July 2014

Monthly Forecast

2 In Hindsight: Sanctions Overview 3 Status Update since our June Forecast 4 Peacekeeping Rwanda will hold the presidency of the Coun- • Syria, on humanitarian access by Under-Sec- cil in July. A high-level open debate on regional retary-General for Humanitarian A!airs Val- 5 Iraq partnerships in UN peacekeeping is planned, to erie Amos and on the chemical weapons track 8 Syria be presided by Foreign Minister Louise Mushi- by Sigrid Kaag, Special Coordinator of the 10 Lebanon kiwabo of Rwanda. UN Secretary-General Ban OPCW-UN Joint Mission; 11 Israel/Palestine Ki-moon, Chairperson of the AU Commission • Sudan-South Sudan issues, by the Special Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma and EU High Repre- Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan and head 13 South Sudan sentative for Foreign A!airs and Security Policy of the UN O"ce to the AU, Haile Menkerios; 15 Sudan and South Catherine Ashton are expected to brief. • Lebanon and implementation of resolution Sudan The quarterly open debate on the Middle East 1701, likely by Special Coordinator Derek 17 Sudan (Darfur) is also expected with a briefing by Special Coor- Plumbly and Assistant Secretary-General for 18 Somalia dinator for the Middle East Peace Process Robert Peacekeeping Edmond Mulet; 20 Central African Serry. • Cyprus and the status of negotiations by Spe- Republic A briefing is expected on the annual report of cial Representative and head of the UN Peace- 21 Libya the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) by Ambas- keeping Force in Cyprus, Lisa Buttenheim; sadors Vladimir Drobnjak (Croatia) and Antonio • preparations for the deployment of the UN 23 UNOWA (West Africa) de Aguiar Patriota (Brazil), the former and cur- Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation 24 Cyprus rent chairs of the PBC. Mission in the Central African Republic, by 26 Peacebuilding Briefings, followed by consultations, are Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping 28 Notable Dates expected on: Hervé Ladsous; and Supplement • Iraq, by Nickolay Mladenov, the head of UN • the work of the 751/1907 Somalia and Eritrea Active Security Council Assistance Mission for Iraq; Sanctions Committee by its chair, Ambassador Sanctions Regimes: An • the UN O"ce for West Africa by its head, Spe- Oh Joon (Republic of Korea). Abridged History cial Representative Said Djinnit; and Formal sessions will be needed to adopt reso- • the work of the 2127 Central African Republic lutions renewing the mandates of UNFICYP in Sanctions Committee, by its chair, Ambassa- Cyprus and UNAMI in Iraq. dor Raimonda Murmokaitė (Lithuania). Also in June, Council members plan to hold At press time, it appeared that the briefing fol- an Arria-formula meeting with the Human Rights lowed by consultations on Darfur by the head Council’s Commission of Inquiry on Syria and an of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur, informal interactive dialogue with the chairs of Mohamed Ibn Chambas, scheduled for July, the PBC country-specific configurations. might be postponed until August. Throughout the month members will be fol- Briefings in consultations are likely on: lowing closely events in Ukraine, Iraq, Mali and • Libya by Special Representative Tarek Mitri, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and addi- the head of the UN Support Mission in Libya; tional meetings may be scheduled.•

30 June 2014 This report is available online at securitycouncilreport.org.

For daily insights by SCR on evolving Security Council actions please subscribe to our “What’s In Blue” series at whatsinblue.org or follow @SCRtweets on Twitter.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast July 2014 securitycouncilreport.org 1 In Hindsight: Sanctions

The Council has recently demonstrated consequences and mapping linkages with other Denmark, Finland, Germany, Liechtenstein, renewed activity in using sanctions as a tool aspects of UN peace operations. the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Swit- for maintaining international peace and secu- Improved coordination and cooperation zerland—proposed extending the procedural rity. With the adoption of resolution 2140 within the UN system and with regional safeguards of the Ombudsperson from the concerning Yemen on 26 February 2014, the organisations could also lead to enhanced 1267/1989 Al-Qaida regime to the other UN Council reached an all-time high number e!ectiveness of sanctions regimes and bet- sanctions regimes (S/PV.6964). of concurrent sanctions regimes: 15. Some ter compliance. This might include greater Ultimately, the sanctions issues outlined Council members and observers, however, synergy between the work of panels/groups above—institutional evolution, strategy, coor- have recognised that there remains consider- of experts and UN peacekeeping operations, dination, transparency and due process—are able room for improvement in UN sanctions further communication between the Council secondary to Council dynamics. Put more design and implementation. and UN country teams, more coordination concretely and starkly, there may be no other Since the imposition of the first mandato- among sanctions committee chairs and infor- greater indicator of the potential success or ry sanctions in 1968 with resolution 253 con- mation sharing among panels/groups. Regu- failure of a UN sanctions regime than con- cerning Rhodesia, the Council’s approach lar consultations between the Council and sistent, sustained commitment among the has evolved in several ways: regional organisations—potentially includ- Council members themselves, particularly • in order to minimise unintended conse- ing e!orts to harmonise certain sanctions the P5. When Council members fail to fol- quences such as humanitarian impact, regimes—could lead to better compliance low through with secondary sanctions against sanctions regimes since the mid-1990s and enforcement through complementary sanctions spoilers, or they themselves under- have been primarily targeted rather than international and regional measures. Per- mine a UN sanctions regime, the message comprehensive; haps sanctions coordination and cooperation for the wider UN membership is clear. And • designation criteria have expanded to could be an agenda topic for the next annual when Council members block or delay publi- address human rights violations and the joint consultative meeting with members of cation of a report by a panel/group of experts, protection of civilians, particularly chil- the AU Peace and Security Council. the integrity of the process may be compro- dren and women (precedents were estab- Transparency is perhaps the most con- mised, as may also occur when the experts lished—both in the Democratic Republic spicuous area of sanctions practice where the appointed to such panels/groups are predom- of the Congo—with resolution 1698 and costs of reform are low and the benefits (i.e., inantly nationals of certain Council members. resolution 1807 respectively); awareness, legitimacy and compliance) are Likewise, when seeking to understand why • regarding structure, sanctions commit- high, yet there have been few changes. Nor certain sanctions regimes are actively imple- tees and a panel or group of experts have is transparency in sanctions regimes a new mented (e.g., 1267/1989 Al-Qaida) while become standard for most regimes (all 15 issue: notes by the President of the Security others remain for all intents and purposes current regimes have a committee, and Council were issued on the matter in 1995 dormant (e.g., 1591 Sudan), the answer can 12 of 15 committees have a monitoring (S/1995/234) and 1999 (S/1999/92), while the be found within Council dynamics. mechanism); and Informal Working Group on General Issues Taking up several of the challenges out - • in response to due process concerns, the of Sanctions, a subsidiary body of the Coun- lined here, the governments of Australia, Fin- Focal Point (resolution 1730) and the cil, made further recommendations in 2006 land, Greece and Sweden in partnership with O"ce of the Ombudsperson (resolution (S/2006/997). Measures to increase transpar- the Watson Institute at Brown University 1904) were created to facilitate delisting ency could include regular consultations with and Compliance and Capacity International processes. non-Council member states a!ected by spe- launched on 28 May the High Level Review One area that remains relatively underde- cific sanctions regimes, more frequent public of UN Sanctions (http://www.hlr-unsanctions. veloped is sanctions strategy. In the interest briefings by the chairs of sanctions committees, org). Three working groups will consider of improving sanctions implementation, most the inclusion of more specific information in issues related to UN integration and coordi- practitioners and scholars have focused on rel- the annual reports of sanctions committees, nation, external institutions and instruments, atively narrow measures of e"ciency, which and publicly available transcripts or summary and regional organisations and emerging chal- can obscure the bigger picture of what UN records of sanctions committee meetings. lenges. This high-level review has a few nota- sanctions are intended to achieve. At a strate- Due process continues to be a subject of ble state-led predecessors, including the Bonn- gic level, there is often considerable ambigu- interest within a sanctions context. The cre- Berlin Process, the Interlaken Process, and the ity regarding how sanctions are meant to rein- ation of the Focal Point for Delisting in 2006 Stockholm Process, which generated reports force other aspects of UN engagement, such and the O"ce of the Ombudsperson in 2009 published from 2001 to 2003. Building on as peacekeeping, mediation or peacebuilding. were largely in response to legal challenges in these initiatives, the Informal Working Group There may also be insu"cient consideration national and regional courts, particularly in on General Issues of Sanctions issued its final of alternative policy options being e!ectively relation to the then 1267 Al-Qaida/Taliban report on 18 December 2006 (S/2006/997). ruled out by imposing sanctions under cer- regime. Addressing the Council on 10 May Reinstating the Informal Working Group tain circumstances. Prior to authorisation, the 2013 following a briefing by the chairs of the could be a useful way for the Council to con- Council could take a more strategic approach counter-terrorism subsidiary bodies, a group sider insights and lessons from new policy- to sanctions design by systematically determin- of like-minded states on targeted sanctions— oriented research on UN sanctions. ing objectives, identifying potential unintended comprising Austria, Belgium, Costa Rica,

2 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast July 2014 Status Update since our June Forecast

Ukraine Drugs and Crime Yuri Fedotov. The Council MINUSMA in which four Chadian peace- On 2 June, Russia called for consultations also adopted two presidential statements on keepers were killed (SC/11438). Under- on the humanitarian situation in Ukraine. Afghanistan at the debate, one on counter- Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Hervé At that meeting Council members agreed narcotics (S/PRST/2014/12) and another on Ladsous briefed the Council on 18 June, pre- to ask humanitarian chief Valerie Amos to the elections (S/PRST/2014/11). senting the most recent MINUSMA report brief, she did so on 16 June. On 17 June, the (S/2014/403). The Foreign Minister of Mali, Council issued a press statement condemn- Iran Abdoulaye Diop, also addressed the Council ing the killing of two Russian journalists On 9 June, the Council adopted resolution during the public session (S/PV.7202). Spe- that day in Ukraine, marking the first state- 2159 which renewed for 13 months the Panel cial Representative Albert Gerard Koenders ment Council members agreed to since the of Experts assisting the 1737 Iran Sanctions briefed during the following consultations. On crisis began (SC/11442). On 24 June, the Committee, without any changes to its man- 25 June, the Council adopted resolution 2164 Council was briefed by Assistant Secretary- date. The resolution requested the Panel to that established benchmarks for MINUSMA, General for Human Rights Ivan Šimonović submit a mid-term report to the Committee renewed the mission for a year and granted and Assistant Secretary-General for Politi- by 9 November 2014 and a final report by 9 Koenders greater political authority. cal A!airs Tayé-Brook Zerihoun (S/PV.7205). May 2015. On 25 June, the chair of the Com- Šimonović briefed on the UN Human Rights mittee, Ambassador Gary Quinlan (Australia), Côte d’Ivoire Monitoring Mission and Zerihoun briefed presented his 90-day report on the work of On 16 June, Special Representative and head on the ceasefire and peace plan proposed by the Committee to the Council (S/PV.7211). of UNOCI, Aichatou Mindaoudou Souley- President Petro Poroshenko of Ukraine. He reported that the Committee had had one mane, briefed the Council on the most recent informal meeting and two “informal informal” UNOCI report (S/2014/342), followed by Tribunals meetings and had discussed the Panel’s final consultations (S/PV.7197). On 25 June, the On 5 June, the Council held a debate on report (S/2014/394) as well as an incident Council adopted resolution 2162 renewing the International Criminal Tribunal for the report on an interception reported by a mem- UNOCI for a year and introduced some former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (S/PV.7192). ber state (in reference to the 5 March inter- changes to the mandate. The resolution rein- The meeting focused on the completion ception of the ship Klos-C in the Red Sea by forces the role of the Special Representative strategy reports submitted by both Tribunals Israel). Referring to the ongoing talks between in supporting political processes underway (S/2014/343 and S/2014/351) and the report Iran and the P5+1, Quinlan emphasised that in Côte d’Ivoire and envisions a reduction of from the International Residual Mechanism all UN sanctions remained fully in e!ect and UNOCI military and police components by for Criminal Tribunals (S/2014/350). could only be altered through the adoption of 30 June 2015. The resolution also authorises a Council resolution. all UNOCI and UNMIL military helicop- Annual Meeting with the AU PSC ters to be utilised in both countries. It calls Members Liberia for the establishment of a Quick Reaction On 6 June, members of the Security Council In consultations on 16 June, the chair of the Force within UNOCI for an initial period of and members of the AU Peace and Security 1521 Liberia Sanctions Committee, Ambas- one year and authorises its deployment by Council held their eighth annual joint consul- sador Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein (Jordan), the Secretary-General without prior Council tative meeting in New York. A joint commu- briefed Council members on the Panel of authorisation for up to 90 days, in case of niqué was issued which discusses the Central Experts’ midterm report (S/2014/363) as serious deterioration of the situation there. African Republic, the Democratic Republic of well as the recent sanctions review that had the Congo, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, the been conducted with a view towards scaling Counter-Terrorism AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur, counter- back or ending the regime as mandated in On 17 June, the Council adopted resolutions terrorism in Africa and strengthening coop- resolution 2128. 2160 and 2161. Resolution 2160 renewed, eration between the two bodies (S/2014/400). with minor adjustments, the 1988 Taliban Peacekeeping sanctions regime. Resolution 2161 renewed Afghanistan On 11 June, at the initiative of Russia the the measures targeting Al-Qaida associated On 6 June, Council members issued a press Council held an open debate on new trends individuals and entities and extended the statement condemning an attack in Kabul in peacekeeping operations (S/PV.7196). The mandates of the O"ce of the Ombudsperson which caused a number of deaths and Secretary-General briefed and issues such as and the Analytical Support and Sanctions injuries to civilians and security person- the use of force in peacekeeping, the use of Monitoring Team assisting the 1267/1989 Al- nel (SC/11431). On 25 June, the Council new technology in peacekeeping operations Qaida Sanctions Committee for 30 months. held its quarterly debate on Afghanistan (S/ and inter-mission cooperation and multidi- PV.7208) considering the most recent Secre- mensional mandates were discussed. The Sahel tary-General’s report (S/2014/420). Briefings On 19 June, the Special Envoy for the Sahel, were provided at the debate by Special Rep- Mali Hiroute Guebre Sellassie, briefed the Coun- resentative and head of UNAMA Jan Kubiš On 11 June, Council members issued a cil on the implementation on the UN inte- and Executive Director of the UN O"ce on press statement condemning an attack on grated Sahel strategy (S/2014/397). Sellassie

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast July 2014 securitycouncilreport.org 3 Status Update since our June Forecast (con’t) highlighted the deteriorated situations in Lib- as well as the implementation of the national UNRCCA (Central Asia) ya, Mali and Nigeria and said that addressing dialogue outcomes and the economic chal- On 26 June, Miroslav Jenča, the Special Rep- security challenges in the Sahel requires a flex- lenges facing Yemen. resentative and head of UNRCCA, briefed ible geographic definition of the region. Sel- Council members in consultations. In a lassie also raised concerns about “competing” Golan Heights press statement following the briefing Coun- interventions and strategies within the UN and On 25 June, the Council adopted resolution cil members emphasised the importance the need for greater coordination (S/PV.7203). 2163 renewing UNDOF for six months after of preventive diplomacy and commended considering the Secretary-General’s latest UNRCCA’s e!orts to assist countries in Ye m e n report on the observer mission during 18 the region on issues such as trans-boundary On 20 June, the Council met in consulta- June consultations (S/2014/401). water management, counter-terrorism and tions with Special Adviser Jamal Benomar drug tra"cking (SC/11457). on the worsening security situation in Yemen,

Peacekeeping

Expected Council Action between 2007 and 2012, there were at least into a UN operation, but a 20 April 2007 In July, as proposed by Rwanda, the Council five thematic debates on this issue. (Two of report by the Secretary-General indicated is expected to hold a high-level open debate them took place at the initiative of South that the conditions to deploy a UN peace- on regional partnerships in peacekeeping. It Africa and all of them at the request of elect- keeping operation to replace AMISOM did is anticipated that Foreign Minister Lou- ed members.) Furthermore, since 2007, AU not exist in Somalia (S/2007/204). In 2009, ise Mushikiwabo of Rwanda will chair the Peace and Security Council members have the Council took an unprecedented step in meeting. AU Commission Chairperson held annual consultative meetings with resolution 1872 by authorising the provi- Dlamini Zuma and EU Foreign A!airs and Council members. Since 2013, Council sion of a logistics support package funded Security Policy chief, Catherine Ashton, are members have also met periodically with the by UN assessed contributions and chan- expected among the briefers. A resolution is EU Political and Security Committee. nelled through the UN Support O"ce for a likely outcome. On 31 July 2007 the Council adopted res- AMISOM (UNSOA), established for this olution 1769, authorising the establishment purpose in Nairobi, Kenya. Background of the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur On 16 April 2008, President Thabo Rwanda seeks to discuss the growing impor- (UNAMID). In 2004 the AU had established Mbeki of South Africa chaired a high-level tance of regional organisations for UN peace- the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), to which open debate on the need to strengthen the keeping. Drawing on lessons learnt from the UN supplied light and heavy support relationship between the UN and regional operations in Africa as well as from its expe- packages sequentially, eventually resulting organisations in the maintenance of interna- rience chairing the Working Group on Peace- in the first-ever UN-AU hybrid operation. tional peace and security (S/PV.5868). The keeping Operations, Rwanda would like to For the first time, the UN had created an meeting resulted in the adoption of reso- explore ways in which regional partnerships operation for which it assumed full financial lution 1809, which recognised the need to can best bring their comparative advantage to responsibility but over which it did not retain “enhance the predictability, sustainability and UN peacekeeping, help share the burden and exclusive operational or political control. flexibility of financing regional organisations” ultimately, make peacekeeping more e!ective. In resolution 1725 of 6 December 2006, when they undertake peacekeeping under The role of regional and subregion- the Council endorsed the proposal by the UN authorisation. al organisations in UN peacekeeping has Intergovernmental Authority on Devel- To address the limitations of AU opera- recently been discussed in the Council pri- opment (IGAD) and the AU to deploy a tions due to inadequate equipment and trans- marily in the context of country-specific situ- peacekeeping mission in Somalia. The AU port and other operational weaknesses, a 24 ations such as the Central African Republic established the AU Mission in Somalia December 2008 report by a joint AU-UN pan- (CAR), Mali and South Sudan. Previously, (AMISOM) expecting the mission to evolve el came up with two main recommendations:

UN DOCUMENTS ON PEACEKEEPING AND COOPERATION WITH REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2127 (5 December 2013) authorised the deployment of MISCA. S/RES/2085 (20 December 2012) authorised the deployment of AFISMA. S/RES/2033 (12 January 2012) called for the elaboration of “further ways of strengthen- ing relations between the Security Council and the AU PSC”. S/RES/1872 (26 May 2009) established UNSOA. S/RES/1809 (16 April 2008) encouraged increased engagement between the AU and the UN. S/RES/1769 (31 July 2007) established UNAMID. S/RES/1725 (6 December 2006) authorised a peacekeeping operation by IGAD and the AU in Somalia. Security Council Presidential Statements S/PRST/2010/21S/PRST/2009/26 (26 October 2009) S/PRST/2009/3 (18 March 2009) followed the debate on the AU-UN Panel’s report. S/PRST/2007/7 (28 March 2007) stressed the importance of supporting the resource base and capacity of the AU. Secretary-General’s Reports S/2011/805 (29 December 2011) was on UN-AU cooperation in peace and security. S/2010/514 (14 October 2010) was on support to UN-authorised AU peacekeeping operations. S/2009/470 (18 September 2009) was on support to UN-authorised AU peacekeeping operations. S/2008/813 in peacekeeping. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.6702 (12 January 2012) was the last debate on this issue organised by South Africa. S/PV.6561 S/PV.6409 (22 October 2010) was a debate organised by Uganda. S/PV.6206 (26 October 2009) was a debate organised by Viet Nam. S/PV.6092 (18 March 2009) was a debate organised by Libya over the report of the joint AU-UN panel. S/PV.5868 (16 April 2008) was a debate organised by South Africa.

4 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast July 2014 Peacekeeping (con’t) the establishment of a multi-donor trust fund cooperation between the UN and the AU, • encouraging its ad hoc Working Group to support AU peacekeeping capacity and the in particular with regard to UNAMID and on Conflict Prevention and Resolution use of UN assessed contributions to support AMISOM. Although the issue has not been in Africa to meet more regularly on top- UN-authorised AU operations on a case-by- discussed since, the Council has continued ics pertaining to the e!orts of African-led case basis, provided the Security Council and to rely on regional and subregional organ- initiatives in support of UN-mandated General Assembly approved and there was isations to support peacekeeping e!orts. In operations; and an agreement that the mission would transi- addition to the examples mentioned above, • requesting the Secretary-General to elab- tion to UN management within six months two African-led missions, led by the Eco- orate lessons learnt from practical cooper- (S/2008/813). The report was discussed in an nomic Community of West African States ation between the UN and the AU, focus- 18 March 2009 open debate organised by Lib- and the AU respectively, were authorised ing on UNAMID and AMISOM, as well ya (S/PV.6092) and resulted in the adoption by the Council to fill in temporarily for as the more recent example of AFISMA of a presidential statement (S/PRST/2009/3). UN peacekeeping missions: the African- and MISCA. The statement did not welcome the recom- led International Support Mission in Mali mendations of the report, and requested the (AFISMA) and the African-led Internation- Council and Wider Dynamics Secretary-General to submit another report al Support Mission to the CAR (MISCA). With Africa currently taking up about 73.7 with a detailed assessment of the recommen- Discussions preceding and following their percent of the UN peacekeeping budget and dations, in particular those on financing. The respective deployment focused on the need the need to react in situations where a UN second report (S/2009/470), released on 18 for logistical and financial support to ensure peacekeeping operation is not an option at September 2009, was discussed in a 26 Octo- their operational capabilities. a given moment for political, operational or ber 2009 debate organised by Viet Nam (S/ financial reasons, Council members agree PV.6206). In a presidential statement, the Key Issues that partnerships with regional organisations Council expressed “its intention to keep A key issue is to ensure that the partnerships in Africa and elsewhere are fundamental in all options under consideration” regarding are e!ective at the strategic, operational and maintaining international peace and security. financing (S/PRST/2009/26). tactical level. However, the AU position is to seek more The AU e!orts to support UN peacekeep- Another key issue for the Council is to parity in that partnership, to replace ad hoc ing were further discussed in a 22 October devise an e!ective, sustainable and fair work- arrangements with sustained financial and 2010 open debate organised by Uganda (S/ ing relationship with regional organisations, material support for UN-authorised mis- PV.6409). A presidential statement noted compatible with the new tasks they are man- sions and to make sure the Council takes that “the issue of securing sustainable, pre- dated to do. AU perspectives into account when a UN dictable and flexible financing remains a key A related issue is for African Council peacekeeping mission takes over from Afri- challenge” (S/PRST/2010/21). members to articulate any concerns African can-led missions. On 12 January 2012, at the request of regional organisations may have over Council Some Council members have promoted South Africa, the Council held its most decisions and be proactive to draft Council an ad hoc approach in order to maintain recent debate to date on regional partner- outcomes on African and other issues. the primacy of the Council and have advo- ships in peacekeeping focused on Africa (S/ cated for the establishment of trust funds or PV.6702). The debate resulted in the adop- Options bilateral cooperation as opposed to hybrid tion of resolution 2033, which requested Council members may adopt a resolution: operations or African-led operations funded the Secretary-General to conduct, in con- • establishing a regular cycle of Council through UN assessed contributions. sultation with the AU, a comprehensive briefings on peacekeeping partnerships analysis of lessons learnt from practical by the relevant actors;

Iraq

Expected Council Action Iraq by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham mandate, which expires on 31 July, will likely In mid-July, Special Representative Nicko- (ISIS) and the territorial consolidation of be renewed for a year. lay Mladenov will brief the Council. Delib- Kurdistan. Council members are also due to receive erations will likely focus on the prospects of The Secretary-General’s report on the a report on Iraq’s compliance with resolution forming a unity government and the security UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) 1284 regarding the repatriation or return of implications of the seizure of north-western will also be presented, and the mission’s Kuwaiti missing persons or property.

UN DOCUMENTS ON IRAQ Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2110 (24 July 2013) extended the mandate of UNAMI until 31 July 2014. S/RES/1618 (4 August 2005) was on terrorism in Iraq. Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2014/1 by ISIS. Security Council Press Statements SC/11437 (11 June 2014) deplored the takeover of Mosul by ISIS. SC/11430 called for an inclusive government and encouraged a humanitarian response to the situation in Anbar. Secretary-General’s Reports S/2014/191 (14 March 2014) was the most recent Iraq/Kuwait missing persons and property report. S/2014/190 (14 March 2014) was the most recent UNAMI report.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast July 2014 securitycouncilreport.org 5 Iraq (con’t)

Background and Key Recent in Anbar province uprooted in the course of 800 to 2,000 ISIS fighters. Mladenov attrib- Developments six months, and media reports indicate up uted the disintegration of Iraqi forces in An already dire security situation in Iraq to 500,000 have fled Mosul since the ISIS Mosul to several factors: two senior gener- reached crisis levels when ISIS spearheaded o!ensive began in earnest on 5 June. als abandoned their posts, forces were over- its surprise takeover of Mosul on 10 June. In light of these developments, Mladenov stretched due to fighting in Fallujah and This crisis was preceded by almost daily coor- briefed Council members twice in June. On Ramadi, and two longstanding issues played dinated and sectarian attacks in 2013 and 4 June, he reported that the 30 April elec- a part, namely corruption and the force 2014 against civilians, law enforcement per- tions gave Maliki 92 of 328 seats in parlia- structure, by which troops were deployed to sonnel and government o"cials in the lead- ment—the largest number of seats but not areas where they had little or no a"liation up to the 30 April elections. According to the majority needed to ensure Maliki a third with the local population. Meanwhile, ISIS UNAMI, at least 7,818 civilians were killed term as prime minister without having to cannot maintain control of seized territory in in 2013, compared to 3,238 in 2012. The form a coalition with Kurds and Sunnis. The isolation from other Sunni groups. It needs death toll continues to climb in 2014, with Council issued a press statement the next day active cooperation in the areas from which it UNAMI reporting a minimum of 4,000 civil- praising the completion of the election pro- stages its operations. Former Baathist mili- ians and 698 members of the Iraqi security cess, calling for an inclusive government and tary commanders with ties to the areas under forces already killed by the end of June. The encouraging a humanitarian response to the insurgent control, including former Vice- UK-based Iraq Body Count project puts situation in Anbar. While Mladenov made President Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, are part of civilian deaths in 2014 at 8,266. clear that Iraq was facing grave challenges, the fight against the government. While there In Anbar province, ISIS has been in con- no one anticipated he would brief the Coun- was a disintegration of state authority in the trol of Fallujah and parts of Ramadi since cil a week later on the possible unravelling north, Mladenov said it was not a country- December 2013 and had been expanding of the state. wide phenomenon as forces largely withdrew its presence in Nineveh province for several Council members issued a press state- from Anbar and Nineveh provinces to secure months before its takeover of Mosul. (Anbar ment on 11 June deploring the fall of Mosul. Baghdad. and Nineveh provinces make up the entire The previous day Maliki called an emer- After the fall of Mosul, ISIS and other western border of Iraq with Syria and Jor- gency session of parliament for 12 June to groups continued to make gains, including dan.) The ongoing expansion of territorial declare a state of emergency. A quorum taking control of western border crossings. control by ISIS in a contiguous area of east- could not be reached because a significant By 23 June, ISIS had seized control of a Syr- ern Syria and north-western Iraq has been majority of the Kurd and Sunni blocs boy- ian border crossing. Baghdad and ISIS both possible because of a power vacuum in east- cotted the session; they were extremely wary claim they are in control of the single crossing ern Syria, where the regime of Bashar Al- of granting Maliki even more extraordinary into Jordan and another into Syria. Jordan, Assad has neither the inclination nor the and authoritarian powers. anticipating such a development, had already capacity to launch major counter-terrorism Mladenov briefed Council members on increased its security forces on the border e!orts, and severe sectarian political divi- 12 June directly after the boycotted parlia- with Iraq to prevent the spread of ISIS into sions in Iraq, which have been exacerbated ment session and two days after Mosul fell Jordan. Analysts think ISIS is aware it would by the lack of security following the US with- to ISIS in an o!ensive that began on 5 June be a tactical error to spread its operations drawal in 2011 and the sectarian policies of in Samarra. Fighting continues in Samarra, into Jordan. Such a move would likely clarify the Shi’a-dominated government of Prime which has become a front line for the Maliki the true US red line in terms of the regional Minister Nouri al-Maliki. government. Fighting is also ongoing for the balance of power. The recent tension is linked to a govern- strategic city and refinery of Baiji, the largest Similarly, ISIS does not seem to be ment crackdown against Sunni protests that in Iraq. Although it mainly supplies domestic encroaching on areas administered by the began in April 2013, largely due to the fact markets in the north, its loss to ISIS would be Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and that the Shi’a-led government was consoli- a blow to the Maliki government, potentially protected by its highly disciplined Peshmerga dating its hold on power. It is also linked a!ecting fuel supplies further south. forces. The KRG has secured and expanded to the anti-terrorism laws that led to mass In Mosul, ISIS fighters took control of its borders, taking control of a border cross- sweeps and detention of Sunnis. This has government buildings, including the region- ing with Syria and the long-disputed, oil-rich been compounded by the heavy-handed al headquarters of the central bank, and mil- city of Kirkuk on 12 June after Iraqi troops Iraqi military assault on Fallujah to rout ISIS, itary bases stocked with US-provided arms, melted away. Any potential for military coop- including aerial bombardment of residential munitions and equipment. ISIS released eration between the central government and areas. These military operations and the gov- thousands of prisoners from city jails, some the KRG against ISIS and Sunni forces may ernment’s sectarian policies have left large of whom may potentially join their ranks. involve Baghdad’s acquiescing to the KRG’s parts of the Sunni population estranged and ISIS claims to have already transported pursuit of unilateral oil and gas deals. On 22 with little confidence in the government’s large weapons caches and armoured vehicles May and 9 June—before the fall of Mosul— willingness or ability to protect their inter- back to Syria. the KRG piped crude oil to Ceyhan in Tur- ests or their lives. Civilian displacement has Iraqi forces fled Mosul, o!ering very little key, bypassing the central government. This been severe, with more than 427,000 people resistance to an attack by only approximately action raised fears in Baghdad that such

6 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast July 2014 Iraq (con’t) economic independence would lead to a well as re-emerging splits in the Shi’a base. 1770 in 2007. One option is to adopt a reso- broader declaration of independence, and Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the highest lution that does little more than renew this Iraq threatened legal action against any buyer. Shi’a religious authority in Iraq, has activat- existing mandate without adjustment. On 20 June, Israel received a first shipment ed militias to support Iraq in fighting ISIS. While UNAMI is a political mission not of this disputed oil. However, Sistani also delivered a thinly veiled equipped to operationally address the vari- Recent events may force Baghdad to seek criticism of Maliki by calling for a govern- ous and very serious security issues, another cooperation with the KRG nonetheless, and ment that has broad national support and option is to adopt a resolution mandating it is expected that KRG oil exports will be avoids past mistakes. Moktada al-Sadr, a UNAMI to provide better capacity to address used as political leverage during discussions powerful Shi’a cleric heading the large and the cross-pollination of the crises in Iraq and to form a new national government. On the experienced Mahdi Army, vowed his forces Syria, support the establishment of a more other hand, having captured Kirkuk and would never be under government control. inclusive political system and facilitate a secured independent export capacity, the However, Iran is still clearly backing Maliki humanitarian response. KRG has less incentive to join the central and his address to the nation on 25 June gave As for countering ISIS, the Council could government and may be looking to unilater- no indication he was willing to concede his include in the UNAMI renewal a substantial ally declare independence. US Secretary of electoral advantage in forming the govern- reference to resolution 1618 adopted on 4 State John Kerry met with KRG President ment, a process expected to begin on 1 July. August 2005 specifically on terrorism in Iraq. Massoud Barzani on 24 June in an attempt Such language could include a strong reaf- to persuade him to participate in the political Human Rights-Related Developments firmation of member states’ obligations to process in Baghdad. prevent the transit of terrorists, prevent arms Human Rights Navi Pillay expressed extreme Iraq relies on good relations with both Iran and financing that would support terrorists alarm at the dramatic deterioration in the situation and the US, and Maliki has asked “friendly in Iraq as forces allied with ISIS overran a succes- and emphasise the importance of strength- governments” for help. On 16 June, Iran and sion of major population centres. Hundreds were ening the cooperation of the countries in the the US informally and briefly discussed Iraq killed and half a million people were displaced. Pil- region, particularly neighbours of Iraq. on the sidelines of talks on the nuclear file. lay warned of the acute vulnerability of civilians While ISIS has been listed under the Both have reportedly deployed reconnais- 1267/1989 Al-Qaida sanctions regime, in by armed groups or trapped in ISIS-controlled sance drones to gather intelligence, but not areas. Humanitarian access was also a major con- practice the Council has done very little to necessarily in coordination. cern. She reminded the parties of their obligations follow-up resolution 1618 on the specific On 19 June, the US said it would send under international law to treat troops who have threat of terrorism in Iraq. A further option 300 military advisers, including elite Green laid down their arms humanely and to observe the would be to review, revise and revive the use - Beret commando units, to Baghdad and was of the 1518 Iraq Sanctions Committee— prepared to take targeted military action if - which for all practical purposes is defunct necessary. However, US President Barack and was only ever used to sanction Saddam Obama said that US troops would not return days and of religious leaders on 12 and 14 June. Hussein’s Baathist regime—to now target to combat in Iraq and that Iraq needed a high-level ISIS fighters and supporters. leader who could deliver an inclusive political Key Issues solution. Kerry underscored those messages The key issue for the Council is averting the Council Dynamics to Maliki during a 23 June visit to Baghdad. territorial and political disintegration of Iraq, Council members have found that publicly Iran continues to be an ally of the Maliki which would have major negative implica- addressing the growing violence in Iraq in government but has expressed opposition to tions for regional and international security. the past has been di"cult, primarily because any US military intervention. Iran is seri- Another immediate issue is how the of US sensitivities related to its 2003 inva- ously concerned about the Sunni threat that Council can bolster counter-terrorism e!orts sion and 2011 withdrawal. Recently, Coun- ISIS poses to Iraq, has positioned troops to curtail the spread of ISIS. Related to this cil members issued two press statements on along the joint border and authorised air is whether and how to address the mutually ISIS and the rapidly deteriorating situation strikes if ISIS forces come within 60 miles destabilising impact of the Syrian civil war in Iraq—about conditions in Anbar province of the border. It is widely reported in the and the Iraq crisis—in particular, ISIS opera- on 5 June (SC/11430) and about the fall of media that Islamic Revolutionary Guard tions in both countries. Mosul on 11 June (SC/11437)—and were units from Iran are in Iraq helping to orga- A more manageable issue for the Council briefed in consultations on 23 June on the nise the security forces and Shi’a militias— is determining how UNAMI can contribute wider threat of terrorism in the region. This including members of Hezbollah. to a political process that yields an inclusive increase in Council attention contrasts with It may be di"cult for Maliki to stay in government and responds more e!ectively to the routine and at times tangential consid- power given the high level of distrust Kurds the humanitarian crisis and sectarian tension. eration of the situation in Iraq every four and Sunnis have in his leadership. Further- months that has characterised the Council more, there are significant challenges to Iraq’s Options for years, despite repeated warning signs of unity, including KRG threats to peel even UNAMI’s mandate has not significantly growing authoritarian tendencies by Mali- further away from the central government as changed since the adoption of resolution ki, increasing threats from ISIS and other

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast July 2014 securitycouncilreport.org 7 Iraq (con’t) centripetal forces challenging or gnawing at to bear on the Council’s approach to Iraq. juncture might be misinterpreted as support territorial integrity. Mladenov has repeatedly stated that Iraq for Maliki. This increased attention could signal that, and Syria are becoming one battleground, The Council continues to remain impervi- given the political, humanitarian and regional and some members feel that the Council ous to the independent oil exports from the implications of territorial seizures by ISIS and should have the capacity to look at these KRG which pose mounting challenges to the the KRG and pronounced sectarian violence, issues holistically. These Council members authority of the central government. (Since Council members may be looking to increase have expressed concern that treating Iraq and 2007, the KRG has signed exploration and engagement on Iraq. Some members have Syria as discrete situations is not a sustain- production agreements with many foreign indicated it may be necessary to take stock able approach. companies, including Chevron and Exxon of and deliver a more strategic response before On the political front, some members the US and Total of France.) the 31 July renewal of UNAMI. have found it di"cult to formulate a Coun- The US is the penholder on Iraq issues Some Council members have noted that cil response to the government-formation in general, and the UK is the penholder on the same coherence with which the Council process beyond the routine call for an inclu- Iraq-Kuwait issues. approaches the impact of the Syrian crisis sive government. Some Council members are on Lebanon needs to be similarly brought concerned that a display of support at this

Syria

Expected Council Action Key Recent Developments the regime had used chlorine-filled bombs Early in the month Sigrid Kaag, Special On 3 June, President Bashar al-Assad was re- against civilians. On 17 June, the fact-finding Coordinator of the Organization for the Pro- elected to a further seven years in o"ce with mission issued a report that its review of the hibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-UN 88.7 percent of the vote. Polling was only evidence supported such allegations. Joint Mission, will brief Council members held in government controlled areas and the On 20 June the Secretary-General deliv- on the implementation of resolution 2118 elections were widely viewed as a sham poll ered a major public address, presenting regarding the destruction of Syria’s chemi- in the midst of a violent civil war. six points for an integrated, international cal weapons. Shortly after the elections, the Islamic approach to Syria. He called for an arms Under-Secretary-General for Humanitar- State of the Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)—an embargo, unfettered humanitarian access, ian A!airs Valerie Amos will brief Council extremist group that has been operating in new e!orts for a serious political process, members on humanitarian access later in eastern Syria and western Iraq—launched accountability, completion of the destruc- the month. Australia, Jordan, Luxembourg a surprise deep o!ensive into neighbouring tion of chemical weapons and the need to and the P5 have spent a month negotiating Iraq, seizing Mosul on 10 June and threaten- address the regional dimensions of the con- a draft resolution to follow-up the lack of ing Baghdad while consolidating control of flict, including the threat by extremist groups. any meaningful implementation of resolu- border crossings between Iraq and Syria. Regarding a renewed political process, the tion 2139 since its adoption on 22 February. Kaag last briefed Council members on 4 Secretary-General said he would soon At press time, it was unclear when the draft June, reporting that the 30 June deadline for announce a new special envoy with a man- might be circulated to the wider Council for the completion of all removal and destruction date to pursue a political solution. consideration and a vote. activities would be missed. On 23 June, the On 26 June, Amos briefed Council mem- Council members are also tentatively OPCW announced that the final 7.2 percent bers, presenting a report that clearly dem- planning to hold an Arria-formula meeting of declared chemical weapons material had onstrates that the regime has used the dis- with the Human Rights Council’s Commis- been removed from Syria. It seems it will take tribution of humanitarian aid as a tactic sion of Inquiry on Syria, which has collated a further two to four months to destroy the of war. She reported that there continues testimonies that indicate a massive number chemicals abroad. to be no progress in implementing any of of war crimes and crimes against humanity. During the 4 June consultations, Kaag reit- the key demands in resolution 2139, such Finally, on the political track, Council erated that other important issues remained as authorising cross-border aid operations, members will be anticipating the Secretary- such as verification work, the destruction of allowing access to besieged or hard-to-reach General’s announcement of a new Special production facilities and clarification of the areas, observing medical neutrality, ceasing Representative to succeed Lakhdar Brahimi. declared chemical weapons stockpile. There aerial bombardments or easing administra- was also a discussion of the OPCW’s fact- tive hurdles. In fact, since the adoption of res- finding mission to investigate allegations that olution 2139 on 22 February 2014, those in

UN DOCUMENTS ON SYRIA Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2139 (22 February 2014) was on humanitarian access. S/RES/2118 (27 September 2013) was on chemical weapons. Security Council Letter S/2014/426 (18 June 2014) stated from Syria that the delivery of aid without consent constitutes an attack on their country. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.7212Secretary-General’s Reports S/2014/427 (20 June 2014) and S/2014/365 (22 May2014) were on humanitarian access. S/2014/368 (23 May 2014) was on chemical weapons. Human Rights Council Document A/HRC/26/CRP.2 (16 June 2014) was an oral update of the Commission of Inquiry covering the period 15 March to 15 June 2014.

8 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast July 2014 Syria (con’t) need have increased from 9.3 million to 10.8 barrel bombs, with recent allegations that A less likely option is for the Council to million and those in hard-to-reach areas have it has used chlorine bombs. The prolifera- heed the Secretary-General’s call for the increased from 3.5 million to 4.7 million. tion of extremist armed groups and their international community to support an end Most alarmingly, while needs have increased, increasing use of suicide attacks, car bombs, to all violence in Syria, in particular by stop- access continues to drop significantly due to mortars and tunnel bombs under govern- ping the flow of arms into Syria and impose even more arduous clearance and transport ment military positions have contributed to an arms embargo. procedures put in place by the government the escalating violence. Although infighting over the course of the last two months. between opposition groups has waned as Council and Wider Dynamics ISIS has concentrated on Iraq, it seems ISIS At press time, humanitarian leads Australia, Human Rights-Related Developments has transferred part of the significant weap- Jordan and Luxembourg had just marked an onry and other military assets it has seized in intense month of complex negotiations with of the Human Rights Council and two working Iraq, back to Syria. the P5, in consultation with OCHA, on a groups warned that the 22 May veto by China and Russia of the draft resolution referring Syria to Meanwhile, the political and accountabil- draft resolution on humanitarian access. the International Criminal Court could expose the ity tracks remain blocked. The initial draft was a short text that, Syrian population to further gross human rights under Chapter VII, would have permitted and humanitarian law violations. Key Issues the UN to carry out cross-border aid opera- During her opening statement to the Human In the fourth year of the conflict, the key issue tions in the absence of state consent. China Navi Pillay regretted the Security Council’s inabil- is whether and when the parties, in particular and Russia, clearly uncomfortable with the ity to ensure accountability in Syria. She deplored the government, will meaningfully implement prospect of casting a fifth veto on Syria, have that war crimes and crimes against humanity are resolution 2139 on humanitarian access. An been genuinely engaged in negotiations while commonplace in Syria and occur with complete issue for the Council is what further steps firmly flagging their objection to a Chapter impunity. it might take if substantive implementation VII resolution challenging state sovereignty. continues to lag. Early in the negotiations, Russia suggest- update on the unprecedented level of violence in Another issue for the Council is to find ed that the draft resolution expand upon the Syria that threatened the entire region. Pinheiro ways to support a cessation of violence and suggestion in the 22 May report on humani- resuscitate e!orts for a political solution to tarian access that the UN ensure aid oper- solution and insisted that accountability must be the crisis. ations at border posts outside government part of any future settlement. Regarding humani- A final issue is how to address the mutu- control are conducted in a transparent way. government and non-state armed groups are ally destabilising impact of the crises in Iraq Much of the negotiations since have been egregiously violating resolution 2139. He called on and Syria, the disappearance of the common dedicated to working out what the modalities the Security Council to use the tools available in border, and the realignment of priorities and of such a monitoring mechanism would be the UN Charter and strengthen the mechanisms allegiances by the parties on the ground as a while, in tandem, Russia sought buy-in from for implementing its resolutions. Human Rights Watch released a report on result of the gains accumulated by ISIS. Syria. Some progress was made and it seems 23 June reporting that non-state armed groups Syria has agreed in principle to the mecha- Options nism at four UN-identified priority border in support roles. The report does not cover all On humanitarian access, Council members crossings outside government control. - could adopt a resolution: A fundamental obstacle remains, Syria lar allegations regarding pro-government militias. • authorising cross-border aid deliveries has insisted that all such aid would need across routes under the supervision of UN to be redistributed under the government’s Underlying Problems monitors; and/or authority, undermining the original intent of The situation in Syria is devastating, with a • authorising the UN to carry out cross- enabling aid to reach those in need via the death toll estimated at 162,000. There are border aid deliveries in the absence of most direct route possible. The humanitar- almost 2.9 million refugees and there are state consent. ian leads and the P3 are unlikely to agree 6.4 million internally displaced persons. The Another option for the Council is to begin to a text which could potentially strengthen head of the UN Refugee Agency said on 20 brainstorming how to approach the cross- Syria’s use of aid distribution as a tactic of June that the number of people displaced pollination of the crises in Iraq and Syria— war. The guiding principle for these members by conflict has reached levels not seen since particularly the dimension of competition has been to come up with a formula in New World War II and that Syria was a significant between Iran and Saudi Arabia for regional York that will have a positive impact on the factor behind that trend. primacy as well as the proliferation of ISIS ground in Syria. In addition, Syria’s letter Adding to the dire humanitarian situation and Hezbollah fighters in both countries. In to the Council on 18 June stating that the are alarming reports of intentional govern- this regard, it will be important in the Syria delivery of aid without consent constitutes an ment policies of starving areas under siege prong of any such approach that the coun- attack is a worrying development. and deliberately attacking the health infra- ter-terrorism aspect of the conflict does not On chemical weapons, with the final structure. The regime has increased its use overshadow the humanitarian, political and tranche of declared chemicals having left of incendiary weapons, cluster bombs and accountability tracks. Syria Council members are unlikely to be

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast July 2014 securitycouncilreport.org 9 Syria (con’t) interested in doing more than monitoring the seemingly deliberate delays by Syria in Australia, Jordan and Luxembourg are the the remaining activities of the OPCW-UN the pace of removal activity as well as oth- penholders on the humanitarian track. How- joint mission. Nevertheless, divisions linger er outstanding government obligations—in ever, most texts need to be agreed between on this track. Russia had put forward a draft particular a full declaration of its chemical Russia and the US prior to agreement by the statement welcoming the final removal. The weapon arsenal and destruction of the 12 broader Council. statement was blocked by the US, with the production facilities. support of several other members, given France is the penholder on Syria while

Lebanon

Expected Council Action Syrian crisis and intensified cross-border of or sympathetic to ISIS. The same day In July, Special Coordinator for Lebanon incidents from Syria into Lebanon. The there was a suicide car bomb detonated at Derek Plumbly and Assistant Secretary-Gen- Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have contin- a checkpoint in the Beka’a Valley, killing one eral for Peacekeeping Edmond Mulet will ued to redeploy from the Israeli border in the member of the internal security forces and brief Council members in consultations on south to the Syrian border in north and east wounding 32. Another car bomb detonated the Secretary-General’s report on the imple- of the country due to mounting instability. in a Shi’a area of Beirut on 23 June and a mentation of resolution 1701, which called As a consequence, UNIFIL has increased its suicide attack on a Beirut hotel followed two for a cessation of hostilities between Hezbol- operational activities in the south to com- days later. On 24 June, Lebanese authorities lah and Israel in 2006. pensate for the loss of LAF capacity. Coop- arrested another 11 men suspected of being The mandate of the UN Interim Force eration between UNIFIL and the LAF was part of a terrorist cell. in Lebanon (UNIFIL) expires on 31 August. the focus peacekeeping chief Hervé Ladsous’ Regarding the political situation, Council visit to Lebanon in late June. members were briefed in consultations on Key Recent Developments On 17 June, the International Support the latest 1559 report by Special Envoy Terje Council members last discussed UNIFIL on Group for Lebanon, which includes France, Rød-Larsen on 6 May. Key areas of focus 25 March, when deliberations focused on the Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the US, com- included the enormous impact the Syrian relative calm in the mission’s area of opera- mitted to provide training to the LAF to crisis is having on the political, security and tions and the added value of the tripartite cope with the spillover of the Syrian crisis. humanitarian situation in Lebanon. Hezbol- mechanism in de-escalating tensions between On 17 May, then President Michel Slei- lah’s military activities in Syria, subsequent Israel and Lebanon. Discussion also focused man announced that a contract would be sectarian tensions and pronounced cross- on the marked increase in Syrian cross-bor- signed to formalise the 29 December 2013 border incidents were also discussed. Of par- der fire. The July report is likely to highlight pledge by Saudi Arabia of a $3 billion grant ticular interest was the political stalemate that breaches of the Blue Line—the UN-demar- to Lebanon to purchase arms from France. would ensue in the probable scenario that a cated line between Israel and Lebanon— The military aid from the Sunni kingdom is new president would not be elected. including violations of Lebanese airspace by widely perceived as an attempt to counter On 29 May the Security Council adopted Israeli drones and other aircraft. Continuing the influence that Shi’a Iran wields in Leba- a presidential statement following the failure hostilities and the harassment of UNIFIL non through Hezbollah. of the parliament to elect a new president personnel are also likely to be reported. Lebanon began to implement a new when Sleiman’s term expired on 25 May. The The report will likely describe ongo- security plan in April to rein in sectarian statement expressed the Council’s disap- ing tensions between Hezbollah and Israel, violence. On 25 May, radical Sunni cleric pointment that the presidential election was including the 24 February Israeli attack of Omar Bakri Muhammad was arrested due not completed within the constitutional time- a Hezbollah position inside Lebanon and to his public support for the Islamic State frame and urged Lebanon to hold elections the 14 March roadside bombing, claimed in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). On 20 June, 17 quickly. It also called on all parties to respect by Hezbollah, of an Israeli military vehicle men were arrested in Beirut on the suspicion Lebanon’s policy of disassociation and, albeit patrolling south of the Blue Line. they were plotting to assassinate a promi- without naming Hezbollah, to refrain from The 1701 report is also expected to depict nent Shi’a leader, the Speaker of Parliament any involvement in the Syrian crisis. serious sectarian tension as a result of the Nabih Berri, and of possibly being members The existing political rivalry in Lebanon

UN DOCUMENTS ON LEBANON Security Council Resolution S/RES/2115 (29 August 2013) renewed UNIFIL for an additional year. Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2014/10 (29 May 2014) expressed disappointment that presidential elections were not completed within the constitutional timeframe. Secretary-General’s Reports S/2014/296 (24 April 2014) was the latest 1559 report. S/2014/130 (26 February 2014) was the latest 1701/UNIFIL report. OTHER RELEVANT FACTS Special Coordinator for Lebanon Derek Plumbly (UK) Special Envoy for the Implementation of Resolution 1559 Terje Rød-Larsen (Norway) UNIFIL Force Commander Major General Paolo Serra (Italy) until 24 July 2014 and then Major General Luciano Portolano (Italy) Size and Composition of UNIFIL as of 31 March 2014Troop Contributors Duration March 1978 to present; mandate expires 31 August 2014. Cost 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014: $492.62 million (A/C.5/68/21)

10 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast July 2014 Lebanon (con’t) between the Shi’a Hezbollah-dominated the dramatic shift in the geopolitical land- Council Dynamics March 8 coalition and the Sunni-led March scape in the region since then, the tension There is consensus in the Council that UNI- 14 alliance has been exacerbated by the two and public rhetoric has died down, and the FIL contributes to stability between Israel blocs’ support for opposing sides in the Syr- US has been actively working with both Israel and Lebanon, becoming even more crucial ian conflict, with Hezbollah fighting openly and Lebanon to reach a mutual understand- in the context of the Syrian crisis. The Coun- on behalf of the Syrian regime. This rivalry ing and avoid activity in the disputed area. cil is united on the importance of preserving has stalled the elections and, in seven rounds The ongoing influx of Syrian refugees is Lebanon’s sovereignty, national unity, ter- of voting since 23 April, no presidential can- placing an unprecedented strain on Leba- ritorial integrity and remains supportive of didate has received the required two-thirds non’s communities, infrastructure and ser- the country’s policy of disassociation from majority of the 128-member parliament due vices. More than 1.1 million refugees are the Syrian crisis. to the boycott of these sessions by the March registered in Lebanon, increasing its popula- However, there are divisions, particularly 8 bloc. The last round was 18 June, and the tion by roughly 25 percent and giving it the among the P5 members, on how to charac- next vote is slated for 2 July. It seems unlikely highest per-capita refugee population in the terise the impact of the Syrian conflict on that the necessary quorum in parliament will world. Uno"cial estimates put the figure Lebanon, Hezbollah’s participation in the be reached as long as Iran and Saudi Arabia, closer to 1.5 million. Syrian conflict, Syria’s role in cross-border which back the March 8 and March 14 blocs attacks and Israeli airstrikes on alleged weap- respectively, fail to agree on potential consen- Key Issues on transfers by Hezbollah. sus candidates. The key issue is that the conflict in Syria con- Such divisions may also be reflected in a US Secretary of State John Kerry visited tinues to negatively impact Lebanon. desire by Council members, particularly the Beirut on 4 June and met with both the prime Ongoing issues include continued viola- P3, to manage the spillover e!ects from the minister and president regarding the political tions of resolution 1701, such as the Israeli Syrian crisis by using a mechanism outside stalemate and Syrian crisis. The discussions occupation of areas north of the Blue Line the Council, as demonstrated by the Inter- also touched on natural gas reserves. These and overflights in Lebanese airspace. national Support Group for Lebanon. These reserves were a source of heightened tension members highlight the importance they between Israel and Lebanon in the summer Options attach to Lebanon’s stability by providing of 2011 due to the disputed maritime zone of The most likely option for the Council in July humanitarian assistance and bilateral finan- 850 square kilometres and competing claims is to take no action. However, most Council cial support, including for the LAF, through over their respective national rights to such members will be looking to the July consulta- this Group. This support has become par- natural resources. (There is no established tions to feed into the August renewal of the ticularly important given the recent crisis in maritime boundary between Israel and Leba- UNIFIL mandate. Iraq, Syria’s neighbour to the east. non; Israel unilaterally installed a buoy line, France is the penholder on Lebanon in which Lebanon does not recognise.) Given the Council.

Israel/Palestine

Expected Council Action Key Recent Developments of illegal settlements in East Jerusalem and In July, Special Coordinator Robert Serry The most recent quarterly debate on the the West Bank, created obstacles to the peace will brief the Council during its quarterly Middle East was held on 29 April—the final talks. Monitoring groups reported that Israeli open debate on the Middle East. Issues like- day of a nine-month time frame to achieve settlement construction quadrupled in the ly to be raised include the lack of a cred- a comprehensive settlement between Israel nine months of the peace talks. Palestinian ible path toward a political solution, Fatah- and Palestine. Serry briefed on the collapse of President Mahmoud Abbas said he would Hamas reconciliation, East Jerusalem, Israeli US-brokered peace talks, and there has been not continue talks unless Israel agreed to a settlement expansion, the disproportionate no real momentum to bring the parties back settlement freeze and honoured its previous Israeli military response to the disappearance to the table since. commitment to release Palestinian prisoners. of three Israeli teenagers in the West Bank There were significant developments in On 2 April, Palestine then presented let- and Palestinian prisoners in Israeli adminis- the preceding weeks that had signalled the ters to accede to 15 international conventions trative detention. collapse. In March, Israel reneged on its and treaties, including the Geneva Conven- commitment to release Palestinian prison- tions of 1949 on international humanitarian ers, which, alongside accelerated expansion law and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and

UN DOCUMENTS ON ISRAEL/PALESTINE Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.7204 S/PV.7178 Fernández-Taranco. S/PV.7164 (29 April 2014) was the most recent quarterly open debate. Other S/2011/24 which was vetoed by the US.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast July 2014 securitycouncilreport.org 11 Israel/Palestine (con’t)

1907 on the laws of war. The Rome Statute consideration of joining the ICC, as the response as collective punishment and as an of the International Criminal Court (ICC) Rome Statute includes as war crimes the Israeli escalation tactic in retaliation for the was not included. However, on 27 April the transfer of civilians into occupied territory unity government. Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) (i.e., settlers and settlements) as well as the authorised Abbas to join some 63 additional forcible transfer of a protected people in an Human Rights-Related Developments treaties and international agencies, including occupied territory (i.e., forcing Palestinians Palestinian teenagers during demonstrations in the ICC. If Palestine were to accede to the o! their lands, preventing their return and Rome Statute, it would have a legal avenue destroying their property). Commissioner for Human Rights said the two to hold Israel accountable for its occupation Also in late April, around the time of the minors presented no direct threat and their kill- of Palestinian territory. Such moves for rec- disintegration of the peace talks, 120 Pal- ing may amount to extrajudicial executions under ognition and the accoutrements of statehood estinians in Israeli administrative deten- human rights law and wilful killings under interna- tional humanitarian law. have long been opposed by both Israel and tion began a hunger strike to protest their the US. Abbas has not pursued that track any detention without charge or trial. There are - further to date. approximately 5,200 Palestinian detainees ing the Human Rights of the Palestinian People Israel formally suspended its participa- in administrative detention, by which Isra- and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories tion in the peace talks following the 23 April el holds Palestinians suspected of being a expressed grave concern at the deteriorating health of the hunger strikers and urged Israel announcement that Fatah and Hamas had security threat without charge or trial for to end the practice of administrative detention. reached an agreement to form a unity gov- six-month periods that may be renewed ad The Special Committee also stressed that force- ernment. While Fatah-Hamas reconcilia- infinitum. By mid-June, the number of pris- feeding violates principles of international human tion agreements have been reached several oners refusing food had increased to 300 rights law and the rights of the detainees. The times—most notably in Mecca in 2007, Cai- and 75 of these had been hospitalised. The statement furthermore expressed concern at ro in 2011 and Doha in 2012—each has gone Israeli parliament approved in a first vote a the alarming pace and scale of Israeli settlement unimplemented. However, both Fatah and measure on 10 June to enable force-feeding resources in Palestine by Israel in violation of its Hamas have a significant impetus to make prisoners, other votes are necessary for the this agreement stick. The chances of Fatah bill to become law. On 6 June the Secretary- and maritime blockade imposed by Israel on the forging a peace deal with Israel have dissi- General reiterated the UN’s long-standing Gaza Strip and accounts of excessive use of pated. Hamas is extremely isolated due to position that administrative detainees should force by Israeli security forces against Palestin- the seven-year-old Israeli blockade of Gaza be charged or released without delay and In a statement to the Human Rights Council that was compounded by similar closures at that force-feeding prisoners would contra- - the Rafah crossing into Egypt following the vene international standards. The hunger erated her concern about the excessive use of 3 July 2013 military coup against the Muslim strike ended on 25 June after Israel agreed force by Israeli security forces and about the con- Brotherhood-led government. to improve some conditions in detention. tinued evictions from and demolition of Palestin- ian homes. She also reiterated her call for Israel On 2 June, a national unity government On 12 June, an Israeli airstrike killed one to respect due process when using administrative was formed, ending the seven-year split Palestinian and wounded three in Gaza, fol- detention. between Fatah and Hamas, but key stum- lowing a rocket launch from Gaza into Israel. bling blocks remain, such as how to inte- A similar exchange occurred on 18 June with grate the two security forces. Abbas pledged Israel striking five targets in Gaza. Key Issues that the unity government would honour its Also on 12 June, three Israeli teenage set- The key issue is determining what, if anything, international commitments, recognise Isra- tlers went missing near Hebron in the West the Council is prepared to do to encourage el (the PLO recognised Israel in 1993) and Bank. The incident occurred in Area C of parties to reach a comprehensive final-status renounce violence. Composed of technocrats, the West Bank where Israel has sole secu- agreement in the face of US reluctance to the unity government is temporary and will rity responsibility, yet Israel has attributed address the Israel-Palestine situation sub- prepare for presidential and parliamentary responsibility to Hamas. Hamas denied stantively in the Security Council. elections in early 2015—a prospect that nei- responsibility but has made public com- ther bloc seems eager to face. The EU and ments praising the perpetrators. The Pales- Options the US agreed to work with the new govern- tinian Authority has condemned the incident Council members could take advantage of ment but, given their concerns about Hamas, without ascribing blame while criticising the the political vacuum left by the rupture of will watch closely how it operates. Israeli military response. At press time, a US-brokered talks. They could draw atten- On 5 June, in reaction to the forma- massive security sweep across the West Bank tion to the fact that the situation has mostly tion of the unity government, Israel reaf- has resulted in four killed, including a minor, deteriorated in the 21 years since the 1993 firmed that it would not negotiate with dozens injured and more than 370 Pales- Oslo Accords and perhaps question whether any Palestinian government that included tinians detained—mostly Hamas members, US mediation e!orts will ever be able to Hamas and announced major new settle- including “re-arrests” of previously released deliver a comprehensive agreement. Council ment plans in East Jerusalem and the West prisoners as well as several legislators. The members could also draw attention to the Bank. This resulted in renewed Palestinian Palestinian Authority has characterised the lack of any meaningful engagement by the

12 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast July 2014 Israel/Palestine (con’t)

Middle East Quartet—comprising the EU, that could threaten the renewal of negotia- The US is the lead on Israel-Palestine and Russia, the UN and the US—and call for tions, despite the accumulated evidence of has given no indication it is willing to relin- the Quartet to take up an e!ective media- such actions taking place. quish its monopoly on mediating between tion role, particularly since peace talks failed the parties. The US does not have favourable two months ago. Council and Wider Dynamics views of the Palestinian Authority explor- In response to Israeli settlement expan- The artificially imposed moratorium on ing other avenues toward statehood, such sion, Council members could consider reviv- Council action on Israel/Palestine ended as membership in the UN or a referral of ing the draft resolution condemning settle- when the 29 April deadline passed without Israel to the ICC. Nor is the US amenable ments, which had 14 votes in favour but any agreement. Nevertheless, there remains to Council outcomes on Israel-Palestine. was vetoed by the US on 18 February 2011 little impetus to forge a more direct role for This was most recently displayed on 23 June (S/2011/24). Such a resolution could be a the Council vis-à-vis the peace process. All when the US blocked a press statement put more palatable option for Council members Council members share the view that no forward by Jordan that condemned the kill- leaning on Palestine to stay clear of acceding Council activity would be possible without ing Palestinians by Israeli forces during the to the Rome Statute of the ICC. the support of the US. Given the more over- security sweep. Nevertheless, the most likely option for whelming concerns in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, The last resolution that specifically the open debate is that Council members will Council members have very little appetite to addressed the peace process was resolution assert their customary reiteration of previous- challenge the status quo on this particular 1850 of 16 December 2008, which expressed ly stated positions—such as the importance issue—especially as the parties themselves support for the since defunct 27 November of the two-state solution and encouraging seem ill inclined to resume negotiations at 2007 Annapolis negotiations. parties to refrain from undertaking actions this juncture.

South Sudan

Expected Council Action possibility of a federal governance system and other measures, if the parties failed to adhere The Council expects to receive a report from who will lead during the transitional period to the agreement. (Ethiopia is the current the Secretary-General on the UN Mission in were among the most contentious matters chair of IGAD and has played a key role in South Sudan (UNMISS) by 25 July, which discussed. On 19 June, while addressing the the mediation process.) it will likely not discuss until early August. National Assembly, Kiir said that he would The IGAD Heads of State and Govern- However, given the dire situation in South lead the transitional government in South ment adopted a communiqué in Addis Ababa Sudan, it is possible that it may be discussed Sudan, arguing that his removal would be on 10 June on the situation in South Sudan. sometime during July, either in a stand-alone a “red line”. They commended Kiir and Machar for meeting or in the context of Sudan-South On 9 June, 14 eminent African figures, recommitting to their 9 May agreement and Sudan consultations. including 11 former heads of state, wrote an demanded that the parties respect the cessa- The mandate of UNMISS expires on 30 open letter to Kiir and Machar, pleading with tion of hostilities. They also expressed their November. them to end the conflict in South Sudan and expectation that the government and the to “engage in an inclusive peace process” to SPLM in Opposition “immediately endorse Key Recent Developments avoid the continuing violence and the harsh modalities for inclusive participation…and… National and international e!orts to resolve judgment of history. move immediately to inclusive negotiations the civil war in South Sudan have continued. On 10 June, under pressure from the on substantive issues”. Stakeholders from within South Sudan— Intergovernmental Authority on Develop- The AU Peace and Security Council including the government, the Sudan Peo- ment (IGAD) mediators, Kiir and Machar (PSC) met in Addis Ababa on 12 June and ple’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in agreed to finalise negotiations on the cre- also adopted a communiqué on the situa- Opposition and civil society representa- ation of a transitional government of nation- tion in South Sudan. Among other things, the tives—held a symposium in Addis Ababa on al unity within 60 days and recommitted to PSC welcomed the convening of the stake- 6-7 June to focus on strategies to resolve the stop the fighting. (Three previous ceasefire holders symposium, expressed deep concern conflict and move forward with a political agreements signed by South Sudan and the that South Sudan and the SPLM in Opposi- transition, as called for in the 9 May agree- SPLM in Opposition on 23 January, 6 May tion have not moved ahead with the peace ment between President Salva Kiir and the and 9 May have been violated.) Prime Min- process in a meaningful way, strongly con- leader of the SPLM in Opposition, Riek ister Hailemariam Desalegn of Ethiopia said demned continued violations of the cessa- Machar. According to media reports, the that IGAD would consider sanctions, among tion-of-hostilities agreements and reiterated

UN DOCUMENTS ON SOUTH SUDAN Security Council Resolution S/RES/2155 Additional Useful Resource

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast July 2014 securitycouncilreport.org 13 South Sudan (con’t)

its readiness to implement targeted sanctions su!ered some important losses. On 2 June, IGAD’s chief mediator on South Sudan, on and other measures, upon IGAD’s recom- Francis Nazario, a high-level o"cial in the the status of the South Sudan peace process. mendations, on any party that continues to Foreign Ministry and former deputy ambas- undermine the peace process and fails to sador to the UN, resigned after stating in a Human Rights-Related Developments uphold its commitments. press statement that the “current leadership a report on South Sudan by the Special Rappor- The negotiations, which recommenced on in Juba is neither capable nor willing or ready teur on the human rights of internally displaced 12 June, were suspended by 16 June, with to bring peace to the country now” and stat- both sides expressing their grievances about ed that the government “is insensitive to the the talks. On 17 June, it was reported that needs and su!ering of the people of South but the report also takes into account the events Kiir wrote a letter to Desalegn, demanding Sudan”. In particular, he complained that have resulted in the sharp deterioration of the an apology after IGAD Executive Secre- disrespect for human rights, corruption, and situation and a large-scale internal displacement tary Mahboub Malim reportedly called Kiir suppression of freedom of speech were char- in and outside the compounds of UNMISS. Beyani and Machar “stupid” if they believed that acteristic of the present leadership. recommended that the overcrowding of UNMISS the crisis in South Sudan could be resolved On 7 June, having fled South Sudan for bases be addressed as part of a long-term com- militarily. Nairobi, 17 members of parliament resigned prehensive strategy on internal displacement. He said that the safety and security of the displaced More broadly, the government has also and announced that they were joining the population must be the absolute priority for the questioned the objectivity of IGAD. In a opposition. They issued a press release refer- UN. He commended the adoption of resolution 12 June statement, the government called ring to Kiir as a “dictator” who has used the “unacceptable, wrong and unfair for both parliament as a “rubber stamp institution”. protect civilians. sides to all the time be uniformly and ran- They accused Kiir of stacking the govern- domly blamed for any violations”, referring ment with Dinka and argued that the gov- Key Issues specifically to paragraph 8 of the 10 June ernment revenues had been stolen and One key issue is how to ensure that the gov- IGAD communiqué, which expressed disap- squandered and public goods had not been ernment of South Sudan and the SPLM pointment with both parties for failing “to fairly distributed to the population. They also in Opposition honour their commitments honour their commitments to date, to engage called for a federal system of government in to a ceasefire and engage in meaningful the peace process meaningfully toward politi- South Sudan, saying that this would help to negotiations. cal resolution of the crisis and to bring an end ensure that resources and services would be Another key issue is the pace of deploy- to senseless killings”. The government has fairly distributed throughout the country. ment of the additional forces serving in also stated that representatives participating Meanwhile, the humanitarian situation in UNMISS, as well as the disposition of these in the negotiations should be “non-partisan”, South Sudan remains catastrophic. In addi- forces in fulfilling the mandate to protect and thus, should not include pro-opposition tion to the thousands who have perished in the civilians. In particular, it remains unclear civil society figures. conflict, more than 1.4 million are now dis- what the deployment scheduled will be for Meanwhile, the SPLM in Opposition has placed, including approximately 1,038,000 the approximately 2,500 troops expected to also complained about IGAD-led selection internally displaced and about 367,260 refu- serve in the IGAD Protection Force under process for participants in the negotiations. gees who have left for neighbouring coun- the UNMISS chain of command. These In a 15 June press release, it expressed the tries. The UN O"ce for the Coordination troops will come from Ethiopia, Kenya and view that there should only be two direct of Humanitarian A!airs (OCHA) estimates Rwanda. (On 19 June, the first of these parties—the government and the SPLM that 4 million people (more than one-third troops, approximately 90 peacekeepers from in Opposition—in the talks, with all other of the population) is in need of humanitarian Ethiopia, arrived in Juba.) stakeholders aligning behind the party of assistance. In May, the World Food Program A related issue regards the anticipated par- their choice. It seems that the opposition warned that “3.5 million people are now fac- ticipation of an infantry battalion from China also objected to the planned structure of the ing crisis or emergency levels of food insecu- in UNMISS. China has a strong economic negotiations, which called for four distinct rity and the risk of famine later in 2014 must stake in the oil industry in South Sudan, and negotiating groups: the government, the now be taken into consideration”. On 6 June, it has been reported that it may primarily SPLM in Opposition, former SPLM detain- OCHA reported “an alarming increase” in be interested in defending personnel at oil ees and other political parties. the number of children su!ering from severe facilities. A key question is how amenable An IGAD e!ort to restart the negotiations acute malnutrition in Unity State, where these troops will be to protecting civilians not on 20 June had collapsed by 23 June. The measles cases have also been confirmed. A directly linked to these facilities. government agreed to reengage in the pro- cholera outbreak, which began in Juba in Another key issue is the Council’s role in cess, while former high-level SPLM detainees May, has begun to spread, and as of 16 June, facilitating humanitarian access, given the and some civil society actors also participat- 37 people had died from the disease accord- dire predictions of possible famine in the ed. However, the SPLM in Opposition con- ing to the Ministry of Health. coming months and restrictions that have tinued to boycott the talks because of their At press time, Council members were been placed on humanitarian access by gov- concerns about the selection of participants. planning to hold an informal interactive ernment and opposition forces. In the meantime, the government has dialogue on 27 June with Seyoum Mesfin,

14 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast July 2014 South Sudan (con’t)

Underlying Problems Options perspectives on the Addis Ababa peace talks While the humanitarian situation continues Options for the Council include: and how civil society can most e!ectively to deteriorate and people continue to die in • signalling a possibility of imposing target- engage in the discussions. South Sudan, it remains unclear at this point ed sanctions against specific individuals in whether Kiir and Machar and their proxies South Sudan who undermine the peace Council Dynamics have the desire to negotiate in good faith process; There is frustration among Council mem- and make the di"cult decisions necessary • conducting a visiting mission to South bers with the lack of progress being made to bring lasting peace to South Sudan. On Sudan to put direct pressure on the par- in the IGAD-mediated negotiations, and 10 June, Kiir and Machar agreed to create ties; and some of them appear to question the com- a transitional government of national unity • referring the situation in South Sudan to mitment of the parties to the peace process, within 60 days, but who would be included the ICC. given the delays in the talks. Several mem- in this government remains an open question Given rampant corruption and allega- bers continue to be amenable to the notion as both men have shown little appetite for tions of unequal distribution of resources of targeted sanctions against those obstruct- sublimating their personal ambitions. Given in South Sudan, the Council might consid- ing conflict-resolution e!orts. This idea may their mutual distrust, it is di"cult to envision er requesting the Secretariat to produce a be given additional impetus, considering that a scenario in which they could both have a special report—in consultation with the AU, IGAD and the AU have both indicated that meaningful role in any e!ective transition- IGAD, the IMF or other relevant actors—on sanctions should be considered an option. al arrangement. Meanwhile, the IGAD-led the sources of economic mismanagement in However, it remains unclear whether Rus- peace talks remain mired in process, stalled South Sudan with recommendations for the sia, which publicly expressed wariness about by disagreements between the parties includ- way forward. potential sanctions on South Sudan, would ing the form and substance of civil society Another option would be to hold an support this approach. participation, as well as disenchantment with Arria-formula meeting with civil society rep- The US is the penholder on South Sudan. the mediation. resentatives from South Sudan to get their

Sudan and South Sudan

Expected Council Action People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North Umma Party, was arrested for defamation In July, the Council is scheduled to hold its (SPLM/A-N) launched an assault on SAF after accusing the government-a"liated monthly meeting on Sudan-South Sudan troops that had seized Al-Atmur. In repel- militia, Rapid Support Forces (RSF), of issues, likely in consultations. The Special ling the attack, Sudan alleges that it killed murdering and raping civilians in Darfur. Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan and head 110 rebels, whereas the SPLM/A-N claims Citing the arrest and infringements on press of the UN O"ce to the AU, Haile Menke- it su!ered only three casualties. There also freedoms, the National Umma Party, one rios, is expected to brief. At press time, no continued to be reports of SAF aerial bom- of the leading opposition parties in Sudan, outcome was anticipated. bardments of civilian targets, including, most and the Reform Now Party (RNP) with- notably, on 16 June in the town of Farandalla, drew from the national dialogue process. Key Recent Developments where a hospital operated by Médecins Sans Although Al-Mahdi was released on 15 June, The domestic turmoil in Sudan and South Frontières (MSF) was partially destroyed. In a it remained unclear whether these two polit- Sudan, respectively, have made it di"cult 17 June press release, MSF noted that “sever- ical parties would re-engage in the process. for the two countries to make progress in al other medical facilities in South Kordofan On 8 June, Ibrahim al-Sheikh, head of the addressing the remaining issues dividing have been bombed in recent weeks”. In a 10 Congress Party, was arrested for remarks them, including border demarcation, the June press release, 45 humanitarian organ- critical of the government and of its man- final status of Abyei and the establishment isations said that more than 100,000 people agement of the Darfur situation. At press of a Safe Demilitarised Border Zone, among were displaced in April and May, primarily time, he remained incarcerated. other matters. in South Kordofan, citing reports of looting, In South Sudan, the dire political and In Sudan, fighting has continued in South arson and destruction of food supplies in ter- humanitarian crisis continues to cause mis- Kordofan and Blue Nile states. On 6 June, ritories formerly held by rebel forces. ery. In addition to the thousands that have the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) took control The arrests of two key opposition figures perished in the civil war that erupted on 15 of the Al-Atmur area, a rebel stronghold only appeared to be a setback for the nation- December 2013, 1.4 million people are now 30 miles from Kadugli, the capital of South al dialogue process in Sudan. On 17 May, displaced and approximately 4 million people Kordofan. On 10 June, rebels with the Sudan Sadiq al-Mahdi, the leader of the National (more than one-third of the population) are

Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2156 (29 May 2014) renewed UNISFA until 15 October. S/RES/2046 (2 May 2012) provided a Security Council Letter S/2013/657 (11 November 2013) was a note by the Council President indicating the change in frequency of meetings on the implementation of resolution 2046 from semi-monthly to once a month.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast July 2014 securitycouncilreport.org 15 Sudan and South Sudan (con’t) in need of humanitarian assistance, with aid On 17 June, the JBVMM, which had been Another option is for the Council to call agencies warning of a possible famine later dormant since November 2013, was partial- for a commission of inquiry to investigate this year. Meanwhile, negotiations between ly reactivated, with air patrols of the border accusations of aerial bombardments and the government and the Sudan People’s Lib- recommencing out of Kadugli. At press time, ground attacks on civilian targets in South eration Movement in Opposition have stale- ground patrols had yet to recommence. Kordofan. If political di!erences in the mated, with the opposition boycotting the Council result in a stalemate on this front, talks on 20 June, after complaining about the Key Issues individual members could recommend this process by which civil society was selected for Given the internal challenges facing both option to the Secretary-General on a bilat- participation. At press time, it was unclear Sudan and South Sudan, a key ongoing issue eral basis. when this stalemate would be broken and the is whether and how the Council can facili- Council members could also decide to parties would reengage in negotiations. tate progress between the two countries in hold an Arria-formula meeting on South The Council held consultations on addressing the outstanding matters (e.g., the Kordofan and Blue Nile open to all interest- Sudan-South Sudan issues on 10 June. determination of the SDBZ centreline, bor- ed UN member states. Such a format would Menkerios stated that Sudan and South der demarcation, the establishment of tem- enable member states to learn about recent Sudan had made no progress in addressing porary administrative bodies in Abyei and the developments in the two areas from civil the political and security issues that contin- final status of Abyei). society groups and other experts and raise ue to divide them. As in prior consultations, Another key issue is how the Council awareness about the political and humanitar- he reiterated that the national dialogue in decides to approach the national dialogue ian crisis there. Sudan is a positive development, while sug- process in Sudan, which President Omar gesting that the recent arrests of key opposi- al-Bashir has stated is designed to “stop the Council Dynamics tion figures and restrictions on the press are war and bring peace, free political society, As has been the case for the last three years, counterproductive. Menkerios also spoke fight against poverty and revitalise national the Council continues to be unable to for- about recent SAF bombardments of civil- identity”. mulate a strategy to alleviate the su!ering ian areas in South Kordofan. Also an important issue is the impact that of civilian populations in South Kordofan On 29 May, the Council adopted resolu- SAF military campaigns in South Kordofan and Blue Nile because of political di!erences tion 2156, renewing the mandate of the UN and Blue Nile are having on civilians, par- among its members. The US and others are Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) ticularly in South Kordofan. appalled by recent reports of aerial bombard- until 15 October. While the resolution leaves A related issue is what can be done to ments of civilian targets, including hospitals the fundamental mandate of the mission get the peace talks between Sudan and the and schools. On the other hand, China and unchanged, it expresses concern over the SPLM-N back on track, as the parties have Russia have traditionally asserted Sudan’s lack of progress by Sudan and South Sudan not met since late April. sovereign right to fight rebel groups on its in honouring security and political commit- territory, and Russia apparently questioned ments regarding Abyei and the border areas Options the veracity of the accusations that Sudan more generally. Along these lines, it notes the The Council may choose to issue a state- is deliberately targeting civilians in consulta- stalled e!orts by Sudan and South Sudan ment that: tions on 10 June. to demilitarise the Safe Demilitarised Bor- • welcomes the national dialogue but While Council members have viewed the der Zone (SDBZ) and to make operational expresses concern about the curtailment national dialogue in Sudan as a step in the the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring of press freedom and the arrests of opposi- right direction, some have been more cau- Mechanism (JBVMM). The resolution reit- tion figures in Sudan; tious in their support than others, preferring erates previous demands that Sudan remove • encourages Sudan and the SPLM-N to to see concrete steps before commending the its police around the Di!ra oil field and that reengage in negotiations on humanitar- process. The recent arrests of al-Mahdi and South Sudan fully remove its security person- ian and political issues in South Kordofan al-Sheikh led some Council members to call nel from Abyei. It further urges that a peace and Blue Nile; and into question the government’s commitment conference be organised between leaders • deplores recent SAF ground and aer- to political inclusiveness and dialogue. from the Misseriya and Ngok-Dinka groups, ial attacks on civilian targets in South The US is the penholder on Sudan-South which have clashed in Abyei in recent years. Kordofan. Sudan issues.

16 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast July 2014 Sudan (Darfur)

Expected Council Action 2013 in Jebel Amir, North Darfur, over access On 24 April, the Council received a brief- At press time, it appeared that the Council to a gold mine, in which 100 people died and ing, followed by consultations, on the last briefing and consultations on the Secretary- 100,000 were displaced. Recently, conflict quarterly UNAMID report (S/2014/279). General’s quarterly report on the AU/UN between the two groups led to road closures Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), that prevented critical supplies from reaching Operations Hervé Ladsous briefed in the which had been scheduled for July, might El Sereif, North Darfur. At the conclusion of open session. Ladsous underscored the dete- be postponed until August. No Council the reconciliation meeting on 7 June, the two riorating security situation in Darfur. Cham- outcome was anticipated in July, although groups agreed to open the roads to El Sereif. bas discussed the activities of the govern- the UNAMID mandate is expected to be International Criminal Court (ICC) Pros- ment-a"liated Rapid Support Forces militia. renewed in August. ecutor Fatou Bensouda delivered on 17 June UNAMID’s mandate expires on 31 her semi-annual briefing to the Council on Human Rights-Related Developments August. the work of the ICC in Darfur and stated that The Independent Expert on the situation of human “the time is long overdue for…Sudan’s consis- visited Sudan from 15 to 24 June. In a 25 June Key Recent Developments tent defiance of Security Council resolutions With ongoing fighting between government to be met by decisive action from the Coun- demonstrate its commitment to the national dia- forces and rebel movements and inter-com- cil”. Bensouda also called for a “thorough, logue and release all political detainees. Baderin munal violence, the security and humanitar- independent and public inquiry” into alle- expressed concerns about the condition of three youth activists detained by the National Intelli- ian situation in Darfur remains dire. Accord- gations that UNAMID reporting had been gence and Security Service; the situation of press ing to the O"ce for the Coordination of manipulated “with the intentional e!ect of freedom and media censorship; and the escala- Humanitarian A!airs (OCHA), approximate- covering up crimes committed against civil- ly 395,000 people have been displaced so far ians and peacekeepers”. Bensouda further and other serious human rights violations. He in Darfur in 2014, with roughly 258,000 still indicated that there should be greater scru- urged the government to improve humanitarian access to civilian populations and to enable the unable to return home. There are current- tiny of the UN’s non-essential contacts policy ly 2.4 million internally displaced persons with ICC indictees. (In her written report to the ICRC was asked by the Sudanese authorities (IDPs) in the region. In late May and early the Council, she expressed concern about to suspend its activities.) June, there were several reports that IDPs had a long meeting that Deputy Secretary-Gen- been assaulted and abducted by unidentified eral Jan Eliasson held with President Omar armed assailants in various parts of Darfur. al-Bashir of Sudan—who has been indicted Key Issues On 5 and 7 June, local residents reported by the ICC for war crimes, crimes against The key issue for the Council remains how to to UNAMID that more than 19 villages in humanity and genocide—during the AU address the deterioration of the security and North Darfur had allegedly been attacked Summit in January in Addis Ababa.) humanitarian situation in Darfur. by Arab militias. On 21 June, dozens were The Council adopted resolution 2148 on A related issue is ongoing defiance of reportedly killed when members of the Mis- 3 April, which took note of the Secretary- Council resolutions by Sudan. As the ICC seriya community attacked members of the General’s proposed adjustments to UNA- Prosecutor noted in her 10 June written Salamat community in a cattle raiding inci- MID’s benchmarks and indicators in his 25 report to the Council, hardly any of the 55 dent in Um Dukhun county, North Darfur. February special report (S/2014/138) on the resolutions adopted on Sudan since 2004 On 24 May, a UNAMID peacekeeper strategic review of the mission. The adjusted have been implemented. mediating a dispute between members of the benchmarks are: (1) an inclusive peace pro- Another key issue is whether the Coun- Fur community and Arab militia was shot cess between Sudan and rebel groups that cil, or individual Council members, will and killed in Kabkabiya, North Darfur. Three have not signed the Doha Document for exert leverage on the Secretariat to follow other peacekeepers were wounded in the inci- Peace in Darfur; (2) protection of civilians through on the ICC Prosecutor’s call for the dent. The Council issued a press statement and humanitarian access; and (3) prevention Secretary-General to conduct a “thorough, later the same day condemning the attack or mitigation of community-based conflict. independent and public inquiry” into the (SC/11413). (The first two—an inclusive peace process allegations that UNAMID’s reporting has From 5-7 June, more than 250 members and protection of civilians and humanitarian been manipulated to conceal crimes against of the Abbala and Beni Hussein groups met access—overlapped existing benchmarks for civilians and peacekeepers. (At press time, in Kabkabiya to discuss their reconciliation UNAMID. The third one is new, demonstrat- it remained unclear whether the Secretariat e!orts. The two groups have a history of vio- ing concern about the intensification of inter- would heed the call for such an investigation.) lent clashes, including one attack in January communal violence in Darfur.)

Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2148 (3 April 2014) endorsed the revised priorities of UNAMID. S/RES/2138 (13 February 2014) renewed the mandate of the Panel of Experts for 13 months. S/RES/2113 (30 July 2013) extended UNAMID’s mandate until 31 August 2014 and called for a review of UNAMID by 28 February 2014. Secretary-General’s Report S/2014/279 (15 April 2014) was the most recent quarterly report on UNAMID. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.7199 (17 June 2014) was S/PV.7159Security Council Press Statement SC/11413 (24 May 2014) condemned the killing of a UNAMID peacekeeper. OTHER RELEVANT FACTS Mohamed Ibn Chambas (Ghana) Force Strength (as of 30 April)Civilian personnel (as of 30 March) USEFUL ADDITIONAL RESOURCE

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast July 2014 securitycouncilreport.org 17 Sudan (Darfur) (con’t)

Options failed to protect, or in some cases even make the humanitarian and development needs The Council might consider adopting a state- an e!ort to protect civilians in the region.” of people in Darfur, whereas others appear ment that: to believe that such measures would reward • deplores the upsurge in violence and dis- Council Dynamics negative behaviour on the part of Sudan. placement in Darfur in recent months; Council members continue to express con- During the 17 June briefing, several Coun- • supports the ICC Prosecutor’s call for an cern about the heightened violence and dis- cil members—Argentina, Australia, Chile, investigation on UNAMID reporting; and placement in Darfur, but there are di!er- Jordan, Luxembourg and Nigeria—explicitly • emphasises that protection of civilians is a ences in how they apportion blame for the supported the proposal for an independent, strategic priority of the mission. situation in Darfur. Most Council members public investigation into the allegations that Another option is for the Council to hold are highly critical of Sudan for the instabil- UNAMID purposely distorted its reporting an Arria-formula meeting with Aïcha El Basri, ity in the region, while also recognising that to conceal information about attacks on civil- who served as UNAMID spokesperson from rebel groups share responsibility. However, ians and peacekeepers. The UK also encour- August 2012 to April 2013. El Basri released China and Russia tend to be supportive of aged the Secretariat “to look carefully into documents that, according to Bensouda’s 10 Sudan, arguing that it is working diligently the allegations made”. June report to the Council, supported alle- to promote peace and reconciliation in the The UK is the penholder on Darfur, while gations of distorted reporting by UNAMID. region. Some, particularly Russia, believe Argentina chairs the 1591 Sudan Sanctions In a 9 April piece in Foreign Policy, El Bas- that reducing Sudan’s debt and removing Committee. ri wrote, “UNAMID lied to the media and bilateral sanctions would enable it to address

Somalia

Expected Council Action were local political violence unrelated to July 2013 (S/2013/413), Al-Shabaab derives In July, Ambassador Oh Joon (South Korea), the Islamist group. significant revenue—perhaps more than $25 chair of the 751/1907 Somalia-Eritrea Sanc- The latest confidential midterm report of million per year—from the charcoal trade, tions Committee, is scheduled to brief Coun- the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group and the overall scale of charcoal production cil members in consultations. An outcome is (SEMG), which was leaked to the media, and exports had actually increased despite not anticipated. apparently documented governmental cor- the imposition of UN sanctions on 22 Feb- ruption—often in the form of diverting SNA ruary 2012. The 751/1907 Somalia-Eritrea Key Recent Developments arms to clan militias and public markets— Sanctions Committee posted on its website Despite territorial gains by the joint AU and a lack of state regulatory capacity. None- an implementation assistance notice dated Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Soma- theless, on 5 March the Council adopted res- 7 May, which provides recommendations li National Army (SNA) o!ensive, Al-Sha- olution 2142 reauthorising a partial lifting regarding the interdiction of charcoal from baab continues to pose a serious asym- of the arms embargo until 25 October. As Somalia. Developed in conjunction with the metrical security threat in Somalia and requested by the Council, the Secretary-Gen- UN Environment Programme, the document nearby countries. Al-Shabaab attacked the eral o!ered technical advice to improve sanc- principally covers: Council requirements, parliament building in Mogadishu on 24 tions compliance by the Federal Government particularly as stipulated in resolution 2036; May, resulting in the death of 10 AMISOM of Somalia (FGS) on 3 April (S/2014/243). measures to prevent the export and import and SNA troops and eight attackers. The On 22 May, the Council issued a presidential of charcoal from Somalia (respectively by the Council issued a press statement condemn- statement regarding arms and ammunition FGS and other member states); and technical ing the attack (SC/11412). On 15 and 16 management by the FGS (S/PRST/2014/9). guidance on the seizure, disposal or destruc- June, gunmen killed more than 50 people The first of two FGS reports to the Council tion of charcoal. in the coastal town of Mpeketoni, Kenya. regarding implementation of resolution 2142, Oil continues to be a potential source of Although Al-Shabaab has publicly claimed which was due 13 June, has been submitted. instability in Somalia. In the absence of an responsibility (and details in media reports The embargo on the export and import agreed-upon regulatory framework for the seem to o!er corroboration), President of charcoal continues to falter. According to industry, oil rights remain disputed among Uhuru Kenyatta has claimed the attacks the final report of the SEMG published 12 the FGS, federal states, the semi-autonomous

UN DOCUMENTS ON SOMALIA Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2158 (29 May 2014) renewed the mandate of UNSOM for one year. S/RES/2142 (5 March 2014) renewed a partial lifting of the arms embargo in Somalia until 25 October 2014. S/RES/2111 (24 July 2013) reauthorised the mandate of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group until 25 November 2014. S/RES/2036 (22 February 2012) imposed an embargo on the export and import of charcoal from Somalia. Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2014/9 (22 May 2014) concerned arms and ammunition management by the Federal Government of Somalia. Security Council Letters S/2014/400 (6 June 2014) transmitted the joint communiqué from the eighth annual meeting with the members of the AU PSC. S/2014/243 (3 April 2014) transmitted the Secretary-General’s recommendations for improved regulation of small arms by the FGS. Security Council Press Statement SC/11412 (24 May 2014) condemned the attack on parliament by Al-Shabaab. Sanctions Committee Document S/2013/413 (12 July 2013) OTHER RELEVANT FACTS Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia. USEFUL ADDITIONAL RESOURCE

18 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast July 2014 Somalia (con’t) region of Puntland and secessionist Somalil- Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) for a period of Regarding the partial lifting of the arms and (for more on this, see Oil in Somalia: Add- one year and changed the Secretary-General’s embargo, Council members are unlikely to ing Fuel to the Fire? by the Mogadishu-based reporting cycle from 90 days to 120 days. On take any action in July other than reviewing Heritage Institute for Policy Studies). Accord- 4 June, Under-Secretary-General for Humani- the report submitted in June by the FGS. ing to media reports, the SEMG sent the tarian A!airs and Emergency Relief Coordi- Recognising the potential for contested 751/1907 Somalia-Eritrea Sanctions Com- nator Valerie Amos briefed Council members oil concessions to exacerbate instability in mittee a letter on 27 May expressing concern in consultations regarding the critical human- Somalia, the Council could impose a mora- regarding a “Oil Protection Unit” planned itarian situation in Somalia. Poor weather, torium on further oil contracts until the allo- by Somaliland. Puntland and Somaliland conflict-related factors and a lack of funding cation of resource rights between the FGS have a contested border covering much of for humanitarian assistance have caused early- and federal states has been resolved and a the Sanaag and Sool regions and have issued warning indicators of an impending famine functional regulatory framework for the oil competing oil concessions within this area. similar to three years ago. On 6 June, members industry has been established. On 12 June, troops from Somaliland occu- of the Security Council and the AU Peace and Another option could be for Council pied Taleh in the Sool region (as they had also Security Council (PSC) issued a joint com- members to take a visiting mission to Soma- done briefly in mid-April), prompting a joint muniqué following their eighth annual consul- lia in order to better assess developments in statement issued on 14 June by the UK, the tative meeting which highlighted the need for the country. US and EU calling for the withdrawal of all the FGS to adhere to the terms of the partial forces from Sanaag and Sool. lifting of the arms embargo, such as reporting Council and Wider Dynamics According to publicly available informa- obligations (S/2014/400). During 2014, Council members have exhib- tion, half of the 12 individuals currently listed ited significant cooperation with regard to under the 751/1907 Somalia-Eritrea sanc- Key Issues policymaking on Somalia, unanimously tions regime have defected to the FGS, have With respect to sanctions, more e!ective adopting two resolutions as well as issuing a been arrested or have been killed (but the implementation of the embargo on the presidential statement and seven press state- consolidated list has not yet been modified export and import of charcoal continues to ments. Meanwhile, Somalia faces numerous accordingly): be a critically important issue, particularly challenges that suggest the need for sustained • Aboud Rogo Mohammed, listed as an as it is apparently still a substantial source of (and perhaps increased) UN engagement, Al-Shabaab fundraiser, was killed by revenue for Al-Shabaab. such as inadequate humanitarian financing, unknown gunmen in Mombasa, Kenya, Another fundamental issue is full FGS chronic insecurity, little progress in the feder- on 27 August 2012; compliance with the regulatory provisions al state-formation process, rampant corrup- • Hassan Dahir Aweys, a former Al-Sha- linked to the partial lifting of the arms embar- tion and a conspicuous lack of state capacity. baab commander, surrendered to the FGS go, which has implications for the availability The depth of these obstacles to peacebuild- in June 2013; of arms and ammunition to clan militias and ing and statebuilding and the relative lack of • Omar Hammami, an Al-Shabaab com- Al-Shabaab. progress by UNSOM thus far would seem to mander and spokesperson, was killed by Improving public financial management indicate that a more proactive implementa- the group’s intelligence service, Amniyatt and creating a regulatory framework for nat- tion of certain existing measures (e.g., char- Mukhabarat, on 12 September 2013; ural resource management that is mutually coal sanctions) is warranted. However, due to • Abubaker Shari! Ahmed, listed as an Al- accepted by the FGS and federal states are a number of factors—including UN budget Shabaab recruiter, was killed by unknown central issues for peacebuilding and state- constraints, national sovereignty concerns gunmen in Mombasa, Kenya on 1 April building in Somalia. and counter-insurgency priorities—there also 2014; currently seems to be little latitude in the • Hassan Mahat Omar, listed as an Al-Sha- Options Council for pursuing alternative approaches baab recruiter and fundraiser, was arrested As specified in paragraph 23 of resolution to UN engagement in Somalia. in Nairobi on 2 April; and 2036, the 751/1907 Somalia-Eritrea Sanc- The UK is the penholder on Somalia, the • Mahomed Sa’id, an arms tra"cker and tions Committee can list individuals and enti- US is the penholder on piracy, Russia is the Somali warlord in Puntland and the ties—such as those identified by the SEMG— penholder on legal aspects of counter-piracy Sanaag region closely allied to Al-Sha- that have violated sanctions on the export measures and the Republic of Korea is the baab, defected to the FGS on 7 June. and import of charcoal from Somalia, par- chair of the 751/1907 Somalia-Eritrea Sanc- In resolution 2158 of 29 May, the Council ticularly in cases where there has been a link tions Committee. renewed the mandate of the UN Assistance to Al-Shabaab financing.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast July 2014 securitycouncilreport.org 19 Central African Republic

Expected Council Action of the population—or 2.5 million—urgently expressed concern that MINUSCA may In July, the Council will be briefed on prepa- need protection and relief to meet their most not be able to fill its allotted troop level by rations for the deployment of the UN Multi- basic needs. 15 September, that the transitional politi- dimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission In a recent deadly attack, the Notre Dame cal process is stagnant and that the country in the Central African Republic (MINUS- de Fatima church in Bangui, which was shel- remains de-facto divided between Christians CA), by Under-Secretary-General for Peace- tering 9,000 people, was attacked on 28 May, and Muslims. keeping Operations Hervé Ladsous. resulting in the deaths of at least 17 people The preliminary report of the CoI was The Council will also hear a briefing by and the reported abduction of 27 civilians by circulated to Council members on 28 May Ambassador Raimonda Murmokaitė (Lith- the assailants, who were taken to an unknown (only two of the three commissioners par- uania), followed by consultations on the location. Many IDPs in the CAR have taken ticipated in the investigation drafting). Its interim report of the Panel of Experts (PoE) refuge at places of worship. The attackers— findings were that individuals from both assisting the 2127 Central African Republic who arrived in pick-up trucks in the early sides of the conflict have perpetrated seri- (CAR) Sanctions Committee. afternoon—threw grenades into the church ous breaches of international humanitarian The Council may also be briefed on the ground before opening fire on people, using law, crimes against humanity and war crimes, work of the Commission of Inquiry (CoI) small arms. from 1 January 2013 to the present. At this established by the Council in resolution 2127 On 30 May, Council members issued a stage, however, the CoI said that it is prema- to investigate reports of violations of interna- press statement, condemning in the stron- ture to talk of genocide or ethnic cleansing tional humanitarian law, international human gest terms the recent attacks and calling on or of significant involvement of other states rights law and abuses of human rights in the member states and regional and international in the conflict. The CoI recommended that CAR, after its report is reissued. organisations to increase troop, financial and the Council establish a body to prosecute the The mandate of MINUSCA expires on logistical support to MISCA to enable it to alleged o!enders. 30 April 2015. implement its mandate fully and help pre- After the report was circulated, the CoI pare for the transfer of authority to MINUS- was heavily criticised within the Secretariat Key Recent Developments CA on 15 September (SC/11423). and by Council members for its lack of coor- Thousands are estimated to have been killed The Council was briefed on 24 June dination with the O"ce of the High Com- in the CAR since 24 March 2013, when the via video-teleconference by the Secretary- missioner for Human Rights and for submit- predominantly Muslim Séléka rebel group General’s Special Representative and head ting a poor quality report. On 16 June, the ousted President François Bozizé. The Chris- of MINUSCA Babacar Gaye, who stated Secretary-General sent a letter to the Coun- tian anti-balaka militias retaliated with attacks that civilians are regularly targeted while the cil President forwarding the request of the on Muslim civilians, who constitute roughly government lacks its own security forces or CoI to reissue the report to allow for updates 15 percent of the population, and as a result, necessary finances. He added that the cur- on the situation on the ground and editing thousands of Muslims have been forced to rent number of CAR refugees in neighbour- (S/2014/410). flee towards the majority Muslim northeast, ing countries is at 360,000 and expressed On 15 June, the EU announced that it had creating a sort of separation line between the scepticism about holding the planned elec- reached the full operational capacity of its two religious groups and the zones of influ- tions in February 2015 due to the deterio- intervention force in the CAR. The mission ence of the Séléka and anti-balaka. rating situation. includes 700 soldiers and police from Esto- Despite the adoption of resolution 2149, Also briefing was Phumzile Mlambo- nia, Finland, France, Georgia, Latvia, Lux- establishing MINUSCA with an initial Ngcuka, Executive Director of UN-Women, embourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania authorised deployment of up to 10,000 mili- who recently visited the country. She men- and Spain. The EU has authorised the inter- tary and 1,800 police personnel, the situation tioned reports of rape, sexual slavery and vention force for a period of half a year, which remains dire. MINUSCA is to take over from early and forced marriages perpetrated by is currently not expected to be extended in the African-led International Support Mis- armed actors. Marguerite Marie Maliavo- light of MINUSCA’s deployment. sion to the CAR (MISCA) by 15 September. Samba, CAR Minister for Public Health and President Catherine Samba-Panza of the Continued fighting between the Séléka and Social A!airs, who addressed the Council, CAR sent a letter of referral to the Prosecutor the anti-balaka and attacks on civilians have stated that the rule of law was “practically of the ICC, Fatou Bensouda, to open an o"- resulted in many casualties and a humanitari- confined” to the capital and that there was cial investigation into crimes allegedly com- an crisis. According to the UN Refugee Agen- no national army, the judiciary was “sick”, mitted on the CAR territory since 1 August cy, the number of internally displaced peo- the national police needed rehabilitation and 2012. Bensouda, who has been conducting ple (IDPs) across the CAR as of 20 June is judges could not return to their posts. an uno"cial preliminary inquiry into the 542,400, including 117,400 in Bangui. Half In the consultations that followed, Gaye situation since 7 February, announced that

UN DOCUMENTS ON THE CAR Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2149 (10 April 2014) established MINUSCA. S/RES/2134 (28 January 2014) renewed the mandate of the UN S/RES/2127 (5 December 2013) authorised MISCA and a French intervention force. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.7206Security Council Press Statement SC/11423 (30 May 2014) condemned the attack on the Notre Dame de Fatima church in Bangui. Security Council Letter S/2014/410 (16 June 2014) was from the Secretary-General to the Council President on the reissuing of the CoI interim report. OTHER RELEVANT FACTS Special Representative and Head of MINUSCA Babacar Gaye (Senegal) MINUSCA Size and CompositionMINUSCA Duration 10 April 2014 to present. Chair of the Sanctions Committee

20 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast July 2014 Central African Republic (con’t)

she would make a decision on opening the without endangering their own lives. Bocoum never visited despite its being on Council investigation soon. hoped that the targeted sanctions imposed by agenda since 1997; Regarding the 2127 CAR Sanctions Com- the Security Council and the work undertaken by • listing further individuals for violations of - mittee, the interim report of the PoE was duct of armed groups. the criteria set out under resolution 2134, circulated to Council members in June. It either through the Committee or by the highlights the connection between control Council; or and illicit trade of natural resources (such Key Issues • taking no action at this time. as diamonds, gold and ivory) and the fund- Following the establishment of MINUSCA, ing for the activities of the Séléka and the an overarching issue is to sustain a hands- Council and Wider Dynamics anti-balaka. It also documents violations of on approach towards the CAR, including With the establishment of MINUSCA, Coun- international humanitarian law and human monitoring developments on the ground cil members are now looking to monitor the rights law by various actors. closely and following up with Council action situation on the ground and MINUSCA’s The PoE o"cially presented the report accordingly. preparations for deployment. While Council to the Committee on 25 June. Among the Until MINUSCA is fully operational, a members are concerned about the lack of issues discussed were some of the report’s key issue is providing e!ective support for improvement in security or progress in estab- recommendations. Committee members MISCA and other international forces so lishing state authority (it seems that the gov- were unable to agree on adopting the recom- they can restore security in the country. ernment in Bangui has very limited authority mendation to send letters to neighbouring A related issue is not losing track of the even in Bangui), resolution 2149 does not countries to publish their import and export multifaceted needs of the CAR, in particular authorise a support package for MISCA until statistics. One recommendation that the the establishment of state institutions from the deployment of MINUSCA. Some Coun- Committee was able to agree on is sending the ground up and the transitional political cil members are also concerned with the slow a letter to the CAR government to remove process. progress reported on recruiting more troops from its security forces anyone suspected Finally, another issue is addressing the for the mission (beyond the MISCA contin- of membership in an armed group. Some relationship between the illicit trade in natu- gencies) and the logistical preparations for Council members inquired on the presence ral resources and the funding of the armed MINUSCA’s deployment. of Boko-Haram but the PoE’s coordinator groups. Council members will also be eager to said that they were not aware of any current address the initial findings of the CoI and Boko-Haram presence in the CAR. Options of the PoE. The CoI initial report and the Options for the Council include: PoE interim report both stress that the war- Human Rights-Related Developments • issuing a statement in support of the ring parties have committed crimes and - transitional political process, calling for human rights violations. A di"cult question ered a report of the independent expert on the accountability for crimes and encourag- for Council members (and the international Thérèse Keita Bocoum (A/HRC/26/53). Bocoum ing member states to contribute troops community at large) is pursuing accountabil- and resources to MINUSCA; ity while looking for interlocutors who can anti-balaka • discussing and taking up recommenda- influence both the Séléka and the anti-balaka and Séléka groups continue to perpetrate serious tions in the reissued report of the CoI and to lay down their arms and put an end to human rights violations against civilians based on the report of the PoE; the de facto partition of the country that has unable to provide assistance to displaced people • undertaking a Council visiting mission been taking place. to the CAR, a country the Council has France is the penholder on the CAR.

Libya

Expected Council Action Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). Key Recent Developments In July, Council members are likely to be The mandates of UNSMIL and the Panel The security situation in Libya remains vola- briefed on developments in Libya by Tarek of Experts (PoE) assisting the 1970 Libya tile. Rogue General Khalifa Haftar attempt- Mitri, the Special Representative of the Sec- Sanctions Committee expire on 13 March ed an unsuccessful coup on 14 February retary-General and head of the UN Support and 13 April 2015, respectively. and has since targeted Islamist militias in

UN DOCUMENTS ON LIBYA Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2146 (19 March 2014) imposed measures on vessels transporting crude oil that had been illicitly exported from Libya. S/RES/2144 (14 March 2014) extended the mandates of UNSMIL and the PoE. S/RES/1970 (26 February 2011) referred the situation in Libya to the ICC. Secretary-General’s Report S/2014/131 (26 February 2014) was the latest report of the Secretary-General on Libya. Security Council Letter S/2014/417 (17 June 2014) was from the US to the Council President about Khattala’s abduction by US special forces. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.7194 Security Council Press Statement SC/11447 (23 June 2014) welcomed the parliamentary election of 25 June 2014. Sanctions Committee Document S/2014/106 (15 February 2014) OTHER RELEVANT FACTS Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNSMIL Tarek Mitri (Lebanon) UNSMIL Size and Composition UNSMIL Duration 16 September 2011 to present.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast July 2014 securitycouncilreport.org 21 Libya (con’t)

Benghazi. Forces loyal to Haftar also attacked of the justice system, due to attacks on pros- On 16 June, US special forces in Libya the General National Congress (GNC) in ecutors and judges. Nonetheless, the trial of seized Ahmed abu Khattala, indicted by a Tripoli on 18 May. 37 former regime o"cials, including Saif al- US federal court for the 11 September 2012 That attack came against the backdrop of Islam Qaddafi and Abdullah al-Senussi, had attacks on the US consulate in Benghazi. the disputed 4 May GNC election of Ahmed begun, though not without delays. UNSMIL (According to the media, Khattala is cur- Maiteeq as prime minister and subsequent had visited all defendants in Tripoli, Misrata rently aboard the USS New York en route to cabinet approval, which were contested by and Zintan but was denied access to detain- the US.) On 17 June, Ambassador Samantha interim Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni, ees held in al-Hadba prison. (On 21 May, the Power (US) sent a letter to the President of who was mandated to serve after Prime Min- ICC reiterated its decision that Qaddafi, held the Council stating that the US had acted in ister Ali Zeidan was sacked by the GNC on in Zintan by local militia, should be tried in accordance with its “inherent right of self- 11 March. Al-Thinni, who resigned after an The Hague, and in a 14 May briefing to the defense” under Article 51 of the UN Charter attack on his family on 13 April, questioned Council, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda (S/2014/417). According to the letter, Khat- the legality of the procedure that was used insisted that Libya should immediately sur- tala was planning future attacks against US to elect Maiteeq, as have others who have render him to the Court.) targets and will be presented before a US argued there was no quorum for the 4 May The Council also received during the federal court for prosecution. vote by the GNC. meeting the periodic briefing by the chair Justice Minister Saleh al-Marghani of Lib- On 9 June, the Supreme Court ruled of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Commit- ya stated in response that the US had no right that the appointment was unconstitutional, tee, Ambassador Eugène-Richard Gasana to abscond with Khattala, while other o"- thus leaving al-Thinni in o"ce. Maiteeq (Rwanda). Ambassador Ibrahim Dabbashi cials characterised the operation as an attack and the deputy president of the GNC, Salah (Libya) stated that in the last month, freedom on Libyan sovereignty. Makhzoum, said they would abide by the of expression had been greatly compromised decision. by abductions and assassinations of political Key Issues A protest march on 8 June calling for mili- activists and the reluctance of judges to carry An overarching issue is the current fighting tias to disband reportedly ended with 31 killed out their duties because they feared for their between militias and factions of the army, as and another 80 people wounded following lives. Dabbashi rejected the notion that Libya well as the challenges to the government and clashes with the government-aligned Libya was divided and ruled by tribes. its lack of authority. The continued opera- Shield militia outside its compound in Beng- Amidst the fragile security situation and tions of Haftar and his suspected political hazi. Army chief of sta! Major General Youssef the lack of government control over large intentions to side-line the government are a al-Mangoush, who is o"cially in charge of the parts of the country, elections were held on particular example. militia, resigned following the incident. 25 June for a new House of Representatives Another issue is to monitor the post- On 9 June, Mitri briefed the Council for to replace the defunct GNC. Prior to the election situation and to try to build politi- the first time since Haftar began his opera- election, Haftar declared that he would sus- cal momentum through the new House of tions. He said that Haftar had launched pend all military operations on 25 June. Representatives, which, it is hoped, will be “Operation Libya Dignity”, a military o!en- As requested by Mitri, Council members perceived as legitimate. sive against groups Haftar had labelled as ter- issued a press statement on 23 June welcom- rorists and blamed for the recent wave of vio- ing the elections as an important step towards Options lence and targeted assassinations in Benghazi stable democratic governance. They called on The Council could issue a statement: and in eastern Libya. Avoiding any personal all parties to ensure that the elections are • condemning the use of violence against assessment, Mitri added that others viewed peaceful and conveyed their intention to the legitimate authorities; the o!ensive as an attempted coup. monitor the situation closely (SC/11447). • calling on all sides to honour the election Mitri further said that the continuing At press time, media reports indicate that results and seize the opportunity to build security crisis posed a threat to the politi- turnout for the 25 June election was rela- up and strengthen democratic institutions; cal transition and that he would soon con- tively low, with less than half of registered • calling on the militias and army factions in vene a meeting with major actors aimed voters showing up to the polls. (Above 1.5 Libya to refrain from using violence and to at forging an agreement on the principles million voters were registered for the elec- agree to work together for national recon- of political interaction, national priorities tion, down from 2.8 million registered voters ciliation, justice, respect for human rights during the remainder of the transition and for the 2012 election.) Some polling stations and the rule of law; ways to address immediate security issues stayed closed for security reasons and a cou- • threatening or adopting targeted sanc- and other divisive matters. (Nevertheless, ple of violent incidents occurred, with at least tions against spoilers of the political pro- the dialogue that was planned for 18-19 five people killed in clashes between govern- cess; and June was postponed indefinitely in light of ment forces and militants and 30 wounded in • calling for improved coordination of inter- the objections by various parties to some of Benghazi. In another incident, human rights national support under the auspices of its proposed documents.) activist Salwa Bughaighis was shot dead at UNSMIL. Mitri also reported that the security situ- her Benghazi home shortly after she had ation continued to impede the functioning returned from voting.

22 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast July 2014 Libya (con’t)

Council Dynamics silence on the situation, the need to at least and create new momentum for establishing The overall deterioration of the security and monitor the situation closely prompted a functioning government. Together with the political situation in Libya are sources of con- Council members to ask Mitri to brief them continued work of the Constitution Draft- cern for Council members. Yet due to di!er- again in July, following the elections. It seems ing Assembly on a new constitution, Coun- ing points of view among Council members that one point of consensus among Council cil members hope that these developments on how to address or characterise the actions members is that Libya deserves closer Coun- will create a positive momentum that will of the government and di!erent groups and cil attention due to the current state of a!airs. reverse the deteriorating security and bring militias, in particular those of Haftar, the Council members are hoping that the political stability. Council has not been able to pronounce itself election of a new parliament and the subse- The UK is the penholder on Libya. on the situation. quent formation of a new government will Nevertheless, after several months of allow Libya to revitalise the political process

UNOWA (West Africa)

Expected Council Action internationally, that eventually brought closer sanctions. A follow-up summit was held in In July, the Council will hold its semi-annual attention to the group in the Security Coun- London on 12 June, which Djnnit attended briefing and consultations on the UN O"ce cil. Following a 5 May attack on a market- (S/2014/425). Amidst the increased attention, for West Africa (UNOWA). Said Djinnit, the place that killed hundreds, the Council issued Boko Haram has escalated attacks, with up Special Representative of the Secretary-Gen- a press statement on 9 May calling for the to 500 people reportedly killed in villages in eral to West Africa and the head of UNOWA, release of the girls, noting for the first time Borno state on 2-3 June, its deadliest attack is expected to brief. UNOWA’s mandate— the threat that Boko Haram poses regionally since the group emerged in 2002. renewed through an exchange of letters and stating its intention to consider future While Djinnit has become increasingly between the Secretary-General and the Presi- measures against the group (SC/11387). occupied by the Boko Haram crisis, UNOWA dent of the Council—expires on 1 December On 8 May, the Secretary-General continued its work on a range of other issues. 2016 (S/2013/759). announced that he was sending a high-level It was active in implementing the UN Sahel representative to Nigeria. Djinnit was dis- Strategy, which was under UNOWA’s “over- Key Recent Developments patched to Nigeria from 12 to 15 May and all authority” after the departure of Special Since the Council last met on UNOWA in announced that the UN would provide an Envoy Romano Prodi on 31 January and the December 2013, the region experienced integrated support package, including assis- appointment of a substitute. (For further increased violence, perpetrated primarily by tance for the abducted girls once they were details, see “Peace and Security in Africa” in Boko Haram in Nigeria. The conflict, which released and for their families and com- the June 2014 Forecast.) worsened compared with 2013, caused more munities, as well as increasing support to On 22 May, Djinnit and Yury Fedo- than 1,500 deaths in the first quarter of 2014, address socio-economic problems in the tov, Executive Director of the UN O"ce according to an Amnesty International report. north. Djinnit undertook a second visit to on Drugs and Crime, attended a high-level This included a 14 March attack by Boko Nigeria from 4 to 9 June. donor conference in New York to raise funds Haram in Maiduguri, in which an estimat- A 17 May summit on Boko Haram, organ- for the transnational crime units under the ed 600 people died, mostly prisoners on ised by France in Paris, brought together West Africa Coast Initiative at which close to the loose killed by security forces. UNOWA Nigeria, neighbouring Benin, Cameroon, $1.4 million was raised. issued a press statement on 4 March con- Chad and Niger as well as the UK, the US As part of e!orts to address drug tra"ck- demning attacks in Borno state from 1-3 and the EU. They agreed, among other things, ing in West Africa, the West Africa Commis- March that resulted in more than 80 deaths. to seek Security Council sanctions against sion on Drugs released a major report on A bomb blast in Abuja on 14 April, which Boko Haram, the splinter group Ansaru and 11 June. The report urged West African gov- killed at least 75 people, prompted a Council their leadership. On 22 May, the 1267 Al- ernments to reform drug laws and policies, press statement condemning multiple terror- Qaida Sanctions Committee added Boko including decriminalising low-level o!ences, ist attacks in Nigeria on 13-14 April, its first Haram to the sanctions list (the draft narra- avoiding militarisation of e!orts to combat statement on a Boko Haram attack since 25 tive summary noted its links with Al-Qaida- drug tra"cking and providing more treat- January 2012 (SC/11352). a"liated groups in Mali), and on 26 June, the ment for drug users as West Africa increas- However, it was the kidnapping of nearly Committee approved the addition of Ansaru ingly becomes a region for drug consump- 300 schoolgirls in Chibok, on 14-15 April, and Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shek- tion and not just transit. It further urged triggering protests both in Nigeria and au, subjecting them to financial and arms law enforcement to focus more on pursuing

UN DOCUMENTS ON UNOWA Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2013/22Security Council Letter S/2013/759 (23 December 2013) extended UNOWA until 31 December 2016. Secretary-General’s Report S/2014/442 (26 June 2014) was on the activities of UNOWA. USEFUL ADDITIONAL RESOURCE

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast July 2014 securitycouncilreport.org 23 UNOWA (West Africa) (con’t) high-level corruption and major tra"ck- Options and worsening attacks, the Council issued a ers and called on consuming and produc- As is common for UNOWA briefings, the press statement on the incident. Since the ing countries outside the region to provide Council might hear the briefing and take no Secretary-General’s 8 May announcement greater assistance to West African states. action. that he was dispatching a high representa- UNOWA continued to monitor develop- Conversely, the Council could issue a tive to Nigeria, Nigeria has gradually recon- ments across the region in the run-up to pres- statement on the threat of Boko Haram, wel- ciled to increased international attention to idential elections to be held in at least eight coming recent agreements at the Paris and the crisis. West African countries from 2014 to 2016, London meetings and UNOWA’s role and France, the UK and the US have stepped with particular attention to political tensions good o"ces, including for addressing struc- up military and intelligence assistance to in Burkina Faso and Niger. tural problems of poverty, human rights and Nigeria and its neighbours to support e!orts Under-Secretary-General for Political governance. to confront the group as part of the agree- A!airs Je!rey Feltman visited Senegal, Mau- A statement could also express support of ments reached at the Paris summit. Chad ritania, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea from 15-18 the Secretary-General’s recommendation in also has a strong stake in the conflict, with April. his 11 December 2013 report on UNOWA Boko Haram operating across borders. It com- (S/2013/732) to establish an analytical unit in mitted itself at Paris and London to greater Key Issues UNOWA to improve its capacity to inform its cooperation with Nigeria and to developing A critical issue is how the Council can good o"ces e!orts. a regional counter-terrorism strategy to com- become more engaged in dealing with Boko bat Boko Haram. Haram, which is not only wreaking violence Council Dynamics During consultations last December, most in Nigeria but was or is present in Cameroon, The Council has largely refrained from members apparently expressed support for Central African Republic, Mali and Niger. making pronouncements on Boko Haram, UNOWA’s proposed analytical unit. Whether Transnational problems of drug tra"ck- due to sensitivities from Nigeria, even before the Council endorses the unit may depend ing, organised crime, arms tra"cking and vio- it became a Council member in January. on the larger financial contributors, such lent extremism across the region constitute Nigeria has long considered the conflict an as France, the UK and the US, which have further important issues. A related issue is internal issue and has opposed suggested sought to cut-back UN spending and are sen- progress with the Manu River Union security Council statements in the past to condemn sitive to any proposed UN budget increases strategy to address cross-border movements attacks by the group. It was not until more due to their own fiscal problems. of armed groups and weapons tra"cking and than three weeks after the Chibok kidnap- Nigeria is the penholder on West African the Gulf of Guinea anti-piracy strategy. pings, that, prompted by a huge public outcry issues.

Cyprus

Expected Council Action side for the resumption of unification talks. communiqué and the resumption of talks in In July, the Council is expected to renew the Despite the impasse in the negotiations pro- Cyprus (SC/11273). The Secretary-General mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in cess and a failure to agree on the commu- issued a statement commending the leaders Cyprus (UNFICYP) for an additional six niqué, the Council extended UNFICYP’s for their commitment to resuming negoti- months ahead of its 31 July expiry. The Spe- mandate, adopting a technical rollover reso- ations and reaching a statement of shared cial Representative and head of mission, Lisa lution without including any language that principles, deemed an invaluable basis for Buttenheim, will likely brief the Council on could be interpreted as a form of pressure to renewed talks. The day the communiqué was the latest UNFICYP report and the status reach an agreement (S/RES/2135). agreed, Alexander Downer announced that of negotiations. After months of political stalemate and he was stepping down from the position of moderate pressure by the UN Secretariat, the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Key Recent Developments especially the Secretary-General and his Cyprus, a position he held for more than five Prior to its last meeting on Cyprus on 30 Special Adviser, agreement on a joint com- years. As there are no concrete plans at this January, the Council anticipated that Cypri- muniqué was reached on 11 February. The time to find a new candidate for the posi- ot leaders would agree on a joint communi- Council reacted the same day by issuing a tion, Buttenheim will serve as acting Special qué, a precondition set by the Greek Cypriot long-awaited press statement welcoming the Adviser of the Secretary-General on Cyprus

UN DOCUMENTS ON CYPRUS Security Council Resolution S/RES/2135Secretary-General’s Reports S/2013/781S/2012/149 (12 March 2012) was the latest report on the status of negotiations in Cyprus. Security Council Press Statement SC/11273 (11 February 2014) was the statement welcoming agreement on a joint communiqué. OTHER RELEVANT FACTS Special Representative of the Secretary General and Head of UNFICYP Lisa M. Buttenheim (US) Acting Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Cyprus Lisa M. Buttenheim (US) UNFICYP: Force Commander Major General Chao Liu (China) UNFICYP: Size, Composition, Cost and Duration Strength (as of 30 April 2014)- Troop ContributorsAnnual Budget March 1964 to present.

24 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast July 2014 Cyprus (con’t) as well as Special Representative and head unresolved. Though there seems to be agree- Turkish Cypriot leaders. Regarding UNFIC- of UNFICYP. ment and convergence on the structure of YP’s mandate renewal, an issue is how much Soon after agreeing on the joint commu- the legislature, the judicial system and the longer the Council can maintain the mission, niqué, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot police, the leaders are still far from agreeing established 50 years ago, given finite resourc- negotiators made historic visits to Ankara and on other important issues. The major ones es and no real progress in negotiations. Athens respectively, where they met with o"- involve property, displaced persons and the cials from the foreign a!airs ministry of each executive branch, on which both sides seem Options country. Starting with the adoption of the to be far from agreement. One option for the Council is to again extend joint communiqué, the initial screening phase According to media reports, a meeting UNFICYP in its current configuration for of negotiations was concluded on 15 April. between Anastasiades and Erolglu on 2 June six months. After completing this phase, the negotia- indicated that, despite some progress since Another option could be to acknowledge tions moved to an ongoing substantive phase. agreeing on the joint communiqué, there was positive momentum resulting from resump- During the substantive phase, both sides are a stalemate in the negotiation process. The tion of unification talks in February while expected to submit substantial, counter and leaders seem to disagree about substantive simultaneously including additional language bridging proposals for a settlement. Also, and procedural issues of negotiations. The that would add a sense of urgency to the both sides have agreed in principle to meet Greek Cypriot side is accusing the Turkish issue, pointing out that the process cannot on a more frequent and structured basis, with Cypriot side of not engaging with substan- be open-ended. both leaders meeting once every two weeks tive proposals on all issues and refusing an Issuing a presidential or press statement and chief negotiators meeting weekly. enhanced EU role in negotiations. On the welcoming progress is an additional option if, During the substantive phase of negotia- other hand, Turkish Cypriots are accusing before the Council meeting, Greek Cypriot tions, Under-Secretary-General for Political Greek Cypriots of trying to change previous- and Turkish Cypriot leaders reach an initial A!airs Je!rey Feltman visited the island on 5 ly agreed-upon points. In a brief statement agreement that could enable negotiations on May. Feltman met with Greek Cypriot lead- following the 2 June meeting, Buttenheim a comprehensive settlement agreement. er Nicos Anastasiades and Turkish Cypriot confirmed that the leaders agreed to con- leader Dervis Erolglu. Feltman conveyed the tinue submitting proposals on all core issues Council Dynamics strong support of the Secretary-General for and also discussed possible confidence- Few Council members tend to follow the a comprehensive settlement and the need to building measures. issue of Cyprus with much attention. Among maintain positive momentum in negotiations. those that do, the most notable are France, On 21 May, US Vice President Joe Biden Human Rights-Related Developments Russia and the UK. Traditionally, the UK has visited Cyprus, where he met privately and UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights tended to be more sympathetic to the Turk- Flavia Pansieri presented a report on the situ- jointly with both leaders. Biden expressed ish Cypriot position while France and Rus- ation of human rights in Cyprus to the Human support for the reunification talks and peace Rights Council (A/HRC/25/21) on 26 March. The sia have been more sympathetic towards the process. He was clear in his remarks that report described some positive intercultural and Greek Cypriot position. Judging from recent he came to Cyprus “on behalf of the US to interreligious developments in 2013 but stressed developments, there seems to be increased help Cypriots get a solution, not to present that the continuing division of Cyprus remains interest by the US in finding a solution to the an obstacle to the enjoyment of human rights or impose one”. Though Biden’s visit was Cyprus issue in the near future. by all. It observed that addressing the underly- important for providing additional impetus ing human rights issues should be an important The Ukrainian crisis has provided a new for the negotiation process, the main purpose context for Council dynamics on practically of the visit was to discuss energy and region- a comprehensive settlement would contribute to every issue where there are divergences in al security issues. After discoveries, starting improving the human rights situation throughout positions, in particular between Russia and Cyprus. in 2011, of hydrocarbon reserves within the the P3. Regarding Cyprus, Russia tends to The UN Committee against Torture consid- coastal waters of Cyprus, exploration and ered the fourth periodic report of Cyprus on 8-9 support the Greek Cypriot position that the drilling is set to start this year. Should the May and adopted concluding observations and Council should not impose any conditions reserves prove to be substantial, they could or timeframe for the negotiations. The UK serve as an alternative supply of energy to Several recommendations pertained to detention and other Council members that are frus- Europe and the wider region. If realised, conditions. trated by the longevity of the process are of hydrocarbon reserves have the potential to the view that negotiations should be stimu- become a major source of revenue for Cyprus Key Issues lated by imposing some form of pressure on and could possibly provide positive momen- Besides renewing UNFICYP’s mandate, an both sides. tum for unification talks. issue for the Council remains how to facili- Although Biden’s visit re-energised tate a more substantial process of unifica- the unification talks, many issues remain tion negotiations between Greek Cypriot and

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast July 2014 securitycouncilreport.org 25 Peacebuilding

Expected Council Action (S/PV.7143). Helen Clark, the Administrator program to educate rural areas about the In July, the Council expects to receive a of the UN Development Programme, also ebola virus. As of 5 June, there had been 351 briefing by Ambassadors Vladimir Drobn- briefed, as did Patriota. Interventions focused cases of ebola and 226 deaths since the out- jak (Croatia) and Antonio de Aguiar Patri- on the Secretary-General’s three peacebuild- break began in late January. ota (Brazil), the former and current chairs ing priority areas—inclusivity, institution- Since April, the Guinea-Bissau configu- of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), building and sustained international sup- ration has issued three press statements on on the seventh annual report of the PBC port—identified in his 8 October 2012 report Guinea-Bissau’s electoral process to restore (A/68/729-S/2014/67). on peacebuilding (S/2012/746). constitutional order. A statement on 1 April Later, on the day of the briefing, an infor- expressed concern over incidents of violence mal interactive dialogue involving Council Recent Developments in Country- and intimidation before the 13 April national members, the six PBC country-configuration Specific Configurations elections. Statements were also released pri- chairs and ambassadors of the PBC agenda The chair of the Burundi configuration, or to the 18 May presidential run-o! elec- countries is planned. Ambassador Paul Seger (Switzerland), vis- tion and on 12 June after the two successful No outcome is expected. ited Burundi on 26-27 May to help di!use electoral rounds. Patriota, as configuration internal tensions and to restore trust between chair, last briefed Council members on 19 Key Recent Developments the government and the international com- May (S/PV.7177), recalling a preliminary The PBC adopted its annual report on 29 munity. The visit was part of a broader trip strategy for configuration re-engagement January. The report reviews PBC activities by Seger in which he also travelled to Brus- with Guinea-Bissau following the inaugura- over 2013 and assesses progress in advanc- sels, Paris, Kigali and Arusha, meeting senior tion of the new government. ing recommendations from the 2010 review. representatives of various governments and In March, the third review of mutual The report includes in an annex a decision regional organisations to explore options commitments between Liberia and its PBC to start holding an annual session during for engagement on Burundi and to define configuration was concluded. Commitments the third or fourth week of June each year respective roles in light of the planned depar- were extended for an additional year, with the around Peacebuilding Day, which is 23 June. ture of the UN O"ce in Burundi (BNUB) final report noting that these may be aligned The initiative is intended to create closer at the end of the year. Seger also discussed in 2015 around a “New Deal” compact. collaboration between stakeholders in New organising a round-table meeting as a fol- Recent configuration activities have focused, York, capitals and the field while reflecting on low-up to the 2012 Geneva Donor Confer- among other things, on advancing the stalled broader peacebuilding policies. The session ence and to assess the implementation of reconciliation process and improving land will replace the high-level ministerial meeting Burundi’s Strategic Framework for the Fight and natural resource management through during the General Debate. against Poverty II. the Peacebuilding Fund and World Bank sup- The PBC held its first annual session Ambassador Mohammed Loulichki port. In May, Ambassador Mårten Grunditz on 23 June, organised around the theme of (Morocco), the then-chair of the Central (Sweden) informed the PBC that he would resource mobilisation. The session included African Republic (CAR) configuration, vis- replace Ambassador Sta!an Tillander (Swe- interactive discussions on revenue genera- ited the CAR from 4-7 March. It was his den) as configuration chair in July and that tion in post-conflict countries and sustaining first visit since being appointed chair in Jan- they would jointly visit Liberia. (Unlike the resources for post-conflict countries transi- uary. Loulichki met transitional authorities other configurations, Tillander has not been tioning from Security Council-mandated and o"cials of the UN Integrated Peace- an accredited permanent representative.) missions to UN country teams. building O"ce in the CAR to discuss prio- On 26 March, at the final briefing on Sier- Following last year’s briefing on the annu- ries for PBC engagement and how the con- ra Leone upon the withdrawal of the UN al report and interactive dialogue in April figuration could support international and Integrated Peacebuilding O"ce in Sierra 2013, Rwanda formally organised and start- regional e!orts to stabilise the CAR. In Leone (UNIPSIL), Ambassador Guillermo ed chairing a “PBC working stream”, which April, Ambassador Omar Hilale (Morocco) Rishchynski (Canada), chair of the Sierra focuses on Council-PBC relations. The group, assumed the chairmanship. Leone configuration, addressed Council which had met once in 2012, met more reg- At a meeting of the Guinea configuration members about a new plan for lighter PBC ularly since April 2013. It is composed of on 16 April presided by its chair, Ambassa- engagement (S/PV.7148). With the conclu- Council members who are members of the dor Sylvie Lucas (Luxembourg), UN security sion of UNIPSIL, Sierra Leone became the PBC, configuration chairs and PBC-agenda sector reform (SSR) experts briefed on a Jan- second PBC-agenda country, with Guinea, country representatives. uary interagency mission. SSR in Guinea was that is not on the Council agenda. The Council last considered peacebuild- starting a new phase, focusing on building ing as a separate issue on 19 March when civilian oversight of the defence and security Key Issues Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson forces and strengthening the police and jus- Enhancing the advisory role of the PBC briefed on UN peacebuilding e!orts, includ- tice sectors. The configuration has also been to the Council is a key issue. Members are ing women’s participation in peacebuilding seeking donors for a $400,000 UNICEF likely to reflect on the PBC’s first annual

UN DOCUMENTS ON PEACEBUILDING Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2012/29 (20 December 2012) emphasised the importance of inclusivity in national peace- building processes. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.7143Peacebuilding Commission Document S/2014/67 (29 January 2014) was the PBC’s seventh annual report.

26 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast July 2014 Peacebuilding (con’t) session and the upcoming 2015 PBC review the relapse into conflict in the CAR as of 10 viewed as beneficial for, among other things, in this regard. December 2012. While the P5 continue to providing a better idea of how PBC engage- A closely related issue is taking full advan- oppose country-configuration chairs partici- ment can support the Council’s work and tage of the country-specific expertise of the pating in consultations, several new initiatives for planning mission mandates or drafting chairs of the PBC country-configurations, in within the past year have been undertaken by Council statements. Concerned over Burun- particular the question about the chairs par- members to enhance the PBC’s advisory role. di possibly relapsing into conflict in Burundi, ticipating in Council consultations. As Presidents of the Council in September Council members have highly valued Seger’s 2013 and March 2014, respectively, Austra- contribution, whose advice has been credited Options lia and Luxembourg organised meetings of for specific provisions in resolution 2137 that The Council may: Council experts and Tillander prior to for- renewed BNUB. • discuss the annual report and take no mal meetings on the UN Mission in Liberia. On the past six occasions, the presenta- action; or Seger had also briefed Council experts on tion of the PBC annual reports provided an • issue a presidential or press statement that his e!orts and observations prior to Coun- opportunity for Council members to hold a welcomes recent practices for improv- cil meetings on Burundi. Additionally, the debate, with the 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2012 ing PBC-Council cooperation and the “PBC working stream”, chaired by Rwanda, meetings held as open debates. upcoming 2015 PBC review. is viewed as a best practice. In addition to the 2015 PBC review, the For some members, these practices have Council expects a final report from the Secre- Council and Wider Dynamics demonstrated opportunities to increase tary-General on peacebuilding in the aftermath Within the Council (and broader member- PBC-Council collaboration on a case-by- of conflict in December, when it may adopt a ship), it is felt that the PBC has not lived up case basis with the di!erent country-config- new presidential statement on peacebuilding. to its envisioned role, a view reinforced by urations. Informal meetings with configura- There is no designated penholder on the 12 April 2012 coup in Guinea-Bissau and tion chairs ahead of Council meetings are peacebuilding.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast July 2014 securitycouncilreport.org 27 Notable Dates for July Bruno Stagno REPORT DUE REPORTS FOR CONSIDERATION IN JULY REQUESTING Executive Director DOCUMENT Joanna Weschler Deputy Executive Director & 29 January 7th Annual PBC Report (S/2014/67) S/RES/1645 Director of Research

25 June SG report on UNOWA (West Africa) S/2013/759 Amanda Roberts Coordinating Editor & Senior Research Analyst 26 June SG report on the implementation of resolution 1701 (Lebanon/ S/RES/2115 UNIFIL) Shamala Kandiah Thompson What’s in Blue Editor & Senior Research Analyst 27 June OPCW report on the implementation of resolution 2118 (Syrian S/RES/2118 chemical weapons) Astrid Forberg Ryan Senior Research Analyst & 4 July Interim report of the 2127 CAR Panel of Experts (Central African S/RES/2127 Republic) Victor Casanova Abos Research Analyst

11 July SG report on UNAMI (Iraq) S/RES/2110 Charles Cater Research Analyst 11 July SG report on Iraq/Kuwait Missing Persons and Property S/RES/2107 Paul Romita Research Analyst 14 July S/RES/2135 Eran Sthoeger Research Analyst 24 July SG report on the implementation of resolution 2139 (humanitarian S/RES/2139 access in Syria) Benjamin Villanti Research Analyst

MANDATES RELEVANT DOCUMENT Robbin VanNewkirk EXPIRE Publications Coordinator

Laura Coquard-Wallace 31 July UNAMI (Iraq) S/RES/2110 Research Associate

31 July S/RES/2135 Dahlia Morched Research Associate and Communications Coordinator

Vladimir Sesar Research Associate

Maritza Tenerelli Administrative Assistant

Lindiwe Knutson Research Intern

Stevenson Swanson Editorial Consultant

Security Council Report is a non- Governments of Australia, Austria, The Security Council Report and What’s in Blue Apps Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, are available for free at the App Store. Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey, the Ford Foundation and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

Design Point Five, NY

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza 885 2nd Ave at 48th St, 21st Floor New York NY 10017

Telephone +1 212 759 6394 Fax +1 212 759 4038 Web securitycouncilreport.org whatsinblue.org

Keep informed of the latest developments in the Security Council through our Apps for the iPhone and iPad. Android platform will be coming soon.

The material in this publication is subject to copyright ownership. Material in this publication may be freely used as in the public domain. You are free to copy, distribute, or make derivative works of the work under the following conditions: you must attribute the work to Security Council Report, Inc.; you may not use this work for commercial purposes; if you alter, transform, or build upon this work, you may distribute the resulting work only under a license identical to this one.

28 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast July 2014 Active Security Council Sanctions Regimes: An Abridged History

2140 The Security Council has used its Article 41 powers under the UN Charter to impose sanc- Ye m e n 2 1 4 0 tions 30 times since it first established a mandatory sanctions regime on Southern Rhodesia (2014) in resolution 232 (1966). Currently, 15 sanctions regimes are in force, with the 751 Somalia AF,TB regime dating back to resolutions 733 (1992) and 751 (1992) while the 2140 Yemen regime 2127 2134 established in resolution 2140 (2014) is the most recent. Central African Republic 2127 (2013) (2014) All current sanctions regimes are targeted, using one or more measures to signal, constrain AE AE,AF,TB or coerce states, entities or individuals to change behaviour. Di!erent measures are frequently 2048 used in tandem to strengthen a regime: at present, arms embargoes (12), asset freezes (14) Guinea-Bissau 2048 (2012) and travel bans (14) are part of almost all current regimes in force. In addition to the type(s) TB and scope of measures adopted, the strength of a sanctions regime is also determined by the institutional architecture that verifies compliance and non-compliance. A standalone sanctions Ta l i b a n 1 9 8 8 1267 1988 regime is institutionally weaker than a sanctions regime with a committee, which in turn is (1999) (2011) weaker than one with a committee and a panel/group of experts or monitoring group (di!erent A E , A F, A E , A F, TB shades of blue in the table reflect these institutional variants). TB 1970 1973 2009 Libya 1970 (2011)(2011)(2011) Security Council resolution numbers appear in bold followed by the year they were adopted in parenthesis. A E , A F, A E , A F, A E ( P ) , Only resolutions establishing, amending or ending a sanctions regime are referenced, not those renewing JR,TB JR,TB AF,TB an existing regime without introducing any variations. Abbreviations for sanctions measures introduced, 1737 1747 1803 1929 amended or continued appear below the respective resolution number. Iran 1737 (2006)(2007) (2008) (2010) AF,NP A E , A F, A E , A F, A E , A F, NP,TB NP,TB NP,TB Democratic People’s 1695 1718 1874 2087 2094 Republic of Korea 1718 (2006) (2006) (2009) (2013)(2013) Sanctions Regime Only AE: Arms Embargo, (P) Partial NP A E , A F, A E , A F, A E , A F, A E , A F, AF: Asset Freeze NP,TB NP,TB NP,TB NP,TB Sanctions Regime and Committee CE: Charcoal Embargo 1636 1757 Sanctions Regime and Committee alongside DE: Diamond Embargo Lebanon 1636 (2005) (2007) Panel/Group of Experts or Monitoring Group DS: Diplomatic Sanctions AF,TB A F, J R , Terminated Regime ES: Economic Sanctions TB JR: Judicial Referral Sudan 1591 1556 1591 1593 NP: Non-Proliferation Sanctions (2004) (2005)(2005) TB: Travel Ban AE A E , A F, A E , A F, TE: Timber Embargo TB JR,TB Côte d’Ivoire 1572 1572 1584 1643 1975 (2004)(2005)(2005) (2011) A E , A F, A E , A F, A E , A F, A E , A F, TB TB DE,TB DE,TB Democratic Republic of 1493 1533 1596 1649 1698 1807 the Congo 1533 (2003) (2004) (2005) (2005)(2006) (2008) AE AE A E , A F, A E , A F, A E , A F, A E ( P ) , TB TB TB AF,TB 788 1343 Liberia 1521 1478 1521 1532 1689 1753 1903 (1992) (2001) (2003) (2003)(2004) (2006) (2007) (2009) AE AE,DE, AE,DE, AE,DE, AE,AF, A E , A F, AE,AF A E ( P ) , TB TB,TE TB,TE DE, TB,TE DE AF Iraq 1518 661 1483 1518 1546 1762 (1990) (2003) (2003) (2004) (2007) ES AE AE,AF AE(P),AF AE,AF

Al-Qaida 1267 1333 1368 1390 1455 1526 1617 1730 1735 1817 1989 1267/1989 (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006)(2006) (2008) (2011) A E , A F, A E , A F, A E , A F, A E , A F, A E , A F, A E , A F, A E , A F, A E , A F, A E , A F, A E , A F, A E , A F, TB TB TB TB TB TB TB TB TB TB TB Eritrea 1907 733 751 1356 1407 1425 1474 1519 1766 1844 1907 1976 2036 2093 Somalia 751 (1992)(1992) (2001) (2002)(2002)(2003)(2003) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2011)(2012) (2013) AE AE AE AE AE AE AE AE A E , A F, AE,AF,TB A E , A F, A E , A F, AE(P), AF, 1990 1995 2000 2005 TB 2010 JR,TB CE,TB CE,TB