THE WEST AND THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AFTER THE ARAB SPRING Lorenzo Vidino, Editor Al Mesbar Studies & Research Centre in collaboration with The Foreign Policy Research Institute The West and the Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab Spring Lorenzo Vidino, Editor February 2013 About Al Mesbar Studies & Research Center Al Mesbar Studies & Research Center is an independent Center that specializes in the study of Islamic movements. The Center focuses primarily on contemporary Islamic movements, their thoughts and practices, symbolisms and ideologies and their historic impact. About the Foreign Policy Research Institute Founded in 1955 by Ambassador Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI is a non-partisan, non-profit organization devoted to bringing the insights of scholarship to bear on the development of policies that advance U.S. national interests. In the tradition of Strausz-Hupé, FPRI embraces history and geography to illuminate foreign policy challenges facing the United States. In 1990, FPRI established the Wachman Center to foster civic and international literacy in the community and in the classroom. The West and the Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab Spring Turki Al Dakhil Chairman, Al Mesbar Studies & Research Centre We are delighted at Al Mesbar Studies & Research Centre to partner with the Foreign Policy Research Institute in publishing this important book at an historic moment, for this work examines the West’s relationship with political Islam, emerging from the largest shift ever witnessed in the Arab region in modern times. While the Arab Spring was not Islamic at its beginning in 2011, Islamists today are the biggest winners, after their ascension to power. And they now threaten many regimes in other Arab countries. The heart of this book is an examination of eight Western countries and their perspectives on the Islamists’ ascension to power in the Arab Spring’s aftermath. The chapters provide historical context, along with the official positions of each country and its policies before and after 2011. The reader will also notice certain similarities in how these different Western countries have related to the Muslim Brotherhood over the years. Reactions, often provoked by fear are expressed in a consistent way. Specifically, domestic considerations are highlighted which led to policy formulations in these countries toward the Arab region on the one hand, and the Islamic factions on the other. The chapters examine the oscillating relationship between Washington and the Muslim Brotherhood during the last two presidential administrations. The George W. Bush administration dealt with the Brotherhood infrequently and with great suspicion. Barack Obama’s administration has engaged much more and established contacts with the Freedom and Justice Party, and supported democratization in the region. In addition, several European countries are concerned about the rise of Islamists to power because they are aware of the persecution and harassment of minorities—especially Jews, Baha'is and Christians living among Muslims in Muslim-majority countries—as well as the poor treatment of women. Certain Western countries’ attitudes toward political Islam also are linked with domestic affairs, the extent of Islamists' responses to liberal and secular values, as well as the influential role played by the emergence of populist parties in Europe, and their use of political Islam for their own purposes, and the impact of immigration from the Middle East to these countries. Officials in other countries have long considered the Middle East a source of terrorism. Yet, the importance of handling security matters and counterterrorism efforts hindered the establishment of closer relationships with the Muslim Brotherhood prior to 2011. However, after the Arab Spring, the Muslim Brotherhood has become a central reality, with explicit calls to engage them in a dialogue. The chapters in this book also illuminate the position of European countries that have an ambivalent and confusing history with Islamist movements, and in which political Islam has remained marginalized for decades. However, after the transitions that took place in 2011, these countries were encouraged to trust new Islamic political forces, once they became committed to democracy. We hope this book helps reader understand a complex and significant new force on the world stage. Table of Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 1 U.S. Policy and the Muslim Brotherhood By Steven Brooke ..................................................................... 6 Between ‘Engagement’ and a ‘Values-Led’ Approach: Britain and the Muslim Brotherhood from 9/11 to the Arab Spring By Martyn Frampton & Shiraz Maher .................................................................. 32 Canada and the Arab Islamists: Plus ça change By Alex Wilner … ........................................................ 56 Political Islam According to the Dutch By Roel Meijer ........................................................................... 68 Germany and the Muslim Brotherhood By Guido Steinberg ................................................................... 86 France and Islamist Movements: A Long Non-dialogue By Jean-François Daguzan ........................... 101 Spain and Islamist Movements: from the Victory of the FIS to the Arab Spring By Ana I. Planet and Miguel Hernando de Larramendi ................................................................................................................ 114 Israel and the Arab Spring: Understanding Attitudes and Responses to the "New Middle East" By Benedetta Berti........................................................................................................................................... 130 Contributors ............................................................................................................................................. 147 About the Editor ...................................................................................................................................... 148 Al Mesbar Studies & Research Centre Officers and Board .................................................................. 149 Foreign Policy Research Institute Officers and Board of Trustees ..................................................... 150 Introduction Lorenzo Vidino Before December 2010, virtually no one had heard of Mohammed Bouazizi outside of the dilapidated central Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid. Yet when he set himself on fire in front of the local governor’s office, in a desperate protest gesture against the confiscation of his goods and the apparent humiliation he suffered at the hands of the local police, the poor fruit seller became the symbol of a protest movement that engulfed first Tunisia and then large swaths of the Arab world, changing the region’s history. In Tunisia and in Egypt the protest movements managed to topple the authoritarian regimes that had ruled the two countries for decades with only a small amount of blood being spilled, as the militaries decided not to intervene against protesters. In Libya, on the other hand, protests against the Muammar Ghaddafi regime soon slid into a civil war that lasted until the fall, when the ruler was killed and the entire country fell into the hands of the militias headed by the Transitional National Council. Protests turned to violence also in Yemen, Bahrain and Syria, where at the time of this writing a real civil war is taking place. In virtually all other countries in the region there have been at least some protests against local regimes, testifying to the extensiveness of the phenomenon scholars have called the Arab Spring or Arab Awakening. Few observers had foreseen such a momentous phenomenon. And most were also surprised that Islamist forces seemed to play only a marginal role, if any, in the protests. From Tunis to Cairo, from Sana’a to Homs, protesters criticized local regimes for their corruption and inefficiencies, demanded rights and jobs, and represented all walks of life and political persuasion. Islamic insignia, demands for sharia and religious slogans were virtually absent. Indeed in some cases Islamist forces played an important role in organizing protests, thanks to their tested mobilization skills. Yet, due to the diverse nature of the protest movement, as well as Islamists’ concerted decision not to visibly engage, in no country did the protests possess an Islamist undertone. Yet, by the fall of 2011 and the first months of 2012, it became apparent that in several Arab countries Islamist movements were poised to be the main beneficiaries of the Arab Spring. In October, Ennahda secured 41 percent of the vote in the first post-revolutionary parliamentary elections in Tunisia, making it the country’s main political party. Ennahda went on to lead a coalition government with secretary general, Hamadi Jebali, becoming its prime minister. After a lengthy process, in January 2012 Egyptian authorities announced that the Muslim Brotherhood’s political party, Freedom and Justice, had won close to an absolute majority. Surprisingly, the Salafist al Nour won 25 percent of the votes, allowing Islamist forces a virtually unchallenged control over Egypt’s People’s Assembly. In June the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohammed Mursi won the country’s first free presidential election. Al Mesbar Studies & Research Centre and the Foreign Policy Research Institute 1 |