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Lumads-Our-People-Too.Pdf The Lumads Are Our People, Too! • By Rudy B. Rodil ♥ Introduction The Lumad are the indigenous peoples of Mindanao. They constitute approximately five percent, clearly the minority, of the total Mindanao population in the 1990 census. The rest of the inhabitants in the region are Muslims, also indigenous, estimated at 20 percent; settlers and their descendants roughly make up the balance of 75 percent. It should be pointed out that a good portion of or assimilated into the latter segment are descendants of native inhabitants who were converted to Christianity in the Spanish period, mostly from northern and eastern Mindanao. How they became minorities is the story of this paper. Not only have they been reduced to a numerical minority in their own lands, they have also been marginalized in other aspects of our national life. Their minoritization involved, mainly the state machinery, with unwitting participation from the major segments of the population. It is not our intention to find fault, merely to lay down the facts in the hope that we may be able to help secure for them a well deserved social space in the Filipino nation. Their situation is not beyond help. This presentation is divided into four parts. Part I is on the Lumad communities and their ancestral domains in Mindanao. Part II focuses on the process of marginalization. Part III discusses the actual process of dispossession. Part IV explores the tri-people approach to peace and development in the region. PART I The Lumad Communities and Their Ancestral Domains in Mindanao The Lumad are the Indigenous Cultural Communities of Mindanao, namely, in alphabetical order: the Ata, Bagobo, Banwaon, Bla-an, Bukidnon, Dibabawon, Higaunon, Mamanwa, Mandaya, Mangguwangan, Manobo, Mansaka, Matigsalug, Subanen, Tagakaolo, Talaandig, T'boli, Teduray and Ubo. We have 20 in the list but there can be more because aside from distinguishing themselves by their ethno-linguistic identity, they also, and more commonly, refer to each other by their geographic names or their place of habitation. • Presented at Bishops-Ulama Forum, February 22-23, 1999, Davao City. Slightly revised version of the paper written earlier for the Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility (CMFR). ♥ Historian and Professor of History at the MSU-Iligan Institute of Technology, Iligan City, and member of the Government Peace Negotiating Panel in the GRP-MNLF Formal Peace Talks, August 6 1993 – October 4, 1996. 156 Origin of the Name Lumad and its Significance The name Lumad grew out of the political awakening among them during the martial law regime of President Ferdinand Marcos. In June 1986, representatives from 15 tribes agreed to adopt a common name in a congress which also established Lumad Mindanao. This is the first time in their history that these tribes have agreed to a common name for themselves, distinct from the Moros and from the migrant majority. Lumad is a Cebuano word meaning indigenous. The choice of a Cebuano word may be a bit ironic -- Cebuano is the language of the natives of Cebu in the Visayas -- but they deemed it to be most appropriate considering that the various tribes do not have any other common language among themselves except Cebuano. Lumad Mindanao, the organization, is no longer intact, but the name remains and is, from all indications, gaining more adherents. Lumad-Mindanao's main objective was to achieve self-determination for their member tribes, meaning self-government within their ancestral domains and in accordance with their customary laws under the sovereignty of the Republic. The decision to have a common name was crucial and historic. This was a first in Lumad history. Earlier, they were called by various names by outsiders which they shared with other indigenous groups all over the country. They were labeled paganos by the Spaniards or referred to simply by their tribal identities. They were tagged Wild Tribes or Uncivilized Tribes or non-Christian Tribes by the Americans. They were officially named the National Cultural Minorities or just Cultural minorities or simply Minorities by the Philippine Government. They were renamed Cultural Communities in the 1973 Constitution; this was revised to Indigenous Cultural Communities in the 1987 Charter. Visayans call them nitibo ; Tagalogs call them taga-bundok or katutubo . Christian churches used to prefer the name Tribal Filipinos but today they are among the more active users of the name Lumad , and in a more respectful tone. Except for paganos, all these denominations also included the Moros. Commonality Among Lumad Communities and Other Inhabitants of Mindanao Although the different Lumad communities do not have a common language, they actually have so much in common among themselves and with the other indigenous inhabitants of the region as well. Firstly, like the rest of the Philippine population, they share a common origin in the Malayo-Polynesian family of languages. Secondly, among themselves, according to a recent linguistic study, a large segment or fully 17 groups belong to the Manobo subfamily of languages, thus pointing convincingly to a common origin among them. 1 1 Richard E. Elkins, “Root of a Language,” in Filipino Heritage , Volume 2, p. 524. 157 Thirdly, this similarity of origin is acknowledged, each in its own way, among the Moro people and the Lumad by their folk tradition. For example, among the Kalibugan of Titay, they speak of two brothers as their ancestors, both Subanen. Dumalandalan was converted to Islam while Gumabon-gabon was not. Among the Subanen of Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur, they talk of four brothers as their ancestors. Tabunaway was the ancestor of the Magindanao; Dumalandalan the Maranao; Mili-rilid of the Teduray, and Gumabon-gabon of the Subanen. The Manobo of Cotabato and the Magindanao say that brothers Tabunaway and Mamalu are their common ancestors, although they differ on which of the two was converted to Islam. In the Manobo version, it was Mamalu who became Muslim; in the Magindanao version, it was Tabunaway. 2 The Manobo version further states that they share the same ancestor with the Ilyanun, the Matigsalug, the Talaandig, and the Maranao. 3 In the Teduray tradition, the same brothers Tabunaway and Mamalu are acknowledged as their ancestors. 4 The Higaunon communities recognize a common ancestry with the Maranao in their folklore especially in the border areas of Bukidnon and Lanao. They also believe that the Talaandig belong to their same ethnolinguistic group. Common Higaunon- Maranao ancestry is pronounced in the Bukidnon folklore where they speak of two brothers Bowan and Bala-oy, one of whom is said to be the ancestor of the Maranao. 5 Among the Talaandig of Bukidnon, their great ancestor Apu Agbibilin is acknowledged as the common ancestor of the Talaandig, Magindanao, Malanao (their pronunciation) and Manobo tribes who were saved at the highest peak of Mt. Kitanglad during the great flood. 6 Among the Bla-an (pronounced by them as two syllables, accent on the second syllable) of Davao del Sur, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao and Cotabato, 2 Dr. Najeeb M. Saleeby, Studies in Moro History, Law and Religion in Notre Dame Journal , Vol.6, No. 1 (April) 1975, pp. 10, 14, 16, 33,35, 36. 3 Elena Maquiso, Prologue to the Ulahingan (Manobo Epic) Dumaguete City: Silliman University, 1965). Mimeo Edition, pp. 1-6. “Teduray-Maguindanao Ethnic Relations: An Ethnohistorical Puzzle,” Solidarity , Vol VII, No. 4 (April) 1972, p. 25; Also, Appendix B 4 - Fernando C. Trecero, Teduray Tales (Manila: Bookman, Inc., 1977), pp. 135-140. 4 See Dr. Stuart Schlegel, “Teduray-Maguindanao Ethnic Relations: An Ethnohistorical Puzzle,” Solidarity , Vol VII, No. 4 (April) 1972, p. 25; Also, Appendix B 4 - Fernando C. Trecero, Teduray Tales (Manila: Bookman, Inc., 1977), pp. 135-140. 5 Mardonio M. Lao, Bukidnon in Historical Perspective (Musuan, Bukidnon: Publications Office, Central Mindanao University, 1985, Volume I, Appendix K, pp. 256-264. Translation of the original by Dr. Victorino T. Cruzado. Lao’s “Oral Tradition or Bukidnon Pre-history: The Kalikat hu mga Etaw dini ta Mindanao,” Kinaadman IX (1987), pp. 23-31 is a less complex version of the Bukidnon origin story. 6 From the genealogy of Datu Migketay Victorino L. Saway, the present tribal Chieftain of the Talaandig in Bukidnon who took over the position from his father Datu Kinulintang who died in 1992. 158 they speak of common ancestry with other ethnolinguistic groups. In an interview with a Bla-an tribal leader of Danlag, Tampakan, South Cotabato, this author got the following account which should be quoted here lengthily: “It was Almabet, their creator, who gave them that name. Almabet created eight people, first the Bla-an, then the others, namely, Tabali (T'boli), Ubo (Manobo), Alnawen (Maguindanao Muslim), Teduray, Klagan, Matigsalug, and Mandaya. He called them by these names. They would later be the ancestors of ethnic groups of the same names. Lands were assigned to them. Kolon Nadal (Koronadal) was given to the Bla-an. Almabet ascended from Melbel (Marbel). From here they (Bla-an) went to Kolon Bia-o (Columbio), to Buluan which they partly share with the Alnawen (Maguindanao Muslim), to other parts of the present South Cotabato, and to Datal Pitak in Matanao in the present Davao del Sur. The Tabali went to Lake Sebu. The rest went to their respective places. Although they claim common ancestry with these other groups, their languages are not mutually intelligible.” 7 The Kalagan and the Tagakaolo belong to the same ethno-linguistic group. 8 Ancestral Domains of the Lumad of Mindanao Traditionally, the Subanen have inhabited the Zamboanga peninsula, with larger concentrations in the following specific areas: Dapitan or Illaya Valley, Dipolog Valley specifically in Diwan, Punta and Sinaman, Manukan Valley, Sindangan, Panganuran in the present town of Gutalac, Coronado in the present town of Baliguian, Siocon, Kipit in the present town of Labason, Malayal and Patalun (now Lintangan) both in the present town of Sibuco, Bolong Valley, Tupilak and Bakalan Valleys in the town of Ipil, Lei- Batu Valley, Sibugai-Sei Valley, Dumankilas Bay, Dipolo Valley, Lubukan Valley, Labangan Valley and Mipangi Valley.
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