July 2014 Monthly Forecast 2 In Hindsight: Sanctions Overview 3 Status Update since our June Forecast 4 Peacekeeping Rwanda will hold the presidency of the Coun- • Syria, on humanitarian access by Under-Sec- cil in July. A high-level open debate on regional retary-General for Humanitarian A!airs Val- 5 Iraq partnerships in UN peacekeeping is planned, to erie Amos and on the chemical weapons track 8 Syria be presided by Foreign Minister Louise Mushi- by Sigrid Kaag, Special Coordinator of the 10 Lebanon kiwabo of Rwanda. UN Secretary-General Ban OPCW-UN Joint Mission; 11 Israel/Palestine Ki-moon, Chairperson of the AU Commission • Sudan-South Sudan issues, by the Special Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma and EU High Repre- Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan and head 13 South Sudan sentative for Foreign A!airs and Security Policy of the UN O"ce to the AU, Haile Menkerios; 15 Sudan and South Catherine Ashton are expected to brief. • Lebanon and implementation of resolution Sudan The quarterly open debate on the Middle East 1701, likely by Special Coordinator Derek 17 Sudan (Darfur) is also expected with a briefing by Special Coor- Plumbly and Assistant Secretary-General for 18 Somalia dinator for the Middle East Peace Process Robert Peacekeeping Edmond Mulet; 20 Central African Serry. • Cyprus and the status of negotiations by Spe- Republic A briefing is expected on the annual report of cial Representative and head of the UN Peace- 21 Libya the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) by Ambas- keeping Force in Cyprus, Lisa Buttenheim; sadors Vladimir Drobnjak (Croatia) and Antonio • preparations for the deployment of the UN 23 UNOWA (West Africa) de Aguiar Patriota (Brazil), the former and cur- Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation 24 Cyprus rent chairs of the PBC. Mission in the Central African Republic, by 26 Peacebuilding Briefings, followed by consultations, are Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping 28 Notable Dates expected on: Hervé Ladsous; and Supplement • Iraq, by Nickolay Mladenov, the head of UN • the work of the 751/1907 Somalia and Eritrea Active Security Council Assistance Mission for Iraq; Sanctions Committee by its chair, Ambassador Sanctions Regimes: An • the UN O"ce for West Africa by its head, Spe- Oh Joon (Republic of Korea). Abridged History cial Representative Said Djinnit; and Formal sessions will be needed to adopt reso- • the work of the 2127 Central African Republic lutions renewing the mandates of UNFICYP in Sanctions Committee, by its chair, Ambassa- Cyprus and UNAMI in Iraq. dor Raimonda Murmokaitė (Lithuania). Also in June, Council members plan to hold At press time, it appeared that the briefing fol- an Arria-formula meeting with the Human Rights lowed by consultations on Darfur by the head Council’s Commission of Inquiry on Syria and an of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur, informal interactive dialogue with the chairs of Mohamed Ibn Chambas, scheduled for July, the PBC country-specific configurations. might be postponed until August. Throughout the month members will be fol- Briefings in consultations are likely on: lowing closely events in Ukraine, Iraq, Mali and • Libya by Special Representative Tarek Mitri, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and addi- the head of the UN Support Mission in Libya; tional meetings may be scheduled.• 30 June 2014 This report is available online at securitycouncilreport.org. For daily insights by SCR on evolving Security Council actions please subscribe to our “What’s In Blue” series at whatsinblue.org or follow @SCRtweets on Twitter. Security Council Report Monthly Forecast July 2014 securitycouncilreport.org 1 In Hindsight: Sanctions The Council has recently demonstrated consequences and mapping linkages with other Denmark, Finland, Germany, Liechtenstein, renewed activity in using sanctions as a tool aspects of UN peace operations. the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Swit- for maintaining international peace and secu- Improved coordination and cooperation zerland—proposed extending the procedural rity. With the adoption of resolution 2140 within the UN system and with regional safeguards of the Ombudsperson from the concerning Yemen on 26 February 2014, the organisations could also lead to enhanced 1267/1989 Al-Qaida regime to the other UN Council reached an all-time high number e!ectiveness of sanctions regimes and bet- sanctions regimes (S/PV.6964). of concurrent sanctions regimes: 15. Some ter compliance. This might include greater Ultimately, the sanctions issues outlined Council members and observers, however, synergy between the work of panels/groups above—institutional evolution, strategy, coor- have recognised that there remains consider- of experts and UN peacekeeping operations, dination, transparency and due process—are able room for improvement in UN sanctions further communication between the Council secondary to Council dynamics. Put more design and implementation. and UN country teams, more coordination concretely and starkly, there may be no other Since the imposition of the first mandato- among sanctions committee chairs and infor- greater indicator of the potential success or ry sanctions in 1968 with resolution 253 con- mation sharing among panels/groups. Regu- failure of a UN sanctions regime than con- cerning Rhodesia, the Council’s approach lar consultations between the Council and sistent, sustained commitment among the has evolved in several ways: regional organisations—potentially includ- Council members themselves, particularly • in order to minimise unintended conse- ing e!orts to harmonise certain sanctions the P5. When Council members fail to fol- quences such as humanitarian impact, regimes—could lead to better compliance low through with secondary sanctions against sanctions regimes since the mid-1990s and enforcement through complementary sanctions spoilers, or they themselves under- have been primarily targeted rather than international and regional measures. Per- mine a UN sanctions regime, the message comprehensive; haps sanctions coordination and cooperation for the wider UN membership is clear. And • designation criteria have expanded to could be an agenda topic for the next annual when Council members block or delay publi- address human rights violations and the joint consultative meeting with members of cation of a report by a panel/group of experts, protection of civilians, particularly chil- the AU Peace and Security Council. the integrity of the process may be compro- dren and women (precedents were estab- Transparency is perhaps the most con- mised, as may also occur when the experts lished—both in the Democratic Republic spicuous area of sanctions practice where the appointed to such panels/groups are predom- of the Congo—with resolution 1698 and costs of reform are low and the benefits (i.e., inantly nationals of certain Council members. resolution 1807 respectively); awareness, legitimacy and compliance) are Likewise, when seeking to understand why • regarding structure, sanctions commit- high, yet there have been few changes. Nor certain sanctions regimes are actively imple- tees and a panel or group of experts have is transparency in sanctions regimes a new mented (e.g., 1267/1989 Al-Qaida) while become standard for most regimes (all 15 issue: notes by the President of the Security others remain for all intents and purposes current regimes have a committee, and Council were issued on the matter in 1995 dormant (e.g., 1591 Sudan), the answer can 12 of 15 committees have a monitoring (S/1995/234) and 1999 (S/1999/92), while the be found within Council dynamics. mechanism); and Informal Working Group on General Issues Taking up several of the challenges out - • in response to due process concerns, the of Sanctions, a subsidiary body of the Coun- lined here, the governments of Australia, Fin- Focal Point (resolution 1730) and the cil, made further recommendations in 2006 land, Greece and Sweden in partnership with O"ce of the Ombudsperson (resolution (S/2006/997). Measures to increase transpar- the Watson Institute at Brown University 1904) were created to facilitate delisting ency could include regular consultations with and Compliance and Capacity International processes. non-Council member states a!ected by spe- launched on 28 May the High Level Review One area that remains relatively underde- cific sanctions regimes, more frequent public of UN Sanctions (http://www.hlr-unsanctions. veloped is sanctions strategy. In the interest briefings by the chairs of sanctions committees, org). Three working groups will consider of improving sanctions implementation, most the inclusion of more specific information in issues related to UN integration and coordi- practitioners and scholars have focused on rel- the annual reports of sanctions committees, nation, external institutions and instruments, atively narrow measures of e"ciency, which and publicly available transcripts or summary and regional organisations and emerging chal- can obscure the bigger picture of what UN records of sanctions committee meetings. lenges. This high-level review has a few nota- sanctions are intended to achieve. At a strate- Due process continues to be a subject of ble state-led predecessors, including the Bonn- gic level, there is often considerable ambigu- interest within a sanctions context. The cre- Berlin Process, the Interlaken Process, and the ity regarding how sanctions are meant to rein- ation of the Focal Point for Delisting in 2006 Stockholm Process, which generated reports force other aspects of UN engagement, such and the O"ce of the Ombudsperson in