Sandstorm MIDDLEEAST CONFLICTS &AMERICA

Editedby DANIEL PIPES

AM IDDLEEAST COUNC ILBOOK This bookwas w rittenu nderthe au spicesof th e Middle EastCou ncil,a division ofthe Fore ignPolic y Research Institutein Phil adelphia.The Coun cil worksto de fine andpromote Amer icanin terests by shapingth e debate in whichU.S. for eign policyis made.

UNIVERSITY PA!SSOF AMllRICA litmh,un• New■ York • London Copyright © 1993 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute

University Press of America~ Inc. 4720 Boston Way Lanha m, Maryla nd 20706

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All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America "To live well anc! rewarded is to tie one's full conviction, British Catalog ing in Publication Information Availab le concentratio n, and courage to a humane and honest cause."

Co-published by arr angement ~ith the Foreign Polic y Research lnslltute

Library of Congress Cataloging-In-Publication Data Sandstorm : Middle East conflicts and America / edited by Daniel Pipes . p. cm. "A Middle East Coun cil book." Includes index . 1. Middle East-P olitics and govemm ent- 1979- 2. Middl_e East-Foreign relations-U nited Stat~s- 3. ~ nited States- Foreign relations-M iddle East. I. Pipes, Damel , I 949- DS63. I.S3 1992 956.05--

ISBN 0- 8191-889 3- X (cloth : alk. paper ) ISBN 0-8191-8894-- 8 (pbk . : alk . paper) Contents

Acknowledgments

Introduction 1

Arab Politics The Islamic Republic of Egypt, Emmanuel Sivan 15 The Second Battle of Algiers Kahlid Duran 33 Do Lebanese Shi'is Hate the West? Hilal Khashan 61 The Revival of Pan-Arabism Hila! Khashan 71

The Arab-Israeli Conflict Israel's Security Dilemma Michael Mandelbaum 87 How Fares the Camp David Trio? Mitchell G. Bard 109 Changing Arab Attitudes toward Israel Aaron David Miller 131 Islam in the Palestinian Uprising Robert Satloff 151 The Intifada: Has It Turned American Public Opinion? Eytan Gilboa 171

vii viii Contents

Declaring Independence: Israel and the PLO Acknowledgments Daniel Pipes 197

The Persian Gulf Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War Efraim Karsh 219 Sandstorm has benefited from the efforts of many Tragedy in Mecca individuals . Steven C. Dinero deserves special thanks for Martin Kramer 241 selecting the articles to include in this collection , and Iran after Khomeini: Weakened and Weary drafting the introduction. Michael Hong then very ably PatrickClawson 269 reworked the introduction into its final form. Adam Iran after Khomeini: Ready to Talk Garfinkle has contributed greatly over the years through his Charles A. Kupchan 277 counsel and his willingness to read and comment on articles. Why the Oil Crisis Won't Last Many of the Orbis staff had an important role in Eliyahu Kanovsky 285 preparing these articles for publication , including John Maurer, Virginia L. Montijo, James F. Smith, and Joann U.S. Policy Tomazinis. Most of all, Roger Donway, who has overseen U.S. Relations with Israel: the production of Orbis since 1988, has greatly improved The Military Benefits the entire contents. Steven L. Spiegel 309 I was the primary editor of articles that appeared from The U.S. Raid on Libya - and NATO 1986 to 1990; and Patrick Clawson was the primary editor Frederick Zilian, Jr. 345 of those appearing in 1991. Breaking the Iran-Contra Story We wish to thank the board and membership of the Daniel Pipes 385 Middle East Council for making this publication possible .

The Authors 393 D .P. Philadelphia, 1992 Index 395

ix Introduction

s one of the world's most volatile areas, the Middle East receives disproportionatemedia coverage. But A newspaperand televisionaccounts almost invariably present the events of the day without providing the context needed to understand the implications and meaning of those events. We selectedthe eighteenarticles in this volumewith an eye to providingjust such backgroundfor MiddleEast topics of currentinterest. The chapters originally appeared in Orbis: A Journal of WorldAffairs, a quarterly devoted to issues of U.S. foreign policy. They were published between 1986 and 1991 and appearhere unaltered, except for minor stylistic changes. While covering a wide range of topics, two themes stand out: securityissues (wars, terrorism, and hostage taking) and attitudes(public opinion in Lebanon and the United States,and the Israeli security dilemma). These are the features which endure for years, and even decades, and thereforeprovide a key to understandingthe daily flux of eventsand policies. Consider Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf war, eventsthat seemed to twist the Middle East kaleidoscope, ahakingeverything up. States once powerful became weak; enemiesbecame allies;some financialdebts disappearedwhile othersgrew quickly; a proud country suffered attacks without retaliation. The rout of Iraqi forces in February 1991 then producedstill other changes. The Arab-Israeliconflict looked closer to resolution as the Arab states, concentrating on

1 2 Introduction Introduction 3 hostilities in the Gulf, let anti-Zionism stray to the sidelines. It quicklybecame apparentthat Asad had joined the U.S.­ Saudis summonedthe courageto speak their mind, coming out led coalition for his own reasons (in particular, his long­ with blisteringattacks on thosewho had failedor betrayedthem standingrivalry with Saddam),not owing to a change of heart. in their hour of need. (Y asir 'Arafat, for example, they called Asad still engaged in all manner of unsavory activities - "that clown.")1 Conquest and occupation transformed conqueringLebanon, dominating the Palestinians,confronting Kuwaitis: playboys turned into resistance fighters, hesitant Israel, sponsoring terrorism, trafficking in drugs - in some diplomatsbecame resoluteallies. cases doing more of these than ever. The assertion of American might had finally eliminated And while Washingtonwas able to compel the Arab and the stigma of close ties with the UnitedStates; for the first time, Israeli disputantsto meet in Madrid, it could not force them to Arab states proudlywore their American association. Even so make peace. famous an anti-Americanas Hafiz al-Asad of Syria joined the Why were the hopes of winter dashed by the realities of U.S.-ledcoalition; more astonishingyet, Syrian and American spri?g? Not because of mistakes made in Washington; troops stood together in Saudi Arabia. Old verities and foreignersare not that importantin determiningMiddle Eastern structuresappeared moribund; the MiddleEast had been altered politics. Rather, the reason has to do with the region's in deep and irreversible ways; and the war's decisive end incorrigible tendency to domination and strife. Ethnic- and confirmed expectations that a new order in the region had religious-basedhatreds last for generations;political passions dawned. regularlyoverrule economic requirements; and the imperatives But things quickly went back to business-as-usual, so of dictatorial rule negate democratic or humane leanings. much so that within two months it felt almostas though the war Opportunismreigns: Saddam Husaynwas friendlyto the U.S. had never taken place. Saddam Husaynremained in power, as government when he needed help in 1986; the Saudis were barbaric,truculent, and deceitfulas ever. He went right back to friendly in 1990 for the same reason. spinning promises about autonomy and democracy, all the It often seems that little really changes in the Middle East. while massacringIraqis, just as before. The Saudis revertedto Anwar as-Sadat's trip to Jerusalem,the IranianRevolution the their old, coy ways, reluctantto allow U.S. militaryequipment lran-Iraq war, the intifada,and the Kuwait crisis all came.and to be pre-positioned on their soil. Back in power, Kuwait's went. Details are jiggled, but things go on fundamentally as leadersreturned as much as possibleto the pre-invasionway of before. Of course,things do changeover time,but slowly,oh so life; calls for power sharing meet with reluctance and disdain slowly. and the notion that Kuwaitiswould do more of their own work This conclusion suggests that U.S. policy in the Middle quicklyfell by the side. East must have modest and r!!asoned aspirations. Neither American power nor the strengthof i~ examplecan push away deeply grounded perceptions and habits. Washington has 1 The New York Times,February 27, 1991. 4 Introduction Introduction 5 neitherthe desirenor the need to rebuildIraqi societyfrom top war against colonial rule now cast in the mold of the Israeli to bottomas it did in Japanand Germany;regrettably, the Arab­ government. He also points to implicationsof the Algerian Israeli conflict has decades yet to run. Further, except with example for the Palestinians: the "uprisingagainst their own regardto Turkeyand Israel,the onlydemocracies in the Middle government and the party of their own people's liberation East, Washington should be wary of overextension in the movement,rather than againstforces of occupation.. . served region. Gettingtoo close allows the misdeedsand failuresof as a poignantif unintendedwarning to the youths of the West othersto becomeour own problems. Bankthat life afternational liberation may be worsethan before The articles that follow, each with its own nuances, it." Since Duran's essay was written,upheavals have vividly confirm and amplify these points. They help the reader illustratedjust how powerfulmilitant Islam remains in Algeria. distinguishwhat does change, and what does not. We have In an attemptto explainthe motivationsof LebaneseShi'i arranged them under four rubrics: Arab politics, the Arab­ terrorists, Hilal Khashan surveys Lebanese Shi'i students' Israeliconflict, the PersianGulf, and U.S. policy. attitudes. In "Do LebaneseShi'is Hate the West?" he inquires about religion,relations with the West, and terrorismdirected I. Arab Politics. Emmanuel Sivan explains in ''The againstWesterners . The resultsprompt Khashanto challenge Islamic Republicof Egypt" that the drawingpower of radical the common view that LebaneseShi 'is are "profoundlyanti­ Muslim scholars in Egypt derives from their occupying the Westem,"and that thosesentiments arise from Shi' i religiosity. "moral high ground" of Islamic sacred law, the Shari'a. The Instead, he finds a surprisingdegree of political moderation. radicals'"founding myth" that the Shari'a must guideEgyptian IMuslims. That Islamistsin Egypt led demonstrations reportson theirreactionsto Iraq's invasionof Kuwait.He found against the October 1991 peace conference shows us these that Sunnis tended to be less organized politicallybut more issuesare stillimportant, still consequential. inclined towardpan-Arabist, pro-Saddam Husayn, and radical The activism of Palestinian youths in the intifada anti-Western views than Shi'is. Khashan notes that, since influencedtheir brethren in Algeria,according to KhalidDuran, Sunnis do not enjoy the oppo~nities for politicalexpression leadingto the protestsand riots of October 1988. Duran dubs thnt Shi'is do, pan-Arabismhas b~ me a ~.'demographically this ''The Second Battle of Algiers" and notes the profound atobllizing necessity" for Sunnis in countrieswith significant irony of an Algerian leadershipremembered for its inspiring Shl'i populations. He predicts that Sunni pan-Arabismwill 6 Introduction Introduction 7 make a resurgencein the regionduring the comingdecade, and Aaron David Miller approaches the same topic more that the "precariousness"of Sunnipolitical power in landsnorth optimistically.In "ChangingArab Attitudestoward Israel," he of the Arabian peninsulawill cause this movement to spread arguesfor the existenceof a new pragmatismdeveloped among still further. With Lebanon's politicalfuture still shifting,this some key Arab states besides Egypt in the late 1980s. The analysisremains an excellentguide for the future. "cost/benefitcalculus" that has alwaysplayed a part in shaping II. The Arab-Israeli Conflict Michael Mandelbaum Arab attitudeshas recently served to moderateArab policies. applies politicalscience theory with special verve in "Israel's Israel's stayingpower, backed up by successon the battlefield, SecurityDilemma." On the one hand, the West Bank and the and the increasinglylimited Arab militaryoption have fostered GolanHeights serve to buffer Israelfrom its Arab neighborsto Arabpragmatism. Events over the lastfifteen years contributed the east, and in so doing they contributeto Israel's defense. On to this trend. Just as the Egyptian-Israelipeace treaty reduced the other hand, the continued occupation of those territories Arab capabilities vis-a-vis Israel, the Iran-Iraq war shifted increases regional tensions. Herein lies Israel's dilemma. attentionto the PersianGulf. Miller, however,acknowledges Should it trade land for peace,thereby weakening its defenses? that a reversionto the old animosityremains possible so long as Or should it continue to occupy the territories and risk these Arab states continue to maintain a war stance toward provokingthe Arab states and invitinginternational isolation? Israel. Mandelbaum concludes that Israel will opt to stay in the In "Islam in the Palestinian Uprising,'' Robert Satloff Occupied Territories, preferring strength over an intangible warnsof the dangersto the Arab-Israelipeace process posed by decreasein tensions. We at the Middle East Councilwere not fundamentalist Islam in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. the only ones intriguedby Mandelbaum'sargument: the PLO Published after the United States had begun a dialogue with translated his article into Arabic and reprinted it in a bootleg Yasir 'Arafat and the PLO, this article describes the role that editionof its own. fundamentalistgroups like IslamicJihad and Hamas have had Mitchell Bard argues in "How Fares the Camp David in creatingand maintainingthe intifada. Accordingto Satloff, Trio?" that diplomatic treaties have done little to attenuate in choosingto deal with the Palestiniannationalist leadership of decades of Egyptian hostility toward Israel. Egypt's "cold the PLO, Washington did not sufficiently recognize the peace"-a phrasecoined by BoutrosBoutros-Ghali, now U.N. influence of fundamentalismin the OccupiedTerritories. The secretarygeneral-with Israelhas its obviousmutual benefits peace process, he writes, will depend "as much on intra­ in comparisonwith the previousstate of war, but Cairo's lackof Palestiniandevelopments [between Palestinian nationalists and resolve leaves the relationshipin limbo. Bard concludesthat Islamic fundamentalists]as on Palestinian attitudes toward pragmatism was the chief motivating factor behind Egypt's Israel." He suggests that Washington risks disaster in involvementin the Camp David initiative,and that in the near attempting to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict without term, the "emotional, religious, and historical sources of tokJng the interests and views of Hamas and other conflictbetween Israelis and Arabswill not disappear." fundamentalistsinto account. Introduction 8 Introduction 9

Using pollingdata, Eytan Gilboaconsiders the effect that Also, though "wars are not easily limited," the process of the Palestinianuprising has had on publicopinion in the United escalationis not always random. Karsh ends on a pessimistic States, particularly on such issues as support for Israel, note,citing "the exceptionallymild internationalreaction to the acceptanceof thePLO, and an independentPalestinian state. In erosionof several crucialthresholds and 'red lines' during the ''The Intifada: Has It Turned AmericanPublic Opinion?"he war (primarily the use of gas)," and predicts an increased concludesthat though the intifadadid gain enormous media "potentiallevel of violencein [futureJMiddle Eastern wars." attention,the resulting''barrage of criticalcommentary" neither His 1989analysis was born out just a year later. diminished traditional American support for Israel nor Martin Kramer probes enduring Sunni-Shi'i tensions in increased the standing of the PLO or the acceptability of a ''Tragedy in Mecca" and notes that fundamentalist Islam Palestinian state on the West Bank. Though contrary to reintroduced the concept of "holy war by Muslims against conventionalwisdom at the time of publication,in early 1989, Muslims" intoMiddle Eastern public life. The leadingexample this conclusionhas subsequentlybeen vindicated of thiswas theviolent clash between Iranian pilgrims and Saudi In "DeclaringIndependence: Israe l and the PLO," Daniel securityforces in Meccaon July 31, 1987. The exact detailsof Pipes comparestwo texts - the Palestinianproclamation of the confrontation remain unclear, but Kramer explains its independenceof November15, 1988,and its Israeliprecursor underlying causes. For a thousand years, Sunni and Shi'i of May 14, 1948. He pointsto thesimilarities in "subjectmatter, Muslimshave battledover the natureof the annualpilgrimag e organiz.ation,and even in specificphrasing " between the two to Mecca,a centralfacet of the Muslimreligion . Accordingto texts and suggests that the PLO document was intentionally Kramer, the Khomeini-ledIran ian revolution re-aggravated mcx:leledafter the Israelione. He concludesthat the dissimilar and exacerbated the centuries-old conflict between Sunnis careersof the two documentsconfirm "the old truththat history (particularlyWahhabis) and Shi'is. He furthersuggests that this prcx:lucesdocuments more than documentsprcx:luce history." problem, thoughhardly noted by non-Muslims,will continueto m. The Persian Gulf. Iraq and Iran fought the longest inflame politicalpassions in the MiddleEast conventional war of the twentieth century, a brutal, high­ PatrickOawson and CharlesKupchan both visited Iran in casualty conflict that left both countries economically November 1989 and came away with complementary devastated,demoralized, and bloodied. Though the two sides impressions. In "Iran afterKhomeini" they describethe severe conspicuously" failedto apply most of the classicprinciples of toll that eight years of conflicthave taken, causing the radical war-from theassignment of realisticwar aimsto the adoption Iranian regime to steer away from aggressivelyexporting the of appropriatetactics," Efraim Karsh suggestsin "Lessons of Islamic revolutionand to refocuson economicreconstruction. the Iran-IraqWar" that the conflictoffers "significantmilitary They both look forward to _nonnalizing relations with a and strategic lessons" for other states. Morale, for example, moderating adversary, but approacJiJhe matter differently. doesnot alwayshave a positiveeffect on a country'swar effort. Clawson proposes a package deal: after the release of the 10 Introduction Introduction 11

Westernhostages in Lebanon,restrictions on trade with Iran are interestsin the broader global theater by providing the United lifted. At the same time, Washington should maintain "a States with military innovation and expertise, and with credible set of threats" in case Iran does not stop supporting knowledge gained from battlefieldexperience against Soviet­ terrorists. For him,"the best way to deal with [Iran]is through made weaponry. In addition,Israel's martialsuccesses benefit hard-headed,quid-pro-quo bargaining, not through muve,nice American arms makers and adversely affect Soviet defense gestures." Kupchan counsels Washington to seek_ a plans and arms sales. rapprochement with Tehran and t~ open a constt1;1ct~ve In ''The U.S. Raid on Libya - and NATO,"Frederick dialogue. As each side engages m confidence:~uil~~ng Zilian highlightsthe strained U.S. relationshipwith its NATO measures, the two countries can then develop a positive alliesat the time of the April 1986air raid on Libya. Though the relationship." U.S. acted unilaterallyand with the supportof only one NATO Eliyahu Kanovsky believes that the oil crisis of 1990, ally (the UnitedKingdom), U.S. government criticism of fellow stimulated by the invasion of Kuwait, resembled the one of alliancemembers was muted,especially in comparisonwith its 1979, followingthe Iranianrevolution. In "Why th~ Oil Ois~ criticismof Allied reactionsto the declarationof martial law in Won't Last" (publishedin September1990), he predictsthat oil Poland in December 1981. Still, the Libyan action brought up priceswill fall as world marketsadapt to the threatenedshoi:age "one of those continuouslydivisive issues since the early days of oil. As in the 1970s, they will lower the demand for oil by of the Alliarice,'' namely, the NATO charter's applicabilityto increasingenergy efficiency , drawingon alternative~~s, ai:1da non-Europeanterritories and states. Ziliaricorrectly suggests in varietyof other methods. He was correct: not onlydid od pnces this 1986 article that NATO will "evolve, not wither." He also drop, but they did so as soon as hostilitiesagainst Iraq begari. predictsthat the raid on Libyawill serve as a precursorto future When the next oil shock occurs,Kanovsky's logic shouldserve unilateralactions in the Third World on the part of the United as a guide for decision makers, both in business and States - with or without the support of Washington's government. Europeanallies. With the collapseof the Soviet threat and the IV. U.S. Policy. Is Israel a plus or minus in U.S. re-evaluationof NATO's role, out-of-areaquestions have taken calculations in the Middle East? Steven Spiegel makes the on a new importance;and in this context,the 1986 Libya raid authoritative case for the plus view in "U.S. Relations with remainsa benchmarkevent. Israel: The MilitaryBenefits." He shows how Israel provides DanielPipes 's "Breaking the Iran-ContraStory " provides the United States with military innovation and expertise, the two key documents which revealed the Reagan offering"room for study and for possibleenhanced cooperation administration'sstrategy of dealing with Iraniari" moderates." in those areas in which they specialize." Not only does the One is the brief, rarely seen text that broke the story in Ash­ relationshipfurther U.S. interestsin the region by providing a $1,/ra', a Lebanese weekly, the other a speech of Ali Akbar democratic and militarily strong ally, it also furthers U.S. Hashemi-Rafsanjani,then speaker of Iran's Parliament. The 12 Introduction accountin Ash-Shira' forced Rafsanjanito respondto protect himselffrom chargesof cooperatingwith the United States. In his speech,Rafsanjani provides the first details of the American activities, includingthe cake in thes hapeof a key. At that point, the scandalbroke wide open.

Arab Politics