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Global Fissile Material Report 2006 a Table of Contents IPF M Global Fis sile Material Report Developing the technical basis for policy initiatives to secure and irreversibly reduce stocks of nuclear weapons and fissile materials 2006 Over the past six decades, our understanding of the nuclear danger has expanded from the threat posed by the vast nuclear arsenals created by the super- powers in the Cold War to encompass the prolifera- tion of nuclear weapons to additional states and now also to terrorist groups. To reduce this danger, it is essential to secure and to sharply reduce all stocks of highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium, the key materials in nuclear weapons, and to limit any further production. The mission of the IPFM is to advance the technical basis for cooperative international policy initiatives to achieve these goals. A report published by Global Fissile The International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) www.fissilematerials.org Program on Science and Global Security Princeton University Material Report 2006 221 Nassau Street, 2nd Floor Princeton, NJ 08542, USA First report of the International Panel on Fissile Materials First report of the International Panel on Fissile Materials Developing the Technical Basis for Policy Initiatives to Secure and Irreversibly Reduce Stocks of Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Materials www.fissilematerials.org Global Fissile Material Report 2006 a Table of Contents About the IPFM 1 Summary 2 I. Background 5 1 Fissile Materials and Nuclear Weapons 6 2 Nuclear-Weapon and Fissile-Material Stocks 12 3 Production and Disposition of Fissile Materials 21 4 Agreements and Institutions 32 to Control Fissile Materials II. New Initiatives to Control Fissile Materials 39 5 A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty 40 6 Declarations of Fissile Material Stocks 51 7 Limiting National Fissile-Material Production Capabilities 57 8 Global Cleanout of Highly Enriched Uranium 67 Endnotes 72 Glossary 86 Appendix A 93 IPFM Members and Princeton’s Program on Science and Global Security Global Fissile Material Report 2006 c About the IPFM The International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) was founded in January 2006. It is an independent group of arms-control and nonproliferation experts from both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. The mission of the IPFM is to analyze the technical basis for practical and achiev- able policy initiatives to secure, consolidate, and reduce stockpiles of highly en- riched uranium and plutonium. These fissile materials are the key ingredients in nuclear weapons, and their control is critical to nuclear weapons disarmament, to halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to ensuring that terrorists do not acquire nuclear weapons. Both military and civilian stocks of fissile materials have to be addressed. The nu- clear weapon states still have enough fissile materials in their weapon stockpiles for tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. On the civilian side, enough plutonium has been separated to make a similarly large number of weapons. Highly enriched ura- nium is used in civilian reactor fuel in more than one hundred locations. The total amount used for this purpose is sufficient to make about one thousand Hiroshima- type bombs, a design well within the potential capabilities of terrorist groups. The Panel is co-chaired by Professor José Goldemberg of the University of São Paulo, Brazil and Professor Frank von Hippel of Princeton University. Its founding members include nuclear experts from fifteen countries: Brazil, China, Germany, India, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. This group of countries includes six nuclear weapon states and nine non-weapon states. Short biographies of the panel members can be found in the Appendix. IPFM research and reports are shared with international organizations, national governments and nongovernmental groups. It has full panel meetings twice a year in capitols around the world in addition to specialist workshops. These meetings and workshops are often in conjunction with international conferences at which IPFM panels and experts make presentations. Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security provides adminis- trative and research support for the IPFM. IPFM’s initial support is provided by a five-year grant to Princeton University from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation of Chicago. Global Fissile Material Report 2006 1 Summary Over the past six decades, our understanding of the nuclear danger has expand- ed from the threat posed by the vast nuclear arsenals created by the superpowers in the Cold War to encompass the proliferation of nuclear weapons to addition- al states, and now also to terrorist groups. To reduce these dangers it is essential to secure and to sharply reduce all stocks of highly enriched uranium and sepa- rated plutonium, the key materials in nuclear weapons, and to limit any further production. The current global stockpiles of fissile materials are huge: 1400-2000 metric tons* of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and about 500 tons of plutonium – enough for several tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. It is urgent to reduce these stocks to very low levels at a very limited number of locations. Chapters 1–3 in Part I of this report explain what fissile materials are, their use in nuclear weapons, how they are produced and disposed, and provide estimates of current national stockpiles and production rates. Chapter 4 provides a brief over- view of the agreements and institutions that have been set up to control the pro- duction and use of fissile materials. Part II (chapters 5-8) describes four goals toward which we believe significant prog- ress can be made in the near future: • A cutoff on production of fissile materials for weapons, and placement under inter- national safeguards of all civil stocks of fissile material, and stocks that are excess to military requirements; • Declarations by Russia and the United States (and eventually by the other nuclear weapon states) of their total fissile-material stockpiles; • Measures to limit the proliferation of national uranium centrifuge enrichment and reprocessing plants; and • Total or near-total elimination of the use of highly enriched uranium as a civilian reactor fuel. A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would impose upon the nuclear weapon states (including India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea) the obligation not to produce fissile materials for weapons. This obligation has already been accepted by the non-nuclear weapon states, and would help to ensure that reductions in the nuclear weapons arsenals are irreversible. Declarations – or at least an exchange of information between Russia and the United States on their overall fissile-material stockpiles – would provide a basis for further balanced reductions in their nuclear 2 Global Fissile Material Report 2006 * In this report, tons should be understood to refer to metric tons. arsenals. Containing the proliferation of national fissile material production facili- ties would reduce concerns about an increasing number of countries obtaining a nuclear-weapon option along with such facilities. Finally, eliminating HEU in civil- ian-reactor fuel would greatly reduce the danger of HEU falling into the hands of potential nuclear terrorists. Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty Negotiations on an FMCT have been blocked in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) for a decade by a lack of agreement on whether or not the negotiations will proceed in parallel with discussions of possible treaties to bar nuclear threats against non-nuclear states, to prevent an arms race in outer space, and to achieve nuclear disarmament. The United States opposes such linkages and the rules require that the CD can proceed only by consensus. If this problem can be overcome – either in the CD or by creating another negotiat- ing forum – the negotiators will have to deal with, among other issues, the scope of the treaty and how it would be verified. The weapon states would like to see the scope confined to a ban on the future pro- duction of fissile materials for weapons. Many non-weapon states would also like to include a ban on the use for weapons of materials that have been produced for civilian use or have been declared excess for military use. The issue of verification has been complicated by the Bush Administration’s 2004 decision to oppose international verification of an FMCT. Effective verification is politically and technically feasible, however, and would be valuable. If previously produced civilian materials and materials declared excess for military use were in- cluded within the scope of an FMCT, then the verification arrangements for the civilian nuclear activities in the nuclear weapon states could be the same as in the non-weapon states. Verification that known uranium-enrichment and reprocess- ing facilities had been either shut down or converted to weapon use would also be straightforward. Verification of the absence of fissile materials production at other sites could be done using “managed access” procedures similar to those that have already been accepted under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which allows ad hoc arrangements to protect unrelated sensitive information when in- ternational inspectors check on concerns that a facility might be housing illicit chemical-weapons production. We also discuss, in a preliminary way, possible ar- rangements to provide international assurance that HEU declared for naval-reactor fuel use was not being diverted to weapon use. Stockpile declarations Russia and the United States have reduced the number of weapons in their nuclear arsenals to about one-third of their Cold-War peaks, and they have declared sub- stantial amounts of HEU and plutonium excess to their military needs. But they still retain hundreds of tons more fissile materials in their weapons stockpiles than they need and cannot credibly call on other states to make reductions until they have made deeper cuts themselves. Such reductions are unlikely, however, unless the United States and Russia have better knowledge of the sizes of each others’ fissile materials stockpiles.
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