Electoral Violence and the Legacy of Authoritarian Rule in Kenya And

Home , Divide and rule, Elections in Kenya, Elections in Zambia, Zambia

Journal of Peace Research 2020, Vol. 57(1) 111–125 Electoral violence and the legacy ª The Author(s) 2019 of authoritarian rule in Kenya and Zambia Article reuse guidelines: sagepub.com/journals-permissions DOI: 10.1177/0022343319884983 journals.sagepub.com/home/jpr Johan Brosche´ Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University Hanne Fjelde Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University & Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Kristine Ho¨glund Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University

Abstract Why do the first multiparty elections after authoritarian rule turn violent in some countries but not in others? This article places legacies from the authoritarian past at the core of an explanation of when democratic openings become associated with electoral violence in multi-ethnic states, and complement existing research focused on the immediate conditions surrounding the elections. We argue that authoritarian rule characterized by more exclusionary multi- ethnic coalitions creates legacies that amplify the risk of violent elections during the shift to multiparty politics. Through competitive and fragmented interethnic relations, exclusionary systems foreclose the forging of cross-ethnic elite coalitions and make hostile narratives a powerful tool for political mobilization. By contrast, regimes with a broad-based ethnic support base cultivate inclusive inter-elite bargaining, enable cross-ethnic coalitions, and reduce incentives for hostile ethnic mobilization, which lower the risk of violent elections. We explore this argument by comparing founding elections in Zambia (1991), which were largely peaceful, and Kenya (1992), with large-scale state-instigated electoral violence along ethnic lines. The analysis suggests that the type of authoritarian rule created political legacies that underpinned political competition and mobilization during the first multiparty elections, and made violence a more viable electoral strategy in Kenya than in Zambia.

Keywords authoritarianism, elections, ethnicity, Kenya, violence, Zambia

Introduction We argue that an important step for understanding this underexplored variation lies in the varying strategies The shift to multiparty politics in sub-Saharan Africa in chosen by political leaders in how to consolidate political the early 1990s raised hopes for democratization across a support during authoritarian rule. The institutional continent where most countries had limited experience setup of the authoritarian regimes across much of Africa of competitive elections. The transition gave rise to looked similar, for example, in the dominance of a single ‘founding’ elections, viewed as critical junctures on the party. Yet, how leaders sought to retain the support of a path to democracy. In some of these elections, as in ruling coalition within the authoritarian framework dif- Malawi and Benin, there were only isolated incidents fered significantly. One salient aspect is to what extent of violence, while electoral contests were far from peaceful in, for instance, Coˆte d’Ivoire and Nigeria. Why do the first multiparty elections after authoritarian rule turn Corresponding author: violent in some countries but not in others? [email protected] 112 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 57(1) ethno-regional interests were represented in the ruling context of electoral contests.1 Second, we tally with coalition. A majority of states resorted to some form an emerging literature highlighting how institutional of ethnic inclusion to accommodate ethnic grievances choices during authoritarian rule generate legacies that and undermine regime challengers (Rothchild & structure political choice when democratic openings Foley, 1988). However, regimes pursued inclusion occur.2 While previous research recognizes ethnic to different extents, and we argue that the degree conflict as a critical challenge to democracy in of inclusion matters. Specifically, in the context of multi-ethnic settings and unpacks different measures multi-ethnic societies, leaders that rule by means of to counter such conflicts, it is less recognized that a narrower ethnic support base, what we refer to as strategies to address conflict in heterogeneous societies exclusionary approaches, create interethnic relations were also prevalent during authoritarian rule. Third, characterized by competition and fragmentation. by uncovering dynamics where the electoral contest With the introduction of multiparty elections, such remained peaceful, we contribute to the existing case dynamics heighten the risk of electoral violence by study literature, which focuses mainly on violent foreclosing the forging of cross-ethnic elite coalitions elections.3 and by contributing to more competitive intercommunal relations. In this context, leaders can gain politically by resorting to electoral tactics that rest Motivation on hostile group narratives. By contrast, strategies that An extensive literature acknowledges the challenges of rely on a more broad-based ethnic support base, here introducing elections in multi-ethnic societies with lim- called inclusionary approaches, are more likely to pro- ited democratic experience (c.f. Mansfield & Snyder, duce interethnic relations that alleviate the risks of 1995; Cederman, Gleditsch & Hug, 2013). Elections violence in founding elections by fostering inclusive hold the potential for fueling violence in ethnically inter-elite bargaining and by contributing to more divided societies when leaders suddenly become reliant amicable intercommunal relations, thereby lowering on securing popular support (Mann, 2005; Snyder, incentives for hostile out-group mobilization. 2000), and the ballot box offers no institutional protec- We explore this argument by comparing founding tion for the minority against majority rule. Electoral elections in Kenya (1992) and Zambia (1991), end- violence, levied to influence electoral results or to protest ing authoritarian single-party rule in both countries. announced results, often erupts along ethnic lines as This comparison poses a puzzle. In both countries, electoral dynamics tilt towards ‘ethnic head counts’ the leaders warned about the dangers of reintrodu- (Chandra, 2004; Kuhn, 2015). Many studies probe how cing multipartyism: Zambia’s president Kenneth institutional provisions may reduce the risk of violence in Kaunda claimed that electoral competition would multi-ethnic states, such as formal power-sharing, propel ‘Zambia into the “Stone Age politics” of eth- minority guarantees, quotas, and electoral rules that nic violence’ (Bratton, 1992: 85); while Kenya’s pres- secure broad political representation (Horowitz, 2000; ident Daniel arap Moi declared that multiparty Lijphart, 1977; Reilly, 2001; Sisk, 1996; Fjelde & elections would ‘usher in tribal conflict and destroy Ho¨glund, 2016). While this research recognizes the national unity’ (Barkan, 1993: 90). However, while often deep historical roots of politicized ethnicity, it pri- Kenya experienced electoral violence resulting in at marily explores institutional engineering within the least 1,500 deaths, Zambia’s elections were largely free from violence. Our analysis suggests that the different strategies used for building and maintaining 1 For example, type of electoral institutions (Fjelde & Ho¨glund, a multi-ethnic ruling coalition during the authoritar- 2016; Salehyan & Linebarger, 2014), institutional weakness ian era represent one vital component for explaining (Salehyan & Linebarger, 2014; Hafner-Burton, Hyde & Jablonski, 2014), electoral uncertainty (Wilkinson, 2004), land insecurity this variation. (Klaus & Mitchell, 2015), or international observers (Daxecker, The contribution of this article is threefold. First, the 2012; Smidt, 2016). focus on legacies from an authoritarian past advances 2 See LeBas (2011) on opposition party strength, Riedl (2014) on research on electoral violence by explicating how elec- party system institutionalization, Bratton & van de Walle (1997) on toral violence can have deep historical underpinnings. To patterns of political behavior, and Cook & Savun (2016) on civil conflict. date, most literature approaches the causes of electoral 3 Existing cross-country comparisons focus on violent elections only violence from a short-term analytical vantage point, (e.g. Boone & Kriger, 2012; Klopp & Zuern, 2007), or within-case focusing on the immediate dynamics or institutional variations (Klaus & Mitchell, 2015). Brosche´ et al. 113 framework of formal democratic institutions.4 We know Where ethnicity is politically salient, the task of less about how the political dimensions of interethnic coalition-building tends to focus on inclusion or exclu- relations evolve from the period of authoritarianism to sion of ethnic groups (Wimmer, Cederman & Min, electoral democracy, and what consequences they have 2009; Bormann, 2019). Across Africa’s post-colonial for violent or peaceful electoral conduct. authoritarian regimes, building dominant coalitions Scholarship focusing more generally on regime char- required balancing the need for ethnic inclusion to acteristics and political violence primarily highlights the ensure cooperation, with the risk of facing violent chal- capacity of authoritarian regimes to repress dissent, lenges from excluded groups (Roessler, 2016). In these including ethnic challengers (e.g. Muller & Weede, weakly institutionalized states, elites sought to solidify 1990). This literature posits that the potential for ethnic their rule through political incorporation of ethnic violence surged as democratic institutions placed signif- groups that could otherwise destabilize the regime. By icant constraints on the ability of regimes to coerce co-opting ethnic leaders, it was ‘possible to reduce the multi-ethnic populations into compliance (Mousseau, scale and intensity of their demands’ (Rothchild & 2001; Saideman et al, 2002). Yet, the large variation in Foley, 1988: 233). The ethnic configuration of the state, ethnic violence following the introduction of multiparty in turn, reflected elite bargains among a subset of all rule suggests that ‘removing the repressive lid’ provides ethnic groups, agreeing to cooperate to share executive only part of the story of how intergroup relations evolve power and ‘rents that come from controlling the state’ from authoritarian rule to multiparty electoral (Roessler, 2016: 12). competition. Strategies to sustain ruling coalitions included the Across different authoritarian regimes, significant var- establishment of formal institutions, such as a strong iation exists in how leaders manage threats and how they regime party that could maintain a multi-ethnic support stay in power through maintaining a dominant coalition. base through elections (e.g. Horowitz, 2000: 429). Most In multi-ethnic societies, these choices will be structured importantly, however, regimes rested on informal struc- along ethnic lines. We argue that the choice of ruling tures of patronage politics. At the top, regimes accom- strategy leaves interethnic relations in markedly different modated ethnic elites deemed central to their stability places at the transition to multiparty politics, producing through the distribution of public offices and state different baseline risks for founding elections to turn resources (Arriola, 2013). These ethnic leaders, in turn, violent. Below we focus on one salient aspect of how acted as brokers of patronage that could mobilize their autocratic leaders manage interethnic relations: the own ethnic communities (Bayart, 1993; Bratton & van degree to which various ethnic groups are represented in the ruling coalition. Next, we draw the line from a de Walle, 1994). The inter-elite bargains, thus, trans- more exclusionary system to a higher risk of violent lated into societal stability through the ethnic interme- multiparty elections. diaries’ embeddedness in patron–client networks that extend through society as a whole (North, Wallis & Violent elections as legacies from Weingast, 2009; Roessler, 2016). In heterogeneous societies without a majority group authoritarian rule able to rule on its own, incumbents depended on the Research on authoritarianism highlights the challenge of support of the leadership of other ethnic groups to controlling the majority of the population excluded from ensure regime survival. Almost all ruling coalitions in power, but dictators cannot rule on their own. Instead, Africa involved the inclusion of some ethno-regional political leaders across the spectrum of regime types rely intermediaries, but the degree of ethnic inclusion (both on the maintenance of ruling coalitions, whose support is the size and ethnic plurality) varied significantly.5 critical to ensure regime survival (e.g. North, Wallis & Authoritarian regimes can thus be placed along a con- Weingast, 2009; Svolik, 2012). In democratic contexts, tinuum depending on the degree of intra-elite accommo- elections and electoral rules predominantly shape the dation at the center, and incorporation of various nature and composition of these ruling coalitions. In ethno-political interests into the ruling coalition authoritarian states, ruling coalitions are largely deter- mined at the discretion of the elite (Svolik, 2012). 5 Strategies to forge ruling coalitions were shaped, for example, by the ethnic plurality of the state (Wimmer, Cederman & Min, 2009), 4 Exceptions include Bratton & van de Walle (1997), Horowitz whether social class followed ethnic membership (Horowitz, 2000: (2000), and Rothchild (1997), but none focuses on electoral violence. 23), and legacies from colonial rule (Levitsky & Way, 2012). 114 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 57(1)

(Horowitz, 2000; Rothchild & Foley, 1988). These can system’ (Lemarchand, 1972: 70). What actually trickled be referred to as more or less exclusionary or inclusion- down to the ethnic constituencies was not necessarily ary, depending on how broad the ethnic powerbase of more in regimes with inclusive ruling coalitions. How- the regime was (Horowitz, 2000; Huntington, 1970; ever, rejecting the predominance of a single ethnic clea- Rothchild, 1997). vage, and inter-elite accommodation, still nurtured At one end of the continuum are regimes that Roth- accommodative policies to manage intercommunal child & Foley (1988) label ‘elite consensual systems’, relationships. characterized by broadly incorporative grand coalitions, By contrast, regimes that monopolized state power at where most major ethnic groups were allowed some par- the hands of a single group, or relied on a strategy of ticipation in decisionmaking processes, typically through narrow elite co-optation, produced elite dynamics char- various cabinet or executive appointments to ethnic rep- acterized by fragmentation and competition. Exclusion- resentatives (Arriola, 2009). Senegal under president ary regimes engineered ethnicity through ‘divide and Senghor’s one-party regime is a case in point, where the rule’ strategies that induce collective action problems government relied on inclusion of a majority of Senegal’s among those excluded from power (Acemoglu, Verdier ethno-regional and religious groups, and no single ethnic & Robinson, 2004). Restricting access to state resources group faced discrimination. and repression reinforced the divide and armed leaders At the other end of the spectrum are regimes that from excluded groups with a discourse of historical injus- effectively monopolized state executive power at the tices, political discrimination, and distrust (LeBas, hand of a single ethnic group (Wimmer, Cederman & 2006). Min, 2009). Examples at the extreme end include Bur- The degree of inclusion in coalition-building fostered undi (1966–88), where the Tutsi minority formed the not only different legacies for inter-elite dynamics, but ruling coalition while the Hutu majority were excluded also how ethnic communities are mobilized and, in turn, under the military regime, and the settler oligarchy of their relationship to each other. The elites’ bargaining South Africa, where the minority Afrikaners governed power within the regime coalition largely depended on while excluding the black majority. Beyond this extreme, the strength of the constituencies mobilized. Elites there- we find regimes that survived through exclusionary fore had strong incentives to cultivate their clientelist approaches without monopolizing the state. These relied base. Relying on narratives that invoked out-group on support from constituencies within the ruling coali- resentment and a sense of group entitlement was one tion, while simultaneously restricting political activity way of doing this (Straus, 2015: 58). As individuals and resources for excluded groups (Huntington, 1970). perceived access to state resources to depend on having Kenya, as the empirical analysis demonstrates, fits this a coethnic in power, they had incentives to rally behind category. their in-group coalition and request access to patronage We argue that how leaders formed ruling coalitions as members of particular ethnic groups (Bates, 1983; during the authoritarian era influenced inter-elite Posner, 2005; Wimmer, 1997). Thus, both elite- dynamics, the relationship between the broader ethnic driven top-down and community-driven bottom-up groups, and the relationship between ethnic leaders and processes reinforced the political salience of ethnicity. their ethnic communities. The approaches adopted dur- These processes were mirrored by similar countering authoritarian rule had long-lasting legacies by giving mobilization efforts from ethnic groups outside the rul- rise to different political incentives, for both the incum- ing coalition (Wimmer, Cederman & Min, 2009). The bent and opposition, when formal institutions shifted competitiveness of the mobilization was higher with with transitions to multiparty politics. more exclusionary coalitions. The stakes increased with At the elite level, more inclusionary regimes facilitated the number of groups excluded from power, fostering a the growth of a relatively cohesive ruling class, united by perception of politics as a zero-sum game. More inclu- a shared interest in accessing state resources on which sionary coalition-building did not feed into competitive their positions depended (Bayart, 1993; Arriola, 2009). mobilization of ethnic groups in the same way. The By extension of patron–client relations, a larger number shares of groups in the regime coalitions were larger, of groups perceived themselves as ‘within the ruling reducing ethnic elites’ political premium from marshal- coalition’, which promoted intra-elite accommodation ling their own constituents to signal strength. and integration. In such systems, clientelism ‘provide[s] What were the implications of these characteristics for the cement by which ethnic identities are amalgamated the transition to multiparty rule? We argue that the within the boundaries of a more inclusive political political legacy of more exclusionary systems, with Brosche´ et al. 115 fragmented and competitive interethnic relations, made to resist such rhetoric. In turn, the conditions for violent it difficult to counter the risk of violence in the transi- ethnic mobilization were less ripe. tion, since strategies of ‘divide and rule’ closed the door for broad-based elite bargaining. The exclusionary con- Case selection and sources6 text also provided fertile ground for politicians to capi- We explore this argument by comparing founding elec- talize on ethnic cleavages to solidify their electoral tions in Kenya (1992) and Zambia (1991). These elec- agenda. The strategically induced, competitive mobiliza- tions display considerable variation in the main outcome tion of ethnic groups under more exclusionary regimes of interest: the presence of electoral violence during fueled a perception of politics as a zero-sum struggle that founding multiparty elections. persisted through the transition. These parameters Zambia and Kenya share several characteristics that shaped the perception of both threats and opportunities make the comparison relevant. In both countries, the in the transition to multiparty rule, and thereby the regime introduced single-party rule against the backdrop opportunity structures for both incumbent and the of escalating ethnic tensions and the ‘inability of multi- opposition in terms of how political influence could be ethnic parties’ to maintain multi-ethnic support (Horo- pursued (Kirschke, 2000; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, witz, 2000: 429). The two countries had shifted between 2001: 46–47). The legacy from exclusionary regimes periods of single-party rule and multiparty elections, allowed hostile ethnic narratives to become powerful with similar electoral systems (single-member plurality), tools for electoral mobilization. Elites had large payoffs and both are ethnically diverse with Kenya commonly from resorting to exclusionary appeals and extremist described as having 42 different ethnic communities and rhetoric focusing on out-group threats, which fed into Zambia 73 (Dresang, 1974; Posner, 2007). Ethnic the violent mobilization of ethnic constituencies (Hor- groups live relatively segregated geographically and dom- owitz, 2000; Rabushka & Shepsle, 1972). inate specific regions. How ethnicity nests with electoral In a polarized electoral environment, violence can politics is the subject of this study; here, it is sufficient to take several forms (e.g. Staniland, 2014). First, ethnic note that ethnic identification is important in both coun- rhetoric can legitimize harsh security crackdowns and tries. The cases also differ on important accounts (colo- repressive policing against members of other groups, nial experience, population density, and the land measures that can be used to harass voters, target oppo- question). We return to these factors in the analysis. sition candidates, and violently coerce voters along eth- The analysis builds on secondary sources and inter- nic lines (e.g. Taylor, Pevehouse & Straus, 2017). views with academics, politicians, government officials, Second, it can entail the formation of ethnic militia NGO representatives, traditional leaders, and local resi- groups resorting to violence to intimidate and demobi- dents. We conducted 40 interviews in Kenya (2011) and lize opposition supporters to change the ethnic power- 45 in Zambia (2014 and 2017). The case analysis evolves balance on the ground (e.g. Raleigh, 2014). Third, it can over three parts: (1) elite strategies during authoritarian manifest as intergroup violence if opportunistic politi- rule and their effect on interethnic relations; (2) the cians provoke ethnic riots to solidify their own electoral election and outcome; and (3) the implication of author- base (e.g. Wilkinson, 2004). itarian rule on violent versus peaceful elections. More inclusionary regimes faced transition to multiparty politics with less competitive, antagonistic, and Kenya’s authoritarian legacy and violent divisive patterns of interethnic relations both at the elite 1992 elections7 and communal levels. They were thus less likely to experience electoral violence. The opportunity structure In December 1992, Kenya held its first competitive mul- engendered by authoritarian rule created more options tiparty elections after three decades of single-party rule. for elites to forge cross-ethnic coalitions, as well as dif- While the election created a democratic opening, large- ferent incentives for intragroup mobilization. Specifi- scale violence (state-sponsored, but with clear ethnic cally, the absence of blatant discrimination of certain connotations) killed approximately 1,500 people and groups reduced zero-sum perceptions of politics and displaced 300,000 (Africa Watch, 1993: 1). The ruling opened up for interethnic elite negotiation. It also made party, the Kenyan African National Union (KANU), it easier for elites to close political deals during transitions (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997: 87). Such dynamics 6 The Online appendix includes additional information about case reduced leaders’ incentives to resort to ethnic outbidding selection and interviews. and exclusionary appeals and made it easier for followers 7 The Kenya analysis partly draws on Fjelde & Ho¨glund (2018). 116 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 57(1) emerged as the sole winner, with Daniel arap Moi retain- ethnic, the Kikuyu dominated it and faced repression, ing the presidency. regardless of whether they were part of the uprising or not (Throup, 1993). This underpinned a sense of entitlement among Kikuyu, seen in land claims in the Rift Politics during single-party rule Valley made by Kikuyu migrant laborers (Kanyinga, Kenya’s first president Jomo Kenyatta established de 2009). facto one-party rule in 1969, which continued when Land redistribution, particularly in the fertile Rift Moi came to power in 1978. During this era, political Valley region, soon became a major political issue. leaders used ethnic coalition-building as a strategy to KADU, supported by white settlers, opposed land- maintain their powerbase, but access to state power and buying programs which would accommodate Kikuyu resources was reserved for only a few ethnic groups. land claims. In this context, the KANU–KADU merger Ethnicity was a key asset in political mobilization and was an interethnic elite ‘pact’, where ‘in exchange for shaped voting patterns (Hyde´n & Leys, 1972). Overall, political power KADU dropped its opposition to settle- Kenyans perceive national politics as a rivalry between ment schemes in the Rift Valley’ (Klopp, 2001: 477). Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luo, Luhya, and Coastal groups (Pos- Kenyatta’s land-buying program led to the migration of ner, 2007).8 However, ethnic coalitions are not fixed and many Kikuyu farmers to the region (Harbeson, 1973) shifting alliances characterized the single-party era, where and laid additional foundation for land conflict. Kenyatta and subsequently Moi sought to promote their After the KANU–KADU merger, the ethnic ruling own ethnic interests using ‘similar political methods of coalition grew increasingly exclusionary. In the process factional manipulation to achieve these ends’ (Throup, of consolidating power, the regime ostracized another 1987: 34; see also Omolo, 2002). community, the Luo, and singled them out as second- Exclusionary ethnic coalition-building was not a prevalent trait in the immediate post-independence period. rank citizens, invoking smear campaigns and marginali- In 1963, KANU won the first free elections, and was zation of Luo leaders (van Stapele, 2010: 115). The ethnic divide widened as Kenyatta demoted Vice- initially able to unite all ethnic groups in the ruling 9 coalition. The main opposition party, the Kenyan President Oginga Odinga (a Lou). While the conflict National Democratic Union (KADU), was co-opted and originated in ideological disagreement, it intertwined eventually merged with KANU in 1964. While KANU with ethnicity (Ogot, 2003: 33). In 1969, the govern- and KADU had similar political agendas, their support ment banned Odinga’s party, the Kenya People’s Union bases were different: KANU drew support mainly from (KPU), and one-party rule became de facto. Originally, the Kikuyu community, based in Central Province and both Luo and Kikuyu MPs supported KPU, but it part of Rift Valley, and some communities in the Nyanza became branded as a Luo party and members associated and Eastern Provinces. KADU’s prime ethnic base was with it faced punishment, including loss of jobs, social the Luhya (Western Province), Kalenjin and related rejection, and difficulties in obtaining government loans groups (Rift Valley), and some communities from the or licenses (Mueller, 2014: 5). Northeastern and Coast Provinces (Barkan, 1993). After Kenyatta’s death in 1978, Moi came to power Thus, in the initial post-independence era, a broad and ruled in a paranoid and kleptocratic manner (Bar- multi-ethnic coalition formed the ruling coalition at the kan, 1993: 87–88; Throup, 1993: 385). Moi inherited a center (Throup, 1993). state in the hands of patrons that had been loyal to Nevertheless, the Kikuyu community came to dom- Kenyatta, and, as he was Kalenjin, he lacked support inate the civil service, and state policies favored the Cen- from a dominant ethnic group. To ensure control, Moi tral Province economically (Barkan, 1993: 87). When raised the level of state patronage transferred through Kenya became independent and Kenyatta (of Kikuyu individuals and made access to patronage conditional origin) came to power in 1963, expectations were that on loyalty to the executive. These strategies served to the Kikuyu would gain a privileged position. Although increase ethnic salience (Cheeseman, 2006: 79). More the independence movement (the Mau Mau) was multi- specifically, the regime’s powerbase became increasingly

8 Also interviews K4 (NGO director, Nairobi, 17 November 2011) 9 Interviews K2 (NGO representative, Nairobi, 16 November 2011); and K6 (CBO representative, Nairobi, 21 November 2011). Locally, K31 A and B (local politicians, Kisumu, 28 November 2011); and ethnic or tribal identities subsumed under each group can be equally K32 (District Peace Committee member, Kisumu, 29 November important (e.g. Lynch, 2011). 2011). Brosche´ et al. 117 exclusionary geographically and ethnically. Moi began to of the opposition was a consequence of Moi’s early strat- favor formerly ‘disadvantaged groups’, including Kalen- egy to channel patronage via powerful individuals serving jin and allied tribes, while many Kikuyu had to leave the as ethnic patrons to secure support. The approach had civil service (Kahl, 1998: 113). Public investments were raised ethnic salience, fostered a perception of politics as reoriented from the Central Province to Moi’s main sup- zero-sum, and created strong center–locality relations port base, primarily the Rift Valley (Throup, 1987: 34). where individual patrons had the capacity to mobilize Thus, ‘over time, through reorganizing national alliances mass support and deliver their ethnic constituencies and patronage networks to ensure patrimonial control, (Cheeseman, 2006: 302–303). By being both wealthy KANU alienated many within Kikuyu and Luo constitu- and having an established ethnic support base, the main encies’ (Klopp, 2001: 277). However, the Kikuyu political leaders knew that ‘even if they suffered electoral remained economically influential, placing Moi in a vul- defeat, the strength of their personal support would ensure nerable position (Holmquist & Ford, 1995: 177). that they continued to be major players in Kenya’s polit- A faltering economy gradually undermined Moi’s ical landscape’ (Cheeseman, 2006: 303). patronage-based regime and contributed to increased mar- Large-scale violence and coerced displacement accom- ginalization of certain groups (Mueller, 2014; Throup, panied the election. As a direct response to the demo- 1993). A coup attempt in 1982 (allegedly led by Luo cratic transition, violence began over a year prior to the officers, but also involving Kikuyu), further engrained the elections. It intensified in the months preceding the elec- regime’s repressive approach to dissent (Barkan, 1993; tion and continued after. While people were killed and Mueller, 2014). In the wake of the coup, Moi dispropor- displaced in several parts of Kenya, the violence centred tionally promoted Kalenjin officers within the security on the Rift Valley Province (and along its border with forces and reinforced the paramilitary police (Roessler, Nyanza and Western Province), which saw the largest 2005: 213). In this context, a perception of ‘Kalenjiniza- share of parliamentary seats and where mass support for tion’ grew and the Kalenjin became associated with the Moi was crucial (Kahl, 1998: 111–112). Violence was regime’s repressive measures (Lynch, 2011: 140). levied strategically to establish KANU dominance, by playing on prevailing land conflicts between the ‘indigen- ous’ groups (Kalenjin, Maasai, Samburu, and Turkana) The election and more recent settlers in the region. The violence tar- The transition to multiparty politics took place in a geted mainly Kikuyu, Kisii, Luhya, and Luo – groups context of rising inflation and food shortages. In August associated with the opposition. It served to appropriate 1991, a wide coalition of clergy, lawyers, and opposition the promised (land) resources for KANU-supporting groups formed the Forum for the Restoration of Democ- communities, to secure the support of the Kalenjin com- racy (FORD), challenging the political and economic munity, and punish opposition voters (Boone, 2011: state of the country. The government responded with 1328; Throup & Hornsby, 1998: 195–197). force and arrested several FORD leaders. The internal Moi’s regime portrayed the violence as ‘ethnic clashes’ pressure, combined with donors’ suspension of foreign (Barkan, 1993: 90; Throup, 1993: 390). While the eth- aid (Kirschke, 2000), led to legalization of multiparty nic dimension was clear, the government was involved in politics in December 1991. fomenting the violence. High-ranking government offi- Moi won the presidential election with 36% of the cials seeking re-election supported the training and arm- vote, and KANU secured 57% of the seats in parliament ing of militias, mainly Kalenjin (Africa Watch, 1993; because the opposition was severely divided (Mueller, NCCK, 1992). Moreover, the regime ordered the secu- 2014).10 FORD was initially a cross-ethnic coalition, rity forces not to intervene and perpetrators enjoyed including Luo and Kikuyu. Yet within months, several impunity (Throup & Hornsby, 1998: 64). By contrast, rival alliances were formed along ethnic lines, where each revenge attacks targeting the Kalenjin were less organized faction fielded its own presidential candidate. FORD (Africa Watch, 1993: 2). broke into two factions: FORD Asili, led by a Kikuyu (Kenneth Matiba), and Ford Kenya, led by a Luo (Raila Odinga) (Oyugi, 1997: 47–48). Partly, the fragmentation Explaining electoral violence How did authoritarian rule influence Kenya’s 1992 elec- 10 KANU manipulated the voter and party registration and the tion? The mode of coalition-building and diversion of electoral commission, and denied the opposition permits to hold opposition during single-party rule contributed to elec- rallies (Barkan, 1993: 93). toral violence, via legacies relating to the character of 118 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 57(1) interethnic relations at the elite and communal level. Zambia’s authoritarian legacy and peaceful These shaped political elites’ options for political mobi- 1991 elections lization. Two processes were particularly important. Zambia became a single-party state in 1972 when the First, the legacies from authoritarian rule created frag- government banned all parties except Kaunda’s United mented and competitive elite relations. The opposition National Independence Party (UNIP). In October 1991, came primarily from outside of Moi’s main circle of the first multiparty elections in 30 years were held. power and was initially united by having been excluded Kaunda and UNIP were massively defeated, Kaunda from power and state patronage (due to their ethnicity). stepped aside, and Zambia experienced a largely peaceful But it quickly disintegrated along ethnic lines. Because transition to multiparty politics (Bratton, 1992). ‘ethnic brokerage’ was central for how leaders mobilized political support, it was neither feasible nor desirable for the opposition to strive for cross-ethnic support (Cheese- Politics during single-party rule man, 2006: 302; LeBas, 2011). In addition, no inclusive After a relatively peaceful path to sovereignty, Zambia gained independence in 1964 and Kaunda became the elite pact, which could have reduced the risks leaders first president.13 The independence movement, led by faced, was on the table (Kirschke, 2000: 396). Instead, Kaunda and UNIP, started with passive resistance, but Moi continued a previous tradition of divide and rule to later reverted to active resistance including the burning secure victory, and ‘introduced new means of coercion to of bridges and government buildings (Larmer, 2011: 40; assert political control’, where ethnic militias played a Rasmussen, 1974). Although regional divisions existed, key role (Kirschke, 2000: 397). In this process, the secu- no particular ethnic group dominated and UNIP was rity forces, where Kalenjin officers allegedly had been ‘committed to obtaining total support from the whole promoted disproportionately, remained loyal to Moi and country’ (Roberts, 1976: 221). did not halt the violence (Roessler, 2005: 214). Ethnicity has been important in political mobilization Second, legacies from the authoritarian era made elec- in Zambia and has shaped voting patterns since indepen- toral rhetoric exploiting ethnic cleavages a viable electoral dence (Osei-Hwedi, 1998; Posner, 2005). At the center, tactic. ‘Exclusionary ethnicities’ had been entrenched by political competition is primarily between four broad Moi’s concentration of patronage to his support base and ethno-linguistic groups – Bemba, Nyanja, Tonga, and increased stigmatization of other groups (Lynch, 2011: Lozi – but these are all composed of different ethnic 9; Mueller, 2014: 8). Following this logic, antagonistic, groups. Political parties do not fully align with a region intergroup competition underpinned the electoral rhetoric or group, but have generally been considered to represent and tied in with deep-seated land grievances, exploited by a particular region and the ethnic group dominating it. 11 politicians to garner electoral support. KANU politi- While Zambians generally perceived UNIP as a Bemba- cians, seeking re-election, were the prime instigators. The leaning party at independence, it later became associated purpose was to punish pro-opposition supporters or pre- with the Nyanja (Posner, 2005: 107–108). vent them from voting through intimidation or displace- Post-independence, UNIP remained the political ment. After land was cleared, it was used as patronage to powerhouse. However, internal tensions of an ethnic reward militants and secure electoral support (Boone, nature ravaged UNIP and in 1966, Lozi speakers left 2011: 1328). In this process, the politicians resorted to and formed the Unity Party (UP). Factional fighting ethnic outbidding: for instance, at political meetings pol- continued in 1967: the Bemba–Tonga alliance won over iticians called for the eviction of ‘aliens’ and ‘foreigners’ the Lozi–Nyanja alliance and Bemba took up many (mostly Kikuyu, but also Luo) from the land, so that senior government positions. Despite allegations of native ownership (to primarily Kalenjin and Maasai) Bemba hegemony, the government structures remained could be restored (Africa Watch, 1993: 18; Klopp, ethnically diverse and involved other groups (Dresang, 2001). These communities, in turn, feared expulsion if 1974: 1609–1611). KANU lost the election (Kahl, 1998: 109).12 Two years after its formation, UP was banned due to agitation for increased autonomy of Barotseland in the west. The ban signalled the government’s increasing 11 Interview K22 (regional commissioner, Eldoret, 24 November 2011). 12 Interviews K15 (victim, local resident, Eldoret, 23 November 13 Northern Rhodesia, as Zambia was called from 1911 to 1964, was 2011) and K18 (coordinator, peace organization, Eldoret, 23 never a settler economy, enjoyed more self-rule, and had a small white November 2011). population. Brosche´ et al. 119 sensitivity to competition. To reduce the risk of ethnic the country’s major ethno-regional groupings to the contestation, the regime championed the motto of ‘One national structures [ ...] reinforced growing tensions Zambia, One Nation’, intended to foster national, not within the party’ (Larmer, 2011: 56), he intentionally ethnic, identity (Burnell, 2005). Politics came to evolve deployed it to reduce the risk of any particular group around ethnic balancing: a range of policies, from land feeling excluded and the political salience of ethnicity distribution to ministerial appointments, depended on (Dresang, 1974: 1609). Furthermore, the regime intro- balancing ethnic representation rather than on merit duced a rotational system, where public servants would (Dresang, 1974: 1615). never work in or represent their original constituency, Single-party rule was a reaction to challenges arising but moved around to different parts of the country. Both from within UNIP (Gertzel, Baylies & Szeftel, 1984: 7). these factors contributed to interactions within the polit- In 1971, the United Progressive Party (UPP) emerged as ical elite based on a culture of cooperation and coexis- a UNIP-splinter group. UPP was a Bemba-dominated tence, rather than rivalry founded on ethno-regional party, led by former vice-president Simon Kapwepwe. differences.17 UPP threatened Kaunda, as it represented long-term In contrast to Kenya, regional favoring was not evi- UNIP representatives and drew considerable support dent during Zambian single-party rule.18 Kaunda com- from UNIP strongholds like the Bemba-dominated bined formal policies (like public spending on education) Copperbelt and the north (Burnell, 2001; Posner, and informal neo-patrimonial interventions to uphold 2005). This was in sharp contrast to the African National loyalties across ethno-political elites. These elites became Congress (ANC), the main opposition party from inde- part of a system where cooperation was sufficiently inclu- pendence until the introduction of single-party rule, sive to foster integration (Burnell, 2005: 119). While which had its prime support base in the Tonga- economic recession in the mid-1970s increased the dominated south. An increasing number of interparty population’s disillusionment with the regime, it did not violence incidents served as a pretext for UNIP to act skew regional distribution of state resources, which could on single-party rule. In February 1972, the government have created ethnic grievances among disadvantaged banned UPP and detained Kapwepwe together with over groups. Instead, the different regions all took a reason- 100 leading party members. The same year, the regime able part of the losses (Burdette, 1988: 124). co-opted the ANC leadership and a constitutional During single-party rule, UNIP remained a national- amendment passed in December 1972 made Zambia a ist party and no major destabilizing ethno-regional polit- de jure single-party state (Gertzel, Baylies, & Szeftel, ical movements existed (Burdette, 1988: 160–161). Still, 1984: 16–17). UNIP faced political dissent and one issue of discontent During the first years of single-party rule, Zambia was was alleged underrepresentation by some regions in the riding high on revenues from copper. Kaunda began to Central Committee (Gertzel, Baylies, & Szeftel, 1984: promote national unity based on socialism and Christian 101–102). Kaunda responded by reshuffling the Central values (Burdette, 1988: 77–78). For Kaunda, it was a Committee leadership. Although such efforts aimed to political necessity to prevent ethnicity from becoming reduce imbalance, accusations of bias were common. the only political identification, since he was partly an Kaunda’s early cabinets were perceived as Bemba- outsider to the ethnic game: he was born and raised in a dominated, but later considered to favor Nyanja- Bemba-speaking area in northern Zambia, but his par- speakers (Posner, 2005: 98). ents were from Malawi.14 Over time, power became concentrated within Under Kaunda’s rule, the political elite was structured UNIP’s leadership and increasingly with the president according to ethnic balancing.15 Kaunda deliberately (Bratton, 1992: 83; Gertzel, Baylies & Szeftel, 1984: balanced ethnic and regional interests, including political 102–104). Political participation was encouraged within compromises and power-sharing in political, economic, and military realms (Bratton, 1992: 83; Lindemann, Posner (2005: 127–128) shows that Bemba dominance was stark 16 2011). While his policy of ‘appointing members of all among the top ministerial posts. 17 Interview Z9 (NGO representative, Kitwe, 24 November 2014). 18 Government resource allocation suggests that economic motives 14 Interview Z43 (lawyer, Lusaka, 18 May 2017). overrode political motives post-independence (Hern, 2015: 65–66). 15 Interview Z1 (academic, Lusaka, 19 November 2014). In the immediate post-independence period, education spending 16 Lindemann (2011) describes an even ethnic distribution of seemed targeted to reduce provincial differences (Dresang, 1974: government positions, the party,andthearmyovertime,while 1612–1613). 120 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 57(1)

UNIP, while the party repressed all opposition. Kaunda occurred, such as youth groups harassing traders who did viewed ethnic polarization as a threat to his power and not have UNIP member cards. The regime deployed delegitimized all dissent by characterizing any criticism paramilitary forces to townships, but there was no real as tribalism (Larmer, 2011: 65). While Kaunda’s repres- attempt to use the security forces for UNIP’s purposes sion was not on par with Moi’s, disappearances or sus- (LeBas, 2011: 217–218). picious deaths silenced many political opponents, and Much of the tension ahead of the election concerned expressed opposition often resulted in a state reaction, disagreement over electoral rules and monitoring. such as demotion or loss of employment (Burnell, 2005; Furthermore, the opposition accused the government Phiri, 2006). of misusing state resources in the campaign (Bjornlund, In the second half of the 1980s, UNIP further Bratton & Gibson, 1992; Bratton, 1992: 90). While restricted political liberties, for example, by outlawing thousandsofvoterswereexcluded from the voters’ reg- strikes (LeBas, 2011: 98). After food riots in the istry, these flaws were caused by mismanagement, 1980s, Bemba were at a higher risk of clampdown by rather than deliberate manipulation (Rakner & the security forces, but this was mainly due to protest Svåsand, 2005: 91). starting in Bemba-dominated towns, not ethnic bias The 1991 election resulted in a landslide victory for (Lindemann, 2011: 1859; Scarritt, 1993: 269). MMD. Chiluba gained almost 76% of the presidential vote and MMD 125 of 150 parliamentary seats (Burnell, 2001: 240). Fears that Kaunda, who controlled the secu- The election rity forces, would use the army to remain in power The transition originated in the 1980s, when discontent existed, but he handed over power peacefully to with the regime grew widespread. The trade unions MMD.19 became the main champions of the reintroduction of multiparty politics. Faced with widespread rallies in favor of change, Kaunda agreed to introduce multiparty elec- Explaining the absence of electoral violence tions in 1990. The Movement for Multiparty Democ- The political legacy from the period of single-party racy (MMD) registered as a political party, led by rule shaped political mobilization ahead of the 1991 Frederick Chiluba, a Bemba-speaking Lunda from Lua- elections and had implications for how the transition pula Province, who gained a prominent role due to his unfolded. Kaunda’s deliberate policy to prevent ethnic position as trade union leader (Cheeseman, 2006: 306). dominance – politically, economically, and socially – MMD drew support from many different groups in was essential in countering ethnically based electoral society, including labor and business, and several top- violence at the re-introduction of multiparty politics. level politicians left UNIP for MMD (Bratton, 1992: 92; First, ethnic balancing during authoritarian rule fos- Phiri, 2006: 167). The opposition was able to unite tered a culture of cooperation within the Zambian elite, political leaders from all major ethnic groups, and the rather than rivalry based on ethno-regional differences. leaders refrained from appealing to ethnic and regional Not only was elite bargaining common, it was also inclu- loyalties (Osei-Hwedi, 1998: 232). sive by involving elites from a broad set of ethnic groups While internal divisions existed within MMD, it (Burnell, 2005; Lindemann, 2011). The legacy of elite remained united. One reason was that ‘senior figures cooperation had been particularly strong during political within the MMD had little to gain and everything to crises. In 1991, Chiluba and Kaunda met in a series of lose from splitting with the party’ (Cheeseman, 2006: church-led meetings (Bartlett, 2000) and followed a 306). UNIP’s power had largely rested on indirect sup- longstanding tradition of elite negotiations during tur- port from urban workers, which gave the unions a pro- bulent times. These meetings settled many contentious minent position in Zambian politics. When the labor issues. Most importantly, the incumbent and the oppo- unions turned against UNIP in the late 1980s, individ- sition leader agreed to concede to electoral defeat (Bjorn- ual political leaders held neither the networks nor lund, Bratton & Gibson, 1992: 413). economic power for mass mobilization (Cheeseman, Second, inclusionary governance during single-party 2006: 78). rule made interethnic relations less fragmented. This Although the threat of violence was looming during the transition, the elections remained relatively peaceful. 19 Interviews Z8 (academic, Kitwe, 24 November 2014); Z1 There were allegations from both parties about threats (academic, Lusaka, 19 November 2014); Z4 (veteran politician, and intimidation, but only a few instances of violence Lusaka, 19 November 2014). Brosche´ et al. 121 contributed to the opposition’s ability to form a broad- ethnic divisions. While Kenya was not at the extreme based coalition across ethnic divides, with leaders united end of the exclusionary spectrum, it was significantly in their interest in removing Kaunda from power, not an more exclusionary than Zambia. Importantly, the mode interest in placing their ethnic group in power (Osei- of coalition-building was also underpinned by different Hwedi, 1998: 232). In fact, 20 MMD candidates were logics: ‘[w]hereas in Kenya political life has been char- ‘former or sitting UNIP MPs and 12 had been cabinet acterized by open deployment of ethnic self-interest, in ministers or central committee members’ (Baylies & Zambia it has been more covert and intermingled with Szeftel, 1992: 83). Post-independence state policies that other forms of allegiance – for example, on material had created well-organized and centralized labor move- grounds’ (Larmer, 2011: 274). Both approaches were ments composed of different ethnic identities also con- strategies for regime survival and help to explain why tributed to the broad-based cross-ethnic opposition electoral violence occurred in Kenya, but not in Zambia. (LeBas, 2011: 246). In particular, the political legacies from authoritarian Third, the interethnic relations in place lowered rule work through two main pathways. incentives for violent ethnic mobilization. The political First, legacies structure options for cross-ethnic rhetoric did not revolve around exclusionary ethnic lan- coalition-building and cooperation, making electoral guage, but widespread discontent with Kaunda and a violence more or less likely. By emphasizing ethnicity need for change. Although the rhetoric was hardline, over other political cleavages, exclusionary coalition- neither Kaunda nor MMD appealed to regional or eth- building engenders interethnic relations characterized nic loyalties, and both sides drew cross-ethnic support by fragmentation and competition. Thus, while Zam- (Lindemann, 2011: 1860; Osei-Hwedie, 1998: 232). bia’s opposition drew support from all ethnic groups, Kaunda’s history of ethnic balancing, combined with his Kenya’s opposition was fragmented and polarized along own fluid ethnic identity, meant that it was difficult for ethnic lines. Furthermore, in Zambia the legacy of coop- him to draw on ethnicity to consolidate electoral sup- erative interethnic elite relations reduced the perceived port. In fact, ‘[b]oth UNIP before the 1990s and [ ...] risks associated with the transition and enabled inter-elite MMD [ ...] in the 1990s were successful in polling bargaining that solved several contentious issues. support in every province and from across the entire Second, political legacies place constraints on electoral ethnic spectrum’ (Burnell, 2005: 115). Thus, violent mobilization. Specifically, more exclusionary ruling coa- ethnic mobilization would have been a complete break litions create ethno-political dynamics where narratives with history, and it would have been difficult to win the exploiting ethnic cleavages become a powerful mode of elections with more narrow ethnic appeals.20 political mobilization for elites in the pursuit of electoral gains. LeBas (2006: 422) notes how ‘political incentives must align with existing identities, rather than encourage Divergent outcomes of electoral violence the formation of identities that transcend them’. Polar- ization and group boundaries are upheld and reproduced WhydidKenya’sfoundingmultipartyelectionturn by political elites and create situations where space for violent, while Zambia’s did not? Whereas the transitions bargaining shrinks (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001). In in Kenya and Zambia diverged on many dimensions, Kenya, the electoral rhetoric played on historical injus- Zambia also had a potential for violence. The prelude tices and ethnic divisions, and the violence served both to to the reintroduction of electoral politics faced several solidify the incumbent’s support base and to punish crises, and Kaunda (like Moi) warned that political lib- opposition voters. In Zambia, the use of an ethnically eralization would have violent consequences. To under- hostile rhetoric would have signalled a break from the stand the different outcomes, our analysis highlights how rhetoric used during authoritarian rule. the regime in each country used varying strategies to A key mechanism for explaining electoral violence, forge ruling coalitions during authoritarian rule. While thus, is the propensity of exclusionary regimes to culti- Kenya’s single-party rule contained a relatively exclusive vate perceptions of politics as a zero-sum game. When approach, based on a narrow support-base and active such perceptions outlast the authoritarian era and trans- suppression of those excluded from power, Zambia’s fer into the electoral arena, an elevated sense of threat single-party rule was more inclusive, based on a broader fuels electoral violence. ethnic support base and with deliberate efforts to counter Developments prior to single-party rule clearly influenced politics in Kenya and Zambia. Without victimiza- 20 Interview Z1 (academic, Lusaka, 19 November 2014). tion of one ethnic group in Zambia’s independence 122 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 57(1) struggle the policy of ethnic balancing was buttressed, colonial and post-colonial experience, and characterized whereas the Kikuyu victimization during Kenya’s libera- by a heterogeneous ethnic landscape, pervasive patronage tion laid the foundation for exclusive ethnic politics. politics, and weak formal institutions. The findings carry Relatedly, appeals to land grievances rooted in Kenya’s particular relevance for countries in the region. However, colonial and post-colonial policies, less prominent in in other parts of the world electoral regimes face compa- Zambia, played a significant role in the 1992 violent rable challenges due to high social fragmentation and elections and have contributed to a territorialization of past authoritarian rule. Thus, the political dynamics cre- ethnicity (Jenkins, 2012; Klaus, 2020). Such historical ated by prior governing strategies are also likely to be of developments explain why the Rift Valley was the epi- consequence for electoral violence in unconsolidated center of the violence (Boone, 2011; Kahl, 1998). regimes in the Middle East and Asia.

Conclusion Replication data The Online appendix, which includes additional infor- In this article, we show how political legacies from dis- mation regarding the case selection and interviews, is tinct authoritarian regimes contribute to explaining vio- available at http://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets. lent versus peaceful multiparty elections in multi-ethnic states. We argue that policies enacted during authoritarian rule to uphold the regime’s powerbase shape inter- Acknowledgements ethnic relations at the elite and communal levels, and We appreciate excellent suggestions by the editors and their interaction. Different ethno-political dynamics fol- three anonymous reviewers. We also thank colleagues at lowing from more exclusionary versus inclusionary Uppsala University for comments, and participants at approaches influence the mobilization strategies leaders workshops/conferences for feedback on the manuscript. adopt when competitive, multiparty elections are (re)in- Finally, we are grateful for the insights provided by inter- troduced. Our conclusions endorse research underscor- viewees and research assistants in Kenya and Zambia. ing the significance of historical grievances in violent electoral mobilization (e.g. Klaus, 2020; Klaus & Mitch- ell, 2015), and complement studies that emphasize the Funding importance of perceptions of politics as zero-sum (e.g. The Swedish Research Council (grant 348-2013-5408 Fjelde & Ho¨glund, 2016), leaders’ threat perceptions and 2016-05833) and Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (e.g. Hafner-Burton, Hyde & Jablonski, 2014), and (grant P16-0124:1) funded this research. political elites’ instrumental use of ethnic cleavages (e.g. Berenschot, 2020; Wilkinson, 2004). While these ORCID iD studies focus on immediate conditions surrounding the Johan Brosche´ https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1282-9823 elections, we highlight how historical legacies shape Hanne Fjelde https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5251-7309 political mobilization in the era of multiparty politics Kristine Ho¨glund https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7167- by creating different ethno-political incentive structures 609X during the transition. For future research, key topics are the mechanisms explaining self-reinforcing tendencies of conflict, and References how previous experiences with violence shape future Acemoglu, Daron; Thierry Verdier & James A Robinson electoral politics. In this regard, it is pertinent to analyze (2004) Kleptocracy and divide-and-rule: A model of per- how legacies from founding elections influence subse- sonal rule. Journal of the European Economic Association quent elections. It is noteworthy that electoral violence 2(2–3):162–192. has been a pervasive feature in most Kenyan elections Africa Watch (1993) Divide and Rule: State-Sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya. New York: Human Rights Watch. after 1992, while Zambian elections were largely free Arriola, Leonardo (2009) Patronage and political stability in from violence after 1991 and until 2015. Zambian pol- Africa. Comparative Political Studies 42(10): 1339–1362. itics has become more volatile, with instances of electoral Arriola, Leonardo R (2013) Capital and opposition in Africa: violence in 2016 (Goldring & Wahman, 2016). Yet, Coalition building in multiethnic societies. World Politics violence remains at a low level with few fatalities. 65(2): 233–272. This analysis is rooted in the historical and contem- Barkan, Joel D (1993) Kenya: Lessons from a flawed election. porary realities of sub-Saharan Africa, marked by the Journal of Democracy 4(3): 85–99. Brosche´ et al. 123

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