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The Talibanization of Southeast Asia Praeger Security International Advisory Board The Talibanization of Southeast Asia Praeger Security International Advisory Board Board Cochairs Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of Public and International Affairs, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia (U.S.A.) Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations and Chairman of the Advisory Board, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews (U.K.) Members Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.A.) The´re`se Delpech, Director of Strategic Affairs, Atomic Energy Commission, and Senior Research Fellow, CERI (Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques), Paris (France) Sir Michael Howard, former Chichele Professor of the History of War, and Regis Professor of Modern History, Oxford University, and Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History, Yale University (U.K.) Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy, USA (Ret.), former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army (U.S.A.) Paul M. Kennedy, J. Richardson Dilworth Professor of History and Director, International Security Studies, Yale University (U.S.A.) Robert J. O’Neill, former Chichele Professor of the History of War, All Souls Col- lege, Oxford University (Australia) Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland (U.S.A.) Fareed Zakaria, Editor, Newsweek International (U.S.A.) THE TALIBANIZATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA Losing the War on Terror to Islamist Extremists Bilveer Singh PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL Westport, Connecticut • London Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Singh, Bilveer, 1956– The Talibanization of Southeast Asia : losing the war on terror to Islamist extremists / Bilveer Singh. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN: 978–0–275–99995–7 (alk. paper) 1. Terrorism—Southeast Asia. 2. Terrorism—Religious aspects—Islam. 3. Jemaah Islamiyah (Organization) 4. Political violence—Southeast Asia. I. Title. HV6433.S644S56 2007 363.3250959–dc22 2007026124 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2007 by Bilveer Singh All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2007026124 ISBN: 978–0–275–99995–7 First published in 2007 Praeger Security International, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10987654321 To Gurdial Kaur, my beloved wife who has been the pillar of strength and inspiration in my life. Contents Preface ix Acknowledgments xiii Abbreviations xv Glossary of Key Islamic Terms xix Chronology: The Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyyah in Southeast Asia xxi Introduction: Behind the Veil of Successful Counterterrorism 1 1 Religious Extremism and Terrorism: A Conceptual Framework 10 2 Southeast Asia’s Experience with Old and New Islamist Extremism 25 and Jihadism 3 The Rise of Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyyah as Southeast Asia’s Leading 50 Transnational Terrorist Organization 4 Counterterrorism in Southeast Asia: One Step Forward, Two 100 Steps Backward? Conclusion: Southeast Asia’s Failure in Its War on Terror 133 against Islamist Extremism and the Road Ahead Appendix 1: General Guidelines on the Struggle of Jama’ah Islamiyyah 159 (Excerpts) Appendix 2: ASEAN Agreements on Combating Terrorism 181 viii CONTENTS Appendix 3: ASEAN’s AJAI Operatives Who Have Been Detained, Released, 183 or Killed (as of June 2007) Notes 191 Bibliography 211 Index 225 Preface Southeast Asia had been afflicted with the danger of terrorism, long before the United States and the Western world became aware of the threat in the wake of Sep- tember 11, 2001 (hereafter referred to as the 9/11 Incident), attacks on New York and Washington. Various enduring factors such as historical developments, nature of geography, ethnic-religious makeup, accessibility to external forces, the role of extraneous actors in dominating the politics and economy of the region, and the nature of regimes in the region have entrenched terrorism, particularly associated with religious extremism in the region. This was evident in Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar, and the Philippines since the end of the Second World War in 1945. The terrorist challenge was essentially national in character, with groups attempt- ing to either secede from the central government to form a new state or to force the central government to adopt policies that would support the raison d’eˆtre of these extremist groups. Essentially, this involved the establishment of a political system that was more Islamic in character, either nationally or within a specific territory of a national state. This changed fundamentally with the emergence of new terrorist threats in the region in the post–Cold War period. This study analyzes the increasing Talibanization of Southeast Asia, a relatively new phenomenon. It involves the adop- tion of Islamist doctrines, ideologies, and values that are largely militant in character, which for some groups includes the adoption of violence to achieve their goals. The emergence of organizations that are prepared to adopt terrorism as a means to achieve their goals is particularly pertinent, especially since it is rationalized in the name of Islam. While there were groups that adhered to these principles and mode of operations in the past, what is new is the expanse of the network, their extrana- tional goals and linkages. However, religious-oriented terrorism is not a stand-alone x PREFACE phenomenon. It is largely a function of the introduction and adoption of radical and extremist religious ideologies, in this case, the radicalization of Islam in Southeast Asia, hitherto one of the few oases of moderate Islam in the world. Understanding this process, referred to in this study as Talibanization, is the key to unraveling the increased radicalization in Southeast Asia. What has made the challenge of this new terrorism distinct, especially with regard to the emergence of the Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyyah (AJAI), is that while it aims to establish an Islamic state, its goals, organizational structures, and operations are far more wide-ranging. Unlike the terrorism and challenges of past religious extremists in the region, the AJAI represents the birth of the first regional terrorist organization in Southeast Asia. It is a transnational terrorist organization along the lines of the Al Qaeda, even though on a much smaller scale in terms of objectives and goals. It aims to establish a regional Islamic state (Dauliah Islamiyah Nusantara, or DIN) covering most of southern Southeast Asia that would ultimately form a new Islamic epicenter in the Asia-Pacific region. Additionally, what has made the AJAI a potent force has been its ability to synergize with various existing religious extremist groups in the region and beyond, including the Al Qaeda and other like-minded groups based in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This has succeeded in posing one of the most serious secu- rity challenges to the region since the end of the Cold War. This study is an attempt to understand and unravel the growing nexus between extremist Islamists and terrorism as evident in the operation of various terrorist groups in Southeast Asia, particularly AJAI. The term ‘‘Islamist’’ is deliberately chosen to distinguish it from the common term ‘‘Islamic.’’ In this study, ‘‘Islamic’’ refers to what is written in the Koran and Hadith, whereas ‘‘Islamist’’ is the use of ‘‘Islam’’ for specific purposes. Many political actors have often tried to justify their actions on grounds that these are ‘‘Islamic,’’ when indeed they are not. To that extent, ‘‘Islamists’’ usually manipulate and distort what is ‘‘Islamic’’ to achieve political goals. While ‘‘radical piety’’ is fast becoming a fact of life in the region, what is most dan- gerous is its abuse and manipulation to achieve the political goals of Islamists. The rise of the Islamist agenda is a key cause of extremism and terrorism. This study examines the problems and challenges facing Islam, the rise of Islamic radicalism, and the emergence of various Islamist extremist groups that are threatening secular regimes in Southeast Asia. The emergence of Islamist radicalism will mainly focus on the AJAI, especially in Indonesia. What the AJAI is, how it emerged, what threat it poses, and the measures adopted to manage it will be examined. Whether there is a future for Islamist extrem- ism and how Southeast Asian states have responded to the phenomenon will also be studied. A key theme throughout this study is the resilience of Islamist extremism and the apparent inability of governments in the region to annihilate the menace, especially at its roots. This study argues that due to inappropriate measures and approaches, and a lack of understanding of the key challenge at hand, governments in the region are ‘‘barking up the wrong tree,’’ as they have largely missed the nexus between religion and terrorism, leading in reality to the rapid Talibanization of Southeast Asia. Despite various counterterrorism measures since 2001, the region PREFACE xi has failed to prevent terrorist organizations such as the AJAI and its affiliates from regenerating and mounting attacks. If anything, the threat of Islamist extremism and terrorism has worsened even though the region has launched a ‘‘war on terror’’ since 2001. The rising Talibanization of Southeast Asia is a function of the spread of radical Islam into the region. This has spread from the epicenter of Islamic radicalism, namely, the Middle East. While Southeast Asian Muslims had long-standing histori- cal ties with the Middle East, the spread of radical Islam to the region is a recent phe- nomenon, especially since the 1980s. Southeast Asia had in the past experienced spurts of radicalism, such as the Padri movement in Sumatra in the nineteenth cen- tury and Moro challenge in southern Philippines.
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