A China Strategy
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A CHINA STRATEGY Edward Lucas STRATEGY PAPER CEPA Strategy Paper | A China Strategy CONTENTS n an era of geopolitical competition, the West — the U.S.-led countries of Game of Thrones: Who Runs the World? ... 3 Ithe transatlantic alliance and their East Filling the Strategic Vacuum ........................ 6 Asian allies — lacks a strategy for dealing Learning and Doing ....................................... 7 with its most formidable competitor: the Counterarguments .......................................... 10 People’s Republic of China (henceforth Conclusion ........................................................ 11 China). But the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a strategy for dealing with Endnotes ........................................................... 13 the West. It involves a long-term goal of “national rejuvenation”1 — making China the world’s most powerful country by 2050 — implemented with decisive ABOUT THE AUTHOR leadership; a clear-eyed appreciation of Western diplomatic, economic, political, Edward Lucas is a non-resident fellow at and social weaknesses; and effective the Center for European Policy Analysis means of exploiting them. These tactics, (CEPA). He has 40 years experience dealing best characterized as “sharp power,”2 with transatlantic and regional security, include censorship and manipulation of and edits the new China Influence Monitor, the information system, cyber operations, a weekly bulletin on China’s westward divide-and-rule diplomacy, leverage of footprint. trade and investment, and propaganda, plus military bluff and intimidation. Under Xi Jinping, the Chinese party-state has its most powerful leader and its most ABOUT CEPA centralized government since the Mao era. The Center for European Policy Analysis It has institutionalized ethnic and religious (CEPA) is a 501(c)(3), non-profit, non-partisan, persecution at home and developed public policy research institute. Our mission formidable offensive capabilities, including is transatlantic: to promote an economically a blue-water navy, nuclear weapons, and vibrant, strategically secure, and politically ballistic missiles, which change the balance free Europe with close and enduring ties to of power: in the Asia-Pacific region now, the United States. Our analytical team consists of the world’s leading experts on Central-East and globally soon. It conducts successful Europe, Russia, and its neighbors. Through influence operations — overt and covert cutting-edge research, analysis, and programs attempts to sway public opinion and we provide fresh insight on energy, security and decision-making in the heart of Western defense to government officials and agencies; we democracies. These include: help transatlantic businesses navigate changing strategic landscapes; and we build networks of • abuse of international arrest warrants future Atlanticist leaders. to muzzle dissent;3 • constraining discussion and activity on university campuses;4 All opinions are those of the author(s) and do • curbing freedom of assembly for anti- not necessarily represent the position or views CCP protesters;5 of the institutions they represent or the Center 6 for European Policy Analysis. • cyberattacks and data heists; Cover: • debt-diplomacy traps;7 • disinformation campaigns;8 • divide-and-rule diplomatic gambits;9 2 CEPA Strategy Paper | A China Strategy • forcing Western companies to adopt most powerful country in the world by contentious Chinese terminology;10 2049, the world had better get used to it. 11 • infiltrating political systems; We are not doomed. Divided, the West is • intimidating Chinese people living indeed easy prey. United, it is more than a abroad;12 match for China. The United States must lead the West’s efforts to curb the CCP’s • pressuring cultural institutions to shun influence and channel China’s rise, but it 13 anti-CCP artists and performers; cannot lead on its terms alone. It needs • preventing unfavorable depictions of alliances and allies, with relations based on China in popular culture;14 and compromise, dialogue, and mutual respect. • punishing or swamping critical media coverage.15 Game of Thrones: China’s ability to capture elites is a Who Runs the World? particular and distinctive threat. The party- state’s long-term, patient, and sophisticated The future of the international order strategy of exploiting the opportunities is the future of the world. We have a presented by globalization has led to many limited window during which we can individuals, organizations, and corporations still establish an international order that having stakes in good relations with China. accommodates China’s rise but is not An important subset of these stakeholders dominated by the CCP. Success will shape acts and speaks (or refrains from words the lives of billions of people one way. and deeds) in ways that prioritize Chinese Failure will shape them another way — interests over their own countries’ along lines that the CCP finds acceptable. national security. The wider effect of this is Without a concerted and determined collective self-censorship and self-restraint international effort, Western countries, amounting to self-harm: our response fails. including the United States, will end up as rule-takers in a world where China is the The West lacks leadership and goals. Our principal rule-maker. Given the way Xi’s approach to China is based on the flawed regime treats its own people, we should assumption that globalization, prosperity, not assume that it will be more benevolent and technology will make the country toward outsiders. more liberal. We underestimate our own vulnerabilities. We do not exploit China’s China is not a rich country. National weaknesses. We prioritize short-term income per head of population, economic benefits over political and adjusted for purchasing power parity, strategic considerations. We do not help is roughly one-third that of the United weaker democracies understand the risks States or most European countries.16 But of engagement with the Chinese party- in terms of the overall size of its economy, state or build their capacity to resist malign it is quickly catching up with the United influence. Nor do we show solidarity with States and the European Union (EU). In victims of CCP aggression. any bilateral negotiation, China, by virtue of its size, is now either an equal or a This cowardice and neglect acts as the superior power. The leadership in Beijing enabler of Chinese divide-and-rule tactics. has contemptuously brushed aside British We let the CCP set the terms in which complaints (largely unsupported by other China is discussed, depicting criticism countries) about the crackdown in Hong as unfounded, malevolent, or racist, and Kong, for example. Almost the only case projecting a sense of inevitability — the in which China is subject to serious idea that as China will be the richest and constraint is when foreign countries 3 CEPA Strategy Paper | A China Strategy A protester holds a «Free Hong Kong revolution» flag during a rally calling China to release 12 Hong Kong people arrested at sea by mainland authorities, in Taipei, Taiwan, October 25, 2020. Credit: REUTERS/Ann Wang. cooperate with each other to increase their preferences and sensibilities. Years bargaining position. A prime example before the pandemic, for example, it of this is in the South China Sea, where had established bastions of influence in U.S. naval efforts are complemented by the World Health Organization (WHO), Australian, British, French, Indian, and building close personal ties with senior Japanese warships taking part in Freedom officials and securing their promotion to of Navigation Operations (FONOPs). The high positions.18 During the global health emerging significance of the Quadrilateral emergency this year it used its human Security Dialogue or “Quad” — a de and institutional assets to mute criticism facto security grouping comprising of China over the origins of the Covid-19 Australia, India, Japan, and the United pandemic, and to marginalize the Republic States17 — highlights the lack of any more of China (Taiwan). China uses the same formalized specific body aimed at dealing tactics of generous institutional funding with Chinese aggression. and patient patronage of individuals, punctuated by occasional tantrums, in The CCP plays a long game. As well as other UN organizations, such as the Food weakening, subverting, and marginalizing and Agriculture Organization and the international organizations that might International Telecommunications Union.19 constrain its power, the party-state also co-opts and repurposes these bodies and Pulling out of the WHO, as the United their rules in ways that suit authoritarian States did, is no answer. Other countries 4 CEPA Strategy Paper | A China Strategy Figure 1. United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, Voting Patterns Compared to China’s Data Analysis: Who Votes with China, by Yiqin Fu. Data from Voeten (2013). China (the PRC) became a UN member in 1971. All absences ignored. Yes/Abstention/No treated as ordered categorical variables. “correlation computed as the spearman statistic with range [-1, 1], Unweighted Euclidean distance yields a similar result. Gray areas are non-UN members or China. will stay, allowing China a still greater U.S. policymakers also need to worry influence on global health policy. This about the future of Europe. Once the chimes with another long-term Chinese strongest and most dependable U.S. ally, strategy: gaining influence in Africa, Europe is now