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Iran's Nuclear Program Johnson Lin SUNY Geneseo Proceedings of GREAT Day Volume 2011 Article 23 2012 Iran's Nuclear Program Johnson Lin SUNY Geneseo Follow this and additional works at: https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. Recommended Citation Lin, Johnson (2012) "Iran's Nuclear Program," Proceedings of GREAT Day: Vol. 2011 , Article 23. Available at: https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2011/iss1/23 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the GREAT Day at KnightScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Proceedings of GREAT Day by an authorized editor of KnightScholar. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Lin: Iran's Nuclear Program Iran's Nuclear Program Johnson Lin I. Introduction for Peace, the United States agreed to lease “Iran up to 13.2 pounds of low-enriched uranium (LEU) for The potential Iranian nuclear weapons research purposes” and also supplied a five- program is an issue of utmost concern to the megawatt reactor for the production of electricity.1 international community. Iran has been deemed by In return for U.S. nuclear assistance, Iran signed the the U.S. State Department as a state sponsor of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on July 1, terror, and it has the dangerous potential to use its 1968, the first day the treaty was open for nuclear program to construct nuclear weapons. signature. Iranian leaders have consistently declared Iran’s The NPT originated from the international right to pursue peaceful nuclear technologies, but community’s growing awareness of the inherent they have not fully adhered to the international dangers of the proliferation of nuclear arms. After inspections and regulations that are necessary to witnessing the destructiveness of nuclear weapons ensure its peaceful nature. While there isn’t against Japan during World War II, many believed irrefutable evidence linking Iran’s nuclear an increase in the number of countries with nuclear advancement to nuclear weapons, many signs seem weapons threatened global security. The treaty to point in that direction. served international security interests by advancing The problem of Iran’s nuclear program fits nuclear non-proliferation, disarming and perfectly within the realist theory of international dismantling existing nuclear weapons, and relations. Despite the existence of the United advocating for peaceful nuclear development.2 Nations and other multinational organizations, Iran, having just initiated a meaningful nuclear realism argues that states exist in an anarchic program, signed the treaty as a non-nuclear environment. Uncertainty about the capabilities signatory, agreeing not to acquire or manufacture and intentions of Iran’s nuclear program creates nuclear weapons, to accept safeguards that verified serious security dilemmas for the international nonproliferation obligations and to negotiate in community, particularly the U.S. and Israel. The good faith for the cessation of the nuclear arms international community has acted to thwart Iran’s race. These conditions were supposed to bar Iran, suspect nuclear weapons program. Some of the and other non-nuclear states, from developing options available can be successful and others are nuclear weapons. In return for its agreement to doomed to fail. Understanding the history of Iran’s these provisions, under Article IV of the treaty, Iran nuclear program is necessary for understanding gained recognition of its “inalienable right…to how the international community ought deal with develop research, production and use of nuclear this potentially deadly problem. energy for peaceful purposes” in accordance to articles I and II.3 Iran’s signing of the NPT II. History of Iran’s nuclear program publicly signified its intention to abstain from developing nuclear weapons. Iran’s nuclear program began in 1957 through With a commitment to peaceful and the United States “Atoms for Peace” program. responsible nuclear development, Iran was able to Under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the acquire nuclear assistance from Western states such program promoted the development of safe and as France and Germany throughout the 1970s. The peaceful nuclear technologies. It strengthened the nuclear program was a priority of Shah Reza alliance between the two, which was vital to U.S. Pahlavi, Iran’s leader, because he believed that the national security interests because of the Cold War exploration and development of alternative forms and Iran’s strategic location on the border between the Soviet Union and the Middle East. President 1 Greg Bruno, “Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Council on Eisenhower sought to increase military, economic, Foreign Relations (March 10, 2010) and civilian assistance to gain a greater strategic 2 Paul Lettow, “Strengthening the Nuclear position with Iran. The aid to Iran’s nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” Council on Foreign program grew from U.S. national security interests, Relations 54 (April 2010) an example of international realism. Under Atoms 3 Lettow, “Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime” 217 Published by KnightScholar, 2012 1 Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2011 [2012], Art. 23 of energy production was necessary for the Iranian technology, the mass exodus of nuclear scientists, economy given the economic uncertainty resulting and Israel’s destruction of Iraq’s nuclear facility at from regional wars that disrupted Iran’s oil Osirak, which removed an immediate threat to production and from predictions of looming energy Iran.8 However, this break in Iran’s nuclear shortfalls.4 Instability in the Middle East in the development was ephemeral. It ended with the 1970s pushed Iran towards developing nuclear death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 and the energy, a means of meeting its energy demands subsequent ascension of Ayatollah Khamenei. This beyond oil. In March 1974, Iran announced its change of Iran’s leadership changed the trajectory plans to produce 23,000 megawatts of electricity of Iran’s nuclear desires. from nuclear power. This ambitious goal would Ayatollah Khamenei had much more of a have been able to meet a great deal of Iran’s energy positive view of nuclear power than his needs, but the amount of nuclear energy necessary predecessor, and initiated plans to rebuild the to do so was also enough to produce about 600-700 nuclear program in Tehran. In the 1991 Gulf War nuclear warheads.5 Iran’s growing ambitions about against Iraq, coalition forces, of which Iran was not the possibilities of a large nuclear program began to a participant, discovered a clandestine Iraqi nuclear rattle its partners around the world. program. With the increase of a Western presence Despite the Shah’s assurance that his nuclear in the Persian Gulf and the real possibility of Iraqi program had only peaceful intentions, foreign nuclear armament, Iran perceived increasing governments increasingly became reluctant to aid security threats. With a neighboring rival having Iranian nuclear development. A United States almost developed nuclear weapons, and Western special national intelligence estimate asserted, “The powers exerting influence in the region, Iran ambitions of the Shah could lead Iran to pursue believed that it could no longer depend on its nuclear weapons, especially in the shadow of traditional non-nuclear defenses.9 Following the India’s nuclear test in May 1974.”6 Furthermore, in tenets of realism, insecurity pushed Iran to further an interview with the French newspaper Le Monde, develop an indigenous nuclear program. the Shah was quoted as saying that Iran would, In addition to defense, nuclear weapons would “sooner than is believed” be “in possession of a also useful for Iranian attainment of regional nuclear bomb,” and Assadollah Alam, the Shah’s hegemony. Iran remembers the glories of the court minister, claimed on several occasions that ancient Persian Empire, which was decimated by the Shah wanted a nuclear bomb but found it raiding Arabs, who were spreading Islam across the expedient to adamantly deny it at the time.7 These region. Iranians beam with nationalism and see indications that Iran’s nuclear ambitions was themselves as separate and superior to neighboring leaning towards more than merely energy Arabs. This is evident in Iran’s adherence to Shi’a production pushed the U.S. towards taking a stiffer Islam as opposed to the Sunni sect popular among approach against Iran. Arabs. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the By the time of Iran’s Islamic Revolution in the Middle East was no longer a battleground between late 1970s, France and Germany began superpowers. New regional leaders could emerge, withdrawing their support of Iran’s nuclear and a functional Iranian nuclear weapon would program. The chaos resulting from the revolution, cement Iran’s superiority over its Arab rivals and primarily the hostage crisis and the regime change leadership in the region. In order to construct to a hostile Islamic republic, created a dangerous nuclear weapons, Iran has received assistance from situation that Western governments believed would non-Western states such as Russia, China, Pakistan, only be exacerbated with the inclusion of nuclear and North Korea.10 technologies. During this period, Iran’s nuclear As Iran accelerated its development of nuclear program slowed dramatically. The deterioration of technologies in the 1990s, it began moving astray the program was the result of a combination of from
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