Revenue As a Measure for Expenditure: Ming State Finance Before the Age of Silver

REVENUE AS A MEASURE FOR EXPENDITURE: MING STATE FINANCE BEFORE THE AGE OF SILVER

by NOA GRASS

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES

(History)

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver)

December 2015

This dissertation explores fiscal policy during the first half of the Ming dynasty. Assuming a constant state of financial crisis caused by an ideological refusal and institutional inability to increase revenue, it identifies aspects of financial administration that contributed to the durability and resilience of the state. It first analyzes the principles of early Ming financial administration as reflected in the founding administrative text, Zhu si zhi zhang. The chapter devoted to the Ministry of Revenue focuses on the management of local resources through the timely and accurate flow of funds and information throughout the realm and along the administrative hierarchy. Based on evidence of standardized annual revenue reports, this dissertation argues that those principles were applied with relative success throughout most of the fifteenth century.

Next, it identifies the practice of commutation in tax collection and official payments as the main fiscal policy that enabled the Ming to abide by its principle of keeping expenditure low while avoiding financial default. Commutation served as a partial tax remission that enabled taxpayers to convert the grain they owed to a money or commodity at a favourable rate. It also alleviated the physical and financial burden of transportation. But as the state came to depend on fixed silver payments, financial administration transformed from a system that was focused on managing local resources to one that was geared to maximizing revenue in the

ii political centre. Finally, payments to officials, soldiers, and princes were affected by commutation. Despite their different social status, these groups were all treated as servants of the state and were managed according to the fiscal principle of measuring expenditure according to revenue. Throughout the fifteenth century payments were partially commuted to scrip and as a result salaries and stipends were greatly diminished. Nevertheless, particular policies and practices maintained a minimal degree of remuneration. And strategies employed by members of these groups in order to better their material condition illuminate the relationship between the state and its servants, as well as their place in local society.

iii Preface

This dissertation is my original, previously unpublished work. I prepared the tables that appear in Appendix D using data from published historical sources. Unless otherwise

indicated, translations from the Chinese sources are my own.

iv Table of Contents

Abstract ...... ii Preface ...... iv Table of Contents ...... v List of Tables ...... viii List of Figures ...... ix Notes on Usage ...... x Acknowledgements ...... xi Dedication ...... xiii 1 Introduction: Ming Fiscal Policy in Historical Context ...... 1 1.1 Distinction Between Private and Public Revenue ...... 6 1.2 Indirect Taxation ...... 9 1.3 Money...... 13 1.3.1 Government Credit...... 19 1.4 Financial Administration and Expertise ...... 21 1.5 Another Approach to Financial Administration ...... 24 1.6 Distinguishing between the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries ...... 30 1.7 Accounting ...... 33 1.8 Tax Commutation ...... 37 1.9 Exposition of the Chapters ...... 41 2 The Structure and Role of the Ministry of Revenue ...... 57 2.1 Legal Foundation of Financial Administration ...... 58 2.2 Political Origins of Ming Financial Administration ...... 67 2.3 The Structure of the Ministry of Revenue ...... 73 2.3.1 The Board of Population ...... 75 2.3.2 The Board of Expenditure ...... 82 2.3.3 The Board of Money ...... 84 2.3.4 The Board of Granaries ...... 85

v 2.4 Annual Revenue Reports ...... 88 2.5 Sixteenth Century Developments ...... 96 3 The Role of Tax Commutation in State Finance ...... 102 3.1 Scrip ...... 108 3.2 Silver ...... 129 3.3 Cotton and Silk ...... 156 3.4 The Annual Revenue Reports and Ming Financial Administration ...... 163 4 Civilian and Military Salaries ...... 166 4.1 Government Land ...... 168 4.2 Salary Charts ...... 172 4.3 Commutation of Salaries into Scrip ...... 176 4.4 Commutation into Sappan Wood, Pepper, and Cloth ...... 185 4.5 Silver ...... 191 4.6 Sending Money Home ...... 194 4.7 Paying Local Officials ...... 199 4.8 Ming Salaries in Comparative Perspective ...... 202 5 Military Finance ...... 207 5.1 Rations ...... 212 5.2 Awards ...... 216 5.3 The Salt for Grain Policy ...... 220 5.4 Military Colonies ...... 229 6 Princes ...... 239 6.1 Regular Income ...... 247 6.2 Commutation of Grain Allocations ...... 252 6.3 Princely Estates ...... 256 6.4 Expansion of Princely Estates ...... 260 6.5 Other Expenses of Princely Households ...... 268 6.6 Hereditary Titles ...... 270 6.7 Implications for the State Budget ...... 272 7 Conclusion ...... 275 Bibliography ...... 287

vi Appendices ...... 309 Appendix A: List of Ming Emperors ...... 309 Appendix B: Weights and Measures ...... 310 Appendix C: Commutation Exchange Rates ...... 311 Appendix D: Revenue Reports ...... 312

vii List of Tables

Table A-1 List of Ming Emperors ...... 309

Table B-1 Weights and Measures ...... 310

Table C-1 Commutation Exchange Rates ...... 311

Table D-1 Yongle Reign ...... 313

Table D-2 Yongle Reign (cont.) ...... 314

Table D-3 Yongle Reign (cont.) ...... 315

Table D-4 Yongle Reign: Tributes from Jiaozhi ...... 316

Table D-5 Hongxi-Xuande Reigns ...... 317

Table D-6 Hongxi-Xuande Reigns (cont.) ...... 318

Table D-7 Hongxi-Xuande (cont.) ...... 319

Table D-8 Hongxi-Xuande Reigns: Tax Remissions on Government Land ...... 320

Table D-9 Zhengtong-Tianshun Reigns ...... 321

Table D-10 Zhengtong-Tianshun Reigns (cont.) ...... 322

Table D-11 Zhengtong-Tianshun Reigns (cont.) ...... 323

Table D-12 Chenghua Reign ...... 324

Table D-13 Chenghua Reign (cont.) ...... 325

Table D-14 Chenghua Reign (cont.) ...... 326

Table D-15 Hongzhi Reign ...... 327

Table D-16 Hongzhi Reign (cont.) ...... 328

Table D-17 Hongzhi Reign (cont.) ...... 329

viii List of Figures

Figure 3-1 Total Annual Tax Income Collected in Scrip (ding) ...... 128

Figure 3-2 Total Annual Income from Silver Mining (liang)...... 143

Figure 3-3 Total Annual Income in Silk (pi) ...... 162

Figure 3-4 Total Annual Income in Cotton (pi) ...... 162

ix Notes on Usage

Chinese terms and names are rendered in pin yin except for references in other transliteration systems. Chinese and Japanese names are written surname first, unless they appear differently in English publications. Chinese terms for measure words are used except for liang, the standard measure word for silver in the Ming. I chose to use the term tael since it has become standard in English publications and in order to avoid confusion with liang as a measure unit for cloth. I use shi, a unit of volume, instead of dan, a unit of grain bearing the same character, for denoting the standard unit for grain since grain was measured by volume in the Ming. Reign dates are designated according to the equivalent of the end of the Chinese year in the Gregorian calendar. Therefore the end of one reign and the beginning of the next share the same year. Translations of official titles rely, wherever possible, on Hucker, Dictionary of Official Titles (1985).

x Acknowledgements

This dissertation has been long in the making. It saw the joy of the birth of my

daughter and the hardship of a difficult illness. Throughout this time, I have had the privilege of the guidance of my teachers and supervisors, Timothy Brook and Leo Shin.

Professor Brook saw the direction in which my project is going even before I fully grasped it and encouraged me to continue along that path. Professor Shin has the gift of

putting me back on track and reminding me to look at the big picture in the midst of

confusing details. I was also lucky to work with wonderful colleagues who had direct impact on the development of my academic identity. I had long and fruitful discussions with Desmond Cheung and Malcolm Thompson. Many cups of coffee were shared with

Laura Madokoro while working out our individual projects. Gabriela Aceves has often provided the right word of advice at the right time. The Institute of Asian Research provided a wonderful space to work and converse. I would like to acknowledge the collegiality of IAR employees Karen Jew, Carolyn Grant, Yoko Nagao, Kirstin Luettich, and Marietta Lao. The lunchtime discussions helped maintain my mental wellbeing during stressful times. I would like to send my deep gratitude to the staff of the dialysis and transplant clinics at Vancouver General Hospital. Without their care I would have not been able to finish this dissertation. Many thanks go to all of my friends in Vancouver who were always there to lend a hand and open their hearts when times were rough.

Finally, I would like to thank my family in Israel for their care and concern that helped

xi me get through difficult times. And to my husband Beni and Daughter Daniela, without your constant support and limitless love this project would have been meaningless.

xii Dedication

To the memory of my mother Keren Grass,

who always kept my desk clean so I could study.

xiii 1 Introduction: Ming Fiscal Policy in Historical Context

On a summer day in 1390, the Hongwu emperor held a nomination ceremony for

the new heads of the six ministries. Addressing the former Minister of Works and new

Minister of Revenue, Zhao Mian 趙勉 (jin shi 1385), the emperor laid down his principles for conducting state finance:

On this day I command you, Mian, to act as Minister of Revenue, to measure revenue in order to determine expenditure so as not to harass the people, and to always keep to public interests and avoid private interests.1

As a household advice, measuring revenue to determine expenditure (liang ru wei chu 量

入為出) means not to spend more than what one has. As an ideal of governance, it is connected to the idea of maintaining the public interest and avoiding private gain, and is part of a wider principle of managing wealth locally rather than amassing it in the political centre.2 The earliest record of this idea is in the ancient Confucian classic, Li ji

禮記.3 In the chapter dedicated to the king’s rule, it describes the way in which the national budget should be prepared, summarizing income at the end of the year and

1 Ming Taizu Shi lu, 明太祖實錄 [veritable records of Ming Taizu] (Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju, 1961-66): 202:1a.

2 Ming Taizu Shi lu, 135.2b-3a. The ruler, being the head of the “all under heaven,” stores wealth “all under heaven.”人君為天下之主當貯財于天下.

3 Li Ji 禮記, 5:29. http://www.chant.org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/Database.aspx (accessed: 12/18/2015). In the ancient record the phrase is 量入以為出.

1 planning the following year’s expenditure according to it. The founder of the Ming

dynasty, Zhu Yuanzhang, was a former peasant educated by an elite group of advisors that promoted adherence to conservative Confucian ideals of government. Together, they

attempted to shape state and society according to these principles and bring China back to

what they viewd as Confucian rule after centuries of foreign domination. Zhu Yuanzhang

personally experienced the abuses of a predatory tax system, in which local strong men

acted as tax collectors and wielded arbitrary power over the population. He therefore

established a small administrative structure that imposed minimal government

intervention in the livelyhood of the common people. He kept expenditure at a minimum

and devoted it entirely to the basic requirements of remunerating state servants.

But after the death of the first emperor the Ming expanded geographically and administratively. The transfer of the political centre back to the far north demanded vastly larger resources than did the first capital that nestled in the heart of the most fertile region in China. Population growth and growing social and economic complexity could not be controlled without a bigger administration. But in the choices that reformers made at key moments in the history of the dynasty, it is clear that they chose to adhere to the basic principle of keeping both revenue and expenses low rather than seeking ways to increase revenue. Instead of introducing change to the system of government finance, they made efforts to sustain the existing one. The government did not create fiscal institutions that could generate more revenue. Tax revenue did not reflect agricultural and commercial expansion. There were no official financial mechanisms of borrowing and credit. During most of the dynasty the government stifled maritime trade and did not tap into its profits.

And after the demise of scrip the state did not even control the production of money.

2 In his monumental work on state finance in the Ming, Ray Huang exposed the

inadequacy of state institutions to collect tax and distribute it in an efficient way.4 In his

detailed account of various aspects of Ming financial administration Huang points at

organizational weakness as the main characteristic of Ming government in the sixteenth

century. He exposes the cumbersome process of tax assessment and collection, the

atrophy of tax data, and the surcharges imposed on taxpayers in order to finance the

process of payment and delivery of taxes. His conclusion that the Ming state was under-

taxed overhauled the standard interpretation of the fall of the dynasty that placed the

blame of the late Ming mass rebellions on heavy taxation. Still, low taxes did not mean

that commoners were better off. Without sufficient funds for the proper functions of

government, officials resorted to informal and at times extortionist means of extracting

revenue. When faced with growing expenditure it did not have the political aptitude to

initiate meaningful reform. It was therefore doomed to operate in a perpetual state of

financial crisis.

As Huang states elsewhere, fiscal policy in the Ming suffered from its adherence to Confucian principles of government that was more literal than in other dynasties.5 This dissertation starts out from this assumption and asks what kind of fiscal policy did Ming administrators nevertheless conduct? And what structural or practical means where employed in order to over come the limitations of this approach to state finance? In

4 Ray Huang, Taxation and Governmental Finance in Sixteenth-Century Ming China (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974).

5 Ray Huang, “Fiscal Adsministration During the Ming Dynasty,” Chinese Government in Ming Times (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969): 73-77.

3 examining Ming fiscal policy according to its own principles, this dissertation offers an

alternative approach to understanding financial governance in the Ming. It first argues that the model of agrarian taxation was at its best during the fifteenth century when the political centre was able to obtain financial information from the provinces and maintain good communication along the administrative hierarchy. Secondly, it identifies tax commutation as the primary fiscal mechanism employed in order to adapt to changing economic circumstances, and demonstrates how large-scale commutation of the grain tax into silver impacted fiscal administration. The final three chapters examine the role of commutation in expenditure, concentrating on official payments to the three main groups of state servants: officials, soldiers, and members of the imperial clan.

In order to highlight the unique character of the Ming and to place it in the context of the history of fiscal policy in China, this introductory chapter examines key aspects of fiscal policy in the Ming against notable developments that took place mainly during the

Song. In doing so, this discussion utilizes historical categories of fiscal systems that describe a developmental trajectory. One of the peculiarities of the Ming is that whereas the Song developed sophisticated fiscal institutions that were partially continued during the Yuan the Ming did not continue along the same path. Instead, it employed fiscal policy that was determined by institutional limitations and supported by ideological opposition to fiscal expansion. The second half of this chapter introduces the practices of accounting and commutation of revenue and expenditure as two aspects of this fiscal policy that contributed to the viability of the dynasty.

First, a distinction should be made between the terms “fiscal policy” and “fiscal state.” The term “fiscal” pertains to public revenue and was originally associated with the

4 wealth of the king, which was later identified with public revenue.6 Despite its modern

ring, in its broadest sense the contemporary definition of the term “fiscal policy” can be

applied to imperial China. The International Monetary Fund defines it as “the use of

government spending and taxation to influence the economy.” And, it is added, the

purpose of fiscal policy is usually to promote growth and reduce poverty.7 In the Ming,

the promotion of growth and the reduction of poverty took place in an agrarian context.

And the peculiarity of its fiscal policy is that it remained so even as the economy became

more commercialized. This is why it is important to distinguish between fiscal policy and

the term “fiscal state.” As it is used in historical research, the latter designates the most

advanced stage of financial administration that characterizes contemporary states. Fiscal

states by definition exist in developed commercial societies. Therefore, although the

Ming dynasty was not a fiscal state in terms of this modern definition, it did conduct

fiscal policy within its own governmental framework.

The exploration of historical change in fiscal systems goes back to Joseph

Schumpeter who described the transition between the feudal and capitalist eras in fiscal

terms.8 While feudal rulers of domain states extracted revenue in kind, the tax state that replaced it operated within a capitalist system in which the goal was to increase tax

6 The earliest example of the term in the Oxford English Dictionary is from 1570. http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/view/Entry/70635?redirectedFrom=fiscal#eid. Accesed 12/19/15.

7 Mark Horton and Asmaa El-Ganainy, Fiscal Policy: Taking and Giving Away,” http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/fiscpol.htm. Accesed 09/22/15.

8 Josef A. Schumpeter, “The Crisis of the Fiscal State,” (1918), reprint The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism, edited by Richard Swedberg, 99-140 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991).

5 revenue by promoting and interacting with a commercial economy. This historical

perspective has since been expanded to other periods and countries.9 With the advantage

of numerous case studies, spanning from the Middle Ages to the early modern period

across Europe, the distinction between domain and tax states has been modified so that it

no longer represents a modern-premodern binary. Instead, characteristics of domain and

tax states can both be found in the early modern period. Furthermore, the addition of the

concept of the fiscal state provides another distinction in the degree of sophistication

between financial systems.10 In the following pages elements of fiscal policy during the

later period of imperial China, spanning from the Tang-Song to the Qing, are analyzed

according to these categories in order to elucidate the character of Ming state finance.

1.1 Distinction Between Private and Public Revenue

An essential aspect in Schumpeter’s distinction between domain and tax states regards an institutional separation between private and public revenue. This insistence on

institutional separation between public and private wealth has obscured the meaning of

this distinction in the context of premodern China. Using Schumpeter’s own example, when a Chinese emperor went to war it was not his personal affair as was the case with contemporary European kings. When addressing issues of state finance officials used the

9 Richard Bonney ed., Economic Systems and State Finance (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 1995; Richard Bonney ed., The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c. 1200-1815 (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 1999; W. M. Ormord, Richard Bonney and Margaret Bonney eds. Crisis Revolutions and Self- Sustained Growth: Essays in European Fiscal History 1130-1830 (Stamford: Shaun Tyas) 1999.

10 W. M. Ormord, Crisis Revolutions and Self-Sustained Growth, 4-8.

6 term guo yong (國用), or ‘state expenses’ that explicitly invokes the public domain, as do

the words of the first emperor stated above warning the new minister to avoid private

interests (私, si) and uphold the public good (公, gong).

That said, whereas European tradition created institutional and legal boundaries between these spheres, the Chinese imperial institution embodied them both. Ironically, in imperial China there was no clear separation between public wealth and the private wealth of the ruler because such a separation would acknowledge that the emperor was a private individual with material interests. Therefore, the classic statement that the whole world is the emperor’s home does not mean that it is his private domain. On the contrary, the emperor belongs within the public domain and should refrain from exploiting it.

Hongwu himself explained this in an early discussion on state finance with one of his

officials who urged to increase reserves at the political centre. After the official argued

that the emperor should store funds just like any other head of household, the emperor replied that the entire realm is his household, and as such his wealth is stored throughout the realm.11 As shall be discussed in the following chapter, the arrangements for

supplying the capital were vague during the Hongwu reign and depended on agricultural

surplus. When giving the order to build a palace treasury (nei fu ku, 內府庫) in the

capital, Hongwu did so with mixed feelings, citing the accumulation of vast sums of

money in the Song imperial treasury.12 He accepted the interpretation of the History of

the Song blaming emperors using public revenue for personal use while their armies were

11 A translation of this discussion appears on pages 56-57.

12 Ming Taizu Shi lu, 179:1a.

7 in need of funds, and thought of the imperial treasury as a potential threat to public

finance.

This was only part of the truth. In the Song the imperial treasury was an important

financial institution. The imperial treasury profited from sales of various items and

commodities that were received through tribute. It lent funds to the state treasury and

often demanded them in return. In this sense, it operated as a business enterprise that contributed to public finance.13 The Ming palace treasury too served as an emergency

fund chest. Stocks of precious metals, silk, commodities such as sappan wood and

pepper, as well as scrip in the early Ming were issued to buy supplies for the military and

sent as aid to famine stricken households. But in the Ming the imperial treasury

functioned only as a giant warehouse. As in the Song, eunuchs managed the various

commodities, stored in a cluster of storehouses. Revenue officials occasionally took

inventory of the storehouses, but they did not have full access to the accounts. Control

was ultimately in the hands of the eunuchs.14

Although the imperial treasury functioned as a public repository, there was no

legal prohibition to imperial appropriation of funds. For example, in the Song the costs of

housing and stipends for imperial kin were mostly taken from the state treasury. The

Ming administrative code was deliberately vague in regards to the income of the imperial

family. Funds were to be derived from the leftovers of tax revenue that was retained in

13 Robert M. Hartwell, “Finance and Power: The Imperial Terasuries in Song China,” Bulletin of Song and Yuan Studies 20 (1988): 18-89.

14 Huang, Taxation and Governmental Finance, 9.

8 the provinces.15 Zhu Yuanzhang followed the tradition of Confucian political culture and

preferred instilling the notion of the priority of public interest by educational means

rather than legal or institutional ones. The problem of course was that maintaining the

integrity of public revenue became a matter of the emperor’s personality.

The difficulty to distinguish between domain and tax state in imperial China

becomes apparent when considering the role of the palace treasury. In accordance with

the definition of a domain state, the emperor derived his income from the economy through imperial prerogative but it was often used for supplementing public expenditure.

Instead of a narrative of separation between private and public funds, statecraft thinkers

distinguished between keeping funds on the local level and centralizing funds in the

political centre. The means to prevent imperial appropriation of public funds was to

prevent excess funds from reaching the imperial palace in the first place. As shall be

discussed in chapter 3, growing difficulties to maintain large military units along the

northern border necessitated a concentration of funds in the capital and undermined this

ideal.

1.2 Indirect Taxation

While the Song and Ming emperors derived their wealth in a similar way, the two

dynasties played radically different roles in the economy. As stated earlier, a primary distinction between the Ming and its predecessors was its focus on agricultural sources of

15 See pp.84-85.

9 revenue. This prevented the state from reaping profits from commercial and industrial enterprises. In the historical literature, indirect taxation is not only a feature of an advanced tax state but also a prerequisite of a developed fiscal state. In imperial China indirect taxation first became an important source of state finance through the utilization of a state salt monopoly. Near the end of the Northern Song, revenue from salt reached half of total revenue.16 In contrast, in the late Ming, revenue from salt constituted around

6.5% of total revenue.17 The salt monopoly was structured according to the general rule

of decentralization under the sole leadership of the emperor that characterized Ming

administration. With no director of its own, salt production and distribution centres

operated separately under the Ministry of Revenue that had no special staff dedicated to

their operation. The government chose to maintain as little control as possible over the

production and sale of salt. Beyond a certain quota, salt producing households were free

to sell their salt to merchants, and households that turned to growing crops on the land

allocated to them paid the equivalent of their tax quota in grain.

Furthermore, in the fifteenth century the government sacrificed the revenue it

could have earned from a tax on salt in order to promote the circulation of scrip. By the

mid fifteenth century an average of 20,000,000 guan of scrip from the sale of salt was

16 Cecilia Lee-Fang Chien, Salt and State: An Annotated Translation of the Songshi Salt Monopoly Treatise, (Ann Arbour, MICH: Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 2004): 36.

17 Fang Jun, China’s Second Capital: Ming Nanjing Under the Ming, 1368-1644 (Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 102. Still, it should be said that within its modest size, the salt monopoly did expand production during the fifteenth century from an average of fewer than 1,000,000 to between 3000,000-5,000,000 yin (引, units of between 120 and 240 kilos). See tables D-3,6,10,13,16.

10 reported.18 In silver value the income would be around 600,000 taels. Actually, the total

value was much lower since many of the notes were damaged and collected for the

specific purpose of removing them from circulation. Salt was also exchanged for grain

transportation to the border. This policy cut transportation expenses but did not contribute

to available funds at the political centre. Revenue from salt was collected in silver only at

the end of the fifteenth century. It was therefore only then that it began to contribute to

the income of the central government.

The Song also expanded its revenue from commercial enterprises. William Liu

contrasts over 2,000 tax stations across the Song realm with only 125 stations operating

in the Ming. 19 This assessment of Ming tax stations seems too modest. According to

Brook, there was a tax station in every county (1,144 in the late Ming).20 Also, as shall be discussed in the following chapters, since in the fifteenth century official and military salaries were partially paid in scrip, and scrip was collected through commercial taxes,

localities probably obtained it through local commercial taxes. Furthermore, there is no

doubt that commercial taxes were not a significant source of total revenue, but recent

work on local finance suggests that commercial taxes may have provided an important

revenue source for magistrates. Local officials could temporarily set up a tax station in

18 See tabels D-6,10.

19 William Guanglin Liu, “The Making of A Fiscal State in Song China,” Economic History Review, 68:1 (2015): 67.

20 Timothy Brook, “Communications and Commerce,” Denis Twitchett and Frederick W. Mote eds. The Cambridge History of China: The Ming Dynasty Part 2 vol. 8 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998): 675-676; Huang maintains that most tax offices closed down in the sixteenth century. See: Huang, Taxation and Governmental Finance, 232.

11 order to collect revenue for a specific purpose such as building a city wall.21 He Zhaohui

provides a glimpse into the struggles of a late sixteenth century magistrate to meet the

expenses of daily administration. After the central government gained more control over

local funds through the Single Whip Reform, there was very little flexibility in tax collection to enable local magistrates to supplement their budgets. One of the last independent components of local revenue came from commercial taxes, which in the case of Magistrate Yuan Huang (袁黃) in Baodi County provided him with extra funds to meet unexpected expenses.22

Indirect taxation also stands at the centre of Qing state finance in the nineteenth

century. Stephen Halsey analyzes the transformation of the Qing fiscal system according

to the model of a “military fiscal state.” 23 In order to cope with loss of agricultural

revenue during the Taiping rebellion, the state moved from direct taxation of agriculture

to indirect taxation of trade.24 He Wenkai uses this conclusion as a starting point for a

comparative study of the ways in which England, Japan, and China dealt with fiscal

crisis. England during the Civil War, Japan during the Meiji Restoration, and China

during the Taiping rebellion all faced fiscal crises. The three countries employed similar

21 Brook, “Communications and Commerce,” 676.

22 He Zhaohui, “Stuggling for Balance: The Finances of Baodi County Around Wanli 20,” Ming Studies 67 (May, 2013): 54-71.

23 Jan Glete, War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal- Military States, 1500-1660 (London: Routledge, 2002). In this work, Glete points at developments in military technology and rising military expenses as the cause for fiscal innovation.

24 Stephen Halsey, “Money, Power, and the State: The Origins of the Military-Fiscal State in Modern China,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, (vol. 56, no.3, 2013), 392-432.

12 methods to overcome these crises, but unlike England and Japan, which managed to

transform into centralized fiscal states, the Qing’s financial system remained

decentralized. He Wenkai’s definition of a modern fiscal state as one that “centrally

collects indirect taxes in order to mobilize long-term financial resources from the markets.” 25 This definition adds the important aspect of centralization of tax collection.

While indirect taxation of trade is conducive to centralization, He Wenkai shows that the

Qing failed to do so. The Taiping rebellion disrupted commercial as well as official

networks of trade and communication. The result was that the Qing had to further

decentralize its financial administration, a move that prevented it from developing the

institutions that supported government credit in Japan and England, among them is paper

currency that will be discussed below.

1.3 Money

Throughout most of the premodern world, control over money meant control over

precious metals. And one of the primary means of gaining control over the supply of

precious metal was through mining and minting operations. During the Song, the mining

of copper reached industrial proportions that were not matched anywhere in the world

before the nineteenth century. In the Song, annual quotas ranged in thousands of tonnes.

The peak was around 1070 with almost 13,000 tonnes. Excessive mining led to the

25 Wenkai He, Paths Toward the Modern Fiscal State: England, Japan, and China, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2013.

13 depletion of copper reserves by the second half of the twelfth century.26 In contrast,

quotas for government receipts from copper mining in the Ming are registered during the

first half of the fifteenth century and amount to around one tonne.27 Accordingly, the

Song was minting over a million strings of coins a year in the eleventh century, while the revenue reports register a negligible quota of 3,000 strings for a short period during the

Yongle reign.28

Monetization is an aspect of an advanced tax state, though it is not necessarily so.

For example, in the late twelfth century, the Hungarian king Béla III (r. 1172-1196) had greater silver revenues than the kings of England and France. The majority of revenues were derived from profits from mines and mints, the salt monopoly, and customs duties.

But although these were revenues derived from a developed monetary market economy, they were all derived by royal privilege: “Behind an apparently modern fiscal system lay, in fact, the might of a ruler whose power rested in his position as the greatest landholder in the country.”29 On the other hand, assuming that the capability to institute direct

26 Peter J. Golas, “Mining,” Science and Civilization in China vol. 5 part 13 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 88.

27 See tables D-2,6.

28 Richard von Glahm, Fountain of Fortune: Money and Monetary Policy in China, 1000-1700, 49 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). For Ming miniting quotas see table D-2.

29 Gabor Barta and Janos Barta, “Royal Finance in Medieval Hungary: The Revenues of King Béle III,” in Oromond, Crisis, Revolutions, 22-37.

14 taxation necessitates a more complex taxing apparatus, Ormond finds that the first

attempt towards universal taxation in England involved taxation in kind and not money.30

In this sense, the degree of monetization in an economy does not in itself testify to

the degree of administrative sophistication. But, as discussed in the previous section, it

does increase the degree of efficiency in concentrating tax revenue in the political centre.

This happened in the sixteenth century as silver eclipsed revenue in kind. Tang Wenji

estimates the silver revenue from the grain tax in 1531 at 6 million taels.31 In addition,

Ray Huang estimates the annual silver revenue from non-agricultural taxes and levies in the 1570’s at around 12,000,000 taels. 32 Calculating the silver value of the grain tax

income estimated for 1531 according to a contemporary average government exchange

rate of 0.7 taels would yield 15,400,000 taels. This means that silver income surpassed

grain income that year. As for the higher grain tax income reported in 1578, valued at

18,647,049 million taels, silver and grain income would be about equal. It can be said,

therefore, that only in the sixteenth century did the Ming exhibit a high degree of

monetization in state finance.

30 Ormond, “The West European Monarchies in the Later Middle Ages,” Economic Systems and State Finance, 123-162.

31 Tang Wenji, Ming dai fu yi fuyi zhidu shi 明代賦役制度史 [A History of the Tax and Corveé System in Ming China] (Beijing: Zhongguo she hui ke xue chu ban she: xin huan shu dian jing xiao, 1991): 188. AThis was about 27% of an annual total of 22,000,000 shi.

32 Huang, Taxation and Govermental Finance, p.164 – annual grain tax revenue for 1578: 26,638,642; p. 214 - estimated income from the salt monopoly: 1,292,224 taels; pp.263-265 - estimations of cash revenue from commercial and other taxes: 4,634,000.

15 The ambivalence of the Ming towards silver is apparent in Qiu Jun’s writings on

the subject in his late fifteenth century magnum opus, Da xue yan yi bu. In an essay on

currency, Qiu Jun proposes to acknowledge the superiority of silver in a three-tire system of currency along with coin and scrip. 33 In another essay he also acknowledges the

benefit of commuting labour services into silver, another important source of revenue.34

But his opposition to silver mining exemplifies the inherent contradiction in the Ming

approach towards the precious metal. Qiu mentions the various uses people make of

silver as a means of conspicuous consumption, displayed in such conspicuous forms as

ornaments, household utensils, and images of gods. He argues that silver mining would

just add more silver that will be used for conspicuous consumption, and should therefore

be kept to a minimum.35 In this section Qiu does not even mention the role of silver as

money. In other words, he accepts the existence of silver as a means of payment but does

not believe the state should be involved in increasing its quantity in the economy.

This approach also elucidates the contrast between the Ming and its Western

contemporaries. In contrast to early modern European polities that built their fortunes on

silver and gold mines and sponsored expeditions to the other side of the world in search

of gold and silver, there was no attempt to seek silver internationally to compensate for inadequate domestic production. Even the relaxing of trade restrictions in the second half of the sixteenth century was more a result of concern over social order than a fiscal

33 Qiu Jun, Da xue yan yi bu, 大學演義補 [Supplement to the Commentary of the Great Learning] (1487, repr. Si ku quan shu zhen ben er ji, 603-666, Taiwan shang shu yin shu guan, 1971): 27:16b-17a.

34 Ibid, 31:20a-21a.

35Ibid, 29:12b-15a.

16 measure.36 Even in the late fifteenth century, when silver became crucial in financing

Beijing and the border armies, Qiu Jun declared in the concluding words of his essay on

government mining: “Comparing our dynasty’s taking of the people’s profit with that of

former eras, its benevolence and generousness in benefitting the people are truly

profound.”37

The institution of paper currency alludes to the sophistication and strength of the

state system in imperial China, and distinguishes the dynasties that employed it from any

other country before the modern period. During the Song dynasty and for the first two

decades of its existence in the Yuan, it succeeded in increasing the money supply and

expanded the resources available to the state. It served as a supplement to coin during the

Song and was issued for limited periods after which it was bought back by the state using

hard currency. The state further backed its scrip by allowing the notes to be convertible.

Yuan scrip served as a replacement for bronze coin that had assumed a minor role in the

economy. During the first twenty years of national circulation, Yuan scrip was

convertible with silver, but thereafter the state ceased to back its notes.38

In the Ming, scrip and coin were intended to circulate side by side. Coin from

previous ages was allowed to circulate alongside the officially minted coins due to

insufficient quantities. Still the amount of coin in circulation was never enough for it to

36 von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune, 114-118.

37 Qiu Jun, Da xue yan yi bu, 29:15b.

38 38 Herbert Franz Schurmann, Economic Structure of the Yuan Dynasty (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956).

17 be instrumental in state finance. Although paper currency existed in China from the tenth

to the fifteenth centuries, its management declined over time. The Ming continued to

issue scrip with no external backing. The early Ming made all the possible mistakes in trying to enforce its paper currency on the market. The government stopped minting coin, and banned silver and gold from market transactions, thus contributing to the rise in the value of these commodities against scrip. With the additional harm of excessive issuing,

Ming scrip devalued beyond repair within a few decades. Thereafter, there was no

attempt to mint silver even as it became the common medium of exchange. Instead,

administrators were content with supervision of market prices and determination of

official exchange rates.

He Wenkai’s discussion on the failure to issue paper currency in the Qing adds

further insight. The attempt to reintroduce paper currency into the economy failed in the

wartime conditions of the Taiping rebellion. The government created provincial offices

for the dissemination of scrip and intended to support the notes by provincial stocks of

specie. But provincial stocks were not sufficient to guarantee convertibility. Moreover,

the dissemination of paper currency was unsuccessful. While the government paid

soldiers and construction workers in paper notes, they often had to commute them into

silver or bronze in order to purchase supplies or equipment in local markets. There were

some local successes in issuing paper notes such as Jiangsu, where bronze coin from the

18 local custom taxes served as security. But, as mentioned above, the failure of the Qing to

centralize fiscal resources left the currency with no sufficient backing.39

In comparison, the early Ming built a financial apparatus that was deliberately

decentralized. Furthermore, the state never built any mechanism into its paper currency

that would ensure its creditworthiness. Ming notes were never secured by any

government pledge to redeem them. Finally, it could be argued that just as the economic

and political conditions in wartime Qing China were detrimental for establishing national

paper currency, they were not ideal in the early Ming either. China in the 1370’s was a

war-ravaged country that was just beginning to recuperate from economic devastation.

The trading networks and economic surplus that were needed to support a means of credit

such as scrip were not yet in place. To that we should add the war of succession at the

turn of the fifteenth century, which probably further diminished confidence in the

political viability of the Ming. By the time the economy recovered and stabilized, paper

notes were largely discarded.

1.3.1 Government Credit

As William Liu proposes, the Song management of paper currency suggests that

there was an understanding that government-issued notes are essentially a form of public

debt. By redeeming notes periodically, and using scrip as an additional form of currency

39 He Wenkai, “Economic Disruption and the Failure of Paper Money in China, 1851-1864,” Paths Towards the Modern Fiscal State,” 131- 152.

19 alongside coin, the state was managing a system of short-term credit. In addition, the

Song allowed the payment of taxes in scrip, a mechanism that could be seen as another form of state backing. This was the only active policy the Ming employed in order to encourage the circulation of its notes, but as shall be discussed in Chapter 3, this was not enough to maintain their value. And in any case the state largely backed away from a commitment to collect tax in scrip early in the fifteenth century.

Liu further argues that the salt certificate system (ru zhong 入中) of the Song operated as a form of public debt. By issuing salt certificates to merchants in return for transportation of grain, the state was indebted to them until the salt was redeemed. But more importantly, merchants were able to trade in these vouchers in special voucher stores in Kaifeng.40 The interpretation of the salt exchange system as a form of public

debt is also at the centre of Winkin Puk’s discussion of the similar salt certificate policy

(kai zhong, 開中) of the Ming.41 Despite the similarity between the two policies, the

appearance of a form of public debt is much clearer in the Song, when the state was actively promoting trade in government credit. In contrast, the Ming response to trade in

salt vouchers was to fix their price in order to prevent speculation.

40 Liu, “The Making of the Fiscal State,” 68-72.

41 Win-Kin Puk, “The Ming Salt Certificate: A Public Debt System in Sixteenth Century China?” Ming Studies 61 (Spring, 2010): 1-12. This issue will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5.

20 1.4 Financial Administration and Expertise

In comparison with their predecessors from the Tang to the Yuan, the status of

financial officials was greatly reduced in the Ming. The Ministry of Revenue had little

capacity to initiate reform and its role was mainly supervisory. In contrast, the Song exhibited considerable fiscal organization and expertise. During its first hundred years, the State Finance Commission (san si 三司) was one of the three highest branches of government, placed above the Ministry of Revenue. It contained three separate agencies:

The Salt and Iron Monopoly supervised much more than the production and sale of these

commodities, for it also handled the production and distribution of military supplies, paid

salaries to military officials, oversaw communications, and collected commercial taxes. A

special tax bureau, literally the Office of Measuring Expenses (du zhi si 度支司) prepared

annual financial reports on receipts and disbursements, and paid the salaries of civilian

officials. The third agency was the Census Bureau (hu bu) and it was responsible for

maintaining population records, collecting agricultural taxes (along with the wine

monopoly tax that was attached to them), and handling the long-term storage of goods.

These three agencies had independent directors who were not subordinate to the central

government organs but answered directly to the emperor. 42 In the Ming, by comparison,

the duties of these three agencies were all under the Ministry of Revenue, meaning that a

much smaller staff was allocated to these duties.

42 Peter J. Golas, “The Sung Fiscal Administration,” The Cambridge History of China Vol.5 Part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015): 139-213.

21 The Song employed on the local level an entire class of officials devoted to financial matters. On the circuit level, fiscal commissioners handled all financial tasks, especially commercial taxes. The closest equivalent to this post would be the Ming provincial administration commissioner (bu zheng shi 布政使) who, along with a military and surveillance commissioner, headed provincial administration. His duties encompassed civilian, and in particular financial matters.43 Further down the hierarchy, the post of vice prefect was an innovation of the Song, and came to be devoted to tax collection and other financial matters of the prefecture. The dedication of administrative posts to financial matters on the prefecture level was completely absent in the Ming.

Moreover, the first emperor attempted to exclude officials from tax collection altogether by instituting the li jia (里甲) system, which organized society in tax units of approximately 110 households from which the most prominent were responsible for collecting tax and transporting it on a rotating basis. Once this sub-bureaucratic taxation system broke down, the role of collecting tax fell on the county magistrates, along with their other duties. This change meant that state agents became more directly involved in tax collection but with no additional posts to support them.

Furthermore, there is evidence that Song financial officials reached a degree of professionalization and prestige that was not possible in Ming political culture. Robert

Hartwell conducted a survey of the careers of high Song officials showing that they all

43 Charles O. Hucker, A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China Part 1 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1985): 76.

22 had extensive experience in a variety of financial posts.44 His work also made it apparent

that a particular body of knowledge on economic and financial subjects was studied by

imperial students and served as material in the imperial examinations. This knowledge

was not lost in the Ming, but it did not have much value in official careers. First, instead

of encouraging specialization, the Hongwu emperor tended to shuffle his heads of

ministries around every few years, presumably to prevent any one of them gaining too

much power. Second, the most prominent officials involved in state finance were not

necessarily connected with the Ministry of Revenue. As shall be discussed in chapter 2,

an official leading major tax reform in Jiangnan in the mid-fifteenth century served in the

Ministry of Works. This was also the case in Qing government. Revenue ministers were

appointed after successful careers in other branches of government. 45

Little regard for financial expertise was based on an inherent suspicion of fiscal

policy. While Song statesmen distinguished between sound fiscal policy and sheer

opportunist fiscalism, Ming statesmen assumed that such policies would ultimately come

at the expense of the common people. The gulf between the two attitudes is apparent in

the different appraisals of Liu Yan (劉晏, 716-780), the reformer of the Tang salt

monopoly who turned it into an extremely beneficial fiscal apparatus. While an eleventh

century writer praised his ability to increase revenue, put the dynasty on a sounder

44 Robert M. Hartwell, “Financial Expertise, Examinations, and the Formulation of Economic Policy in Northern Sung China,” Journal of Asian Studies, 30, (1971): 281-314.

45 E-Tu Zen Sun, “The Board of Revenue in Nineteenth-Century China,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 24 (1962-63): 180-181.

23 economic base, and refrain from raising agricultural taxes, 46 Qiu Jun, the leading

statecraft writer of the fifteenth century wrote in a treatise on the salt monopoly:

Although Liu Yan was good at finances, he understood that profiting the state is of benefit but he did not understand that profiting the people is of even greater benefit. He knew how to monopolize a certain source in order to gain profit but he did not know how to spread out the taking of profit in order to gain an even greater benefit.47

Qiu Jun held the Confucian mainstream opinion that the state should not extract high profits from a particular source, but spread out the burdens of taxation equitably. Later on in his essay he argues that even if certain fiscal policies have some short-term benefit, in the long run they create an atmosphere in which the state is competing for profit with the people.

1.5 Another Approach to Financial Administration

The works cited above, and many others, use concepts from European economic

history in conducting a meaningful exploration of similar dynamics in imperial China.

They represent an intellectual climate that is free from the interpretation of the history of

late imperial China along the trajectory of early modern Europe, previously revolving

around the question of “why did China fail to reach modern Western-style capitalism?”

46 The Song essayist is Zhang Fangping who served as financial commissioner twice during the mid eleventh century. A partial translation of his essay appears in Hartwell, “Financial Expertise,” 297.

47 Qiu Da xue yan yi bu, 28:9a.

24 This question has been put to rest after R. Bin Wong’s path breaking approach to the

comparative economic history of Europe and China. By comparing eighteenth century

China to its most advanced counterparts in Europe, Wong shows that the two ends of the

Eurasian continent were largely comparable. He further argues that the reasons for the

European breakthrough from the limits of premodern economic growth cannot be

attributed to any failure on China’s behalf but to the special conditions that emerged in

Europe. The advance of commercial capitalism owed to the development of means of

long and short-term credit encouraged by debt-ridden rulers, and international trade.

England’s industrial advantage owed much to its ability to tap into large deposits of coal.

To these structural differences Wong adds the significant distinction in Chinese

and European early modern political economy. In China the Confucian notion of

benevolent government took root. The role of the state was to promote an agrarian

economy and ensure an equitable distribution of wealth. Commercial activities were

tolerated or encouraged as long as they contributed to this ideal and did not create large

income gaps. Moreover, it was not the business of the state to pursue wealth since that

would entail taking from the people what is rightly theirs. In contrast, in a growing

atmosphere of competition between European nation states, the richer a country became, the better chance it had to overcome its competitors. Questions of public welfare and equitable distribution of wealth were secondary in Europe, whereas the pursuit of wealth as a political goal was repugnant to most Chinese administrators.

The consideration of traditional Chinese financial administration according to different principles can be supported by a different theoretical approach to fiscal policy.

Whereas Schumpeter’s definition of fiscal policy concerns the means by which states

25 influence the economy in order to increase tax revenue, fiscal policy is also directed at promoting public welfare. Or in other words, states use taxation in order to distribute wealth in society. The economist Richard Musgrave was the first to propose a theory of this aspect of fiscal policy, which he termed as “public finance,” in the English-speaking academic community. The relatively late appearance of works on this aspect of fiscal policy helps put in sharper relief the distinction between Western and Chinese traditions of political economy. In imperial China, ensuring public welfare was the first mandate of the state and its raison d’être. Musgrave identifies three main roles the state undertakes to distribute wealth in society. Though working within a modern democratic context, they can be applied with some modifications to Ming China.

The first role is that of allocation, the process of transferring private resources to predetermined public wants. The principle of “using the realm’s wealth for public purposes” (yin tian xia zhi cai gong tian xia zhi yong, 因天下之財供天下之用) is the

Confucian equivalent of this principle.48 “Public wants” in imperial China related first to

food security. This principle was applied through allocating portions of tax revenue to

ever-normal granaries and special issues of famine relief. In addition, tax remissions and

tax breaks were another form of allocation of funds for public wants since tax remission

was a form of subsidy for struggling farmers. In the Ming this was considered as an

essential part of financial administration; from 1426, tax remissions were even part of the annual revenue reports. The obligation to provide security from foreign invasion and attack was another form of allocation that took up the bulk of public revenue. But, as will

48 Ming Taizu Shi lu, 179:1a.

26 be discussed below, growing military expenses in the Ming did not lead to the

development of more advanced fiscal institutions.

The second role Musgrave cites is distribution, in which the state intervenes in

the economy in order to diminish inequality in society. Equalizing the tax burden (jun fu,

均賦) was a common feature of tax reform and will be discussed in the context of the reforms conducted in Jiangnan in the mid-fifteenth century. Huang offers an important observation that in the Ming, officials generally preferred economic equality to development:

As Ming administrators saw it, to promote those advanced sectors of the economy would only widen economic imbalance, which in turn would threaten the empire’s political unity. It was far more desirable to keep all provinces on the same footing, albeit at the level of the more backward sectors of the economy.49

The third role is that of stabilization. In the context of a democratic market society this means maintaining high employment and controlling inflation through adjusting tax rates.50 Though unsuccessful, the Ming did attempt to overcome inflation through

taxation. The Household Salt Consumption Tax of the fifteenth century was a universal

tax designed specifically for this purpose. Although there was logic in the assumption

that decreasing the number of notes in the market will strengthen their relative value

against commodities, the Ming did not exercise enough control over its currency in order

to reduce inflation. In addition, low tax rates and tax remissions were a means to maintain

49 Huang, Taxation and Governmental Finance, 2.

50 Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance: A Study in Public Economy, New York: McGraw- Hill Book Company (1959), 3-27.

27 social order. It was tax debt that usually drove peasants to desert their lands, a problem

that directly affected tax revenue and was considered a form of unemployment that

threatened social stability. These methods had limited effect against social dynamics that

increased inequality. Powerful and wealthy landowners were able to evade tax payments

whereas growing numbers of small and poor cultivators were left with a growing tax

burden.

These fiscal policies were considered to be basic principles of government in

Imperial China. In following them the Ming was not different from other dynasties. But

unlike their predecessors, Ming administrators kept holding to the notion that if the state

extracts more revenue from the economy, it is necessarily taking from the people.

Therefore, the development of more sophisticated fiscal practices, such as those discussed above for the Song, was discouraged in the name of public welfare.

Within the boundaries of classical Chinese political economy the debate on the degree of state involvement in the economy, famously summarized in the Discourse on

Salt and Iron (yan tie lun 鹽鐵論), delineated two extremes of fiscal policy.51 Whereas

the Song operated according to one extreme of this debate, the Ming adhered to the other.

If Ming administrators had not been aware of Song policies, its seemingly anti-fiscal approach could be explained as ignorance. But since history is the one field in which

Chinese literati cannot be blamed to lack knowledge, we must conclude that the

51 Huan Kuan 桓寬, Yan tie lun 鹽鐵論 [Discourses on salt and iron] (1st century B.C., reprint, Taipei: Yi wen, 1967). For an English translation see: Esson M. Gale, Discourses on Salt and Iron: A debate on State Control of Commerce and Industry in Ancient China, Chapters X-XIX, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1931).

28 abandonment of some of the more market-oriented policies of the Song was deliberate.

Indeed, from the point of view of the Ming founding elite, they were correcting the errors of Song administration. What to modern eyes is the most advanced period of fiscal policy until the early modern period was perceived as a deviation from the principles of good government. Early Ming policies of agricultural restoration were extremely successful in the first decades of the dynasty but they were insufficient to support the dynastic vision of the Yongle emperor. Beyond the expensive military campaigns and maritime expeditions, moving the capital to Beijing and the huge expenses entailed in supplying it destroyed the tax system of the founding era. Moreover, a tax system that was designed for a stable agrarian population was incompatible with the dynamism and commercialism of the mid and late Ming periods.

The story of state finance in the Ming is therefore one of practical solutions to an inadequate state system. Ming administrators employed solutions that complied with the principle of determining expenditure according to revenue. But they had to employ financial strategies that went beyond the management of a simple agricultural economy.

These policies had a very modest goal; they did not intend to increase state revenue but to reduce expenses and ensure a stable flow of funds throughout the empire and to the capitals. The following section introduces the structure of financial administration as well as major fiscal policies that took place in the first half of the dynasty as manifestations of this principle.

29 1.6 Distinguishing between the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries

In concentrating on the first half of the Ming, this dissertation answers the call for

more research on the fifteenth century.52 Almost thirty years ago, Edward Farmer alerted

that this period remains somewhat of a black hole in the study of the Ming. Compared to

the dramatic events and outstanding personalities of the founding period (1368-1424) and

the late Ming period (1522-1644), it appears to be relatively uneventful. Nevertheless, he

argued that knowing more about fifteenth-century Ming China is crucial for

understanding the trajectories that set early and late Ming so much apart.

Thomas Nimick contributed greatly to our understanding of fifteenth century

governance in his discussion of the transformation of local administration. This change

originated in the disintegration of the li jia system, the basic mechanism of tax collection.

He finds that during this period the Ming exhibited institutional flexibility and creativity

that successfully met the challenges of changing social circumstances.53 The central

government managed to regain control over local administration through specially

appointed prefects who acted as representatives of the central government in the local community and at the same served as defenders of local interests against the demands of the political centre. This was the administrative context of the tax reforms initiated during the Xuande and early Zhengtong periods that will be discussed in chapter 3.

52 Edward L. Farmer, “An Agenda for Ming History: Exploring the Fifteenth Century,” Ming Studies 26 (Fall, 1988): 1-17.

53 Thomas G. Nimick, Local Administration in Ming China: The Changing Roles of Magistrates, Prefects, and Provincial Officials (Minneapolis: Society for Ming Studies, 2008).

30 In the sixteenth century power shifted to the two top provincial administrators, the

regional inspector and the grand coordinator. In order to control the growing population

they relied on the magistrate who became the centre of all local government operations

and held sole responsibility over fiscal deficiencies. This shift in local administration

marked a lessening in the degree of control the central government had over local

financial administration:

Whereas for much of the fifteenth century central officials and specially selected prefects had played a role in shaping how localities met the demands for resources, in the sixteenth century, as a result of structural changes, magistrates were generally left to work out their own solutions.54

Nimick proposes that whereas the changes made to local administration in the fifteenth

century retained the ability of the political centre to reach down to local administration

and maintain a certain degree of control over local finance, this ability was lost in the

sixteenth century. This dissertation contributes a fiscal dimension to this trajectory and its

emphasis on fifteenth century administrative viability. After the fiscal model of the

Hongwu era failed, the grand secretaries worked along with emperors in order to reform local administration and taxation. These reforms met central government demands while taking into consideration local interests and abilities. Moreover, these officials improved the system of financial reporting. The continuous recording of annual revenue reports throughout the century reveals that the central government maintained access to local financial information. Although it is clear that this information was becoming less accurate with time, it was still annually updated. In the sixteenth century this type of

54 Ibid, 138.

31 financial reporting was no longer recorded in the official histories, suggesting that the

data was no longer available. One reason, as Nimick attests, was the new independence of the local magistrate. Another is that fixed quotas took over tax collection, thus annulling the need for updated reports. Furthermore, the political centre became more preoccupied with its own finances and the state assumed a more predatory role in its demands for tax revenues. In the sixteenth century the renowned officials Lu Kun and

Hai Rui both noted that detailed audits of local accounts had turned into occasions for collection of extra revenue for the provincial administration.55

In chapter 3 this shift is further connected to the growing reliance on silver in

state finance. While commutation of the tribute grain (zao liang 漕糧) tax into silver began in the early fifteenth century, this chapter argues that the transformation in financial administration occurred towards the turn of the sixteenth century. The tribute

grain tax was the rice transported to Beijing from south and southeast China. Its purpose

was to feed the northern capital and pay its officials and soldiers. Only in the late

fifteenth century do we find clear evidence of a fixed silver tribute tax quota and a shift to

silver in all official payments. To that can be added the reform in the salt monopoly that

resulted in the sale of salt for direct silver payments. From a fiscal perspective then, the

“age of silver” began at the turn of the sixteenth century, between the Hongzhi and

Zhengde reigns.

55 Ibid, 141.

32 1.7 Accounting

Fiscal administration is based on accounting. As Hartwell acknowledged, it is also

a prerequisite for political power. The emperor always had the power to mandate taxes

and order disbursements, but it was of little use unless he knew how much was collected

and where it was stored.”56 In the Ming, accounting and accountability permeated the

bureaucratic hierarchy and connected periphery and centre. It was also the main

occupation of the Ministry of Revenue. As shall be further discussed in the following

chapter, the chapter concerning this ministry in the Ming administrative code (zhu si zhi zhang 諸司職掌, or Handbook of Government Posts) stresses the production of timely and accurate reports on government revenue and the transportation of funds.

Between the early fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, national accounting of all major categories of public revenue was conducted on an annual basis. Recorded in the

Veritable Records of the Ming 明實錄, updated information appeared on population, cultivated land, grain tax from civilian and military fields, various cloth levies, salt and tea production and sales, commercial taxes, mining output, military land, and transports of grain to Beijing. Preparing and producing such a document every year necessitated a degree of communicative centralization that could enable information to flow from local administrative units to the political centre. Despite the decentralized structure of Ming financial administration, regulations regarding bookkeeping and auditing subjected officials to constant record making and reporting that were scrutinized by higher

56 Hartwell, “Finance and Power,” 79.

33 authorities. Accountability was one parameter by which local officials were evaluated at the end of their term in office.

Interestingly, national accounting was not one of the strong parts of Song financial administration. According to Golas:

All the preachment about “determining expenditures by calculating income” (liang ru wei chu) cannot disguise the fact that no one in the central government from the emperor on down had in most years more than a very vague idea of just how much the government took in or disbursed. Only eleven times in the 319 years of the dynasty was the government able to complete a k’uai-chi lu (accounting register) or general account of finances and population that sought to provide that information.57

This is a harsh assessment that neglects to mention that under the Song, the process

of accounting and auditing was the most sophisticated in the history of imperial

China. But it does allude to an inherent weakness in the Song system that emanated

from the multiplicity of accounting agencies. Two separate audit agencies were

responsible for regular and random audits of government accounts. There were

record keeping offices for each of the three agencies in the State Finance

Commission. A special office for managing debts owed to the government kept

track of debtors and enforced payment, and an office calculating tax receipts. There

were also special accounting offices that handled military finance.58

57 Golas, “Sung Fiscal Administration,” 140.

58 For a detailed discussion of accounting in the Song see Philip Yuen-Ko Fu, “A Study of Governmental Accounting in China: With Special Reference to the Sung Dynasty (960-1279),” PhD diss. (University of Illinois at Urbana-champaign, 1968): 175-298.

34 The problem with this plethora of accounting offices was that it was not very

efficient. Their tasks often overlapped and confusion over the delegation of duties

could result in neglect on all sides. When reforming a government agency, officials

complained about entire decades that passed without comprehensive auditing.

Interestingly, when one office was not working properly the preferred solution was

often to simply create a new one. On the one hand this attests to the flexibility and

independence of Song officials, but frequent reorganizations also created instability

and further confusion. It also probably did not contribute to personal accountability.

In this context, it is worth mentioning Qing reactions to what it perceived to be problems in the accounting system. Madeleine Zelin describes the practice of national accounting as an innovation and an improvement of the Ming fiscal system. This is certainly true in comparison with the mess financial administration was in in the late

Ming, but for the most part, it echoed early Ming practices. The obligation of every

province to send an itemized report of taxes to the Ministry of Revenue, based on the

accounts of counties and prefectures, is specified in the administrative code of the

Ming.59 Moreover, the early Qing requirement that every transaction of funds on the local

level be reported and authorized by the Ministry of Revenue was a Ming routine

procedure as well.60 Finally, Zelin finds a high degree of consolidation of financial

information in the Qing annual accounts with the inclusion of data on military land and

59 Zhai Shan 翟善, Zhu si zhi zhang 諸司職張 [Handbook of Government Posts] (1393, reprint Guo li zhong yang tu shu guan, 1981): 2:13a-13b.

60 Ibid, 2:14a.

35 revenue from mining, items that were formally under the jurisdiction of the Ministries of

War and Works. As mentioned, this information appeared in the Ming annual revenue reports as well. At least in the fifteenth century, therefore, the system of national accounting did not fall from the more advanced Song or the reform-minded Qing.61

That said, the abundance of detailed fiscal memorials and tax information from the Qing enables researches to explore the process of accounting and fiscal management on the provincial level in a depth that can not be matched for the Ming. Utilizing these sources, Helen Dunstan reveals how Qing officials balanced provincial military budgets during 1746-48, when a universal tax remission was spread among the provinces. In particular she shows how the Ministry of Revenue separated between the provinces that had the heaviest responsibilities for military subsidies so that in any given year at least one of the major subsidizers collected tax that could be at its disposal in the following year.62 This kind of planning could only be achieved through control over provincial accounts and an ability to obtain updated tax data, and thus reveals the process of Qing accounting. Lack of similar documentation for the Ming prevents this degree of exploration and may suggest that its accounting practices were less advanced. But since the reporting infrastructure and accounting principles were similar, it is plausible that

61 Madeleine Zelin, The Magistrate’s Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in eighteenth Century Ch’ing China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984): 12-15.

62 Helen Dunstan, “About As Interesting As the Telephone Directory: Encounters with Routine Fiscal Memorials of the High Qing Period” (paper from the Fourth International Conference on Sinology “Exploring the Archives and Rethinking Qing Studies, Taipei: Academia Sinica, 2013).

36 Qing practices are comparable to those in the fifteenth century, the difference being that

Qing documents are better preserved.

1.8 Tax Commutation

If the establishment of a national accounting system helped the new Ming state gain control over the economy, the practice of commuting agricultural taxes was a practical solution employed in order to cope with the inherent difficulties of taxing an agricultural economy. In its original role, it was a fiscal policy that struck a balance between local abilities and state needs. For example, in years of scarcity when the collection of the grain tax was insufficient, the state commuted tax debt to other means of payment. By fixing an exchange rate that was favourable to tax payers, commutation entailed an actual reduction while avoiding a complete loss of that year’s tax revenue from a certain region. As a more permanent institution, tax commutation alleviated the high costs of transportation to the capital. In the 1430s, when the dynasty was facing debilitating revenue shortages, commutation of the Jiangnan tribute grain into silver became official policy. From this time on, silver became more prominent in official transactions and reflected its growing prominence in the market. But with the permanence of tax commutation the flexibility of the temporary tax commutation was lost.

Tax commutation was based on the availability of other means of payment that were universally accepted. In the first decades of the Ming, scrip was a common medium of tax commutation. After it devalued, cloth and silver became the main means of

37 exchange. As substitutes for the grain tax, both depended on and contributed to the development of a market economy. Although the Ming did not actively promote a market, as Brook suggests, the economic effects of Ming political economy were on the whole positive: “Much of the economic growth in the Yuan and Ming, though more so in the Ming, was private in organization and capital, but public in terms of its operation within an infrastructure created and funded by the state.”63 Brook alludes to a physical infrastructure of roads and waterways that were constructed and maintained for official use but served commercial transportation as well. In this dissertation, taxation is interpreted as another form of economic infrastructure since it influenced the economic decisions of farmers who had to pay taxes in marketable commodities

In expenditure, commutation had especially deleterious effects on official payments to state servants. Salaries for officials and officers, rations for soldiers, and stipends for princely households were all designated in grain. Once they were commuted to scrip, they were greatly reduced as a result of devaluation. Frequent adjustments to official salaries and military rations did not improve income significantly, though they probably managed to maintain a ration of one shi of rice a month for officials and officers. Soldiers’ rations often fell under one shi. Less known is that grain stipends for princes were partially commuted to scrip too. This situation continued until the late

63 Timothy Brook, The Troubled Empire: China in the Yuan and Ming Dynasties (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2010): 109. A more detailed discussion appears in Confusions of Pleasure: Commerce and Culture in Ming China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

38 fifteenth century when all official payments were commuted to silver. But even then,

commutation did not amount to the full original grain quota.

Tax commutation was responsible for the most significant fiscal reform of the

fifteenth century, the collection of the Jiangnan tribute grain tax in silver. As a response to difficulties in paying military salaries for officers in Beijing, an edict was issued in

1436 in the name of the Zhengtong emperor approving the commutation of the tribute

grain tax into silver. Though initially announced as a temporary policy, tax commutation

became permanent and by the sixteenth century an annual quota of 1,000,000 taels was

standardized in the tax registers.

In the highly monetized economy of the Song, commutation of the grain tax was

not particularly significant. And suggestions to commute large amounts of grain raised

concerns over disturbing the market. In 1070 State Finance Commissioner Wu Chong (吳

充, 1021-1080) proposed commuting 2,000,000 shi from the grain tribute of Jiangnan and

Huai’an circuits in order to fund the border armies. Repeated over five years, he

calculated, the money could purchase enough supplies for three border circuits. Wang

warned that this kind of commutation essentially means purchasing grain from the

market. On such a scale it would bring down grain prices in those circuits and cause a

shortage in coin. Instead he advised the commissioner to stick to the ever normal granary

system (chang ping fa, 常平法) and limit grain purchases to districts that were experiencing high grain prices.64 The possibility of having individual taxpayers conduct

64 Tuo Tuo (脫脫), Song shi (1345, reprint Beijing: Beijing zhong hua shu ju, 1977): juan 175.

39 the commutation on their own did not even come up in this discussion. Perhaps such an

uncontrolled method was unthinkable in the northern Song. Wang Anshi was worried

about disrupting local markets and decided against a large-scale commutation of the tribute grain tax.

Qing officials expressed similar reservations. As Jane Kate Leonard shows, when a suggestion was made to convert the Zhejiang grain tribute tax to silver in order to fund a huge reconstruction project along the Grand Canal, the Daoguang emperor dismissed the suggestion after initially endorsing it. The reasons for declining the suggestion revolved around different scenarios of disturbance to the market and the smooth operation of the canal. There were two options for funding the maintenance project: The first was buying grain from the Jiangnan markets in return for silver. This raised the concern that a purchase on such a large scale would affect grain prices. The other option was to have peasants perform the commutation themselves and pay their tax dues in silver. But top Qing officials did not trust local magistrates to refrain from manipulating exchange rates for their benefit. In addition, the Grand Canal enterprise relied on a complex relationship between government and private sources of funding and service.

Shaking this system too profoundly might harm these relationships and create resentment.65

65 Jane Kate Leonard, “The State’s Resources and the People’s Livelihood (Guoji minsheng): The Daoguang Emperor’s Dilemmas about Grand Canal Restoration, 1825,” To Achieve Security and Wealth: The Qing Imperial State and the Economy, 1644-1911 Jane Kate Leonard and John R. Watt eds. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell East Asia Series, 1992): 47-74.

40 These cases raise interesting questions regarding the Ming. Did commutation of grain into silver disturb Jiangnan grain markets? Did it cause a shortage in silver? These questions are not pursued here, but as far as official commentaries can be trusted, there was no serious disturbance to Jiangnan markets as a result of this practice. If any, this procedure was concurrent with a boost to Jiangnan’s economy. In comparison with the seemingly smooth implementation of this policy in the Ming, the concerns of Song and

Qing administrators seem unfounded. On the other hand, both the Song and the Qing were experiencing currency shortages that may have deterred administrators from authorizing government purchases of that scale.

1.9 Exposition of the Chapters

Chapter 2 establishes the relationship between the legal foundation of the dynasty

and the character of its financial administration. As part of the ambitious endeavor to reshape Chinese society after centuries of foreign rule, the Hongwu emperor presided over a project of legislation and codification of government regulations. In his work on

early Ming legislation, Farmer defines the role of these compilations in Ming society as

that of a constitution.66 These texts were constitutional in the sense that they laid out what

were intended to be permanent arrangements of power. Subsequent emperors could not change them but merely introduce additions in response to changing circumstances.

66 Edward L. Farmer, Zhu Yuanzhang and Early Ming Legislation: The Reordering of Chinese Society Following the Era of Mongol Rule (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995): 10.

41 The Zhu si zhi zhang was written as a technical manual for the central government. It was modeled after the Tang liu dian but its content is original to the Ming.

It is organized by chapters dedicated to each office and agency in the central government:

the six ministries, the Censorate (du cha yuan 都察元), the Office of Transmission (tong zheng shi si 通政使私), the Grand Court of Judicial Review (da li si 大理司), and the

Five Chief Military Commissions (wu jun du du fu 五軍都督府). Unlike the legal codes, the Minister of Personnel wrote this government manual, though the emperor probably closely monitored the work. This text served as the foundation for financial organization for the rest of the dynasty. An analysis of the chapter on the Ministry of Revenue in the

Zhu si zhi zhang reveals that the main goal of Hongwu-era financial administration was to create centralized control over the accurate and timely flow of information and supplies, while avoiding centralizing financial power in the hands of any man or agency besides the emperor.

This compilation forms the basis for the two extent editions of the Da Ming hui dian 大明會典 (Collected statutes of the Great Ming).67 The first edition was completed

in 1503 and after some revision printed in 1511 and presented to the Zhengde emperor. It

is therefore referred to as the Zhengde edition. The role of the Hui dian was to add later

imperial decrees as legal historical precedents (shi li 事例) to the original constitution. It

67 Li Dongyang 東陽李 ed., Da Ming Hui dian 大明會典 [Collected Statutes of the Ming Dynasty] (1511, reprint Ying yin wen yuan Si ku quan shu vol. 375-76, Shanghai: Shanghai gu ji chu ban she, 1987). For a reprint of the Ming edition see Da Ming Hui dian, (Tokyo: Kyûko shoin, 1989). An earlier edition that was completed in 1479 and a later one, completed in 1550, are not extent. The edition of 1587 is the most used by scholars: Li Dongyang 東陽李 and Shen Shixing 申時行 eds. Da Ming Hui dian 大明會典 [Collected Statutes of the Ming Dynasty] (1587, reprint Hua wen shu ju, 1964).

42 also collected relevant articles from the Ming code and other Hongwu era compilations

and entered them at the beginning of each section. As shall be discussed in the following

chapter, these texts were not only neutral administrative records but represented an

affirmation of government agendas. Changes in the structure of the Hui dian attest to a

decline in the status of the Zhu si zhi zhang in the sixteenth century.

Routine financial work was reported in the Ming shi lu 明實錄 (Veritable Records

of the Ming). Upon the death of an emperor a special committee made of top court

officials assembled the various materials accumulated during the former reign period.

Though arranged in chronological order, it is much more than the annals of an emperor.

The Shi lu served as a tool for administrators and reflected the agenda of its compilers.68

If we assume that the information these committees chose to include was based on their

importance, the consecutive recording of annual revenue reports throughout the fifteenth

century attests to the place financial administration held in government work.

These reports also affirm that Hongwu’s emphasis on accounting and auditing did not disappear after his death. The annual updating of information on tax revenue suggests that an infrastructure of gathering and transferring information existed throughout the fifteenth century. Interestingly, while the reports align with the intentions of the founding emperor, they begin only in the reign of his son. This can either mean that the compilers

Hongwu Shi lu did not have access to such information, or that the officials compiling the history of the Yongle emperor attached greater value to the preservation of financial

68 Xie Guian 謝貴安, Ming Shi lu yan jiu 明實錄研究 [A Study of the Ming Shi lu] (Taipei: Wen lu chu ban she yin hang, 1995).

43 information. In the introduction to the Yongle Shi lu, the editing committee outlined its editorial principles, in which they explicitly stated that data on various sources of revenue should be recorded at the end of every calendar year.69 Thus the recording of such information testifies to its being an integral part of the management of the realm.

In all probability, the revenue reports were a summary of the annual tax income reports. This does not necessarily mean that the income reported was of actual receipts.

Rather, it was probably a summary of total owed taxes. As such, the data cannot be used to assess actual income but it can follow general trends in tax collection and provide a sense of how Ming administrators managed the national budget. Nevertheless, the fact that during the first half of the fifteenth century most of the data was updated annually reveals that the Ming did not yet use a fixed quota system. The revenue reports contain only a standard list of items and their quantities. Beyond that they do not reveal much about the process of accounting or the reasons for including certain items. Their simple and direct title does follow the basic principle of financial administration in the early

Ming period: This Year All Under Heaven (shi sui tian xia 是歲天下), meaning the income of the entire realm and not just the emperor’s.

In the last decades of the fifteenth century data gradually turned into fixed quotas to the degree that there was no longer any connection between changing economic circumstances and financial data. In the Jiajing reign (1522-1567) the reports ceased to appear. After an unsuccessful attempt to reinstitute them during the Longqing reign

69 “Xiu zuan fan li” 修纂凡例(Editorial Principles), Ming Taizong Shi lu 明太宗實錄 (Veritable Records of Ming Taizong).

44 (1567-1572), they disappeared from the imperial record altogether. Taken as a measure

for the ability to centrally collect and process data, the demise of the revenue reports

indicates change in the nature of financial administration.

Chapter 3 proposes a fiscal reason for this change. It discusses tax commutation

as both a temporary and permanent feature of tax collection. The commutation of the

tribute grain tax into silver, known as Gold Floral Silver (jin hua yin 金花銀), introduced the most significant transformation in the Ming economy. The shift to permanent silver payments fixed grain quotas and made annual updates redundant. This chapter explores available sources in order to trace the origin and development of this institution. It also follows the emergence of the term Gold Floral Silver and its possible origins, and connects it to a deeper shift in the nature of Ming state finance.

This chapter also uses information from the revenue reports in order to examine other sources of non-grain tax income. As mentioned earlier, although paper currency had little value in the fifteenth century, it did not disappear from circulation so quickly. It continued to be collected in various commercial taxes and used in official salaries. Cotton was another common option for tax commutation and served as an alternative to silver.

Though there is evidence that paying taxes in cotton spread during the fifteenth century, the revenue reports do not indicate a rise in tax revenue. Silk was produced in the imperial workshops for imperial use, but was also registered in the revenue reports.

Interestingly, a doubling in annual quotas of silk cloth is noted around the same time

Gold Floral Silver was initiated. This suggests that silk was a part of the commutation policy as well.

45 The next three chapters address the main avenues of government expenditure. The

Ming dynasty controlled and governed the realm through a civilian and military

bureaucracy, a standing army, and a large number of princely courts that were related to

the ruling house through kinship ties. These three groups, though differing greatly in

status and function, had one thing in common: They were entitled to fixed, periodical

payments. In budgeting its expenses, the imperial court directed its regular expenditure at these three groups, and by that gave material shape and substance to what it imagined as the state. In their different capacities, officials, soldiers and princes ran the machinery of the state and articulated its presence in society. Although bound to their vocations either through social convention or hereditary obligation, their identity as servants of the state manifested itself through the symbolic and tangible bind of standardized and regular payments.

The Ming never came close to the official salary charts in paying these three groups. Instead, the entire period before the commutation of payments into silver is characterized by frequent adjustments and manipulations to grain allocations. These three chapters explore how the state managed the commutation of salaries and how it tried to compensate for the meager remuneration of its servants. The management of expenditure is explored through memorials, imperial decrees, and biographies that appear in the Shi lu, Hui dian, and the official history of the ming, Ming shi 明史.70

70 Zhang Tingyu 廷玉張, Ming shi 明史 [History of the Ming] (1739) (repr. Beijing: Zhong hu shu ju,1974).

46 Chapter 4 discusses the salaries of military and civilian officials in the central and

provincial governments. Official salaries were extremely low due to commutation into

scrip. From the very beginning of the dynasty, official salaries were calculated in grain

but were paid mostly in other means. These substitutes were never sufficient because

their exchange rate was lower than market rates. Nevertheless, a monthly salary was the

reality of most serving officials who did not rise in rank high enough to be able to

translate status into material gain. This is the reality the imperial court had to address in

order to maintain some kind of semblance of a client-patron relationship between the bureaucracy and the imperial court. As part of this effort, this chapter argues that the court attempted to maintain a minimum level of rice allocations and examines a mechanism that helped officials support their families while away from home.

Chapter 5 considers military finance. Commutation of military salaries was determined by their size. While top military officers were subject to the same commutation as civilian officials, regular soldiers were entitled to rations (yue liang 月

糧) that were never high enough to be partially commuted. During the fifteenth century these rations, small to begin with, further diminished and contributed to widespread desertion. Unlike official salaries, military rations were supposed to be largely derived from agricultural fields. Since the produce of most military fields was never sufficient, special transports of grain and other supplies were needed to supplement reserves. This problem was especially grave on the northern border, and serves as the background to the large-scale commutation of the grain tax into silver.

47 This chapter also examines the role of the salt-for-grain policy (kai zhong fa 開中

法) in supporting border armies. It argues that in the Hongwu reign it had a primary fiscal role in supporting the reconstruction of north China, and follows its deterioration as a result of the collapse of the military colonies. The kai zhong is also a good reflection of the Ming relationship with the commercial sphere. As discussed in an earlier section, the goal of this system was to reduce expenses and provide a stable flow of grain and other commodities to border areas. It was not intended to increase revenue.

Finally, this chapter offers a fiscal interpretation to the demise of the Ming military. The system of military finance in China was tied to the registration of hereditary military households and military land. But unlike societies with military elites that assume the character of a feudal, military caste, military households were essentially a fiscal unit. Just as civilian households were required to pay tax and render labour services, soldiers were attached to military guards and were required to work on the military fields of their guard, pay taxes on them, and render military service to the state.

In this light, the system of military colonies, in which soldiers were supposed to rotate among training, campaigning, and agricultural work was essentially another form of tenancy. Tenant soldiers were obliged to pay rents that were even higher than those of civilian government tenants. And just as government tenants fled from their fields when the tax burden was high, so did soldier tenants. The strategy to restore military colonies was similar to that of the tax reforms of the mid-fifteenth century, but the results differed;

lowering tax rates encouraged the privatization of military land and its disappearance

from military registers.

48 Chapter 6 discusses the imperial clan. In theory, princes constituted a class of

their own, endowed with fiefs on which tenants worked the land and paid rent. In reality

they lived off a fixed allocation of funds, granted to every princely household according

to rank. Princely courts were allocated an official staff to preform administrative,

educational and household tasks. They were also endowed with military guards as part of

their task as peacekeepers of the region in which they resided. But these were not their

private armies and the funds to maintain them, even if collected locally, were centrally

administered. There is no fixed term that is used for these allocations but supplies (gong

ying 供應) appears in the princely code.71 Unlike soldiers who were given food rations,

and officials who were granted basic salaries, princely households were entitled to large

amounts of grain and other items in order to enable them to conduct a lifestyle fitting for

nobility as well as to remunerate their large staffs.

These funds were to be collected annually in grain. But, as with official and

military salaries, about half of these allocations were soon commuted to scrip. As a result,

the annual allocations for the lower ranks of the nobility were quite meager. As the

historical record shows, it seems that only the two highest ranks of nobility (out of eight)

actually owned land. Princes often attempted to expand their domains beyond the

territories that were allocated to them, but they mostly did so within regular official

71 Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋, Huang Ming zu xun 皇明祖訓 [Ancestral Instructions of the Great Ming] (1395) (reprint Jinan: Qi Lu shu she, 1996). The Hongwu emperor compiled the Ancestral Instructions for his decedents. It contains general instructions regarding the administration of princely courts, their ritual roles, appropriate conduct, legal status, and granting of noble titles.

49 channels. The biographies of Ming princes in the Ming shi reveal the negotiating process

that took place between princes, local officials, and the court to manage these tasks.

Finally, this chapter finds that the phenomenon of princes as large landowners was more

widespread in the sixteenth century and closely related to imperial favour. It is argued

that princely households burdened state finance not so much in the expansion of their

domains but in the demographic growth of members of the lower nobility that were

entirely dependent on local administration for their livelihood.

The discussion of state expenditure is limited to these three groups because they were the only avenues of expenditure that entailed fixed sums and regulations. It is therefore in these avenues that state administrators could manage and manipulate some

kind of a budget. In contrast, the expenses of the imperial household were never budgeted

and therefore could never be managed by officials. In addition, large-scale public works such as waterway maintenance, construction works, or maintenance of land transportation routes were not regularly budgeted. The funding for them was usually under the supervision of the Ministry of Works that had its own power to requisition labour and supplies from the population. It also made special requests for additional funds from the

Ministry of Revenue.

At this point it should be acknowledged that this dissertation is not an economic, monetary, or financial history of the Ming. Unlike these disciplines of economic history, fiscal history addresses aspects that fall into these fields only as far as they concern the ways in which the state managed revenue and expenditure. In this sense, fiscal history is important to our understanding of the state more than the economy. There is a vast body of work on Ming economic history that deals with fiscal issues such as population and

50 land registration, taxation, transportation of funds, military finance, local finance and its relationship to the political center, and others.72 This dissertation builds on this foundational work while restricting its scope to fiscal policy at the political center.

Moreover, it concentrates on subjects that were not at the forefront of research before; commutation of grain in revenue and expenditure, and national accounting.

The fact that the grain tax was often commuted to other means of payment is well known but has not been systematically explored in the context of a comprehensive budget

72 In the economic history of the Ming some of the standards include the work of Liang Fangzhong on various aspects of the land tax. His works are conveniently assembled in several collections, among them is Liang Fangzhong jing ji shi lun wen ji 梁方仲經濟史論文集[A Collection of writings on economic history by Liang Fangzhong] (Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju, 1989). Among other interests, Wu Jihua contributed valuable insights on the tax structure of the important rice-producing prefectures in Jiangnan that will be mentioned in chapter 3. Fujii Hiroshi has produced a detailed examination of fiscal land registration that will be mentioned in the following chapter. Hoshi Ayao (星斌夫) detailed the complex operation of the grain tribute system in Mindai sōun no kenkyū 明代漕運の研究[A study of the Ming tribute grain system] (Tokyo: Nihon gakujutsu shinkōkai, 1963). Mark Elvin translated this work into English under the title The Ming Tribute Grain System (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Center for Chinese Studies, 1969). In military finance Wang Yuquan produced the definitive work on the Ming military colonies. Yu Zhijia elaborated on the registration system of soldiers in the Ming military guards. And Terada Takanobu explored military finance and the impact of merchants on military finance along the northern border. These works are mentioned in chapter 5. Wang Yuquan and Zhang Xiaoyu’s work on princely estates, and Zhang Dexin’s research the population of the princely clan inform chapter 6. Peng Xinwei’s comprehensive monetary history of China is the standard reference work in the field. Works on Ming account books include Liang Fangzhong’s exposition to the Wanli kuai ji lu, discussed in chapter 2. Hiroshi Iwami’s discussion of the local account books of the late Ming is translated to English: Iwami Hiroshi, “An Introduction to the Shandong jing hui lu”, State and Society in China, ed. Linda Grove and Christian Daniels (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1984): 311-334. Guo Daoyang wrote a general history of accounting in China that is mentioned in the following chapter. In fiscal history Bian Junjie 边俊杰 reemphasized the impact of political corruption on fiscal policy in Ming dai de cai zheng zhi du bian qian 明代的财政制度变迁[A Study of the Transition in the Financial System of the Ming] (Beijing: jing ji guan li chu ban she, 2011). Accounts of fiscal policy on the local level include Cheng Liying 程利英, Ming dai bei zhi li cai zheng yan jiu 明代北直隶财政研究 [a study of the financial administration of the northern metropolitan region in the Ming], (Beijing: Zhongguo she hui ke xue chu ban she, 2009), and He Zhaohui’s article, discussed in this chapter.

51 that includes revenue and expenditure. Terada Takanobu discussed the commutation of

grain transports to the northern border, and the annual emissions of silver to military

garrisons in his work on the expansion of trade in north China.73 Similarly, Nishijima

Sadao pointed at the commutation of the grain tax into cotton cloth as a factor in the expansion of the cotton industry in south China.74 The two works mentioned above look

at commutation from the point of view of market expansion, and are limited to certain

regions of China and particular sectors of the economy.

Finally, commutation of the grain tax has been most widely discussed in the

context of the Single Whip reform.75 The combination of the grain and labor tax into one silver payment signaled a transition to a monetized tax system, or as Liang termed it, a

“modern tax system.”76 In contrast, this dissertation looks at the practice of tax

commutation before the transition to silver and situates it in a broader context of Ming

governance. It shows on the one hand that commutation was a regular part of tax

collection before the advent of silver. And on the other hand, it equates the move to fixed

73 Terada Takanobu 寺田隡信 Sansei Shōnin no kenkyū: Min-dai ni okeru shōnin oyobi shōgyō shihon 山西商人の研究: 明代における商人および商業資本 [A study of the merchants of Shanxi: Merchants and commercial capital in the Ming]. (Kyoto: Tōyōshi-kenkyū-kai, University of Kyoto, 1972).

74 Nishijima Sadao, “Early Chinese Cotton Industry,” Christian Daniels and Linda Grove eds., State and Society in China: Japanese Perspectives on Ming-Qing Social and Economic History, (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1984).

75 For an English translation on Liang Fangzhong’s seminal work on the subject see: The Single-Whip Method of Taxation in China, translated by Wang Yuquan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harverd University Press, 1956).

76 Ibid, 1.

52 silver quotas in the tribute grain tax with a deeper change in fiscal administration that

actually undermined the earlier logic of tax commutation.

Economic historians have used the annual revenue reports as a reliable source to

gather statistics on population, land and tax revenue but have not cited them as evidence

of national accounting.77 In fact, the more meaningful work on Ming accounting regards

the national and local account books that developed in the late Ming period, well after the

disappearance of the annual revenue reports.78 In the following chapter, I suggest that the

annual revenue reports are in themselves a testament to a functioning system of national

accounting that conforms to the principle of managing resources locally, and that their

disappearance in the early sixteenth century is a result of the changing nature of financial

administration.

Finally, the goal of this dissertation is to imagine a budget within which Ming

administrators operated. It therefore gives equal importance to tax collection and public

expenditure. By grouping together three very different social groups that were all in some

way on the state’s payroll, this dissertation reveals how similar solutions were employed

in order to overcome budgetary limitations and suggests that from a fiscal point of view,

princes, officials, and soldiers were all state servants that where supposed to abide by the

77 For example Otto Berkelbach van der Sprenkel, “Population Statistics of Ming China”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, No. 2 (1953), 289-326. And Liang Fangzhong, Zhongguo li dai hu kou tian di tian fu tong ji 中国历代户口田地田赋统计 [A comprehensive account of population, land, and land taxes in Chinese history] (Shanghai: Renmin chu ban she, 1980): 185-199.

78 For example Liang Fangzhong, “Shu ji ping lun: Ming Wanli kuaiji lu” 书籍评论：明万历会计录 (Book Commentary: The Account Book of Ming Wanli), Zhongguo jindai jingji shi yanjiu 3.2. (1935): 292-298. And Iwami Hiroshi’s discussion on the Shandong jing hui lu.

53 principle of measuring revenue in order to determine expenditure. Furthermore, the focus on official salaries and stipends presents a contribution to scholarship that has focused largely on tax revenue and paid less attention to expenditure. And the works that do deal with salaries do not do so in the context of fiscal policy.79

Monetary history deals with the production and circulation of currencies with or

without relation to the state. In the economic history of Europe that has set the standards

of the discipline, money came to be equated with metallic currencies. This dissertation

expands the definition of money to anything the state used in commuting the grain tax.

From the first decade of the Ming, grain could be substituted for cotton and silk cloth,

bronze coin (also referred to as cash), scrip, or silver. In addition, the commodities

sappan wood and pepper were used in salary payments. All of the above could be defined

as money because they were of a standard size and weight, made out of durable material,

and were accepted as means of exchange and a store of wealth.

Within this broad definition there are distinctions that should be acknowledged.

First, cloth could serve as a currency but at the same time was used for its material. Silver too could be considered commodity money since silver had a variety of uses such as

religious statues, household utensils and personal ornaments. To a lesser extent, coin too

had a material value beyond its function as currency. Copper was used for the production

of agricultural utensils and weapons. Finally, sappan wood and pepper were commodities

79 The regulations for the payment of official salaries throughout imperial China are explored in Huang Huixian 黄惠贤 and Chen Feng 阵锋, Zhongguo feng lu zhi du shi, 中国俸禄制度史 [A History of the salary system in China] (Wuhan: Wuhan da xue chu ban she, 1996). Works on princely income include:

54 that were used and consumed, but their durability and standard measures made them

suitable to be used as means of payment. Scrip was the only currency that had no use or

value beyond the implicit promise of the state to honor it. In commutation of taxes and salaries, the exchange rates of these means of payment were determined according to one shi of grain (the implicit reference is usually to rice), which renders it a unit of account.

But in determining prices the silver tael was often used as the standard unit of account.

Looking at these currencies from a fiscal point of view offers a different interpretation of their role in state finance. In contrast to the evidence of their circulation in the private market, silver seems to have taken over only at the turn of the sixteenth century, and scrip remained in government circulation until the last decade of the fifteenth century, long after their perceived demise as a viable currency in market transaction.

Finally, as financial history deals more broadly with the accumulation and investment of wealth in a society, fiscal history is limited to the decisions made on the level of the state. While scholarship has greatly expanded our knowledge of fiscal policy on the local level this project addresses the political centre.80 As such, it is limited to discussions and decisions made on the highest levels of the government, and interprets

these decisions according to contemporary principles of political economy and as a

respons to changing economic conditions. The sources that inform this study were

produced by the inner group of central-government officials, and reflect their approach to financial administration. In addition, this dissertation recognized that official

80 By the local level I mean the structure of local taxation and its transformation as studied in the posts of tax captains (li zhang 里長), the li jia 里甲 system, and the Single Whip reform.

55 compilations necessarily contain the agenda of its compilers. This is not viewed as an obstacle to understanding the realities of the time but as an opportunity to reflect on the ways in which officials used these compilations to initiate reform or encourage policy.

Although using a large body of quantitative data, there is no attempt to quantify state income or expenditure. Rather, this dissertation concentrates on the meaning of their production in the context of Ming state finance, and follows broader changes in tax figures in order to trace policy change.

56 2 The Structure and Role of the Ministry of Revenue

The Ministry of Revenue (hu bu 戶部) was one of the six ministries of the central

government. It presided over the collection of tax revenue, disbursement of payments,

transportation of supplies, maintenance of reserves, and handling the book keeping of

these vast operations. As such, it acted as the headquarters of an empire-wide bureaucracy that reported financial information and forwarded it up the administrative hierarchy. The staff of the ministry was confined to the capitals and was surprisingly small. Under the minister served two vice ministers.81 Between five and ten officials worked in each of the thirteen offices processing documents from the thirteen provinces.

A records office employed a proofreader and several clerks. An office that supervised the

management of scrip had three workers. And two workshops, one for producing the

plates fused for printing paper notes and a printing office manned by three workers each.

Then there were storehouse and granary officials that usually worked in pairs, though in

some storehouses there were up to six workers. This was the entire salaried personnel of

the ministry.82

This structure is original for the Ming and it reflects the ideas of the first emperor

about government. The following chapter discusses the legal and historical context of the

foundation of the Ministry of Revenue in order to explain its particular character. A

81 (Zhengde) Ming Hui dian, 3:4a. The Yongle emperor nominated a censor to supervise the imperial granaries in Beijing and Tongzhou.

82 Zhai, Zhu si zhi zhang, 1:6a-7b.

57 description of the roles of the ministry reveals that it was mainly an information-

processing office. It received information from the provinces and forwarded requests for famine relief, additional funds, or tax remissions to the emperor. The orders regarding

any of these requests always came from the emperor. In addition, as the institution of the

Grand Secretariat acquired political power in the fifteenth century, its officials rather than

the ministers of revenue stood behind national tax reform initiatives. Since the Ministry

of Revenue operated as an accounting office, the annual revenue reports stand out as its

main achievement throughout the fifteenth century. The characteristics of these reports

are discussed here and the decline in the quality of information is tied to changes in

financial administration. Finally, this chapter ends with an exposition on the crisis in

financial management and national accounting in the sixteenth century.

2.1 Legal Foundation of Financial Administration

In February of 1381 the Hongwu emperor voiced his opinion on fiscal policy in

the following conversation:

A minister close to the throne suggested: “The state should manage its finances in order to relieve state expenses [guo yong].” He spoke with much knowledge. The Emperor replied: “Heaven and Earth create wealth in order to nourish the people, therefore whoever holds the position of ruler has the obligation to use it in order to nourish the people. If even while minimizing waste and taxing lightly, one still worries about hurting the people, how much more, when tax is heavy, could there not be resentment?” The minister continued: “From the Son of Heaven to the common people there is no one who could create a state without storing.” The emperor replied: “The ruler manages wealth differently from the common man. The common man plans for a single household, and therefore his wealth is stored in one

58 household. The ruler is responsible for All Under Heaven and so he stores the wealth All Under Heaven. How can he block people’s [path to] nourishment and surreptitiously seize their wealth? In the past, Emperor Wu of the Han employed the likes of Dongguo Xianyang and Kong Jin to tax them heavily.83 They exploited the people and seized their wealth, and there was suffering all over the land. Shenzong of the Song employed Wang Anshi for managing wealth.84 It lead to the rise of petty people and All Under Heaven was in turmoil. This should be guarded against.” The speaker was ashamed and terrified. From this time on there was no more talk about wealth and profit [財利, cai li].85

The Hongwu emperor equated fiscal expertise with heavy taxation, and heavy

taxation meant bad government. While the anonymous minister entreated for a sounder

financial policy that would increase the available resources at the centre, the emperor

replied that resources should for the most part be kept in their localities. In this sense

Hongwu was a “commoner emperor” who even on his throne held the point of view of

the commoner. He was suspicious of any ideas to increase state revenue, and believed

that the central government should have as little possession over the wealth of the

dynasty as possible. In this conversation it becomes clear that maintaining a decentralized

and weak financial administration was a way to prevent the accumulation of wealth in the

83 Dongguo Xiangyang (東郭咸陽 ) and Kongjin (孔僅 )were heads of the salt and iron state monopolies during the reign of Han Wudi (141-87 BCE).

84 Emperor Shenzong (神宗, r. 1068-1086) appointed Wang Anshi (1021-1086) as vice Chief-Councilor, a post that enabled him to carry widespread reforms in the economy, such as the Green Sprouts Act that offered peasants government loans at lower interest rates than private lenders. See: Dieter Kuhn, The Age of Confucian Rule: The Song Transformation of China, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009): pp. 54-55.

85 Ming Taizu Shi lu, 135:2b-3a.

59 political centre. It would take more than a century for court officials to suggest reforming financial administration away from this model.

In an otherwise highly centralized administration that could penetrate down to the level of the individual household, the emperor’s aim was to prevent privileging interests of the political centre over those of the localities, and to prevent those with political power from gaining economic power as well. He tried to do so by maintaining centralized control over a decentralized system of financial administration, a system in which no one person, besides the emperor, had total knowledge or control over the nation’s finances.

And no one, besides the emperor, had the final say on how to allocate resources.

Decentralization, though, did not mean abandoning uniform standards. When the regulations for financial administration were finalized they were a manifest of standardization, punctuality and exactness. These regulations are the subject of the chapter on the Ministry of Revenue in the administrative code of the Ming, Zhu si zhi zhang. Legally, the status of this compilation was not as firm because Zhu Yuanzhang did not write it. Langlois points out that Ming law was connected to Zhu Yuanzhang’s person. In Ming political culture, the words uttered by the founding emperor could not be corrected or changed because they provided “a solid rock upon which to rest the myth of legitimate, fair, and just rule.”86

There is evidence that early Ming legislation retained its authority after the death of the founding emperor, but its literal application is less clear. Tam Kai-chai examined

86 Langlois, “Ming Law,” 176.

60 legal texts from the Jiajing period proving that the Da gao (大誥, Grand

Pronouncements) and the Da Ming lü ( 大明律, Great Ming Code) were used in order to

define crimes and fix punishments. He also finds that throughout the Ming possession of

a copy of the Da gao served to reduce punishment.87 Timothy Brook, on the other hand,

finds that although the Da gao continued to be revered after the Hongwu reign, it was not

used in court or as a means of popular education.88 This kind of reverence with no actual

legal substance may also be the case in regards to extra punishments and warnings Zhu

Yuanzhang declared in publicly displayed placards; Hok-Lam Chan has found that the

placards issued by the Hongwu emperor, containing extra-legal punishments to violators in an array of categories were still hung in government offices during the Jiajing reign.89

These were extremely harsh punishments for relatively minor offences such as execution

for playing football in military camps. Although punishments were not necessarily

carried out, officials continued to hang these placards in public places.

Although the words of the Zhu si zhi zhang were not the emperor’s, in its

technical and formulaic writing it is part of a long tradition of administrative texts

beginning with the Zhou li (周禮, Rites of Zhou), the government blueprint attributed to

87 Tam Kai-chai 家齊譚, “Ming Taizu Yu zhi da gao zai Hongwu chao yi hou xing yong qing kuang xin tan” 明太祖御製大告在洪武朝以後行用情況新探 [A Reexamination of the Legal Authority of Zhu Yuanzhang’s Grand Pronouncements After the Hongwu Reign], Journal of Chinese Studies 47 (2007): 73- 91.

88 Timothy Brook, Jerome Bourgon, and Gregory Blue, Death by a Thousand Cuts, 118-119 (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2008).

89 Hok-lam Chan, “Ming Taizu’s “Placards” on Harsh Regulations and Punishments Revealed in Gu Qiyuan’s Kezuo zhuiyu”, Asia Major, 22.1 (2009): 13-39.

61 the Duke of Zhou, that most probably reflects Qin political culture.90 Following

Schaberg who argues for the constitutional status of the ancient text, I would like to

suggest that Zhu si zhi zhang played a similar role in the Ming. Schaberg uses

‘constitution’ in the ancient Greek sense of politea, or system of government, and views the Zhou li as a rational technical vision of the total management of the resources needed to sustain the realm.91

The compilation of the Hui dian in the late fifteenth century serves as an

affirmation that Zhu Yuanzhang’s legal project did not disappear after his death. And the

best indication that his administrative code continued to be at the centre of government

administration is its place in the expanded administrative guide Da Ming Hui dian. This

compilation was organized around the Zhu si zhi zhang and other Hongwu-era legal

texts, and structured according to the central government offices and court agencies.92 In

addition, the editors included subsequent decrees that served as legal precedents.

Arranged according to a clear hierarchy, each sub-section begins with a quote from Zhu

si zhi zhang. Then follow quotes from other Hongwu-era texts and finally later imperial

decrees chronologically arranged. By doing this, the compilers reiterated the

constitutional status of the original administrative code but also acknowledged historical

90 Jin Chunfeng 春峰金, Zhou guan zhi cheng shu ji qi fan ying de wen hua yu shi dai xin kao 周官之成書及其反映的文化與時代新考 [A New Consideration on the Historical and Cultural context of the Production of the Zhou guan] (Taibei: Dong da tu shu gong si, 1993).

91 David Schaberg, “The Zhouli as Constitutional Text”, Statecraft and Classical Learning: The Rituals of Zhou in East Asian History, ed. Benjamin A. Elman and Martin Kern (Leiden: Brill, 2010): 33-63.

92 These include compilations such as Grand Pronouncements (Da gao) of which four collections were printed between 1385-1387, Ancestral Instructions (Huang Ming zuxun) from 1396, and Da Ming lü (The Great Ming Code) printed in 1397.

62 change. This arrangement gives the sense that the Hongwu-era law was viewed as constitution whereas imperial decrees served as amendments to the law in response to changing circumstances. The Hui dian was a final authority in cases of uncertainty about regulations. For example: In 1520, a traveling censor reported that every year a certain county in the southern metropolitan region sends cloth to the Ministry of Rites in

Nanjing, but according to the Hui dian, it should be sent to Beijing. The emperor ordered to follow the old rule.93 Even when procedures had deviated from the original plan, in policy discussions emperors continued to refer to it either as a model to follow or as a model that unfortunately cannot longer be followed. In such a discussion, Hongzhi demonstrated knowledge of the text when he remarked: “Even though the Zhu si zhi zhang contains a regulation for coin-minting stations in each province, this has long been discontinued.”94

A second edition was prepared during the Jiajing reign but never published. The only part remaining is the emperor’s forward. A third edition was published during the

Wanli reign (1573-1620).95 In the Wanli edition the hierarchy of what we could call

93 Yuan Ruiqin (原瑞琴), “Da Ming huidian xingzhi kaolun” 大明会典性质考论(The Nature of Da Ming huidian), shixueshi yanjiu 3 (2009). For a more thorough discussion comparing the two extend editions see also the author’s Da Ming huidian yanjiu 大明会典研究 (A Study of the Da Ming huidian, Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2009).

94 Ming Xiaozong Shi lu, 29:12.b.

95 The Wanli edition is conspicuously absent from the siku quanshu, but is far more accessible in modern reprints. Shen Shixing (申時行), Da Ming huidian (1587, repr, series: guo xue jiben congshu, Taibei: Huawen shuju, 1964). The annotators of the title in the Imperial Library Si ku quan shu knew of the Wanli edition but apparently had no accsess to a copy. They also claimed that it was a flawed work that reflected the flawed government of the time, and therefore was inferior to the Zhengde edition. See ji yun 記昀, Si ku quan shu zong mu ti yao 四庫全書總目提要 [An annotated catalog of the Imperial Library] vol. 2 (1782, reprint 1933): 52-53.

63 ‘constitutional’ texts and imperial decrees disappears. In the guiding principles for the

revision, the authors acknowledge this change:

The Hui dian was previously arranged with Zhu si zhi zhang first and the historical precedents later. But the regulations are from the twenty-sixth year of Hongwu and so should be considered as Hongwu era regulations.96

Accordingly, the other Hongwu-era compilations receive the same treatment: Excerpts

from the Da Ming lu are written under “first year of Hongwu”, those from the Da gao as

“twelfth year of Hongwu” and so on. Though not erasing them, by making this editorial change, the authors rejected the special status of Hongwu administrative regulations.97

Although the editor-in chief of this edition, Zhang Juzheng (張居正, 1525-1582), died before its completion, as grand secretary he nominated an editing committee of like-

minded officials. It is therefore very likely that such a fundamental change in the nature

of the Hui dian would not take place without his permission. From what we know of his

statecraft philosophy, this decision reflects his conflicting attitude towards government

reform. On the one hand, Zhang argued that statecraft should be brought back to the

simplicity and decisiveness of the Hongwu era and its institutions. On the other hand, he

believed that government should be relevant to the time and that no regulation is eternal.

96 “Guiding Principles of the Revision” (chong xiu fan li), (Wanli) Da Ming Hui dian, p. 22, 1a-b.

97 Alternatively, Yuan Ruiqin interprets the dating of Hongwu era compilations as a sign of greater systemization. See: Yuan Ruiqin, “Zhang Juzheng yu Wanli Da Ming Hui dian zuan xiu” 张居正与万历大明会典纂修 (Zhang Juzheng and the compilation of the Wanli Hui dian), Jiangnan da xue xue bao 12.2 (March, 2013): 46.

64 So, in order to return to the spirit of the early Ming, it was necessary to discard the blind

faith to its institutions that were no longer applicable to current times.98

Since Zhang was a political reformer, we should consider this revision of the

Ming Hui dian as a major part of this reform. In a political culture that revered every

word of the founding emperor as sacred, and was often crippled by the inability to

diverge from his plan, this editorial change signaled the abandonment of even lip service

to the Ming administrative code, and an open acknowledgement that it was no longer

relevant to contemporary government. Not everyone agreed. In 1579, Vice Censor in

Chief Zhang Lu (張鹵, 1523-1598), who openly opposed Zhang Juzheng’s reforms, published a new edition of the collected Hongwu-era legal and administrative compilations titled Huang Ming zhi shu.99 Whether or not this was done in direct

opposition to the compilation of the Hui dian cannot be gleaned from the preface to the compilation, but the re-appearance of the Da Ming ling, Da gao, and Zhu si zhi zhang suggests that Zhang Lu was making a stand regarding the administrative and legal standards of his contemporaries.

The Wanli edition of the Hui dian put an official seal to a departure from the original plan. In this sense administrative guides should be viewed not only as records of

98 For a discussion of Zhang Juzheng’s thought see: Robert Crawford, “Zhang Juzheng’s Confucian Legalism”, State and Society in Ming Thought, ed. William Theodor De Bary, New York: Columbia University Press (1970), pp. 367-414. For a discussion of Zhang Juzheng’s efforts in reforming financial administration and the political climate of the time see: Ray Huang, 1587: A Year of No Significance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).

99 Zhang Lu, Huang Ming zhi shu 皇明職書 (Administrative Compilations of the Great Ming, 1579, reprint Taibei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1969), 1a-b.

65 government organization but also as embodiments of government reform. It may also be

said that the timing of the compilation becomes crucial for understanding important

junctures of administrative reform. The Zhengde and Wanli editions of the Hui dian are

both evidence of official activism. If late fifteenth-century reformers reiterated early

Ming institutions in the face of deteriorating standards, sixteenth-century reformers tried to free administration from its Hongwu-era constraints. If this is the case, how was this

revision related to reform in financial administration? As shall be discussed in the

following chapters, while the task of the Hongwu emperor was to maintain decentralized

control over financial administration embodied by the principle of ‘storing wealth among

the people,’ Zhang Juzheng pushed for further centralization of state finance. This

transformation in financial administration occurred long before Zhang’s time, but he was

the person that recognized it and further pursued it for the benefit of the state.

Because it covers a longer period of the dynasty, the Wanli edition of the Hui dian became the standard edition used by scholars of Ming statecraft. And since it diminishes the importance of Zhu si zhi zhang for government administration it is easy to forget that there was in fact a plan for organizing financial administration. In the following pages I return to this neglected text and treat it as the basis for the institutional dimension of financial administration in the early and mid-Ming periods. Furthermore, this chapter places its compilation in the political context of the early Ming. It argues that the creation of the Ming Ministry of Revenue, its function and its limitations, are a product of political crisis as much as it is a manifestation of the personality and ideology of the

Hongwu emperor.

66 2.2 Political Origins of Ming Financial Administration

The structure of Ming government was finalized in the Zhu si zhi zhang, after a period of experiment and change. The final version was a response to several political scandals that shook the central government during the first two decades of the dynasty. It also reflects the ideology of the founding elite and the personality of the first emperor, who insisted on centralizing power in his own hands. The first government reform was initiated in 1381 after Grand Councilor Hu Weiyong (胡惟庸, d. 1380) was charged with conspiring to assassinate the emperor. As a result the emperor permanently abolished the position of grand councilor. Under the new government structure, ministers reported to the emperor directly and their authority to make policy decisions was curtailed.

Soon after this upheaval, the court issued new government guidelines.100 This was probably done in haste since they were mostly copied from the Tang liu dian 唐

六典 (Six Statutes of the Tang) but the particular design for financial management already showed discrepancies from the Tang model. This is most evident in the guidelines regarding the Board of Expenditure in the Ministry of Revenue.101

Literally meaning Board of Measuring Expenditure (度支部, du zhi bu), it became the most powerful financial agency during the second half of the Tang owing to its authority over accounting and the distribution of funds. The Tang liu dian illustrates

100 Ming Taizu Shi lu, 130:5a-8a.

101 Translated as Revenue Section in the Tang and Bureau of General accounts in the Ming. See: Hucker, Dictionary of Official Titles.

67 its role in these words:

The Expenditure bureau (i.e. Board of Expenditure) is responsible for administering payments and state expenses. [according to] the changing numbers of tax revenue, the adequacy of manufactured goods, [and] the profits from land and water routes, it calculates annually what was sent out and pays what is needed.102

This paragraph was copied word for word from the Tang original except for the sentences highlighted above. The sentences highlighted here were omitted from the Ming version first because the early Ming government did not collect taxes from ‘land and water routes,’ or custom duties, and secondly because in the Ming, the Board of Expenses was not authorized to make annual calculations on a national basis or decide how revenue will be allocated.

During the following decade the emperor’s suspicions of his officials only grew.

The case of the pre-stamped documents (kong yin an 空印案) of 1382 was not in itself a clear-cut corruption case, but it was treated as such by the emperor. Once completing a transport of some kind, officials would check the amount received against the amount ordered and if it matched they would stamp the order document. If the amounts did not match, transporters had to turn back and make the trip again with the proper amount. In order to avoid being sent again to correct the numbers and save an extra trip, transporters were equipped with pre-stamped documents that could be filled in after all transportations were completed to ensure the numbers matched. But since this practice also had the

102 The translation is from Twitchett, Financial Administration,100-101. For the original see: Li Linfu 李林甫, Da Tang liu dian (8th century, repr. Taibei: wen hai chu ban she, 1962), 3:43b.

68 potential to falsify reports, the emperor judged this procedure harshly and executed the

officials involved in it.103 A tally system then replaced the former one in all government communications. This system used stub-books with detachable copies that ensured documents were not tampered with after being sent out of a government agency.104

As if to confirm his greatest fears, in 1385 the emperor discovered a nation-wide corruption case led by Vice Minister of Revenue Guo Huan 郭桓. Officials and commoners connected to agencies in the central government, and various administrative offices in most provinces were implicated with issuing false receipts for transportation of the grain tax, embezzling scrip and silver, money laundering, and outright stealing of grain from granaries containing military reserves. According to the emperor, the revenue loss was as high as twenty-six million shi of grain, about a full year’s income. Almost immediately after the discovery of the case, the emperor issued the first collection of the

Da gao, in which he recounted some of the crimes connected to the case, and issued warnings to officials and commoners.105 During the next several years he issued three

installments, one of them dedicated to soldiers. The emperor expected every household in the empire to hold a copy of these compilations and treat them as the law.

103 Zhang, Ming shi, juan 94, 2318-19; Wu Han 吳含, Zhu Yuanzhang juan 朱元章卷 [Biography of Zhu Yuanzhang] (1965) (repr. Hongkong: Long men shu dian, 1973): 166-167.

104 For the imperial decree see: Huang Ming zhao ling 皇明詔令 [Imperial Decrees of the Ming Dynasty] (1539),(repr. Si ku quan shu cun mu cong shu, Jinan: Qi lu shu she, 1996), 2:24b-25b.

105 On the severity of punishments for financial crimes in the Da gao see Timothy Brook et al. Death by a Thousand Cuts, chapter 4 (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press).. Also Lin Tai-yung, Ming T’ai-tsu and his Administration of Justice, PhD dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1979. Lin offers a detailed account of the Guo Huan case and its relation to the compilation of the Grand Pronouncements.

69 In the sections pertaining to financial procedures, the emperor addressed the

corruption cases attributed to Guo Huan, as well as more mundane administrative

problems that harbored potential corruption. His attention to minor misconduct is

particularly interesting because it reveals his insistence on clarity and timeliness in

government work. For example, in response to a complaint forwarded by the Minister of

Revenue and his staff regarding the heavy workload, the emperor ordered an

investigation that found that the 143 documents supposedly dated to a single day’s work

had actually accumulated over two weeks. Only six of them were actually received on the

day in question.106 In another case, the emperor lashed out at his officials for chaos in the annual commercial tax reports, forwarded individually from 2,437 local administration units. Some documents bore seals that were placed upside down or were missing a seal

altogether. Some were missing names of the people taking part in the transaction while

others did not separate tax income figures item by item. He concluded his public

admonition of the careless officials with an overt death threat that must have been truly

terrifying: “The souls of the dead are not yet gone, and new ones appear.” 107 But then he

expressed his magnanimity by willing to pardon those who admitted their faults.

A couple of months after Guo Huan was tried and executed, the emperor ordered the Ministry of Revenue to inscribe in stone the revenue and expenses of the year in the main hall of the office.108 This public display suggests that an accounting of public

106 Ming Taizu, Yu zhi da gao chu bian (1385), repr.: Xu xiu si ku quan shu, shi bu, zheng shu lei vol. 862, Shanghai: Shanghai gu ji chu ban she, 1995-2002, article 67, 38a-38b.

107 Ming Taizu, Yu zhi da gao xu bian (1386), article 51, 43b-44b.

108 Ming Taizu Shi lu, 174:2a.

70 revenue and expenditure took place, but fixing the numbers in stone gives the impression

that the emperor intended to fix the economy in a static state, as if the ultimate goal of the

Ministry of Revenue was to maintain the same budget from that year on. This fits with

Hongwu’s general vision of the economy: Fixing the population in their localities and

professions and preventing both revenue and expenditure from growing.

Most of all, it reflects the emperor’s demand for complete transparency. This may

not have seemed an excessive reaction on behalf of a ruler who had lost all confidence in

the integrity of his officials. To him, lack of clarity was a sign of foul play. On the other

hand, the Hongwu period was one of the darkest periods in the history of Chinese public

life. Mass executions of officials and commoners, confiscation of property and exile

plagued the administration for more than a decade. Few officials rising to high positions

in government emerged unscathed. It was in this political context that organization of

government was finalized. Zhai Shan (翟善, c. 1370-1451) was one official who

managed to earn the trust of the emperor. In his capacity as Minister of Personnel, he

supervised the compilation of Zhu si zhi zhang. The chapter dealing with the Ministry of

Revenue outlines a compartmentalized agency functioning mainly as a giant

communication centre, processing and verifying data as well as the transportation of

funds and supplies throughout the empire.

Owing to the circumstances of the early Ming and to the personality of the founding emperor, administration was, in principle, devoid of personal agency. The task

71 of officials was to maintain a smooth flow of funds and information by recording, inspecting, and verifying every aspect of economic activity that was related to public revenue. In this sense, the financial apparatus created in the early Ming was close to

Weber’s definition of a rational bureaucratic state. In developing his thesis, Weber referred to China as contrasting model.109 In his understanding, the Chinese imperial state operated according to ethical and magical assumptions on top of existing clan and commercial networks. The imperial bureaucracy was not a rational one because it was not manned by specialized trained men but by gentlemen. In contrast, the bureaucratic state, which resembles a capitalist enterprise, “rests primarily on calculation and presupposes a legal and administrative system, whose functioning can be rationally predicted, at least in principle, by virtue of its fixed general norms, just like the expected performance of a machine”.110 Weber contrasted the impersonal, machine-like modern state against the irrational state that rested on personal ties, honored traditions, and individual judgment.

In the beginning of the Ming, Hongwu tried to crush these features by force and create an administration that would leave little place for personal ties and individual judgment. The following section demonstrates this through a closer look at the structure and roles of the ministry of revenue.

109 Max Weber, “The rational State and Its Legal System,” Essays in Economic Sociology, edited by Richard Swedberg, 116-119 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999).

110 Ibid, 110.

72 2.3 The Structure of the Ministry of Revenue

The general structure of the Ministry of Revenue follows that of the Tang as well

but the functions of each department are different. A minister and two vice-ministers

headed an office divided into four boards: The Board of Population (min bu 民部) dealt with the registration of population and land for tax collection, along with the administration of famine relief. The Board of Expenditure (du zhi bu 度支部) handled government payments. The Board of Money (jin bu 金部) supervised and reported all non-agricultural revenue. And the Board of Granaries (cang bu 倉部) supervised the maintenance of grain and fodder stores and shipments outside the provinces. Initially, the boards were separate offices with their own staff of a director, vice-director, and secretary. But in 1390 he replaced them with twelve provincial bureaus (qing li si, 清吏

司) that handled the responsibilities of each of the former boards. Although these bureaus bore the names of the provinces they supervised, they were not part of the provincial administration and resided in the capital. Their task was to handle the documents moving back and forth from the capital to the provinces. Initially, each office was manned by a director, and vice-director. During the Zhengtong reign between three and four secretaries were added to each office. In some cases another vice-director was added to the staff with specific responsibilities. For example, a second vice-director in the Jiangxi office was responsible for military provisions in Xuanfu.111 The actual paperwork was

done by ranked and unranked clerks: thirteen head clerks, another forty-one clerks (ling

111 (Zhengde) Ming Hui dian, 3:4a-6b.

73 shi, 令史) and over a hundred unranked clerks (dian li, 典吏).112 Every bureau was issued an official seal, which implies they held a certain degree of executive power in their respective jurisdictions.

Since the Metropolitan Region (zhi li 直隸, or regions, after the establishment of dual capitals in the fifteenth century) had no provincial administration, the regular administration of the finances of prefectures, military guards, and tax agencies within it were divided between the bureaus. For example, in addition to handling the financial administration of the province, the Shanxi bureau was responsible for eleven military guards and battalions, one prefecture, two sub-prefectures, two granaries, and a salt distribution agency in the two metropolitan regions. Furthermore, against any geographical logic, the finances of the most important prefectures in the Nanjing region were divided between different bureaus. So while the Shanxi bureau dealt with Suzhou prefecture, the Henan bureau kept the records of neighboring Songjiang and Fengyang prefectures. 113 It is hard to understand the reason for this cumbersome arrangement other than further preventing the consolidation of financial information in one particular office.

Some degree of consolidation is recorded by the time the Wanli edition of the Collected

Statues was published when all Nanjing metropolitan prefectures were placed together under the jurisdiction of the Sichuan bureau.114

Following is a description of each of the four boards as it appears in the Zhu si zhi

112 Ibid, 6:5a.

113 (Zhengde) Hui dian, 16:3a-5a and 10b-11a.

114 (Wanli) Hui dian, 14:8b-9a.

74 zhang. Although the boards were turned into departments in each provincial bureau, the

discussion here will treat them as separate offices for the sake of clarity. Though it may

be that tasks were allocated to clerks within each bureau according to the four categories,

it might as well be the case that they all handled all of them.

2.3.1 The Board of Population

The term min bu is translated here as Board of Population since it dealt primarily

with matters such as census taking, famine relief, marriage and popular legal

education.115 Population and land censuses were first and foremost elements of a fiscal apparatus. The basic fiscal unit was the individual household. Households were taxed

according to the amount of land and other forms of property they owned, and preformed

labour services according to the number of fit adult males. The census was thus the basic

tool used to determine tax quotas. The quality of information on land and population for

the early Ming surpassed those of the Song and Yuan dynasties.116 A national census was

conducted every decade and recorded population and property in what became known as

the Yellow Registers (huang ce 黃冊), yellow being the color of the binding of the

imperial copy. The Fish-Scale Map Registers (yu lin tu ce 魚鱗圖冊) mapped the plots of

land in each locality. These documents were stored in what was probably the largest

115 Zhai, Zhu si zhi zhang, 3:93a-154b.

116 The Ming census also serves as the earliest source of reliable information for the study of historical demographic patterns. See: Ho Ping-ti, Studies Population of China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), 3. And Dwight Perkins, Agricultural Development in China 1368-1968 (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969).

75 archive in the world on an island in Xuanwu Lake at Nanjing.

The first census of the territory under Ming control was announced in 1370. In the

proclamation, the future characteristics of the Hongwu-era administration were already

apparent. It entailed the first application of the tally system: each household received a

blank form to fill out, which contained two duplicates that could be torn along a seal. One

half was sent to the ministry while the other was retained by the household and was

presented in case of inspection.117 Households that tried to avoid registration were

registered as military households, and officials that were caught reporting false numbers

were decapitated.

Once the regulations for the Yellow Registers were established in 1391, the

Ministry of Revenue remained nominally in charge of the census, but its staff did not

participate in census inspections or in archive maintenance. In charge of the census were

two investigating censors, an official from the Revenue Scrutiny Office (hu ke 戶科) and four secretaries from the Ministry of Revenue. 118 Students from the imperial academy

carried out the tasks of population surveys and archive maintenance. Students usually

117 The text of the proclamation was transcribed into a local gazetteer along with the registration form, as filled by one family in the county. This is described in Arthur W. Hummel, “A Census Report for the Year 1370 A.D.”, Annual Report of the Librarian of Congress for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1940, (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1941), 158-159. A photocopy of the declaration and registration form appears in George Sarton, Introduction to the History of Science, vol. 3, part 2, (Baltimore, 1948), 1268-1270.

118 The revenue scrutiny office was an office outside the ministry of revenue in charge of inspecting its procedures. Zhang Wenxian finds that in the fifteenth century, a special commission took over the duties of the previous committee. See: Zhang Wenxian, “The Yellow Register Archives of Imperial Ming China”, Libraries and the Cultural Records 43.2 (2008).

76 served for one year before continuing to their first official post.119 The deteriorating

quality of the data can be attributed to diminishing personnel. The first emperor assigned

1,400 students for the task. This number fell to 800 in 1442, and 350 in 1493. One could

argue that the original number was not enough to keep track of the population to begin

with, but by the end of the fifteenth century it was hardly enough even to maintain the

archive. It is also probable that the number of personnel dwindled because updated

population and land statistics were no longer important for financial management. By the

sixteenth century, the Yellow Registers became a repository of fixed quotas that had little

relation to demographic and economic reality. On the one hand this was a sign of

weakening control over local administration. By settling for fixed quotas, the state

obtained revenue well under the full tax potential of the economy.120

On the other hand, this was a blessing for local officials who were left with some

leeway in tax collection. By under-reporting the figures of registered households and

cultivated land, officials could rely on a larger pool of revenue in order to meet extra

expenses and demands from the central government. One method was to continue

reporting an original household and not its descendants. This way more households were

sharing the tax burden of one.121 For this purpose, local officials created their own local

registers called Complete Records of Tax and Labour Service (fu yi quan shu, 賦役全

119 Bin Xie 彬謝, Nanjing hu bu zhi 南京戶部志 [Gazetteer of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue] (1550), 5:10b-11b.

120 Huang, Taxation and Governmental Finance, 46-47.

121 John W. Dardess, A Ming Society: T’ai-Ho County, Kiangsi, Fourteenth to Seventeenth Centuries, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996):74-76.

77 書,) that were not reported to the throne. The information in these registers may have been more accurate than that of the Yellow Registers, but they were essentially the same kind of compilation, containing fixed tax quotas that were used as a basis for taxation.122

Land was registered in two main categories: government land (guan tian 官田) and private land (min tian 民田). Government land was further divided into a number of categories according to their fiscal obligation. The main difference between private and government land is that the first was subject to taxation and could be bought and sold, while the second was worked by tenants who paid rent and could not be traded.

Originally, the income from private land was the primary source of local revenue and the income from rent financed the capitals and the central government. But these distinctions blurred in time. It should be noted that the Board of Population was responsible for collecting data on land registration but not on the actual grain tax. But it did supervise the transportation of sericulture taxes, paid in bolts of cloth. Once these shipments arrived in the capital, it was up to the Population Bureau officials to verify the shipping documents before entering them in the imperial storehouses.

Perhaps as part of their role to register the population, revenue officials were also given the task of enforcing the social prohibition to marry within the same surname as well as other aspects of the law.123 This was apparently done by posting placards in places of interaction between revenue officials and tax captains or corveé labourers. In

122 Iwami Hiroshi, “An Introduction to the Shandong jing hui lu”, State and Society in China, ed. Linda Grove and Christian Daniels (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1984): 311-334.

123 Zhai, Zhu si zhi zhang, 3:108b-109a.

78 this capacity, officials that were responsible for fiscal control were also responsible for social control. Since revenue officials had demographic information, and since they came into contact with commoners in tax payments and labour services, they were in a position to supervise the legality of marriages. Moreover, there may be a fiscal reason for this extra diligence. Marrying within the same surname could disguise the creation of a new household. It is unlikely that many of the commoners could read the statutes and regulations. Besides officials conducting learning sessions, it is hard to imagine how this task could have been carried out.

The Department of Population also oversaw special allocations of funds. In the wake of the nation-wide embezzlement case, strict procedures were devised to ensure control over the transportation of funds. Once an allocation of extra funds from one granary to another was approved, revenue officials had to fill in a stub book that had two identical copies, one of which remained in the Ministry of Revenue and the other sent to the receiving office. The information to be filled in on this form contained the date of issue, the name of the official issuing the shipment, a receipt number, and the name of the provincial or prefectural office requesting the funds. Once the shipment was completed the official had to write a report on the manner in which it was carried out. This information was later used to investigate the granary or storehouse officials when their time came to change office. A clear account record would result in a promotion.

In this capacity, revenue officials were also responsible for other important functions such as the routine inspection of military reserves of grain and fodder as well as the condition of roads for transporting military supplies, and the allocation of funds in cases of natural disaster and famine. Revenue officials were to travel to the area affected

79 and prepare an itemized report including the nature of the disaster, the number of

households affected, their names, their property and tax obligations. Using this

information a memorial was sent to the throne with an estimate of the aid administered

locally and an estimate of extra aid, whether in grain or scrip, for the approval of the

emperor. The reaction to famine was therefore twofold; first immediate and local, and in

the case this was not sufficient, officials applied for extra aid directly from the court. The

task of revenue officials was to verify the size of aid needed and officiate the allocation

of extra funds. Finally, a special register of the entire process was compiled and archived

for future reference.

The final task of the department was bookkeeping, or accounting (kuai ji 會計).

This is the only mention of accounting throughout the entire chapter of the Zhu si zhi

zhang. It does not refer in any way to total tax revenue but is applied to the maintenance

of granary reserves. Still, this passage is interesting because it reveals the accounting

techniques of the time. The department was required to produce two reports: the first

containing data on the previous year and the second containing a projected budget for the

following year. In the first report all stored grain, beyond three years of military reserves

was to be calculated according to “existing sum” (xian zai 見在), ”deficiencies” (bu fu 不

敷), and “surplus” (yu sheng 餘剰). The second report detailed expected income and

expenditure for the coming year. The categories in this report were “remainder from

previous years” (jiu guan 舊管), “new revenue” (xin shou 新收), “disbursement” (kai chu

開出), and “net sum” (shi zai 實在). These reports were supposed to be jointly reported

80 every year to the Ministry of Revenue.124

The accounting procedure that is described here is the “four-column” (si zhu 四) accounting system that was practiced in China at least since the Tang and was the most sophisticated accounting procedure of the time.125 In terms of budget making, it is clear that the knowledge and expertise of former dynasties was retained in the Ming. Granary officials kept the accounts. Then, assuming that the information was forwarded to the local magistrate and on to the provincial administration without hindrance, top revenue officials at the centre could produce a similar report at the national level. It is important to note that in this case, accounting procedure is applied in order to manage supplies and is not used in the context of revenue. In other words, there was no institutional arrangement or requirement to aggregate tax data from various sources in one document.

For one, aggregate tax income would be impossible to calculate since tax was collected in different commodities and monies. There was therefore no concept of total national revenue that could then be distributed according to a government plan. On the other hand, since grain was the main source of income and expenditure, it is understandable that the level of grain supplies was almost equal to total revenue.

124 Ibid, 3:109a-109b.

125 Guo Daoyang 郭道扬, Zhongguo kuai ji shi gao 中国会计史稿 [A Draft History of Accounting in China], 2 vols., (Wuhan: Zhongguo cai jing jing ji chu ban she, 1982); Chen Shimin, “The Rise and Fall of Debit- Credit Bookkeeping in China- History and Analysis”, The Accounting Historians Journal 25.1 (June, 1998): 73-92; Y. L. Zhao, “A Brief History of Accounting and Auditing in China,” Accounting and Auditing in the People’s Republic of China (Dallas, TX: Centre for International Accounting Development, 1987): 165-191.

2.3.2 The Board of Expenditure

Government expenses were organized under seven categories, each with their

own specific procedures: grants and awards, military salaries, military salt rations,

miscellaneous payments, government salaries, granary allocations (for traveling

officials), and travel provisions for soldiers.126 Every payment was conducted through a

similar procedure of verification using stub-books. The main role of officials was to

communicate requests for funds, verify them, and follow up on the completion of the

transport. In other words, officials in the Board of Expenses dealt with the paper work of

transporting funds. The term “awards and grants” (shang ci 賞賜) essentially meant any form of monetary or non-grain irregular payment. Grants could be issued to meritorious officials or foreign dignitaries, but they were especially important in supplying the military with cloth and uniforms. Initially, grants were issued in scrip, but as early as the

Hongwu reign other commodities that often replaced scrip appeared, such as Indian pepper and sappan wood.127

Grants were issued from the palace treasury (nei fu 內府). This was a general

term for a number of storehouses that collected vast amounts of scrip, cloth, silver and

gold, ivory and pearls that came from commercial taxes, the sericulture tax, converted

grain tax, tribute levies, and money from fines and confiscated property. Although

126 Zhai, 3:111b-127a.

127 These commodities will be discussed in chapter 3.

82 commonly regarded as the private treasury of the emperor, it had an important public

function in a system that made no distinction between these two capacities.128 Beyond

palace consumption, the palace treasury paid out grants and awards, issued funds for

famine relief, and sent emergency funds to the military. By accommodating special

requests from the provinces to the throne, the palace treasury could supplement funds that the local system of granaries and storehouses lacked. In this sense, it played an important role in public finance. By involving the emperor directly, the allocation of funds could bypass the regular avenues of the bureaucracy and provide a swift response to pressing needs anywhere in the empire, serving as a ready depository for immediate action in case of emergency.

The proper procedure for issuing grants for the military began with a formal request to the Ministry of Revenue. The ministry then assigned officials to verify the names and numbers of the soldiers in question with their own records, and calculate the amount of funds requested. Once the information was deemed to be correct, a memorial was sent to the palace treasury where the numbers were again verified. Then functionaries from the Board of Population were sent to carry out the shipment.

Originally, this means that the jurisdiction of the Board of Expenses ended once the payment was authorized. This would maintain a segregation between the officials extracting the funds from the palace treasury and those who transported them. But once these departments came under the same office, there was no clear separation between the

128 Liu Ying 刘穎, Ming dai nei cheng yun ku shi tan 明代內承運庫試探 [The Study of nei cheng yun ku in Ming Dynasty], M.A. thesis, (Shandong University, 2009): 12-13.

83 tasks.

Monthly request forms detailing the number of officers and officials in the various

capital offices and agencies were sent to the ministry for approval. In the case of monthly

grain rations for soldiers, although the grain was procured from a local granary, the

request had to be approved in the capital. A request was first made to the Board of

Expenses, which prepared duplicate documents and sent them to the requesting unit and

the supplying granary. The documents could later be matched in order to ensure that what

left the granary tallied with what the unit received. A signed copy was finally stored in

the ministry’s archives to be used in granary inspections. The same procedure took place

for the allocation of monthly salt rations to soldiers. Salt rations for soldiers outside the

capital were paid in paper notes at a rate of 100 wen per jin of salt. Salaries for civilian officials outside the capital were paid in scrip as well at a rate of two and a half guan per shi of rice.

Issuing miscellaneous payments was another standard function of this office. The examples for such payments in the Zhu si zhi zhang include payments for building projects undertaken by the Ministry of Works or the production of military uniforms.

Again, the requesting agencies had to submit a request detailing the funds and supplies they intended to use. These were cases in which local administrative units could apply for funds from the central government in addition to their own budgets.

2.3.3 The Board of Money

The Boards of Granaries and Money were responsible for supplying the court.

84 The Board of Money specialized in money and money commodities that as a rule went to the Palace Treasury. These items were derived from commercial and monopoly taxes (ke cheng 課程), and fines (fa zang 罰贓). It deposited all the tax that was paid in money in the appropriate imperial storehouses. Like the Board of Granaries, it verified the amounts transported, but had no access to the funds themselves. Therefore it operated as another accounting agency. The revenue it monitored included proceedings from the salt and tea monopolies, commercial taxes, fines, and income from government silver mines. Money was collected in paper notes, gold, silver and coin. Bolts of silk products were also collected as a kind of money. The new code of 1393 differed from the previous one in one particular aspect: whereas formerly officials from the Board of Money also handled tribute arriving on foreign ships, the only legal avenue for foreign trade, this function was terminated, probably as part of the new restrictions on foreign trade. The sensitivity in the transportation of such high value items is reflected in the extra precautions taken to prevent embezzlement. Money and precious metals had to arrive at the imperial storehouse with “the seal unbroken,” meaning that the chests were sealed and shipped intact to the capital. Once again, the role of the revenue officials was confined to following the transaction as supervisors, verifying its proper completion, and recording it for future reference.

2.3.4 The Board of Granaries

The Board of Granaries handled the calculation and recording of the grain tax, as well and the transportation of tribute grain tax from the provinces to the capital or to

85 other destinations.129 Every year the tax income was calculated. Locally retained funds

that included military reserves, official salaries, student stipends, and welfare reserves

were distinguished from surplus funds, which were reported to the court and shipped,

either to the capital or to military units. Tribute tax from the directly administered

prefectures was handled in the same way. First, grain for military, administrative,

educational, and welfare purposes was retained. The text states that “in case there is more

than is needed” arrangements should be made to transport them through designated tax

captains.130 The way in which it was distributed reflects the intent of the first emperor to

store for “All Under Heaven” because only what was left after calculating official and military salaries, welfare funds and an additional two-year reserve for military guards,

was transported to the capital. In other words, there was no separate budget for the central

government.

In preparing grain for shipment, officials first sent a report on available funds,

subtracting two years’ worth of military pay, official salaries, student stipends and

welfare funds. Only the extra funds were reported to the ministry. Officials from the

Department of Granaries received tax captains that shipped grain to the capital and

handled the procedure of depositing the supplies in the imperial granary. After that they

recorded the completion of the transaction. These officials stood at the very end of a long

chain of transactions. The Tax Captain (liang zhang 糧長) supervised the Community

Head (li zhang 里長) who supervised the Tithing Head (jia shou 甲首). Finally, the

129 Zhai, Zhu si zhi zhang, 3:139b-154b.

130 如有多足用. Ibid, 3:140.

86 tithing head supervised the individual households.131

It seems that the Tax Captain actually made two trips. The first was to report the extra tax income in the area under his jurisdiction. Then he would receive a shipment document to take back with him. In the second trip he shipped the funds to their designated destination. After the capital moved to Beijing, tax captains continued to obtain their certificates from the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue.132 This was done so that the Ministry of Revenue could be able to verify that the amount arriving in the capital tallied with the original report. The only point of interaction between government officials and commoners was on the level of the tax captain who supervised the transportation of the tax. This means that the main role of the Granary officials was to verify the reports on retained and extra tax income and to assign and check the shipment documents. More inspection was done once the shipment had entered in the respective granaries and storehouses. The storehouse managers had to report every new acquisition to the scrutiny office, which would check all the documents. Only once the receipts tallied with the shipment document of the Tax Captain would he be allowed to go back home.133

131 For a discussion of the relationship between the tax captains and the li jia system see: Martin Heijdra, The Socio-Economic Development of Rural China During the Ming, PhD Diss. (Princeton University, 1994): 104-151.

132 Liang Fangzhong 梁方仲,” Ming dai liang zhang zhi shu yao” 明代糧長制述要 [On the tax captain system of the Ming dynasty], Ming Qing Shi lun cong, (Hubei: Hubei ren min chu ban she, 1957. Reprint: Liang Fangzhong jing ji shi lun wen ji fu bian, Henan: Zhong zhou gu ji chu ban she): 123

133 Zhu si zhi zhang, 3:141a-141b.

2.4 Annual Revenue Reports

The annual revenue reports represent a record of accounting on a national level that took place before the sixteenth century. The Ming Shi lu contains these reports for the years between 1403-1522. The information is organized in lists of income from various taxes and state monopolies. Other than the declaration that these reports pertained to the income of the entire realm (tian xia), we have no information on what the numbers actually indicated. Moreover, it is not clear why the editors of the Shi lu decided to place these reports at the end of the last day of the calendar year. Since Shi lu were compiled from daily court diaries the inclusion of the reports likely indicate that they were presented to the emperor at the end of every year. On the other hand, unlike most entries, there is no indication of an audience with the emperor, no mention of the presenters, nor any reaction from the emperor. Moreover, the standardized manner in which the data is organized suggests that it was a written report based on a fixed template. In this case, it could be that the written form had been either attached to the court diaries, or subsequently incorporated into the Shi lu from a file of annual reports. The first Shi lu complete revenue report looked like this:

是歲天下戶千一百四十一萬五千八百二十九口六千六百五十九萬八千三百三十七人稅粮三千一百二十九萬九千七百四石布帛一十萬五千四百二十六匹絲棉三十七萬九千二百一十五斤綿花絨十六萬二千二百四十九斤課鈔五百六十萬六千八十七錠金五十兩銀八萬一百八十五兩銅二千四百二十三斤鉄七萬九千八百六斤鉛六萬二千四十二斤硃砂千八百五十五兩海肥二十六萬六千七百五十四索茶百六十七萬八千一百七十斤鹽百二十九萬二千八百六十二引屯田子粒二千三百四十五萬七百九十九石馬三萬七千九百九十三匹

This Year throughout the realm: Households- 11,415,829, Adults- 66,598,337

88 persons, Grain Tax- 31,299,740 shi, Hemp and Cotton- 115,426 pi, Cotton and Silk- 379,215 jin, Raw Cotton- 162,249 jin, Commercial Taxes- 5,606,087 ding, Gold- 50 liang, Silver- 80,185 liang, Copper- 2,423 jin, Iron- 79,806 jin, Lead- 62,042 jin, Cinnabar- 1,855 liang, Shells- 266,754 string, tea- 1,678,170 jin, Salt- 1,292,862 yin, Grain from Military Land- 23,450,799 shi, Horses- 37,993 pi. 134

We can only assume why these reports were recorded in the last day of every year. I find it hard to believe that the emperor was engaged in a national budget meeting for the coming year on the eve of the Lunar Festival. But the reports may have played a certain ritual function. During the Yongle reign the reports appear right after an imperial visit to the ancestral temple. In some cases these two entries are actually coupled together as one occurrence. Perhaps Yongle was showing his dead father that the empire was in good shape. For example, on the last day of his first year on the throne, which was also the first year of the revenue reports in this format:

壬寅享太廟是歲天下戶千一百四十一萬五千八百二十九口.135

Leaving space after “ancestral temple” may have been enough for denoting a separation

between the two events. It could also be that the scribe simply forgot to enter one, since

punctuation marks do appear before subsequent reports. Still, the highly ritualized nature

of the last day of the year must have given special meaning to the revenue reports as well.

In any case, the regularity and meticulousness of the reports indicate that the

Ministry of Revenue did in fact recover from the administrative blow dealt to the central

134 Ming Taizong Shi lu, 26:7b. There is no demarcation between the visit to the ancestral shrine and the revenue reports also in 1407: Ming Taizong Shi lu 62:5b.

135 Ibid, The spaces are in the original text.

89 government after the abolition of the prime minister’s office, and that despite its compartmentalized structure, it acted as a central agency that was able to process large amounts of data and present it in one unified report. The term tian xia is important because it announces the intention of the compilers to encompass the total revenue of the realm. And since the reports were compiled annually they had to rely on annual updates from the provinces. The provincial administration commissioner dealt with the finances of a province, but grand coordinators were even more involved with financial issues and often communicated with the throne regarding deficiencies and sent memorials with constructive suggestions. At least during the fifteenth century, the degree of control prefects had over local administration and their cooperation with the grand coordinator and regional inspector are reported to have been rather high.136

Moreover, The kind of data that is reported suggests that it was a tool for preparing the budget for the coming year. Since the categories listed do not contain special items appropriated by the court for palace consumption but monies and commodities that were used for public purposes, it could be said that although there was no separation between public and private income, the reports were used as a tool for state finance, guo yong, rather than an account of the emperor’s wealth.

Finally, the consistency of the reports manifests the principle of clear and timely updates on tax revenue. This was the main task the first emperor delegated to his revenue officials and may therefore be seen as a logical outcome of the administrative structure

136 Nimick, Local Administration, 51-60.

90 that was established in the previous reign. On the other hand, this kind of report suggests

the ability to centralize financial data in the hands of people outside the emperor. During

the Hongwu reign, the recording of financial information was inconsistent. For 1385-86

only grain and horses are listed. Population and land statistics appear every decade upon

completion of the decennial census, and occasionally, data on revenue from the sale of

monopoly tea and salt appeared, as well as income from silver mining.137 In 1394 a more

standardized and fiscally oriented format appear. The first part contains data on total

grain reserves, and tax revenue in scrip, precious metal, and cloth. The second part

contains a list of minerals and commodities: mercury, saltpeter, alum, lead, iron and salt,

but also tea, silk floss, and cowries.138 During the short Jianwen reign (1399-1402) no reports were recorded.

The correlation between the improved quality of financial data and the new reign

suggests that the responsibility for the change lay in the personnel of the Ministry of

Revenue. No individual is credited for this operation but throughout the Yongle reign and

until 1430, Xia Yuanji (夏原吉, 1366－1430) dominated the Ministry of Revenue. He

began service in the ministry under the Hongwu emperor and rose through its ranks after

making the right choice and siding with the future Yongle emperor. In addition to

becoming Minister of Revenue, he became one of the emperor’s most trusted officials.

The history of the Ming extols him for his role in re-organizing the tax and corveé system

137 Ming Taizu Shi lu, 206:5b.

138 Ibid, 230:6b.

91 and overseeing the reconstruction of the region of Zhexi after a flood.139 But it is another

biographer, Qiu Jun, who describes him as the person who held the financial management of the dynasty in his hands for close to forty years. Under his good management the state did not know scarcity.140 Huang’s opinion that “in the Ming period no hu-pu shang-shu ever rose to become a Cochrane or Colbert,” pointed at the inability of revenue ministers to initiate policy. But within the limits of what they could do, Xia Yuanji was precisely such a person.141

Intentionally or not, the reports are another representation of the principle of

Expenditure according to Revenue since there is no data on expenditure. Moreover, it is

not clear whether the data is a result of the accounting method described above. At least

for the grain tax, it most likely represents a sum of total owed taxes rather than actual

receipts. For example, in 1425, Minister of Revenue in Beijing, Guo Zi warned that the

total grain tax revenue for the last three years amounted to under 23,000,000 shi.142 In

contrast, the annual revenue reports recorded a total of 90,000,000 for those three years.

Therefore, it is most likely that the numbers indicate anticipated rather than actual

income.

Another important feature to bear in mind is that the tax categories could

139 Zhang Tingyu, Ming shi, juan 149, 4150-4155.

140 Jiao Hong 焦竤 1541-1620, guo chao xian zheng lu 國朝獻徵錄 [Records of Contributions to the Dynasty] Si ku quan shu cun mu cong shu, (Jinan: Qi lu shu she, 1996), vol. 101, 415.

141 Huang, Taxation, 11.

142 Taizong Shi lu, 250:7a-7b.

92 represent units of account as the actual items indicated. As shall be discussed in the next

chapter, portions of the grain tax were often substituted with other means of payment,

even before the official commutation of the tribute grain tax into silver. And while there

are some categories of tax commutation, they do not cover the more important aspects of this practice. This is clear from the fact that silver is never reported as commuted tax.

This reality limits any attempt to assess the actual income from tax revenue at any given

time, since revenue could be higher or lower depending on the commutation rate. The

generality of the information doesn’t enable us to assess how comprehensive it is either.

Nevertheless, there is evidence that the Ministry of Revenue not only expected timely and

accurate data but had the means of checking it too:

The finances of the entire realm are reported every year to this Ministry. Those who send false reports should be arrested and punished. The data sent on grain this year from Shaanxi provincial administration and Yangzhou prefecture was not only late but wrong. 143

Despite their limits the annual revenue reports are still a unique source of economic data

in an era that was relatively silent regarding financial matters.

Another important aspect is the fact that data was updated annually. This suggests

that unlike Hongwu’s desire to set the annual budget ‘in stone’ and unlike the fixed

quotas of the latter half of the dynasty, throughout most of the fifteenth century, fiscal

accounting may have been more attuned to economic reality. This assumption is

corroborated by the relative quality of the data. In comparison with the other Ming

143 Ming Yingzong Shi lu, 74: 9a.

93 compilations the annual reports stand out as the most accurate. As van der Sprenkel has

shown, beyond clerical errors that are easily explained, the data on population is

consistent and reliable. 144 It was also updated annually. Only after the revenue reports

ceased to be reported in the Jiajing reign, figures appear once every decade.

The reports are a more reliable source of information regarding land statistics as

well. Previously, scholars relied on the Hui dian that lists 8,804,623 qing of taxable land

for the year 1391, but only 4,292,310 qing for the year 1501, and a similar number for the

Wanli period. This huge discrepancy led Ming commentators as well as modern scholars

to conclude that between the fourteenth and the sixteenth centuries the dynasty lost

control over half of its cultivated land.145 Fujii Hiroshi convincingly challenged this

assertion by showing that the higher figure must be a clerical error.146 By collecting land

statistics from prefectural and provincial gazeteers, he proved that wrong figures were perpetuated in the administrative codes of the dynasty. In the annual revenue reports land figures remain around 4,000,000 qing throughout the fifteenth century with one exception; for the Hongzhi reign (1488-1504) land figures jump to eight and even

9,000,000 qing. Since the Hui dian was under compilation at the time it may be that the

144 Van der Sprenkel, “Population Statistics of Ming China,” 289-326.

145 Wang Qi 王圻, Xu wen xian tong kao 續文獻通考[General history of institutions and critical examinations of documents and institutions continued], Si ku quan shu cun mu cong shu ser. 3 v. 187 (Ji’nan: Qi Lu shu she, 1995): 36:14a-b.

146 Fujii, Hiroshi 藤井宏. "Mindai dendo tōkei ni kansuru ichikōsatsu." 明代田土統計に関する一考察 [An investigation of Ming land statistics]. 1943, 1944, 1947, Tōyō Gakuhō 30, no. 3 (1943): 90-123; 30, no. 4 (1944): 60-87; 31, no. 1 (1947): 97-130. This finding has been noted by Martin Heijdra, “The Socio- Economic Development of Rural China during the Ming,” in The Cambridge History of China vol. 8, eds. Denis Twitchett and Frederick Mote (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998): 444-445.

94 data was copied from it, which further attests to the quality of the reports in this period.

The error was corrected during the next reign and the number dropped back to around

four million.

But other than this correction, the nature of the reports changes during the Hongzhi-

Zhengde reigns. In some categories there are round numbers that suggest fixed quotas. In

others, figures are simply copied from one year to the next. Whether the system was moving to fixed quotas or whether there was simply lack of current information, in the turn of the sixteenth century they ceased to represent economic reality and reflected a deeper change in the nature of financial administration. Fixed quotas in certain categories appeared already during the Yongle reign and they are connected with a loosening of government control over certain aspects of the economy. For example, during the Yongle reign the annual income from cinnabar remained fixed for several years at a time: 20,080 liang between 1406-1410, 1,579 liang for the years 1412-1413, and 1,504 liang between

1417-1424. During those years income from lead was fixed at 20,780 jin, and copper at

2,128 jin.147 Moreover, the quotas for these items dropped significantly in the following years and by the second half of the fifteenth century disappeared completely. A similar

process occurred for iron quotas: Between 1436-1464 the 74,583 jin of iron were reported

repeatedly after which the category disappears from the records.148

Throughout the Chenghua reign the fixed quota for cotton wadding was 105,000

liang, and other cloth categories remained the same for several years at a time. But it was

147 See table D-2.

148 See Table D-11.

95 only during the Hongzhi period that all the categories besides the categories of land, population and grain, and fodder were practically identical throughout the reporting period. In the Zhengde period the reports become completely meaningless when even land and grain tax figures remained unchanged. During the Longqing reign (1567-1573) annual reports reappeared but again, the data is copied from one year to the next. From this time until the end of the dynasty no similar reports are recorded. Since the whole point of reporting tax figures annually is to update information, the growing repetition of information can be used as a measure for a deteriorating administration precisely in the realm in which it was formerly relatively strong: in the communication of financial information between locality and centre.

Within the confines of Ming financial administration, the ability to present clear and updated information to the emperor was key to the successful management of the empire. Without official channels throughout which information and funds could flow, management of the empire would be impossible. In order to maintain these channels, ongoing cooperation between local and provincial officials, between different ministries, and between officials and the emperor was necessary. The appearance of the revenue reports suggests that until the last decade of the fifteenth century this was the case. Once the infrastructure that supported the accumulation of financial data deteriorated, officials had to readdress the principles of accounting.

2.5 Sixteenth Century Developments

Li Chengxun 李承勛 (jin shi 1493) who served as Grand Coordinator for

96 Liaodong in the beginning of the Jiajing reign and witnessed the chronic lack of supplies on the north eastern border, opened his memorial to the throne with a sarcastic comment, saying that while good financial administration takes income as a measure for expenses and bad financial administration does the opposite, the Ministry of Revenue is doing neither. He added that in recent years, although accounting is part of the ministry’s duty in name, in practice there is no actual measuring of expenses according to revenue.149

He was echoing Qiu Jun 邱濬 (1421-1495) who a few decades earlier suggested the historical origin of the problem hi described:

Our Dynasty abolished the [post of] Grand Councilor and had the Ministry of Revenue manage the population, land and taxes of the realm. This however dispersed these tasks among subordinate offices, which ended up simultaneously managing these obligations. The tasks are numerous and complex but there is no office to consolidate them. Your Minister requests that, as in ancient times, in addition to the directorship of a finance minister (ji xiang 計相) and the assistance of the minister of revenue, another position be added [at the level] of Minister that will consolidate all national finances.150

Qiu Jun pointed at a central problem in Ming financial administration- the empire was operating without an accountant. And indeed, in the last two decades of the fifteenth century, the revenue reports show no meaningful accounting work. Qiu Jun

149 Chen Zilong 陳子龍, Huang Ming jing shi wen bian 皇明經世文編 [A Compilation of Statecraft Writing of the Ming Empire] (1638),100:9b-10b. Reprint: Si ku jin hui shu cong kan, (Beijing: Beijing Chu ban she, 2000), vol. 23, 308.

150 Qiu, Da xue yan yi bu, 24:6b.

97 acknowledged the failure of the Hongwu vision of national finance and suggested to

emulate past dynasties in placing a chief finance official.

The Jiajing emperor was the first to acknowledge the need for national

accounting. He ordered the compilation of a national account book that would, for the first time, give equal weight to expenditure. This new emphasis on expenditure also indicates that it was a growing concern. In order to manage it better the emperor ordered a return to the accounting procedures of the Tang and Song dynasties. In 1543 he issued a decree for the production of a national budget emphasizing the long neglect of annual expenses:

In the twenty-second year of the Jiajing reign (1543), the Emperor confirmed the petition of the Ministry of Revenue to follow the practice of former dynasties’ national accounts (國計, guo ji). In the end of each year it is to calculate stipends for princely households, salaries for holders of noble titles, government salaries and grain rations, monthly military grain rations for border and inland units, and tribute grain to the capital comprising actual grain and converted grain, with a distinction between collected and uncollected tax. The total amount of the realm’s income and expenditure should be written down in a simple and convenient manner that can be posted on a placard and presented to the throne.151

The first actual result to emerge from these initiatives was the Da Ming kuai ji lu (大明

會計錄, Account Book of the Great Ming), allegedly presented to the Jiajing emperor,

but it is not extent. In 1576 Minister of Revenue Wang Guoguang began compiling the

151 Wanli Ming Hui dian, juan 24, p. 626.

98 Wanli kuai ji lu, which was presented to the emperor in 1581.152 It contains detailed lists of regular expenses alongside annual income. In the preface, both the Tang and Song examples are mentioned as predecessors of this genre but no other similar compilation in the Ming, suggesting that the compilers considered it the first of its kind during their dynasty.

In his work on the history of accounting in China, Philip Fu suggests that the purpose of the account book was to warn the Wanli emperor of the dire financial strait the empire is in, rather than invigorate or reform financial administration.153 Ray Huang

maintains that this was the apex of Zhang Juzheng’s reforms in Ming accounting. In the

years before the completion of the account book, Zhang Juzheng abolished government

and military posts in order to cut expenses. He ordered audits of tax and labour service

quotas in all counties, and presided over a nation-wide land survey. The information was

gathered in the Wanli account book and served as the basis for the fiscal chapters of the

Wanli Hui dian.154

Even if this was part of a serious attempt to reform financial administration, the

mechanism of tax and data collection was too damaged to permit meaningful change.

Though the Wanli edition of the Hui dian lists expenses alongside revenue figures, the

quality of the information is questionable. The editors of the Hou hu zhi (後湖志,

152 As mentioned on p. 51, a preliminary analysis of this text appears in Liang Fangzhong, “Shu ji ping lun.”

153 Fu, “A Study of Governmental Accounting in China,” 150-151.

154 Huang, Taxation and Governmental Finance, 296.

99 Gazetteer of the Yellow Registers Archive) preferred to include population statistics from the Zhengde rather than the Wanli edition. Similarly, the editors of the eighteenth-century imperial library, Si ku quan shu, did not even include the Wanli edition for a similar reason: In the short preface to the Zhengde edition they explain that Wanli-era administration was so broken down that the Hui dian was a badly written text.

Why did it take so long for such an account book to appear in the Ming? Since it has been established that there was no lack of motivation or ability in financial administration, we may assume that this was an application of the idea of Revenue as a

Measure for Expenses. According to this logic, there is no need to count expenditure because it depends entirely on revenue. In the sixteenth century, the naïve idea that expenditure can be disregarded was no longer an option for administrators. By giving equal weight to revenue and expenses administrators took a more realistic approach and acknowledged that in order to survive expenditure must be managed.

Zhang Juzheng’s reform concentrated on tightening control over tax collection and reducing corruption and fraud in the bureaucracy. His aim was to strengthen the political centre and in that he succeeded marvelously. Before his death, the granaries in

Beijing had grain enough for nine years. And the national silver treasury contained an emergency store of four million taels. Tax collection and auditing were more efficient, and tax evasion was prosecuted with more vigor. But, as Huang mentions, Zhang never attempted to carry out a reform in governmental finance. Local budgets were not increased so under the new audits officials were more vulnerable to state demands. There were also other opponents to these reforms; landlords naturally did not want to pay higher tax, students at the imperial academy resented the cut in official posts, and officials who

100 refused to pay travel expenses now denied from them. Zhang’s initiatives survived only as long as he remained in power.155

As mentioned earlier, Zhang appreciated the organizational capacity of the early

Ming, especially its emphasis on the collection of tax data and auditing of accounts. He of course lived in a time when it was impossible to return to the system of “storing wealth with the people.” Instead, his reforms further strengthened the ability of Beijing to tap into local revenue. The localized, commodity-based model of state finance disintegrated early in the fifteenth century. The reforms that followed managed to restore stability and solvency to the realm. These reforms acknowledged the changes in Ming economy and utilized them. The replacement of grain taxes with silver and cloth accommodated local economic patterns and facilitated the transportation of supplies. Finally, the substantial amounts of silver that entered China in the sixteenth century catered to the growing demands of both market and state. Zhang Juzheng managed to accommodate state demands for a while through the traditional means of fiscal retrenchment and better auditing.

The following chapter returns to the policies that introduced money into state finance and contributed to the spread of silver in the Ming economy. It explains the role of tax commutation in state finance and follows its role from a means of negotiation between local and central demands, into a tool for strengthening the fiscal capacities of the centre.

155 Ibid, 298-301.

101 3 The Role of Tax Commutation in State Finance

Tax commutation was the main source of money income for the Ming. Unlike the

Tang and the Song before it, the Ming did not rely on indirect taxation, and so it did not enjoy the benefits of greater centralization and efficiency in tax collection. There was also the benefit of collecting tax in money. Money taxes are easier to assess, and easier to transport. They of course depend on the availability of money, and are aided by an active monetary policy. After the An Lushan rebellion the Tang dynasty expanded its monetary revenue sources and even attempted to institute a direct tax in cash. But, as Twitchett argues, there was not enough coin to institute a direct monetary tax and most of the levies were made in cloth.156 In the Song the industrial capacities of copper mining and coin production were matched by the scale and sophistication in which it taxed its commercial economy.

Ming China did neither. It did not have an adequate supply of money nor was it inclined to tax commercial transactions on a large scale. It could even be argued that before the late fifteenth century even the salt monopoly did not function as a commercial source of revenue. Salt was a vehicle for aiding grain transportation to the northern border, and a means of collecting excess notes and removing damaged notes form circulation. In neither capacity did the salt monopoly contribute directly to monetary

156 Ibid, 42. The liang shui (兩稅) tax was made of a land tax assessed in grain, and a households tax assessed in silver.

102 revenue. In contrast, the salt monopoly, along with other commercial taxes, constituted

over half of the annual income in the Tang and Song dynasties.

The benefit of commutation is that it does not necessarily involve money and

therefore does not depend on a monetary economy. Before the An Lushan rebellion, tax

commutation took place in order to save transportation costs. There is evidence that in

Jiangnan the grain tax was paid in hemp cloth. In other regions grain was substituted for

silk, salt, or cash.157 In the Tang, household production of cloth was widespread and built

into the regular tax system.158 In the Ming too, cloth, probably cotton, often served as a

substitute for grain and was available through local production. In these cases,

commutation into cloth would not necessarily involve purchasing it on the market,

though state demands did contribute to the expansion of a cloth industry. In more

monetized economies money became the main substitute for grain and entailed some

interaction with a market. In the Yuan, scrip was the official means of commutation, and required some kind of market interaction.159 But the reason for the commutation, as the

History of the Yuan mentions, was to reduce transportation costs. These two examples

157 Twitchett, Financial Administration, 30-31.

158 Francesca Bray, Technology and Gender: Fabrics of Power in Late Imperial China (Berkeley: University of California Press,1997): 205-215.

159 Yuan shi, 93:7.b.

103 show that in the logic of tax commutation there was no distinction between money and commodity. The importance was that it was light and of high value.160

In the early Ming the means of commutation were interchangeable. There is some indication that during the Hongwu reign there was a preference for scrip, but there was usually an option between several high-value commodities. After the demise of scrip silver became the most convenient means of commutation in its dual role of money- commodity, circulating in an economy that did not regulate currency. Unlike scrip, silver enabled the Ming to rely on a commodity that was high in value and easy to transport, and at the same time a stable and durable store of value. Since it was widely accepted as a means of exchange, it also reflected the growing reliance on an agricultural market economy.

In this chapter I argue that the Ming never fully relied on taxation in kind and was involved with a market economy from its inception. Furthermore, as the biggest economic player in the Ming economy, the state promoted a market economy through its tax policies on a nation-wide scale. This chapter analyzes the purpose of tax commutation, its scope in tax collection, and assesses its impact on the circulation of currencies and the production of commodities through the examination of scrip, silver, silk and cotton.

160 The term that was used in this context is qing qi (輕齊). Schurmann follows Liang Yansheng in translating it as “light sending:. See: Herbert Franz Schurmann, Economic Structure of the Yuan Dynasty, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956): 83, n.18. An alternative term is or qing huo (輕貨).

104 In the daily management of the empire, official grain tax quotas had little relation

to actual receipts. The full quota was often not collected and the portion that was

collected was not entirely in grain. The most common substitutes for grain in the first half

of the dynasty were scrip and cloth. Tax commutation was initially applied as a

manifestation of the principle of Revenue as a Measure for Expenditure, because its aim was not to increase revenue but to lower the costs involved in the collection and transportation of agricultural taxes. Money and money commodities were easier to carry;

when roads or waterways were impassable for heavy carts or boats, tax could be still be

delivered using lighter means of transportation. It was also a way to expedite the

transportation of funds in case of an emergency. Commutation provided an alternative

form of payment when grain was scarce. Also, though less reported, local officials also faced the problem of too much grain. After bumper harvests petitions were made to the court to substitute the grain tax for other items in order to avoid amassing quantities of grain in the government granary that would eventually rot.

During the Hongwu and Yongle reigns, paper currency was the main means for commutation of the grain tax. In the Xuande reign scrip was more strictly confined to

commercial taxes. This was part of another role commutation played in the Ming, that of

promoting the circulation of its scrip. Taxation was a way to collect scrip from the market

and control the quantity in circulation. In complete contradiction to any fiscal reason, the

dynasty collected taxes and paid salaries in scrip long after it devalued and largely

disappeared from the market. Commercial taxes and the salt tax were collected in scrip

until the last decade of the fifteenth century, when they were commuted to silver. This

was also the time when scrip disappeared from official payments. Although the revenue

105 reports continued to register the data in ding units of paper currency, this was probably a mere convention by that time.

The entrance of silver into public finance was part of specific tax reforms that intended on the one hand to alleviate the tax burden on individual taxpayers and on the other to solve the logistical difficulties of supplying the military in the far north with grain from the southeast. The Hongwu emperor may have prohibited the use of silver in commercial transactions but never avoided using silver in public finance. Although there are no cases of widespread tax commutations, the history of his reign registers several large transportations of silver as aid to the military. That silver was fairly common in the mid fifteenth century is evident by the existence of silver payments for labour service.

Instead of performing their regular service at the local yamen, men could pay the amount of silver needed to hire a day worker instead. This was an option for people who could afford it. Though commutation of labour service served as an extra source of revenue, it was not widespread before the sixteenth century.161

The organized and widespread commutation of the grain tax into silver was first announced in 1436, when the emperor agreed to collect the tribute grain tax in silver and ship it in ingots to Beijing. This policy, later known as Gold Floral Silver, signaled a shift in the practice and purpose of tax commutation and in the degree of monetization in state finance. It also signaled the withdrawal from the early Ming ban on silver. The A detailed

161 Yukio Yamane, “Reforms in the Service Levy system in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries,” Christian Daniels and Linda Grove eds., State and Society in China: Japanese Perspectives on Ming-Qing Social and Economic History (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1984): 279-310.

106 discussion of early attitudes towards silver and the political maneuvers that led to the

Gold Floral Silver policy will be discussed below. In the following section deals with the official policy regarding paper currency, and its role in state finance.

Cloth had a dual capacity in public expenditure both as clothing material and as a means of payment. In the beginning of the Ming, the Hongwu emperor ordered every landowner to plant mulberry, hemp, or cotton. From this a tax quota was set on each of these items. Households that did not plant any of the three had to pay in the finished product, measured in roles of silk, a bolt of hemp, or of cotton.162 This was another agricultural tax that was to be collected in kind. But when silk and cotton substituted for the grain tax, they also functioned as a currency. In north China cotton and silk cloth could be used for clothing and as currency for purchasing grain and horses. Cotton, in addition to being sent to the north to clothe the military and pad the winter uniforms of the soldiers, also served as a currency for purchasing grain for the troops. Higher valued silk was exchanged for horses on the border.

Since the revenue reports contain tax quotas and not actual receipts, the existence of commutation is difficult to discern. Nevertheless, the information does reflect the more significant changes in fiscal policy during the fifteenth century. Along with evidence from the court diary and administrative compilations, the importance of commutation in the fiscal management of the dynasty becomes clear.

162 (Wanli) Ming Hui dian, 17:41a-41b.

107 3.1 Scrip

First issued in 1375, the Great Ming Circulating Treasure Note (大明通行寶鈔，

Da Ming tong xing bao chao) was a direct continuation of its Yuan-dynasty predecessor.

It was conceived as a high denomination currency, representing bronze coin that circulated along with it and that was used in smaller transactions. Issued in six denominations, the highest represented a string of one thousand coins, also called guan (

貫). The other five notes represented between one hundred and five hundred coins. The official exchange rate of the one-guan note was initially set at one tael of silver and one shi of rice. As scrip depreciated a new unit of account, representing five one-guan notes, began to appear in tax income reports. The term ding (錠) was the Yuan silver unit of account. This suggests an attempt to attach scrip to silver, but sinc scrip was not officially convertible in the Ming, the term probably designates the alleged value of five guan of scrip. Thereafter scrip was accounted both in guan and in ding.163

In order to promote its scrip as the primary currency the Ming attempted to demonetize precious metals, especially silver that circulated widely in the Yuan. It prohibited its use in trade, and although the court held silver in reserve, it did not use it in order to back the value of its notes. Saying that, it should be noted that silver and gold were in fact convertible with scrip, but this in practice was a one-direction exchange,

163 Since silver was never monetized in the Ming, ding pertained only to scrip while liang, the unit of weight of a standard tael, became the common designation for silver. The paper ding in the Ming continued to represent five-guan notes and depreciated at the same rate. Peng Xinwei 信威彭, Zhongguo huo bi shi 中國貨幣史 (Monetary History of China) (Shanghai: Ren min chu ban she, 1958), 469.

108 intended to collect precious metal from the market. Commoners could exchange their

precious metals with the government but there is no indication that the government exchanged silver for scrip. But even if it did, the quantity of metal in reserve was so

limited that it could hardly support a silver-based paper currency.164 Early Ming administrators may have picked this idea up from Yuan policies. In the 1280’s the government prohibited purchasing goods on the market with silver.165

Not only were silver and gold banned. Initially, Zhu Yuanzhang minted sovereign

coin that circulated alongside coin from earlier dynasties and was intended to serve as

small change alongside scrip. The decision to institute paper currency was possibly a

result of insufficient output of copper and production of coin. Moreover, the Ming shi

states that in the early years of the dynasty merchants were still accustomed to using

Yuan-dynasty paper currency. 166 But as the value of coin against scrip rose, imperial

mints were shut down. Copper was scarce in the early Ming and the closure of the mints further reduced the supply of coin. Hongwu’s policy regarding minting coin was

extremely fickle. After establishing imperial mints in every province he started shutting

them down. The mint in Fujian closed down upon imperial order in 1375, and the rest of

164 Wu Han 吳含, “Ming chu she hui shen chang li de fa zhan 明初社会生产力的发展” [The Development of Productivity in Early Ming Society], Li shi yan jiu, no. 3 (1955): 53-84.

165 Nancy Shatzmen Steinhardt, “Currency Issues of Yuan China,” Bulletin of Song Yuan Studies 16 (1980): pp. 59-81. The author is not convinced about the degree of enforcement of this ban. One such prohibition from 1262 states: “ By imperial order, in all private markets were gold and silver are used to pay for cash and commodities, only scrip should be used instead” (敕私市金銀應支錢物止以鈔為准). See: Yuan shi, 5.

166 Song, Yuan shi, juan 81, 1962.

109 the provincial mints closed in the following year.167 In 1377 provincial mints reopened for production, and in 1393 they were shut down again out of concern for the burden this imposed on the people.168 Despite periods in which the state returned to minting coin,

counterfeiting became so widespread that debased private coins completely replaced the official currency.169

Unlike the insistence on promoting its scrip, the Ming never made any serious

effort to promote the circulation of its coin. This was in part a result of the conviction that

in order to promote scrip the use of coin should be discouraged. Furthermore, due to the

scarcity of copper, the state never managed to control its currency and offer an adequate

replacement for counterfeit coin. That said, coin was collected in commercial taxes.

Officially, it constituted one third of the tax quota. The specific arrangement in this case

is not clear. Did merchants pay their allotted tax both in scrip and in coin, or were

officials responsible to make sure that one third of their quota was is coin? In any case,

the total income would be negligible. In the revenue reports commercial taxes are always

designated in scrip so there is no way to ascertain how much of it was in coin.

Furthermore, coin was never designated as a specific means for tax commutation

(although it was an option during the first decades of the Ming), nor was it used in regular

official payments. There was probably simply not enough of it. In other words, it was

never perceived as an important part of state finance.

167 Ming Taizu Shi lu, 101:2.a; 106:7.b.

168 Ibid, 112:4.a; 229:1.a.

169 Von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune, 97.

110 In comparison, the Song dynasty circulated scrip alongside currencies that acted

as a measure of value and could back its fiat currency. Bronze coin served as the metal

backing for scrip. Every two years the state would buy notes off the market using coin

and issued new notes. It therefore managed the circulation of its scrip as a form of short- term debt that would be redeemed within designated time periods. Between 1260 and the

1280’s, the Yuan enabled the free exchange of notes to silver and gold. Special government offices called Price Stabilization Depots were established for that purpose.

But from the 1280’s silver and gold were prohibited in trade and scrip devalued continuously.170

Rather than following the example of the Song, the Ming repeated the Yuan ban

on trade in silver. This probably only undermined the circulation of scrip because the

scarcity of silver supported its high value. In addition, the inundation of the market with

notes during the Hongwu reign was disastrous. In 1385 35,000,000 guan, were printed.171

In comparison, the quantity of paper money printed annually during the yuan did not

often surpass 1,000,000 ding.172 In 1390, around 95,000,000 guan were poured into the

economy in famine relief efforts and disbursements of emergency military funds.173 For

example, in 1376, the emperor issued 500,000 ding of paper notes along with over 80,000

170 Schurmann, Economic Structure, 135.

171 Yuzhi da gao xu bian 25a-26a.

172 Schurmann, Economic Structure, 141-143.

173 Huang, Taxation, 69-70.

111 bolts of silk to the capital guard and the standing army around Nanjing.174 Two years

later, over 17,000 soldiers drilling in Henan were granted 45,000 ding.175

In response to reports of famine in 1389, the emperor sent an emergency sum of

5,360,000 ding to help more than 214,600 households from Qingzhou Prefecture in

Shandong to purchase food.176 If the intention was that every household should get an equal share, then about 125 guan were distributed to each family. The value of a one- guan note in the late 1380’s was about 200 coins. In normal conditions this sum would purchase around 60 shi of rice and a larger amount of cheaper grains. In normal times this amount could last a family two years. But considering high grain prices during famine, it is likely that the seemingly generous aid was granted with consideration given to higher than normal grain prices.177 On the other hand, it is hard to imagine that such a sudden

influx of money in the prefecture would assist in lowering prices, especially before

sufficient grain arrived at the prefecture.

In these abrupt and large injections of currency into rural economies the first

emperor demonstrated a profound misunderstanding of the nature of fiat currency. By

sending large amounts of the currency to an agricultural population he ignored the fact at

that time there was little one could do with money. By all accounts, Shandong’s

174 Ming Taizu Shi lu,197:7b.

175 Ibid, 121:3a.

176 Ibid, 188:3a.

177 Dieter Kuhn, The Age of Confucian Rule, 215. This calculation is based on Kuhn’s assessment that one shi of grain could support a family of five for ten days.

112 agricultural economy was just recovering from the devastation of war, and it is unlikely

that a viable commercial market existed in Qingzhou at the time. In other words, the

quantities of notes that entered Qingzhou prefecture had no market in which to circulate.

Large issues of scrip were frequent especially during the reign of the first

emperor, but continued throughout the Yongle reign too. Even if they did relieve distress

in the short run, the influx of money pushed down the value of the notes. Excessive

issuing with no external backing or parallel means of collecting notes back from the

market could only led to inflation. Records of the exchange rate between paper currency

and coin or silver indicate that within a decade of its inception, the one-guan note fell to under a half of its original value, and by the turn of the fifteenth century was exchanged for less than a hundred coins. During the Yongle era this trend continued and by the

Hongxi reign (r. 1424-1425), a one-guan note was worth no more than a few coins. 178

The odd thing with the story of paper currency in the Ming is that it continued to

circulate despite its being practically valueless. It continued to be disseminated in the

economy through government expenditure and collected as tax until the final years of the

fifteenth century. Moreover, in its first decades of circulation it was an acceptable

178 Peng Xinwei created a chart of exchange rates between scrip and coin and silver based on various reports. Some of the information is deduced through reports of commodity prices. The usefulness of the information is limited since the value of silver and coin fluctuated against commodity prices too but the general trend is clear. From an initial exchange rate of one guan of scrip to a thousand coins and one tael of silver, its value dropped to 200 coins and one fifth of a tael in 1386. In 1407 an exchange rate of one guan per 12 coins was reported, but six years later it rose back to 47 coins. This is one of three cases in which the value of scrip was reported to have risen. The other two occurred in 1487 and 1525, but in these late periods scrip was no longer an actuality. As for the 1413 report, the increase is not significant but it may indicate that the currency gained some degree of confidence in it. Peng Xinwei, Zhongguo huo bi shi, Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chu ban she, 1958. P. 465.

113 replacement for the grain tax. There is evidence that commutation of the grain tax into

scrip was widespread during the Hongwu reign. This practice continued during the

Yongle reign though the scale of commutation is not clear. As we shall see, from the mid

Xuande period this policy was reversed.

Judging by the legislative efforts of the first emperor, scrip appears to have been a regular substitute for grain. The following imperial statement is taken from the Da gao:

Conversion of the Grain Tax

All levies that officials are collecting in Zhexi are harming the people with a rapaciousness resembling that of wild animals. For example, in the case of the conversion of the autumn tax, the prefectural, sub-prefectural, and county officials expand the tax of two guan of paper notes for each shi of grain and devise all kinds of categories such as: A river travel fee of a hundred coins, a carriage travel fee of three hundred coins, a meal fee of a hundred coins, a granary inspection fee of one hundred coins, a reed basket fee of a hundred coins, a bamboo basket fee of a hundred coins, and a river-god fee of a hundred coins. How can these kinds of offenses against the people be pardoned?179

Zhexi is singled out here not only because of its economic importance at the time but

because it was the centre of the Guo Huan affair.180 By singling it out, the emperor used

179 Zhu Yuanzhang, Yu zhi da gao: chu bian.

180 Lin, Ming T’ai-tzu’s Administration of Justice, 51-52.

114 Zhexi as a model for financial administration throughout the realm. While the emperor’s outrage was directed at the tendency of local officials to make up all kinds of surcharges, he did not object to the fact that the autumn tax, the most important source of revenue, was regularly collected in scrip. So common was this practice that it was taken for granted and in itself merited no particular attention. Moreover, in this case scrip alone is mentioned as an acceptable means of payment. Therefore it may have been privileged over other means.

Another example for the acceptability of paying taxes in scrip appears in the following clause of the Great Ming Code:

Rules of Paper Currency When people bring paper currencies to granaries, markets, treasuries, or tax offices to pay various taxes in lieu of paying in grain or to purchase salt or other goods, or when any yamen delivers illicit goods or fines, it is essential that personal names or marks be recorded on the backs of the currencies for later examination.181

In this regulation, substituting grain for paper currency comes across as an option that does not require any special authorization. We might even go further and assume that a clause such as this obliged officials to accept scrip when handed to them. What is

181 The translation is from Jiang Yonglin, Mandate of Heaven and the Great Ming code, (Seattle: University of Washington Press): 91.

115 interesting about these two excerpts is that they are descriptive and not prescriptive. Even

if it does not indicate the scope of the practice it does attest to its commonplace nature.

In other clauses of the Da gao, the emperor details some of the fraudulent

practices relating to scrip and divulges what is probably the only surviving quantitative

data on commutation of the grain tax to scrip: In detailing the crimes of the Guo Huan

affair of 1385, he recounts that out of the Zhexi’s annual grain tax quota of 4,500,000 shi,

the equivalent of 2,000,000 was collected in scrip. And out of that amount almost half

disappeared before reaching the storehouse.182 The annual scrip quota printed during

1385 is revealed in another incident; close to 35,000,000 guan. The reason why we know

this is that out of this quota, Guo Huan and his culprits stole 1,437,540 ding (or 7,187,700

guan) and laundered the loot by mixing it together in several storehouses with scrip

collected from commercial and commuted taxes. When actual tax proceeds arrived at the

storehouse, the granary officials involved in the scheme simply avoided registering it and

divided the money among them.183 In another article we find the sum of collected taxes in scrip for that year: 27,545,295 guan.184 The state was undoubtedly printing large sums of

scrip, but it was also collecting much. At least in 1385, the state collected in tax almost

eighty percent of what it printed, meaning that it was using taxation in order to back its

currency.

182 Yu zhi da gao: chu bian, 10b.

183 Yu zhi da gao xu bian 25a-26a.

184 Ibid, article no. 32.

116 In other cases scrip was one of several options for tax payment. In 1376, one year

after paper notes were first issued, the emperor announced a nationwide commutation of

the grain tax. That year was a good year: the last campaigns against remnants of the

Mongol army ended, the realm was pacified, and granaries were full. It was a time to thank the people for their toil during the years of conquest, transporting grain to the military. A large-scale tax exemption was granted, covering most provinces.185 In

addition, rent from government land that was not exempted was to be collected in money.

The emperor articulated that this was done for the convenience of the taxpayers, since by

fixing the exchange rate of grain to money they would not be affected by changing

prices.186 Again in 1386, the emperor ordered the Ministry of Revenue to calculate all

surplus grain in the provinces to be collected in either silver, gold, cloth (either hemp or

cotton), or scrip. This decree is probably the basis for the Wanli Hui dian account on the origins of the commutation of the tribute tax that shall be discussed below. But I am inclined to read this decree as a temporary one since it specifies “this year’s autumn grain tax along with grain from previous years.” 187 In these two cases scrip was only one

option with which people or officials could pay and collect tax. But between it and the

other options of coin, silver, gold, and cloth, it makes sense that scrip would be the

cheapest means of payment.

185 Ming Taizu Shi lu, 105:2b-3a.

186 Ibid, 105:4b-5a.

187 Ibid, 178:1.b.

117 Since government land was concentrated in Jiangnan, the commutation was really

directed towards government tenants. And since tribute grain was the main source of

income for the court, the government, and the army surrounding the capital city, we can

assume that scrip was in turn used to purchase grain and other foodstuffs from the market. This policy must have entailed a decrease in income but it also entailed a relaxing of the tax burden that was especially high on government land in Jiangnan.188

Substituting grain for scrip continued during the Yongle reign. Specific decrees

show that the practice had spread beyond Jiangnan. In 1407, Yongle specified scrip in an

order to convert that year’s summer tax in Beijing as well as tax owed from previous

years.189 A late Ming discussion of this decree maintains that in this case the reason for

commuting tax to scrip was promoting its circulation.190 In the summer of 1416, the

Grand Coordinator of Sichuan recommended collecting the previous year’s grain tax for

Luzhou Prefecture in scrip and cotton due to famine.191 The opposite situation demanded

official intervention too: In the same month Xi’an Prefecture requested collecting its summer tax in scrip stating that granaries were full.192 Similarly, in 1411 a request to

collect the autumn tax in scrip was sent from Fujian Province, citing the same issue of a

188 The issue of high tax rates in Jiangnan will be discussed in more detail in the following sections.

189 Ming Taizong Shi lu, 65:5b.

190 Chen Renxi 陳仁錫, Huang Ming shi fa lu 皇明世法錄 [A Record of the Law of the Great Ming] (1630), reprint: Si ku jin hui shu cong kan, ser. 2, vol. 4 (Beijing: Beijing chu ban she, 2000): 33:3b.

191 Ibid, 177:1a.

192 Ibid, 177: 7a.

118 bumper harvest.193 Too much grain in store would simply rot. It was therefore more

logical to release the extra grain to the market by collecting the tax in money. Whether

responding to deficiency or excess, officials were commuting the grain tax as a way to

moderate the effects of seasonal imbalances on grain prices.

Another purpose for collecting taxes in scrip was to maintain its value. Ming

officials did not seem to grasp the importance of convertibility but they did understand

the relationship between the quantity of notes in circulation and inflation. In 1404 Censor

Chen Ying 陳瑛, one of Yongle’s early recruits, suggested controlling the amount of

scrip in the market with increased taxation:

Recently, the script system is not operating smoothly. In every case the reason is that the court is issuing too many notes and has no way to collect them, and as a result commodities are expensive and scrip is cheap.194

He submitted a plan to rescue the failing currency by imposing a new general salt tax that would be payable only in scrip. Chen calculated 10,000,000 civilian households plus

2,000,000 military households. By taxing them the state could collect more than

50,000,000 ding per quarter. He predicted that at this rate scrip would appreciate within a few months. The emperor convened a committee to discuss this proposition. It accepted the suggestion but decided to halve the proposed tax payment in order to spread the collection of scrip throughout a longer period. The emperor accepted the revised version

193 Ming Taizong Shi lu, 108:3a.

194 Ibid, 33:8.a-8.b.

119 of the suggestion. This would mean that a family of five would be charged an annual sum

of 42 guan. In the assumed exchange rate of the time the payment would be equivalent to

about half a tael of silver. There is some indication that in the following years the value

of paper currency rose a little but the general downward trend continued.

Minister of Revenue Xia Yuanji suggested another remedy to the Yongle emperor; issuing new notes bearing the Yongle reign name.195 This method was applied a

few times during the Yuan. In 1287-8 Zhiyuan scrip was issued at a ration of 1:5 to the

Zhongtong scrip that had been circulating since 1260. And Zhida scrip was issued in

1309-10 again at a ratio of 1:5 to Zhiyuan currency.196 The frequency of the new issues

suggests that this solution was a temporary one. Interestingly, the Yongle emperor

refused. For an emperor who spent vast resources in cementing the legitimacy of his

reign and glorifying it, this refusal is curious. In fact, Yongle-era notes were issued after

all. In the eighteenth-century numismatic work Quan bu tong zhi Yongle and Hongxi-era

notes are recorded.197

Collecting many more millions of notes in the new salt tax perhaps prolonged

some sort of circulation but it could not restore their value. In addition, there seems to

have been real resistance to using scrip in the market place and the currency was confined

to government operations. Nevertheless, there are historical examples in which taxation

195 Zhang, Ming Shi, 81:1963.

196 Schurmann, Economic Structure, 135.

197 Meng Lin 孟麟 Quan bu tong zhi 泉布統誌 [Comprehensive record of money] (1833): 8.20a-21.b; 8.24a-25a.

120 was the sole backing for a successful circulation of fiat currency. In his discussion of

1690s Massachusetts, Dror Goldberg explored the case of paper currency issued by the

colonial government. Forbidden by England to mint its own coin or issuing any other

sovereign money, it resorted to printing notes that were otherwise inconvertible and

passed them as private bills of exchange. These bills functioned in every way as money.

Though unable to talk about it openly, the colonial government did allow and even

encouraged tax payment in paper notes and becoming, according to Goldberg, the progenitor of the modern character of pure fiat currency.198

The relationship between taxation and circulation of paper currency is demonstrated in land-sale contracts preserved from Huizhou prefecture. As Li Ruoyu has

shown, from the time Ming scrip was first issued until the Xuande period (with the

exception of the short Jianwen reign), the majority of land sale contracts specify paper

currency.199 These contracts had to be approved by a local official, a process that may

have obliged the sellers and buyers to officially acknowledge scrip in the contract.

Nevertheless, the fact that scrip disappears from contracts later on shows that the

currency specified in them was not merely an empty word. Also, the fact that some

198 Dror Goldberg, “The Massachusetts Paper Money of 1690,” The Journal of Economic History 69.4 (2009): 1092-1106. Based on this work, Goldberg proposes a theoretical model by which a tax-based mechanism of fiat currency can promote circulation regardless of value. Unlike convertibility, where the value of a paper note is guaranteed by a metal reserve, in the tax-based mechanism, a government can promote circulation without guaranteeing value. See: Goldberg, “The Tax-Foundation Theory of Fiat Money,” Economic Theory 50.2, (June, 2012): 489-497.

199 Li Ruoyu 李若愚, “Cong Ming dai de qi yue kan Ming dai de bi zhi” 从明代的契约看明代的币制 [The Ming Monetary System as Reflected in Ming Contracts], Zhongguo jing ji shi yan jiu 4 (1988): 39-43.

121 contracts that are dated to the same period do specify other means of payment such as cloth or silver indicates that people chose scrip over different options.

In one of these contracts the connection between tax payments and the sale of land is direct: When in 1411 Lady Huang (黃氏), the wife of Wu Xiding (吳希慶) from the eleventh township of Qimen county in Huizhou Prefecture sold a piece of land for scrip, she stated in the contract that it was “in order to raise money for payment of the grain tax.”200 Valerie Hansen finds that the need for cash was a common reason for the sale of land in Huizhou during the Yuan period. In this case, it was not only the need for cash but also the specific need for scrip that directed this particular seller. 201 From this passage we can deduce that paper currency was the common means of exchange in

Huizhou, or make a more cautious conclusion that paper currency was still a requirement in transactions that involved the government, in this case drafting a certified land sale contract, and paying taxes. As explained below, there was indeed a regular commutation of the Huizhou tribute grain tax to Nanjing, at least from 1422.

Scrip disappears from Huizhou contracts abruptly after 1428. In that same year

Xuanzong issued a new regulation for commutation of the grain tax (zhe shou shui liang

200 Huizhou qian nian qi yue wen shu Song-Yuan-Ming bian 徽州千年契約文書－宋元明編 [One Thousand Years of Huizhou Contracts Song, Yuan, Ming Collection] (Yangzhou: Hua shan wen yi chu ban she, 1991): 67.

201 Valerie Hansen, Negotiating Daily Life in Traditional China: How Ordinary People Used Contracts 600-1400 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995). Valerie Hansen found that the need for cash was a common reason for land sales in Huizhou during the Yuan.

122 li 折收稅糧例).202 The declaration detailed several kinds of silk and cotton cloth and

their exchange rates to different kinds of grains and beans. Scrip was completely

excluded from the edict. Ever since the first order to convert the grain tax to money in

1376, this was the first time paper currency was excluded. Furthermore, In the summer of

1429, the Ministry of Revenue in Nanjing requested canceling the long standing

permission, since 1422, in which Fujian and Guangdong Provinces, as well as Huizhou

prefecture sent all their tribute tax to Nanjing in scrip and cloth. The reason given was

that the imperial storehouses had an excess of both. In this case, the emperor refused to

order the change as it might cause inconvenience to taxpayers.203 Still, the disappearance

of scrip from the Huizhou land contracts supports the assumption that magistrates

stopped accepting it.

The initiative to eliminate scrip from the land tax continued in 1430 when Suzhou

Prefecture petitioned to commute its overdue autumn grain tax payments into scrip. The

petition was based on an imperial approval to do so made by the previous Hongxi emperor in 1425. Revenue officials quickly stepped in and presented the emperor with numbers: The commutation of 1425 pertained to a debt of 3,920,000 shi of grain that had

accumulated since 1422. In addition, in 1429, as a relief measure the emperor granted

permission to pay the grain tax in scrip and cloth, either cotton or silk. But as of the date

of the memorial, those funds had not been fully paid. The sum amounted to 3,920,000

shi. To date, this sum had still not been fully paid. Any further allowances would

202 Ming Xuanzong Shi lu, 41:5b.

203 Ibid, 55:3a-3b.

123 jeopardize state income. The emperor ordered to reconsider the request to commute the

grain tax.204

Parallel to these developments, in 1429 the emperor announced that in 33

provincial capitals and commercial centres, commercial tax would be raised fivefold and

paid in scrip.205 I interpret these two decrees as part of one policy intended to divert the

collection of scrip from agricultural revenue to commercial revenue. The problem of

excess notes was dealt with by printing less. In the summer of 1428 a halt was put on the

printing of new notes.206 There is no indication as to when or if printing resumed. Also,

the new tax policies dealt with the problem of damaged notes. Poor quality of paper and

printing meant that they tore and faded within a short period of time. This caused a gap in

value between newly issued notes and older ones. Revenue officials found that tax

collectors would not accept bad notes and drove them out of circulation. From the point

of view of the government, the problem was that it forced excess printing, and so it was

vital to remove old notes from circulation. In earlier times government depots for

replacement of damaged notes (for a small fee) were erected, but they do not seem to

have been efficient.207 In order to get rid of old and damaged notes, a special tax on

owners of vegetable patches and fuit groves demanded payment specifically in them. In

204 Ibid, 74:1b-2a.

205 Ibid, 50:3a-3b.

206 Ibid, 44:9b.

207 These were called ‘cash offices’ (xing yong ku 行用庫). See Ming shi, 91.1962. The depots were apparently erected in every prefectural and county yamen in 1376 but were closed down, except for the capital depot in 1380.

124 addition, revenue officials were ordered to use old but still legible notes in the payment of awards and grants, while those that were too damaged were burnt.208

Taken together, these policies reveal that although the government was still committed to supporting its currency, there was an awareness that the state could not afford commuting its grain tax the way it had been doing up until then. After the Yongle reign and the short and unproductive Hongxi era, the Xuande emperor faced the task of restoring financial balance to the dynasty. The reality of Ming scrip policy was that it was subsidizing its circulation by incurring huge losses. Paper notes devalued so greatly that collecting them in tax payments was a form of tax remission. If the Yongle emperor could afford this kind of policy for a while, the Xuande emperor could not. In an attempt to separate the grain tax from scrip the Ming confined its paper currency to two main functions: The collection of commercial and monopoly taxes and official payments. As figure 3-1 shows, the expansion of commercial tax stations did lead to an increase in the tax collection but only for a short period of time.

Scrip was recorded in the revenue reports under several categories: “commuted to scrip” (zhe chao 折鈔) pertained to commutation of the grain tax. During the first two decades of the fifteenth-century, scrip was reported as commuted grain tax only four times but in large quantities, ranging between 3,000,000 and 9,000,000 ding. From the

Xuande to the Chenghua reigns average commutation was under 80,000 guan. During the

Chenghua period the average rose threefold, after which it disappears from the record. A

208 Ming Xuanzong Shi lu, 55:10a.

125 second category was “miscellaneous commercial taxes” (za ke chao 雜課鈔). This was the aggregate tax collected in the various tax and customs stations. The more significant avenue for the collection of tax in scrip was through commercial tax. Although it was supposed to be collected both in scrip and coin at a seventy-thirty ratio, only scrip is registered. During the Yongle reign, there is an annual average of 15,000,000 guan, or

3,000,000 ding being collected annually. In the Xuande reign the average rises to

30,000,000 guan and drops to around one-third during the Zhengtong reign. In the

Chenghua reign the reports register a rise to an average of 27,000,000 guan. Averages of over 70,000,000 are appearing for the last two reigns, but these were already collected in silver.

The final two categories pertained to the sale of salt (yan chao 鹽鈔) and tea (cha chao 茶鈔).209 Since the figures in these two categories are registered as income, they were probably not part of the salt-grain or tea-horse exchanges but either salt vouchers sold to wholesale merchants, or revenue from the salt tax. A category of tea vouchers appears from the Xuande reign and registered small revenue that turns into an insignificant quota of 189,474 guan During the Zhengtong-Jingtai reign. It disappears altogether during the Chenghua period and returns during the Hongzhi reign, though the data is confusing.210 During the Yongle reign there is no record of income from the sale of salt or salt vouchers. From the mid 1420s to the mid 1460s the average annual income

209 See tables D-3,6,10,13,16. It should be said one third of the commercial taxes was collected in coin but since the revenue reports do not make this distinction I bring the entire sum in as they appear in the sources.

210 The category pertains to revenue from monopoly sales but units of tea are counted rather than cash income.

126 is close to 18,000,000 ding. There is no report of income from salt sales in the Chenghua

period. Although the idea of a general salt tax was suggested to the Yongle emperor early

in his reign, the revenue reports the category of the general salt tax (hu kou shi yan chao

戶口食鹽鈔) only in 1488 that replaces the former yan chao. It stood at an annual

average of 88,000,000 guan.211 Again, within a few years this revenue too was commuted

into silver. Each guan of scrip was exchanged for 0.003 of a tael. And if indeed thirty

percent of commercial taxes were collected in coin, the rate applied would be seven

bronze coins for 0.01 of a tael. In this calculation the average income from the salt tax

would be 424,000 taels. In the proposal suggesting this change the estimation was more

modest, and closer to the figure we would get if income in coin was excluded, 223,000

taels. This sum, they suggested, could be used for military salaries.212

Two main trends are discernable throughout the fifteenth century. The first is the

low figures of commuted grain tax after the Yongle reign, and the other is the enormous

sums of notes collected through commercial taxes and sale of salt. Considering the

exchange rates of the time it may be surmised that the main function of commercial taxes

was to enforce the circulation of paper currency, since this income was not a significant part of state finance. Under the fiscal conditions of fifteenth century Ming China, removing scrip from the grain tax was a wise move. Concentrating it on commercial

211 This tax was suggested to the Yongle emperor in 1404 but does not appear as a separate category in the reports until 1488. For the original decree see: Ming Taizong Shi lu, 33:5b.

212 Ming Xiaozong Shi lu, 74:9b-10a.

127 transactions made sense too, but the modest amounts attest to the failure to harness the commercial economy for the purpose of increasing revenue.

80,000,000

70,000,000

60,000,000

50,000,000

40,000,000

30,000,000

20,000,000

10,000,000

0 1403 1408 1413 1418 1423 1428 1433 1438 1443 1448 1453 1458 1463 1468 1473 1478 1483 1488 1493 1498 1503 1508 1513 1518

Figure 3-1 Total Annual Tax Income Collected in Scrip (ding)

(Source: Ming Shi lu)

128 3.2 Silver

The first emperor’s attitude towards silver was a negative one. After conquering

Shandong, his most trusted general, Xu Da (徐達, 1332-1385) traveled to Nanjing to report on the gains for the Ming army. In addition to captive soldiers, horses, grain, and salt, he also mentioned the existence of silver mines that could be exploited by the government. Hongwu replied:

I know the evils of silver only too well. The profits for the government are few while the sufferings of the people are numerous. Especially these days when so many are weak and tired, how can such a heavy burden be imposed on them? Men of past had the saying “uproot tea and plant mulberry so the people can benefit”. How can you not know of it? [Xu Da] retreated in shame.213

Like tea, silver could bring profit but could not feed or clothe the people. In the emperor’s view, exploiting the land for a commodity that does not support the people’s

livelihood was not the business of the state. Beyond this ethical dimension, there was also a social cost to mining operations that Ming administrators throughout most of the dynasty were not prepared to pay. The mining workforce was usually made of migrant workers who received little pay or nothing at all when the mining operation was unsuccessful. Resentment easily turned into banditry and in one case to a widespread rebellion.214

213 Ming Taizu Shi lu, 31:2b.

214 Huang, Taxation and Governmental Finance, 242.

129 On the other hand, neither the first emperor nor his descendants refrained from

using silver in order to expedite and supplement payments. Silver from the imperial

storehouse was generally sent to the military for purchasing grain. During the Hongwu

reign, significant amounts were remitted. In response to shortages, Taizu ordered the

shipment of 100,000 taels of silver to Beiping (along with 100,000 bolts of cotton cloth)

and 200,000 taels to Shanxi so that grain could be bought instead of being transported.215

At another time he approved the request of the Sichuan provincial administration to send

200,000 taels of silver in order to supplement official and military salaries in the coming

year.216 These amounts were much beyond the meager silver quotas of the period, which

were limited to several thousand taels. Where did the silver come from?

One option is that it was confiscated from surrendering rival forces. There were was also some commutation: In 1374 officials were allowed to collect tax in gold, silver, coin, and cloth in prefectures that had difficulties transporting grain due to blocked waterways.217 There was also the 1386 decree mentioned in the previous section, in

which all surplus grain beyond locally retained funds were to be commuted into precious

metal, cloth, or scrip and sent to the capital.218 Finally, in 1397 the emperor announced a

general commutation plan for all unpaid taxes. Cloaked in a language of alleviating

people’s suffering and simplifying transportation, the emperor initiated a policy for

215 Ming Taizu Shi lu, 75:5b.

216 Ibid, 86:1a.

217 Ibid, 88:7a.

218 Ibid, 178:1b.

130 collecting debt. He specified exchange rates for scrip, raw and woven cotton, ramie cloth, silk and silver.219 He further stressed the regional character of commutation: “All accumulated debt throughout the realm will be commuted, according to local geographic preference to cloth, precious metals, and other such items.”220 During the Hongwu reign

silver was never singled out as the only means of conversion so there is no way to

estimate the amounts that reached the capital. Paying tax in silver continued to be an

option even as scrip was actively promoted, although it is hard to believe that given the

option to pay taxes in scrip, taxpayers would prefer to part with much more valuable

silver and gold.

While officially continuing the ban on silver in trade, Yongle reversed his father’s

policy on government mining. During his reign domestic production reached its dynasty-

long peak. He may also have been more lenient towards silver in trade. When the guards

of Jubao gate (聚寶門), one of the commercially busiest entrances to Nanjing, seized

travelers that carried in their luggage a gold bracelet and several taels of silver, the

Ministry of Punishments proposed sentencing them for breaking the law of commoners

wearing gold and silver ornaments and for using silver in trade. But the emperor

intervened saying that it is not against the law to carry such items in one’s luggage.221

219 Ramie grows in south China. It is harvested three times a year. Each harvest yields finer fiber that produces finer quality cloth. This is what may have been levied here. See: Dieter Kuhn, “Textile Technology: Spinning and Reeling, ”Science and Civilization in China Vol. 5, Chemistry and Chemical Technology Part IX (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988): 30-38.

220 Ibid, 255:4a.

221 Ming Taizong shi lu, 115:2a-b.

131 The recording of such a minor incident may have served to show the emperor’s

magnanimity, but it also hinted that Yongle condoned clandestine trade in silver.

In his short reign, the Hongxi emperor took steps to return to the path of the

founding emperor. This included moving the capital back to Nanjing, putting an end to

the maritime voyages, and pulling out of the territories conquered in Vietnam. He also

exhibited a greater commitment to remove silver from public use. After the death of his

father but before officially on the throne, he responded to natural disaster in the southern

metropolitan prefectures by retrieving a decree from 1407 permitting grain transportation

to the capital in cloth and scrip. On the other hand, he ordered the Ministry of Revenue to

close the remaining paper money depots in Nanjing and Beijing. The reason was that

these depots were established to “collect gold and silver from the towns people that led to market closure.” 222 This statement suggests that these deopts were selling scrip for gold

and silver in addition to the role of replacing paper notes, a procedure that involved a

small payment in coin.223 This fee was payed in coin and not in silver and gold. In any

case, this statement acknowledges that collecting silver and gold from the market was

disrupting trade and abolishing the scrip depots may have been the closest jesture to

officially revoking the ban on precious metal in trade an emperor could make.

The Hongxi emperor did not live long enough to complete the first year of his

reign and accomplish the transfer of the capital back to Nanjing. His successor, the

Xuande emperor, decided to keep the capital in Beijing and deal with the financial

222 Ming Renzong shi lu, 3, part 1:1a.

223 See p. 116.

132 consequences of that decision as well as with the financial state in which the Yongle

emperor left China. The main problem was diminishing tax income from the financial

core of the dynasty. As the richest rice-producing region in the empire, Jiangnan prefectures contained the highest concentration of government land. Rent on government land was four to ten times higher than tax on private land.224 And added transportation

fees made the actual payment even higher. Historically, the high rate is interpreted as part

of Zhu Yuanzhang’s revenge on the Jiangnan elite that supported his rival Zhang

Shicheng (張士誠, 1321-1367) during the conquest of China. And indeed, Zhu had

targeted large landowners. He confiscated their lands, which automatically became

government land, and sent entire households to reclaim lands in frontier areas.225 Lin

Jinshu has since challenged the ‘revenge’ narrative by arguing that in fact Hongwu-era

tax rates were not higher than they were under the Song and Yuan dynasties, and that

most of Jiangnan government land was actually inherited from previous eras.226

Wu Jihua argues that the real burden lay in the transport surcharge that added up

to two thirds of the original quota to the tribute grain tax of Suzhou and Songjiang

224 Lin Jinshu 林金树, “Shi lun Ming dai Su Song liang fu de zhong fu wen ti” 试论苏松二府的重赋问题 [Regarding the problem of Heavy Taxation in Su and Song Prefectures], Ming shi yan jiu lun cong, (Jiangsu ren min chu ban she, 1982): 91-123.

225 Richard von Glahn, “Towns and Temples: Urban Growth and Decline in the Yangzi Delta, 1100-1400,” The Song-Yuan-Ming Transition in Chinese History, edited by Paul Jakov Smith and Richard von Glahn, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003): 176-212.

226 Lin Jinshu 林金树, “Guan yu Ming dai Jiang nan guan tian de ji ge wen ti 关于明代江南官田的几个问题 [Some Issues Regarding Government Land in Ming-era Jiangnan], Zhongguo jing ji shi yan jiu, 1 (1988): 73－87.

133 Prefectures.227 The result was that tenants fled their fields and prefectures defaulted on

their payments. In 1430 the Xuande emperor remarked that state finances were in a

mess, and the situation in Jiangnan is the worst.228 He then nominated a grand

coordinator to tour Jiangnan’s prefectures and take charge of taxation. Surprisingly, he

chose a relatively minor official in the Ministry of Works for the Job. According to his

official biography, Zhou Chen 周忱 (1381-1453) entered official service in the beginning of the fifteenth century but never rose to a high position. All the while only Minister of

Revenue Xia Yuanji recognized his abilities. Following his recommendation and that of

Grand Secretary Yang Shiqi 楊士奇 (1365-1444), Zhou was elevated to Vice-Minister of

Works and charged with reforming the tax system in Jiangnan.

Zhou recognized that it was the onerous tax burden that drove tenants away. He therefore initiated several tax reforms in order to address the greater inequalities in the system and accommodate tenants. Along with his main collabourator, the prefect of

Suzhou Kuang Zhong, Zhou began by initiating a land survey and correcting falsities and inaccuracies in existing registers. Next, he lowered the tax quotas of each prefecture,

227 Wu Jihua 吳緝華, “Lun Ming dai qian qi shui liang zhong xin zhi jian shui bei jing ji yin xiang” 論明代前期稅糧中心之減稅背景及影響 [The Background and Impact of Tax Reduction in the Financial Core of the Early Ming], Ming dai she hui jing ji Shi lun cong 明代社會經濟史論叢 [Studies on Socio-Economic Problems in the Ming Period], (Taibei: Taiwan xue sheng shu ju, 1970). See also: Mi Chu Wiens, “Changes in the Fiscal and Rural Control Systems in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries,” Ming Studies 3 (Fall, 1976): 53-69

228 Zhang, Ming shi, juan 153.

134 established a gradation in surcharges, and introduced a new commutation plan.229

Previously, transportation surcharges were calculated as a percentage of the particular tax

obligation. This meant that the more tax one paid, the higher the surcharge. Zhou

reversed the relationship between the original tax quota and its surcharge. For the

individual household this meant that the more grain it owed, the less surcharge it paid. On

a scale of five, the highest was a household that owed over five dou. It did not pay any surcharges. The lowest on the scale were those owing between one and two dou of grain.

They were obliged to pay a surcharge of 1.5 dou. As an additional benefit, the three middle ranks could commute part of their surcharges into silver. This arrangement helped minimize the gap between government tenants and private landowners.

Commutation of the grain tax itself followed the same logic. Households owing six or seven dou for every mu of land could commute the entire payment into silver or cloth. Those owing four or five dou could commute half of their tax obligation. Finally, those who paid a low rate of one or two dou per mu, paid entirely in rice. The option to commute taxes into either silver or cloth catered to local economic patterns. Prefectures that had a cloth industry would pay in cloth while others could opt for silver. Zhou dealt with such nuances as well. In 1436 he petitioned the throne to commute Huizhou’s silk tribute tax to silver because silk production was low in the region and people had to purchase silk elsewhere in order to meet their obligations.230 Three years later he

229 Yu Weiming (郁維明), Mingdai Zhou Chen dui jiangnan di qu jing ji she hui de gai ge 明代周忱對江南地區經濟社會的改革 (Zhou Chen’s Economic and Social Reform of the Jiangnan Region in the Ming), (Taibei: Taiwan shang wu yin shu guan, 1990): 48-60.

230 Ming Yingzong Shi lu, 30:6b.

135 petitioned on behalf of the prefecture again, this time concerning the portion of the

summer tax paid in ramie cloth.231

Why should a household that had difficulties paying tax in grain find it easier to

pay in silver or cloth? The answer lies in the government exchange rates. The official

exchange rate Zhou proposed was one quarter of a silver tael for one shi of rice, while the

market price of grain was normally almost double; 0.4 or 0.5 of a tael purchased one shi

of rice. This means that paying grain taxes according to the official exchange rate

entailed a reduction of fifty percent. On the other hand, grain prices fell right after the

harvest so that taxes commuted during this period would not be subject to such a

discount. But records of grain commutation rates indicate that they did not drop beneath

0.3 of a tael. 232 Another important point is that no quota was set for payments in silver or

cloth, meaning that taxpayers could presumably choose to pay in grain if market prices

favoured it. The aim of the commutation plan was to ensure tax supply to the capital by first accommodating taxpayers. It was essentially a tax reduction that was mitigated by

the considerable reduction in transportation costs, silver and cloth being cheaper to

transport than grain.

To be sure, the widespread availability of cloth and silver was a prerequisite for

this plan. As shall be discussed in the following section, demand for cotton and its products in order to clothe the army encouraged the expansion of the cotton industry in southern China. And silver was already being used as a convenient replacement for

231 Ibid, 65:10b.

232 0.4 of a tael in 1435, 0.3 in 1438, 0.5 in 1440, 0.5 in 1474. For a list of exchange rates see Appendix C.

136 labour service. Although a systematic expansion of the commutation of labour service

started only in the last decade of the century, it set a precedent for a regular commutation

of a tax obligation. The difference between labour service commutation and grain tax

commutation was that while the first was used as a local source of finance, the latter

became a regularized means of financing Beijing. Labour service demands depended on

the discretion of local officials and were levied according to necessity. Since the central

government did not intervene at first in this procedure, it is a good indication of the

proliferation of silver in the economy outside of state intervention.

Perhaps the most important point of this policy was the exclusion of paper

currency. Until the early 1430s southern provinces and Jiangnan prefectures still enjoyed

the privilege of sending tribute grain tax to Nanjing in paper currency. Zhou’s reform put

an end to that. This was therefore a logical conclusion to the initiative taken by the

Ministry of Revenue a few years earlier. The goal of Zhou Chen’s plan was based on the

traditional concept of equalizing the land tax. The option of silver or cloth payments was

designed to alleviate the burden off those who had a heavier tax rate to begin with,

tenants of government land. But this was also a first step towards harnessing the

commercial economy of southeast China for the needs of Beijing. In 1435, the last year

of the Xuande reign, the Ministry of Revenue requested commuting 80,000 shi of

Huizhou’s grain tax for 32,000 taels of silver (or 0.4 taels per shi). The silver was sent to the Shanxi border garrisons of Xuanfu and Datong in order to purchase grain.233 It is the

first case I found that silver was the sole means of exchange. Since the Xuande emperor

233 Ming Yingzong Shi lu, 10:3a.

137 died in the beginning of his tenth year on the throne, it was actually his son who consented. As the Shi lu editors tell us, it took some convincing: After the heir apparent voiced his concerns regarding the ‘convenience’ of this plan (不便), the Minister of

Revenue Hu Ying (胡濙, 1375－1463) explained the matter again and obtained his approval.234 The fact that more explanation was needed is not surprising; the heir apparent was a boy of eight at the time. The fact that this merited special mention may allude to the opinion of Shi lu editors about this procedure. As we shall see in the actual discussions regarding the policy later known as Gold Floral Silver, the emperor is portrayed as hesitant about commutation of the grain tax, and the editors voice clear opposition to it.

The option to commute the tribute tax was discussed twice in the fall and early winter of 1436. Vice-Censor Zhou Quan 周銓 raised the problem of salaries of officials serving in military guards in Beijing. As in the case of other Beijing officials, the rice portion of their salaries was stored in Nanjing. In the past messengers were sent to deliver the grain but apparently the grain was traded for other commodities and since the price of rice was cheap, it was sold at a loss and delivered only a fraction of the needed items.

Zhou does not elabourate on who sold the grain, where, or whether or not this was done individually. But it is a rare acknowledgement of the way in which salary grain was managed. His proposal essentially followed that of Zhou Chen, to commute the tribute tax to silver or cloth according to local preference, and transport it to Beijing. But he also

234 Ming Yingzong Shi lu, 21:6b-7a.

138 advised to first calculate expenditures and authorize the commutation according to it. It is important to notice that this proposal regarded only civilian officials who served in the military guards (ge wei guan yuan 各衛官員). This was not a large or important group. It may have been, therefore, a pilot suggestion in order to gauge the emperor’s response before suggesting broadening the practice.

Voicing local interests, The touring inspector of Jiangxi province, Zhao Xin(趙新,

1381-1461) mentioned the difficulties of boats travelling from the more remote and mountainous counties in Jiangxi to deliver grain to Nanjing. The current practice was to collect tax in precious metal or cloth and sell them for grain once the commodities reached the river ports along the way to Nanjing. But when grain prices were high it was hard to meet the grain quota. If Jiangxi would be permitted to submit its grain tax in silver and cloth then the transaction costs of purchasing grain would be saved and Beijing officials would receive a more appropriate payment. He therefore second Zhou Quan’s proposal to commute rice to silver or cloth, depending on the conditions of the locality.

Not wanting to deviate from traditional practice, or at least not wanting to seem as doing so, the emperor asked what did his ancestors do. Minister of Revenue Hu Ying reiterated the Hongwu commutation rates that included paper money, cotton and silk cloth, and silver and gold. He explained that this measure was first applied to aid taxpayers in

Shaanxi and later in Zhejiang. The sole purpose, he emphasized, was to accommodate taxpayers. The emperor accepted the proposal. In hindsight the editors of the Shi lu did

139 not miss the opportunity to comment on the significance of this decision and add that

“from this time on granary stores diminished.”235

Two months later, Grand Secretary Yang Shiqi, also holding the title of Minister

of War at the time, addressed the problem of Beijing military salaries. As with the salaries of the Beijing officials, the grain was stored in Nanjing and soldiers were sent south to deliver it. In this case the grain was not sold but transported. But as soldiers were unreliable, much of the rice was squandered along the way and only a fraction of it arrived at the capital. The emperor convened a committee that suggested sending a senior official to Nanjing in order to coordinate with the Nanjing revenue officials and other authorities the sale the grain accumulated in the southern capital’s granary and transporting commodities obtained from the sale to Beijing. Once in Beijing they would be resold according to their original purchasing price for grain. The other option was to follow Zhou Quan’s proposition with some modification. The proposition included silver alone, and added that grain would be commuted only during years of high grain prices. In plentiful years, taxpayers could return to submitting grain. The emperor determined that commutation of the tribute grain tax to silver will take place for one year only and added that it shall not become a permanent regulation (bu wei chang li 不為常例). 236

The decree was made by the new Zhengtong emperor who was nine years old at

the time and therefore was undoubtedly acting upon the instructions of others. Upon his

235 Ming Yingzong Shi lu, 23:7b.

236 Ibid, 21:6b.

140 accession, the boy-emperor was under the direction of the three Grand Secretaries, Yang

Shiqi , Yang Rong 杨荣 (1371-1440), and Yang Bo 楊溥 (1372-1446), as well as three chief eunuchs among whom Wang Zhen 王振 (d.1449) was becoming most prominent.

Above them the Empress Dowager presided over the decision making process.237 It is therefore vary plausible that the people behind promoting these policies were those who stood behind the emperor’s verdict. After the death of Xia Yuanji in 1430, they continued the policies of financial retrenchment and reform that began after the death of the Yongle emperor. Zhou Chen, who was acting under the patronage of Yang Shiqi, introduced silver into the grain tax as a regular procedure in what may have been a pilot program for the introduction of silver into state finance on a large scale. Even if these developments were not as orchestrated, the continuous promotion of silver in tax collection cannot be denied. And although the emperor insisted that it be temporary, the Ming never returned to taxing entirely in kind. In this light, the recurrent hesitation of the emperor to go through with these plans may reflect the opinions of the later editors of the history rather than the people surrounding him at the time.

Despite the importance of this shift, there is surprisingly little information about actual silver income in the palace treasury during the Zhengtong reign. Moreover, there is no evidence of a fixed quota before the sixteenth century. The annual revenue reports never reported on grain commuted into silver in the same way they did for cloth and

237 Denis Twitchett and Tilemann Grimm, “The Cheng-t’ung, Ching-t’ai, and T’ien-shun reigns 1436- 1464,” Frederick W. Mote and Denis Twitchett eds., The Cambridge History of China- The Ming Dynasty 1368-1644 part 1, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988): 305-342.

141 scrip. Since silver entered the palace treasury it was not considered public revenue and

therefore not included in the reports. The only data regarding silver in the revenue reports

concerns receipts from mining. Even at its peak during the Yongle reign, quotas reach an average of only 280,000 taels. The average during the rest of the fifteenth century falls significantly, ranging from several thousands to several tens of thousands of taels.

Ironically, while the state was moving away from the control of silver mining, its reliance

on it increased.238 Or perhaps it was the other way around. As the state collected more

silver as tax, it had no need to spend resources on managing silver mines. As figure 3-2 below shows, there is a sharp decline and several breaks in the reports on mining receipts

from the beginning of the Zhengtong reign.

238 Von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune, 114. Von Glahn argues that the initial silver-mining boom contributed to the acceptability of silver in tax payments.

142

450,000

400,000

350,000

300,000

250,000

200,000

150,000

100,000

50,000

1403 1407 1411 1415 1419 1423 1427 1431 1435 1439 1443 1447 1451 1455 1459 1463 1467 1471 1475 1479 1483 1487 1491 1495 1499 1503 1507 1511 1515 1519

Figure 3-2 Total Annual Income from Silver Mining (liang)

(Source: Ming Shi lu)

143 Since silver receipts are only an indication of the revenue extracted from

government-operated mines, they do not reflect the prevalence of silver in the market.

Rather, the reports reflect a change in fiscal administration. Starting from the year 1436,

the revenue reports display two new categories. The first is titled “river-transport of rice

and beans to Beijing” (zao yun Beijing mi dou 遭運北京米豆), meaning the grain tribute

tax. Before this date numbers fluctuated between 1,000,000-5,000,000 shi. From this year on, the average is between 4,000,000-4,500,000 shi.239 This fits with the Ming shi

account stating that in the beginning of his reign, the Zhengtong emperor set a tribute quota of 4,500,000 shi.240 The second category was “grain transports from various locations” (ge chu yun na liang mi 各處運納糧米). The difference between the two categories is first in the verb used: Cao yun refers to water transport along the Grand

Canal, while yun na means transport over land. This category can either refer to

transports of grain throughout the realm, but probably meant additional grain transport to the capital. The Ming shi account also adds that the Chenghua emperor set a fixed quota of 4,000,000 in 1472/3.241 But the revenue reports for this reign period never reach that

figure. Perhaps the reason for adjusting the quota was due to difficulties in transportation;

earlier that year revenue officials reported that out of the regular quota 1,100,000 shi had

not yet reached Beijing.242 Here, again, there is no mention of silver. It is therefore fairly

239 In the Chenghua reign the annual average falls to 3,500,000 and is fixed on a round four million during the Hongzhi-Zhengde reigns. See appendix D.

240 Zhang, Ming shi, 79: 1917-1918.

241 Ibid,

242 Ming Xianzong Shi lu, 110:2a.

144 certain that between the Zhengtong and Chenghua reigns a quota of between four and four and a half million shi was established. Portions of this quota were probably commuted into silver but there is no clear information on quantities.

The earliest figures of silver income are probably from the late fifteenth century.

In his work on silver income during the Ming, Wang Hui relies on an estimate by Wang

Qi (王圻, jin shi 1565) who cited 2,430,000 taels during the Zhengtong reign.243 This figure is probably taken from an earlier essay on state finance made by Wang Ao (王鏊, jin shi 1475) who served as minister of revenue during the Zhengde reign.244 It is more plausible that these figures pertain to the Hongzhi reign because the point of Wang Ao’s essay is to compare the period before and after the ascension of the Zhengde emperor to the throne. 245 Due to a scribal error, “pre-Zhengtong” is written instead of “pre-

Zhengde.” Moreover, the figure he cites for total silver revenue includes commutation of the salt tax and other commercial taxes that began during the Hongzhi reign. Finally, he mentions that a total of 3,209,000 shi was commuted into 814,000 taels at a rate of 4 shi per tael. This figure is close to the sum of 819,811 taels reported in the capital at the end

243 Wu Hui 吴慧, “Ming Qing (qian qi) cai zheng jie gou xing bian hua de ji liang fen xi (明清（前期)财政结构性变化的计量分析)” Zhongguo she hui jing ji shi yan jiu no. 3 (1990): 39-56.

244 Wang Yuquan ed. Zhongguo jing ji tong shi: Ming dai jing ji juan 中国经济通史：明代经济卷 [Comprehensive Economic History of China: The Economy of the Ming Dynasty] (Beijing: Jing ji ri bao chu ban she, 2000): p. 268. Unlike the authors’ claim, the figures do not pertain to the Zhengtong period. The paragraph begins with the words Zhengtong yi qian which should be Zhengde yi qian. The author is comparing between the period before and after the Zhengde era in order to criticize the rise in imperial expenditure.

245 Wang Ao 王鏊, Zhen ze chang yu, Bai bu cong shu ji cheng v. 149 (Taibei: Yi wen, 1965): 1:32.b-33.b.

145 of 1487.246 On the other hand, Wang Ao’s breakdown of the sources of tax commutation

reveals that the salt and commercial taxes were not the most important. Rather, it was a

commutation of “grain transports from various locations” (ge chu shui liang zhe zheng,

各處稅糧折徵)by the sum of 1,030,000 taels. This corresponds to the category in the

revenue reports and confirms that at least by the end of the fifteenth century those

additional land transports registered in grain were actually silver transports. Up until the

Chenghua reign the grain reported under this category remains around 1,000,000 shi. But

from the Chenghua reign around 4,000,000 shi are reported annually. During the

Hongzhi-Zhengde period the numbers are fixed in dubiously high quotas; 15,000,000 and

11,000,000 shi respectively. It is therefore most likely that Wang Ao referred to the

Chenghua-Hongzhi period, though the initiative to add another source of grain or silver to the capital started in the beginning of the Zhengtong reign.

Official quotas for commuted grain tax are first registered for the year 1502, the fifteenth year of the Hongzhi emperor. The compilers of the Hui dian entered the results

of the general land and tax survey as well as updated tax quotas, in what became one of

the three major account works of the Ming, the first being the land and population survey

of the Zhu si zhi zhang, and the third being the Wanli Kuai ji lu. The most striking difference is that in the Hongwu survey there are no tax quotas for tribute to the capital. It is possible that since the separation between government and private land was clearer during the Hongwu period there was no need for a tax quota since government land was essentially the domain of the imperial court. Instead of fixed tribute quotas from the

246 Ming Xiaozong Shi lu, 285:6a.

146 provinces, there is only a vague notion of surplus (yu 餘).247 In contrast, in the Zhengde

hui dian, every province and directly administered prefecture were assigned a fixed quota of commuted grain and fodder, either in cloth or silver, and quantities of taxes in kind.

This change suggests that as the boundary between private and government land blurred so the imperial court had to designate its share of the tax income.

The Zhengde Hui dian specifies a total of 3,865,500 shi of rice and wheat that

was to be commuted at the rate of 0.25 taels per shi. In addition, levies of hay were

commuted at a rate of 0.03 of a tael per one pack of hay (shu 束 or bao 包). The total was

146,313 taels. Finally, scrip income from the household salt tax was transported. Under

the rate of one guan per 0.003 taels the total income would amount to 52,969 taels.

Altogether, 4,064,782 were expected to enter the palace treasury.248 This is therefore the

first confirmation of a fixed quota a million taels directed at the palace storehouse in

Beijing.

Silver was commuted from the taxes of the commercial cores and centres of

international trade. Most of the silver came from provinces outside the directly

administered prefectures. Silver commuted from 2,474,500 shi was collected from the

affluent southern and coastal provinces: Jiangxi (1,030,000 shi), Zhejiang (730,000 shi),

Fujian (364,000 shi), and Guandong (400,000 shi). These sums were between one third

and one half of the total autumn tax assessment of these provinces.249 The remaining sum

247 See pp. 84-85.

248 (Zhengde) Ming Hui dian, 24. Nanjing received as tribute only 67,950 taels.

249 (Wanli) Ming Hui dian, 24:17b-21a.

147 of 1,391,000 shi was collected from the centrally administered prefectures of which

Suzhou and Changzhou shouldered by far the heaviest burden: 796,000 and 346,000 shi respectively.250

Quotas are of course one thing and actual receipts are another. If indeed the central government intended to have one million taels shipped to Beijing every year, it seems that during the fifteenth century it had some difficulty doing so. The following excerpt is a response made by the Ministry of Revenue to the military commissioner of

Shanxi, refusing a request for more silver to support the soldiers in the strategic stronghold of Xuanfu in 1451:

In a full year the commuted tax silver does not exceed 700,000 taels. This year the accumulated shipments of silver to Liaodong, Shaanxi and other border regions for grain purchases, awards, fodder and horse purchases, already surpassed 970,000 taels.251

Two years earlier the Zhengtong Emperor was captured in Xuanfu by Mongol forces. In

1451 the Ming was still in a state of emergency and the military expenses were unusually high. From this communication it is clear that while military needs were approaching one million taels, in the mid-fifteenth century tax commutation did not yet reach that level.

The year-end holdings of silver at court in the late fifteenth century were not large: in 1481 officials reported an income of 678,937 taels in the imperial storehouse,

532,414 taels in 1483, and 495,420 taels in 1486. Only in 1487 was the figure close to

250 Ibid, 26:2b-12b.

251 Ming Yingzong Shi lu, 205:9.a-9b.

148 Wang’s account with a sum of 819,811 taels.252 These figures do not necessarily allude to

the entire commuted quota for that year. Rather, they may pertain to the funds that were

retained in the palace treasury after other disbursements were made. As Wang Ao explains, during the pre-Zhengde period only a small portion entered the imperial treasury; between 100,000- 200,000 taels were reserved for the imperial household,

336,500 taels paid for officer salaries, 336,500 taels were sent to the northern border, and

between 200,000-450,000 taels were kept as emergency reserve. If the figures reported

pertain only to imperial and emergency reserves then they were quite sufficient.

Another question that arises when trying to assess the quantities of commuted

grain regards official exchange rates. Tang Wenji finds that exchange rates fluctuated

during the second half of the fifteenth century. For example, grain tax in Suzhou and

other directly administered prefectures was commuted at a rate of 0.6 taels per shi in

1481, between 0.7-1 taels in 1491, and between 0.7-0.8 in 1494. Only in 1505 a rate of

0.3 is registered. But during the subsequent Zhengde reign the exchange rate rarely drops

beneath 0.5 taels per shi.253 The reasons stated for the higher exchange rates are either

disaster or military emergency, meaning high grain prices or difficulties in meeting the

tax quota. This might explain why commercial taxes were finally commuted into silver

during the last decade of the fifteenth century.

Concentration of large amounts of silver at court transformed financial

administration and the balance of power at court. Officials supported commuting the

252 Ming Xianzong Shi lu, (1481) 210:10b, (1483) 235:12b, (1486) 273:7a, (1487) 185:6a.

253 Tang, Ming dai fu yi, 188-191.

149 tribute tax in order to simplify the payments for officers and soldiers in Beijing. And the

Zhengtong emperor even built a special storehouse for that purpose. But silver was also

by law a commodity that entered the imperial treasury. So the more the court relied on

silver imports to the imperial treasury, the more access the emperor had to the precious

metal. In the following pages I propose that this operational change in state finance led to

a conceptual change, which can be discerned from certain discrepancies between the two

editions of the Ming Hui dian in their descriptions of the palace treasury. First, it should

be said that there were not supposed to have been any discrepancies at all. Just as the role of the Zhengde Hui dian was to faithfully record the Hongwu era code and add later regulations to existing law, so was the Wanli edition mandated to add the imperial edicts that were announced since the early sixteenth century until the Wanli era. But as has been demonstrated in chapter 2, this was not the case. Instead, in certain aspects the Wanli edition deviates from the first edition. Considering that the Wanli Hui dian was compiled during the tenure of Zhang Juzheng who was promoting fiscal reform, observing the discrepancies between the two editions regarding Gold Floral Silver is illuminating.

In the Zhengde edition, the chapter dedicated to the imperial treasury (nei ku 內

庫) does not offer an account on the commutation of grain into silver. Only in the shi li section do we find various imperial decrees regarding temporary commutations of grain into silver and cloth. It is rather in the description of the national silver treasury254 (tai

254 National Silver Vault in Hucker’s dictionary.

150 cang yin ku 太倉銀庫) that the editors acknowledge commutation of tribute tax into silver. The text is as follows:

In the seventh year of Zhengtong the Imperial Silver Storehouse was established. One secretary from this ministry (i.e. Revenue) was nominated to manage it. All fodder tributes in silver from the prefectures of the southern metropolitan region such as Su and Chang were transported to the Ministry and sent to the storehouse.255

This was a special silver storehouse that was built in 1442 to store the silver that was to be either sent to the northern armies or used for purchasing grain for them. It was managed by the Ministry of Revenue and was a separate store of silver from the imperial silver depository, the nei cheng yun ku 內承運庫. Therefore, although it was part of the storehouse network of the inner court, it was supposed to demarcate a boundary between private and public use of silver transports. The Wanli edition kept the

above entry describing the national silver treasury but added an entry describing the nei

ku in which Gold Floral Silver was introduced as the most important item. It is here that

we find the complete narrative of Gold Floral Silver as it is known today:

Within the holdings of the imperial treasury the largest is Gold Floral Silver. Since the beginning of the dynasty all commuted grain was transported to Nanjing in order to pay officer’s salaries and supply emergency funds to border armies. In the first year of Zhengtong, these funds were first transferred from Nanjing to the Imperial Treasury under an annual quota of one million taels. All the surplus funds beyond officer’s salaries were available for imperial use…256

255 Zhengde Ming huidian, 33:9b.

256 Wanli Ming Hui dian, 30:1a.

151 It is highly unlikely that these are simple semantic differences, a result of negligent

editing. After all, Gold Floral Silver was a vital for the livelihood of the capital and its

military. Furthermore, the Hui dian compilations were such monumental projects that they served as an opportunity for the officials involved in compiling them to state the agenda of their generation. In relating to the commutation of the grain tax the editors of the Zhengde Hui dian designated it as a source of public revenue alone and omitted any mention of funds entering the imperial treasury. In addition, the description pertains only to fodder. There is clearly an attempt to minimize the significance of commutation of the grain tax, or at least disregard of it being a regular procedure.

On the other hand, the editors of the Wanli edition placed Gold Floral Silver as part of private imperial wealth. Moreover, the narrative gives a sense of continuity between the Hongwu and Wanli eras when in fact they were radically different. It is true that the first emperor ordered commuting extra grain into valuable items, but there was never any insistence on silver, and the quantities cannot be compared. The claim that the

Zhengtong emperor simply moved the commuted funds that were regularly shipped to

Nanjing north to Beijing is misleading too. This was clearly a completely new policy.

Why did the authors need to describe continuity? I argue that this was the politically acceptable way to officially acknowledge administrative change. Perhaps this was also done in order to achieve legitimacy for a controversial practice. In the end, this account justifies the appropriation of most of the commuted silver by the emperor, a clear reversal from Hongwu’s intentions when authorizing the establishment of a palace treasury. A less conspiratorial interpretation would be that more than a century after commuted silver

152 began arriving in the capital, a different reality was forgotten.257 When compiling the

new edition, the editors saw a need to add a description of the imperial treasury that was

missing in the former. And looking back at the history of their dynasty, they produced a

narrative that made most sense to them.

Surprisingly, the term Gold Floral Silver itself does not appear before the

sixteenth century, and is absent from the Zhengde Hui dian. It first appears in the Shi lu

in an entry dated to November 1517, when the Ministry of Revenue presented a memorial

regarding difficulties in tax collection in the prefectures of the southern metropolitan

region.258 The term hua yin referred to the quality of the silver.259 The term jin hua yin appears first in Jin dynasty (1115-1234). Alternatively, it was also the term used for silver vessels and plates inlaid with gold that were among the royal utensils of emperors and

imperial kin. The Wen xian tong kao tells that from the Jin and Song dynasties the

emperor’s sword was of gold floral silver.260 In the Ming, decorated silver vessels called hua yin, presumably for the purity of the silver, were given to princes as wedding gifts.261

The first emperor founded a silver workshop in the palace for the purpose of producing

257 The only other author that noticed the late apprearance of the term jin hua yin and to connect it to a change in the storage of silver was Horii Kazuo 堀井一雄, “ginkagin no senkai”金花銀の發展 (The evolution of jin hua yin) Tōyō ji kenkyū, 5.2 (1940): 128-140.

258 Ming Wuzong Shi lu, 155:2a.

259 Zhongguo qian bi da ci dian: Song Liao Xixia Jin 中國錢幣大辭典: 宋遼西夏金編 (Dictionary of Chinese Currency: The Song, Liao, Xixia and Jin Dynasties) (Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju, 2005): 204, 299.

260 Ma Duanlin 馬端臨, Wen xian tong kao 文獻通考 (c. 1300, reprint Puban collection, Guan wu zhai, Guangxu ren yin, 1902): 117.

261 Zhi si zhi zhang, 3:25b.

153 these kinds of vessels as well as household items for the imperial family.262 This workshop also produced silver ingots during the Yongle reign. Liu Xiaoping has amassed an impressive collection of Ming silver ingots with legible inscriptions. ingots dated to the Yongle reign bear the inscription of “Silver Workshop Floral Silver” (yin zuo ju hua yin, 銀作局花銀).263 Other inscriptions include “Imperial Treasury Gold Floral Silver”

(nei cheng yun ku hua yin 內承運庫金花銀).264 Therefore, the sixteenth-century term referring to the tribute tax derives its meaning from the Yongle period imperially cast silver taels, and the ornaments of the imperial household. In both usages it is clear that gold floral silver belongs to the imperial treasury as distinct from the public storehouses.

The connotation this term has with imperial prerogative further strengthens the impression that tax commutation that was perceived as public revenue in the fifteenth century, came to be seen as private imperial possession in the sixteenth century.

Between Zhou Chen’s tax reform and Gold Floral Silver of the sixteenth century we find a significant change in the role of tax commutation in state finance. Starting out as a means to reduce tax and transportation costs, it served as an option for tax payment, not an obligation. When Zhou proposed his new tax scheme, he intended to resolve the problem of tax arrears by accommodating local conditions while alleviating some of the costs of transportation. This was essentially the same policy devised by the Hongwu

262 Ming Taizu Shi lu, 235:1a.

263 Li Xiaoping 李晓萍, Ming dai fu shui yin ding kao 明代赋税银锭考 (A study of the tax silver ingots of the Ming) (Beijing: Wen wu chu ban she, 2013): 220.

264 Ibid, 227-28.

154 emperor in 1397, only it concentrated on cloth and silver alone. When Zhou Quan and

Yang Shiqi proposed utilizing this procedure in order to pay military salaries in Beijing,

they were looking for a solution to insufficient funds in the north. Both officials dealt with the problems of collecting tax in kind, and both did so along the Ming economic model that opposed raising tax revenue. In addition, if the plan suggested by Zhou Quan was indeed followed, it did not entail a fixed quota, so that commutation depended on grain prices. But this ideal did not last long and the state moved to a quota system that was in place by the early sixteenth century at the latest. The abundance of silver in the palace treasury made these funds available for the consumption of the imperial house and the eunuchs that ran it. Officials serving at court during the Wanli reign such as Wang Qi referred to the Zhengde reign as the time when the state stopped living within its means.265

It could hardly be said that the Ming state ceased to live within its means only in the sixteenth century when it was never able to provide adequate compensation for its officials. The problem Wang was alluding to is deterioration in the management of the

finances of the realm and as a result population figures have dropped and the dynasty lost

half of its registered land. As discussed in Chapter 1, this was a mistake but it served

officials who were critical of financial administration to stress their point. The general

deterioration in financial administration was related to the reliance on fixed quotas, since

once they were established there was no need to update financial information, only to

make sure that officials meet their quotas. This change is apparent in the revenue reports.

265 Wang Qi, Xu Wen xian tong kao, 36:13a.

155 Starting from the Chenghua period and culminating in the Zhengde era, tax categories

that were previously updated annually turned into fixed quotas. First, a category of raw

cotton was fixed during the Chenghua reign and spread to all sericulture taxes in the last

thirty years of the reports. By the end of the Zhengde reign, the grain tax itself was

simply copied from one year to the next.

If in the first half of the dynasty there was some degree of relationship between

local conditions and official reports, from the late fifteenth century the central

government was no longer concerned with local conditions, or no longer able to manage

them beyond its demands for revenue. As fiscal demands grew, the system of tax

commutation, originally employed as a means to negotiate between state-needs and local

interests, became a way to further exploit local resources.266

3.3 Cotton and Silk

Cotton and silk differed from paper notes and silver ingots in their primary capacity as commodities. The first emperor imposed a sericulture tax and directed the population to set aside farmland for mulberry trees. Cotton was levied in large quantities too. Wu Han estimates that an average of one million bolts of cloth were granted to the army every year in the early Ming.267 In the early fifteenth century, reports on income

266 Nimick, Local Administration, 139.

267 Wu Han 吳含, “Ming chu she hui shen chang li de fa zhan 明初社会生产力的发展” [The Development of Productivity in Early Ming Society], Li shi yan jiu, no. 3 (1955): 53-84.

156 from cotton and silk products indicate that textiles constituted the highest non-grain source of state revenue. After a slump around mid-century, the quotas rise again and during the last decades of the dynasty rival silver quotas with a value of close to one million taels, with cotton products constituting the main portion of the total. In the revenue reports, silk floss (si 絲), cotton wadding (mian 綿), silk cloth or tabby (juan 絹), cotton and hemp cloth (bu 布), and unspun cotton (mian hua 綿花) were listed in separate categories.268 Tabby and cotton cloth were a regular feature in grants and awards to soldiers and foreign emissaries. The finer silk products for palace consumption were produced in the imperial workshops in Nanjing and other prefectures of the southern metropolitan region.

Whereas Wu Han attributed the development of the Ming cotton industry to large- scale military allocations, Nishijima Sadao looked at tax policies in order to explain the expansion of the cotton industry. This brings us back to Zhou Chen’s Jiangnan tax reforms. An excerpt from the 1512 gazetteer of Songjiang Prefecture provides more detail on the regulations for commuting grain tax into cotton: One bolt of wide, white cotton cloth was to be collected for 2-2.5 shi of rice.269 The cloth had to be of a certain weight, width, and length. If it was too light, then the cloth could be longer or wider. Moreover, he suggested that red yarn would be woven in both ends so that no one could crop pieces

268 In light of the expansion of the cotton industry and its predominance in military requisitions, I assume that cotton cloth was levied in greater quantities than hemp. Therefore bu is treated as referring to cotton in the calculations made below.

269 A bolt of cotton cloth (疋/匹, pi) was 12.4 meters long. “Minmatsu Shinsho seiji hyōronshū,” 明未清初政治評論集 [A Collection of State Craft Writing from the Late Ming and Early Qing] Chūgoku koten bungaku taikei v. 57 (Compendium of Classic Chinese Literature, Tōkyō: Heibonsha, 1967-1975), 12-13.

157 of it on the way. The author of the gazetteer concludes that this method continued to take place during his time, though the exchange rate fell to one shi of rice.270 In this case the different exchange rate probably reflects a change in grain prices. That was the principle of Zhou Chen’s plan. By controlling exchange rates the government could accommodate taxpayers when prices varied. For example, in 1436 the Ministry of Revenue ordered the lowering of the exchange rate of cotton and grain:

Before, because cotton was cheap and rice was expensive (we have) memorialized the emperor to allow the commutation of grain from the autumn at a rate of two bolts of cloth per shi of grain. Lately, Guangxi and other provincial headquarters are reporting that the heavy exchange rate is causing losses to the people. A return to the old exchange rate of one bolt is recommended. The emperor agreed.271

The logic is clear, when the price of grain was high, one shi of grain sold on the market for two bolts of cotton or more. But when it was cheap, a tax of two bolts became onerous.272

In contrast to what one would expect, the revenue reports do not record any rise in revenue from cotton during this period. In fact, during the Yongle reign a much higher average was reported: on average close to 780,000 bolts of cloth, and almost 290,000 jin

270 Nishijima Sadao, “Early Chinese Cotton Industry,” 29.

271 Ming Yingzong Shi lu, 14:5b.

272 Nishijima, Early Cotton Industry, 31. A one to one exchange rate is mentioned for the mid-fourteenth century also in a 1605 edition of the Jiading County Gazetteer. In this account the exchange rate was one bolt of cotton cloth for one shi of rice.

158 (斤, 377,000 pounds) of raw cotton. For the next forty years the annual average of cotton cloth dropped to around 160,000 bolts, and raw cotton dropped to 240,000 jin. Only in the 1460s did the average of cotton cloth rise again, this time to more than 800,000 bolts.

During the Hongzhi reign a fixed quota of over 1,000,000 bolts suddenly appears, and over 1,500,000 during the Zhengde reign.

During the reform years of the mid 1430s it is actually silk income that rises in the revenue reports. Xu Dixin and Wu Chengming have estimated that silk produced in the imperial workshops amounted to 62 percent of the total requirements, though this seems to be the case only for the first third of the fifteenth century.273 According to their estimate, in the early Ming the annual quota for all state workshops was 56,805 bolts.274

This would put the total at 94,675 bolts. During the Yongle reign silk and cotton are grouped together under one category that stands at an average of 154,000 jin. From the

Hongxi reign these items are recorded separately. In the early Xuande reign the reports record an annual average of around 95,000 bolts, confirming Xu and Wu’s estimate. But from the second half of the 1430’s the figure doubles to around 190,000 bolts. In the second half of the fifteenth century the annual average is about 280,000 bolts. The

273 Xu Dixin 许涤新 and Wu Chengming 吴丞明, eds., Zhongguo zi ben zhu yi de meng ya 中国资本主义的萌芽 1522-1840 [The Sprouts of Capitalism in China] (Beijing: Ren min chu ban she, 1985), 143-149. Calculations regarding quotas rely on the Collected Statutes and memorials; Dagmar Schäfer and Dieter Kun, Weaving an Economic Pattern in Ming Times (1368-1644): The Production of Silk Weaves in the State-Owned Silk Workshops, (Heidelberg: Edition Forum, 2002).

274 One bolt (pi) was 12.4 meters long. Minmatsu shinsho seiji hyoronshu 明末清出政治評論集 [Collection of Critical Essays on Late-Ming and Early Qing Statecraft], series: Chugoku koten bungaku taikei 中國古典文學大系 (Tokyo, 1971): 12-13.

159 numbers drop below 200,000 during the last two decades of the fifteenth century and continue to drop to 126,000 bolts in the first two decades of the sixteenth century.

It is tempting to conclude that the Jiangnan tax reforms first had an impact on silk, and only later on cotton. As figures 3.3 and 3.4 suggest, income in silk cloth rose significantly starting at the period of the Jiangnan tax reforms, while cotton cloth rose sharply in a few stages from the beginning of the Chenghua reign. Another way to interpret the rise in silk products would be a rise in imperial demand. But while Xu and

Wu date the significant rise to imperial requisitions in the Jiajing and Wanli reigns, the revenue reports mark an increase that is evident from as early as 1435. In addition, more silk was produced by private manufacturers and not in imperial workshops that shrank in their production capacity. The imperial requisitions of silk from independent manufactures increased, but when and where is not yet clear. We can conclude that tax commutation rather than imperial requisitions first contributed to the rise in income.

Finally, there is no certainty that silk and cotton were actually collected in kind. In

1443, Zhengtong permitted regions that did not grow silkworms to substitute their silk tax with silver.275 It is therefore very probable that part of what is registered as silk is actually silver. As for the increase in cotton revenue, the tribute list in the Zhengde Hui dian confirms that by the sixteenth century, cotton surpassed silk. Counting all provinces and metropolitan prefectures, a total of 661,455 bolts of cotton and 264,441 bolts of silk were sent to Beijing every year. Interestingly, labour service in the capital was entirely

275 (Wanli) Ming Hui dian, 17:42b.

160 commuted into silk, not silver. The southern capital received 200,000 bolts of cotton and only 16,452 bolts of silk.276

276 (Zhengde) Ming Hui dian, juan 24.

161 350,000

300,000

250,000

200,000

150,000

100,000

50,000

1426 1430 1434 1438 1442 1446 1450 1454 1458 1462 1466 1470 1474 1478 1482 1486 1490 1494 1498 1502 1506 1510 1514 1518

Figure 3-3 Total Annual Income in Silk (pi)

(Source: Ming Shi lu)

2,000,000 1,800,000 1,600,000 1,400,000 1,200,000 1,000,000 800,000 600,000 400,000 200,000 0

1404 1409 1414 1419 1424 1429 1434 1439 1444 1449 1454 1459 1464 1469 1474 1479 1484 1489 1494 1499 1504 1509 1514 1519

Figure 3-4 Total Annual Income in Cotton (pi)

(Source: Ming Shi lu)

162 3.4 The Annual Revenue Reports and Ming Financial Administration

The annual revenue reports are a product of early Ming financial administration.

Their detailed recording in the Shi lu indicates that accounting was of primary importance to fifteenth century administrators. They also imply that an infrastructure for conducting such accounting existed. They represent the ideal of storing wealth among the people with no distinction between imperial and public wealth, and give an impression of an economy based on the collection of various commodities. The data pertains to total tax income for a certain year, collected and uncollected. And, according to the maxim of measuring expenses against revenue, there is no information on expenditure. Perhaps the main purpose of the revenue reports was to relay an image of stability and prosperity. In this also lies their weakness. The financial crises and changes of the fifteenth century are not represented in the reports, nor is the growing role of tax commutation. Since tax revenue was recorded in official units of account, there was no way to register temporary replacements of one commodity with another.

Tax commutation provided flexibility to a system of revenue collection that was not amenable to frequent change and that would otherwise be at the mercy of harvest fluctuations and of the conditions of transportation routes. It served as means to negotiate between state needs and local conditions. Commutation of the grain tax into scrip during the Hongwu reign was a way to grant tax concessions without compromising income completely. The actual reduction in grain procurement that this practice entailed could no longer be sustained during the following Xuande reign, but tax commutation was not abandoned. Rather, it shifted scrip to the commercial sector of the economy and focused on the higher-value and more stable commodities, cloth and silver, in commuting the

163 grain tax. These kinds of commutations became more and more regularized until the grain tribute tax came under a fixed quota. Although the revenue reports do suggest such a development, silver is conspicuously absent. The only hint is that of a more or less fixed quota of tribute grain to Beijing.

Similarly, if we rely on Nishijima’s assessment, state income from cotton should have risen during the 1430s. Categories of commuted tax into cotton exist in the revenue reports but in very small quantities. But since commutation into cloth was an option for

Jiangnan tenants, the actual quantities may be hidden in the fixed tribute tax category. It should be added that officials did not record tax commutation on the local level either. In the Songjiang gazetteer that recounts Zhou Chen’s tax reform, cotton tax reports do not change significantly from the Hongwu to the Zhengde reigns.277 This suggests that any additional commutations were still registered under the total sum of the grain tax.

Still, changes in tax collection can be inferred indirectly by the spread of tax categories bearing fixed quotas in the revenue reports. Repetition of the same figure throughout an entire reign suggests either fixed quotas or lack of new data. Furthermore, when a particular category disappears from the reports it may be that fixed quotas did not change from one reign to the next. During the Yongle reign the income from copper, bronze coins, and cinnabar ceased to be updated and in the following reigns disappear altogether. In the same way, from the beginning of the Zhengtong reign a fixed quota was set for iron and this category was canceled too is in the beginning of the Chenghua

277 Wei Chen 威陳, Songjiang fu zhi 松江府志 [Gazetteer of Songjiang Prefecture, 1512]: 7.

164 period. This of course does not mean that these commodities were no longer collected.

But unless the quota changed from one reign to the next there was no reason to continue reporting it. It seems that only the editorial committee of each reign’s veritable records could decide on such a change. That is why we find numbers repeating themselves for an entire period and then either disappearing or being changed.

The fact that fixed quotas were reported for the most important sources of revenue indicates that the purpose of the revenue reports, supplying updated information on revenue to the political centre, was no longer achieved. During the Jiajing reign the demand for better account keeping was met by the emperor’s order to produce an account book that gives equal consideration to expenditure. This was an important step towards more effective financial administration but lacked sufficient infrastructure for gathering information. The growing concern over expenditure provided the greatest motivation to return to the Tang and Song-style national account books. As shall be discussed in the following chapter, during the fifteenth century the Ming dealt with difficulties in remunerating its servants in grain by commuting portions of salaries and stipends to other, readily available, commodities and money. As greater sectors of government were moving to regular payments in silver, the flexibility that the former system provided, and perhaps its ability to mask real shortages was gone.

165 4 Civilian and Military Salaries

This chapter examines policies regarding official remuneration before payments in silver. State policies in tax collection had a direct effect on expenditure. The insistence on keeping taxation low necessarily meant keeping salaries low. The decision to substitute grain for other means of payment instead of raising tax revenue suggests that from the early Ming the management of official salaries followed the principle of taking revenue as a measure for expenditure. Official salaries certainly diminished greatly as a result of commutation, and in some cases probably hardly covered basic needs. But the court did not merely stand by while this happened. In remunerating capital officials, the court constantly adjusted official salaries by changing the size and content of their commuted portions. These were temporary solutions applied within the framework of the

Hongwu salary chart that succeeded in maintaining a stable and functioning administration.

A distinction is made between officials serving in and outside the capitals.

Whereas the court experimented with other means of payment instead of scrip in salaries for capital officials, it made little effort to adjust those of local officials who continued to rely on scrip supplements to modest grain payments. On the other hand, the court maintained control over local salaries mainly in the centrally administered prefectures. In the provinces conditions varied. Furthermore, it is suggested that salaries of both central and provincial officials were not nominal. Officials relied on their rice portions to support their families and were aided by the government in transferring funds across China.

166 Finally, a comparison with the salaries of Song and Yuan officials reveals that salaries were partially paid in money too, and as inflation struck they diminished in a similar way. In this sense, the problems of the Ming was not new or unique, but a feature of pre-modern Chinese economies that employed a combination of commodities and monies in state finance.

The origin of the pitiful situation of official salaries in the Ming has been discussed by Gu Yuanwu in Ri zhi lu, a text that has become an authoritative account and interpretation of Ming institutions. His argument identifies two related faults in the Ming system: The first mistake was to terminate land grants and base salaries entirely on centrally administered grain allocations. The second mistake emanated from the first one; since tax revenue was insufficient to cover salaries, scrip was paid instead. As paper notes devalued, official salaries diminished. And even when scrip was replaced with cloth and silver, the substitutes never compensated for the original grain portions.278 This

chapter first discusses what Gu Yuanwu saw as the initial problem, the canceling of land

grants to officials, and places it in the intellectual and institutional context of the early

Ming.

278 Gu Yanwu 顧炎武, “Feng lu” 俸祿 [Salaries], Ri zhi lu ji shi [Collected Notes on the Record of Daily Accumulated Knowledge, Huang Rucheng 黃汝成 ed. (1795, reprint Beijing: Hua shan wen yi chu ban she, 1990): 548-553.

167 4.1 Government Land

The complete removal of specially designated land from official salaries is an

innovation of the Ming.279 In previous dynasties, official salary charts included rent

allocations according to rank. This income, called zhi tian (職田) or office land, utilized

government fields for the purpose of funding public projects or supplementing officials’

income.280 Although the designation of sizes of land by rank may suggest that officials

collected rent, their income was calculated according to fixed payments. For example, in the Tang, officials were entitled to income from between two and a half and twelve qing

頃 of land but payment was fixed at a certain rate of grain per mu 畝.281 Song officials

received payments in coin. Those serving outside the capital were entitled to supplement

payment from office land, which was probably paid in cash too.282 In the Yuan, salaries

included a component of rent according to rank, but were paid partially in paper

money.283 In contrast, the salaries of Ming officials were not allocated from specifically

designated fields but were incorporated into the general budget. This arrangement made

them even more dependent on centrally administered payments than their predecessors.

279 There is some indication that Zhu Yuanzhang designated specific fields in Jiangnan for official salaries but retreated from it quickly. Ming shi, juan 82, 2001-2002.

280 Shorthand for zhi fen tian (職分田). Zhou Bodi 周伯棣, Zhongguo cai zheng shi (Shanghai: Shanghai ren min chu ban she, 1981): 364.

281 Hucker, Dictionary of Official Titles, vol. 1, 36.

282 Ibid, 52.

283 Huang Huixian 黄惠贤 and Chen Feng 阵锋, Zhongguo feng lu zhi du shi, 中国俸禄制度史 [A History of the salary system in China] (Wuhan: Wuhan da xue chu ban she, 1996): 357-363.

168 In his account, Gu chooses to praise the Tang system of government fields that allegedly produced upright and hardworking officials, which remained connected to agriculture rather than being consumed by the temptations of money and office.284 But

beyond historical allusions to upright officials, he does not offer concrete reasons for the

superiority of one system over another. This description seems more idealic than

historical. Nevertheless, his opinion offers an interesting perspective on the imperial

bureaucracy of the Ming as officials seeking office for money. This description points to

a very different image from that of a gentry class that regards public office as a

prerogative but in no way as a profession. In his work on the philosophical and

sociological characteristics of the Confucian elite before and during the founding of the

Ming dynasty, John Dardess proposes to understand it as a professional group.285 Their

approach to office was one of public vocation that did not include the pursuit of profit,

but it did entail remuneration for applying their professional knowledge. The early Ming

Confucian scholar and examination tutor Liang Yin expressed it like this:

”…I have no fields to harvest and what I stockpile are simply books. My descendants who inherit this will have no grain taxes or other obligations, yet when their studies are finished they will have something to render to superiors and to contribute to the good order of the world. My concern for my

284 He mentions Tao Qian (陶潛, 365-427) who is said to have left office and a comfortable salary for the uprightness of rural life, and Ruan Zhangzhi (阮長之, 379-437) who missed the day of the annual salary payment in order to rush to his mother’s funeral. Gu Yuanwu, Ri zhi lu, 550.

285 John W. Dardess, Confucianism and Autocracy: Professional Elites in the Founding of the Ming Dynasty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

169 descendants is thus so keen that I have no thought to set up landed property for them.286

We can be sure that this statement was written during the early Ming because Lin acknowledges that he has no grain tax obligations. This was the case during the Ming but not under the Yuan, when Confucian households had some tax obligations. Although this is undoubtedly an ideological statement that does not reflect the landed background of most holders of examination degrees in the Ming bureaucracy, it may shed light on the ideological background of the setting of official salaries separate from any land component.

The centralization of official salaries can be also viewed as part of the centralizing project of the founding period. Government land was indeed the basis for official salaries but fields were not specifically designated for salary payments. Rather, all government land was managed collectively. Government land, or fields (guan tian 官田), was a general term for several kinds of sub-categories: Manor fields (Zhuang tian 莊田) supplied the needs of princely courts. School-fields (xue tian 學田) served as local sources of revenue directed at supplying meals for teachers and students as well as covering the costs of sacrifices for Confucius.287 Military fields (jun or dun tian 軍,屯田)

286 Liang Yin, 梁寅(1303-90), Shi men ji 石門集 (Printed ed. 1889), 1:37a-38b. Translated in Dardess, Confucianism and Autocracy, 52.

287 Ming Taizu Shi lu, 144:2a-2b.

170 supplied military units. Although the History of the Ming does mention fields for official

salaries (bai guan zhi tian 百官職田) in this list, this category disappears subsequently.288

Without the component of land grants, Ming officials can be seen as the first

salary men in China. In Max Weber’s discussion of the nature of the modern bureaucracy, he argues that in state systems in which officials received their salaries in kind, it was tempting to hand over the right to tax to them, which turned them into tax farmers or landlords. This weakened the bureaucratic structure and hierarchical relationships within the state. Weber assumed that this was the case in Imperial China:

The allocation of fixed income in kind from the magazines of the lord or from his current intake- which has been the rule in Egypt and China…easily means a first step towards appropriation of the sources of taxation by the official and their exploitation as private property.289

Weber assumed that throughout imperial China, officials were paid in kind from land rent and therefore did not see their remunerations as salaries. He used the term prebendum

taken from the history of the Catholic Church in order to define the Chinese system.

Prebendum was remuneration for priests serving in administrative functions who were entitled to a portion of the manor’s produce. Technically, Ming officials received their salaries from rent on government land as did their predecessors, but since it did not figure

as a component in the salary chart any relationship to agricultural produce was

288 Zhang, Ming shi, juan 77, 1881.

289 Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Translated and Edited by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, 205 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958).

171 completely severed. Moreover, since their salaries were commuted to money, the

translation of their remuneration as salaries (feng lu 俸祿), in the modern sense of the word is justified.

4.2 Salary Charts

All government officials were entitled to a standard monthly salary. In addition to

civilian posts, military and civilian degree holders served in military command posts.

Beneath the high level posts such as regional military commanders, the most numerous

were those of guard, battalion, and company commanders. When edicts refer to ‘civilian

and military officials’ (wen wu guan 文武官) they are directed at the commanding level

of the military who were all ranked officials. For the first time in Chinese history, clerks

were entitled to a monthly salary too. They were placed in a parallel ranking system with

its own salary chart. The highest ranked clerks earned a similar income to that of the

lowest degree-holding officials and they shared government positions with them.

Students in the imperial academy and successful candidates serving in their first post for

a three-year probation period (ban shi guan 辦事官) received a monthly income too.

Logistically, central government offices paid their officials from the imperial

granaries and storehouses in the capital, while localities paid their officials from the

retained portion of the tax revenue. Official salaries were part of other regular expenses

such as salaries for the local military guard, educational and welfare funds and two years

172 of military reserves.290 Although it was up to the county and prefecture to budget for its workers, the court had the final say on the contents of salaries. As we shall see, the greatest distinction in the working conditions of officials was between those serving in and outside the capitals. The terms commonly used for capital officials were jing guan

(京官), or inner officials (nei guan 內官). This last term could also denote eunuchs, but in this context is contrasted with outer officials (wai guan 外官), or provincial officials.

Salaries for officials and clerks were fixed according to the nine-rank system that began in the Northern Wei Dynasty (386-535). In their history of official salaries in

China, Huang Huixian and Chen Feng describe a general shift from payment in kind to payment in money. Beyond the land grant component, the Northern Wei paid its officials in grain and cloth. The Sui and Tang dynasties paid salaries primarily in grain with an additional payment in coin that could be commuted to cloth. In the Song the cash component of the salary became more significant though a grain and cloth component remained. Ming salaries were calculated in grain but mostly paid in scrip and other money commodities.291

As the Duke of Wu, Zhu Yuanzheng began to experiment with remuneration for his nascent administration. In 1367 he arranged for generous grants and travel allowances for his prefects and magistrates in charge of the Jiangnan prefectures and counties that

290 Zhu Yuanzhang (1396), Zhu si zhi zhang 2:1.a. Other scholars believe that official salaries were paid from the portion that was transferred outside the locality. See: Bian Junjie, Ming dai de cai zheng zhi du, 67.

291 Huang, Zhongguo feng lu,

173 were recently captured from Zhang Shicheng.292 Their families were included as well as their deputies and clerical staff. The size of the grants, paid in cloth and silver, was intended to ensure that officials would not burden the local population for covering their expenses, and to secure their loyalty. A prefect received four pieces of woven silk, six pieces of thick silk, two pieces of silk gauze, and six pieces of ramie cloth. The fathers of the heads of the prefecture, sub-prefecture, and county received the same amount of cloth as their sons, while their mothers, wives and eldest sons were entitled to half that amount.

With the additional allowance granted to the family members, the total income of the household tripled. The households of the deputy officials were entitled to half the sum of their superiors. This pattern repeated itself with clerks (li mu 吏目 and dian li 典史).

Their family members received half the sum of the deputy officials. Silver for travel fare was granted to prefects, sub-prefects and magistrates in installments of fifty, thirty-five, and thirty taels respectively. Their deputies were entitled to a budget of their own, between half and three quarters of their superiors’ pay. Clerks completed the list with a budget of ten taels of silver.293

It is unlikely that this arrangement continued for very long. And official salaries and budgets were never again to be this generous. Still, they do indicate that the future emperor understood the importance of adequate compensation for his officials. Once the dynasty was established, it issued the first salary chart in 1371. The chart is identical to

292 Ming Taizu Shi lu, 24:4b-5a; Yu Jideng 余繼登(jin shi 1577), Dian gu ji wen 皇明典故紀聞, (Beijing: Zhong hua shu ju, 1981): 1:11.

293 Ibid, 24:5a.

174 that in that of the administrative code of the Tang Dynasty, which served as the main

template for the construction of the new government. Salaries were calculated in standard

units of grain, starting from an annual sum of 50 shi of grain for rank 9b up to 900 shi for

rank 1a.294 In 1381 the emperor approved a general raise: Rank 1a received an additional

100 shi down to rank 9b, which recovered an additional 10 shi annually. The raise was

not evenly distributed; officials that enjoyed the biggest increase in income were ranked

3a and 3b with an additional two hundred shi.295 Beyond this sum, all officials received a

bonus in scrip; 400 guan for the first four ranks down to 30 guan for rank nine. With one guan comparable to around one shi of rice, this addition was significant.

The timing of the publication of this salary chart was not arbitrary. It was part of the general reorganization of government following the execution of Prime Minister Hu

Weiyong. As Wu Han interprets, along with the prime minister most high-ranking officials were dismissed or executed. And in order to obtain the complete loyalty of the new recruits Zhu rewarded them accordingly.296 In the same decree the emperor also

emphasized that a clearer system of rewards and punishment should be established.297

The new salary chart was to be engraved in stone, placed publically and its

implementation enforced by the revenue officials in order to “prevent confusion.” In

294 Ibid, 60:8b.

295 Ibid, 130:2a-2b.

296 Wu Han, “Hu Weiyong dang an kao” 胡惟永檔案考 [On the Case of the Hu Weiyong], Yanjing xue bao 15 (1934): 163-205.

297 Hu Weiyong allegedly abused the system of rewards and punishments in order to promote his followers and eliminate his enemies. See: Farmer, early Ming legislation, 48.

175 centralizing power in his own hands the emperor tightened his control over his servants

by reiterating and clarifying the procedures for rewards and penalties. But despite this,

another salary chart was issued in 1387: While the salaries of the highest ranking officials

rose to an annual sum of 1044 shi, the rest were reduced to a level close to that of the first

salary chart.298 This may indicate that the need to literally buy the support of his officials

was over and that the emperor felt secure enough to return to the previous salary plan.

Alternatively, high salaries may have been abandoned simply because the expense was

too high.

These salary charts make no distinction between officials in and outside the

capital. The salaries of all officials were calculated according to rank, but once rice

payments began to be replaced with money and commodities, the place in which an

official served was more important than rank in determining actual compensation.

4.3 Commutation of Salaries into Scrip

Huang Fulu, who served as prefect of Shunqing Prefecture (順慶府) in Sichuan in the early sixteenth century, lamented the deterioration in officials’ income. In the beginning of the dynasty, he remarks, officials were paid entirely in rice and a person of rank seven would receive around seven shi of rice every month; enough for a decent living. But thereafter, part of that portion was commuted. In the case of officials serving outside the capital, any amount beyond two shi was commuted to scrip. Coming up to

298 Ming Taizu Shi lu, 185:2a-2b.; 222:6a-6b.

176 Huang’s time, scrip had depreciated so badly that the actual amount of rice that could be

purchased was nowhere near the original sum.299 Huang Fulu happened to live during a time when this reality had the gravest effect on an official’s income because these were

the final years of the transition to silver in the Chinese economy. In the last decades of

the fifteenth century and the first two decades of the sixteenth, the court continued to pay

officials in scrip or cloth but as Huang remarks, rice was purchased with silver and both

scrip and cloth could be converted to only a very small amount of silver on the market.

What is surprising in this account is that even at this late stage, salaries were still

being paid with scrip and that they were still being exchanged on the market. This may

not have been the case throughout China. Perhaps in Sichuan the complete disappearance

may have been delayed, but this account nevertheless reminds us that paper scrip did not

disappear from state finance right after silver became a common currency in government

transactions. Initially, commuting salaries into money was a perfectly rational idea. Paper

notes are much easier and cheaper to transport than rice. As long as officials could use

the notes to purchase the supplies they required, their income remained stable and the

state saved transportation costs. In addition, although tax quotas were fixed, actual

agricultural yields fluctuated. The availability and cost of rice changed according to the

time of year and the quality of the harvest. This too made payments in money a good

idea, providing the court with more flexibility in handling supplies. It also provided

officials with the means to purchase other items.

299 Huang Fulu 黃甫錄 (1496, jin shi), Huang Ming ji lue: yi juan 皇明紀略一卷 [Historical Sketches of the Great Ming] (si ku quan shu cun mu cang shu zi bu vol. 240, Ji’nan: Qi Lu shu she, 1995): 71-87.

177 The first introduction of paper currency into official salaries occurred in the spring of 1376, right after the first issue of the official paper currency. The Ministry of

Revenue reported that beginning from the fall of that year, half of the salaries for all officials and officers in the northern provinces of Beiping, Shaanxi, and Shanxi shall be paid in rice while the other half will be made of paper notes and wheat. In the other provinces there was to be a thirty percent commutation.300 Officials in the capital were left out of the list of provinces and were probably excluded from this arrangement.

Although the reason for the announced change is not stated, the greater percentage of conversion for northern officials suggests a shortage in grain or difficulty to transport it.

On the other hand, the inclusion of southern officials, where grain transport shouldn’t have been that difficult, raises the possibility that the Ministry of Revenue used its power to authorize and administer salaries in order to promote the new currency that was first created in the previous year. Without a central banking system, the state did not have many avenues for entering its scrip into circulation. Disseminating the paper notes in salaries was probably the only way to equally cover all regions of the empire.

Whatever the immediate reason for this decision, it created a precedent. Ten years later, in 1386, the emperor ordered the Ministry of Revenue to convert all official salaries to scrip. The inclusive term ‘All Under Heaven’ (tian xia) seems to address officialdom at its entirety, but in the Collected Statutes this declaration is interpreted as referring to officials serving outside the capital. And indeed in 1393, when regulations were finalized in Zhu si zhi zhang, only officials outside the capital were paid entirely in scrip while

300 Ming Taizu Shi lu, 104:4a-4b.

178 those serving in it received their pay from the autumn grain tax, meaning rice301. If this was indeed the case then rice portions for local officials were entirely omitted.

Salaries for officials serving in the capital were partially commuted during the

Yongle reign. Following three years of bloody war, Zhu Di won the throne from his nephew. The effect of this war on imperial granaries must have been significant since in

1402, even before his enthronement as the Yongle emperor, he announced that in order to economize, certain military personnel who up to that moment earned their entire income in grain would now be paid partly in scrip. They included men serving in the military regional commissions, in provincial surveillance commissions and in princely courts. He also reiterated the 1386 regulation, declaring that salaries of officials serving on the level of the prefecture, sub-prefecture and county will continue to be paid entirely in scrip.302

Three months later he approved a new salary program, proposed by minister of revenue

Xia Yuanji, that cut into the rice portions of central government officials as well.303

According to this new scheme, portions of salaries were converted from grain to scrip in a progressive manner in which the highest-ranking officials were subject to the largest conversion of sixty percent of their salaries into scrip, while ranks 7-8 received only twenty percent in paper notes. Rank 9 officials as well as clerks and soldiers were paid entirely in rice.

301 Zhu si zhi zhang, 2:18b-19a.

302 Ming Taizong Shi lu, juan 12, part 1:9b.

303 Ibid, 15:1b-2a. A more detailed version of this proposal appears in Huo Tao, “guan guan feng” 關官俸 [concerning government salaries], Guo chao dian lue, 35:1b-2a.

179 The aim here seems to be reducing rice payments while ensuring that all officials

and soldiers would receive a basic rice stipend that, in the case of the lowest earning

officials and soldiers, was their entire salary. Moreover, acknowledging the devaluation of scrip, Xia proposed an exchange rate of five guan to one shi of rice, but the emperor

doubled it to ten guan. Since prices of grain are usually rendered in silver it is hard to tell

whether this exchange rate resembled market rates at the time. But considering that the

exchange rate of scrip to silver was not more than one qian (錢, one tenth of a tael) and at

its lowest rice cost three qian, officials would have not been able to obtain their full grain

allocations on the market.304

In 1411 the emperor introduced further cuts into rice portions: Now officials

ranked nine who previously escaped the salary cut were subject to a 20% conversion.

Another adjustment in 1418 left officials in ranks 1-5 with half of their salaries in paper

notes, and the rest were subject to a 40% commutation. By the end of the Yongle reign,

Nanjing officials of all ranks, now serving in what became a regency (留守, liu shou) received only 20% of their salaries in rice. Clerks, who were initially spared any salary commutation due to their low income, were divided into two categories: Those who were supporting families were entitled to a monthly salary of six dou of rice (about 60 liters), while singles had to make do with four dou. The rest was paid in scrip. At the bottom of the hierarchy were student apprentices: They earned three dou a month for new officials with or without families. In this sense we can imagine them resembling apprentices in

304 For some fifteenth-century exchange rates see appendix C.

180 lucrative jobs nowadays who practically have to pay to gain experience in their future

careers.

The situation of grain supplies in the capital apparently did not improve. In 1421,

the emperor decreed that only 5 dou of rice would be paid from the Beijing granary every month while the rest would be paid from the Nanjing granary.305 With no arrangement to get hold of the Nanjing funds it seems that this decision was more theoretical than practical, and indeed the decree adds that those who do not wish to be paid with Nanjing rice may convert this portion too into scrip. Unranked officials (雜職官, za zhi guan)

with families had to make due with six dou while singles earned 4.5 dou of rice, with the rest in scrip. In this edict the grain component of official salaries was practically reduced to a basic grain ration, with only the money component reflecting differences in hierarchy.

The idiom “bending at the waist for five dou” (五斗折腰) was a common phrase meaning that five dou of rice was a meager wage not worth serving for. It supposedly originated in a declaration of an official in the Jin dynasty that he would not serve for a salary of five dou.306 Since this idiom was popular in the Ming it is likely that it resonated

with the realities of official life. It also indicates that five dou was considered a certain

305 (Zhengde) Ming Hui dian, 29:13a.

306 Jin, Yong 金庸. “Tan bu wei wu dou mi zhe yao” 探《不為五豆米折腰》[On the saying Refusing to Serve for Five Dou] (1958) reprint Jin Yong San wen ji 金庸散文集 [A Collection of Prose Writings by Jin Yong] (Beijing: zui jia chu ban she, 2006): 311-313. In a short essay, the martial arts novelist has argued that the meaning of the declaration as quoted in the History of the Jin is actually the opposite: the official was not willing to sacrifice his principles for the material benefits of office.

181 low limit for service. It seems that at their most harsh, cuts in rice portions rarely went

below this sum.

But not all capital officials were reduced to such meager wages. Interestingly, after all other groups of officials were gradually brought into this salary reduction plan, the last group to be addressed was Mongol military officers at court. This group was prominent in the Ming court from the beginning of the dynasty and throughout the fifteenth century. They constituted about one third of the imperial guard.307 But they were

also significant within the ranks of the military in the capital. Ming emperors essentially

continued the Yuan practice of an imperial bodyguard and entourage. It was a multiethnic

group that included a significant number of Mongols and Jurchens. As David Robinson

suggests, “the capital units under the Ming, like their counterparts during the Yuan, were

more closely aligned with the emperor and his interests, than with the civil

bureaucracy.”308 The function of the Mongol military dignitaries at court as confidants of

the emperor was probably even more pronounced during the reign of the Yongle emperor

who was struggling to gain legitimacy for his reign. Their rice portions were also much

higher than their Han colleagues. Their salaries were subject to a commutation too but

only up to 50%.

The glaring discrepancy was pointed out by one of the capital officials: In the

very end of his first year on the throne, Li Wenda, a secretary in the Ministry of

307 Henry Serruys, “Foreigners in the Metropolitan Police During the Fifteenth Century,” Oriens Extramus 8, no. 1 (1961): 59-83.

308 David M. Robinson, “The Ming Court and the Legacy of the Yuan Mongols,” Culture, Courtiers, and Competition: The Ming Court (1368-1644), (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2008): 365-422.

182 Personnel, presented to the Zhengtong emperor a scathing diatribe against the preferential treatment of Mongol officials at court. He complained that while all Han officials, regardless of rank, received only one shi of rice every month, Mongol officials continued to get at least half of their salaries in rice. Taking a deputy commander of rank 3a as an example, from a salary that was calculated at 35 shi a month, a Han official received one shi while his Mongol counterpart enjoyed a monthly stipend of 17.5 shi. In a terminology intended to rouse ethnic tension, Li accused the emperor of “taking the food out of the mouth of his precious subjects in order to feed wild beasts.”309

So it appears that there was more grain to be found in the capital for certain privileged officials after all. While commuting salaries was an economic necessity, it was not devoid of political calculations. This was especially the case with the Yongle emperor who did not follow the principle of revenue as a measure for expenditure in his political agenda. He may have stressed the need to economize in rice, but his entire reign was characterized by ambitious projects. Moving the capital to Beijing, military campaigns in the north and in Vietnam were extremely costly. The emperor himself admitted that the extravagant maritime voyages were eating up most of the tribute income from the provinces.310 During his reign, grain tax quotas were the highest but actual receipts fell

309 Ming Yingzong Shi lu, 25:10a-10b. Although the memorial is recorded in the veritable records and the positive reaction of the emperor is indicated, Chen Ziliong, the editor of a seventeenth century collection of memorials, remarks that this memorial was barred from reaching the emperor by the three Yangs who controlled the court at the time. See: Li Wenda 李文達, “Da guan zhi feng” (Salary payments for Mongol Officials), Chen Zilong ed. Huang Ming Jing shi Wen bian, Si ku jin hui shu cong kan (Beijing: Beijing chu ban she, 2000): 36:16a-18b.

310 Li Jinming, Ming dai hai wai mao yi shi (Beijing: Zhongguo she hui ke xue yuan chu ban she, 1990): 46.

183 behind. In the last years of his reign his ministers cautioned him that state supplies were

in serious danger.

Scrip also continued to depreciate. Xia Yuanji suggested issuing a new paper note with the Yongle reign title on it. This adjustment had taken place several times in order to curb the depreciation of Yuan scrip and had had some success. This was an apt

recommendation in light of the turmoil of the civil war and Yongle’s usurpation. The

effect of political uncertainty on Ming scrip is not usually cited as one of the causes for

its depreciation. But fiat currency is worthless without the stability of the political entity

that issues it. During the Jianwen reign and the civil war, there was no certainty that the

Ming would survive. As mentioned earlier, in contradiction to the official historical

narrative, there is evidence that the Yongle and Hongxi emperors issued notes with their

reign titles. There is no indication that the Xuande emperor did the same. During his

reign paper currency reached its bottom price.. The one-guan note that was officially

exchangeable with 1,000 bronze coins in 1376, was worth only a few coins fifty years

later. Surprisingly, the court did not discard scrip completely until the last decade of the

fifteenth century, and in some cases even later. Instead, it explored the use of other means

of payment.

184 4.4 Commutation into Sappan Wood, Pepper, and Cloth

The first commodities to substitute for scrip in the salaries of all officials and

clerks serving in both capitals were sappan wood (蘇木, su mu) and pepper.311 The

choice of these two commodities is a curious one, since they were not a traditional means

of official payment as were other commodities such as coin, precious metals, or cloth.

Instead, they were a product of the South-Asian trade that took place as a part of tribute

relations during the Hongwu and Yongle reigns. After the annexation of a region in northern Vietnam, sappan wood was also levied as tax and is listed in the annual revenue reports.

Sappan wood was a product used for medicine and as a dye for fabrics. The kingdoms of Java, Siam and Melaka regularly sent it as tribute along with pepper and other valuables such as elephant tusks and tortoise shells. On several occasions very large quantities were submitted to the court. For example, 100,000 jin of sappan wood were presented to the Hongwu emperor by a delegate from the kingdom of Champa that captured twenty boats from a pirate.312 The availability of these commodities in the

palace storehouses and their high value made them a convenient means of payment and they were often used in imperial grants to soldiers. In 1371 the emperor granted gauze, brocade, and Sappan wood to a Mongol force that defected to the Ming army. 313 In 1380,

311 The Hui dian record a decree from 1424, but in 1425 the Minister of Revenue stated that this policy began in 1422. Ming Hui dian, 29:9a-23a, and Ming Ren zong Shi lu, 9:7a.

312 Ming Taizu Shi lu, 84:7a.

313 Ibid, 98:2a. The interesting point here is that the loot belonged to the Ming emperor and not to the Champa king

185 he granted scrip, Sappan wood and pepper to solders from the capital military guards who

were wounded in battle or fell sick during their service.314 And towards the end of that

year, the emperor sent Sappan wood instead of coin to his soldiers in the capital as

allowance for the winter festival.315 This and other commodities were also used as

payment for labourers: In 1391, Hongwu granted close to 14,000 water transport soldiers

Sappan wood, pepper and bronze coins.316 In 1419, Yongle paid construction workers

with scrip, cotton cloth, Sappan wood and pepper.317

Sappan wood and pepper continued to be used in special grants, but it is their

appearance in salaries that is of interest to this discussion because it created a precedent by which salaries were doubly converted, first from grain to money, and then from money to a commodity, a practice that would continue for the next hundred years. On the one hand, the court substituted the failing currency with a more viable money commodity but the trick was that the exchange rate be tied to scrip and not to the original rice quota.

This means salaries may have risen a little but did not come close to the original sum. In

1424, the court set an exchange rate of one jin of pepper to 16 guan of paper notes, and one jin of sappan wood to eight guan in remitting official salaries in Beijing. These two products are always stated together with the first holding twice the value of the second.318

314 Ibid, 131:7a.

315 Ibid, 134:6b

316 Ibid, 207:3b

317 Ming Taizong Shi lu, 212:2a.

318 The court used the same method when converting salaries to cloth using silk and cotton, as if they constituted a high denomination and low denomination currency.

186 This was apparently a welcome change since in the following year, the students of the

imperial academy (guo zi jian 國子監) requested to be included in the program.319 In

1434 it was the turn of the Nanjing officials to join in. By this time the exchange rate

stood at 100 guan for one jin of pepper and 50 guan for one jin of Sappan wood.320 This

means that the court did try to adjust the exchange rate according to that of the market,

but it did not issue any official exchange rate of the two commodities to grain. What the

government was doing was essentially granting one jin of either commodity as a

supplement for salaries and then issuing the exchange rate with scrip. Rice was by now

completely out of the equation.

The Hongxi and Xuande reigns were a time of financial retrenchment. During the

one-year reign of the Hongxi emperor, official posts deemed unessential were canceled,

and government expenditures were cut. Also, the expensive maritime expeditions were

discontinued.321 After debating the issue for several years, the Xuande emperor dealt with

the problem of tax arrears by lowering tax quotas. As discussed in the previous chapter,

prefectures in Jiangnan were at the centre of a reorganization and reform of the tax

system.

There were also effects on officials’ income: In 1428, all rice stipends for student

apprentices were stopped. And grants of cloth replaced both the scrip and grain portions

319 Ming Xuanzong Shi lu, 9:8a.

320 Ibid, 114:1b.

321 Hok-Lam Chan, “Chien-wen, Yung-lo, Hung-hsi, Hsuan-de reigns,” Cambridge History of China vol.7, 182-304.

187 of court officials. In 1431, the rice for the last two months for officials in Nanjing was

replaced with cloth. This procedure apparently created a precedent since in the following

year cloth was used instead of all rice portions of officials in both capitals.322 The person behind this decision was Hu Ying (胡濙, 1375-1463). Although he served as minister of

Rites, he received a special appointment early in 1431 to deal with matters pertaining to the Ministry of Revenue. His memorials to the throne suggest that he was appointed to look into the matter of official and military salaries.

In a memorial presented to the emperor in 1433 Hu Ying offered to replace scrip with cloth in salary payments. His explanation also provides a glimpse of a common procedure in salary payments that will be discussed in chapter 4. Instead of paying officials in the capitals, receipts for payments were issued and could be cashed in their hometowns. But the foreign soldiers had to be paid on the spot. In addition, in several of the northern metropolitan prefectures there were places were the number of officials surpassed the available stock of scrip. As a result, many were paid out from the river-boat tax along the river. This led to delays in payments. Moreover, since the guard units in the mountain passes were all paid with scrip on the spot, the result was a concentration of scrip detrimental to circulation. 323

He suggested commuting the paper money payments for these soldiers into cloth.

Seventy percent of the sum in silk at a rate of 400 guan per piece, and thirty percent in

322 Ming Hui dian, 29:4a. In the Hui dian the order is to convert one shi of rice, which is the rice most officials received every month.

323 Ming Xuanzong Shi lu, 100:10b.

188 cotton, at a rate of 200 guan per bolt. Here again is a double conversion that was beneficial to the court since the amount of cloth that was exchanged for paper notes was much smaller than the amount that would have been exchanged directly for rice. In addition, Hu addressed the discrepancy in the exchange rates of officials and officers on the one hand, and foot soldiers on the other. While the first group received scrip payments at an exchange rate of 25 guan per shi, soldiers were paid at a much lower rate of five or ten guan per shi. He suggested dividing the expenditure budget more equally, setting an exchange rate of 15 guan per shi for all ranks. The editors of the shi lu remark that Hu’s plan was ultimately overturned and the salaries of low ranking officials and soldiers remained very low. 324

In the following year the court returned to Sappan wood and pepper in

commutations of salaries and rations in Beijing.325 The general picture that arises from

these proposals is one of total desperation at court, with officials going through the

imperial storehouses to find items that could be used as payment. In any case, these kinds

of manipulations in commodities and exchange rates are the means by which the dynasty

maneuvered through what can only be described as a time of financial crisis. As

discussed in the previous chapter, this was the year when Zhou Chen was sent to the

south to put the core of state finance in order.

Alternating between scrip and Sappan wood/pepper became the preferred means

to deal with either shortages or excesses. In 1436 the Ministry of Revenue reported that

324 Ming Xuanzong shi lu, 100:10b.

325 Ming Hui dian, 29:14a.

189 the shipment of paper notes to pay soldiers in several northern military guards was

insufficient and requested to supplement it with Sappan wood and pepper.326 In the same

year the assistant to the manager of the money storehouse in the imperial treasury

suggested to pay officials entirely in scrip because in the last few months the imperial

storehouses were short on purchased commodities (presumably sappan wood and

pepper).327 The Ministry of Revenue opposed, saying that excess payment in scrip will clog the market, or in the words of the memorial, make them stagnant (zhi 滯). The compromise was to divide the payment between scrip and pepper/sappan wood. It seems that this proposal managed to create a satisfactory balance between prudent management of the paper money system and availability of other means of payment since it continued for the next four decades.

In 1471, the Ministry of Revenue reported that there was not enough Sappan wood and pepper in store to pay salaries and requested exchanging them for cloth.328 By

1483 stocks of Sappan wood and pepper were completely depleted.

326 Ming Yingzong Shi lu, 12.5b.

327 Ibid, 19.3b. The money storehouse was called si yao ku (司鑰庫) and was manned by eunuchs. See Ming shi juan 74.

328 Ming Xianzong Shi lu, 97:5b.

190 4.5 Silver

The shift to silver in salary payments during the second half of the fifteenth

century was gradual and subject to conflicting agendas. In 1437 military officials in the

capital received their Nanjing rice allowances in silver.329 But this development did not

spread quickly. Only in 1450 was this regulation extended to civilian officials in the

capital but with reservations:

In the first year of Jingtai, it was ordered that all civilian officials in court receive their Nanjing salary portions according to the regulation for military officers in silver. Those who do not wish to do so, are allowed (to refuse). All commissioners in chief in the prefectures will also follow this rule.330

This decree was made by the new emperor and signaled a change in the attitude

towards official salaries. In 1452, silver also replaced the scrip portions of court officials.

500 guan of scrip were replaced with one tael of silver.331 The silver that was used was

taken from funds earmarked for purchasing fodder in the imperial storehouse.332 This

commutation rate mirrored the actual value of scrip, but this did not necessarily work in favour of officials since they received scrip according to the artificial exchange rate with grain, 25 guan for one shi. This would mean that for the equivalent of twenty shi in paper

329 Ming Hui dian, 29:14b. The decree specifically designates grain tax that was collected in silver to be used for payment.

330 Ibid, 29:15a-15b. A possible explanation for officials to prefer their salary grain in Nanjing will be discussed in the following section.

331 Ming Yingzong Shi lu, 218:3a.

332 Ibid, 15.b. Part of the tribute obligations of provinces was to send silver in lieu of hay.

191 notes, an official was entitled to one tael of silver. In the following year the emperor ordered a fixed amount of silver to be paid to civilian and military officials at court as the converted portion of their salary, 124,312 taels for soldiers and 3,589 taels for civilians.333

But once the former Zhengtong emperor came back from captivity and managed to take back the throne he reversed these policies. First he canceled silver commutations of rice portions and ordered that payments should be once again made in rice. In 1468, in what was perhaps a final attempt to revive scrip, officials in Beijing received their converted portion, 30% in paper notes and 70% coin. Only in 1480 was scrip abandoned once again for cloth, and only in 1484 did the court once again introduce silver.334 During the Hongzhi reign scrip, cloth and silver continued to replace each other periodically. In

1503, he updated the exchange rate of scrip to rice for the last time. How long this lasted is not clear but in subsequent decrees silver replaces both rice and scrip. In 1507 the

Zhengde emperor ordered that the three largest rice-producing prefectures, Suzhou,

Songjiang, and Changzhou, send their rice tax in silver explicitly for the purpose of preparing salaries. The procedure was as following: After the silver had been entered in the imperial storehouse (tai cang 太倉), every office was ordered to send a messenger to

333 Ibid, 230:9a.

334 Ming Hui dian, 29:16.b.

192 collect the funds.335 In 1517 he further expanded this requirement to encompass two more prefectures in Jiangnan.336

From this time on there were no more distinctions between rice and commuted portions. Official and military salaries were paid entirely in silver. Not only scrip, but also rice, ceased to be part of official income. Therefore, it can be said that this reflected a deeper change in financial administration to a reliance on silver not as a commodity substituting for rice but as the basic unit of account. This shift tallies with the information on fixed commutations of silver from south China. Throughout the fifteenth century

Beijing resisted more than endorsed commutation of salaries into silver. With the failure of scrip to circulate on the market, the government experimented with several commodities and at times insisted on returning to scrip. The introduction of silver into official salaries began in the second half of the fifteenth century. It was promoted by some emperors and discouraged by others. It took several decades until the financial system finally adjusted to the reality of silver as the primary source of state finance.

335 (Wanli) Ming huidian, 39:12b-13a.

336 Ming Wuzong Shi lu, 152:7a.

193 4.6 Sending Money Home

One particulary interesting procedure regarding the salaries of officials in Beijing sheds light on the ways in which they maneuvered within the regulations. Yongle’s decree from 1421, by which capital officials could extract only five dou from the granary in Beijing and the rest was remitted in Nanjing, led to a new procedure. In his short reign, the Hongxi emperor gave his consent to officials who could not leave their posts to attend to their aging parents to send a portion of their salaries home (fen feng yang qin 分俸養

親 or fen feng yuan ji 分俸原籍). At first glance, this is a curious declaration because it gives the impression that the emperor could control what officials did with their money.

But since this meant a change in the procedure for the transportation of funds, it required the emperor’s approval.

We know that paying Beijing officials with Nanjing rice was still standard procedure more than forty years after the original decree because when in 1457 the

Shuntian emperor reaffirmed the essentials of this procedure, it applied to officials serving in the capital and pertained only to the rice portions they were allocated in

Nanjing. 337 This confirms that despite the transformation of the tribute grain tax into silver, this category of payment in rice remained in Nanjing.

Although particular mentions pertaining to this practice are few, one request from

1446 was recorded in the Shi lu: While bound for the Shaanxi border, the Deputy

Regional Military Commissioner (shou dou zhi hui shi 署都指揮使) requested that half

337 Ming Hui dian, 29:15a.

194 of the rice portion of his salary would be paid to his father who was stationed in Longhu

military guard (龍虎衛) in Nanjing. The Ministry of Revenue approved that this shall be

done in accordance with the salary regulations for Shaanxi officials.338 Both request and

approval seem to be part of a regular procedure and it is hard to explain why this passage

entered the historical record in the first place.

Much more frequent are records of discussions regarding this procedure when

there were problems. In 1440 the Zhengtong emperor prohibited capital officials from

sending grain to their hometowns in Shanxi, Shaanxi, Yunnan, Sichuan and several

prefectures in the northern metropolitan region. 339 In this case, no reason for the restriction was given, but a decade later the Ministry of Revenue reported that it

prohibited sending rice home in the same provinces because these areas were important

for supplying grain for the military. 340 I interpret this as meaning that grain for officials’

families was transported in the same way that grain for the military was transported.

When heavy loads of grain were transported to the north, the transporters could not take

on the extra load. The ministry also recommended prohibiting sending rice to the

southern provinces of Jiangxi, Huguang, Fujian, and Guangdong. In this case banditry

was interfering with the smooth transportation of grain. When conditions were peaceful

transfers could continue as before. The only possible conclusion from these remarks is

that the Ministry of Revenue was handling the logistics of transporting rice to the

338 Ming yingzong Shi lu, 140:2b.

339 Ming Hui dian, 29:15a.

340 Ibid, 149:4a-4b.

195 hometowns of individual officials. Of course, this was not a door-to-door service; grain was probably sent to the local or even provincial granaries. Nevertheless, the paper work that this kind of operation entailed is hard to imagine.

This practice spread to officials outside the capital as well. An imperial decree that was made right after the Tumu incident in 1449 expresses approval for all officials to send parts of their salaries to parents who were above seventy years old, had no other male relatives to support them, and lived in remote areas that were difficult to access.341

There seems to have considerable debate regarding this extension of the practice. The

Chengua emperor declared in 1467 that outer officials that wanted to help their aging parents with parts of their salaries could do so. But four years later he reversed his decision.342 Whether or not this restriction was enforced, by 1487 the emperor explicitly

referred to inner and outer officials in his reaffirmation of the practice.343 This imperial

consent was once again confirmed in 1524.344

This procedure brought about its own abuses. In 1465 the Ministry of Revenue

requested changing the rule regarding sending home grain. The problem was that officials

were sending portions of their Nanjing grain and then coming to request the entire sum.

341 Ming Yingzong Shi lu 186:8a-8b. This decree must have been made by the regent since the Zhengtong emperor was already in Mongol captivity.

342 Ming Hui dian,15a.

343 The wording of the decree is as follows: 內外官員有父母在家願分俸助養者准令分俸於原籍關支. This authorization was first issued in 1458 by the Tianshun emperor and reiterated word for word in 1487 by the Chenghua emperor. See Ming Yingzong shi lu, 286.5b, and Ming Xianzong shi lu 289.6b.

344 Ming Shizong Shi lu, 38:9b.

196 Apparently the Nanjing granary officials did not have the documents to prove that sums

were already withdrawn. Officials were instructed that if they wanted to send their

Nanjing salaries home, they had to send the entire sum.345

Another corruption case connected to this procedure led to the impeachment of

several investigating censors.346 Their crime was that in order to expedite the transfer of

funds to their homes they used their official seals and sent them through the Office of

Transmission (通政司, tong zheng si), the agency that transferred official documents to and from the emperor. Bearing an imperial seal, transportation through this channel was probably quicker and subject to less inspection, or at least outside the control of the

Ministry of Revenue, which was the agency that oversaw the transportation of most official funds. Investigating censors in the Ming were usually of rank 7a, which means that annually they were entitled to the equivalent of 90 shi of grain or a monthly salary of

7.5 shi, but the actual monthly grain allocation was around one shi. Whether or not they

were sending only rice is not clear but in any case the transfers were probably very

minor. In a second appeal to the emperor made by a touring censor, he stressed that the

felony was minor and that it was motivated by the noble intentions of caring for aging

parents. The emperor was sensibly not moved by this plea and remained firm in his

conviction.347 If indeed this was their only crime, it is interesting that the emperor would

judge it so gravely. In trying to evaluate how well mid-Ming financial administration

345 Ming Xianzong Shi lu, 12:9b.

346 Ibid, 277:12a-12b.

347 Ibid, 290:2b.

197 functioned, this case suggests that central control over the transportation of funds remained fairly tight. And even if abuses were frequent, there was still the expectation that procedures be strictly followed.

In the cases discussed above, it is most likely that rice was transported. But officials also sent money. The following memorial reveals a financial mechanism that officials used to manage their income:

Regarding the scrip salary payments of civilian and military officials in the northern and southern capitals, approval of the memorial has already been received to fill in a tally payable by the offices in the place of their household registration. Foreign soldiers guarding mountain passes with no household registration, and those serving in places such as Shuntian and the other seven metropolitan prefectures where officials are numerous and scrip scarce are to be paid from the river-boat scrip tax. Moreover, since payments issued in 1430 have not yet been fully payed out and last years’[1431] still have to be paid, the more scrip is issued the more stagnant the system of scrip becomes.348

This short memorial ties together the practice of sending home funds with the realities of scrip salaries from the point of view of a financial administrator. Officials who could use the system of sending home funds could defer payments of scrip through a kind of money order to their hometowns. It would be interesting to know whether their families could redeem them with any other kind of money or commodity. But until there is more evidence, it is assumed that they could demand paper notes from the local storehouse.

This brief remark reveals one way in which money circulated in fifteenth-century Ming

348 Ming Xuanzong Shi lu, 100:10b.

198 China, and also indicates that it was encouraged by the court as a means to promote the circulation of scrip.

In conclusion, the practice of sending home money or rice indicates that officials actually relied on their salaries to support their families, that they did, as Gu Yanwu suggested with contempt, seek office for the material reward. On the one hand, this does not conform to what we know about the meager salaries of officials. But if we think of the Nanjing granary as a kind of bank in which funds were deposited, it may have enabled officials to save their salary funds and send portions of them to their parents.

Although it is hard to imagine how funds could possibly be transported to individual locations under the supervision of the government, documents that refer to difficulties that could arise in transmitting these funds testify that in fact these funds moved along official channels and under official supervision. The Ministry of Revenue tried to avoid this administrative headache and repeatedly recommended restricting the practice only to officials serving in the capital, as well as curtailing abuses to the system. But in the end emperors relented in favour of the wider application of the system.

4.7 Paying Local Officials

The Hongwu emperor’s decree to commute local officials’ salaries to scrip, and the reaffirmation of this regulation by his son, the Yongle emperor, give the impression that local officials fared less well than court functionaries because they received no rice in their salaries and because scrip was never commuted to other commodities. But there was in fact considerable geographic variation in the working conditions of local officials.

199 Generally, the court did not interfere with salaries of local officials, but in the early

Zhengtong reign, the Ministry of Revenue conducted a nation-wide survey of the educational officials’ (教官, jiao guan) salaries. It concluded that there were considerable variations between regions. As a rule, the heads of Confucian schools (教授, jiao shou) received a monthly salary of five shi. An instructor (學正, xue zheng) earned 2.5 shi, and lower-level instructors earned 2 shi a month. In some cases these officials were paid entirely in grain, in other cases half of the grain portion was commuted to scrip. In

Yunnan educational officials received only six dou in grain. Only officials in the southern metropolitan region, they found, were paid entirely in scrip.349 According to the

Dictionary of Official Titles these were all low ranking positions; indeed, in the Ming shi educational officials are listed as a clerical position.350 This means that their salaries would be of the lower level within the hierarchy of the local administration.

But in comparison with court officials in the mid fifteenth century, in some regions they were earning better salaries than high-ranking officials. I have no explanation for the reason education officials were targeted, but if this is any indication about the well-being of prefecture and county level officials, we may conclude that not all of them were reduced to insufficient grain rations. Zhengtong’s response was to raise the rice portions of Yunnan and northern metropolitan officials to one shi a month. In the same day he responded also to a petition from the records office in the Huguang provincial administration office requesting to raise salaries of clerks so that they can

349 (Zhengde) Ming Hui dian, 29:3b.

350 Zhang, Ming shi, 82.

200 “support their families”. The emperor passed this on to the Ministry of Revenue that drafted the following proposition:

The salaries of outer officials were already a fixed regulation during the Hongwu period. Only salaries of assigned officials (wen zhi guan, 文職官) in the prefectures, sub-prefectures and counties, and office managers (shou ling guan, 首令官) in military guards of the northern metropolitan region are paid [entirely?] in scrip due to lack of grain. It is suitable to give one shi of rice.351

The text states that the emperor agreed to this proposal and by that raised salaries throughout the realm to a monthly one shi of grain. In this proposition the Ministry of

Revenue initiated change by portraying it as continuity. It chose to follow the very first of

Hongwu’s decrees and ignore subsequent ones. The result was that except for the northern metropolitan region, officials throughout the realm were ensured a monthly rice portion of one shi. The Zhengtong emperor continued to pay attention to local conditions and issued a string of decrees addressed to particular provinces. They are too numerous to be detailed here but they all follow a general guideline that guaranteed between one and two shi of rice a month to officials in all ranks.352

351 Ming Yingzong Shi lu, 17:3b-4a.

352 Ming Hui dian, 29:14b-15a.

201 4.8 Ming Salaries in Comparative Perspective

The Ming shi summed up the discussion of official salaries by concluding “since

ancient times, official salaries were never so meager.”353 While this may be the case, it

would be a mistake to assume that salaries of officials in previous eras were especially

high. The Song and Yuan dynasties serve as a good comparison because they too paid

their officials mostly in money, which means that their value depended on market prices

and on the strength of the currency. In the first six decades of the Northern Song prices

were low. In South China one dou of rice was sold for four or five bronze coins. In the

eleventh century prices gradually rose as a result of military conflict and in 1050 one dou

was sold for 120 coins. In the following century, during the war with the Jin dynasty, one

dou of rice was sold for 2,000 coins, or two guan.354 Huang and Chen argue that even

though cash payments were increased several fold during this period they could not keep up with inflation. Another factor that disguises the real condition of most Song officials was a big income gap between high and low officials. While the Song spent more money to pay salaries, it was disbursed unequally and did not improve the lives of most officials.355 The Ming may have learnt a lesson from this situation because its commutation grades favoured the lower incomes. This of course did not prevent high officials from amassing fortunes. But as a system, it could be said that while the Song made a few officials very rich, the Ming kept everyone equally poor.

353 Ming shi, 82.

354 Huang, Zhongguo feng lu, 300-302.

355 Ibid, 309-310, 314.

202 Yuan officials, like their Ming counterparts, were paid in scrip. When valuing the

salaries in rice, the highest Ming officials earned considerably more, while ranks 6 and

lower earned slightly less than their Yuan counterparts. Taking the exchange rate of scrip

to rice as indicator, a salary chart from 1320 states that rank 1b was entitled to a monthly

salary of 200 guan of Zhiyuan scrip that, according to the official exchange rate that

appears in the salary chart, was exchangeable for 50 shi of rice. In comparison, in 1388

the monthly rice ration for rank 1b was 74 shi. At this early stage, the Ming official would have earned considerably more than his Yuan counterpart. But of course, once scrip depreciated, the original rice quotas were meaningless. The question is though how faithful were the Yuan official exchange rates to market conditions? Generally speaking, up until the last decades of the Yuan scrip was an acceptable means of payment. In that sense there is no doubt that Yuan officials earned more.356

But there was also the issue of high grain prices. As Huang and Chen argue, grain prices during the Yuan left officials worse off even than their Song predecessors.

Employing a rather high assessment of household members, Huang and Chen find that an official household of ten would need at least two liang of Yuan scrip for subsistence.

According to the salaries paid to officials of the ninth rank in the early fourteenth century, the salary would last six days. They do not mention whether rent from government land added a meaningful supplement to their income.357 Inflation harmed salaries of Yuan

356 For the 1320 salary chart and official exchange rate see: Wang Shidian 王士點 (14th century), Mi shu jian zhi 秘書監志 [Gazetteer of the Imperial Archive] (Hangzhou: Zhejiang gu ji chu ban she, 1992): juan 2.

357 Huang, Zhongguo feng lu, 390.

203 officials too. Since scrip served not only as a means of payment but also as a unit of

account, salaries depreciated along with the devaluation of the money. The salary chart of

1320 was probably an attempt to deal with the effects of inflation since in it Zhiyuan (至

元) paper notes replaced the devalued Zhongtong (中統) notes. Another step was to reintroduce rice into salaries. 358

Since salaries were calculated in rice during the Ming, as long as the exchange

rate of scrip was updated officials should have been able to get their equivalent in grain.

But although emperors updated exchange rates, they could not keep up with inflation.

Emperors did periodically update the official exchange rate. In 1433 Xuande set the

exchange rate of scrip to grain at 15 guan per shi.359 At the time, one guan of scrip was worth one hundredth of a tael, and one shi of grain could be purchased for 0.4 of a tael when prices were not high. According to this exchange rate it would take at least 25 guan to purchase one shi of rice. According to this calculation, an official would be able to acquire a little over half the grain he was entitled to. We should consider that rice, especially in the north, was more expensive than other grains.

Another, even greater problem was the fact that scrip was not always accepted in the market. In this case officials would have had to pass through middlemen who would exchange their notes for silver or copper. He Wenkai’s description of workers refusing to

358 Wang, Mi shu jian zhi, 2:1a-12b. In the gazetteer of the imperial archive there is a memorial from 1320 requesting a partial conversion of officials salaries in the capital from scrip to inferior quality rice. The History of the Yuan states that from 1303, all official salaries were supplemented with rice allotments. See: Song, yuan shi, 96.

359 (Wanli) Ming Hui dian, 39:10a.

204 accept paper notes in the nineteenth century that they could not use in local markets may

have been the case for Ming officials as well. Commutation of scrip into commodities

that were better received may have alleviated this problem, as was the case with the

replacement of paper notes with silk and cotton cloth.

The problem of inflation and high commodity prices was a problem in all

dynasties that paid salaries in monetary means. In the Ming this problem was more

pronounced because of the complete dependence of officials on centrally managed funds.

The attempt to adjust exchange rates helped little when scrip was unaccepted in the

market. Still, paper notes circulated in a certain capacity throughout the fifteenth century,

making their way to the market and collected through commercial taxes. This economy

was very much a parallel one to the private market. Neither the state nor officials

benefitted from it. Under these conditions it is difficult to explain the insistence on using scrip. Beyond the attempt to enforce its circulation, it is possible that the state simply had no other option before the mechanisms for collecting tax in silver were developed.

On the local level, variations in the size and content of remunerations suggest that local administrators coped with the shortage of funds in different ways. When the court addressed the issue of payments for low-level administrators in the early Zhengtong reign, the findings revealed that the officials were paid entirely in paper currency only in the metropolitan region, or where enforcement was easier. In accordance with the ideal of equalizing conditions, the emperor set a minimum monthly wage of one shi, before any commuted portions were calculated. This was of significance in the case of clerks that most likely depended on their wages for their livelihood. Discussions that resemble those that took place under the Qianlong emperor regarding the connection between wages and

205 corruption are not found in this context. But it is worth remarking that the adjustment in clerical salaries took place at the same time of a complete reform in local administration.

Finally, there was much flexibility within the system that allowed officials to defer payments and allocate them according to their preference. After the capital moved north, instead of transporting all the grain for official salaries, a portion of it was kept in the Nanjing granary. The grain stocks in Nanjing became a reserve fund for officials.

They could choose when to extract their grain salaries, send somebody at their behalf, and even receive a money order that could be redeemed in another province by their kin.

Complaints from the Ministry of Revenue concerning difficulties in transportation attest to the scale of these operations. And the use of money orders suggests another means by which funds were circulating throughout the realm.

Within the constraints of the deficient system of government payments, the court experimented with alternative means of remuneration. Local administrators could dispose of funds at their own discretion, and individual officials were finding ways to work around obstacles to their own benefit. In these cases flexibility and creativity compensated to a certain degree for institutional weakness.

206 5 Military Finance

After the conquest of China, the organization of the military was part of the

general effort to settle the population and reclaim agricultural land. The military colony

system was designed to contribute to this effort and serve as the economic basis of a self-

sufficient army. The system never achieved this goal and the military often relied on

centrally financed shipments of grain, cloth, and money. Its subsequent disintegration

created a financial burden that the fiscal system was not designed to bear. This chapter

discusses fiscal aspects of the transformation of the Ming military, and its ramifications

on state finance. As the crisis in the military colony system reduced tax revenue from military fields, the state responded in a similar way to its solution for the crisis in the

Jiangnan tribute tax, namely reduction of tax rates. In addition, grain deficiencies were supplemented through commutation of grain transports. Finally, the salt monopoly that contributed to military finance through the salt exchange system that was developing characteristics of a public debt institution did not follow in the footsteps of the Song salt monopoly and remained a system of direct exchange.

The Ming attempted to create a standing army on the scale of the Song military at its largest without the financial mechanisms that the former had. Instead, it attempted to establish a self-supporting army. This was an ambitious plan; it meant that military finance took place outside the civilian tax base and that soldiers rather than civilians undertook the task of transportation. The sources of military finance were a combination of land allocations for tenant cultivation, imperial grants, and additional grain payments

207 transported either by merchants in return for state-monopoly salt or by government

labourers. In reality, the military never fully supplied itself, and it demanded more funds as the dynasty progressed. As discussed in Chapter 3, by the mid-fifteenth century

growing military expenses led the state to rely on silver commuted from the tribute grain

tax and sales of monopoly salt.

The Ming military was modeled after that of the Yuan. The state requisitioned

military service from a percentage of the population that was registered under the

category of military households (jun hu 軍戶). The main public obligation of a military

household was to supply one able-bodied soldier. In the Yuan, Han military households

supplied foot soldiers and servants to the Mongol mounted officers.360 In the early Ming

the emperor also followed the Yuan example in ennobling the high commanding rank of

his army in an attempt to create a military aristocracy with relatively independent

jurisdiction. These early aristocrats ranked second only to the imperial princes, who in the early Ming were expected to act as regional military commanders. As Dreyer points out “the extremely preferential treatment given to the officers and nobles was nothing less than an attempt to impose a social order headed by an elite military aristocracy.”361

The military elite enjoyed a higher income than their counterparts in the civilian

administration and were treated with more tolerance. As provincial commanders they also

held sway over their civilian counterparts in the top administrative positions.

360 Song, Yuan shi, 98:1b.

361 Edward L. Dreyer, Early Ming China: A Political History 1355-1435, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982): 86.

208 But Ming China was not the Mongol Yuan. As the fifteenth century progressed

and the civilian administration reestablished its monopoly of social status and political

power, military careers lost their appeal in Chinese society. Early in the fifteenth century

large-scale desertions threatened the integrity of the military. Military land was tilled by

soldiers-turned-tenants and the relationship between them and their commanders

resembled one of landowner-tenant, and reregistering or selling it as private land was

common. In the service of the state, entire units assumed the role of conscript labourers

who transported grain or were employed in construction in the palace or the princely

courts. By the mid-sixteenth century, according to Ray Huang, “the military strength of

the Ming Empire reached its nadir.” The longstanding problems in the hereditary military

system had severely depleted the ranks of the Ming military. Registration records lost

their relationship to reality and the attempt to find deserters or replace them with other

soldiers could not keep up with the pace of desertion. This situation gave rise to a

transformation in the Ming military from a hereditary to a mercenary army, which in turn

greatly expanded military expenses that had to be met from the centre. 362

Recent scholarship suggests several reasons for this deterioration. Tian Bing

argues that decreasing yields, usurpation of military land by commanders and princes,

and desertion, combined with the collapse of the merchant transportation system forced the Ming to rely on corveé labour. In order to alleviate the burden of transportation, silver was transported instead of grain. Finally, he argues that military finance in the north

362 Ray Huang, “Military Expenditures in Sixteenth-Century Ming China,” Oriens Extramus 17.1-2 (1970): 39-40.

209 shifted completely to silver between the Chenghua and Zhengde reigns (1465-1506).363

As a result of the depletion of the military, the government moved to hired soldiers who

were paid with silver.

Military historians assess the strength of the Ming military differently than do

institutional historians. Kenneth Swope argues that rather than gradual deterioration, the

strength of the Ming military fluctuated. His study of the Wanli-era campaigns in Korea

reveal that under the right leadership and with imperial backing, the Ming military could

be a formidable power even in the late sixteenth-century. In the context of the Wanli era, the failures of the Ming military against the raiding Mongols and pirates were indeed a low point but not indicators of complete collapse. He reminds us that despite regular complaints about the lack of men, training, and supplies, the army managed to ward off continuous attacks by Mongols in the north, suppress uprisings by indigenous clans in the southwest and control illegal trade and pirate attacks along the southern coast. Despite the decline in the social dominance of the military aristocracy, elite military families held power, status, and wealth.364

In addition, it is important to acknowledge how embedded the military was in society if we are to grasp the full picture of military finance. As Michael Szonyi has shown, the system of hereditary military kinship affected the way in which lineages

363 Tian Bing 田冰, “Ming Chenghua zhi Zhengde shi qi bei fang bian liang gong ying de bian hua ji qi ying xiang”明成化至正德时期北方边粮供应的变化及其影响 [The Transformation in Grain Supply to the Northern Border between the Chenghua and Hongzhi Reigns and its Effect], Zhengzhou da xue xue bao, 40.2 (2007): 88-92.

364 Kenneth M. Swope, “A Few Good Men: The Li Family and China’s Northern Frontier in the Late Ming,” Ming Studies, 49 (Spring 2004): 34-81.

210 organized themselves in order to meet the personal and financial demands of the service obligation.365 The two capitals were host to hundreds of thousands of soldiers and their families. Luo Xiaoxiang argues that military households stationed in Nanjing were a group of urban migrants who became very much embedded in the civilian life of the city.

Insufficient military pay forced them into civilian jobs that entailed daily interaction with the population.366 Tens of thousands of soldiers were based along the border, and soldiers were present in every prefecture and princely household. Though military families were expected to support serving members, and indeed did so to some extent, the livelihood of this enormous group of people depended on state allocations of grain, salt, clothing, and military and agricultural supplies. The depletion of the Ming military was in large part a result of the failure of the Ming to finance it. Although supplying the army was crucial for the survival of the Ming state, it too was subject to the same economizing that characterized the bureaucracy. In this chapter I discuss the official plan for military finance, the solutions that were employed once the official plan failed, and the impact of these solutions on the Ming economy.

365 Michael Szonyi, Practicing Kinship: Lineage and Descent in Late Imperial China, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2002.

366 Luo Xiaoxiang, “Soldiers and the City: Urban Experience of Military Guard Households in Late Ming Nanjing,” Frontiers of History in China 5.1 (2010): 30-51.

211 5.1 Rations

The Ming army was organized along the Yuan model. Soldiers were attached to

military guards (wei hu suo or wei suo 衛戶所) of about 5,600 households. These units were further divided into battalions of 1,200 (qian hu suo 千戶所), and companies of 112 households (bai hu suo 百戶所). Finally, each company was made up of two platoons and ten squadrons. Ranked military officials held command posts. A Guard Commander held the high rank of 3a and was entitled to thirty-five shi a month. The battalion commander of rank 5a received sixteen shi, and the company commander who ranked 6a received a monthly allowance of ten shi.

During the Hongwu reign, every company had to submit a monthly payment request by filling out a standardized form. Since units differed in the number of soldiers they employed, it had to specify the number of regular, active soldiers (zheng wu 正武), and calculate the quantity of grain it required according to the salary chart specified on the form: the two heads of companies (zong qi 總旗) were entitled to a monthly ration of

1.5 shi, and squadron commanders (xiao qi 小旗) received 1.2 shi. Then came differences in proximity to combat: Frontline soldiers (tou jun 頭軍) were allocated one shi, while soldiers in the rear (ci jun 次軍) received only eight dou. The last category in the chart is interesting because it addresses soldiers with no dependents. Single soldiers (zhi shen 集

212 身) were entitled to six dou a month, since they did not have to feed a wife and

children.367

This separation between singles and family men reminds us that the basic unit in

the Ming military was the household and not the soldier. As a rule, soldiers with families

received a monthly stipend of around one shi, and single soldiers around five dou. This

was of course an extremely low stipend but it nevertheless showed concern for

supporting the families of soldiers. This concern appears in later imperial decrees as well:

Soldiers with families are referred to either as “those with family dependents” (you jia

xiao zhe 有家小者), or those who “established a household” (cheng hu zhe 成戶者). In

1390 the emperor even addressed the issue of single (maybe widowed?) women and children that came along with the Mongol soldiers who were placed in the Guangyang military guard (廣洋衛) stationed in Nanjing. They, like single soldiers, were entitled to five dou a month.368 The Chenghua emperor ordered continuing to pay one shi of grain to

Jurchen military households (nü hu 女戶) in Jinyong military guard.369 The young, the

old, and the sick also received monthly grain allocations of around 3 dou a month. These

regulations show a commitment to support military guards as entire communities at a

level that exceeded their strict military function.

367 (Zhengde) Ming Hui dian, 27:2a-2b. Since the payment request form includes space for a date using the Hongwu reign, it is not clear whether it was used in later times.

368 Ibid, 27:3a.

369 Ibid, 27:13a.

213 The men employed in military guards were not only soldiers from hereditary

military households. There were artisans, grain transporters, criminals serving time in

military guards, and labourers performing their corveé duties. In addition there were

especially designated troops, such as retainer officers who entered the position through

their personal relations with hereditary officers. In 1418, Yongle sent an expedition to

Samarkand and drafted previously unpaid soldier retainers (she ren 舍人) and labourers with a relatively handsome pay of one shi a month. The payment was to be calculated from the day of departure and paid in full upon arrival. The expedition was probably a diplomatic one since in the same year the ruler of Samarkand sent tribute.370

Soldiers stationed along the mountain passes of the Great Wall received better

wages. The Hongwu emperor directed to pay each soldier one shi of grain regardless of

family size (bu ju kou shu duo shao 不拘口數多少). When the Ministry of Revenue

reported a shortage in the supplies of Songpan military guard in Sichuan, Yongle ordered

sending aid to the soldiers at once, calculated by size of the families: one shi for a family

of ten and above, down to a family of three who were allocated five dou.371

As mentioned in the previous chapter, scrip and wheat replaced portions of the

rice rations beginning in 1376. In 1410, Yongle declared that in regions where rice was

plentiful twenty percent of the rations should be paid in scrip. In 1425-6, half of the salaries of soldiers in Shaanxi were to be supplemented with silver and cloth allocations.

370 Ming Shi, juan 7.

371 Ming Hui dian, 27:4b.

214 Reflecting a similar trajectory in civilian salaries, military rations diminished through the

first half of the fifteenth century. Even as silver transported to Beijing began to substitute

the salaries of officers in the capital, soldiers in border areas continued to receive partial

grain rations supplemented with paper notes: in 1438 it substituted for rations for troops

along the border in Xi’an.372 In 1441 a portion of the rations for military guard soldiers in

Guizhou military guards was commuted to scrip issued from the Sichuan provincial storehouse.373 And in 1445 paper notes replaced half of the rice rations of all military

guards in Liaodong.374

In 1447, silver and cotton cloth were added to the rations of soldiers in the Beijing

area.375 And only in 1484 an imperial decree allowed officers in Liaodong to receive

rations in silver during the second half of the year, in case supplies were insufficient. The

exchange rate was 0.25 of a tael per shi, the official exchange rate in Jiangnan but

probably too low to enable soldiers in Liaodong to purchase the needed grain at local

prices. The same allowance was made for water transport soldiers in Shandong in

1488.376 During the Zhengde grain rations were commuted entirely into silver.377 The

appearance of silver in commutations later in the fifteenth century repeats the assumption

372 (Wanli) Ming Hui dian, 41:6a.

373 Ibid, 41:6b.

374 Ibid, 41:8b.

375 Ibid, 41:9a.

376 Ibid, 41:14a-b.

377 During the Jiajing era, the government returned to a combination of silver and grain allocations and during the Longqing reign there was an attempt to eliminate silver altogether. See: Terada Takanobu, Sansei Shōnin, 40-41.

215 made in the previous chapter. Only in the last decade of the fifteenth century did silver

replace payments outside the capital. That said, it should be remembered that silver never

replaced grain in military rations. Rice remained the main source of income for most soldiers.

5.2 Awards

The term shang ci (賞賜) was used for special grants and awards in

acknowledgment of a service or merit, such as achievements on the battlefield. But

awards also denoted various non-grain payments that were issued in order to supplement

military supplies. They were also non-regular payments that were issued upon formal request in response to temporary shortages in supplies. Beyond the emergency shipments of scrip and silver, cloth became a regular feature of military finance. Since cotton was the material from which winter uniforms and padding were made, providing adequate clothing for soldiers serving in the north was crucial for their survival. Cloth was also a

means of exchange and could be used to purchase supplies. In both capacities cloth

shipments were an important part of general military finance.

Although equipping a soldier, including uniform, was part of the obligation of

military households, in the Hongwu reign supplying uniforms and clothes became a

matter of state expenditure.378 During this period millions of uniforms, bolts of cloth, and

378 Wu Han, “Ming chu she hui sheng chang li de fa zhan” 明初社会生产力的发展 [Industrial Development in the Early Ming], Li shi yan jiu 3 (1953): 53-84.

216 raw cotton were granted to soldiers, particularly in North China. But rather than

becoming a regular feature of the budget, shipments of cotton were issued sporadically.

In 1371 Hongwu granted over 300,000 bolts of summer cotton cloth to the soldiers that

were heading to Sichuan.379 And in 1372 he ordered a supply two bolts of cotton for every one of the 190,000 soldiers stationed in the capital.380 In these cases the cloth was

sent directly to the units, though it is not clear whether individual soldiers received cloth

from which to make their uniform, or whether there workshops and workmen in the

garrisons responsible for sowing uniforms. It is also possible that the cloth was not used

for clothing at all, but exchanged for supplies.

During the fifteenth century, cotton allocations became a regular part of local

budgets through tax commutation, and in areas that did not produce cotton, money

replaced cotton duties. In 1425, cotton payments could still be exchanged with scrip. The

Provincial Administration Office of Shaanxi memorialized the throne that a wave of

locusts has destroyed the harvest and people could not afford to send their regular

payments. The solution proposed was to use government funds in order to purchase cloth

at a higher rate: 50 guan instead of 15 guan of scrip for one bolt of cloth, and six guan

instead of two guan for one jin of raw cotton. This could alleviate the tax burden for that

year and ensure soldiers were well equipped.381

379 Ming Taizu Shi lu, 60:2b.

380 Ibid, 67:6a.

381 Ming Xuanzong Shi lu, 2:8b.

217 In 1441, the Vice Commissioner of Supplies in Datong reported that the annual

shipments of raw cotton to Datong should be moved to storehouses closer to the military

guards in order to ease the difficulty of transport.382 In 1445 the Vice-Minister of

Revenue requested tightening official supervision over annual cloth transports from the

Ministry to military guards in Tongzhou (通州) on the outskirts of Beijing. The main complaint was that shipment documents were arriving without a seal, making it difficult to ascertain the quantities being paid out. The emperor ordered the establishment of seal- bearing officials in the local storehouse in order to manage the shipments to Tongzhou.

Here too, it is clear that cotton shipments were a regular procedure. What is also interesting is the concern on the part of the revenue official that accounts be kept.

In the late fifteenth century silver replaced the commuted cotton that was shipped to the northern military. In 1469 the Ministry of Revenue presented a memorial signed jointly by the Censorate, the transport commanders and supervising officials and touring inspectors. The authors exposed the actual loss of income to soldiers in the north caused by this practice and provided a detailed account of it. Instead of exchanging one shi of rice for one bolt of cotton, the exchange rate of the grain tribute tax was applied, 0.25 taels for one shi of rice. This silver was used to purchase grain as payment for military travel expenses (行糧). By this exchange rate three shi of rice were collected at a rate of

0.75 taels. At the contemporary exchange rate this could only purchase 0.8 shi of grain in the north. The decrease was therefore more than three fold. 383 This is the other side of the

382 Ming Yingzong Shi lu, 85:12a.

383 Ming Xianzong Shi lu, 71:2a.

218 commutation plan that was discussed in Chapter 3. Tax was paid in silver at a reduced rate for the benefit of the southerners, but military supplies in the north suffered from it.

When cotton shipments failed to arrive in Liaodong due to bad weather, the officer responsible for supplies in the Embroidered Uniform Guard (錦衣衛, jin yi wei) suggested transporting silver by land instead. The cotton arrived from Shandong province by sea. He therefore suggested replacing the regular commutation rate of one bolt of cotton for one shi of grain, with 0.4 taels. This was a considerably higher rate than the

0.25 of Jiangnan. On the other hand, transportation was not as far, so perhaps transport charges were lower. Upon reception of the report on sending silver in lieu of cotton shipments, a Revenue official at court commented that since there is no cotton industry in

Liaodong, silver can only purchase a limited quantity of cotton and eventually cotton for military use will need to be shipped over. He therefore recommended that this be a temporary solution.384 Apparently private transports supplying a private market were insufficient as well.

Still, commutation to silver was the best way to manage shortages. In 1482

Revenue officials prepared a report on the state of supplies for military guards along the border north of Beijing. Storehouses contained less than half the necessary supplies. Not all of it was used as clothing. Some of it was set aside to purchase grain for the soldiers.

The official suggested supplementing cotton stocks with grants of silver from the national

384 Ming Xianzong Shi lu, 178:5a.

219 silver storehouse in Beijing. 385 In 1489, the Ministry of Revenue reported that due to consecutive crop failures in Qingzhou (青州), Shanxi, the local battalion did not receive grain allocations for two years and cotton for six years. The solution was to send silver that was obtained from sales of salt in the Hedong salt monopoly in Shaanxi to cover the shortages of grain and cloth. And in the following year the Ministry of Revenue requested taking 50,000 taels from the national silver treasury (tai cang) and sending it to border soldiers in Shaanxi in order to purchase winter clothes.

As government silver became more available in North China, awards were granted in silver and became part of the budgets of military units. Shipments of cloth and uniforms were a regular feature of military finance. Despite the intention to create a self- sufficient army, grants of cloth were centrally administered from the beginning of the dynasty. But while in the early Ming these shipments were occasional, in time they became regular features of local budgets, and government procurement of cloth was built into tax obligations. In the cases examined, the silver replacing cloth came from the imperial treasury. This was another case in which military finance became more dependent on central government funds, leading to further centralization.

5.3 The Salt for Grain Policy

The most important and difficult aspect of military finance was supplying the garrisons along the northern border. Supplying these remote areas (that were extremely

385 Ibid, 22:1b.

220 difficult to reach) was a project in itself. The northern border was a border precisely

because that is where terrain and climate were no longer suitable for agriculture. This

meant that under the best conditions, military colonies could not support the huge

numbers of troops deployed in strategic strongholds. Supplementing the garrisons’ food

supply involved long-distance transportation on a huge scale. Soon after the

establishment of the dynasty it was apparent that the state could not accomplish this task,

and so it revived a Song dynasty policy of paying merchants in salt monopoly certificates

by which they gained the right to sell monopoly salt in exchange for transporting grain to

designated military granaries.386 This policy was praised by the compilers of the History

of the Ming for its dual achievement of supplying the army without burdening the local population and was considered the best policy for supplying the army.387

This policy came to be known as kai zhong (開中). The meaning is not

immediately apparent.388 I understand it to be shorthand for kai zhong yan liang (開中鹽

糧), in which kai refers to the government’s call to merchants and zhong refers to the merchants’ receipt of salt in return. This interpretation is based on an alternative reference to this policy that appears in imperial decrees: na liang zhong yan (納糧中鹽),

386 For a detailed description see: Li Lung-hua “Ming dai de kai zhong fa,” 明代的開中法[the kaizhong policy of the Ming dynasty], Xianggang Zhongwen da xue Zhongguo wen hua yan jiu suo xue bao 香港中文大學中國文化研究所學報 [Journal of the Research Institute of Chinese Culture in the Chinese University of Hong Kong] 4.2 (1971): 371-493.

387 Ming shi, 1935. 有明鹽法末善開中 [“In the salt policies of the Ming, none was better than the kai zhong”].

388 S.A.M. Adshead, Salt and Civilization, London: MacMillan, 1992. Samuel Adshead translated it literally as “opening to the centre.”

221 or transporting grain and receiving salt. Na liang is the standard term of grain

transportation for the government. But unlike its usual connotation of coercion, the kai

zhong policy relied on the commercial interests of merchants.

The policy utilized the existing infrastructure of monopoly salt sales. The salt

industry in Ming China was spread throughout the realm but the big production sites were

concentrated along the east coast in Shandong and Zhejiang provinces, on the southern

reaches of the Huai river, and in the Hedong region in Shaanxi province.389 Each region

had its own Salt Distribution Centres that sold salt that could be traded within the boundaries of that region. The kai zhong policy essentially redirected the sale of salt in

these centres to include grain transport. After a year in which merchants were called to transport grain in return for salt permits, the Ministry of Revenue issued an official regulation in 1371 titled the Huai Zhe Shandong Salt Exchange Regulation (淮浙山東中

鹽之例, Huai, Zhe, Shandong zhong yan li).390 From the wording of this declaration it is clear that the entire annual output of these three production centres, which stood at over half of the total output, was now put in the service of military finance. According to the revenue reports for the Yongle reign, this would mean over 500,000 yin (引).391

Each of these salt production centres posted notices with the destinations for grain

transportation and the exchange rate between grain and salt. The exchange rate was

389 Tao Chang-Chiang, “The Salt Industry of Ming China,” Geographical Review 65.1 (Jan. 1975): 95.

390 Ming Taizu Shi lu, 51:4b.5a.

391 One large yin weighed 240 kg and a small yin weighed 120 kg. The calculation here is made according to the large yin.

222 specific for each destination and was determined according to the distance and the difficulties of travel, including risk of attacks. In addition, salt from different production centres was priced differently. Liangzhe salt had the highest quality and was therefore priced higher than the other two. Finally, the exchange rate was determined according to necessity. The more the grain was needed, the more worthwhile was the transport for the merchants. So, for example, while merchants had to transport 2.5 shi of grain to Kaifeng prefecture, which was situated in the heart of North China to receive one yin, they only had to transport one shi to Datong in the northern border of Shanxi province. These were the rates in exchange for the highest quality salt from Lianghuai. But for the lower grade salt from Liangzhe, merchants could transport less; two shi and 0.8 shi respectively.

The kai zhong policy fulfilled the goal of the first emperor in keeping military finance outside the civilian tax base. Not only did it save the very heavy burden of transportation, the grain transported was not tax grain. It was either purchased by merchants or grown especially on fields they reclaimed. These fields were registered as a special land category under the title of shang tian (商田).392 Reclamation of land increased the supply of grain in the north and, as a consequence, economic recovery. The contribution of merchant transportation to state finance was especially important during the Hongwu reign: in the early years of the dynasty, Hongwu granted frequent tax

remissions to entire provinces. Henan, Shandong, and Beiping were exempt every few

392 Wang Ch’ung-wu, "The Ming System of Merchant Colonization," in Chinese Social History: Translations and Selected studies, edited by E-Tu Zen sun and John De Francis, 299-308 (Washington D.C.: American council of Learned Societies, 1956).

223 years, as well as prefectures surrounding Nanjing.393 Under these circumstances kai zhong shipments substituted grain that was taxed from farmers with grain that was bought from them, thus contributing to economic recovery that was remarkably quick.

Shipments were not only directed to the northern border, but also reached important government centres along the Yellow River. Kaifeng, the administrative centre of North China, that was once a candidate for becoming the capital of the empire, and its subordinate seat in Luoyang were key destinations in a network of granaries that utilized the Yellow River and its tributaries to supply North and Northwest China. Even if transportation had a primary military purpose, the benefit to the economy of north China was far-reaching.394

Nevertheless, kai zhong transportation did not wholly replace corveé labour. In the winter of 1414, 150,000 labourers from Shandong, Shanxi and Henan delivered grain to Xuanfu, northwest of Beijing. This was perhaps because the scale of transportation was more than merchants could undertake, or because they were employed elsewhere. In his first year on the throne Zhu Di, soon to become the Yongle Emperor, diverted kai zhong shipments to Beijing, his new power base, in order to replenish supplies to military guards there.395 When Xia Yuanji, then Vice-Minister of Revenue, asked what shall become of military guards around the realm, Yongle agreed to issue salt certificates from the Yunanan production centre for grain shipments in the province, as well as to continue

393 Basic Annals of Ming T’ai-tsu, trans. Romeyn Taylor, (San-Francisco: Chinese Materials Centre, 1975).

394 Ming Taizu Shi lu, 61:4b.

395 Ming Taizong Shi lu, 11:2a.

224 transportation to Gansu. But beyond that, kai zhong shipments that during the Hongwu

reign reached various destinations in northern and central China were now concentrated on Beijing, funneling to it the grain needed for turning it into the new capital of the dynasty. Following the first years of his reign, kai zhong shipments were directed back to military destinations and were adjusted upon demand.

Although the kai zhong system was designed as a straightforward system of exchange, in practice it was a form of credit because the government was able to supply grain long before it had to pay back in salt. Merchants first arrived at the imperial salt production centres to read notices of the destinations for grain transportation and

exchange rates. Upon arrival with the grain at their destination, merchants received a receipt from the designated granary, which they would then take back to the salt production centre in order to receive salt vouchers. This whole process took years to complete and was usually divided between ‘frontier merchants’ (邊商) who transported the grain, and ‘interior merchants’ (內商) who received the salt certificates. Often the frontier merchants would sell salt certificates to the interior merchants who could decide whether to apply for the salt or hold on to the certificates.

This process gave rise to a speculative trade in salt vouchers, which Wing-Kin

Puk interprets as a form of public debt. At the centre of his argument lies an alternative interpretation of a report made by the salt commissioner regarding backlogs in the redemption of salt vouchers. The commissioner commented that merchants with certificates that are twenty years old are arriving at the production centres and demanding to redeem them. All the while, salt was being issued to holders of more recent

225 certificates.396 Puk identifies this as a form of public debt since the government was

willing to redeem the vouchers in the first place. 397

Although I can agree that there was an element of credit in the system, it was not

designed to be a long-term borrowing institution. And although salt licenses were probably traded, they were not government bonds that were freely exchanged like money.

Not all merchants could afford waiting for their certificates to be redeemed and sustained heavy losses.398 On the other hand, the scale of a kai zhong transaction was so large to

begin with, merchants most likely undertook it with substantial capital to begin with. For

big players who could invest large funds and withstand long waits, this system could be

extremely profitable. In his work on Shanxi merchants in the Ming, Zhang Zhengming

argues that involvement in the grain-for-salt trade is what catapulted them to the top of

the mercantile world and contributed to the creation of the Shanxi banks.399

Nevertheless, without the certainty of redeemable certificates, merchants were reluctant to continue participating in the exchange. Qiu Jun alluded to this problem in his essay on the kai zhong policy:

Lately, since border reserves are pressed for supplies, the price has been raised and merchants are summoned with no attention to their sequence. People arrive and get paid immediately. This is called Stored Salt. As Stored Salt becomes more popular, the demand for Normal Branch Salt diminishes. Payments increase daily and stocks decrease. This causes Stored Salt of today to be no different from

396 Ming Yingzong Shi lu, 63:9a.

397 Wing-Kin Puk, “The Ming Salt Certificate.”

398 Huang, Taxation and Governmental Finance, 200-201.

399 Zhang Zhengming, Ming Qing Jin shang ji min feng 明清晋商及民风[Ming and Qing Shanxi Merchants and Local Customs] (Beijing: renmin chu ban she, 2003).

226 the former Normal Branch salt. Merchants wait for a long time and its hard to get paid, therefore their profit is small. Luckily there are no disturbances on the border, and reserves are in surplus. But in case of an emergency they [border garrisons] may not be able to get enough.

What Qiu Jun is describing is a situation of over issuing. The salt that was previously kept in reserve was now being used in payments since regular salt stocks were depleted.

Merchants with “normal branch salt” certificates were forced to wait in order to redeem them, while bearers of emergency, or “stored salt” were getting preference in payments.

From this description, it does not seem that merchants were happy to trade in certificates instead of redeeming them. It seems that the opposite was the case; the salt monopoly could not produce enough salt to redeem the certificates it issued. Moreover, even if certificates had been considered to be assets in the past, the difficulties in redeeming them were damaging their viability.

Whereas Puk interprets the report of the Salt Distribution Commissioner as evidence for a public debt system, I interpret it as an acknowledgement of the system’s failure. Merchants wanted to redeem their certificates much more often than they wanted to hold on to them. This is the reason why the salt monopoly encountered difficulties in the first place. And since the salt monopoly was issuing more certificates than it could redeem, it was losing its credibility and with that the cooperation of merchants.

Chinese scholars working within the framework of ‘the sprouts of capitalism’ (資

本主義的萌芽) point at the kai zhong as one of the instigators of commercial

227 development that made capitalist development possible. 400 But commercial development

and sophistication are not synonymous with capitalism. Furthermore, individual

merchants may have been acting and thinking like capitalists but the Ming state was not.

In other words, it did not utilize the salt for grain exchange to increase its fiscal capacity.

The Song government encouraged trade in salt certificates, providing an avenue for profit without the need to redeem them. There is no evidence that the Ming attempted to do the same. Instead, when hearing of speculation in salt certificates, fixed prices were enforced, thus stifling any chance of trading them.

It should also be said that merchant grain transportation was never meant to be the main avenue for financing military presence on the northern border. Instead it was meant to be a supplement to the military colony system.401 When military colonies were

functioning relatively well the addition of kai zhong shipments contributed to a stable supply of grain and low grain prices. The disintegration of military colonies along the

northern border strained the ability of the salt monopoly to finance the military through

the merchant transportation system to the point that it broke down. When in 1492 the salt

monopoly turned to direct sales of salt in return for silver, it retrieved its fiscal viability

and adapted to the changing nature of military remuneration that was partially caused by

400 Liu Miao (刘淼), Ming dai guo jia yu min jian zi ben de guan xi: kai zhong yan shi 明代国家与民间资本的联系: 开中盐粮 [Relations Between the State and Popular Capital: The Kaizhong Salt and Grain exchange], Yan ye shi yan jiu 2 (2005): 1-13.

401 Wang Qi, Xu wen xian tong kao, 14:38a-b.

228 the transformation in the nature of the Ming military. This transformation shall be

discussed in the following section.

5.4 Military Colonies

In this section the institution of military colonies (jun tun 軍屯 or tun tian 屯田) is

considered as a fiscal rather than a military institution. From a fiscal point of view,

military colonies were an important source of revenue, and military households were rent

paying fiscal units. What is called desertion in a military context was the same behavior

government tenants exhibited when faced with an onerous tax burden. It may even be

said that the main cause for desertion was peace and not war. Soldiers had much more to

gain in wartime. They could share the spoils of the enemy they defeated and the personal

belongings of the people they killed. They were also rewarded for each enemy ‘head’

they severed. But in times of peace they were left with the tedious work of the tenant and

the labourer. The consequent ‘disappearance’ of military land from the registers was also

part of the general blurring of distinctions between government and private land that

characterized financial administration in the fifteenth century.

In the early fifteenth century, military land was subject to a high tax rate. The

Yongle emperor first set a tax quota for military colonies. The tax on military land that

was fixed in the early Yongle reign stood on 24 shi per unit of military land (fen 分). A

unit was the size of between twenty and one hundred mu, depending on the quality of the

soil. Twelve shi were for the consumption of the soldier-tenants and the rest, called surplus tax (yu liang 餘糧), went to the military granary to pay the salaries of the officers

229 and the rest of the guard soldiers. This means an average of 1.2 shi was due for every mu

of high quality land. In 1422 the tax was reduced to eighteen shi, with only six shi out of

the total levied as surplus tax. Finally, in 1435 only the six shi of the surplus tax was to

be reported and carried to the military granary. This would put the tax burden on a unit of

twenty mu at three dou per mu.402 This decision to reduce the tax burden is reminiscent of

the actions the state took in Jiangnan during those years. In both cases officials followed

the ideal that lower tax rates encourage peasants to stay on the land.

In the case of the military colonies this step may have had an unintentional effect.

Sun Chengze 孫承澤 (1593-1676) interpreted the transformation of the military colonies:

Not everybody knows that if the main produce were turned in to the government and distributed to them on time, this would then prevent poor soldiers from being too spendthrift, stabilize the market price in the four seasons and control monopolization. Now that the main produce has been exempted from being turned in [to military granaries] for checking and auditing, the main produce has become [the soldier’s] entitlement; and the colony land also becomes [the soldier’s] private property. The land is either sold or mortgaged.403

In other words, this had a crucial effect on the management and ownership of the

land. It meant that beyond the tax paid every year, the rest became the private property of

the tenants, or their commanders. The government lowered the tax rate on military fields

402 Foon Ming Liew, “Tun Tian Farming of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644),” PhD Diss. (Hamburg, 1984). For the lower tax quota of 1435 see: Ming Yingzong Shi lu, 1:7b.

403 Sun Chengze 孫承澤, (1592-1676), Chun Ming meng yu lu 春明蒙餘錄 [Record of a Remembered Dream of the Capital] (Beijing: Beijing gu ju chu ban she, 1992): 601. The translation is by Foon Ming Liew, “Tun Tian Farming,” 170.

230 in order to prevent desertion. But, according to Sun, it this policy encouraged the

“civilianization” of the military fields.

Wang Yuquan described several practices that led to the transfer of military field

to civilian hands. When soldiers were unable to cultivate their fields they would rent them or portions of them out to civilians. From the rent they received they would pay

their dues to the military granary. In other cases, local officials assigned civilian tenants

to cultivate military land that was abandoned.404 Here too, the fields were taxed at the

rates of military land. Another more widespread matter was the sale mortgage of military

land. The sale of land, although done illegally, resulted in a transfer of fields to private owners permanently. This practice took military land completely out of the military tax registers.405 Focusing on Shanxi, Zhang Haiying describes the demilitarization of military

colonies as a gradual process embedded in local social dynamics. He shows that the local

civilian population often absorbed military land. To begin with, while military fields for a

particular guard could be at a distance from each other, they were often interspersed with

private land. It was sensible to employ civilian tenants on the more remote fields rather

than have the soldiers travel long distances to them. In addition, civilians worked as

tenants when the guard soldiers were away campaigning. As desertion intensified, fields

404 Wang Yuquan 王毓铨, Ming dai de jun tun 明代的军屯 [The Military Colonies of the Ming] (Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju, 1965, reprint 2009): 339-347.

405 Ibid, 348-355.

231 were abandoned. Given the close proximity of military and private fields, it is easy to see how the distinctions between the two disappeared.406

An inspection of the penalties for desertion of military guards reveals that it did not entail a big risk. Ming law was lenient towards the simple soldiers, and placed most of the responsibility for desertion on the commanders. The Da Ming lü addresses the issue of desertion in an article titled: “Allowing Military Soldiers to Abandon

Service.”407 The punishment specified, eighty strokes with the heavy stick, was administered to commanders that knowingly allowed soldiers to run away, but there is no mention of what is to be done with the deserters if they were caught. Flogging was the lightest of the five grades of punishments in Ming law. Moreover, the number of strokes was usually reduced and could be substituted with a money payment.408 The law was less lenient in the case of fleeing from military campaigns. First-time deserters who were caught received a punishment of 100 strokes with the heavy stick and sent back to the battlefield. A repeated offence was punished by strangulation. If soldiers voluntarily returned to their units within 100 days the punishment was revoked. And if they returned later than the allotted time, the punishment was reduced.409 This actually gave soldiers freedom to leave their posts for months without being punished. In contrast, Song law regarding deserters was harsher, especially in the early period of the dynasty. A soldier

406 Zhang Haiying 张海瀛, “Ming dai Shanxi de min dian tun tian,” 明代山西的民佃屯田 Zhongguo she hui jin ji shi yan jiu 1 (2002): 1-5.

407 Jiang Yonglin, The Great Ming Code: Da Ming lü (University of Washington Press, 2005): 134.

408 Brook, Death by a Thousand Cuts, 37-38.

409 Jiang, The Great Ming Code, 135.

232 that was away from his post for more than one day received the death penalty. Thereafter

the law became somewhat more lenient and dealt the death penalty to soldiers that had a

repeated record of desertion.410

Another, more severe punishment for commanders was banishment to frontier

military guards, though this would be quite meaningless punishment considering that

many of them were already there. Nevertheless, there was one crime that was

unforgivable. In cases where commanders intentionally sent soldiers across the border for

private business and as a result were captured by the enemy or killed, the punishment was decapitation. Intention determined the degree of the punishment. If there were no proven conspiracy between the deserter and the commander the punishment would be lighter, between 40 and 50 strokes with the light stick for every missing soldier. Commanders were also punished if they privately employed soldiers in their households, but not that heavily if they did not prevent the soldier from fulfilling his military service.

Another relevant article of the code refers to the families of deserters. According to an article directed at soldiers guarding the capital city, they are to be punished if they banish the wives and daughters of deserters outside the city walls.411 This seems like a

reaction to soldiers taking the law into their own hands and collectively punishing the

families of deserters. On the other hand, banishing the families of corrupt officials to

410 Wang Tseng-Yü, “A History of the Sung Military,” in The Cambridge History of China vol. 5, ed. John edited by W. Chaffee and Denis Twitchett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 214-249.

411 Jiang, The Great Ming Code, 140.

233 frontier regions was a common punishment. The same punishment could be applied as a deterrent for soldiers too but instead the law protected their wives and daughters.

Although during the Chenghua reign heavier punishments for deserters were announced, the Ming put more energy into replacing soldiers who were missing than punishing those who left their units.412 During the Hongwu era, there was no clear organized procedure for registering soldiers or replacing those who went missing. This led to such abuses as sending officials to pick men from military households regardless of age or physical state. In 1388 military guards were ordered to create registers indicating soldiers in service and absentees (qing gou ce 清勾冊), and send a copy to the Ministry of

War. Officials would tally these registers against the registers of military households sent in from the counties and prefectures (jun hu hu kou ce 軍戶戶口冊) and determine which household was suitable for replacing a soldier in each military guard. As Yu Zhijia argues, with this procedure in place, replacing soldiers became more efficient and eliminated some of the avenues for abuse.413 This kind of military bookkeeping resembled the structure of financial bookkeeping that was built on cooperation between different administrative units and the flow of information along the administrative hierarchy. In this sense it was an extension of financial administration.

412 Ming shi. Juan 90, 2229-30. Six months of labour service for first-time offenders and up to eighteen moths of labour service for repeated offenders.

413 Yu Zhijia, Ming dai Jun hu shi xi zhi du 明代軍戶世襲制度 [The Ming System of Hereditary Military Households] (Taiwan: Xue sheng shu ju, 1987): 52.

234 Military land was an important financial component in the annual budget of the army. The annual revenue reports list grain received as tax from military land. During the

Yongle reign the numbers for military land tax seem impossibly high. In the years 1404,

1406 and 1407 the income from military land ranges between 20,000,000-23,000,000 shi.

That would make for an addition of two-thirds of the total annual grain tax income. But throughout most of the Yongle reign the annual income was much lower, ranging around

10,000,000 shi, and in the last five years of his reign the number fell to 5,000,000. During the Hongxi and early Xuande reigns there is a small recovery with the average rising to

8,000,000, but from 1435 the annual average of grain from military land does not surpass

3,000,000.414 This fall coincides with the lower tax quota issued by the Xuande emperor.

There is no record of income from military land during the Chenghua reign. In the

Hongzhi and Zhengde reigns the averages are 3,000,000 and 1,000,000 respectively.

During the Chenghua period, a category of military land holdings was added; the average is close to four million, clearly a clerical mistake because in the Hongzhi reign the average is 300,000 qing, and in the Zhengde reign 160,000.415 If the History of the Ming

assessment were correct, this meant a significant drop from around 800,000 qing in the

early decades of the dynasty.416

The Ming suffered a huge loss of income that was designated as military land but

it may have maintained a certain level of tax collection on some of those fields under the

414 For Shi lu figures on tax from military land see tables D-3,11,17.

415 For Shi lu figures on military land see tables D-14,17.

416 Ming shi, 77. Military land was recovered during the Wanli era and reached around 640,000 qing.

235 category of private land. As Ma Zoudan shows in his study of military households in

Liaodong, the descendants of soldiers formed clans that cultivated former military land as

their private property. Instead of trying to reverse this process, officials preferred to put

these households under the civilian tax registry.417 On the other hand, not all soldiers-

turned-private landowners were happy to comply with government demands. In the early

sixteenth century attempts to collect tax arrears in Ningxia ended in rebellion. After

sending high-ranked government officials to put the registration and tax collection of

military land in order in 1510, the Prince of Anhua exploited the widespread resentment

this move created and led a rebellion against the throne with an army of disgruntled

officers.418

In the fifteenth century three parallel developments transformed the Ming

military. Mass desertion from military colonies and a drop in agricultural revenue was dealt with by a reduction in the tax quota of soldier-tenants. According to some

observers, the surplus grain remained in the private hands of the growers and enabled

commanders to set aside fields for sale and mortgage. The process of the demilitarization

of the military colonies was an outcome of local social dynamics in which the

demarcation between civilian and military fields blurred and military households

developed into largely civilian lineages.

417 Ma Zoudan, The Art of Being Dominated: Strategies for Interacting with the State in Ming-Dynasty Liaodong, 1449-1618, MA thesis, University of British Columbia, 2015.

418 David M. Robinson, “Princes in the Polity: The Anhua Prince’s Uprising of 1510”, Ming Studies, 65, (May 2012): 13-56.

236 As revenue from military fields diminished, and as military expenses along the northern border grew, especially after the Tumu crisis, the reliance on merchant transportation grew to unmanageable proportions. Silver shipments first supplemented military salaries in Beijing, and throughout the fifteenth century came to replace both grain and cloth in border regions. Silver was also used as direct payment to mercenary troops. These troops who did no engage in agricultural work were often better trained than soldiers from registered households. 419 Diminishing reports on military land coincide with the increase of silver in military finance, and it is likely that growing dependence on silver further contributed to neglect of military fields.

Finally, an examination of the penalty code of the Ming suggests that the state was rather lenient towards deserters. In face of their growing numbers, the government made efforts to improve registration and ensure replacements for the missing troops. But the most interesting feature of Ming military during the fifteenth century is that it became an organic part of civilian society. As Kenneth Swope argues, the ‘civilianization’ of the

Ming military was not an entirely detrimental process. Most of the fleeing soldiers did not become roaming bandits but either returned to their hometowns in the early Ming or established themselves as tenants or landowners in their new homes. It was then up to local officials to incorporate them into the tax system.

The collapse of the military colony system placed the burden of military finance on the civilian tax base. Gold Floral Silver was an early response to this crisis, and the

419 Kenneth Swope, The Three Great Campaigns of the Wanli Emperor, 1592-1600: Court, Military, and Society in Late Sixteenth-Century China, PhD diss. (University of Michigan, 2001).

237 transformation of the kai zhong policy into direct silver payments further deepened the reliance on silver. Unlike the Song and the Qing that developed indirect taxation in order to meet growing expenditure, the Ming utilized tax commutation. When it came to supplying the military on the northern border, commutation could only rely on the existence of developed markets in which large scale purchases could be made. In this sense, the importance of merchants in military finance did not end along with merchant grain transportation. It became even more pronounced.

238 6 Princes

The clan of the founding emperor and households bearing hereditary titles constitute the third major group that was entitled to regular remuneration. This chapter examines the notion that they posed a heavy burden on the state budget through an examination of the constitutional regulations for the imperial clan, outlined in Hongwu’s

Ancestral Instructions (Huang Ming zu xun, 皇明祖訊) and consequent changes made to their stipends. Members of the imperial clan did not escape the same budgetary cuts imposed on officials through commutation. Higher-ranked nobles were able to use their privileged status in order to expand their land holdings and wealth up to the point of encroaching on public revenue. Then officials would often intervene in order to defend state assets. Despite their elevated social status, princes were subordinate to provincial authorities. The burden on public revenue was real but it was not due to annexation of lands by powerful princes. Rather it was a result of the dependence of the lower ranks of the nobility on local tax revenue for their livelihood. Here again, the early model of self- sufficiency in which princely households were expected to live off fields designated for them collapsed and the burden of financing them fell on local tax income.

The service the members of the imperial clan provided to the state is not as apparent as in the case of the military and the bureaucracy. In fact, their whole existence was conditioned by a forced idleness. The Ming nobility was initially designed to function as a military elite. Taizu intended to employ his sons as protectors of the dynasty along the borders and in the provinces, but he did not give them direct control over their

239 domains. Officials and soldiers serving the princely courts were appointed by the state,

and the major source of their livelihood came from fixed stipends managed by

government officials. In this sense they were radically different from their Yuan

predecessors who exercised political, military and economic independence in their

domains. After the usurpation of the throne by the Prince of Yan, Ming emperors and

officials preferred a parasitic nobility to a powerful and threatening one, and ensured its

control over the princes through economic dependence. By the mid-fifteenth century

princes lost their military positions and throughout the rest of the dynasty they asserted

only symbolic power, conditioned by their complete exclusion from economic and

bureaucratic avenues to wealth and social prestige.

But the fact that they were a symbol of imperial power with no real clout does not

mean they did not render an important service to the state. If we consider imperial clan

members as servants of the state, it would be as performers, as the abstract notion of

imperial power made visible. As Craig Clunas argues, their sheer numbers and

geographical spread probably made them even more visible in society than important

officials.420 Their palaces stood in the middle of cities, and often upgraded towns to

major intersections of trade and travel. The design of their palaces made it possible for

commoners to come into contact with small-scale replicas of the Forbidden City. When parading outside the palace walls, their carriages and entourages attested to imperial

420 Craig Clunas, Screen of Kings: Royal Art and Power in Ming China (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2013).

240 grandeur and vitality. As a matching contrast to the aloofness and mystique of the emperor, they were placed in society in order to be seen.

In this symbolic context, it is worth taking into account Clunas’ reminder that the literal translation of their title should be King and not Prince. Their titles resonate with ancient kingdoms, thus invoking the authority of the sacred past. But when discussing the actual power and social position of the descendants of Ming emperors, Prince is more accurate because they did not rule. They did not even govern their own domains. They expressed their position as elite members of society in the religious realm, in state rituals, and in literati culture. As Richard Wang shows, Ming princes were enthusiastic sponsors of Daoism. They participated in ritual, sponsored the construction of shrines, and financed the printing of religious texts.421 Princes were involved with literary and cultural activities, authoring books and interacting with literati.422

In economic history, the parasitical nature of Ming princes as a social class encouraged studies that merely stated the obvious. Scholars cited cases in which individual princes seized public or private land, or drained local revenue due to their sheer numbers. Although these were undoubtedly serious problems, dwelling on them misses a complex reality that may be glimpsed by a more nuanced reading of the available evidence. Some princes greatly expanded their domains but others were not especially well off. Princely households became wealthy mainly through imperial favour.

421 Richard G. Wang, The Ming Prince and Daoism: Institutional Patronage of an Elite, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

422 Jérome Kerlouégan, “Printing for Prestige? Publishing and Publications by Ming Princes,” East Asian Publishing and Society, 1.1, 1.2 (2011): 39-73, 105-44.

241 Best known are the favourite sons of the Jiajing and Wanli emperors, the Prince of Jing

靖王 (enfeoffed 1561) and the Prince of Fu 福王 (enf.1614) who will be discussed

below, were notorious for their rampant appropriations of land in their domains.

But most princes, deprived of imperial favour, had to overcome official

opposition to improving their lot. The palace of the Prince of Yong 雍王 (enf. 1499) was built in Hunan. His residence was decaying due to the dampness of the earth under it. The prince requested moving to a new estate in Shandong but officials at court argued that building a new palace would waste too much money and labour and suggested instead that he move to the old residence of the Prince of Shen 申王(enf. 1408) in Sichuan.423

The Prince refused to move, saying it was too far. He stayed in the palace until the earth

underneath it caved in in 1509, the palace collapsed, and he died with no heir.424 While

this case is unusual in its extremity, poverty was a common part of life for the minor

branches of the imperial clan. Beneath the first and second ranks of noble titles, the

lower-ranking households had very little to show for their imperial origin.425 In the

sixteenth century, it was common for princes to relinquish part of their stipend and

donate it to their poor relatives: For example, the eighth Prince of Lu 潞王 (enf. 1549)

423 Ibid, 3643. The Prince died before moving into his new residence in Xuzhou (敘州)

424 Ming shi, 3641-2.

425 Zhang Dexin 張德信, “Ming dai zhu wang fen feng zhi du shu lun” 明代諸王封分制度述論 [Discussion of the Enfeoffment system of Princes in the Ming Dynasty] Li shi yan jiu 5 (1985): 76-91.

242 supported poor clan members from his own income.426 The second prince of Heng 衡王

(enf. c.1538) donated 5,000 shi of his income to aid other clan members.427

The biographies of imperial princes in the History of the Ming are arranged according to the Confucian polarity of merit and corruption. Information on the lives of princes does not usually go beyond cases of exceptional examples in either direction. The violence and corruption of the first prince of Qin 秦王 (enf. 1378) is noted as is the virtue and public-mindedness of the prince of Shu 蜀王 (enf. 1390) who promoted Confucian learning by granting a monthly stipend of one shi to poor scholars. For the next 150 years his descendants proved to be “enlightened rulers and keepers of ritual.” They are said to have been all highly educated, built schools, supervised water projects, and aided the people in times of famine. 428 Other commendations include public initiatives such as

that of the sixth Prince Xiang 襄王 (enf. 1550) who responded to a natural disaster in his

region of Xiangyang (襄陽) by keeping a frugal lifestyle and donating his income to the

province.429

By singling out the especially bad and the uncommonly good, the Ming shi

highlighted the exceptions to long lines of descendants who, from the point of view of the state, lived unremarkable lives. Since what we know of the large majority of Ming

426 Ming shi, 3575.

427 Ibid, 3641.

428 Ibid, 3579 -81.

429 Ibid, 3630. In this particular case he donated grain to supply border garrisons.

243 princes does not go beyond their names and titles, we are left to extrapolate about the

majority from the few. For example, while the construction and sponsorship of Confucian

schools, or providing aid from their personal income in times of need are frequently

mentioned, there is hardly any mention of the wide support princes gave to Buddhist and

Daoist establishments, beyond some acknowledgment that they were keen believers.

Taking this bias into account, it is still possible to learn from centrally compiled sources about the economic status of princes when there were matters that directly involved the court. Once restrictions on the mobility of princes took place, they rarely visited the imperial palace and had little connection with the emperor. But such interactions as there were often related to financial issues. The voluminous information on these interactions in the Veritable Records reflects their central place in the daily management of the empire. Generally speaking, princes did not have an independent channel of communication or privileged status. Requests to increase their income reached the emperor through bureaucratic channels and were debated both in the Ministry of

Revenue and by the local officials in the Princely prefecture. The final verdict usually followed the recommendations of the officials. The records of this process shed light on the normal workings of this aspect of state finance and the relationship among the princes, local officials, court officials, and the emperor. They concern cases of illegal usurpation of land or tax revenue, requests for more land or higher stipends, special gifts from the emperor, and punishment by cutting the stipends of princes who fell out of favour.

Beyond individual cases, how can we assess the real burden of the imperial clan on state finance? In the past, scholars have noted the harm to tax revenue caused by the

244 huge estates of the princes. Since these estates were exempt from taxation, they did not

contribute to tax revenue, and as they grew at the expense of registered land, they eroded

the tax base of their locality.430 The other factor was their growing numbers, which in my

opinion was the real problem. First, it should be said that the influx in the population of

the imperial clan became a problem only in the sixteenth century.431 In 1569 Minister of

Rites Qi Yuanzuo 戚元佐 (jin shi 1562) counted 240 commandery princes, 12,000

households of male descent holding lesser titles, and 16,600 noble households of female

descent.432 If all were paid their entire stipends in grain they would have consumed

thirty-seven percent of that year’s grain tax revenue. By the end of the dynasty, princely stipends would have surpassed it.433

Nevertheless, the gravity of both these aspects need to be reassessed. As this

chapter will show, princes were not landowners in the full sense of the word, and the

cases of huge estates are few and confined to the mid-to late sixteenth century.434

430 Zhang Xiaoyu 蔣孝瑀, Ming dai de gui zu zhuang tian 明代貴租莊田 [Princely and Noble Estates in the Ming Dynasty] (Jia xin shui ru gong si, 1969).

431 Wu Jihua, “Lun Ming dai zong fan ren kou” 論明代宗藩人口 [On the Ming princely population], Ming dai she hui jing ji shi lun cong, 237-290.

432 Ming Muzong Shi lu, 32:10b-13a.

433 Zhang Dexin 張德信, “Ming dai zong shi ren kou feng lu ji qi dui she hui jing ji de yin xiang” 明代宗室人口俸祿及其對社會經濟的影響 [the social and economic impact of the salaries of the members of the imperial clan], Dong yue lun cong (1988): 126.

434 Wang Yuquan used early Qing land surveys in order to assess the size of princely landholdings. It is clear that at the end of the Ming princely estates grew in size but the evidence reflects seventeeth century conditions. Other evidence regarding expansion of princely estates is more convincing for the sixteenth century. See: Wang Yuquan 王毓铨, “Ming dai wang fu de zhuang tian” 明代王府的莊田[The Estates of the Ming Princely Courts] (li shi lun cong 历史论丛, 1964).

245 Furthermore, the size of the imperial clan undoubtedly posed a significant financial burden, but it was not so significant before the sixteenth century, when half of all grain stipends for the lower ranks of the imperial clan were paid in scrip. As imperial decrees on princely stipends show, the state employed a tactic similar to that for official salaries.

Changes in princely stipends even may have trailed behind those of officials, such that they began to be commuted to silver about a decade after officials started to receive their commuted portions in silver, suggesting that they were not a privileged group.

In this chapter it is argued that the economic impact of the imperial clan on state finance was a result of three interlocking developments. First, separation between princely farms (initially a form of government land) and private land that was supposed to separate local tax revenue from princely income, but that arrangement broke down in the fifteenth century, as a result of which the nobles had to be financed from regular tax revenue. Second, in the early sixteenth century, the converted portions of the stipends were changed from paper currency to silver, thus raising the actual financial burden on local administration. Along with their natural multiplication, the result was that although many clan members were far from wealthy, they still posed a significant burden on local administration. For example, the Jingjiang (靖江) Princely clan based in Guilin numbered

2,000 people and was supplied with 50,000 taels of silver a year. This would mean an average of only 25 taels per person, a stipend that left many clan members with no means to support themselves.435

435 Wang Shixing 王士性( 1546-1598), Guang zhi yi 廣志繹 [Gazetteer of Guangxi] Si ku quan shu cun mu cong shu, ser. 2 vol. 251, Ji’nan: Qi Lu shu she, (1996): 5:17b.

246

6.1 Regular Income

In 1376, when the size of the imperial clan was small, stipends were extremely

generous: 50,000 shi of rice for each imperial son, with an addition of 25,000 guan of

scrip, forty bolts of brocade, 300 bolts of ramie cloth, two kinds of silk gauze 100 sheets

each, summer and winter cotton cloth a thousand bolts each, 200 yin of salt, 1,000 jin of

tea, and monthly fodder to feed 50 horses. Metal was also supplied and made into

artifacts on the princely estate.436 Imperial grandsons and great-grandsons were granted

60 qing of land from the age of 15, the year they received their noble title. According to

the decree, this grant of land was to remain in their hands permanently (yong ye 永業).

But what exactly does this mean? Zhang Dexin assumes that this served as a supplement to the finalized and much smaller stipends stipulated in the Huang Ming zu xun. He also interprets the decree to mean that the land remained in the hands of the family permanently. On this reading he bases his argument that this grant served as a supplement to princely income and motivated princes to have large families and gain the benefit of extra agricultural land. But since this special grant does not appear in the finalized stipend chart, there is no reason to assume that it continued to exist. It is more likely that Hongwu was experimenting with land grants as he did with official salaries in the beginning of his reign, but reverted to fixed stipends instead.

436 Ming Taizu Shi lu, 104:1a-2b.

247 Moreover, it is not even clear whether Hongwu intended to ennoble all his male descendants. Out of the noble titles for eight generations of male descendants, only the first two are inherited by birth.437 Below imperial and commandery princes, who were the sons and grandsons of an emperor, the next six titles were intended to be conferred only by appointment:

All sons and grandsons of a commandery prince who have civilian or military talents may be employed. The family members and others from the [princely] prefecture shall recommend them to court for examination and conferral of title. They will be promoted and transferred according to a common selection procedure. If they commit a felony, their clan members shall investigate and report the facts to court. If the felony is light, they will be demoted. If the felony is heavy, they will be dismissed and will lose their title. Nevertheless, in the case of retribution, they will not be subject to corporal punishment.438

437 The sons of an emperor who were not designated as heir (太子, Taizi) were titled Imperial Prince (親王, qin wang). The next six generations of sons that were not heirs were: Commandery Princes (郡王, Jun wang), Defender General of the State (鎮國將軍, Zhen guo jiang jun), Bulwark-General of the State (輔國將軍, Fu guo jiang jun), Supporter-General of the State (奉國將軍, Feng guo jiang jun), Defender – Commandant of the State (鎮國中尉, Zhen guo zhong wei), and Bulwark Commandant of the State (輔國中尉, Fu guo zhong wei), and Supporter-General Commandant (奉國中尉, Feng guo zhong wei). Female noble titles were conferred on the daughters of imperial kinsmen. They paralleled the male ranks only down to the sixth generation and did not bequeath their title to their children. Daughters of the emperor held the title of Imperial Princess (公主, Gong zhu). The following ranks were Commandery Princess (郡主, Jun zhu), County Princess (縣主, Xian zhu), Commandery Lady (郡君, Jun jun), County Princess (縣君, Xian jun), and Township Lady (鄉君, Xiang jun) The translation of the titles is taken from Hucker’s Dictionary of Official Titles, except for my use of ‘county’ instead of ‘district, and ‘Lady’ instead of ‘Mistress.’

438 Zhu, Huang Ming zu xun, 35.

248 Officials who proposed allowing members of the imperial clan to assume posts in the

imperial bureaucracy revisited this passage in the sixteenth century.439 And indeed

princes were allowed to sit for the imperial exams, though they never really got the

chance to become active members of the imperial bureaucracy. Listing the ranks of

imperial nobility, the Huang Ming zu xun (Imperial Instructions of the Ming) places the

lower ranks of the nobility under the category of ‘government post’ (guan zhi 官職)

rather than ‘noble rank’ (jue 爵), further indicating their separate status. Clan members

inherited the right to earn a title, but that title was not guaranteed and depended on recommendation and performance. Since the titles came with material compensation it is not at all clear that the first emperor intended to have the state support all imperial descendants down to the eighth generation. Sons and grandsons of princely concubines who were not enfeoffed retained the right to be addressed as princely sons and grand sons, but there is no mention of any implication this status might have had on their livelihood.440 Interestingly, although female descendants held titles only down to the

sixth generation, they all inherited it. There is no indication that this procedure of

nominations was ever followed. It is more likely that sons and grandsons of commandery

princes automatically received their titles as well as their entitlements for state funding.

In 1387 the emperor canceled all allocations of supplies beyond the grain stipend, and when Huang Ming zu xun was issued in 1396, stipends were set on 10,000 shi for

439Chen Zizhuang 陳子壯 (jin shi 1619), “Zong cai huan shou fei yi shu” 宗才還授匪易疏 , in Zhao ling zou yi 詔令奏議, Zhou Shiyong 周時雍 ed (1645). Academia Sinica Database, http://hanchi.ihp.sinica.edu.tw/ihpc/hanji?@@595238439, (accessed June 14 2015).

440 Zhu, Huang Ming zu xun, 35. 子孫未封者皆稱王子王孫言語皆稱裔旨.

249 each imperial prince and 2,000 for each commandery prince and imperial princess. The next six male titles received between 1,000-2,000 shi, and female titles between 200-800

shi. This may have signified the emperor’s concern that princes gain excess power and

challenge his successor. Upon the death of his eldest son and the nomination of his

grandson as heir, Hongwu became increasingly worried about a possible coup. Hok-lam

Chan interprets the elimination of virtually the entire top echelon of the military nobility,

and the growing restraints on princes, as a precaution against a possible usurpation by

one of these powerful nobles.441 He mentions new restrictions on the authority of princes

to nominate their staff. In this light, the reduction of princely grain stipends can be seen

as the financial manifestation of increased centralized control over princely

establishments.

If stipends were granted to every noble household in full, they could not be

considered ungenerous. But the reality was that stipends were never uniform. In the early

sixteenth century there were thirty four imperial princes, out of which seventeen were

entitled to an annual stipend of 10,000 shi, six other princes received half of that allotment in scrip, and eleven others received between 1,000 and 6,000 shi, with parts of the stipends converted to scrip. That would put grain allocations for princely estates at

227,200 shi rather than 340,000 shi in the early sixteenth century. Moreover, only the first generation of a commandery prince’s household was entitled to 2,000 shi. The principal heirs had to make due with 1,000 shi, half of which was commuted to scrip.

441 Hok-lam Chan, “Ming Taizu’s Problem with His Sons: Prince Qin’s Criminality and Early-Ming Politics,” Asia Major 20.1 (2007): 92-95.

250 This means that at least on paper, hereditary commandery princes actually earned less

than the nobles below them in rank. Moreover, in every individual princely house, the

lowest-ranking household received half of the annual stipend in scrip. This would make

the annual grain allotment of a household of a Supporter-General Commandant only 100 shi, a stipend equivalent to that of a county magistrate.442 Finally, in the mid sixteenth

century, most imperial princes permanently gave up between 500-2,000 shi of their

annual grain stipend.443

When Hongwu set the regulations for the imperial clan he did not intend his

descendants to live idly at the expense of public revenue. His sons and grandsons were to

fulfill the role of regional protectors and the talented members among their descendants

were to assume roles in the military bureaucracy. Before his death, Hongwu curtailed the

economic independence of the princes by reducing their grain allocations. During the

following reigns, not all grain allocations were paid in full and some diminished

significantly. A realistic assessment of the scale of expenditure devoted to the upkeep of

the imperial clan should further consider commutation which shall be discussed in the

next section.

442 (Zhengde) Ming Hui dian, juan 28.

443 (Wanli) Ming huidian, 38:1a-5b.

251 6.2 Commutation of Grain Allocations

The strongest evidence against the argument that princes controlled their estates

as feudal lords is the fact that their stipends were commuted from grain to monetary

substitutes. Initially, commutation of princely stipends may have been a temporary

solution when localities defaulted on tax payments. In 1403, the Ministry of Revenue

proposed that several princely estates situated in regions that experienced bad harvests

receive one third of their grain allocation in rice and the rest in scrip.444 When these

commutations were budgeted into the prefecture or county budgets, they not only

alleviated the burden of transportation; they also diverted a significant portion of the

expense from agricultural taxes to commercial taxes that were, by this time, paid entirely

in scrip.

In 1526 the Prince of Yi 伊王 complained that in the past 17,700 guan of paper

notes from the tax receipts of Henan province substituted for 8,000 shi of rice from his

annual stipend.445 Recently, he complained, this income was discontinued, which left him with an annual stipend of only 2,000 shi. Although the prince presented the income in scrip, in all likelihood this income was actually received in silver, which would amount to

53 taels. The prince probably expected to be granted the contemporary equivalent of

8,000 shi in silver, bringing the sum up to 2,000 taels, thus doubling his annual stipend.

He therefore applied for a supplement. The Ministry of Revenue replied that Henan

444 Ming Taizong Shi lu, 123:3a.

445 Ibid, 82:6a. The first prince of Yi was enfeoffed in 1408, along with his brothers the prince of Tang (唐)and the Prince of Ying (郢). All received a stipend of 2,000 shi with an additional grant of scrip.

252 province was 800,000 shi behind in its tax payments, and so recommended denying the

request. The emperor agreed with the Ministry of Revenue.446 Indeed, there seems to

have been no improvement in his stipend. In the Wanli Hui dian list of princely income,

the Prince of Yi still received only 2,000 shi.

In contrast, in 1486 the Prince of Xiang actually requested 30,500 guan of scrip

from a nearby customs depot, as a permanent stipend. The Ministry of Revenue replied

that the customs depot was not in the boundary of the prince’s fief of Xiangyang, and that its revenue was used to pay the salaries of officials in the neighboring Hanyang

Prefecture (漢陽府). The emperor agreed to grant this sum but only for three years.447 In

this case too, there is no mention of silver, and even if the actual collection of the tax

were in silver, it would have amounted to only ninety taels. Whether in silver or in scrip, princes were relying on commuted portions of their income, or trying to get hold of extra income not through their land holdings but through the tax income of local government agencies.

Silver at last appears in the official salary list during the Wanli reign. When did this change happen? During the second half of the fifteenth century, the attitude towards princes collecting rent in silver changed. The problem was that when done unofficially, it often involved extortion. In 1460 the Tianshun emperor received a report that the Prince of Ning and other members of his clan were collecting their rent in silver at a

446 Ming shi, 3611.

447 Ming Xianzong Shi lu, 277:8a.

253 commutation rate that was about three times the market price. And in 1465 Chenghua

addressed the violations of commandery princes in Datong, saying that with no officials

around to supervise them, they indulge in all kinds of abuses such as using larger

measures of grain when collecting rent, or only accepting silver as payment. Instead, he

added, the princes ought to revert to the old custom of collecting their rent only from the

granary of the head of the clan, the Prince of Dai 代王.448 In 1481 the Ministry of

Revenue reported a memorial sent by a tax captain by the name of Wang Qing 王青 from

Wenxi county (聞喜縣), Shanxi:

This county annually transports grain stipends to the four princely estates of Yangqu (陽曲), Lingqiu (靈丘), Huairen (懷仁), and Shanyin (山陰) [all were commandery princes under the house of Qin] as well as each defender general (zhen guo 鎮國). Every shi of grain is forcefully converted into three liang of silver, which leaves the common people in dire straits.449

In these cases two princely households, situated on the northern border, forced their tenants into paying the rent in silver at an exorbitant exchange rate, charging between three and ten times the market value. But the violation was not only that, for princes were not allowed to collect their rent in silver in the first place. The Ministry of Revenue recommended that the commandery princes should continue to collect their grain portions

448 (Wanli) Ming Hui dian, 38:8a-8b.

449 Ming Xianzong Shi lu, 210:8b-9a.

254 in kind, and that the fees they collected outside of the official granaries should adhere to a commutation rate of 0.3-0.4 taels per shi. Violators would be punished by demotion.

In 1503, the emperor accepted the suggestion of the touring censor of Jiangxi to formalize the conversion of grain stipends into silver. In his memorial he complained that although the law stipulates that grain portions of princely stipends should be collected in grain, they are really collected in silver and at three times the amount prescribed.

Therefore, he suggested formalizing the practice at an official exchange rate. The details of this suggestion reveal the modest amounts of grain allocated by the authorities: 2,000 shi for imperial princes, and 150 shi for commandery princes and lower. The rate the

Ministry of Revenue suggested is one tael per shi for imperial princes and 0.8 of a tael per shi for commandery princes and lower. This exchange rate was lower than what princes were collecting, 1.6 and 1.3 tales per shi, but it was still much higher than the market rate of 0.4.450 In 1529, this practice was extended to all princely households in

Huguang. In this case the exchange rate was lower: 0.763 taels per shi for imperial

princes, 0.7 taels for commandery princes, and half a tael for the rest. 451 In 1536 the

official exchange rate was lowered for princely stipends in Henan (other than imperial

princes) to 0.5 taels.452

450 Lu Jun, “Ding lu mi shu,” 定錄米疏 [Setting Grain Payments) Ming dai jing ji wen lu san zhong 明代經濟文錄三種 [Three Compilations of Economic Writings from the Ming Period] vol. 2, (Beijing: Quan guo tu shu guan wen xian suo wei fu zhi zhong xin, 2003), 24.

451 Ming Hui dian, 38:11a.

452 Ibid,, 38:11b-12a.

255 The gradual process by which princely stipends were collected in silver was thus

formalized in the early sixteenth century. It nonetheless imposed a new kind of hierarchy by setting different exchange rates of grain for silver that gave preferential treatment to the imperial princes, perhaps as a way to ensure their acquiescence. The relation between them and market exchange rates depended on grain prices, but they were generally higher than the average market price. It is therefore likely that by fixing the commutation rate of grain, the court actually raised princely incomes to a degree that was never reached after the first decades of the dynasty.

6.3 Princely Estates

Although princes were given territorial titles and lived in grand palaces, from a

financial aspect the princely estate was not an independent entity. Beyond their civilian

staff and military retinue, princes had no jurisdiction over their domains. It should also be

remembered that only the first two ranks were titled prince and resided in princely

estates. These estates were made of fields within the prefecture, designated as princely

land. As an administrative compilation of the Ming shows, princely estates were

registered along with other administrative units of a prefecture. For example, De’an

Prefecture in Huguang was host to the Prince of Qi. The gazetteer mentions that his

palace was outside the city wall, and lists the various buildings that housed the service

256 staff of the prince as well as the princely granary and storehouse.453 Xi’an Prefecture was

host to the Prince of Qin and eight commandery princes. The imperial prince resided to

the east of the prefectural city and the commandery princes all resided within several li of

the main palace.454 There were two stages to the enfeoffment of a prince. First, at the age

of between ten and fifteen, the young prince would receive his title. Years would pass

until he would actually travel outside of the imperial palace to take residence in his new

domain. Until that time, the young prince’s support came from the palace budget, and

only once he moved to his new princely prefecture special princely farms were assigned.

The fields designated as princely farms were a category of government land,

meaning that they were under government supervision but were not registered for tax

collection. Rather, tenants lived and worked on them and paid rent. This is why in the zu

xun the first emperor designated princely income in grain stipends, not in land. He also

stated that stipends should come only from within the princely estate, and warned princes

not to correspond with the local yamen or the court with frequent requests. 455 The intention in this warning was probably to prevent princes from interfering in county administration.

Since there is no indication otherwise, we must assume that the first emperor intended the descendants of the princes to be financially supported by the principal

453 Da Ming yi tong wen wu zhu si ya men guan zhi 大明一統文武諸司衙門官制 [All Government Offices and Official posts of the Great Ming], (c. 1521, reprint Taibei: Taiwan xue sheng shu ju, 1970), 284.

454 Ibid, 204.

455 Zhu, Huang Ming Zu Xun, 45-47.

257 princely house and derive their income from its resources. This reliance naturally led to competition. In 1426 the commandery prince of Yongxing (永興), a member of the house

of Qin, sent a complaint that his younger brother had married but still did not receive his

annual income, a military entourage, and a residence. He suggested building a compound

for him in an area vacated by one of Xi’an’s military guards. The emperor ordered the

prince of Qin to pay him according to the law and agreed to establish a residence

appropriate for a defender-general, and send a military entourage of fifty men. The Prince

of Qin refused to send them, claiming that they were employed on his estate as labourers.

Better to send men from the estate of the prince of Yongxing, who presided over a

military cohort of five hundred. The emperor replied with anger that the prince was

displaying a lack of brotherly love by suggesting that no man could be spared from the

three military guards in his service (15,000 men) but preferred to take men from his

brother’s cohort of five hundred, and stuck to his original order.456

From this exchange it is clear that as new households were established, existing

ones had to share their resources with them. Furthermore, in this case the establishment

of a new household did not increase the wealth of the Qin princely household but

depleted its resources, by taking away men not only from the Prince’s military guard, but

also from the military headquarters of the province which was responsible for paying its

stipend. In fact, during the Xuande reign, more and more new princely households turned

to provincial granaries as a permanent arrangement.

456 Ming Xuanzong Shi lu, 16:4b-5a, and 17:7b.

258 In 1427 the emperor ordered the annual income of grain and scrip for the newly

enfeoffed Prince of Yichuan 宜川王 to be paid out of the Shaanxi provincial stores. This

was a new commandery prince who resided in Xi’an prefecture. This decree, and many

others that appear at this time, reveal that the administrative separation between

government and princely income was probably more theoretical than real, and that in any

case there was not enough revenue from princely land in Xi’an to support the growing

princely clan. From this time on, stipends for the lesser ranks of the nobility came

increasingly from public revenue. These adjustments show that princely estates did not

produce enough revenue to support the growing number of branches in the imperial clan.

In this light, even high-ranking commandery princes were dependent on government

funds rather than on privately owned estates.

While the decrees of the Xuande emperor addressed specific cases, his son’s

approach was more systematic. In 1447, Zhengtong assigned an entire level of the

nobility to the financial care of local prefects. County ladies would, as of the day of their

wedding, be paid from the local government granary. Following the same line, in 1466

Chenghua assigned payment for the stipends of commandery princes to the granaries of

their princely house, while those of the defender generals, the next rank down, were

assigned to county and prefecture granaries. This was perhaps an attempt to divide the

financial burden between the granaries of the imperial princes and those of the county

officials. Whatever the purpose of this division, it is clear that by the mid-fifteenth century, adult male and female descendants of princes who previously had drawn their stipends from princely estates now drew them from local granaries and storehouses. One important caveat to this change is that until they married and established a household of

259 their own, they were still under the financial responsibility of their father.457 It can be said that these decrees favoured imperial princes since they alleviated the financial burden of financing their extended families from the income of their estates, but posed a serious burden on prefectural budgets.

6.4 Expansion of Princely Estates

Although the founding emperor decided to apply a system of government managed stipends, he himself created a loophole in the system that enabled princes to get hold of land that was not under official supervision. These lands were categorized as

‘hilly and lakeside terrain’ (shan chang hu po 山場湖陂) or ‘pasture land’ (mu di 牧地) and therefore outside regular registration, but in time these fields came under cultivation and supplied extra revenue. In most cases, this type of land was granted to princes, but there were occasions for less legal expansion of princely estates. The case of the first

Prince of Xiang demonstrates the procedure:

The Prince of Xiang was granted one hundred qing of untaxed, uncultivated hillside land in Xiangyang and five other counties. First the prince sent a request to the Ministry of Revenue, which then verified it against the maps [i.e. Fish- scale Registers] of Xiangyang and the other counties concerned in the Huguang provincial headquarters, and reported that it agreed.458

457 (Zhengde) Ming Hui dian, 13.b.

458 Ming Yingzong Shi lu, 223:3b.

260 The Ministry of Revenue, or its provincial branch, verified that the land requested was

not under cultivation or under private ownership and then recommended approving the

request. In this way princes could enlarge their estates piece by piece and act as local

entrepreneurs expanding their holdings. In 1474 the same prince got a hold of another

thirty qing in Xiangyang. From the account of this request we know that he already

owned 162 qing of previously uncultivated land.459 This was a typical size for the time.

In relation to some of the princely estates of the sixteenth century that amounted to tens of thousands of qing, the average size of princely estates in the fifteenth century was modest. The largest did not exceed a few thousand qing.460

As the case of the Prince of Xiang demonstrates, as long as the land was not registered, there was no reason to deny it from the prince. But when a request conflicted with local tax revenue it was usually refused: The eighth prince of Qin, Zhu Weichao 朱

惟焯 (enf.1509), requested taking over land adjacent to the banks of the Yellow River northeast of Xian. He was blocked by the Minister of Revenue:

Shaanxi has to finance three outer garrisons, and four princes within the province. The hardship of the people is extreme. How can we let more riverside land to be seized?”461

459 Ming Xianzong Shi lu, 128:3b.

460 Ming shi, 3648.

461 Ibid, 3561. The request came after the Prince donated silver and 200 shi of grain from his annual stipend for the construction of an imperial arch that was commissioned by the Jiajing emperor. The emperor thanked him with the customary jade belt and multicoloured cloth. But he might have thought that he can get more out of the emperor’s gratitude.

261 From his estate in Jinan, Shandong, the Prince of De 德王 (enf. 1457) requested taking over land previously owned by the neighboring princely estates of Han and Qi. The

Chenghua emperor approved. But when he requested an additional lot of so-called pasture land, previously part of the Han estate, the county magistrate intervened, arguing that this land had been returned to private cultivation and was subject to tax collection.

Therefore it would not be appropriate to hand it over to the prince. The emperor agreed with him.462

After the Prince of Rong 榮王 was enfeoffed in 1508, he requested an estate in

Bazhou (霸州) on the lands of the Xinan garrison (信安鎮, in modern Hebei), The

Minister (of either the Ministry Revenue or Ministry of War, the text does not explain) argued that this land was originally set aside as pasture for military horses by Yongle early in the fifteenth century. By the Chenghua period the land had been given to the princely estates of Qi (岐) and Shou (壽). Finally, the Hongzhi emperor decided to give the land back to the military guard. He ended his historical account remarking that he

“did not let private desires overcome public duty.” The prince was eventually enfeoffed in Changde county, Hunan province.463

As part of the effort to reclaim government land, in the mid-sixteenth century the

Ministry of Revenue investigated the princely estate of De, which had been expanded so carefully by its first prince in the fifteenth century, and recommended returning all

462 Ibid, 3635.

463 Ibid, 3642.

262 riverside and hillside lands acquired since the Xuande reign to government use. The emperor allowed it.464

When princes encroached upon public revenue with blatant disregard, there could be harsh retaliation. The third Prince of Jin 晉王 confiscated 100,000 shi of grain from military land. When this was reported, Xuanzong took away his noble title and downgraded him to commoner status.465 During the Jiajing reign the Prince of Yi demolished adjoining houses to his palace in order to enlarge it, confiscating property and employing forced labour. He was admonished for illegally expanding his palace and ordered to restore the houses to the people and pay the expenses of reconstruction. His stipend was also cut by one third. The Prince did not accept the verdict and the Ministry of Rites issued a request to disown him. The emperor agreed and his household was reduced to commoner status.466 Years of land grabbing, extortion and appropriation of property and people by the Prince of Ning were finally reported to the Zhengde emperor.

His order to return the stolen land led the prince to rebel in 1519, a rebellion that ended in his death.467

464 Ibid 3635.

465 Ibid, 3563.

466 Ibid, 3611-12.

467 Ibid, 3594-5.

263 Done correctly, princes could significantly expand their estates. According to

Jiang, the princely estate of Shu (蜀) was the largest in the land.468 He maintains that the

Shu estate owned seventy percent of all the cultivable land in Chengdu Prefecture. The

expansion of the Shu estate was based on the transformation of two military colonies and

their soldiers into lands and tenants of the prince. This would obviously make for a

considerable increase in income, and as a contemporary official report on the matter

claims, it made the house of Shu the richest in the realm (jia tian xia 甲天下). Even if this

was the case and not just hyperbole, this report also mentions how careful the Shu princes

were not to encroach on private land. 469

Rather than a case of illegal expansion and appropriation of land, we can interpret

this as a transformation that was part of the general trend of privatization of military land.

Moreover, these military guards were part of the princely estate to begin with. The

soldiers had to deliver tax grain to the military granaries but render services to the prince.

According to the detailed report, the real problem was that the prince had appropriated

the tax income from the military colonies by using a legal clause granting tax exemption

in cases of natural disaster. Instead of arriving at the provincial military granaries, the

rent went to the prince, who also avoided paying the debts incurred once the alleged emergency was over. So, the problem was not really that the prince took over land that did not belong to him, but that he did not share the revenue with the local government.

468 Jiang Xiaoyu, Ming dai de gui zu zhuang tian 明代的貴族莊田 [Noblilty Estates of the Ming Dynasty] (Taibei: Jia xin shui ni gong xi wen hua ji jin hui, 1969): 29.

469 Li Sui 李遂, (jin shi 1526) Li Xiangmin gong zou yi 李襄敏公奏議 [Memorials and Discussions by Li Xiangmin], (reprint Ji’nan: Qi Lu shu she, 1997): juan 7.

264 Accordingly, the official report recommended increasing supervision over these lands, but not to take them away from the principality.

As these cases show, princes often tried to expand their land holdings but were blocked by local or central government officials. This tug of war between princes and officials shows that the former had a privileged position to make personal requests from the emperor, but because they had to go through the official channels of communication, were often blocked by the latter. Although the emperor decided whether or not to grant extra land to princes, recommendations by officials were usually heeded. This was generally the case until the second half of the sixteenth century, when the two longest ruling emperors in the Ming, the Jiajing and Wanli emperors, abandoned correct procedure.

According to the admonishment of Grand Secretary Ye Xianggao 葉向高 (1559-

1627), the real abuse of princely status occurred when the third and favourite son of the

Wanli emperor was enfeoffed as the Prince of Fu 福王 in 1614 in Henan. The prince received his title thirteen years earlier after his father failed to declare him crown prince instead of his elder brother, Zhu Changlu 朱常潞 (1582-1620). The emperor was determined that his favourite son should outshine all the other princes, including the heir apparent, and lavished him with silver for his wedding expenses and the construction of his new court. His entourage is said to have filled 1,000 boats when he traveled from the capital to his estate.470 The Prince, having direct access to the emperor even as high

470 Xie Zhaozhe 謝肇浙, (1567-1624), Wu za zu 五雜組 [Five-part miscellany] (Si ku jin hui shu cong kan, vol. 37, Beijing: Beijing chu bans he, 2000): 347-703.

265 officials were no longer able to meet him, also won 40,000 qing of fertile land around his estate in Luoyang, Henan. 471

Grand Secretary Ye admitted that this land grant built on a precedent in which the

Jiajing emperor granted the same amount of uncultivated land to the Prince of Jing. Ye played down the seriousness of the actions of the Prince of Jing, perhaps as a way to focus the blame on the Wanli emperor and his son. He called Jiajing’s grant an ‘error committed by a doting father.’ In fact, the biography of the Prince of Jing portrays a more systematic pattern of corruption: The Prince of Jing received his title in 1539 on the same day that his elder brother became heir apparent. He too, like the prince of Fu, remained in the capital for many years, living in opulence that did not differ from that of the crown prince. He moved to his estate in 1561 for only four years before his death, but during that time managed to amass around 40,000 qing of land. His land grabbing went uncontested except for county magistrate Xu Xuemo 徐學謨 (1522-1593) who refused to remain silent.472

Although these demonstrations of excess were outrageous it is not certain that they posed such a serious threat to the wellbeing of the people, or to tax revenue. The

Prince of Jing did not have time to exploit the land he acquired since he died without an heir four years after he moved to his estate. And both he and the prince of Fu owned a marginal portion of the cultivated land registered in their provinces; 2,216,199 in

471 Ming shi, 3648.

472 Ibid, 3647.

266 Huguang, and 741,579 qing in Henan.473 As for the prefectures in which they resided,

they may have been seriously affected: The prefectural seat of the Prince of Jing was

De’an in the northern part of modern Hubei. During the Wanli reign only 8,328 qing of

land was registered for tax purposes. Henan Prefecture was richer with 69,930 qing.474

Since there is no indication of the percentage of registered land lost to princely estates,

the actual harm cannot be determined. Moreover, in 1641 the Prince of Fu himself

requested that his estate be reduced to 20,000 qing. Finally, while officials framed their critique with the language of “harming the people” it was state revenue that they were actually harming. In the mid- to late sixteenth centuries, more and more peasants in fact chose to become tenants in order to escape the burden of taxation. The estates of these princes merely reflected the general trend in these regions.

In sum, princes undoubtedly expanded their domains and their revenue sources in any way they could, trying to escape official scrutiny, just like any other land owner and entrepreneur. But the harm they caused does not seem to have been significant even during the Jiajing and Wanli reigns. Nevertheless, during the reigns of these two emperors, not only was a dangerous precedent set by emperors who doted on their sons and “let private desires overcome public duty,” granting huge territories and thereby showing complete disregard for the authority of the imperial bureaucracy as well as

473 The numbers are from 1578. (Wanli) Ming huidian, 17:8b-9a.

474 Gu Qian 顧汧 and Zhang Mu 張沐 eds., Henan Tong zhi 河南通志 [gazetteer of Henan], (1696, Zhongguo fang zhi ku): 12:33a. And Xu Xuemo 徐學謨 ed., Huguang zong zhi jiu shi ba juan 湖廣總志九十八卷 [comprehensive gazetteer of Huguang in ninety-eight juan], (1591, reprint Ji’nan: Qu Lu Chu she,1996): 10:3b.

267 public revenue, but defied the symbolic hierarchy that served to distinguish the heir

apparent from the other imperial princes.

6.5 Other Expenses of Princely Households

Annual allocations of grain supported the princely household but were not meant

to cover extra expenses. When a prince married and moved to his new estate it was up to

the local prefecture to provide the labour and funds for construction. This procedure was

mentioned earlier when the commandery prince from the house of Qin complained about

the delay in providing a residence for his younger brother.475 Beyond the standard allocation that came along with the titles, princes also requested additional resources for construction of buildings and shrines on their estates. The Prince of Han 韓王 (enf. 1412) requested rent from military land in order to build several buildings. Construction started on a tomb site, two residences, and a Buddhist temple, but then military officials reported a bad harvest and asked that the building projects be put on hold. The emperor ordered to stop the building of the Buddhist temple.476

Tomb construction became a major drain on the budget of Shanxi province. Not

only did it demand funds and labourers, but it could encroach on prime agricultural land.

In response to requests by Shanxi nobles to appropriate agricultural land for their tomb

construction, the Zhengtong emperor replied: “Agricultural land in Shaanxi is limited.

475 See above on p. 252.

476 Ming shi, 3605.

268 How can you use commoners’ land to such excess?” He then fixed a limit on land for the construction of tombs according to each noble rank.477

The problem of extravagant building projects intensified towards the end of the fifteenth century. The regional commander of Huguang took advantage of a heavenly portent to call for an inspection of the land holdings of princely estates in the province.

After severe rain storms that damaged buildings and killed forty-three people, lightning struck the palace gates of the Prince of Ji 吉王. This, he argued, must be a sign from heaven in response to the heavy labour duties imposed on the people in construction of the princely estate. In the years since the beginning of the Chenghua reign, construction costs rose from seven or eight thousand to a hundred thousand taels, and grain payments amounted to ten thousand shi. Beyond that, thirty thousand workers were assigned every year for the project. Even before this project was completed, the Prince of Yong wanted

his palace in Qi to be enlarged.478

Incidentally, this memorial describes the increase of silver in Huguang’s

economy. Between the late 1460’s and the late 1490’s the availability of silver rose

tenfold. Where did the silver come from? The official annual allocation for the prince of

Ji was ten thousand shi of grain. Even if collected entirely in silver, this would amount to

2,500 taels. It is clear therefore that expenditure on the construction of buildings far

surpassed formal allocations.

477 Ming Yingzong Shi lu, 167:5b-6a.

478 Ming Xiaozong Shi lu, 129:6a-7a.

269

6.6 Hereditary Titles

Besides the imperial clan, hereditary titles were granted to men who exhibited

exceptional military or civilian service. There were five dukes of state (guo gong 國公)

who were entitled to an annual stipend of between 2,000 and 5,000 shi, 20 marquises

(hou 候) and 31 earls (bo 伯) with a stipend of around 1,000 shi. The same stipend was

also granted to the emperor’s sons-in-law who were titled commandant-escort (fu ma 駙

馬). The main difference between this group and the imperial clan was that, although these titles and the funds that came with them were hereditary, they did not extend beyond the eldest son. In the early years land was granted to each hereditary household, but they too moved to annual payments during the Hongwu reign.479

These allocations were commuted to scrip early in the Yongle reign. His son, the

Hongxi emperor, decided to replace scrip with wheat from the Nanjing granary. In the

following year, it was a combination of rice and wheat. Assuming that at this point grain

was more valuable than scrip, this decision seems to align with his general generosity

towards both the hereditary nobles and the imperial clan demonstrated by his order to

increase all princely stipends.480 In 1431, Xuande extended the arrangement of paying

479 Ming Hui dian, 35.

480 Ming Renzong Shi lu, 2 part 2:4a-5a. This generosity was shows upon his succession to the throne and was probably also a means to secure support from other princes.

270 commuted portions of official salaries in silk to the hereditary households. But within a

few years payments were once again in wheat and rice.

Further mirroring the revisions applied to the payment of salaries to court

officials, in 1446 thirty percent of the grain stipend for each household was paid in

Nanjing with an option to collect it in silk. And in the following year the practice was

extended to relatives of the dignitaries, who were allowed to collect part or all of their

stipends in silk. In the seven-year interval between the capture of Emperor Yingzong by

Mongol forces and his return to the throne, the Jingtai emperor attempted to reintroduce

scrip to hereditary households’ stipends by returning to the fifty-fifty arrangement, then

for one year in 1455 he replaced both scrip and rice with salt from the Longjiang (龍江)

storehouse. In the following year he replaced scrip with silver from the tribute-tax storehouse in Beijing. The silver was to be taken from the commuted fodder tax, which was sent to the capital in silver. The commutation rate was one tael of silver for every

700 guan of scrip. Here again, payments for the dignitaries followed the changes that took place in the salaries of court officials. The only difference was that the commutation rate of their allocations was a little better, one tael of silver for every 500 instead of 700 guan.

It seems that the titled class enjoyed the best of both worlds. They followed court officials in securing regular silver payments; by 1488 the entire grain portion was paid in silver. But the exchange rate followed the standard that was set for imperial princes in the sixteenth century: 0.7 taels for one shi of grain. Interestingly, it is in relation to the allocations for this group that we find the first mention of an account book. In 1534, the

Jiajing emperor confirmed a petition to employ officials in the Nanjing Ministry of

271 Revenue to produce an account book at the end of every year distinguishing stipends that were paid from those that were yet to be paid, subtracting any portions that were cut for various reasons, and submitting the numbers of paid silver taels for that year. This might be the first step in the process of accounting the expenditure of the privileged groups in society.

6.7 Implications for the State Budget

Formally, the government managed princely income. Although princes were entitled to rent from specially allocated fields, they could not manage them as private landowners. They could not buy or sell the land and they could not decide how much rent to collect. Rather they derived a fixed income that was in part commuted to other means of payment by imperial decree. In this sense, they resembled officials and soldiers as one of the three groups of state servants. Although they belonged to the imperial family, which was never budgeted, the changes made to their income reflected the need to maintain expenditure within budgetary restraints. As the imperial clan expanded, the financial dependence of the lower ranks of the nobility on local budgets became a significant financial burden.

This burden became more pressing when silver replaced scrip. In the memorial mentioned in the opening section of this chapter, Qi Yuanzuo suggested that the number of titles granted to imperial descendants be limited and the rest be sent out into the world to earn their livings as officials, farmers, or merchants. He suggested equipping them with a symbolic attire of cap and belt, as well as a one-time silver grant. The focus of the

272 Minister of Rites on the financial implications of the system of imperial titles rather than

on the financial misconduct of specific princes shows that the real problem was

systematic.

Informally, princely establishments demanded funds and labour that raised their

actual income significantly. Beyond their basic entitlements to a palace compound,

buildings to house officials and other service people, and tombs that would match their aristocratic standing, they found ways to expand their holdings, whether in money or in land. This was not done in a political vacuum. Princes constantly negotiated with local

and central officials. They exploited their influence and familial ties with the emperor,

and mostly worked within the system in order to better their material standing. Their

strategies often succeeded but they were also blocked when their encroachments on the

welfare of the local population or on public revenue were too glaring.

The financial burden of princely income affected the budget of the central

government only indirectly. Hongwu spread his sons throughout the empire to act as

defenders of state, but he did not allow any of them to reside in the financial centre of the dynasty. This rule did not change throughout the Ming. In this light, the achievement of the Prince of Yan is all the more remarkable. Following his usurpation, princes never

again had economic or military power to compete with a reigning emperor.

Formally, princes were not treated very differently than other servants. To be sure, they were elevated servants and they enjoyed public resources and funds that maintained their symbolic status and ritualistic role in society, but they were entitled to a fixed income that suffered from budgetary constraints in the same way that military and

273 civilian salaries suffered. Although the princes had estates of their own, they did not manage them independently but were subordinate to the provincial and central bureaucracy. Revenue officials who consulted with local authorities considered petitions from the princes and in most cases princes were not allowed to encroach on public wealth beyond their necessary upkeep. Unlike sixteenth century emperors and their immediate families, most princes lived under the scrutiny of provincial officials and had limited access to public wealth.

274 7 Conclusion

In the fiscal history of later imperial China, the Ming is an anomaly. It is the only

dynasty that refused to adopt fiscal measures that were adopted by former dynasties in

order to meet growing expenditure. It continued to rely on agricultural income as its

financial base even as the economy witnessed significant commercial expansion. And the

institutions inherited from the Tang-Song and Yuan such as paper currency and the salt

monopoly were not managed as fiscal institutions in the sense that they were not

managed as forms of public debt. This dissertation concludes therefore that the Ming,

more than other dynasties, adhered to classical Confucian principles of political economy

that are embodied in the maxim of measuring expenditure according to revenue. In light

of the inherent conflict between this ideal and the realities of governing an empire, this dissertation identified aspects of financial administration that supported the dynasty without abandoning its principles. It examined the ability to gather financial information and to ensure sufficient tax collection and found that during the fifteenth century they were successful in doing so.

Accounting and tax commutation were more than means to control financial information and ensure tax collection. They were forms of governance that relied on communication and negotiation between centre and periphery. The first Ming emperor emphasized accounting as a form of government accountability. His fierce and devastating battle against government corruption resulted in detailed regulations for

accurate and timely reporting of every transaction that involved the movement of

275 government funds. Accurate and timely financial information also enabled the emperor to

govern properly: grant tax remissions when needed, detect abuses in the process of tax

collection, ensure an equitable tax burden, and maintain a stable flow of resources

throughout the realm.

After the reign of the first emperor, the Ministry of Revenue produced financial

reports on a national level. The reports are probably a summation of a much more

complex process of accounting and communication, of which little is known. The

preservation of these reports in the reign histories provides valuable information on state

revenue and on the process of accounting against the general dearth of financial

information in the Ming. The exclusion of any information regarding expenditure

suggests that the revenue reports were prepared according to the principle of measuring expenditure according to revenue. Calculating expenditure was part of the accounting process in the Ming but it was not supposed to be a consideration in budget management.

The important factor was revenue and expenditure was adjusted according to it.

Although the Ming tax base was agricultural, money and commodities often replaced grain as a means to mitigate the impact of harvest fluctuations on financial administration, and lighten the burden of transportation. The flexibility of tax commutation enabled the court to replace one means of exchange with another and by that accommodate local economic conditions. Commutation was a regular part of financial administration in other dynasties as well, and deserves more attention. It raises questions regarding the place of money and commodities in an agricultural economy, and on the contribution of taxation to monetary expansion and the development of rural

markets and industries.

276 This last point should be of particular interest for fiscal historians since it

concerns the impact of taxation on economic expansion. It can also add another

dimension to the interpretation of the development of a market economy. The theory of

economic development, proposed by Braudel, suggests a structure that is founded on

demographic growth and agricultural surplus and builds towards increasingly complex

economic practices in which money is an important stage. In this scheme the state is left

out.481 More recently, historians are looking at the impact of state policies on the expansion in the use of money. Richard Britnell suggested that the monetization of tax collection was an important factor in the commercialization in the medieval English economy.482 Between 1000-1500 England moved from a barter economy to a market

economy. One of the catalyzers of this process was the commutation of taxes into cash

after the Norman Conquest. This encouraged both the use of money and production for

the market in order to pay taxes.

Working on early modern England, Christine Desan argues that money is not simply a natural phenomenon of trade, but a conscious political construction. In order to understand economic change it is therefore necessary to look at who is making the money and for what purpose.483 This perspective is useful in understanding the role and meaning

481 Fernand Braudel, Capitalism and Material Life, 15th-18th Century 3 vols. trans. Sian Reynolds (London: Colins, 1981-84).

482 Richard Britnell, The Commercialization of English Society, 1000-1500 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997).

483 Christine Desan, Making Money: Coin Credit and the Coming of Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

277 of money in the Ming. In tax commutation it was the state that defined money by taxing in certain commodities or monies. In addition, by requiring peasants to substitute grain with other means of payment the state forced them to sell grain or land in order to obtain them, or manufacture them. In either case, commutation forced rural populations into greater contact with markets and manufacturing.

Undoubtedly, the greatest impact of commutation was on the conduct of state finance. The transition to a fixed silver tax quota in financing Beijing was followed by an ossification of most revenue categories. This change was significant because if we take accounting as a measure for the dynasty’s ability to govern, by relying on fixed quotas it relinquished this ability, limited to begin with, to govern the economy. Under these conditions, the main role of financial administration was to ensure that adequate funds arrived at the political centre with less regard to the way in which they were obtained.

Moreover, since silver entered the imperial treasury it was technically under the direct control of the eunuchs who were personal servants of the emperor. Although the separation between public revenue and the emperor’s Privy Purse was never clearly delineated, the closest imperial China got to an institutional separation between private and public wealth was in the ability of state officials to control public revenue. This was the case before silver entered the imperial treasury. Funds were for the most part locally managed. Beyond the precious items that were stored in the imperial treasury, tribute grain tax was sent to Beijing for consumption. Furthermore, while military colonies and kai zhong shipments fulfilled the requirements of border armies, these funds did not go through the capital. This changed in the 1430’s, when the tribute grain tax was commuted into silver and earmarked as funds for the military in the capital and on the border.

278 Late fifteenth century data on silver depositories in Beijing reveal that beyond the tribute tax from Jiangnan, large amounts of silver were levied from other provinces as well. The detachment of the Ministry of Revenue and its accounting process from this change is manifested in the complete absence of commuted silver from the revenue reports. Two categories pertaining to grain shipments to the capital continue to register income in units of grain. The breach between previous financial procedures and the increasing accumulation of silver in the imperial treasury enabled the appropriation of silver by emperors and a further blurring of the distinction between private and public revenue. The term Gold Floral Silver designates the culmination of this process. In the fifteenth century it was applied to silver produced in the imperial workshop and was part of the emperor’s possessions. In the sixteenth century this term referred commuted tax revenue. Public revenue and imperial possession were one and the same under this term.

In light of these changes a distinction should be made between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. This change can be understood as a withdrawal of the state from economy and society, or a withdrawal of the political centre from management of local finance. Thomas Nimick described this change in posing the relatively successful control over local administration in the fifteenth century in contrast to the greater independence of magistrates in the sixteenth century. Timothy Brook provides another good example in his discussion of the incorporation of polder registration into financial administration. In the late fifteenth century Jiangnan officials moved from registering tax obligations by household to registration by polder. This adjustment followed real geographical conditions and actual ownership rather than outdated household registers. It served as a more accurate way to record and allocate tax obligations, and may have also helped

279 equalize labour service in the locality. One hundred years later the state largely retreated

from any management of polder registration and left it largely to the initiative of local

elites.484 Interpreting this shift in light of the findings of this project, it can be said that

the ability to produce relatively accurate information on local conditions that

characterized the fifteenth century was lost along with the general transformation in

financial administration and was not retrieved thereafter.

Next, in the practice of budget making, the state did not extend its concern of the

“people’s livelihood” (min sheng, 民生) to its servants. This is apparent in the

remuneration practices of the three main groups of state servants. After portions of

official salaries were commuted into scrip, they almost disappeared as a result of

devaluation, but the court intervened in order to prevent that from happening. In the capitals, officials of all ranks were granted one shi of rice a month and the rest was paid in substitutes. Moreover, half of the grain portion of Beijing salaries was stored in

Nanjing. This limitation engendered a system of grain and money transfers throughout the dynasty. This system was never announced as an official procedure and was likely a

part of the existing infrastructure of official grain transports. As the scale of salary-grain

transfers grew and difficulties arose, they became a subject of court debate and thus

entered the historical record. Further research on this topic could expand our knowledge

on official remuneration and on the circulation of funds in Ming China.

484 Timothy Brook, “Taxing Polders on the Yangzi Delta,” The Chinese state in Ming Society, (London:Routlege Curzon, 2005): 63-80.

280 The salary regulation for officials serving outside the capital was entirely in scrip.

Emperors acknowledged that replacing grain with scrip was a necessity in regions that

lacked grain and a means of economizing in expenditure. But the fact that paper currency

was the standard issue in salaries throughout the realm suggests that the court had an

agenda regardless of local grain stores. This means that government salaries did not

follow the logic of commutation, which was a temporary substitute for grain in case of deficiency. Although never acknowledged, this was the most efficient way to disseminate paper currency throughout China. Unlike the early shipments of scrip as famine relief, payments in scrip injected the currency into local markets in a moderate and regularized manner. This was not enough to retrieve public confidence in paper currency, but coupled with local commercial tax collection it may have artificially prolonged the circulation of scrip after it lost its market viability.

Since the court did not manage local finance directly there seems to have been much variation in actual payments. Following a survey on the grain allocations for low- level officials and clerks, it became apparent that only around Nanjing were they paid entirely in scrip. In other provinces salaries continued to include grain portions of between six dou and two shi a month. The Zhengtong emperor set a fixed salary of a monthly one shi. The intention was probably to standardize procedures, and perhaps to ensure a minimum grain allocation to officials working in the lowest levels of government. The general outline of remuneration procedures for state servants offered here begs for additional research that may expose in more detail the ways in which low- ranking soldiers, officials and nobles managed to get by. This dissertation suggests that

281 they in fact relied on government salaries and stipends to a great extent, but more

evidence is needed in order to demonstrate this assumption.

By far the largest avenue of expenditure, the Ming military went through a

profound transformation during the fifteenth century from an army of hereditary

households that was largely self-sufficient, to an army that was composed to a large

degree of mercenaries who were paid in silver. From a financial point of view, military

households were fiscal units and military land was a source of tax revenue. When not

campaigning or training, military-guard soldiers were essentially a kind of government

tenant. And indeed, tax income from military land was regularly updated in the revenue reports. During the Yongle reign reports on income from military land were almost as high as that of the grain tax, a fact that begs further investigation. By the same token, the decrease in income throughout the fifteenth century reflects the deterioration of the system.

From a military aspect the outcome of the deterioration of the hereditary system was a growing reliance on mercenary troops. But as Swope suggests, moving from one kind of military to another need not be taken as a sign of deterioration but should be seen as an adjustment to changing circumstances. The same conclusion can be applied to fiscal management of military land. Desertion of military-guard soldiers was akin to the abandonment of government land by tenants. And just as tax reformers in Jiangnan

preferred to lower the tax rate rather than lose agricultural land altogether, tax on military

land, very high to begin with, was lowered significantly in an effort to maintain a level of

stable income. This brought military land to a similar level with private land and

contributed to a larger social process rendering the two undistinguishable.

282 This outcome was not entirely negative; it meant a certain loss of income for the

state because government land was taxed at a higher rate, but as long as it remained under

cultivation and was subject to taxation, it was better than losing it altogether. It was then

up to the government to ensure that the fields continued to be taxed. And as shown, retrieving military land to tax registration was an ongoing struggle of local and central

officials. When the prince of Shu appropriated the military tax revenue from appended

military fields the provincial authorities engaged in a legal dispute of sorts in order to

reclaim the funds. In Liaodong, a region that was populated in the early Ming mainly by

military households, a civilian community developed with distant hereditary ties to the

original soldiers. Now formed into entire lineages, they continued to pay dues of a single

household. In this case, local officials set out to register these households as private

landowners. In Shanxi, military households-turned-landowners joined forces with the

prince of Ning in order to defy a special envoy from Beijing sent to enforce the collection

of tax arrears. These cases reveal that military land did not simply disappear from the

registers but was subject to constant contention and negotiation between government and

society.

As recent studies have shown, Ming princes and nobles were a part of local

society. They lived within certain social circles and could be influential members of

society. Their activities could be directed at sponsoring religious institutions and

compilations, and even presiding over religious ritual, composing and financing literary

works, and engaging in artistic pursuits. Some also fancied themselves local military

leaders and exposed themselves to imperial prosecution. Through these activities and

social connections they expressed their elite identity. But despite special status in society

283 grain allocations for Princely households did not escape the budget cuts and the effects of commutation. Scrip constituted a significant portion of their annual income. Beneath the two top ranks of imperial nobility, members of the imperial clan were not economically affluent. In addition, the high princes who owned princely estates were not autonomous from local administration. Most princes had to petition the throne and obtain official approval to expand their lands and revenue. In the sixteenth century there were some exceptions to the rule, but even then I suspect that these cases were highlighted as part of a general remonstrance against the Jiajing and Wanli emperors. The real burden on state revenue was not the extravagance of the high princes but their growing numbers and the complete financial dependence of lower branches of the imperial clan on local revenue.

To conclude, the conduct of fiscal policy according to perceived Confucian principles was not mere rhetoric in the Ming. The first emperor established a financial system that stressed local management of funds and little government intervention in economic activity. Later reform in local administration and tax collection aimed to preserve these ideals rather than overhaul them. Even the ways in which the Ming utilized commercial incentive and an expanding money economy did not contradict the founding precepts because they were used for logistical and not fiscal purposes. In the fifteenth century monopoly salt was exchanged not for profit but for transportation of grain. Once the state began to collect tax in silver it did not attempt to increase its silver stores by increasing taxation on commerce and international trade, the sectors where the biggest quantities of silver resided. Logistically, silver was easier to ship and preserve than grain and cloth. As a common means of exchange, it was a convenient payment to

284 soldiers, workers and officials. But public revenue did not increase along with the

growing commercial economy.

Recently, John Dardess phrased the challenge facing the author of this dissertation

in the following words: “To analyze a collapse is a fairly straightforward challenge. To

explain how a system such as the Ming survived for close to three centuries is not so

easy.”485 This dissertation concludes that fiscal administration in the fifteenth century

contributed to the durability of the Ming state. By producing practical solutions to

concrete difficulties, officials managed to overcome the inherent limitations of an agrarian financial model without overhauling it. And through negotiation between local conditions and the needs of the political centre, the state managed to maintain its viability in society. In the fifteenth century the state generally preferred the loss of tax income to the loss of taxpayers. Tax reforms in Jiangnan included tax commutation at a rate that was generally lower than market grain prices and surcharges were adjusted so that they were spread more equally among taxpayers. The loss of military land was a serious problem for military finance but there too, the state responded by lowering tax rates.

This was of course not only a manifestation of the emperor’s benevolence. It was probably the best the state could do in order to keep tenants on the land. It did not have the means to use coercion or direct supervision. It had to negotiate with local society.

Negotiation depended on good communication and knowledge of financial conditions. As this dissertation has established, the state had better access to financial

485 John W. Dardess, Ming China, 1368-1644- A Concise History of a Resilient Empire (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers INC., 2012): 61.

285 information during the fifteenth century. This ability waned towards the end of the fifteenth century and a growing reliance on fixed tax quotas replaced the former model of governance. Loss of control over financial information hampered the state’s ability to manage finances on a local level. The former flexibility in tax collection was further curtailed by the sole reliance on silver as a means of payment. Zhang Juzheng’s efforts to retrieve accountability in state finance succeeded in restocking national and provincial storehouses. But since financial administration was too deeply transformed and the state was hopelessly divorced from Ming society, Zhang resorted to coercion rather than negotiation, and so his achievements did not last long after his death.

The attempt of the first emperor to protect the people from the clutches of the state gave rise to a system that was limited in its ability to conduct fiscal policy in the basic meaning of the term, taking private revenue and spending it on public needs. The energy and ingenuity of the dynasty’s most talented officials and statecraft thinkers was devoted to maintaining this state system while adjusting to changing circumstances. Their actions contributed to the durability of the dynasty and at the same time perpetuated its deficiencies. According to the worldview of Ming statecraft thinkers, the fact that the state limited its ability to extract revenue was a sign of a truly benevolent government.

286

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———. Yu zhi da gao xu bian 御製大告續編 [The Grand Pronouncements Part 2]. 1386, reprint: Xu xiu si ku quan shu, shi bu, zheng shu lei vol. 862, Shanghai: Shanghai gu ji chu ban she, 1995-2002.

———. Huang Ming zu xun 皇明祖訓 [Ancestral Instructions of the Great Ming]. 1395, reprint Ji’nan: Qi Lu shu she, 1996.

308

Appendices

Appendix A: List of Ming Emperors

Table A-1 List of Ming Emperors

Temple Name Reign Name Personal Name Reign Period

Taizu 太祖 Hongwu 洪武 Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋 1368-1399

Huidi 惠帝 Jianwen 建文 Zhu Yunwen 朱允炆 1399-1403

Chengzu 成祖 Yongle 永樂 Zhu Di 朱棣 1403-1425

Renzong 仁宗 Hongxi 洪熹 Zhu Gaochi 朱高熾 1425-1426

Xuanzong 宣宗 Xuande 宣德 Zhu Zhanji 朱瞻基 1426-1436

Yingzong 英宗 Zhengtong 正統 Zhu Qizhen 朱祁鎮 1436-1450 Shuntian 天順 1457-1465 Daizong 景帝 Jingtai 靖泰 Zhu Qiyu 朱祁鈺 1450-1457

Xianzong 憲宗 Chenghua 成化 Zhu Jianshen 朱見深 1465-1488

Xiaozong 孝宗 Hongzhi 弘治 Zhu Youtang 朱祐樘 1488-1506

Wuzong 武宗 Zhengde 正德 Zhu Houzhao 朱厚照 1506-1522

Shizong 世宗 Jiajing 嘉靖 Zhu Houcong 朱厚熜 1522-1567

Muzong 穆宗 Longqing 隆慶 Zhu Zaihou 朱載垕 1567-1573

Shenzong 神宗 Wanli 萬歷 Zhu Yijun 朱翊鈞 1573-1620

Guangzong 光宗 Taichang 泰昌 Zhu Changluo 朱常洛 1620-1621

Xizong 熹宗 Tianqi 天啟 Zhu Youjiao 朱由校 1621-1628

Sizong 思宗 Chongzhen 崇禎 Zhu Youjian 朱由檢 1628-1644

309

Appendix B: Weights and Measures

Table B-1 Weights and Measures

Weight Volume Length Territory

shi 石 71.6 kg dan 石 107.3 l pi 匹 12.4 m qing 頃 16 acres

zhang jin 斤 0.6 kg dou 豆 10.73 l 124.4 cm mu 畝 0.16 acre 丈 sheng liang 兩 37.3 g 1.073 l chi 尺 31.1 cm 升

qian 錢 3.73 g he 合 107 cc cun 寸 0.3 cm

fen 分 0.37 g shao 勺 17 cc fen 分 0.03 cm

Sources: Gotō, Minmatsu, 12-13; Wilkinson, Chinese History, 237.

310

Appendix C: Commutation Exchange Rates

Table C-1 Commutation Exchange Rates to One Tael of Silver

Grain Cotton Silk Paper Notes Year Reference 石匹匹貫 1435 0.40 Yingzong Shi lu 10:3a 1436 0.25 Yingzong Shi lu 23:7b 1437 0.50 Yingzong Shi lu 30:6b 1438 0.30 Yingzong Shi lu 45:10a 1440 0.50 Yingzong Shi lu 65:1a 1441 0.50 Yingzong Shi lu 79:11b 1445 0.25 Yingzong Shi lu 124:1a 1469 0.30 Xianzong Shi lu 71:4a 1470 0.003 Xianzong Shi lu 78:3b Xianxong Shi lu 1474 0.50 127:7a (April-May) Xianzong Shi lu 1474 0.25 133:5a (October-November) 1475 0.005 Xianzong Shi lu 145:9b Xianzong Shi lu 1477 0.80 166:3b (In Henan) Xianzong Shi lu 1477 0.50 166:3b (In Shandong) 1479 0.60 Xianzong Shi lu 185:1a 1480 0.80 Xianzong Shi lu 199.6a 1481 0.25 Xianzong Shi lu 216:2b 1486 0.30 Xianzong Shi lu 282:3b 1493 0.30 Xiaozong Shi lu 67:2a 1496 0.80 Xiaozong Shi lu 116:3b 1499 0.30 0.70 Xiaozong Shi lu 152:1a

311

Appendix D: Revenue Reports

The revenue lists are provided below in table form. The tables are arranged according to reign periods and not items since changes in categories and quotas were introduced at the beginning of each reign. For example, during the Yongle reign figures for horses and cowerie shells are reported as well as revenue from the newly annexed region of Jiaozhi. These categories disappear in later reigns. On the other hand, revenue from silk products is reported only after the Yongle era. The order of the items is preserved and an attempt was made to keep similar categories on the same page. Terms are translated while measure words are transliterated. Measure words become significant when changes are made in the same category such as guan and ding units of scrip. They also help distinguish between finished and unfinished cloth and silk products, as some are measured by weight (liang, jin) while others are measured by bolt (pi). The term bu 布 means cloth and may refer to both cotton and hemp. Categories missing from a list are designated here as “not reported”. In the case of obvious copying mistakes, such as an extra or missing numeral, the figure was rounded to a number consistent with that of the previous report. Otherwise, figures were copied faithfully from the original. For convenience sake, they do not include fractions.

312

N.R. = Not Reported

Table D-1 Yongle Reign

Grain Tax Cloth and Silk Wadding Raw Cotton Year Households Adults Scrip (ding) Reference (shi) Silk (pi) (jin) (jin) 1403 10,626,779 56,310,026 30,349,823 56,744 269,400 14,821 N.R. Taizong Shi lu 15:11a 1404 11,415,829 66,598,337 31,299,704 105,426 379,215 162,249 N.R. Taizong Shi lu 26:7b-8a 1405 9,685,020 50,950,470 31,874,371 396,195 241,283 276,352 N.R. Taizong Shi lu 37:4a-4b 1406 9,689,260 51,618,500 31,133,993 1,329,563 N.R. 514,113 5,668,001 Taizong Shi lu 49:4a-4b 1407 9,687,859 51,524,656 30,700,569 1,363,593 299,133 195,952 N.R. Taizong Shi lu 62:5b-6a 1408 9,822,912 N.R. 29,824,436 133,925 262,415 446,690 N.R. Taizong Shi lu 74:3a-3b 1409 9,443,876 51,502,077 30,469,293 167,903 257,811 220,981 N.R. Taizong Shi lu 86:9a 1410 9,637,261 51,694,769 31,005,458 1,200,904 299,870 237,511 N.R. Taizong Shi lu 99:4a-4b 1411 9,605,755 51,795,255 30,623,138 1,034,638 250,897 636,111 9,987,371 Taizong Shi lu 111:6b 1412 9,533,692 51,446,834 30,718,814 1,320,968 254,065 169,370 N.R. Taizong Shi lu 123:6a-6b 1413 10,992,436 65,377,633 34,612,692 292,519 382,970 138,156 3,205,247 Taizong Shi lu 135:4a-4b 1414 9,684,916 50,950,214 32,352,244 1,878,820 226,968 389,370 N.R. Taizong Shi lu 146:3a-3b 1415 9,689,052 56,618,209 32,574,248 1,186,784 226,960 240,371 N.R. Taizong Shi lu 159:3b-4a 1416 9,687,729 51,524,436 32,640,828 1,535,837 226,992 241,568 N.R. Taizong Shi lu 171:3a-3b 1417 9,822,757 51,878,172 32,511,270 1,723,902 227,035 241,711 N.R. Taizong Shi lu 183:3b-4.a 1418 9,443,766 51,501,867 32,695,864 240,251 128,759 410,544 N.R. Taizong Shi lu 195:3a-3b 1419 9,637,061 51,694,549 31,804,385 1,143,365 246,751 412,286 N.R. Taizong Shi lu 207:2b-3a 1420 9,605,553 51,794,935 22,248,673 126,887 246,507 583,324 N.R. Taizong Shi lu 219:6a-6b 1421 9,533,492 51,446,434 32,399,206 1,211,883 246,560 583,340 N.R. Taizong Shi lu 232:2b-3a 1422 9,703,360 51,794,228 32,421,831 225,417 223,342 69,159 N.R. Taizong Shi lu 244:1b-2a 1423 9,665,133 58,688,691 32,426,739 224,666 223,693 69,310 N.R. Taizong Shi lu 254:2:2a-2b 1424 9,972,125 52,763,178 32,373,741 225,183 223,696 69,575 N.R. Taizong Shi lu 266:3a-3b 1425 10,066,080 52,468,152 32,601,206 400,352 223,697 69,575 19,276,054 Renzong Shi lu 5 p.2:10a-10b

313

Table D-2 Yongle Reign (cont.)

Gold Silver Bronze Coin Copper Iron Cinnabar Cowrie Shells Year Reference (liang) (liang) (guan) (jin) (jin) (liang) (strings) 1403 N.R. 8,354 N.R. 2,128 75,252 480 48,894 Taizong Shi lu 15:11a 1404 50 80,185 N.R. 2,423 79,806 1,855 266,754 Taizong Shi lu 26:7b-8a 1405 50 100,373 N.R. 2,533 80,186 750 321,721 Taizong Shi lu 37:4a-4b 1406 50 82,140 N.R. 2,430 75,720 2,080 334,143 Taizong Shi lu 49:4a-4b 1407 5,000 29,136 N.R. 2,549 82,306 2,080 342,322 Taizong Shi lu 62:5b-6a 1408 50 159,268 N.R. 2,701 77,677 2,080 33,720 Taizong Shi lu 74:3a-3b 1409 5,000 172,670 N.R. 2,570 N.R. 2,080 340,465 Taizong Shi lu 86:9a 1410 50 272,262 N.R. 2,543 84,338 2,080 342,248 Taizong Shi lu 99:4a-4b 1411 50 214,815 N.R. 2,635 79,709 2,020 338,081 Taizong Shi lu 111:6b 1412 50 285,751 N.R. 2,667 84,338 1,579 334,883 Taizong Shi lu 123:6a-6b 1413 50 237,126 N.R. 2,840 N.R. 1,579 341,144 Taizong Shi lu 135:4a-4b 1414 50 271,226 N.R. 2,848 80,859 1,244 338,689 Taizong Shi lu 146:3a-3b 1415 495 393,949 N.R. 2,699 86,829 1,240 339,753 Taizong Shi lu 159:3b-4a 1416 86 276,336 2,811 2,849 389,600 1,484 344,238 Taizong Shi lu 171:3a-3b 1417 1,410 280,523 2,850 2,555 490,398 1,499 333,389 Taizong Shi lu 183:3b-4.a 1418 3,660 298,550 3,201 2,575 214,399 1,504 340,445 Taizong Shi lu 195:3a-3b 1419 3,952 278,274 3,106 2,128 493,631 1,504 332,391 Taizong Shi lu 207:2b-3a 1420 1,965 281,323 3,106 2,128 489,166 1,504 330,026 Taizong Shi lu 219:6a-6b 1421 2,381 302,544 3,106 2,128 489,166 1,504 330,006 Taizong Shi lu 232:2b-3a 1422 1,692 149,020 3,106 2,128 113,783 1,504 330,026 Taizong Shi lu 244:1b-2a 1423 1,192 285,767 3,106 2,128 448,175 1,504 330,026 Taizong Shi lu 254:2:2a-2b 1424 5,340 205,342 3,106 2,128 413,783 1,504 332,006 Taizong Shi lu 266:3a-3b 1425 1,200 175,686 3,106 2,128 N.R. 1,595 N.R. Renzong Shi lu 5 p.2:10a-10b

314

Table D-3 Yongle Reign (cont.)

Tea Salt Military Grain Horses Commercial Tax Tribute Grain to Beijing Year Reference (jin) (yin) (shi) (pi) (ding) (shi) 1403 1,659,117 1,290,019 N.R. N.R. 4,606,816 N.R. Taizong Shi lu 15:11a 1404 1,678,170 1,292,862 23,450,799 37,993 5,606,087 N.R. Taizong Shi lu 26:7b-8a 1405 1,818,694 1,312,511 12,760,300 49,213 N.R. N.R. Taizong Shi lu 37:4a-4b 1406 1,701,349 1,329,750 22,467,700 58,599 6,600,720 N.R. Taizong Shi lu 49:4a-4b 1407 1,990,738 1,397,153 19,792,050 67,455 7,661,412 N.R. Taizong Shi lu 62:5b-6a 1408 1,972,134 1,396,521 14,374,240 72,840 10,495,931 N.R. Taizong Shi lu 74:3a-3b 1409 1,990,738 1,396,075 13,718,400 81,907 6,654,173 N.R. Taizong Shi lu 86:9a 1410 1,990,738 1,388,694 12,229,600 96,431 8,905,572 1,836,852 Taizong Shi lu 99:4a-4b 1411 25,606 1,402,422 10,368,550 122,417 N.R. 2,015,165 Taizong Shi lu 111:6b 1412 1,997,542 N.R. 12,660,970 152,719 10,731,710 2,255,543 Taizong Shi lu 123:6a-6b 1413 1,997,442 1,401,107 11,781,030 181,149 N.R. 2,487,188 Taizong Shi lu 135:4a-4b 1414 1,997,88 1,413,122 9,109,110 234,855 18,231,198 2,421,907 Taizong Shi lu 146:3a-3b 1415 1,021,474 1,424,287 9,738,690 271,961 19,208,277 248,535 Taizong Shi lu 159:3b-4a 1416 1,201,474 1,411,729 10,358,250 310,657 18,692,211 6,462,990 Taizong Shi lu 171:3a-3b 1417 1,021,096 1,386,493 9,031,970 368,705 15,757,243 2,813,463 Taizong Shi lu 183:3b-4.a 1418 1,004,690 1,431,774 9,282,180 514,439 16,879,940 5,088,544 Taizong Shi lu 195:3a-3b 1419 1,047,945 1,416,190 8,119,670 623,020 16,052,341 4,646,530 Taizong Shi lu 207:2b-3a 1420 1,407,945 1,406,411 7,930,920 182,429 15,945,601 2,709,700 Taizong Shi lu 219:6a-6b 1421 147,945 1,416,311 5,158,040 899,287 18,224,662 607,328 Taizong Shi lu 232:2b-3a 1422 1,004,695 1,080,029 5,169,120 1,090,912 51,892,886 3,543,190 Taizong Shi lu 244:1b-2a 1423 1,004,695 1,077,231 5,175,345 1,199,315 16,400,030 3,351,723 Taizong Shi lu 254:2:2a-2b 1424 1,004,695 1,063,972 5,171,218 1,585,322 19,275,054 2,573,583 Taizong Shi lu 266:3a-3b 1425 N.R. 1,068,980 N.R. 1,736,618 N.R. 2,573,583 Renzong Shi lu 5 p.2:10a-10b

315

Table D-4 Yongle Reign: Tributes from Jiaozhi

Silk Lacquer Sappan Wood Year Feathers Fans Reference (pi) (jin) (jin) 1418 1,252 3,000 10,000 2,400 N.R. Taizong Shi lu 195:3a-3b 1419 1,288 2,000 10,000 2,400 5,000 Taizong Shi lu 207:2b-3a 1420 1,325 2,000 10,000 N.R. 5,000 Taizong Shi lu 219:6a-6b 1421 2,265 3,000 10,000 N.R. 5,000 Taizong Shi lu 232:2b-3a 1422 1,535 2,725 7,535 2,500 4,520 Taizong Shi lu 244:1b-2a 1423 1,390 2,800 8,430 2,800 4,800 Taizong Shi lu 254:2:2a-2b 1424 7,147 3,000 10,000 3,000 5,000 Renzong Shi lu 26:3a-3b

316

Table D-5 Hongxi-Xuande Reigns

Commute Silk Raw d Land Grain Tax Silk Cotton Cloth Year Households Adults Cloth Cotton Paper Reference (qing) (shi) (jin) (jin) (pi) (pi) (jin) Money (ding) Ming Xuanzong 1426 4,162,707 9,940,566 52,083,651 31,800,234 179,132 232,734 94,569 129,720 242,147 434,168 12:12b-13a Shi lu Ming Xuanzong 1427 4,124,626 9,918,649 51,960,119 31,312,839 178,300 230,396 94,599 129,720 240,911 74,113 23:11b-12a Shi lu Ming Xuanzong 1428 3,943,343 9,909,906 52,070,885 31,250,111 179,144 230,378 91,179 129,720 237,968 77,133 34:8a-9b Shi lu Ming Xuanzong 1429 4,113,137 9,916,837 52,144,021 30,249,936 174,340 234,984 95,364 128,393 239,087 75,459 49:8b-9a Shi lu Ming Xuanzong 1430 4,501,565 9,848,393 53,184,816 31,331,351 179,315 230,416 95,457 129,852 238,221 77,319 60: 8b-9a Shi lu Ming Xuanzong 1431 4,140,680 9,778,419 51,365,851 30,610,894 179,628 234,140 94,138 129,847 242,234 77,391 74:7b-8a Shi lu Ming Xuanzong 1432 4,180,462 9,705,397 50,565,259 30,300,315 178,662 221,718 94,027 129,754 242,482 76,962 85:10a-10b Shi lu Ming Xuanzong 1433 4,244,929 9,633,294 50,667,805 29,102,685 187,007 33,368 89,164 129,983 243,399 15,671 97:9a-9b Shi lu Ming Xuanzong 107:11a- 1434 4,278,934 9,635,862 50,628,346 28,957,227 180,867 231,987 91,627 133,003 242,754 74,253 Shi lu 11b Ming Xuanzong 1435 4,270,162 9,702,322 50,627,456 28,524,732 175,840 232,068 100,631 130,006 242,809 25,360 115:9b-10a Shi lu 1436 4,270,172 9,702,495 50,627,569 28,499,160 152,281 231,834 140,890 130,571 242,268 25,360 Yingzong Shi lu 12:7a-7b

317

Table D-6 Hongxi-Xuande Reigns (cont.)

Commercial Commuted Rice for Cloth Silver Copper Iron Cloth Salt Scrip for Year Tax Grain Salt for Salt Reference (liang) (jin) (jin) (pi) (yin) Salt (ding) (ding) (ding) (shi) (pi) Ming Xuanzong 1426 14,746,238 79,687 6,251 2,293 527,264 N.R. 3,121,102 22,413,914 713,493 34,316 12:12b-13a Shi lu Ming Xuanzong 1427 18,408,282 74,231 5,880 2,129 488,598 N.R. 3,138,840 19,897,134 168,938 26,573 23:11b-12a Shi lu Ming Xuanzong 1428 16,988,638 73,951 4,402 2,129 488,598 276 3,563,277 22,218,403 677,815 71,529 34:8a-9b Shi lu Ming Xuanzong 1429 19,173,953 79,117 6,009 2,299 529,756 283 3,523,197 2,665,059 683,784 77,176 49:8b-9a Shi lu Ming Xuanzong 1430 32,786,619 74,018 5,880 2,129 490,898 274 5,257,049 25,814,952 602,752 79,195 60: 8b-9a Shi lu Ming Xuanzong 1431 44,740,070 79,761 6,209 2,299 529,757 283 5,403,950 29,057,022 671,851 74,593 74:7b-8a Shi lu Ming Xuanzong 1432 40,335,695 63,139 5,444 2,132 490,898 276 5,498,828 24,533,107 668,338 69,373 85:10a-10b Shi lu Ming Xuanzong 1433 36,550,957 63,117 3,921 2,132 480,038 276 5,487,157 22,114,470 654,408 54,316 97:9a-9b Shi lu Ming Xuanzong 1434 36,173,677 65,041 4,198 2,089 545,168 287 5,426,660 21,453,767 658,264 34,106 107:11a-11b Shi lu Ming Xuanzong 1435 35,286,993 59,914 4,198 1,989 555,267 287 5,526,660 16,509,134 460,399 43,981 115:9b-10a Shi lu 1436 9,538,299 59,755 N.R. N.R. 74,583 1,083 2,440,206 22,545,348 499,297 786 Yingzong Shi lu 12:7a-7b

318

Table D-7 Hongxi-Xuande Reigns (cont.)

Scrip Military Mined Mined Tribute Tea Mercury Cinnabar Year for Tea Grain Gold Silver Grain Reference (jin) (jin) (jin) (ding) (shi) (liang) (liang) (shi) 1426 609,563 15,039 6,130,699 N.R. 37,178 N.R. N.R. 2,309,150 Ming Xuanzong Shi lu 12:12b-13a 1427 630,852 15,017 7,221,858 369 59,290 2,904 500 2,398,997 Ming Xuanzong Shi lu 23:11b-12a 1428 632,435 15,164 4,600,092 483 185,738 3,447 598 3,683,436 Ming Xuanzong Shi lu 34:8a-9b 1429 630,856 15,017 5,552,570 457 191,192 7,110 1,225 5,488,800 Ming Xuanzong Shi lu 49:8b-9a 1430 611,064 11,164 6,826,847 359 294,081 5,325 1,013 3,858,824 Ming Xuanzong Shi lu 60: 8b-9a 1431 611,072 15,164 8,430,217 400 320,297 5,734 1,416 5,453,710 Ming Xuanzong Shi lu 74:7b-8a 1432 611,072 15,110 9,366,420 344 305,459 5,075 902 5,488,800 Ming Xuanzong Shi lu 85:10a-10b 1433 611,072 15,706 8,570,542 349 299,257 5,028 829 6,742,854 Ming Xuanzong Shi lu 97:9a-9b 1434 471,072 15,706 7,209,461 397 325,136 350 928 5,530,181 Ming Xuanzong Shi lu 107:11a-11b 1435 471,072 15,706 2,307,807 335 327,608 5,340 910 5,213,330 Ming Xuanzong Shi lu 115:9b-10a 1436 553,751 37,895 2,776,141 N.R. N.R. 944 162 4,500,000 Yingzong Shi lu 12:7a-7b

319

Table D-8 Hongxi-Xuande Reigns: Tax Remissions on Government Land

Raw Grain Silk Cloth Cotton Scrip Year Cotton Reference (shi) (jin) (pi) (pi) (ding) (jin) 1426 62,059 5 N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R. Ming Xuanzong Shi lu 12:12b-13a 1427 68,402 N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R. Ming Xuanzong Shi lu 23:11b-12a 1428 104,879 N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R. Ming Xuanzong Shi lu 34:8a-9b 1429 11,806 N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R. Ming Xuanzong Shi lu 49:8b-9a 1430 21,579 N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R. Ming Xuanzong Shi lu 60: 8b-9a 1431 746,144 N.R. N.R. N.R. 20 498 Ming Xuanzong Shi lu 74:7b-8a 1432 60,591 173 N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R. Ming Xuanzong Shi lu 85:10a-10b 1433 797,552 155 N.R. 298 N.R. N.R. Ming Xuanzong Shi lu 97:9a-9b 1434 182,378 N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R. Ming Xuanzong Shi lu 107:11a-11b 1435 7,393 N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R. Ming Xuanzong Shi lu 115:9b-10a 1436 217,388 N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R. Yingzong Shi lu 12:7a-7b

320

Table D-9 Zhengtong-Tianshun Reigns

Silk Raw Land Grain Silk Cotton Cloth Year Households Adults Cloth Cotton Reference (qing) (shi) (jin) (jin) (pi) (juan) (jin) 1437 4,373,188 9,713,407 52,323,998 26,713,058 55,293 186,108 19,704 143,898 188,029 Yingzong Shi lu 25 12a-12b 1438 4,323,180 9,623,510 51,790,316 26,979,143 574,709 186,115 187,447 143,898 187,996 Yingzong Shi lu 10a-11b 1439 4,322,126 9,704,145 51,841,182 27,036,776 56,887 186,129 187,970 143,904 188,015 Yingzong Shi lu 49 9a-10a 1440 4,323,151 9,697,890 5,174,390 27,066,285 56,968 186,159 186,228 143,907 188,012 Yingzong Shi lu 11a-11b 1441 4,322,468 9,686,707 51,811,758 27,079,421 17,000 184,929 186,319 143,907 188,014 Yingzong Shi lu 11b-12a 1442 4,317,742 9,667,440 52,056,290 27,069,361 57,726 185,035 185,971 143,908 188,026 Yingzong Shi lu 87 11b-12a 1443 4,242,119 9,552,737 53,949,951 27,085,921 57,726 185,036 187,040 143,918 189,088 Yingzong Shi lu 99 12b-13a 1444 4,242,819 8,557,650 52,993,882 27,100,926 57,735 185,267 192,681 143,918 189,252 Yingzong Shi lu 111 8b-9a 1445 4,249,517 9,549,058 53,655,066 27,134,213 57,716 185,297 192,479 143,978 189,243 Yingzong Shi lu 124 11b-12a 1446 4,247,239 9,537,454 53,772,934 27,155,958 57,571 185,372 192,867 144,003 189,536 Yingzong Shi lu 136 10a-11a 1447 4,245,699 9,528,443 53,740,321 27,014,779 64,109 185,406 192,813 158,179 206,182 Yingzong Shi lu 9a-9b 1448 4,248,705 9,496,265 53,949,787 26,197,238 64,520 185,035 188,008 180,814 173,252 Yingzong Shi lu 7a-8a 1449 4,153,218 9,530,933 53,534,498 26,722,902 113,767 185,461 188,128 405,271 189,712 Yingzong Shi lu 173 11a-11b 1450 4,350,763 9,447,175 53,171,070 24,212,143 64,379 185,562 191,791 392,043 189,731 Yingzong Shi lu 186 18b-19-a 1451 4,256,303 9,588,234 53,403,954 22,720,360 64,272 185,612 189,123 130,819 245,110 Yingzong Shi lu 199, 11a-12a 1452 4,156,376 9,504,954 53,433,830 23,320,780 64,385 185,630 191,745 144,541 461,371 Yingzong Shi lu 211 13a-13b 1453 4,266,862 9,540,966 53,507,730 26,469,679 64,365 185,683 189,360 305,296 190,202 Yingzong Shi lu 224 18b-19a 1454 4,267,036 9,384,334 53,369,460 26,602,618 64,229 185,710 192,483 131,106 185,016 Yingzong Shi lu 236 9a-9b 1455 4,627,342 9,406,347 54,811,196 26,840,653 64,673 186,106 193,234 197,747 190,263 Yingzong Shi lu 248, 9b-10a 1456 4,267,339 9,405,390 53,807,470 26,853,931 64,148 186,189 192,847 406,924 191,175 Yingzong Shi lu 7a-7b 1457 4,267,449 9,404,655 53,712,925 26,849,159 64,141 186,197 193,303 131,370 245,481 Yingzong Shi lu 9a-9b 1458 4,241,403 9,406,288 54,338,476 26,848,464 113,706 186,119 194,489 131,373 245,080 Yingzong Shi lu 285, 9b-10a 1459 4,263,599 9,469,340 54,205,069 16,852,695 64,320 186,219 193,728 131,458 262,186 Yingzong Shi lu 298, 8a-8b 1460 4,199,028 9,410,339 53,710,308 26,845,117 57,844 186,240 193,847 131,483 262,188 Yingzong Shi lu 310, 9a-9b 1461 4,262,749 9,420,033 53,747,400 26,852,575 58,013 186,241 193,580 131,496 262,289 Yingzong Shi lu 323, 8a-9a 1462 4,242,010 9,422,323 53,748,160 26,287,376 113,534 186,190 193,434 131,534 245,240 Yingzong Shi lu 335 8a-8b 1463 4,245,983 9,309,966 54,160,634 24,716,887 57,833 186,191 193,390 123,533 245,636 Yingzong Shi lu 347, 7b-8a 1464 4,293,503 9,385,213 56,370,250 26,629,492 114,139 178,721 194,210 131,550 345,794 Yingzong Shi lu 360 7a-7b

321

Table D-10 Zhengtong-Tianshun Reigns (cont.)

Commuted Commercial Commuted Scrip Rice Cloth for Iron Cloth Salt Year Tax Tax Tax for Salt for Salt Salt Reference (jin) (pi) (yin) (ding) (ding) (shi) (ding) (shi) (pi) 1437 76,885 9,538,299 59,755 74,583 1,083 3,042,084 22,545,348 499,297 786 Yingzong Shi lu 25 12a-12b 1438 76,900 8,860,360 55,859 74,583 1,074 2,843,849 23,588,481 503,287 786 Yingzong Shi lu 10a-11b 1439 76,877 10,315,512 55,875 74,583 1,074 2,568,276 22,460,723 469,249 786 Yingzong Shi lu 49 9a-10a 1440 77,644 9,277,599 58,090 74,583 1,074 3,383,642 22,350,231 500,732 780 Yingzong Shi lu 11a-11b 1441 77,132 8,846,391 80,331 74,583 1,704 2,460,994 19,110,273 592,700 786 Yingzong Shi lu 11b-12a 1442 77,184 9,347,831 84,098 74,583 1,087 4,020,467 14,075,510 511,851 786 Yingzong Shi lu 87 11b-12a 1443 77,780 9,180,513 81,794 74,583 1,087 2,411,295 17,813,997 496,040 786 Yingzong Shi lu 99 12b-13a 1444 77,391 9,246,290 77,496 74,584 1,074 2,771,221 N.R. 486,416 N.R. Yingzong Shi lu 111 8b-9a 1445 77,533 9,693,762 84,307 74,583 1,087 2,880,628 22,746,547 489,924 786 Yingzong Shi lu 124 11b-12a 1446 77,668 9,396,940 77,487 74,584 1,074 2,925,712 19,633,766 488,313 786 Yingzong Shi lu 136 10a-11a 1447 202,392 9,445,667 78,412 74,583 1,074 2,899,545 19,229,662 492,693 786 Yingzong Shi lu 9a-9b 1448 202,379 9,977,569 81,109 74,583 1,087 1,950,511 19,361,344 510,737 786 Yingzong Shi lu 7a-8a 1449 78,160 9,396,941 77,487 74,583 1,074 2,946,202 19,017,599 510,535 786 Yingzong Shi lu 173 11a-11b 1450 178,347 9,402,493 73,111 74,583 1,074 3,036,601 19,336,601 521,587 786 Yingzong Shi lu 186 18b-19-a 1451 177,925 9,041,253 79,669 74,583 1,087 2,695,968 14,274,968 42,283 786 Yingzong Shi lu 199, 11a-12a 1452 161,798 9,579,867 52,371 74,583 1,074 3,116,451 11,491,845 637,330 786 Yingzong Shi lu 211 13a-13b 1453 78,380 9,751,809 76,252 74,583 1,074 3,159,146 14,538,878 626,387 786 Yingzong Shi lu 224 18b-19a 1454 78,324 9,380,931 52,459 74,583 1,074 2,995,632 15,179,257 500,058 786 Yingzong Shi lu 236 9a-9b 1455 79,448 9,229,938 54,413 74,583 1,074 2,605,799 14,594,907 507,147 786 Yingzong Shi lu 248, 9b-10a 1456 79,434 9,905,324 58,501 74,583 1,087 2,766,651 18,113,059 482,700 786 Yingzong Shi lu 7a-7b 1457 79,470 9,469,025 66,125 74,583 1,074 3,197,990 17,877,470 477,332 768 Yingzong Shi lu 9a-9b 1458 79,475 9,117,504 94,229 74,583 1,074 3,197,995 16,425,489 428,028 786 Yingzong Shi lu 285, 9b-10a 1459 79,463 197,699 111,884 74,583 1,087 273,384 16,473,611 527,168 786 Yingzong Shi lu 298, 8a-8b 1460 79,438 9,600,035 104,231 74,583 1,074 2,877,052 15,117,837 520,675 786 Yingzong Shi lu 310, 9a-9b 1461 79,403 10,014,160 107,749 74,583 1,074 3,144,590 15,458,493 529,800 786 Yingzong Shi lu 323, 8a-9a 1462 79,451 10,055,135 104,230 74,583 1,074 3,544,327 14,002,063 520,360 786 Yingzong Shi lu 335 8a-8b 1463 78,606 9,916,672 114,277 74,583 1,074 2,733,084 16,473,611 521,768 786 Yingzong Shi lu 347, 7b-8a 1464 78,952 10,603,201 19,666 74,583 1,074 4,687,941 15,089,462 521,995 786 Yingzong Shi lu 360 7a-7b

322

Table D-11 Zhengtong-Tianshun Reigns (cont.)

Scrip Military Mined Tribute Other Grain Tax Remissions Tea Mercury Cinnabar Year for Tea Grain Silver Grain Transports on Government Reference (yin) (jin) (jin) (guan) (shi) (liang) (shi) (shi) Land (shi) 1437 553,751 189,474 2,772,627 5,550 944 162 4,500,000 1,043,685 430,982 Yingzong Shi lu 25 12a-12b 1438 553,600 189,470 2,791,007 2,800 944 162 4,500,000 666,610 122,793 Yingzong Shi lu 10a-11b 1439 550,811 189,474 2,786,406 5,550 247 170 4,500,000 636,220 83,436 Yingzong Shi lu 49 9a-10a 1440 553,750 189,474 2,792,146 953 444 162 4,200,000 615,102 20,353 Yingzong Shi lu 11a-11b 1441 553,751 189,474 2,693,776 5,550 247 170 4,500,000 729,005 590,692 Yingzong Shi lu 11b-12a 1442 551,034 9,616,600 2,796,046 N.R. 944 162 4,200,000 615,120 1,029,502 Yingzong Shi lu 87 11b-12a 1443 553,751 189474 2,791,152 N.R. 247 105 4,500,000 1,276,131 1,351,410 Yingzong Shi lu 99 12b-13a 1444 553,644 N.R. 2,762,770 N.R. 940 162 4,500,000 NR 541,640 Yingzong Shi lu 111 8b-9a 1445 550,881 189474 2,789,845 67,180 247 107 4,465,000 1,180,374 737,821 Yingzong Shi lu 124 11b-12a 1446 553,750 9,396,941 2,804,020 18,920 944 162 4,465,000 1,115,033 149,410 Yingzong Shi lu 136 10a-11a (ding) 1447 553,751 189,474 2,776,439 52,330 250 170 4,300,000 960,612 587,298 Yingzong Shi lu 9a-9b 1448 553,751 189,474 2,765,336 45,212 944 162 4,300,000 950,890 229,990 Yingzong Shi lu 7a-8a 1449 192,710 189,474 2,723,630 67,180 247 107 4,000,000 794,670 748,408 Yingzong Shi lu 173 11a-11b 1450 192,710 189,474 2,792,254 38,930 944 162 4,305,000 1,539,870 279,412 Yingzong Shi lu 186 18b-19-a 1451 550,895 189,474 2,660,673 N.R. 247 170 4,035,000 928,350 1,159,650 Yingzong Shi lu 199, 11a-12a 1452 553,751 189,494 2,580,455 N.R. 247 107 4,235,000 2,574,497 N.R. Yingzong Shi lu 211 13a-13b 1453 553,750 189,474 2,878,214 N.R. 944 162 4,235,000 1,337,519 136,716 Yingzong Shi lu 224 18b-19a 1454 553,751 189,474 2,879,569 N.R. 247 107 4,255,000 2,147,049 48,977 Yingzong Shi lu 236 9a-9b 1455 553,750 189,474 2,760,563 N.R. 944 162 4,255,000 2,439,470 1,307,381 Yingzong Shi lu 248, 9b-10a 1456 553,751 189,474 2,779,341 7,982 247 170 4,384,000 2,220,446 1,761,865 Yingzong Shi lu 7a-7b 1457 533,750 189,474 2,795,359 16,065 944 162 4,430,070 1,110,967 N.R. Yingzong Shi lu 9a-9b 1458 553,751 189,474 2,852,920 16,065 247 170 4,350,000 1,173,405 90,543 Yingzong Shi lu 285, 9b-10a 1459 550,895 10,097,699 2,852,920 74,457 944 162 4,350,000 173,230 136,027 Yingzong Shi lu 298, 8a-8b (ding) 1460 553,751 189,474 2,966,139 112,544 672 68 4,350,000 1,147,437 2,721,674 Yingzong Shi lu 310, 9a-9b 1461 550,895 189,474 2,856,585 146,341 944 262 4,350,000 1,019,600 439,556 Yingzong Shi lu 323, 8a-9a 1462 553,751 189,474 2,957,475 176,339 944 162 4,350,000 1,116,015 392,942 Yingzong Shi lu 335 8a-8b 1463 551,034 189,474 2,974,990 58,698 944 162 4,350,000 1,011,920 7,496,819 Yingzong Shi lu 347, 7b-8a 1464 553,751 189,474 3,056,919 22,187 247 170 4,000,000 819,072 842,166 Yingzong Shi lu 360 7a-7b

323

Table D-12 Chenghua Reign

Silk Land Rice Wheat Silk Cotton Cloth Year Households Adults Cloth Reference (qing) (shi) (shi) (jin) (Liang) (pi) (pi) 1465 4,724,303 9,107,205 60,499,330 22,028,485 4,320,175 92,762 105,000 293,170 827,554 Xuanzong Shi lu 12:11a-11b 1466 4,727,426 9,105,960 60,472,540 22,028,465 4,321,533 92,781 105,000 293,170 827,554 Xuanzong Shi lu 24:10a-10b 1467 4,727,185 9,202,718 60,653,724 22,301,154 4,350,189 92,763 105,000 289,196 637,514 Xuanzong Shi lu 37:13b-14a 1468 4,778,706 9,111,688 59,929,455 21,956,921 4,553,010 90,955 105,000 270,187 827,514 Xuanzong Shi lu 49:10a-11-a 1469 4,755,032 9,113,648 61,615,850 22,047,907 4,610,064 92,596 105,000 284,476 862,737 Xuanzong Shi lu 61:12b-13a 1470 4,776,573 9,119,888 61,727,584 22,057,281 4,328,444 92,681 105,000 284,891 850,739 Xuanzong Shi lu 74:7b-8a 1471 4,776,721 9,119,891 61,819,814 22,048,578 4,256,293 92,686 105,000 284,910 861,002 Xuanzong Shi lu 86:13a-14a 1472 4,778,932 9,119,912 61,819,945 22,059,870 4,312,196 92,691 105,000 285,100 861,220 Xuanzong Shi lu 99:22a-22b 1473 4,778,951 9,119,970 61,821,232 22,070,560 4,313,610 92,690 105,000 285,210 879,100 Xuanzong Shi lu 111:7b-8a 1474 4,778,980 9,120,161 61,823,480 22,076,860 4,332,190 92,700 105,000 285,210 879,200 Xuanzong Shi lu 123: 6a-7a 1475 4,778,991 9,120,195 61,852,810 21,597,810 4,341,270 92,700 105,000 285,300 879,250 Xuanzong Shi lu 136:12.b-13.a 1476 4,778,990 9,120,251 61,852,891 22,044,550 4,352,428 92,703 105,000 285,290 879,250 Xuanzong Shi lu 148:7.b-8a 1477 4,778,996 9,120,263 61,853,281 22,131,337 4,330,060 92,730 105,000 285,310 879,250 Xuanzong Shi lu 160:13.b-14.a 1478 4,778,998 9,120,278 61,853,581 22,126,480 4,344,540 92,730 105,000 285,319 879,360 Xuanzong Shi lu 173: 9a-9b 1479 4,778,980 9,126,272 61,832,198 22,076,860 4,332,196 92,701 105,000 285,213 879,200 Xuanzong Shi lu 185:7b-8a 1480 4,778,951 9,210,690 61,850,132 22,075,012 4,313,611 92,692 105,000 285,210 879,100 Xuanzong Shi lu 198:7b-8a 1481 4,779,973 9,127,928 62,456,993 22,139,858 4,342,580 92,777 105,000 286,110 825,194 Xuanzong Shi lu 210:10.b-11.a 1482 4,779,986 9,128,119 62,457,997 22,135,760 4,345,986 92,777 105,000 286,225 825,186 Xuanzong Shi lu 222:5b-6a 1483 4,781,688 9,222,389 62,452,677 22,146,277 4,316,287 92,778 105,000 286,634 616,063 Xuanzong Shi lu 235:12b-13a 1484 4,782,081 9,202,389 62,452,806 22,146,695 4,634,020 92,824 105,000 286,633 693,697 Xuanzong Shi lu 24:9b-10a 1485 4,861,498 9,205,711 62,885,829 22,157,263 4,621,998 96,440 105,000 288,446 571,663 Xuanzong Shi lu 259:9b-10a 1486 4,881,121 9,205,860 62,885,930 22,159,490 4,422,094 96,705 105,000 288,449 643,710 Xuanzong Shi lu 273:7a-7b 1487 4,881,901 9,214,144 65,442,680 22,160,445 4,622,899 96,762 105,000 N.R. 641,663 Xuanzong Shi lu 285:6a-6b

324

Table D-13 Chenghua Reign (cont.)

Commuted Commuted Commuted Paper Cloth Raw Commuted Commercial Tax Tax Tax Salt Money for Year Cotton Tax Tax Reference in Rice in Wheat in Cotton (yin) for Salt Salt (jin) (ding) (ding) (shi) (shi) (pi) (ding) (pi) 1465 300,565 1,210,832 14,584,307 53,255 2,386 760 2,147,352 5,787 64,314 Xuanzong Shi lu 12:11a-11b 1466 300,540 857,418 14,585,701 53,255 2,386 768 2,147,352 5,787 64,314 Xuanzong Shi lu 24:10a-10b 1467 296,465 313,952 30,275,982 55,805 2,584 768 2,166,168 5,787 44,314 Xuanzong Shi lu 37:13b-14a 1468 285,918 313,552 26,796,450 45,922 2,386 769 3,791,333 5,787 44,315 Xuanzong Shi lu 49:10a-11-a 1469 281,128 834,521 26,136,579 53,260 N.R. 769 3,791,333 NR 44,314 Xuanzong Shi lu 61:12b-13a 1470 282,312 834,521 27,913,181 53,260 2,386 769 3,791,330 5,787 44,314 Xuanzong Shi lu 74:7b-8a 1471 283,120 834,520 27,914,080 53,310 2,386 769 3,791,350 5,787 44,501 Xuanzong Shi lu 86:13a-14a 1472 283,280 834,630 27,814,910 5,787 N.R. 4,600 N.R. N.R. N.R. Xuanzong Shi lu 99:22a-22b 1473 202,108 834,330 27,961,300 56,200 2,389 720 3,791,000 5,790 44,700 Xuanzong Shi lu 111:7b-8a 1474 282,300 835,030 27,962,100 56,200 2,389 770 3,791,500 5,790 44,700 Xuanzong Shi lu 123: 6a-7a 1475 282,390 835,030 27,862,100 56,200 2,389 772 3,701,500 5,790 44,700 Xuanzong Shi lu 136:12.b-13.a 1476 282,390 835,030 27,862,100 56,200 2,380 772 3,791,506 5,790 44,700 Xuanzong Shi lu 148:7.b-8a 1477 282,390 835,030 27,862,100 56,200 2,389 772 3,791,506 5,790 44,700 Xuanzong Shi lu 160:13.b-14.a 1478 282,393 835,030 27,863,100 56,210 2,389 772 3,791,506 5,792 44,700 Xuanzong Shi lu 173: 9a-9b 1479 282,300 835,030 27,962,100 59,100 2,389 772 3,791,506 5,790 44,700 Xuanzong Shi lu 185:7b-8a 1480 281,798 834,330 27,961,300 56,200 2,389 778 3,701,506 5,790 44,700 Xuanzong Shi lu 198:7b-8a 1481 259,712 844,200 28,261,592 33,962 2,386 774 3,792,639 5,787 33,056 Xuanzong Shi lu 210:10.b-11.a 1482 259,810 844,300 38,262,130 33,962 2,386 774 3,792,639 5,787 33,056 Xuanzong Shi lu 222:5b-6a 1483 259,818 842,291 28,262,291 34,342 2,583 769 3,792,632 5,787 33,056 Xuanzong Shi lu 235:12b-13a 1484 282,682 842,606 28,262,292 34,982 2,386 769 3,779,268 5,787 35,432 Xuanzong Shi lu 24:9b-10a 1485 258,248 514,368 28,362,226 31,980 2,386 738 3,779,268 5,787 33,056 Xuanzong Shi lu 259:9b-10a 1486 281,810 514,390 28,362,890 39,881 2,381 738 3,779,678 5,786 33,506 Xuanzong Shi lu 273:7a-7b 1487 273,317 734,358 28,910,069 31,983 2,386 738 3,779,670 5,787 33,056 Xuanzong Shi lu 285:6a-6b

325

Table D-14 Chenghua Reign (cont.)

Tax Remissions Military Mined Tribute Other Grain Tea Mercury Cinnabar on Year Land Silver Grain Transports Reference (yin) (jin) (jin) Government Land (qing) (taels) (shi) (shi) (shi) 1465 565,139 N.R. 15,128 229 16 3,350,000 3,762,511 564,894 Xuanzong Shi lu 12:11a-11b 1466 563,838 3,812,188 15,128 229 16 3,350,000 4,082,441 2,528,061 Xuanzong Shi lu 24:10a-10b 1467 563,828 3,888,931 12,121 247 17 3,350,000 4,428,928 2,497,396 Xuanzong Shi lu 37:13b-14a 1468 537,638 3,876,193 69,282 229 16 3,350,000 4,223,790 1,205,580 Xuanzong Shi lu 49:10a-11-a 1469 563,828 3,899,084 88,750 229 17 3,350,000 4,263,840 1,015,879 Xuanzong Shi lu 61:12b-13a 1470 563,828 3,948,610 86,080 247 17 3,350,000 4,658,124 540,362 Xuanzong Shi lu 74:7b-8a 1471 563,910 3,953,740 70,967 247 17 3,700,000 4,479,650 312,660 Xuanzong Shi lu 86:13a-14a 1472 563,910 3,957,187 79,968 247 N.R. 3,350,000 4,710,865 290,060 Xuanzong Shi lu 99:22a-22b 1473 563,910 3,957,390 79,960 247 17 3,700,000 4,501,000 815,000 Xuanzong Shi lu 111:7b-8a 1474 563,910 3,958,180 52,124 247 17 3,700,000 5,054,380 677,050 Xuanzong Shi lu 123: 6a-7a 1475 563,910 3,958,290 43,380 247 17 3,700,000 5,071,360 346,230 Xuanzong Shi lu 136:12.b-13.a 1476 563,915 3,958,319 50,105 247 17 3,700,000 5,070,420 319,740 Xuanzong Shi lu 148:7.b-8a 1477 563,910 3,958,320 52,154 247 17 3,700,000 5,070,100 194,840 Xuanzong Shi lu 160:13.b-14.a 1478 563,910 3,958,359 53,458 247 17 3,700,000 6,119,700 107,340 Xuanzong Shi lu 173: 9a-9b 1479 563,915 3,958,180 52,124 247 17 3,700,000 5,054,380 677,055 Xuanzong Shi lu 185:7b-8a 1480 563,921 3,957,390 79,968 N.R. 17 3,700,000 4,501,015 815,038 Xuanzong Shi lu 198:7b-8a 1481 563,910 3,828,393 46,007 247 17 3,700,000 5,528,780 201,085 Xuanzong Shi lu 210:10.b-11.a 1482 563,919 3,837,601 40,067 247 17 3,700,000 5,078,290 937,100 Xuanzong Shi lu 222:5b-6a 1483 563,989 3,463,611 49,080 247 17 3,700,000 5,873,710 480,336 Xuanzong Shi lu 235:12b-13a 1484 563,989 3,699,325 91,021 247 N.R. 3,700,000 4,851,154 694,107 Xuanzong Shi lu 24:9b-10a 1485 539,189 3,699,940 89,969 247 N.R. 3,700,000 4,183,699 569,028 Xuanzong Shi lu 259:9b-10a 1486 539,180 3,699,956 89,969 247 17 3,070,000 4,185,015 1,085,900 Xuanzong Shi lu 273:7a-7b 1487 539,208 3,799,960 117,210 247 17 3,700,000 5,416,916 160,960 Xuanzong Shi lu 285:6a-6b

326

Table D-15 Hongzhi-Zhengde Reigns

Land Rice Wheat Silk Cotton Silk Year Households Adults Cloth (pi) Reference (qing) (shi) (shi) (jin) (Liang) Cloth (pi) 1488 1,253,821 9,102,630 50,207,134 19,563,968 6,757,362 37,801 2,703,550 190,749 1,151,779 Xiaozong Shi lu 8:15a-15b 1489 8,253,881 9,113,630 50,207,934 19,566,856 6,779,453 36,700 2,652,964 178,697 1,151,779 Xiaozong Shi lu 21:21a-21b 1490 8,254,881 9,406,393 50,302,769 18,767,984 7,986,264 36,703 2,652,946 178,697 1,151,779 Xiaozong Shi lu 33:6a-7a 1491 8,254,881 9,503,890 50,307,843 19,848,994 7,995,376 36,705 2,652,946 178,697 1,151,779 Xiaozong Shi lu 46:12a-12b 1492 8,255,881 9,807,173 50,503,356 18,946,897 7,986,358 36,703 2,652,946 178,697 1,151,779 Xiaozong Shi lu 58:7a-7b 1493 8,255,881 9,901,965 50,506,325 19,786,949 7,898,459 36,703 2,652,946 178,697 1,151,779 Xiaozong Shi lu 70:6b-7a 1494 8,255,881 9,906,937 50,539,561 18,987,694 7,947,659 36,703 2,652,946 178,697 1,151,779 Xiaozong Shi lu 83:7b-8a 1495 8,256,881 9,909,725 50,614,196 19,879,784 8,945,964 36,703 2,652,946 178,697 1,151,779 Xiaozong Shi lu 95:10b-11a 1496 8,266,781 10,100,279 50,678,953 18,986,894 8,764,894 36,703 2,652,946 178,697 1,151,779 Xiaozong Shi lu 107:12b-13a 1497 8,267,881 10,201,183 50,727,539 19,878,964 8,965,978 36,703 2,602,946 178,697 1,151,779 Xiaozong Shi lu 120:9a-9b 1498 8,267,881 10,205,358 50,765,185 17,989,687 8,796,798 36,703 2,552,946 178,697 1,151,779 Xiaozong Shi lu 132:8a-8b 1499 8,267,981 10,304,374 50,805,375 18,978,797 8,697,849 36,703 2,652,946 178,697 1,151,779 Xiaozong Shi lu 145:16b-17a 1500 8,268,987 10,306,285 50,827,568 19,698,698 8,879,867 36,703 1,652,946 178,697 1,151,779 Xiaozong Shi lu 157:13a-13b 1501 8,269,981 10,402,519 50,858,937 18,969,789 8,978,979 36,703 1,652,946 178,697 1,151,779 Xiaozong Shi lu 169:10a-10b 1502 8,269,992 10,405,831 50,895,236 19,897,979 8,989,798 26,703 1,652,946 178,697 1,151,079 Xiaozong Shi lu 182:13a-13b 1503 8,357,485 10,409,788 50,908,672 18,965,496 8,978,968 36,703 1,652,946 178,697 1,151,779 Xiaozong Shi lu 194:8b-9a 1504 8,307,489 10,503,874 50,981,289 19,897,689 8,989,897 36,703 1,652,946 178,697 1,151,779 Xiaozong Shi lu 206:9b-10a 1505 8,416,862 10,508,935 60,105,835 18,989,897 8,798,989 36,703 1,652,946 178,697 1,151,779 Xiaozong Shi lu 219:13a-14a 1506 4,697,233 12,972,974 59,919,822 22,167,376 4,626,648 31,553 169,600 126,767 1,666,460 Wuzong Shi lu 8:17a-18a 1507 4,697,233 9,151,773 46,802,050 22,167,376 4,626,648 31,553 169,600 126,767 1,666,460 Wuzong Shi lu 20:9b-10b 1508 1,697,233 9,144,056 55,906,806 22,167,376 4,626,648 31,553 169,600 126,767 1,666,460 Wuzong Shi lu 33:9a-10a 1509 4,697,233 9,143,709 59,425,208 22,167,376 4,626,648 31,553 169,600 126,767 1,666,460 Wuzong Shi lu 45:9a-10a 1510 4,697,233 9,143,919 59,514,145 22,167,376 4,626,648 31,553 169,600 126,767 1,666,460 Wuzong Shi lu 58:11b-12b 1511 4,697,233 9,144,095 59,499,759 22,167,376 4,626,648 31,553 169,600 126,767 1,666,460 Wuzong Shi lu 70:8b-9b 1512 4,697,233 9,152,180 60,446,135 22,167,376 4,626,648 31,553 169,600 126,767 1,666,460 Wuzong Shi lu 82:12b-13b 1513 4,697,233 9,181,754 60,590,309 22,167,376 4,626,648 31,553 169,600 126,767 1,666,460 Wuzong Shi lu 95:9a-10a 1514 4,697,233 9,370,452 63,284,203 22,167,376 4,626,648 31,553 169,600 126,767 1,666,460 Wuzong Shi lu 107:6b-7b 1515 4,697,233 9,383,552 62,123,334 22,167,376 4,626,648 31,553 169,600 126,767 1,666,460 Wuzong Shi lu 119:6b-7b 1516 4,697,233 9,383,148 62,573,730 22,167,376 4,626,648 31,553 169,600 126,767 1,666,460 Wuzong Shi lu 132:10b-11b 1517 4,697,233 9,380,123 62,573,736 22,167,376 4,626,648 31,553 169,600 126,767 1,666,460 Wuzong Shi lu 144:5b-6b 1518 4,697,432 9,379,090 62,627,810 12,167,376 4,626,648 31,553 169,600 126,767 1,666,460 Wuzong Shi lu 157:4b-5b 1519 1,697,233 9,379,182 62,664,295 22,167,376 4,626,648 31,553 169,600 126,767 1,666,460 Wuzong Shi lu 169:9a-9b 1520 4,697,233 9,379,081 62,695,812 22,167,376 4,626,648 31,553 169,600 126,767 1,666,460 Wuzong Shi lu 181:71-8a 1521 4,697,233 9,399,979 60,606,220 22,167,376 4,626,648 31,553 169,600 126,767 1,666,460 Wuzong Shi lu 194:8a-9a

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Table D-16 Hongzhi-Zhengde Reigns (cont.)

Raw Salt Commercial Commuted Salt Rice Cloth Fodder Tea Year Cotton Consumption Tax Tax to Rice Certificates for Salt for Salt Reference (Bundle) (jin) (jin) (guan) (ding) (shi) (yin) (shi) (pi) 1488 246,300 25,767,700 77,375,911 73,920,619 1,462 2,049,008 5,787 21,795 89,000 Xiaozong Shi lu 8:15a-15b 1489 231,200 24,988,600 88,426,982 73,920,619 1,472 2,049,008 5,787 21,795 89,000 Xiaozong Shi lu 21:21a-21b 1490 231,100 32,979,400 88,426,982 73,920,619 5,787 NR NR NR 89000 Xiaozong Shi lu 33:6a-7a 1491 231,200 33,863,500 88,426,982 7,392,619 1,472 2,049,008 5,787 21,795 89,000 Xiaozong Shi lu 46:12a-12b 1492 231,200 35,685,400 88,426,982 93,926,019 1,472 2,049,008 5,787 21,795 89,000 Xiaozong Shi lu 58:7a-7b 1493 231,200 34,874,600 88,436,982 73,926,019 1,472 2,049,008 5,787 21,795 89,000 Xiaozong Shi lu 70:6b-7a 1494 131,200 37,943,700 88,426,982 74,926,019 1,472 2,049,008 5,787 21,795 89,000 Xiaozong Shi lu 83:7b-8a 1495 131,200 48,734,800 88,426,982 73,926,019 1,472 2,049,008 5,787 21,795 89,000 Xiaozong Shi lu 95:10b-11a 1496 131,200 39,846,900 88,426,982 73,925,019 1,472 2,049,008 5,787 21,795 89,000 Xiaozong Shi lu 107:12b-13a 1497 131,200 38,945,800 88,426,982 73,926,019 1,472 2,049,008 5,787 21,795 89,000 Xiaozong Shi lu 120:9a-9b 1498 131,200 39,866,700 88,426,982 73,927,019 1,472 2,049,008 5,787 21,795 89,000 Xiaozong Shi lu 132:8a-8b 1499 131,200 38,967,800 88,426,982 73,927,019 1,472 2,049,008 5,787 21,795 89,000 Xiaozong Shi lu 145:16b-17a 1500 131,200 39,889,700 88,426,982 73,927,019 1,472 2,049,008 5,787 21,795 89,000 Xiaozong Shi lu 157:13a-13b 1501 131,200 38,987,900 88,426,982 73,927,019 1,472 2,049,008 5,787 21,795 89,000 Xiaozong Shi lu 169:10a-10b 1502 131,200 39,699,900 88,426,982 73,927,019 1,472 1,049,008 5,787 21,795 89,000 Xiaozong Shi lu 182:13a-13b 1503 131,200 38,968,900 88,426,982 73,929,019 1,472 2,049,008 5,787 21,795 79,300 Xiaozong Shi lu 194:8b-9a 1504 131,200 39,899,800 88,426,982 73,929,019 1,472 2,049,008 5,787 21,795 71,200 Xiaozong Shi lu 206:9b-10a 1505 131,200 38,988,900 88,426,982 73,929,019 1,472 2,049,008 5,787 21,795 71,200 Xiaozong Shi lu 219:13a-14a 1506 112,894 25,944,204 87,976,067 73,927,019 33,336 2,180,204 5,787 46,063 113,311 Wuzong Shi lu 8:17a-18a 1507 112,894 25,944,204 87,976,067 73,927,019 33,336 2,180,204 5,787 46,063 113,311 Wuzong Shi lu 20:9b-10b 1508 112,894 25,944,204 87,976,067 73,927,019 33,336 2,180,204 5,787 46,063 113,311 Wuzong Shi lu 33:9a-10a 1509 112,894 25,944,204 87,976,067 73,927,019 33,336 2,180,204 5,787 46,063 113,311 Wuzong Shi lu 45:9a-10a 1510 112,894 25,944,204 87,976,067 73,927,019 33,336 2,180,204 5,787 46,063 113,311 Wuzong Shi lu 58:11b-12b 1511 112,894 25,944,204 87,976,067 73,927,019 33,336 2,180,204 5,787 46,063 113,311 Wuzong Shi lu 70:8b-9b 1512 112,894 25,944,202 87,976,067 73,927,019 33,336 2,180,204 5,787 46,063 113,311 Wuzong Shi lu 82:12b-13b 1513 112,894 25,944,204 87,976,067 73,927,019 33,336 2,180,204 5,787 46,063 113,311 Wuzong Shi lu 95:9a-10a 1514 112,894 25,944,204 87,976,067 73,927,019 33,336 2,180,204 5,787 46,063 113,311 Wuzong Shi lu 107:6b-7b 1515 112,894 25,944,204 87,976,067 73,927,019 33,336 2,180,204 5,787 46,063 113,311 Wuzong Shi lu 119:6b-7b 1516 112,894 25,944,204 87,906,067 73,927,019 33,336 2,180,204 5,787 46,063 113,311 Wuzong Shi lu 132:10b-11b 1517 112,894 25,944,204 87,906,067 73,927,019 33,336 2,180,204 5,787 46,063 113,311 Wuzong Shi lu 144:5b-6b 1518 112,894 25,944,204 87,906,067 73,927,019 33,336 2,180,204 5,787 46,063 113,311 Wuzong Shi lu 157:4b-5b 1519 112,894 25,944,204 87,906,067 73,927,019 33,336 2,180,204 5,787 46,063 123,311 Wuzong Shi lu 169:9a-9b 1520 112,894 25,944,204 87,976,067 73,927,019 33,336 2,180,204 5,787 46,063 113,311 Wuzong Shi lu 181:71-8a 1521 112,894 25,944,204 87,976,067 73,927,019 33,336 2,180,204 5,787 46,063 113,311 Wuzong Shi lu 194:8a-9a

328

Table D-17 Hongzhi-Zhengde Reigns (cont.)

Military Military Mined Tribute Other Grain Tax Remissions Mercury Cinnabar Fodder Year Land Grain Silver Grain Transports on Government Reference (jin) (jin) (bundle) (qing) (shi) (taels) (shi) (shi) Land (shi) 1488 285,481 2,932,700 81,270 229 46 4,000,000 15,021,075 7,896,339 7,730,310 Xiaozong Shi lu 8:15a-15b 1489 289,481 2,936,070 81,270 229 46 4,000,000 15,052,075 7,989,729 8,702,450 Xiaozong Shi lu 21:21a-21b 1490 289,481 2,936,070 81,270 229 46 4,000,000 15,021,070 8,794,859 8,943,430 Xiaozong Shi lu 33:6a-7a 1491 289,481 2,936,070 81,270 229 46 4,000,000 15,021,055 8,933,568 8,932,750 Xiaozong Shi lu 46:12a-12b 1492 289,481 2,936,070 77,350 229 46 4,000,000 15,021,075 69,073,986 9,843,560 Xiaozong Shi lu 58:7a-7b 1493 289,895 2,939,470 72,130 229 46 4,000,000 15,021,075 7,984,897 9,635,670 Xiaozong Shi lu 70:6b-7a 1494 289,895 2,939,470 53,380 229 46 4,000,000 15,021,075 8,796,789 8,945,760 Xiaozong Shi lu 83:7b-8a 1495 289,895 2,939,470 53,356 229 46 4,000,000 15,021,075 7,687,698 8,675,850 Xiaozong Shi lu 95:10b-11a 1496 289,895 2,939,470 53,356 229 46 4,000,000 15,021,075 7,878,769 7,964,960 Xiaozong Shi lu 107:12b-13a 1497 289,895 2,939,470 52,380 229 46 4,000,000 15,021,075 8,749,659 7,843,870 Xiaozong Shi lu 120:9a-9b 1498 289,895 2,939,470 52,380 229 46 4,000,000 15,021,075 8,946,768 8,634,080 Xiaozong Shi lu 132:8a-8b 1499 289,895 2,939,470 52,380 229 46 4,000,000 15,021,075 8,785,896 7,896,700 Xiaozong Shi lu 145:16b-17a 1500 289,895 2,939,470 31,920 229 46 4,000,000 15,021,075 9,995,687 8,945,600 Xiaozong Shi lu 157:13a-13b 1501 289,895 2,939,970 31,920 229 46 4,000,000 15,021,075 9,876,597 8,766,700 Xiaozong Shi lu 169:10a-10b 1502 289,998 2,939,585 31,924 229 46 4,000,000 15,021,075 8,967,968 7,989,800 Xiaozong Shi lu 182:13a-13b 1503 296,783 2,944,159 31,920 229 46 4,000,000 15,021,075 8,986,896 7,898,900 Xiaozong Shi lu 194:8b-9a 1504 296,783 2,944,159 31,920 229 46 4,000,000 15,021,075 8,798,797 8,987,800 Xiaozong Shi lu 206:9b-10a 1505 308,181 2,974,079 31,920 Stopped 46 4,000,000 15,021,075 8,989,899 8,898,900 Xiaozong Shi lu 219:13a-14a 1506 161,327 1,040,158 32,920 229 46 4,000,000 11,075,619 665,498 468,687 Wuzong Shi lu 8:17a-18a 1507 161,327 1,040,158 32,920 229 46 4,000,000 11,075,619 324,031 N.R. Wuzong Shi lu 20:9b-10b 1508 161,327 1,040,158 32,920 229 46 4,000,000 11,075,619 170,111 N.R. Wuzong Shi lu 33:9a-10a 1509 161,327 1,040,158 32,920 229 46 4,000,000 11,075,619 2,175,313 N.R. Wuzong Shi lu 45:9a-10a 1510 161,327 1,040,158 32,920 229 46 4,000,000 11,075,619 523,360 N.R. Wuzong Shi lu 58:11b-12b 1511 161,327 1,040,158 32,920 229 46 4,000,000 11,075,619 618,178 N.R. Wuzong Shi lu 70:8b-9b 1512 161,327 1,041,058 32,920 229 46 4,000,000 11,075,619 1,310,698 611,062 Wuzong Shi lu 82:12b-13b 1513 161,327 1,040,158 32,920 229 46 4,000,000 11,075,619 705,886 N.R. Wuzong Shi lu 95:9a-10a 1514 161,327 1,040,158 32,920 229 46 4,000,000 11,075,619 307,849 17,470 Wuzong Shi lu 107:6b-7b 1515 161,327 1,040,158 32,920 229 46 4,000,000 11,075,619 161,060 39,003 Wuzong Shi lu 119:6b-7b 1516 161,327 1,040,158 32,920 229 46 4,000,000 11,075,619 573,733 29,400 Wuzong Shi lu 132:10b-11b 1517 161,327 1,040,158 32,920 229 46 4,000,000 11,075,619 1,246,414 69,726 Wuzong Shi lu 144:5b-6b 1518 161,327 1,040,158 33,920 229 46 4,000,000 11,075,619 1,271,082 337,024 Wuzong Shi lu 157:4b-5b 1519 161,327 1,040,156 32,920 229 46 4,000,000 11,075,619 97,414 N.R. Wuzong Shi lu 169:9a-9b 1520 161,337 1,040,158 32,920 229 46 4,000,000 11,075,619 2,568,923 510000 Wuzong Shi lu 181:71-8a 1521 161,337 1,040,158 33,920 229 46 4,000,000 11,075,619 1,487,015 260,000 Wuzong Shi lu 194:8a-9a

329