as a whole. To 2003, Fort Bragg, N.C. Tape recording in the classified that end, ARSOF applied the COIN model files of the USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, N.C. 15 Classified interview with Lieutenant Colonel to battling the terrorist and criminal Duane Dillard (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 6 activities on Basilan Island. The medical May 2003, Fort Lewis, Wash. Tape recording in the programs and infrastructure improve- classified files of the USASOC History Office, Fort ments sponsored and completed by Bragg, N.C. ARSOF, as well as the money the projects 16 Dillard interview. 17 1st SF Group Philippine Islands brief for historian infused into the local economy, however (January 2002 through December 2002), dated 5 May temporarily, went a long way toward 2003. improving feelings between the populace 18 Forrest L. Marion, “Opening the Second Front: Oper- of Basilan Island and the GRP, which is ation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, January-August one of the three critical relationships in 2002,” USSOCOM classified draft history of JTF-510, stored in the classified files of the USSOCOM History the COIN model. Office, MacDill AFB, Fla.; classified interview with The fact that ARSOF personnel always Captain Eldon Williams (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. dealt honestly with the populace also Briscoe, 6 May 2003, Fort Lewis, Wash., tape recording reduced corruption on the island, if only tem- in the classified files of the USASOC History Office, porarily. While time and resources were too Fort Bragg, N.C. limited to allow ARSOF to fully eradicate the insurgency, the efforts of CA, SF and NCTG personnel made a difference in the lives of the local population and laid the groundwork

September 2004 35 Impact of the Semipermissive Environment on Force-Protection in Philippine Engagements

by Dr. Cherilyn A. Walley

onducting a major joint com- exercise were laid out in the 1999 Pacific, or SOCPAC, at the U.S. bined training exercise in Visiting Forces Agreement in the Pacific Command, or PACOM, and Cthe semipermissive environ- exercise-specific terms of reference, at the 1st SF Group began develop- ment of the Philippines posed seri- or TOR, and in an appendix to the ing a regional campaign plan for ous challenges during the planning original Joint Task Force-510 opera- the Global War of Terrorism, or and execution of Balikatan 02-1, as tions order, or OPORD. Subsequent GWOT. The SOCPAC commander, well as during the security-assist- annexes to the OPORD clarified the Brigadier General Donald Wurster, ance missions that continued after ROE. Under the original ROE, armed considered Exercise Balikatan to the exercise ended. force up to and including deadly force be a contingency operation for the In 2001, the 1st Special Forces was authorized for U.S. troops in self- GWOT plan, so his staff and the Group was tasked to advise, assist defense and in defense or protection staff of PACOM planned it as a and train the Armed Forces of the of U.S. troops, U.S. citizens, Philippine peacetime combined exercise. Philippines, or AFP, to combat the forces and third-country citizens des- The commander of the 1st SF Abu Sayyaf Group, or ASG, the same ignated by JTF-510, as well as in pro- Group, Colonel David Fridovich, terrorist group that had kidnapped tection of AFP property and U.S. mis- and the commander of the 1st Bat- 20 Western hostages and in April sion-essential property. talion, 1st SF Group, Lieutenant 2000 had threatened to kill Ameri- The TOR also authorized the use Colonel Douglas Mandarin (pseu- cans. The first American hostage of U.S. assets and resources, in donym), headed a SOCPAC team held by the ASG, Jeffrey Schilling, combination with those of the AFP, for making a tactical capability was taken captive on Aug. 29, 2000, for medical evacuations. As it assessment visit, or TCAV, while on Jolo Island. In May 2001, Martin turned out, casualty evacuations, accompanying the larger PACOM and Gracia Burnham and Guillermo or casevacs, became necessary dur- planning-survey staff traveling to Sobero became the second, third and ing the course of the joint field the Philippines in preparation for fourth American citizens to be kid- exercises on Basilan Island. While Exercise Balikatan 02-1. napped by the ASG in the southern U.S. forces were not authorized to In accordance with the standard Philippines. In spite of the demon- initiate combat operations, they procedures for peacetime combined strated danger to American lives and were authorized to act in self- training exercises, the PACOM plan- the focus on counterterrorism by defense and in defense of others in ning-survey party was composed of both the American and Philippine their presence while they were on senior staff officers who met with governments, Balikatan was an field operations with the AFP. 1 their AFP counterparts in Manila, at exercise, and the rules of engage- During America’s heightened Mactan Air Base on Cebu, and in the ment, or ROE, were structured emotional state in the months Southern Command headquarters accordingly. immediately following 9/11, the at Zamboanga, Mindanao. In order The legal guidelines for participa- military and civilian planners at to complete the TCAV, Fridovich and tion by American Soldiers in the the Special Operations Command, his assessment team traveled to

36 Special Warfare Zamboanga and Basilan Island, the Mindanao because of his corruption. nied them as part of the Logistics projected area of operations for In light of the escalating terror- Civil Augmentation Program. Signif- Balikatan. Because of its remote ist threat in the southern Philip- icant repairs and construction location more than 500 miles south pines, President Arroyo accepted improvements were needed to house, of Manila, and because of its primar- President George W. Bush’s offer of feed, support and protect the JTF ily Muslim population, Basilan $100 million in military assistance headquarters, which would consist of Island had been both a safe haven (including a C-130 turboprop air- more than 300 personnel. Edwin and a training site for Philippine craft and 30,000 M-16 rifles) and Andrews Air Base’s flight line also insurgent groups for decades. $4.6. billion in economic aid. She required barriers to be installed for The Moro National Liberation also stated that she would allow protection against small-arms fire. Front, or MNLF, Moro Islamic Lib- the U.S. military to advise, train Force-protection considerations also eration Front, or MILF, and the and assist the AFP in the fight dictated that upon arrival, JTF air- ASG regularly engaged the local against the ASG, the group that craft and crews would have to be AFP battalions in combat. The AFP had been specifically targeting placed outside the operational area battalions moved between Basilan Americans earlier in the year. With at Mactan Air Base. Island and southern Mindanao on Arroyo’s decision, Exercise The PACOM operations order a two- to three-year rotation sched- issued in December 2001 set the tone ule that offered little opportunity for Exercise Balikatan. The exercise’s for enlisted soldiers to move up and The combination of TOR established a U.S. military force out of the region. The sergeant cap for the Philippines — 500 person- major of the 32nd Infantry Battal- neglect and lack of mili- nel for the JTF headquarters in Zam- ion had reportedly been in Basilan tary initiative created cir- boanga and 160 SF Soldiers on Basi- since 1976, when the battalion was lan Island, at the battalion level. Ini- first stationed on the island. cumstances that were tially, PACOM’s focus was to get the The situation had degraded to JTF headquarters operational before the point that AFP soldiers no less than ideal, not only troop elements arrived. Unfortunate- longer aggressively pursued the for the continuing pres- ly, that meant that when Fridovich insurgents. The AFP went so far as and his 1st SF Group command-and- to hire local guides instead of using ence and even growth of control group for ARSOF arrived at its own scouts on patrol, which Edwin Andrews on Jan. 29, 2002, ensured that the patrols would insurgent groups but JTF-510 had already exceeded the never purposely encounter oppos- also for the genesis of exercise-force cap limits. Fortunately, ing forces. The combination of the exercise’s area of operations, or neglect and lack of military initia- new terrorist and crimi- AO, was limited to southern Min- tive created circumstances that danao and Basilan Island, which put were less than ideal, not only for nal organizations. the U.S. air assets — aircrews, air- the continuing presence and even craft-maintenance personnel, the growth of insurgent groups but Balikatan became directly linked staff of the joint special-operations air also for the genesis of new terrorist to America’s GWOT. component, and aircraft at Mactan and criminal organizations.2 In accordance with Exercise Air Base on Cebu — outside the area In the middle of newly-appointed Balikatan’s new importance, the covered by the force cap. President Gloria Macapagal PACOM standing Joint Task Force- Two SF teams from the 1st SF Arroyo’s first official visit to Wash- 510 was activated for planning pur- Group, detachments 112 and 134, ington, Nov. 19-23, 2001, a combined poses. While Fridovich turned Torii arrived in the AO at the end of Janu- assault force from the MNLF and Station, Okinawa, into an initial ary to provide antiterrorist protection the Misuari Renegade Group staging base for deploying elements and force protection for the JTF head- attacked Jolo Air Base, inflicting of Army special-operations forces, or quarters and for the 1st SF Group’s heavy casualties on AFP forces and ARSOF, a PACOM engineer-survey advance echelons at Zamboanga and on local civilians. The attack was in team was sent to Camp Navarro at on Basilan Island. The detachments retaliation for Arroyo’s recent sus- Zamboanga, Mindanao, to identify, rotated between performing their pension of Nur Misuari (the former assess and obtain facilities for “bed- force-protection role, providing an on- MNLF leader) as governor of the ding down” the JTF. call quick-reaction force, and conduct- Autonomous Region in Muslim A U.S.-based contractor accompa- ing training for AFP soldiers around

September 2004 37 Zamboanga. In the semihostile envi- In the Philippines, the cell phone civic-action programs, or MED- ronment of the southern Philippines, was an unusual challenge to force CAPs, using their assigned medical providing force protection over such a protection. Cell-phone technology is personnel, to demonstrate their large AO proved to be a major task for widespread in the Philippines, as in commitment and to build rapport. the two operational teams.3 much of the developing world, While the families of terrorists As the realities of the situation in because the land lines date to before routinely received free medical treat- the Philippines became evident to World War II and are concentrated ment along with the other inhabi- the ARSOF personnel, the term in the few large cities. While the tants, the terrorist groups did not “contingency operation” proved to number of cell-phone providers is consider MEDCAP sites to be sacro- be a misnomer. Although required limited, the commonplace mixing of sanct, and force protection for MED- to deploy with unit basic loads of local dialects with English and Taga- CAPs was always an issue. An AFP ammunition for contingency pur- log, and the sheer volume of traffic, motorcyclist usually preceded vehi- poses and required to carry loaded created major challenges for signals- cle convoys to the MEDCAP sites, weapons at all times as part of intelligence personnel. and personnel of the local Civilian force-protection measures, ARSOF The popularity among younger Fil- Auxiliary Force Geographical Unit personnel had to adhere to peace- ipinos of using cell phones to send were pulled in by the infantry bat- time supply-accountability rules — coded-text messages and photographs talions to augment AFP security a single round of ammunition miss- had major affects upon force protec- while the MEDCAPs were conduct- ing was cause for an investigation. tion. During firefights, AFP lieu- ed. Nonmedical SF personnel contin- Additional ammunition required tenants were prone to send cell-phone ually patrolled in and around the vil- for qualification on basic and crew- messages to company commanders lage to make their presence known, served weapons was not provided at (and to the press) instead of using and the military helicopters used to the intermediate staging base on their tactical radios. Even with the transport the medical teams normal- Okinawa, and claymore mines, occasional dead spots on the cellular ly loitered overhead to provide early hand grenades and crew-served networks, especially in southern Basi- warnings in case of attack. The SF weapons — from heavy machine lan, cell phones often outperformed teams and JTF-510 never lost sight guns to mortars — were therefore the tactical radios. The AFP’s stand- of the fact that the same people who not carried into the Philippines by ard field radio was the early Vietnam welcomed humanitarian assistance the units. (The forward operating War-era PRC-25, but AFP units also could be supporting terrorists.6 bases later brought in crew-served used more modern tactical radios, for The SOCPAC commander wanted weapons.) Armored HMMWVs were which they had repeaters set up to focus on unity of planning and on also limited, in spite of their obvious across Basilan. Senior AFP officers making coordinated operational force-protection value. So tight was accepted the tactical radios’ short responses to current intelligence, the ammunition accountability that ranges and unreliability under the from the brigade down to the compa- AFP basic weapons training and triple-canopy jungles of Basilan as a ny level. The JTF-510 operations cen- weapons qualification were delayed good rationale for the common field ter knew where all AFP ground until security-assistance-allocated use of cell phones, in spite of the secu- forces were positioned, so that was ammunition arrived. rity risk inherent in the practice.5 not a change to the commander’s Soldiers traveling off-base had to As a way of strengthening their original focus on long-term AFP mili- remain in groups of two or more, relationships with the populace, tary training and education.7 Howev- all group members had to carry the SF teams turned from perform- er, the SF detachments on Basilan loaded sidearms, and each group ing tactical missions to implement- had already acquired ground truth had to carry at least one rifle. All ing the counterinsurgency model about the operational capabilities of vehicles going off-base had to that had been practiced by the the AFP infantry companies, as they establish and maintain radio or American military in Vietnam. The had patiently trained them for five cell-phone communications with teams also prepared a force-protec- months. The SF teams were eager “to the joint operations center. tion plan for each village. go to work” on the ASG, but their Because the handgun became the Having established themselves enthusiasm had to be restrained as primary weapon for force protec- with the village leaders on Basilan they bumped into a very conservative tion, proficiency was critical, but during the security, civic and JTF-510. The JTF-510 screened all pistol and rifle qualification were humanitarian-needs assessments, concepts of operations closely to miti- taken for granted at JTF-510 and the Soldiers of Forward Operating gate risk, and situation reports from at the ARSOTF headquarters.4 Base 11 initiated area medical the SF teams in the field grew volu-

38 Special Warfare minous. Approvals for concepts of operations routinely took 24 to 48 hours, often negating the exploitation value of current intelligence leads and frustrating the detachments.8 At the same time that the SF teams were attempting company- level operations, JTF-510 was preparing to draw down to 400 per- sonnel by the end of July 2002, and to transition to a headquarters for a 50-person joint special-opera- tions task force, or JSOTF, for the Philippines by Oct. 31.9 The riptide of the JTF-510 exodus was so strong that the JSOTF-P “stood up” on Sept. 1, 2002, within 30 days USASOC Historical Archive after the official end of Balikatan. U.S. Special Forces Soldiers trained Philippine forces in recognizing a variety of improvised The accelerated transition time explosive devices. was facilitated by the 1st SF Group’s change of command in the acts against U.S. personnel during At 8:20 p.m., Oct. 2, 2002, a bomb Philippines. Since the 1st SF Group Exercise Balikatan, and JTF-510 was detonated at a small open-air had functioned as the ARSOTF for presumed that most of the ASG restaurant along the main road to JTF-510, Colonel Joseph Smith had left Basilan Island by the time Camp Enrile, Malagutay, killing four assumed command of JSOTF-P of the Burnham rescue in June people and wounding more than 40. when he assumed command of the 2002. With a much smaller Ameri- Having been too close when he deto- SF troops in theater.10 can presence in the south after the nated the bomb, the “trigger man” With the end of Exercise Balikatan, transition — JSOTF-P headquar- was also killed.13 Among the victims both funding and command and con- ters at Zamboanga and an SF bat- were two members of SF Detach- trol of continuing operations made talion on Basilan — the force-pro- ment 145 who had been conducting transitions. SF teams were asked to tection package was commensu- advanced special-operations work in train two more AFP light reaction rately reduced. Forgotten was how the surrounding area in support of companies and four more light much the extensive information- force protection and had stopped for a infantry battalions, while other spe- collection effort by the SF detach- late meal before returning to their cial-operations forces were committed ments had contributed to the “safe base. Captain Max Horton (pseudo- to training Philippine Air Force UH- environment” that the Philippines nym) was seriously wounded in the 1H pilots and crews in night flying. had enjoyed during Balikatan. explosion, and Sergeant First Class While similar to the operations car- Indications that a bombing cam- Mark Jackson was killed. Fortunate- ried out during Balikatan, these mis- paign was imminent — a satchel ly, the Air Force surgical team had sions now fell in the category of secu- charge was found on the airfield not yet redeployed, although their rity assistance, which was specifically fence, people were observed watch- emergency room had already been funded by a $25 million congressional ing troop movements through closed down and their medical equip- appropriation. With the transition to binoculars, attempts were made to ment packed. The surgeons broke security-assistance funding, control of block U.S. vehicles, and an AFP into the locked equipment containers the missions also passed to the Joint officer was murdered — were to treat the captain and the injured U.S. Military Advisory Group, or JUS- downplayed in the face of the draw- Filipinos.14 MAG, in Manila. The JUSMAG down, and previous force-protec- The bomb had been rigged into a supervised, but since it was located at tion assessments were assumed to motorcycle that was parked in front the U.S. Embassy in Manila, the have remained valid in spite of the of the restaurant just three kilome- JSOTF-P had tactical control over the changing situation. In this environ- ters from the JSOTF-P headquar- Army SF teams in the joint operating ment, ARSOF lost its first Soldier ters. No terrorist group claimed cred- area.11 to terrorist action since the JTF it, and after several days it was pre- There had been no overt terrorist had stood up in January 2002.12 sumed that the two Americans had

September 2004 39 were constantly varied and switched to the late-night hours.15 Jackson, Chapman early casualties While the JSOTF-P regrouped, the ASG and MILF exploited the oppor- from 1st SF Group in GWOT tunity with an abundance of counter- propaganda and more attacks. The When Sergeant First Class Mark W. Jackson was killed in groups bombed the Tiguma Police action near Zamboanga on Oct. 2, 2002, his team, SF A-detach- Station near the Pagadian Airport ment 145, had the enhanced force-protection mission for JTF- and threw grenades into a crowd at 510. Jackson, a team sergeant, was part of the ARSOF contin- the Iglesia Christos Cathedral to add gent training Philippine soldiers to combat the terrorist Abu to the unrest. On Oct. 4 and 5, bombs Sayyaf Group. A 19-year Army veteran, Jackson had served in were found and defused at a hard- the 82nd Airborne Division and the 75th Ranger Regiment prior ware store and in a dumpster at the to his nine years of service in Special Forces. A Farsi and Arabic Zamboanga City mall. Because many speaker, he had served in Kuwait, Jordan, Bahrain, Haiti and of the AFP soldiers based on Basilan numerous countries in Southeast Asia. Island had families in the provinces of Jackson was not the first Soldier from the 1st SF Group to die Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboan- in the Global War on Terrorism. As Soldiers from the 1st Group ga del Sur, the bombings had an prepared to deploy to the Philippines, Sergeant First Class added effect. Nathan R. Chapman, 3rd Battalion, 1st SF Group, was killed in To recover lost face, JSOTF-P con- action on Jan. 4, 2002, near the town of Khowst in Afghanistan. A ducted a MEDCAP with the support communications NCO in SF A-detachment 194, Chapman was of the AFP, the Rotary Club, a non- attached to Task Force Dagger during Operation Enduring Free- government organization, and the dom. The 13-year Army veteran had participated in the 75th Tzu Chi, a nongovernment organiza- Rangers’ parachute assault into Panama during Operation Just tion, in Toloso, just north of Zamboan- Cause and was also a veteran of Operation Desert Storm. Chap- ga City. SF Detachment 145 organ- man, a Tagalog speaker, had served nine years in Special Forces ized tight security, and the Marine and had deployed to Panama, Kuwait, Jordan, Iraq, Haiti and security element was supported by numerous countries in Southeast Asia. Chapman’s fellow Special AFP armored cars and UH-1Hs flying Forces Soldiers named the airfield at Khowst in his honor. overhead. The MEDCAP was success- ful, treating 803 people. However, the MEDCAP was not enough to turn the served as a “target of opportunity” was lost, and the necessity of quick- tide against the terrorists. for the bomber. Rather than flooding ly regaining situational awareness The ASG countered the U.S.-AFP the area with advanced special-oper- was ignored. The AFP and other effort with more bombings. On Oct. 7, ations-trained SF and intelligence U.S. government elements were left four bombs were discovered in and personnel to assess the threat and to to investigate the bombing site, but around the hotels Paradise, Imperial recommend additional force-protec- even the AFP did not survey the site and Platinum in Zamboanga. Fortu- tion measures, the second JSOTF-P until the next morning. nately, only one exploded. On Oct. 9, commander “locked down” the Amer- The urgent need for the resump- another bomb was discovered and icans on Camp Enrile for 72 hours tion of information-collection efforts defused on a vehicle near Edwin and imposed an 11 p.m. curfew for in the surrounding area appeared to Andrews. On Oct. 10, a bomb explod- all Americans under the task force’s be ignored even as the terrorist ed in Kidapawan near Cotabato City, control, including those troops on bombing campaign escalated with killing eight people and wounding 60, Basilan Island. boldness. In response to the height- while another exploded on a bus in All advanced special-operations ened danger, the Marine security North Cotabato, killing six and work was stopped, as the danger element was quickly reinforced wounding 10. Two days later, two outside the wire seemed to out- from Hawaii to improve the defen- AFP infantry battalions operating on weigh the long-term security gains sive posture of JSOTF-P at Camp Jolo were caught by a well-executed of such a posture. While the lock- Navarro, Zamboanga. Since con- ambush by the ASG and MRG. They down may have kept the troops stant support to the advanced oper- suffered heavy losses, and all AFP temporarily safe, the momentum of ating base on Basilan was a neces- who surrendered were summarily the information-collection effort sity, schedules for resupply convoys executed by the organizations’ signa-

40 Special Warfare ture machete beheadings.16 The term before the end of the exercise, the 3 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group, “semi-permissive environment” sud- regional command, satisfied with briefing (undated), “Operation Eagle Free- denly took on new meaning in the its GWOT contribution, reverted to dom (S),” copy in the classified files of the USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, N.C., southern Philippines. preparing for the AFP security- hereafter cited as Eagle Freedom brief. In and around Zamboanga, MED- assistance mission to come. 4 Classified interview with Colonel William CAPs and dental civic-action pro- Just as end-of-combat operations C. Ball by Forrest L. Marion, 12 April 2002, grams conducted to counter the neg- had stimulated rotations in Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii, tape recording in ativism of the bombing campaign Afghanistan and provided time for classified files of the USSOCOM History Office, MacDill AFB, Fla.; classified interview were limited to the AFP bases. The the al-Qaeda and Taliban to regroup with Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Mandarin JSOTF-P commander was reluctant (before Anaconda), the post-Burn- (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 23 May to assume responsibility for Ameri- ham-rescue lull in AFP operations 2003, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording in the cans operating outside the wire, and during the post-Balikatan transition classified files of the USASOC History Office, he put an end to advanced special- facilitated terrorist efforts to pub- Fort Bragg, N.C.; classified interview with Staff Sergeant James Holmes (pseudonym) by operations work. Since he felt that licly discredit the accomplishments Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 6 May 2003, Fort Lewis, the tactical information-collection of the U.S.-assisted AFP. The coun- Wash., tape recording in the classified files of was a critical element for recom- terinsurgency progress made during the USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, N.C. mending viable force-protection Balikatan was lost under the flurry 5 Schwartz interview. 6 measures, the commander of SF of terrorist actions and propaganda, Brown and Wood interview. 7 Forrest L. Marion, “Opening the Second Detachment 145 requested redeploy- and it would not be regained until Front: Operation Enduring Freedom-Philip- ment of his team. The commander several months after Jackson had pines, January-August 2002,” USSOCOM clas- felt that the “risk aversion and been killed. Everyone involved in sified draft history of JTF-510, stored in the bunker mentality” in the face of the post-Balikatan mission was classified files of the USSOCOM History Office, renewed terrorist activity went reminded the hard way of the impor- MacDill AFB, Fla. 8 Classified interview by Lieutenant Colonel against his training and experience tance of force protection, even in a Forrest Marion, 28 February 2003, Fort Lewis, and made the situation intolerable semipermissive environment. Wash., tape recordings in the classified files of the for him. His request was granted, USSOCOM History Office, MacDill AFB, Fla. and Detachment 145 was replaced.17 9 Marion, “Opening the Second Front.” 10 In spite of the increased terrorist Dr. Cherilyn A. Walley is a histo- Marion, “Opening the Second Front.” 11 Marion, “Opening the Second Front”; classi- activity on Mindanao, the security- rian on the staff of the USASOC fied interview by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 7 May 2003, and humanitarian-assistance pro- Historian’s Office. Fort Lewis, Wash., tape recording in the classi- grams and projects on Basilan were fied files of the USASOC History Office, Fort relatively unaffected. The rotational Notes: Bragg, N.C. 12 training of AFP rifle companies and 1 Classified interview with Captain James Schwartz interview. Brown and Staff Sergeant Vance Wood (pseudo- 13 Classified interview with Lieutenant the operation of an NCO academy on nyms) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 6 May 2003, Fort Colonel Duane Dillard (pseudonym) by Dr. southern Mindanao were delayed Lewis, Wash., tape recording in the classified C.H. Briscoe, 6 May 2003, Fort Lewis, until after the Christmas holidays of files of the USASOC History Office, Fort Wash., tape recording in the classified files 2002–2003 because of PACOM’s Bragg, N.C., hereafter cited as Brown and Wood of the USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, inexperience with the technicalities interview; Armed Forces of the Philippines and N.C., hereafter cited as Dillard interview. U.S. Pacific Command, “Terms of Reference for 14 Classified interview with Chief Warrant of security-assistance funding, not RP-US Exercise Balikatan 02-1”, 9 February Officer 3 Jack Landers and Sergeant First because of force-protection concerns. 2002, copy in the classified files of the Class Bart Johnson (pseudonyms) by Dr. C.H. In February 2003, training began USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, N.C.; Briscoe, 7 May 2003, Fort Lewis, Wash., tape again in earnest, and it is still ongo- JTF-510, “Appendix 2 to Annex C in OPORD recording in the classified files of the USASOC ing in the Philippines. Freedom Eagle,” 20 December 2001, copy in the History Office, Fort Bragg, N.C., hereafter classified files of the USASOC History cited as Landers and Johnson interview. Force protection in the semiper- Office, Fort Bragg, N.C.; 1st Special Forces 15 Landers and Johnson interview; classified missive environment of the Sulu Group, “Law of War, Deployment Readiness interview with First Sergeant Steve Donner Archipelago meant different things Training Brief,” 2001, copy in the classified and Lieutenant Colonel Duane Dillard (pseu- during Exercise Balikatan than it files of the USASOC History Office, Fort donyms) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 6 May 2003, Fort did during the period associated Bragg, N.C. Lewis, Wash., tape recordings in the classified 2 Classified interview with Sergeant First Class files of the USASOC History Office, Fort with JSOTF-P. It proved to be inci- Mark Schwartz (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, Bragg, N.C.; classified telephone interview by dental during the exercise when 19 April 2004, Fort Lewis, Wash., tape recording Dr. C.H. Briscoe at Fort Bragg, N.C., 9 Decem- pressure was being applied to the in the classified files of the USASOC Histo- ber 2003. ASG on Basilan. Having resolved ry Office, Fort Bragg, N.C., hereafter cited as 16 Dillard interview. 17 the Burnham hostage situation Schwartz interview. Landers and Johnson interview.

September 2004 41 Special Forces Training Exercises Continue Balikatan Mission

by Dr. Cherilyn A. Walley

xercise Balikatan 02-1 ended in July cise, they also became more involved in 2002, but the presence of Army spe- projects of humanitarian and civic assist- Ecial-operations forces, or ARSOF, in ance, or H/CA. SF teams found themselves the Philippines did not. Even as Joint Task spending much of their time providing Force-510 stood down and handed command force-protection support to H/CA project and control, or C2, over to Joint Special Oper- teams. In 2003, however, a few mobile ations Task Force-Philippines, or JSOTF-P, training teams, or MTTs, did deploy, giving teams of Special Forces Soldiers continued SF troops the opportunity to continue to provide force protection for ongoing training Philippine troops in the tech- humanitarian-assistance projects. niques and strategies of counterterrorism. The end of the exercise did signal a shift in In September 2002, decision-makers from funding sources, however. During Balikatan, the U.S. Army Security Assistance Com- funding came from security-assistance funds mand, or USASAC; the Joint United States Military Advisory Group, or JUSMAG; the “Coordinating with the SOUTHCOM director Defense Security Coordination Assistance, or DCSA; and the Security Assistance Training of training, a lieutenant colonel, was much Management Office, or SATMO, met at PACOM headquarters to discuss security- like dealing with a guerrilla chief. It was the assistance plans for the Philippines. Con- Robin Sage scenario every day.” gress had allocated $25 million in security- assistance funds, and those at the meeting of the United States Pacific Command, or were tasked with deciding how best to use PACOM, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that those funds. SATMO was specifically tasked were re-allocated from the budget for joint with funding and coordinating already- combined exercise training. Following planned MTT missions for training troops of Balikatan, funding came from a Department the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or AFP.1 of Defense-administered security-assistance Soldiers of the 1st SF Group, based at fund and from humanitarian- and civic- Fort Lewis, Wash., and the 1st Battalion, 1st assistance funds administered by the U.S. SF Group, based at Torii Station, Okinawa, Agency for International Development. With were tapped to conduct the MTTs.2 As the the shift in funding sources came a shift in 1st SF Group began preparing for the mission focus. MTTs, however, the staffs of SATMO, For ARSOF, the shift meant that while PACOM and the Special Operations Com- they were still able to build on the gains mand, Pacific, or SOCPAC, encountered dif- made during the Balikatan training exer- ficulties working out the details of allocat-

42 Special Warfare ing funds and tasking personnel. Recent ments, and one to conduct a tactical leaders’ changes in the procedures of the U.S. Spe- course. cial Operations Command, or USSOCOM, The MTT’s goal was to combat insurgency prevented SATMO from directly tasking in the southern Philippines by improving ARSOF personnel for MTTs, which compli- the tactical effectiveness of the AFP. The cated personnel issues. In addition, the Air three training teams conducted a six-week Force’s 6th Special Operations Squadron, program of instruction for the companies in based at Hurlburt Field, Fla., had also been three phases: basic infantry skills, weapons tasked to the Philippines MTTs, which com- marksmanship and a field-training exercise plicated fund movements. SOCPAC itself on platoon and company tactics. A new com- had to learn the new procedures for request- pany entered the training cycle every two ing personnel and funds before the 1st Bat- weeks, and the six-week tactical leaders’ talion, 1st SF Group, would be able to course (for 40 soldiers) was conducted six deploy.3 times. The goal was to train four AFP The procedural delays pushed the first set infantry battalions — the 10th, 32nd and of MTT deployments back. In January 2003, 55th Infantry, and the 5th Marine Beach the 1st SF Group’s 2nd Battalion, based at Landing Team, or MBLT, during the course Fort Lewis, Wash., deployed to Camp Enrile, of a year. All four battalions had previously Malagatay, Mindanao, to begin training an trained with teams from the 1st SF Group AFP light infantry battalion. SF B-Detach- during Exercise Balikatan.4 ment 140 (+) arrived with five SF teams: one As the earlier SF detachments had dis- team to provide force protection, three to teach covered, the involvement of the leaders of light-infantry tactics to company-sized ele- the AFP’s army and marine battalions was lukewarm. The AFP commanders recog- nized the value of the SF training, but while the 1st Infantry Division Training School, the Scout Reconnaissance Battalion, the Philippine Special Forces Battalion and the marines all provided quality English-speak- ing soldiers to act as assistant instructors in support of the “train the trainer” concept, only the commander of the 5th MBLT, whose forces were based nearby, actually visited training. The other commanders remained on Basilan: They even missed the formal graduations of the companies and the tactical leaders’ classes.5 The readiness of weapons and equipment presented another obstacle to effective train- ing. Thirty percent of the army’s M-16 rifles (primarily manufactured in the Philippines) were technically dead-lined, with shot-out barrels and chambers, frozen extractors and locked sights. Some barrels were so worn out that the bullets fired from them hit the flash suppressor and disintegrated, result- ing in dangerous splashback. The marines’ weapons were in slightly better shape, with only 10 percent of their rifles dead-lined; on U.S. Army photo the other hand, 80 percent of their M-16s After Balikatan, SF Soldiers continued to train Philippine were manufactured in the U.S. But neither infantry soldiers in basic skills such as marksmanship. service performed routine weapons cleaning and maintenance, and the SF trainers found

September 2004 43 no ability to speak Tagalog, and they had no knowledge of English. Literacy was higher among the marines, who were reputedly all high-school graduates, and all of them spoke Tagalog and had at least a smattering of English. SF Detachment 140 had only two Tagalog speakers, Sergeant First Class Lonny Woods and Staff Sergeant Mike Bel- lows, so in the face of such educational and language gaps, the trainers determined that the language of instruction would be Eng- U.S. Army photo lish, with the Filipino assistant instructors Training by SF medics in casualty-evacuation proce- interpreting as necessary. “Still, as all SF dures made Philippine soldiers more proficient and are taught in school, the surest way to con- improved their morale. vey the message to the Filipinos was through photos, pictures and demonstra- small-arms lubricants and cleaning equip- tions,” said Williams.7 ment to be nonexistent. The AFP soldiers’ The infantry company training culminat- explained that after all, the bullets cleaned ed with a “graduation” combat operation the barrels.6 from a base camp outside of Camp Enrile. Teaching the required classes posed even The troops and trainers had to provide their more challenges. Working with the AFP own water, fuel, rations, laundry and marks- leadership proved to be difficult: “Coordinat- manship ranges — and they had to do so ing with the SOUTHCOM director of train- under heightened levels of force protection. ing, a lieutenant colonel, was much like The SF Soldiers found themselves in a dealing with a guerrilla chief. It was the dilemma created by the nature of their secu- Robin Sage scenario every day,” remem- rity-assistance mission and the live-fire training environment of Basilan Island. Security-assistance missions preclude the Despite the constraints and their uncertain trainers from being combatants or from per- status as combatants during field operations, forming duties in which they are likely to become combatants. But the trainers’ credi- members of SF Detachment 144 made great bility and effectiveness as teachers mandat- ed that they accompany the AFP troops on headway with the AFP sergeants and junior their graduation exercise, of which combat officers during training. As these were future was an integral part. By carefully applying their mission’s rules of engagement during AFP leaders, the training would have a lasting the mission, the SF trainers managed to walk a fine line and fulfill their training impact on AFP preparedness and tactics. responsibilities.8 Despite the constraints and their uncertain bered Captain Mark Williams (pseudonym), status as combatants during field operations, the commander of SF Detachment 144. Nei- members of SF Detachment 144 made great ther were the AFP troops necessarily headway with the AFP sergeants and junior equipped to learn quickly. After the 1996 officers during training. As these were future Moro National Liberation Front, or MNLF, AFP leaders, the training would have a lasting Accords integrated former Muslim insur- impact on AFP preparedness and tactics. The gents into the AFP, the Army battalions in SF Soldiers were also able to form personal the southern Philippines became 30-percent relationships with, and further influence, Muslim. The former MNLF soldiers came some AFP soldiers. Detachment 144’s com- from the southern islands and had little or mander developed such a good professional no education, and they spoke primarily relationship with the commander of Company either Tausug or Yakan. They had little or C, 10th Infantry Battalion, 1st Lieutenant

44 Special Warfare Julius Navales, that he was asked to be a god- parent for the Navales’ third child. When Navales was promoted to captain, he became the 10th Infantry Battalion’s operations offi- cer, an honor that reflected well on his per- formance as a commander and on the SF team that trained him.9 The SF Soldiers accomplished their mis- sions in spite of numerous challenges. At the regional-command level, a shifting mission focus and new sources of funding complicat- ed and delayed MTT deployment. On the ground, the readiness of AFP troops and equipment, as well as AFP commanders’ indifference, limited the amount of training that could be offered. Strict rules of engage- ment further challenged the SF trainers to balance their responsibilities as combat instructors with their roles as security- assistance providers. In the end, however, the Soldiers of the 1st SF Group managed to increase the AFP’s abil- ity to combat terrorism in the southern Phil- ippines, increasing security not only in that country but also in the entire region.

Dr. Cherilyn A. Walley is a historian on the staff of the USASOC Historian’s Office.

Notes: 1 Interview with Lewis J. Grastie Jr., conducted by Dr. Cherilyn A. Walley, 6 January 2004, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording in the files of the USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, N.C., hereafter cited as Grastie interview. 2 Grastie interview. 3 Classified interview with Captain Mark Williams (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 7 May 2003, Fort Lewis, Wash., tape recording in the classified files of the USASOC History Office,Fort Bragg, N.C., here- after cited as Williams interview; Grastie interview. 4 Williams interview. 5 Williams interview. 6 Williams interview; Classified interview with Sergeant First Class Mark Schwartz (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 19 April 2004, Fort Lewis, Wash., tape recording in the classified files of the USASOC Histo- ry Office,Fort Bragg, N.C., hereafter cited as Schwartz interview. 7 Schwartz interview. 8 Schwartz interview. 9 Schwartz interview.

September 2004 45 Rescuing the Burnhams: The Unspoken SOCPAC Mission

by Dr. C.H. Briscoe

hile the primary mission of Army the U.S. State Department recommended special-operations forces in the that military assistance be provided.1 WPhilippines was to train the ASG threats and the group’s seizure of Armed Forces of the Philippines, or AFP, in 20-Western guests from Sipadan resort in counterterrorism, the kidnapping of two Malaysia in April 2000 had energized the American missionaries changed the scope staffs of the U.S. Pacific Command, or of the mission to include facilitating the PACOM, and the Special Operations Com- rescue of American citizens held hostage mand, Pacific, or SOCPAC. While intelli- by the Abu Sayyaf Group, or ASG. gence analysts had expanded their efforts The selection, organization and training to track all Philippine terrorist groups, of a light reaction company, or LRC, for the operations planners had developed securi- Philippines by United States Special ty-assistance recommendations for improv- Forces Soldiers had been under way at ing the AFP’s capabilities of combating Camp Aguinaldo, Luzon, for nearly two increased terrorism and for restoring law months when the ASG attacked the Dos and order in the predominantly Muslim Palmos Resort, offshore of Palawan Island, southern archipelago. on May 27, 2001. The daring 200-mile After Libya had paid the ASG terrorists cross-ocean raid netted the ASG 20 more than $20 million to release the hostages for ransom. Among them were Sipadan hostages, the ASG seized more three American citizens, Gracia and Mar- hostages in July and August 2000 — more tin Burnham, both missionaries, and than 30 people in several actions. By the Guillermo Sobero. time Schilling was kidnapped in Jolo on The difficult maritime operation, Aug. 29, 2000, Admiral Dennis C. Blair, launched across the Sulu Sea from Basi- commander, PACOM, accompanied by offi- lan, reflected detailed reconnaissance, good cers from SOCPAC, had already traveled to logistics planning and a well-rehearsed Manila to brief the government of the dawn assault that neutralized resort secu- Republic of the Philippines and the AFP on rity and caught the vacationers by sur- the concept of a mobile training team that prise. The Dos Palmas kidnappings would train and equip a company-sized occurred about a month after the first unit to respond to the escalating terrorism. American hostage, Jeffrey Schilling, a con- The creation of a Philippine response unit verted Muslim, had been released might restore popular confidence in the unharmed by ASG terrorists following Philippine government. eight months of captivity on Jolo Island. President Joseph Estrada rejected the Now, the ASG held three Americans, and American offer of assistance, but with a

46 Special Warfare change of the Philippine administration a 2002, Sua concentrated TF Comet’s efforts few months later, the Philippines wel- on finding the Burnhams and preparing comed American assistance. Company B, plans to rescue them. 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group, JTF-510 supported the development of began training the LRC in March 2001. intelligence-driven operations by the The 1st SF Group’s mission was to organ- Southern Command, and it promoted coor- ize and train a national counterterrorist dinated staff work and the fusion of intelli- force for the Philippines in five months. The gence from all sources in the AFP joint challenge for SOCPAC had been to accumu- operations center. PACOM dedicated a late equipment for the 90-man LRC — M-4 Navy P-3C Orion surveillance aircraft to carbines, Kevlar helmets, body armor, night- JTF-510. Signal-intercept teams from the vision goggles and radios — and deliver it to 1st SF Group worked with AFP elements Fort Magsaysay on Luzon before the start of at Camp Enrile, Zamboanga, as part of the training. Brigadier General Donald C. 1st SF Group mission of “training, advising Wurster, commander of SOCPAC, tasked and assisting” the AFP in joint command, the Air Force’s 353rd Special Operations control and communications, fusion of all- Group, based at Kadena Airbase, Okinawa, source intelligence, counterterrorism, to deliver the equipment as a training mis- information operations and civil-military sion, “taking the costs out of hide” because it operations.4 was the only way to execute the program.2 The mass ASG kidnapping at Dos Pal- mas prompted the U.S. Department of When the AFP discovered that Sobero had State to support security assistance for the been beheaded shortly after his capture, and Philippine armed forces, allowing PACOM to shift $2 million from its regional securi- that some hostages seized in the Dos Palmas ty-assistance program to fund the ongoing LRC training. When the AFP discovered raid were being held on Basilan, the Philip- that Sobero had been beheaded shortly pine military leadership felt pressured to use after his capture, and that some hostages seized in the Dos Palmas raid were being the LRC to rescue them. Fortunately, senior held on Basilan, the Philippine military leadership felt pressured to use the LRC to U.S. officials convinced them that the LRC rescue them. Fortunately, senior U.S. offi- would be more capable of rescuing the cials convinced them that the LRC would be more capable of rescuing the hostages hostages after it completed training. after it completed training.3 In the meantime, Major General Glicerio The individual and collective training Sua, commander of the Philippine 1st conducted by the SF teams assigned to the Infantry Division, was working jointly with Philippine battalions on Basilan raised Wurster and with Colonel David Fridovich Philippine soldier confidence levels, of Joint Task Force-510 as the Southern because most culminated in “graduation” Command Task Force Comet commander combat operations in the field. Despite the responsible for Mindanao and Basilan fact that Basilan had been serving as the Island. Under the auspices of the combined “combat JRTC” for AFP battalions for more Exercise Balikatan, starting Jan. 1, 2002, than 10 years, the Filipino soldiers and Sua used the first two phases of his Opera- marines were not proficient jungle fight- tion Liberty to get the army and marine ers. Tactically, they were no match for the infantry battalions on Basilan ready to guerrilla forces operating from the remote conduct major combat operations against areas of Basilan. A typical firefight result- the ASG. When SF detachments from the ed in one AFP killed and three AFP wound- 1st SF Group began providing individual ed, with many casualties of friendly fire. and collective training to the Philippine The presence of the Americans who had battalions on Basilan in late February direct radio contact with helicopters (Phil-

September 2004 47 ippine Air Force UH-1D Hueys during the locals, the few Army Civil Affairs teams day and U.S. aircraft at night) also meant (protected by the SF detachments) that prompt air medical evacuations of Filipino coordinated humanitarian and security- casualties when contact was made with the assistance activities with all ethnic groups, guerrillas.5 But the first evidence that seemed to be everywhere.8 The increased increased combat operations in remote American presence also constrained the areas of the island were having the desired movement of terrorist elements on Basilan effect — pressuring the ASG elements to at the same time that local Muslim support disperse and move from long-established of the ASG was being eroded by the support areas — was the mass surrender of humanitarian projects in progress and by guerrilla fighters on the southern coast of the widespread public knowledge of the Basilan in early April. 2002.6 ASG’s inflated ransoms and abuse of SF Detachment 114, with the 1st Marine female hostages. Battalion Landing Team at Abungabung, When multiple-source intelligence from arranged the surrender of an ASG guerril- Philippine and American assets confirmed la and his extraction to Manila. The guer- that the Burnhams had been moved from rilla agreed to be the “test case” for his Basilan to Zamboanga del Norte, some dis- tance from Zamboanga City, in late May or early June 2002, planning for the rescue When multiple-source intelligence from mission, Operation Day Break, began in Philippine and American assets confirmed earnest, making the Burnham rescue the major focus of the Southern Command. that the Burnhams had been moved from Southern Command began making arrangements for moving several infantry Basilan to Zamboanga del Norte, some dis- battalions aboard Philippine Navy vessels tance from Zamboanga City, in late May or to southern Mindanao to hunt for Abu Sabaya, the ASG leader holding the kid- early June 2002, planning for the rescue napped Americans. Interdiction of ASG maritime supply and mission, Operation Day Break, began in escape routes required greater naval sup- earnest, making the Burnham rescue the port and made Operation Day Break on southern Mindanao a joint effort. As more major focus of the Southern Command. Basilan infantry battalions were included in the operation, many of the SF detach- group of 19 fighters who were short of food ments were left with only remnants of the and tiring of running from AFP patrols. AFP units that they had been tasked to After the guerrilla received his first train. Some detachments split, so that part demand of several cheeseburgers and a of the detachment could accompany their large order of French fries, he was flown to AFP battalion commanders during combat Manila for further interrogation. A cell- operations on Mindanao. phone call assuring his buddies that they Fridovich, as the ARSOTF commander would receive similar meals prompted the of JTF-510, assigned key staff from the surrender of another 18 hungry ASG fight- 1st SF Group to develop viable courses of ers three days later.7 action based on a detailed intelligence As the large force (more than 300 per- preparation of the battlefield. He used sonnel) of Seabees and Marine engineers those plans to steer the AFP leadership composing the Naval Construction Task and to convince them of the need for con- Group from Okinawa arrived to begin work ducting joint rehearsals on the islands off on humanitarian and civic-action projects Mindanao. Nightly aerial surveillance by throughout Basilan, the increased Ameri- U.S. Navy P-3C Orion aircraft had been can presence provided rural residents with arranged through PACOM. After a night- assurance that some of their basic needs surveillance photo was leaked to the Phil- would be met. The primary contact for the ippine press, access to that imagery was

48 Special Warfare strictly controlled. Success with ply boat, inadvertently greeted an AFP ele- unmanned aerial vehicles was limited. ment coming ashore on the beach. As the Despite the fact that the Southern Com- ASG party finished saying “Salam mand (TF Comet) and JTF-510 had made alaikom” (Peace to you), they realized that considerable progress integrating and the boat contained AFP, and they immedi- verifying all-source intelligence, the AFP ately fled into the heavy undergrowth. The battalion commanders would not investi- AFP characteristically failed to pursue the gate every possible terrorist location iden- ASG. It was dark, the AFP units had very tified, and they would not consider night few operational night-vision goggles, and, operations.9 the AFP did not like night operations.15 Primary casualty evacuation was Following a scheme of maneuver devel- assigned to the MH-60L Black Hawks of oped during Operations Liberty I and II, the 3rd Battalion, 160th Special Opera- JTF Comet employed the 10th and 55th tions Aviation Regiment, which replaced Infantry battalions as fixed blocking forces the Air Force’s 33rd Rescue Squadron HH- while the Scout Ranger Battalion conduct- 60Gs in May 2002. Wurster, at Camp ed platoon and company-sized movements Navarro, maintained control of the 160th to contact in areas where ASG elements SOAR helicopters.10 were reportedly operating. In southern JTF-510 worked closely with Southern Mindanao, as on Basilan, contact often Command at Camp Enrealy as Sua and occurred by chance, when the Scout JTF Comet on Camp Navarro coordinated Rangers bumped into ASG groups who the naval movement of army and marine were moving out of concentrated-search elements from Basilan and the truck move- areas. Despite these cautious, deliberate ment into assigned operational areas of and readily compromised Philippine com- southern Mindanao and observed the bat operations, elements of the 55th rehearsals conducted on the offshore Infantry Battalion managed to capture a islands. Three army battalions (the Scout local forester while moving to surround a Reconnaissance and the 10th and 55th suspected ASG element. Questioned, the Infantry) were brought north by ship to forester said that he had seen a group with support the joint operation designed to hostages, two of whom were Americans.16 locate and rescue the Burnhams.11 For a As it turned out, the ASG element that short time, Fridovich had a temporary tac- had the Burnhams, unfamiliar with south- tical operations center aboard a Philippine ern Mindanao, had started using logging naval vessel to monitor the marine land- roads to move faster. They, too, captured a ings, the navy-patrol-boat interdiction of local forester and forced him to act as their key estuaries, the offshore naval patrolling guide. The ASG, like the AFP, did not oper- to blockade the southern Mindanao coast, ate after dark, and they kept the forester and the ground movement of army battal- chained up at night. The absence of local ions into battle positions.12 Muslim support — food, shelter and village The movement of AFP elements was silence — had made the Burnham captors reported by the news media and did not go vulnerable. To further complicate their unnoticed by locals sympathetic to the movement, seasonal rains had turned the ASG. The volume of cell-phone traffic logging roads into sucking mud, and the increased significantly: Surreptitious text fleeing ASG group was leaving plenty of messages kept ASG field elements footprints.17 informed of AFP movements.13 By May 27, Despite additional details provided by 2002, even the captive Burnhams had the forester and by signal intercepts that heard on the radio that several shiploads of Wurster and Fridovich provided, Sua AFP soldiers had landed on the Zamboan- remained unconvinced that the hostages ga peninsula.14 had been moved to Mindanao. After his Gracia Burnham later stated that dur- search proved fruitless, Sua agreed to ing the early days of May 2002, several of insert Scout Rangers into the area where her ASG captors, expecting a night resup- the Burnhams had been spotted, and while

September 2004 49 moving up a riverbed toward the suspected radic when the encounter turned into a fire- ASG site, a platoon-sized patrol of Scout fight, but the Rangers managed to confirm Rangers bumped into the terrorist element the presence of the Americans and to report encamped on the back side of a hill. casualties. When the firefight began, the The Scout Rangers had been following JTF-510 quick-reaction force, an SF detach- the ASG and the hostages for almost 24 ment on standby at Camp Navarro, Zam- hours. On the day before the firefight (June boanga, was immediately activated, 6), they had spotted tracks crossing the although the Burnham contact site was 45 logging road late in the afternoon and minutes away via Black Hawk. Beyond the began following them. The next morning confirmation that Americans were present the Rangers discovered the remnants of a and that the Rangers had suffered casual- hurried breakfast of fruit at a farm and ties, the SF team and the MH-60L aircrews kept tracking the ASG and hostages until had only vague information.20 the group stopped for the day.18 Using a Actually, both sides had casualties — rainstorm to cover their maneuvers, they seven AFP had been wounded, and three attacked the ASG. Until this action, the ASG had been killed. Martin Burnham and Filipino military had been reluctant to con- a Filipino hostage had been killed; Gracia duct operations when it was raining. Burnham had been wounded. When the Caught by surprise by the change in modus firefight ceased, the QRF mission was operandi, Abu Sabaya initially thought scrubbed, and the Black Hawks were used that he was being attacked by an American for casevac. She was evacuated by MH-60L SF team. to Camp Navarro for treatment and subse- Gracia Burnham describes the attack: quently flown to Manila on an MC-130P refueling aircraft.21 We (Martin and Gracia) had just closed After the firefight, the majority of the our eyes when a fearsome barrage of gunfire ASG captors, including Sabaya, escaped cut loose from the crest of the hill. The AFP? down the riverbed toward the coast. The Surely not. It was raining and they never AFP continued to pursue Sabaya, however, fought in the rain … My instincts, after six- it was believed that since his element was teen previous battles, told me instantly what short of food and lacking Muslim support, to do: drop immediately.I flipped my feet the group would probably try to escape around to get out of the hammock — and Mindanao by boat. before I even hit the ground, I felt the zing! of Wurster praised the SF teams for mak- a bullet slamming through my right leg. I ing the AFP battalions more tactically pro- rolled down the steep hill maybe eight feet, ficient, for training them to be better dazed. I looked up and saw Martin on the marksmen and for instilling confidence in ground, too, so I quickly crawled to his side. the soldiers. The Scout Rangers had prac- He was kind of twisted, with his legs under- ticed combat lifesaving on their wounded neath his body … blood was beginning to as well as on Gracia Burnham. soak through his shirt on his upper left The individual and collective training of chest … Shots continued to ring out. The the army and marine infantry battalions Abu Sayyaf were just getting themselves by the SF teams, and JTF-510’s emphasis positioned to fire back … The shooting con- on JTF Comet using multisource intelli- tinued. Grenades blew up … The shooting gence to plan operations against the ASG, gradually became more sporadic. At the top made the rescue possible. Operations Lib- of the ridge I heard shouting in Tagalog, the erty I and II not only coordinated army and language of the AFP. No sounds came from marine field operations but increased pres- the bottom, however, which told me that the sure on the ASG on Basilan, while the Psy- Abu Sayyaf had fled down the streambed. I chological Operations wanted-poster cam- didn’t want to startle anyone who might be paign and the humanitarian projects of nearby, so I slowly waved my hand to signal Civil Affairs reduced Muslim popular sup- that I was still alive.19 port of the terrorists. Despite the con- Radio communications became very spo- straints imposed by the Philippine govern-

50 Special Warfare ment, the ARSOF elements managed to classified files of the USASOC History Office, Fort accomplish their assigned “advise, assist Bragg, N.C. 11 and train” mission and significantly Hemingway interview. 12 Hemingway interview. altered ASG power on Basilan. 13 Hemingway interview. 14 Gracia Burnham, In the Presence of My Enemies (Wheaton, Ill.: Tyndale House Publishers, 2003), 252, 257. Dr. C.H. Briscoe is the command histori- 15 Mandarin interview. 16 an for the U.S. Army Special Operations Hemingway interview. 17 Burnham, 252, 257. Command. 18 Burnham, 266. 19 Burnham, 262-65. Notes: 20 Hemingway interview. 1 Classified interview with Lieutenant Colonel Dou- 21 Hemingway interview. glas Mandarin (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe and Dr. Kenn Finlayson, 23 May 2003, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording in the classified files of the USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, N.C., hereafter cited as Mandarin interview. 2 Classified interview with Brigadier General Don- ald C. Wurster by Forrest L. Marion, Camp Navarro, Zamboanga, Republic of the Philippines, 31 March 2002, tape recording in the classified files of the USSOCOM History Office, MacDill AFB, Fla. 3 Mandarin interview. 4 Forrest L. Marion, “Opening the Second Front: Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, January- August 2002,” USSOCOM classified draft history of JTF-510, stored in the classified files of the USSO- COM History Office, MacDill AFB, Fla. 5 Classified interview with Captain James Brown and Staff Sergeant Vance Wood (pseudonyms) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 6 May 2003, Fort Lewis, Wash., tape recording in the classified files of the USASOC Histo- ry Office, Fort Bragg, N.C., hereafter cited as Brown and Wood interview. 6 Mandarin interview; Marion, “Opening the Second Front.” 7 Mandarin interview; Marion, “Opening the Second Front.” 8 Classified interview with Sergeant First Class Darrel Thomas (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 5 December 2003, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording in the classified files of the USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, N.C.; Company B, 96th CA Battalion, “OEF-P briefing,” undated, in the classified files of the USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, N.C. 9 Classified interview with Chief Warrant Officer 3 John J. Hemingway (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 7 May 2003, Fort Lewis, Wash., tape recording in the classified files of the USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, N.C., hereafter cited as Hemingway interview. Filipino fishermen helped to retrieve a U.S. military unmanned aerial vehicle that crashed into the sea near Zamboanga on 31 March 2002, while on a train- ing mission. 10 Classified interview with Staff Sergeant Clark Kelt- ner (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 26 July 2003, tape recording in the classified files of the USASOC Histo- ry Office, Fort Bragg, N.C.; classified interview with Staff Sergeant John Price and First Sergeant Fred Randolph (pseudonyms) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 13 Sep- tember 2003, Fort Campbell, Ky., tape recordings in the

September 2004 51 112th Signal Battalion Opens the ‘Big Pipe’ During Balikatan 02-1

by Dr. Kenn Finlayson

perations in the United States tions procedures that enhanced the effec- Pacific Command’s theater typically tiveness of operations in the theater. Oinvolve movements and communi- Company C, created in July 2001 entire- cations over vast distances. Exercise ly with internal assets, is the newest of the Balikatan 02-1 was no exception, and the 112th’s three companies. The formation of Soldiers of the 112th Special Operations the unit allowed the 112th to institute a Signal Battalion, headquartered at Fort three-cycle training model: support to joint Bragg, N.C., were charged with helping to and Army special operations forces; inten- shrink the distances and with allowing sive mission training; and support and U.S. special-operations forces stationed in recovery.1 the Philippines to stay in touch. Because it was created “out of hide,” Com- When the 1st Special Forces Group took pany C obtained some of its equipment by part in Exercise Balikatan 02-1, Company rebuilding older communications systems C, 112th Signal Battalion, developed and acquired from a variety of sources. The sig- perfected improved satellite communica- nal Soldiers put all their ingenuity and skill into the refurbishing and upgrading of the equipment — and their efforts resulted in enhanced capabilities that played a key role in the Philippine operations. Even though Company C stood ready to deploy to Afghanistan in support of Opera- tion Enduring Freedom, a change of mis- sion required that it follow the 1st SF Group to the Philippines, without the ben- efit of an established communications package. In conjunction with the 1st SF Group, the 112th held a planning confer- ence at Fort Lewis, Wash., in early January 2002 to work out the details of the compa- ny’s operations.2 Sergeant First Class James Sierra (pseudonym) represented the 112th. The communications-support por- USASOC Historical Archive tion of the joint special-operations task A satellite dish and a communications van belonging to the 112th Signal Battalion sit force, or JSOTF, of the Special Operations next to Landing Zone X-Ray on Mindanao. Command, Pacific, or SOCPAC, would be

52 Special Warfare performed by the Joint Communications Group’s commander, could talk not only to Support Element, or JCSE, based at the JSOTF in Camp Navarro, on Min- Tampa, Fla. Company C rapidly put danao, but also to the forward operating together a support package for augmenting base on Basilan. The commander of 1st the 1st SF Group’s signal detachment and Group’s 1st Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel for ensuring communications throughout Douglas Mandarin (pseudonym), could the area of the group’s operations. communicate with Fridovich, with the The mission pre-deployment site sur- battalion’s rear element on Okinawa, and vey took place Jan. 6, 2002, in Hawaii, with the JSOTF. All the elements men- and Company C moved to Zamboanga, on tioned had the ability to communicate the southern Philippine island of Min- with SOCPAC.7 danao, on Jan. 10. With preparations for At the JSOTF, the JCSE set up with a deployment under way, the company force of more than 90 Soldiers, three times worked hard to complete validation of its the size of the standard 112th JSOTF systems. During Company C’s buildup to package.8 Because of the force-cap issues deployment, it designed, tested and vali- that plagued the exercise, Company C dated its improved satellite multiple operated the Big Pipe with the bare mini- access system, the 93 V-3 system, also mum number of personnel. known as the “Big Pipe.” The Big Pipe uses a standard 3036-disk antenna and a TSC-93 van with an enhanced tactical The 112th Soldiers modified their 93 V-3 sys- satellite signal processor — the compo- nents of the 93C V (2) system.3 tem to make it capable of simultaneous satel- But the 112th Soldiers modified their 93 V-3 system to make it capable of simul- lite-communications access to two of the taneous satellite-communications access Department of Defense’s standardized entry- to two of the Department of Defense’s standardized entry-point, or STEP, facili- point facilities. This was a first for the 112th, ties. This was a first for the 112th, because most communications systems because most communications systems pro- provide access to only one STEP facility at vide access to only one STEP facility at a time. a time. The 15 worldwide STEP facilities provide a standardized, tactical-communi- cations package to deployed warfighters Conditions were austere on LZ X-Ray. in order to support global command, con- The airfield was the primary rotary-wing trol, communications, computers and landing zone for the 160th Special Oper- intelligence. By providing simultaneous ations Aviation Regiment, whose MH- primary and secondary satellite links,4 47E Chinooks provided the aviation the 93 V-3 system effectively doubles the capability to the 1st SF Group’s detach- capacity of the 93C V (2) system and pro- ments. The 112th was forced to erect its vides a safety net for communications. antenna dishes and set its communica- When rotating into the Philippines, the tions van in close proximity to the land- first troops from the 112th moved to Torii ing area, where the prop wash of each Station, Okinawa, on Feb. 7, 2002, and set landing and takeoff threatened the up and tested their equipment.5 From Oki- integrity of the systems.9 Ever resource- nawa, the 112th personnel moved to the ful, the Soldiers found a way of reposi- island of Basilan, establishing their opera- tioning the equipment and vehicles that tions on the helicopter-landing area at counteracted the prop wash. Landing Zone X-Ray. From that location, While Company C’s standard of living the 93 V-3 could access two-step sites — improved over time, space restrictions one at Fort Buckner, Okinawa, the other at did not abate, forcing the unit to leave its Wahiawa, Hawaii.6 repair parts and equipment on Okinawa Colonel David Fridovich, the 1st SF during the first rotation.10 After several

September 2004 53 munications support earned high marks with the 1st SF Group.

Dr. Kenn Finlayson is the command his- torian for the U.S. Army JFK Special War- fare Center and School.

Notes: 1 Patrick,Flood, “Special Operations Signal Support: Operation Iraqi Freedom” (draft) for submission to Army Communicator, 29 Jul 2003. Fort Gordon, Ga. In author’s possession. 2 Interview with Sergeant First Class James Sierra (pseudonym) by Dr. Kenn Finlayson, USASOC Histo- ry Office, 24 December 2003, Fort Bragg, N.C., here- after cited as Sierra interview. 3 Interview with Sergeant Andy Arlen (pseudonym) by Dr. Kenn Finlayson, USASOC History Office, 24 December 2003, Fort Bragg, N.C., hereafter cited as Arlen interview. 4 USASOC Historical Archive Arlen interview. 5 Sierra interview. A member of the 112th rotations, one container full of equip- 6 Interview with Robert Lamore (pseudonym) by Dr. sets up a communica- ment was moved forward to Zamboanga. Kenn Finlayson, USASOC History Office, 24 Decem- tions van near Landing Despite separation from their source of ber 2003, Fort Bragg, N.C., hereafter cited as Lamore Zone X-Ray. The Soldiers resupply, Company C maintained contin- interview. had to find ways of posi- uous communications while it was on 7 Arlen interview. tioning the signal equip- 8 Sierra interview. Basilan. ment that would counter- 9 Lamore interview. act the prop wash of the The 1st SF Group made arrangements 10 Arlen interview. helicopters. for a civilian contractor to move supplies 11 Classified interview with Major Edward Dougher- by water from Mindanao.11 As the materi- ty (pseudonym) by Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 7 May 2003, Fort als were moved up from the beach landing Lewis, Wash.; and Forrest L. Marion, “Opening the Second Front: Operation Enduring Freedom-Philip- area, the signal teams pitched in to assist pines, January-August 2002,” USSOCOM classified with the off-loading and security of the draft history of JTF-510, stored in the classified files supplies. Security became a common mis- of the USSOCOM History Office, MacDill AFB, Fla. sion for the teams, as well as intensive training on force protection and individual Soldier skills, making the 112th Soldiers invaluable as a security force for convoys and operations. The 112th also played a vital role in improving the infrastructure on the island and in providing humanitarian assistance to the local populace, by supporting the Naval Construction Task Group with secure and nonsecure communications and phone lines, as well as by pulling security as the construction teams moved to and from job sites. Company C Soldiers demonstrated their versatility and ingenuity during their deployment to the Philippines. Their suc- cessful fielding of the Big Pipe system became a model for future operations, and their ability to deliver uninterrupted com-

54 Special Warfare Reflections and Observations on ARSOF Operations During Balikatan 02-1

by Dr. C.H. Briscoe

hile the United States Forces teams was the impact on leader responsible for multiple kid- Pacific Command’s efforts the younger Philippine NCOs and nappings, Abu Sabaya, was later Wto aid the Philippine gov- junior officers (to the captain presumed killed offshore as he ernment in combating the terror- level). From the SF Soldiers, the tried to flee southern Mindanao. ists of the Abu Sayyaf Group, or junior leaders learned the basics of Finally, the Philippine govern- ASG, did not become a second front decision-making, of command and ment agreed to contribute an AFP in the Global War On Terrorism, or control, of staff coordination and of infantry battalion for service in GWOT, the operation was success- the way that intelligence should Iraq as part of the recently estab- ful and yielded a number of valu- drive operations. SF detachments lished Operation Iraqi Freedom able lessons. converted AFP base camps on Basi- International Division. Official special-operations lessons lan into tactically defensible areas, Although the presence of SF learned are the purview of the chief and they trained Philippine sol- detachments advising the AFP on of staff for operations, U.S. Army diers and marines in the combat Basilan and in southern Mindanao Special Operations Command, and lifesaving skills needed for provid- deterred the activities of the ASG, are beyond the scope of this article. ing emergency medical treatment the ARSOF mission to the Philip- Still, the observations presented with confidence. Those lifesaving pines did not become the second here, taken from interviews with skills were a significant morale front of the GWOT. Planners at the non-attributable sources — primar- booster for the AFP. United States Pacific Command, or ily participants in all grades and at Second, humanitarian and civic- PACOM, and at the Special Opera- all levels of the operation — are action projects, or H/CA, medical tions Command, Pacific considered valuable as aspects of a successful visits and the daily presence of Balikatan 02-1 to be a joint com- mission that can be applied to other American SF teams on Basilan bined training exercise, not a sepa- operations. improved the images of the AFP rate campaign of Operation Endur- That the mission of Army spe- and the Manila government, and ing Freedom. cial-operations forces, or ARSOF, in they helped return law and order The U.S. did not authorize the the Philippines was successful is to the island. use of additional training ammuni- evident from five measurements of Third, the ASG presence and the tion for predeployment weapons- success. First, ARSOF training threat on Basilan were significant- qualification, nor did it initially efforts significantly improved the ly reduced, and the communist permit the use of heavy, crew- operational capability of more than New People’s Army was added to served weapons. Those two restric- 10 infantry battalions of the Armed the AFP terrorist target list. tions, as much as any consideration Forces of the Philippines, or AFP. Fourth, the AFP resolved a hostage of Philippine sovereignty, preclud- The most notable long-term effect situation involving two American ed Balikatan from becoming a of the individual and collective missionaries, Martin and Gracia springboard for U.S.-led combat training conducted by U.S. Special Burnham. As a result, the ASG operations against terrorist groups

September 2004 55 in the southern Philippines. effect on government leaders, Joint disrupting the country. However, The majority of the combat- Task Force-510 took a traditional the U.S. military presence, AFP equipment needs identified by the public-affairs approach, reacting to training and increased operations 1st SF Group in its statement of negative press accounts and focus- drove most of the ASG from its requirements for supporting “con- ing on winning journalists over by Basilan sanctuaries. tingency” operations in the Philip- facilitating media access to the pines could not be funded, and the AFP elements on Basilan and in Observations priority of the Philippine mission Zamboanga. Consequently, self- Based on ARSOF’s experience in fell well below the mission of the serving commanders and staff offi- the Philippines during Balikatan, ARSOF elements committed to cers, anxious to promote their there are a number of observations OEF in Afghanistan. The receipt of careers in Manila, regularly that we can make that will apply to outdated 1:50,000-scale topograph- “leaked” information to the media the force in other situations. ical maps two months after the SF representatives. • Every regional special-opera- detachments arrived on Basilan The original unconventional- tions command, or SOC, will operate reflected the priorities. warfare, or UW, mission envisioned differently. The characteristics of It made sense to employ all three by the 1st SF Group leadership each SOC will be affected by a num- critical elements of the counterin- never materialized. Sympathy ber of factors: the maturity of the surgency, or COIN, model — SF; SOC headquarters: the military Civil Affairs, or CA; and Psycholog- service and the prior experience of ical Operations, or PSYOP. Howev- Although the presence the SOC commander in dealing with er, the PACOM-imposed “force cap” of SF detachments ad- special-operations forces, or SOF; on ARSOF personnel and heavy the service orientation and priorities weapons in the exercise area of vising the AFP on Basi- of the combatant command; the operations constrained the use of experience of the SOC and the com- CA teams. That compelled the com- lan and in southern batant command with the nuances mander of Forward Operating Base Mindanao deterred the of security assistance; and the expe- 11 to task SF detachments with rience of the SOC and the combat- the CA mission. The use of tactical activities of the ASG, ant command with Army Reserve PSYOP teams to train, advise and and National Guard mobilizations. assist AFP psychological-warfare the ARSOF mission to • Issues of national sovereignty elements was not approved by the the Philippines did not and a colonial heritage will inhibit Philippine government because the U.S.-dominated security assistance Philippine Psychological Warfare become the second and military training. U.S. SF-led Group had been severely compro- “Mike Forces,” popularized during mised during the regime of Presi- front of the GWOT. the Vietnam War, are history in dent Ferdinand Marcos. today’s developing world. U.S. secu- For the exercise to be successful, toward America for the tragic 9/11 rity-assistance and military-train- all three critical elements of the attacks on New York and Washing- ing operations will be more accept- COIN model needed to support one ton did not extend to national-sov- ed if there is parity between U.S. another. Unfortunately, while the ereignty rights. As a former U.S. and host-nation forces. role of PSYOP support had been colony, the Philippines was • Large population centers are identified as early as December extremely sensitive regarding its becoming the natural geographical 2001, planners had not developed sovereignty. Still, the impertinent environment for UW operations. an information-operations plan to ASG tactic of seizing and holding • The Special Forces Qualification emphasize H/CA accomplishments Westerners hostage for large ran- Course’s Robin Sage exercise pre- on Basilan. The H/CA projects soms had become embarrassing to pares Soldiers for challenging advi- received little or no news coverage the Philippine government, forcing sory missions, such as those they from the Filipino media, while Abu it to make a show of targeting the encountered in the Philippines. Sabaya, who was holding the Burn- ASG as a “political sop” for the •CA will continue to be a major hams captive, was readily given American government, while other SF mission, based on SF Soldiers’ radio-broadcast access for his tele- insurgent elements that posed daily contact with the local popu- phone call-ins. In a country in greater threats to law, order and lace at all levels and the continued which the media has a dramatic stability were allowed to continue

56 Special Warfare imposition of force caps on ARSOF •Force protection was, and con- problem during its planning for and other U.S. forces. Limitations tinues to be, a constant challenge. OEF missions. Groups have just on crew-served heavy weapons, Improvised explosive devices are over 30 top-secret billets, and even armored vehicles, tanks and the simplest and safest tools for fewer positions for focal-point pro- artillery are another form of force terrorists to use. Acquiring a situa- gram read-ons. As relations with caps. tional awareness and keeping a other U.S. government elements • Aggressive AFP patrolling presence “on the streets” proved to have grown during the GWOT, the denied the ASG its habitual sanctu- be key to a proactive force-protec- need for more top-level security bil- ary and curtailed ASG movement, tion program. Neither a semiper- lets has increased. while U.S.-directed H/CA projects missive/uncertain environment nor The Philippines mission is an earned local respect, improved a reduced U.S. troop presence justi- ARSOF success story. Balikatan is force-protection measures and fies maintaining a lower force-pro- again an integral part of the Joint reduced Muslim village support for tection posture — the bombing Chiefs of Staff Cobra Gold exercise the terrorists on Basilan. death of Sergeant First Class Mark series for the Pacific. After more • MEDCAPs did much to foster Jackson and the serious wounding than 10 years, PACOM has re- the image that the AFP was pro- of his team leader during the joint established an acceptable presence viding a secure environment. The special-operations task force phase in the Philippines and is now bet- medical and dental-assistance vis- of the Philippines mission, when ter able to monitor the pulse of the its reached out to those areas lack- the American presence was limit- region. AFP training and initia- ing medical care and provided ed, demonstrated that force protec- tives on Basilan compelled the much-needed aid. The MEDCAPS tion is a constant in the asymmet- ASG to return to its home islands. also enabled the AFP, Philippine ric war against terrorism. The 1st SF Group detachments, by officials, nongovernment organiza- • Maintaining a high state of focusing their efforts on the profes- tions and the SF detachments to alertness and being well-armed at sional development of junior offi- work together and interact with all times proved to be good deter- cers and NCOs, have had a major the Basilan populace in a positive rent to terrorist attacks, just as impact on the AFP of the future. manner. regular firing of heavy weapons on Side benefits from a constant • Logistics proved challenging the ranges emphasized the fire- ARSOF presence are that the AFP for the 160th Special Operations power and the well-honed capabili- is looking at its diverse ethnic pop- Aviation Regiment, as well as for ties of U.S. troops. ulation in a different way and that the 1st SF Group, because units • The widespread use of cell the H/CA projects have given the had to be self-sufficient; there was phones in countries of the develop- Basilan islanders significantly no forward support team from the ing world — the most common improved lives. 528th Special Operations Support workplace for ARSOF — com- Battalion attached to the Army pounds the challenges of force pro- special-operations task force to tection. Text-messaging using code Dr. C.H. Briscoe is the command support its SOF-unique require- words, dialect slang and linguistic historian for the U.S. Army Special ments. The most reliable assist- code-switching — the mixing of Operations Command. ance came from the units’ home English, Spanish,Tagalog and local bases in the continental U.S., dialect words — demonstrated how Korea and Okinawa. Filipinos have capitalized on tech- • In OEF-Philippines, in OEF nology to which Westerners are Afghanistan, and later in Opera- still getting accustomed. tion Iraqi Freedom, peacetime sup- • Access to certain U.S. Embassy ply rules applied. The simultane- message traffic during “contin- ous conduct of two GWOT cam- gency” missions overseas required paigns stretched Army materiel top-secret clearances and focal- and ARSOF-specific equipment point “read-ons.” Those clearances thin. Statements of requirements were difficult for SF groups to should include the needs of CA and obtain because of the limited num- PSYOP attachments; otherwise the ber of top-level security positions needs of these small ARSOF ele- the groups are allocated. The 5th ments will get lost. SF Group experienced a similar

September 2004 57 Enlisted Career Notes Special Warfare

CMF 38 approved, MOS 38A The Department of the Army approved the revision of Career Management becomes 38B Field 38 (Civil Affairs) on July 21. Changes to CMF 38 will be effective Oct. 1, 2005. The 38B military occupational specialty, or MOS, (Enlisted Civil Affairs) will be added to the Active Army, and Soldiers serving in MOS 38A (Enlisted Civil Affairs) will be converted to MOS 38B. The Army is devel- oping a process that will allow Soldiers currently assigned to the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion to request reclassification to MOS 38B and remain in the Active Army Civil Affairs community. Other Soldiers seeking to reclassify into Civil Affairs must have five years of service and be in the grade of E5 or E6. The Army is also developing a process that will enable Army Reserve Soldiers to become members of the Active army 38B MOS.

Retirement authority Authority for approving the voluntary retirement of enlisted Soldiers has transferred to HRC been transferred to the commander of the Army Human Resources Com- mand, or HRC, effective Aug. 1, 2004. Soldiers affected by the transfer of authority include retirement-eligible NCOs in the grades of staff sergeant (promotable) and above from all branches of service. Retirement-services officers at all installations will continue to process applications for volun- tary retirement, but they will submit the requests to HRC for approval. Soldiers in the grade of staff sergeant and below, or Soldiers who have been denied continued service under their service’s retention-control-point pol- icy, will not be affected by the changes. Enlisted Soldiers who have at least 20 years of active federal service are generally eligible for retirement, but they are not entitled to retire upon request, while Soldiers with at least 30 years of active federal service are. The transfer of retirement-approval authority is not intended to deny retirement to Soldiers but to ensure that the timing of authorized retire- ments is consistent with services’ manning priorities. The authority for the approval of officer retirements has resided with HRC for several years. Under the officer retirement-approval system, the chief of each officer branch identifies a replacement for each officer who requests retirement before the officer’s separation date is established. If a replacement cannot be identified prior to the officer’s requested date of separation, the losing unit will be requested to accept a personnel shortage. In nearly all cases, officers are allowed to retire within 12 months of their date of application for retirement. It is unlikely that the Special Forces Branch at HRC will defer retirement requests from enlisted Soldiers if those requests are received at least six months before the Soldier’s requested date of separa- tion. For more information, telephone Master Sergeant Larry P. Deel at DSN 239-7594, commercial (910) 432-7594, or send e-mail to [email protected].

58 Special Warfare Officer Career Notes Special Warfare

SF warrant officer earns Chief Warrant Officer 2 Thomas K. Asselta was awarded the Department prestigious award of the Army’s MacArthur Award for outstanding leadership in March. Asselta is assigned to Company B, 2nd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group, Fort Campbell, Ky. The MacArthur Award, named in honor of General Douglas MacArthur, was started by the Army in 1987 as a way of promoting and sustaining effective company- and junior-grade officer leadership in the active Army and in the reserve components. It is jointly sponsored by the United States Army and the General Douglas MacArthur Foundation and is given to officers and warrant officers who exhibit extraordinary leadership abilities and embody the ideals embraced by MacArthur — duty, honor and country. Army Regulation 600-89, General Douglas MacArthur Leadership Award Program, outlines the Department of the Army selection criteria for board- ing 13 active-Army winners out of a group of 24 nominees — 23 from Army major commands and one from Headquarters, Department of the Army. The board also chooses Army National Guard and Army Reserve winners of the MacArthur Award. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Per- sonnel oversees the program and announces the winners each February. Asselta joins the ranks of three other SF warrant officers who have achieved this honor. Chief Warrant Officer 2 Nicholas L. Punimata, an SF detachment commander in the 1st SF Group, was the first warrant officer to earn this honor, in 2000. Chief Warrant Officer 2 Paul W. Herber, Com- pany B, 1st Battalion, 10th SF Group, took the honor in 2001, and in 2002, Chief Warrant Officer 2 Anthony J. Linza, Company C, 3rd Battalion, 5th SF Group, won the award. Following the presentation of the Macarthur Award, Asselta and his fam- ily participated in a number of events, including a wreath-laying ceremo- ny at Arlington National Cemetery’s Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, a visit to Congress and briefings and discussions with senior Army officials.

September 2004 59 Foreign SOF Special Warfare

Chinese armed police Components of the Armed Police Corps of Xinjiang Province in the Peoples emphasize special Republic of China are placing increased emphasis on counterterrorist train- operations ing and improved force structure for special-purpose elements. This includes a recent exercise focusing on rapid crisis response and on the integrated use of helicopters, paratroopers and ground combat vehicles, as well as on cre- ating a special-operations component and reorganizing the anti-hijacking component of the corps. The police corps has also reportedly upgraded its communications infrastructure. While the Armed Police Corps concerns gen- erally include what are characterized as “criminal gangs” and other violent lawbreakers, the force has also been involved in rural and urban suppres- sion and counterinsurgency efforts against Uighur independence activities in “Eastern Turkestan,” a republic that was incorporated into China in the wake of the Chinese communist victory. Approximately 15,000 personnel of the Armed Police Corps are stationed in the southern portion of Eastern Turkestan to ensure what officials of the regional Chinese Communist Party call “the unity of the great motherland.”

Russian arms-export The Russian Federation’s principal defense-arms sales agency — known by agency threatens national the contraction Rosoboronexport — pursues highly active initiatives to pro- security vide foreign clients with a range of modern, if often less than top-of-the-line, weaponry. Among the modern arms offered for sale are a variety of weapons billed as “special operations” small arms. These include the 4.5 mm SPP-1M, an underwater pistol designed to provide personal protection for combat swimmers; the 5.66 mm APS underwater assault rifle, which may be used for personal protection underwater or on shore, or mounted on underwater vehi- cles and used against mini-subs; a 9 mm silenced assault rifle and sniper rifle, and a variety of 9 mm submachine guns, body armor, night-vision and sur- veillance equipment. Rosoboronexport is heir to the highly corrupt Rosvoorouzhenie, whose irregular and illegal weapons transactions in the 1990s were the focus of official Russian-government prosecution. The reputa- tion for irregularity has followed the successor organization Rosoboronexport. Critics charge that its ill-considered and wholly profit-driven sales of weapon- ry to rogue regimes and groups is undermining Russian security by arming terrorist sponsors whose goals and activities are contrary to Russia’s asserted support for the Global War on Terrorism.

Japan looks at combating Japan’s 2004 defense white paper has identified general development direc- external special-ops threats tions for Japanese special-operations forces and has reaffirmed previous Japanese initiatives. The paper’s recommendations are based on Japan’s continued assessment of serious external threats, notably from North Korea and from terrorist groups, as well as the identified need for improved self- defense forces. In reviewing the force posture of North Korea, the white paper noted that Pyongyang is believed to maintain some 100,000 special- operations personnel intended for missions that range “from intelligence gathering and sabotage to guerrilla warfare.” Particular attention will be

60 Special Warfare given by Japan to the threat of enemy special forces and guerrillas — to their early detection and their subsequent destruction or capture. Maritime and ground dimensions of the challenge are identified, as is the need for pro- tecting critical infrastructure. As in other countries around the world, the interaction of military and police forces will receive more emphasis.

Lithuania restructures The Lithuanian Army’s special-operations unit — known by the acronym SOJ — special-operations unit is scheduled to undergo some restructuring and training that may result in a decrease in its size, but which reportedly will increase the capabilities of its main components. Changes will feature greater cross-training among compo- nents and some realignment in light of the army’s new NATO responsibilities. Missions will include “special reconnaissance of strategic installations, short- term direct combat actions and antiterrorist activity,” as well as supporting law-enforcement inside the country when required. Lithuanian special-opera- tions components have been operating in Afghanistan, where their perform- ance has been, by all accounts, highly regarded.

Russia beefs up The famed Russian counterterrorist unit “Alfa” celebrated its 30th anniver- special-warfare units sary July 29. Formed in 1974 under KGB control, during the supposed high- water mark of Soviet military power, the unit became publicly visible to West- ern eyes following its role as a special-operations spearhead for the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Now under the Russian Federal Security Service, Alfa is better known because of its involvement in post-Soviet internal counterter- rorist actions, hostage-rescue, and in the serial conflicts in Chechnya. Most recently, Alfa suffered a substantial number of casualties during its failed efforts to resolve the hostage crisis at Besian, Ossetia, in Russia. Hundreds of hostages were killed and wounded in a firefight among Russian security forces, Chechen hostage-takers, and armed family members and civilians at the scene. Alfa and other security forces were severely criticized for their poor performance and lack of coordination. Veterans of Alfa also have been promi- nent in private security and paramilitary activities. New or recast special-pur- pose units continue to join Alfa and other military, intelligence and police spe- cial-operations forces in Russia. In this regard, the commander of the Russian airborne troop recently announced the formation of special mountain-warfare units trained to conduct counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations. He noted that the units would be provided with new equipment, and while Chechnya was not specifically designated, it appears to be the targeted envi- ronment. There are currently more than 1,500 airborne troops in Chechnya, comprising three battalion and tactical groupings from the 76th Airborne Division, as well as a special-forces detachment. It is unclear whether the new units referred to will be formed from these units or from other existing air- borne units. New police antiterrorist units also continue to be formed. One such “21st century” 16-man unit, operating near Moscow, is said to be experi- mental in nature, although the counterterrorist skills, approaches and mis- sions described, including the assault on tall urban structures from multiple directions, appear to be analogous to those of some other units now in service. They will provide high-quality local support for counterterrorism.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr, who served in a number of Army and Department of Defense intelligence positions and is now a Texas-based defense consultant working on regional-security issues.

September 2004 61 Update Special Warfare

SWCS names best Wolff previously served during upon his graduation from the Uni- instructors for 2004 Operation Iraqi Freedom as chief of versity of Maryland in 1987. operations for the Office of Recon- Specializing in advanced com- The JFK Special Warfare Center struction and Humanitarian Assist- munications capabilities, Soldiers and School, or SWCS, named its ance Southern Region. of the 112th Signal Battalion pro- 2004 Instructors of the Year Aug. 11. vide communications support to Major General James W. Parker, Book details ARSOF activities Army special-operations forces as the commanding general of SWCS, in OEF-Afghanistan well as to joint special-operations recognized the winners and pre- forces around the globe. sented awards to the top officer, The U.S. Army Special Opera- NCO and civilian instructors. tions Command has published a Manuals to update doctrine book that details the activities of The officer instructor for 2004 is for SF skills Chaplain (Major) Charles E. members of the Army special-opera- Reynolds, who served as the SWCS tions community during Operation The Special Forces Doctrine Divi- staff chaplain during the nomination Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. sion, Directorate of Training and period and taught classes in cross-cul- The book, Weapon of Choice: Doctrine, JFK Special Warfare Cen- tural communication, religious issues ARSOF in Afghanistan,was ter and School, is working on new in special operations, suicide preven- produced by the USASOC com- and updated doctrinal publications tion and ethics. mand historian’s office. The that have applicability to SF skills. The NCO instructor of the year is book was written by military The SF Doctrine Division’s Sergeant First Class Fernando historians who all have special- Advanced Skills Branch has com- Verones Jr., who is assigned to the operations experience. Accord- pleted FM 3-05.210, Special Forces SWCS NCO Academy as a small- ing to Dr. C.H. Briscoe, the Air Operations, and graphic training group leader. USASOC command historian, aid, GTA 31-02-001, Special Forces The civilian instructor of the year the book is an attempt to share Air Operations. Both are scheduled is Ernest K. Tabata. Tabata, whose the stories of ARSOF soldiers for distribution to field units during military and civilian service total with the American public. the fall of 2004. For more informa- more than 58 years, is a civilian The USASOC Historian’s Office is tion, telephone Master Sergeant instructor with the 1st Special War- distributing copies of the book to all Antonio Masterjohn at DSN 239- fare Training Group. He has trained ARSOF units and welcomes reader 3043 or commercial (910) 432-3043, every Special Forces engineer comments and suggestions. For more or send e-mail to: [email protected]. sergeant who has served since 1985. information, contact the USASOC The Advanced Skills Branch has All three of the SWCS instruc- command historian at DSN 239- also completed the final draft of FM 3- tors will participate in the Army 3732 or commercial (910) 432-3732. 05.212, SF Waterborne Operations. Training and Doctrine Command The FM has been updated with instructor-of-the-year competition 112th Signal Battalion holds changes that will enable users to con- in November. change of command duct waterborne missions more effi- Lieutenant Colonel Randy S. Tay- ciently. The manual has been submit- Wolff takes command lor assumed command of the 112th ted to the Army Training Support of 96th CA Battalion Special Operations Signal Battalion Center for printing and is scheduled from Lieutenant Colonel Peter A. Gal- for distribution to field units during Lieutenant Colonel James J. the fall of 2004. For more information, Wolff assumed command of the 96th lagher during a change of command ceremony at Fort Bragg June 24. telephone CWO 3 Jeff Kula at DSN Civil Affairs Battalion from Lieu- 239-5952 or commercial (910) 432- tenant Colonel Michael J. Warmack Taylor, a native of Gowanda, N.Y., enlisted in the Army in 1982. 5952, or send e-mail to: [email protected]. during a ceremony at Fort Bragg’s The Advanced Skills Branch has Bull Simons Plaza June 17. He was commissioned in Infantry

62 Special Warfare also updated FM 3-05.211, SF also included Specialist Michelle L. increasing the base of proficiency MFF Operations. The updated Maguire, Support Battalion, JFK before SFQC graduates arrive in the manual contains comprehensive Special Warfare Center and School; force. The prior standard was 0+/0+. information on military free-fall and Specialist Brandon A. Lantz, Additionally, the Officer Record missions so that users will not 415th Civil Affairs Battalion, Kala- Brief, or ORB, will be modified Army- need to consult any other publica- mazoo, Mich. — Specialist Jennifer J. wide to reflect officers’ reading, listen- tions. FM 3-05.211 is also sched- Eidson, USASOC PAO ing and oral proficiency, DLPT scores uled for distribution to field units and their test date. All SF officers and in the fall of 2004. For more infor- 528th Support Battalion NCOs, regardless of their assignment, mation, telephone CWO 3 Randall welcomes new commander will be required to test annually and to C. Wurst at DSN 239-5952 or com- Lieutenant Colonel Patrick V. maintain language proficiency. mercial (910) 432-5952, or send e- Pallatto Jr., assumed command of SWCS and the U.S. Army Special mail to: [email protected]. the 528th Special Operations Sup- Operations Command’s language The Collective Training Branch port Battalion from Lieutenant office are working to identify has completed ARTEP 31-805-MTP, Colonel Michael P. Saulnier during methodologies and resourcing for Special Forces Group and Battalion, a ceremony at Fort Bragg’s Dick supporting initial language training which is also scheduled for distribu- Meadows Field July 16. and unit language-enhancement tion to field units during the fall of Pallatto, a native of Pittsburgh, programs to maximize the benefits 2004. For more information, tele- Pa., enlisted in the U.S. Marine to the force and to support the long- phone Chief Warrant Officer 4 Dou- Corps Reserve in 1983. He graduat- term language initiative. glas Jenkins at DSN 239-8286 or ed from Indiana University of Penn- For more information, telephone commercial (910) 432-8286, or send sylvania in 1987 and was commis- Lieutenant Colonel Mark Strong, in e-mail to: [email protected]. sioned a second lieutenant in the the SWCS Special Operations Propo- nency Office, at DSN 239-3296, com- USASOC chooses top NCO, Infantry through the Army Reserve Officer Training Corps. His previous mercial (910) 432-3296, or send e- Soldier for 2004 assignment was with 1st Corps Sup- mail to [email protected]. The United States Army Special port Command. SF warrant officers get new Operations Command announced Specializing in resupply capabil- the winners of its 2004 competition ities, Soldiers of the 528th provide collar insignia for NCO and Soldier of the Year in supplies, maintenance, equipment The U.S. Army Special Opera- August. and expertise to Army and joint tions Command, or USASOC, host- Sergeant John R. Parker and Spe- special-operation forces around the ed a ceremony July 8 to mark a cialist Joseph R. Camire, both of the globe. They were among the first change of insignia for all Special 3rd Battalion, 160th Special Opera- deployed in support of Operation Forces warrant officers. tions Aviation Regiment, are the Enduring Freedom, and since that SF warrant officers now wear the 2004 winners. time they have continuously same uniform collar insignia as that Runners-up were Sergeant Bren- deployed in support of the Global worn by SF commissioned officers. dan N. Gleespen, 6th Psychological War on Terrorism. USASOC commanding general Operations Battalion, 4th Psycholog- Lieutenant General Philip R. ical Operations Group; and Special- SF officers, NCOs must Kensinger Jr., hosted the ceremo- ist James K. Campbell, 3rd Battal- meet new DLPT minimum ny, which featured the changing of ion, 75th Ranger Regiment. The commander of the U.S. Army the branch insignia from the war- Other competitors for NCO of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare rant-officer eagle, worn by all Army Year included Sergeant First Class Center and School, or SWCS, has warrant officers since May 1921, to Michael J.A. Vaulx, NCO Academy, established a new minimum stand- the crossed arrows worn by SF offi- JFK Special Warfare Center and ard for the Defense Language Profi- cers since June 1987. School; Sergeant Mark C. Reed, 1st ciency Test, or DLPT, for all gradu- The ceremony coincided with the Special Forces Group, Fort Lewis, ates of the Special Forces Qualifica- 86th anniversary of the Army War- Wash.; Staff Sergeant Matthew D. tion Course, or SFQC. rant Officer Corps July 9. Leland, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger The new standard of 1/1/1 (reading, Regiment; and Staff Sergeant listening and oral proficiency) reflects Michael H. Daigle, 528th Special a priority on foreign-language capa- Operations Support Battalion. bilities for the force. The change indi- Soldier of the Year competitors cates a serious commitment to

September 2004 63 Book Reviews Special Warfare

Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness explains why U.S. forces and the AFP Account of al-Qaeda’s Newest were unable to eliminate those terror- Center of Operations in South- ist threats because of politics and poli- east Asia. By Maria Ressa. New cies, and she implies that the terror- York:The Free Press, 2003. ISBN 0- ists will be a force to be reckoned with 7432-5133-4. 274 pages. $26. in the future. In conclusion, Ressa explains that For more than 16 years, Maria a security vacuum has been created Ressa, the current CNN Jakarta in Southeast Asia while the world’s bureau chief, has lived and worked in attention is on the Middle East. She Southeast Asia, and she has called on describes the war on terror as a that experience to provide insight into global insurgency that will be won the development of today’s global only after the world has a greater insurgency networks in her new book, understanding of the radical Seeds of Terror.For special-operations Islamist threats being mobilized personnel charged with conducting today. The author contends that, counterinsurgency, her book provides armed with new intelligence, the an excellent understanding of the ter- U.S. has the capability of rising rorist organizations we face today. above its own self-interest, of com- While serving in Indonesia and the municating with the reasonable and Philippines, Ressa has made connec- Afghanistan in the late 1980s to rational Muslims of the world, and tions and contacts throughout the help fight the Soviets and then of eliminating the global insurgency. region that have given her access to returned home with a thirst for An expert on the workings of sensitive information on the existing Jihad. The book outlines in detail Southeast Asian terrorist net- threats. Ressa’s book is a detailed the 2002 JI bombing of a Bali works, Ressa had her credibility analysis of the inner workings of al- nightclub that left 202 dead, fol- and status as an authority rein- Qaeda and its Southeast Asian opera- lowed by the 2003 bombing of the forced when the Army invited her tional arm, Jemaah Islamiah, or JI. J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta that to speak at West Point’s 2004 con- The book opens with a detailed list left 11 dead and 150 injured. ference on Asian security issues, of al-Qaeda and JI key leaders, fol- Ressa documents how every terror- titled “Terrorism in Asia: Threats, lowed by a timeline that chronicles ist attack since 1993, including 9/11, Options, Implications.” Colonel the inception and growth of the has had a connection to the Philip- David Maxwell, chief of staff of the existing network. Ressa explains pines. She recounts how during Oper- Special Operations Command – how Osama bin Laden took advan- ation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, Korea, said, “She understands the tage of opportunities to expand his or OEF-P, in 2001, 660 United States nature of unconventional warfare reach from the Middle East into Special Forces Soldiers deployed to and counterinsurgency and the Southeast Asia and to connect with the southern Philippine islands of fight in the ideological wars. She the already-growing JI cells created Zamboanga and Basilan to train, also understands the importance of by Abu Bakar Ba’aysir, who is known advise and assist the Armed Forces of intelligence and link analysis.” as the “Asian Osama bin Laden.” the Philippines, or AFP, in combating Seeds of Terror documents the Ressa, privy to nongovernment terrorist insurgents. The book also growth of the Southeast Asian ter- sources as well as to classified documents the impact that SF had on rorist networks that today’s spe- reports of the CIA, FBI and South- the fight against the ASG and the cial-operations forces must under- east Asian intelligence agencies, Moro Islamic Liberation Front, or stand and eliminate. This book is a tracks the progress of Southeast MILF, two of the leading terrorist “must read” for anyone interested Asian Muslims who traveled to organizations in the region. Ressa in the Global War on Terrorism,

64 Special Warfare Southeast Asian security affairs or means of achieving an independent owners are to treat slaves with the development of the global Muslim state. Upon his death, the respect and feed them well; howev- insurgency networks that the group changed its philosophy and er, the rebels did not abide by that world faces today. began to cash in on the kidnap-for- rule and kept supplies for them- ransom culture of the country. The selves, maintaining that the rule CPT J.C. Lumbaca ASG maintains ties to militant applied only to Muslim slaves. Naval Postgraduate School Islamic groups like al-Qaeda. While Burnham acknowledges that Monterey, Calif. In the book, Burnham provides a the ASG was her true enemy,she does graphic account of ASG operations. criticize the AFP and the government In the Presence of My Enemies. While the group usually had suffi- of the Philippines, noting that the By Gracia Burnham with Dean Mer- cient equipment, it did occasionally ASG maintained that its source of rill. Wheaton, Ill.: Tyndale House Pub- lack funding. ammunition was none other than the lishers, Inc., 2003. ISBN 0-8423-8138- Without being overly dramatic, AFP. Although she stops short of 4 (hard cover). 307 pages. $22.99. Burnham talks about the ASG’s assigning blame for the death of her treatment of hostages, including husband to the military, she clearly For a little more than a year, two the beheading of Guillermo Sobero implies collusion between the ASG American missionaries, Martin and on June 11, 2001. She notes that and government officials. Gracia Burnham, were held captive by his death served as a warning The book describes the hope that Filipino rebels on the Philippine island against agitating their captors. the Burnhams felt when they of Basilan. In the Presence of My Ene- In talking about the jihad, Burnham observed U.S. reconnaissance planes mies is the story of their captivity, told contrasts the ASG’s views of Allah flying over Basilan. While Burnham firsthand by Gracia Burnham. with the Burnhams’ idea of God. believes that the presence of U.S. The Burnhams, New Tribes Mis- According to Musab, the second-in- military helped focus the rescue sion evangelicals, became pawns in command, the mujahid code acknowl- effort, she hints that a greater par- the kidnap-for-ransom racket in the edged that “the civilian is nothing; the ticipation by the U.S. military might Philippines. The couple was taken normal person is nothing.The mujahid have produced a different, less costly captive by the Abu Sayyaf Group, or must go on.” For the members of the ending to the hostage-taking. ASG, and held hostage for 376 days ASG, death in a jihad was a great The book poses some interesting before being rescued by members of honor, so the wounding or death of a questions: Should the U.S. and mis- the Filipino Army. Martin was killed comrade or innocent civilian could eas- sionary agencies maintain a no-ran- during the rescue operation. Gracia ily be dismissed as destiny. som policy? Is the U.S. government Burnham provides the reader with The Burnhams found that the doing enough to protect its citizens candid descriptions of life as a ASG altered its interpretation of abroad? Is victory in the war on ter- hostage under the control of Islamic the Koran to meet its needs. The rorism possible, especially given the warriors, painting a picture of con- Koran makes it clear that slave ambition of the enemy? While she trasting cultural contexts and giving doesn’t try to answer these ques- insight into the Philippine kidnap-for- tions, Burnham does draw the read- ransom industry. er into the hostages’ reality. Burnham focuses on their cap- While at one level a Christian tivity, which began May 21, 2001, audience will identify with the when the ASG took 20 people, spiritual aspects of the book, In the including the Burnhams, captive Presence of My Enemies has a from the Dos Palmas resort. broader scope and will draw audi- With brutal honesty, Burnham ences who will appreciate this reflects on that captivity, bringing account of survival under the mali- to light her own battles with cious control of Islamist terrorists. despair, hunger and physical exhaustion. She articulates her CW3 James A. Schroder spiritual odyssey, as she ques- U.S. Army (ret.) tioned her faith in God. She credits Fayetteville, N.C. Martin for her survival. Abdurak Janjalani, an Islamic scholar and a member of the mujahideen during the Afghan-Sovi- et war, founded the ASG in 1991 as a

September 2004 65 Special Warfare

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