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Verifiable Declarations of Fissile Material Stocks: Challenges and Solutions FM(C)T Meeting Series Verifiable Declarations of Fissile Material Stocks: Challenges and Solutions UNIDIR RESOURCES About UNIDIR The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)—an autonomous institute within the United Nations—conducts research on disarmament and security. UNIDIR is based in Geneva, Switzerland, the centre for bilateral and multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations, and home of the Conference on Disarmament. The Institute explores current issues pertaining to the variety of existing and future armaments, as well as global diplomacy and local tensions and conflicts. Working with researchers, diplomats, government officials, NGOs and other institutions since 1980, UNIDIR acts as a bridge between the research community and governments. UNIDIR’s activities are funded by contributions from governments and donor foundations. Note The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The views expressed in this publication are the sole responsibility of UNIDIR. They do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the United Nations. www.unidir.org © UNIDIR 2017 Table of Contents Acknowledgements .................................................................................................... 2 About the Authors ...................................................................................................... 2 Verifiable Declarations of Fissile Material Stocks: Challenges and Solutions Pavel Podvig ................................................................................................................ 3 Pre-Existing Stocks of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material in the FM(C)T: Analysis of Baseline Declarations and Verification Challenges Anatoly S. Diakov ........................................................................................................ 15 Fissile Material Stockpile Declarations and Cooperative Nuclear Archaeology Alexander Glaser and Malte Göttsche ....................................................................... 25 Verifiable Declarations of Fissile Material Stocks: Challenges and Solutions Summary of the discussion Pavel Podvig ................................................................................................................ 39 1 Acknowledgements Financial support for this project was received from The MacArthur Foundation and the Government of Germany. About the Authors Pavel Podvig is a senior research fellow at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and a researcher at Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security. Podvig also directs his own research project, Russian Nuclear Forces (RussianForces.org). His current research focuses on the Russian strategic forces and nuclear weapons complex, as well as technical and political aspects of nuclear non- proliferation, disarmament, missile defence, and US-Russian arms control process. Pavel Podvig is a member of the International Panel on Fissile Materials. He holds a physics degree from the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology and PhD in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations. Anatoly S. Diakov is a founding director of the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology. His research interests include nuclear arms reductions, the history of Russia’s plutonium production and disposition options for excess plutonium. He is a member of the International Panel on Fissile Materials. Dr Diakov received his PhD in physics from the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology. Alexander Glaser is a co-chair of Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security and a Professor at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and in the Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at Princeton University. Dr Glaser is a co-chair of the International Panel on Fissile Materials. He received his PhD in Physics from Darmstadt University of Technology, Germany. Malte Göttsche a post-doctoral researcher at Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security and a fellow of the Consortium for Verification Technology. He is working on warhead authentication based on nuclear measurements and overarching verification concepts and schemes. Dr Göttsche holds a doctoral degree in physics from the University of Hamburg. 2 Verifiable Declarations of Fissile Material Stocks: Challenges and Solutions Pavel Podvig How to deal with existing stocks of fissile material is one of several contentious issues that have emerged from the discussions of a treaty that would prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, an FM(C)T. There has been consistent and growing support for a treaty that, in addition to limiting production, also includes existing material in its scope.1 This issue is likely to remain controversial, especially since it cannot be separated from other steps toward nuclear disarmament and the broader context of international security. It is important, however, to recognize that aside from the general political question of whether an effective arrangement that bans the production of fissile material should also cover existing stocks, there are a number of practical and technical issues that would have to be addressed for such an expansion of the treaty’s scope to become viable. One of these issues is declarations of fissile material holdings. It has been widely recognized that declarations of the amount of weapon-usable fissile material held by States would be an important confidence-building measure (CBM) and could represent a significant step toward reductions and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. This issue has been repeatedly raised during the Nuclear Non- proliferation Treaty (NPT) review process as part of an effort to increase transparency in nuclear disarmament.2 In expressing their views on the future fissile material ban treaty, a number of States advocated the inclusion of measures that would increase transparency of existing stocks.3 A number of important technical studies supported the 1 United Nations, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts to Make Recommendations on Possible Aspects That Could Contribute to but Not Negotiate a Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices, A/70/81, 7 May 2015, Paras 6, 7. 2 Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Transparency of Nuclear Weapons: The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.12, 20 April 2012. 3 United Nations, Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices. Report of the Secretary-General , 16 July 2013, www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/ (httpAssets)/3FA91170E91A8E83C1257CAF00303C49/$file/A-68-154.pdf. 3 idea of declarations and explored various implementation options.4 In a very important step, the United States took the initiative in releasing detailed information about past production of military fissile material and its current stocks. The United Kingdom has also published an account of fissile material in its military programme. Despite the significant progress that has been made over the past twenty years, a number of political and technical issues remain unresolved. The international community has yet to develop a model for declaring existing stocks of fissile material that would make a meaningful contribution to nuclear disarmament and that would be accepted by all States that have fissile material in their possession. One of the challenges is to make sure that the declarations can be verified for correctness and completeness. Given that a significant amount of fissile material remains in active inventories—including deployed nuclear weapons—verifiability of declarations presents a serious challenge to the future fissile material treaty. Proceeding on the assumption that the FM(C)T will include provisions for the limitation or control of existing stocks of fissile material (which is far from certain), this paper assesses a range of potential approaches to verification of initial declarations. The role of initial declarations in an FM(C)T Initial declarations are essential elements of virtually any arms control and disarmament agreement. Since such declarations provide a baseline for limitations and reductions, they play an important role in implementation. The FM(C)T should include a mechanism for verification of initial declarations. This would allow relevant actors to detect and deter actions in violation of the treaty obligations. Initial declarations of existing fissile material stocks could play different roles in a future FM(C)T. First, it has been suggested that even if the treaty does not include provisions on existing stocks, issuing declarations could be a valuable confidence-building measure. Such declarations could also provide a broad measure of progress toward nuclear disarmament. In this case, however, the treaty would not necessarily have to include a mechanism for verifying initial declarations. After all, the declarations would have no bearing on the central obligation
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