Political Competition and Social Organization: Explaining the Effect of Ethnicity on Public Service Delivery in Pakistan
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Political Competition and Social Organization: Explaining the Effect of Ethnicity on Public Service Delivery in Pakistan Dissertation Presented in partial fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Aisha Shafique, B.A., M.Sc., M.A. Department of Political Science The Ohio State University 2013 Dissertation Committee: Sarah M. Brooks, Advisor Marcus Kurtz Irfan Nooruddin Copyright by Aisha Shafique 2013 Abstract In the study of ethnicity on public goods provision, the concept of ethnicity has largely been under specified, resulting in ambiguity in what specific attributes of ethnicity can prove to be deleterious to public goods provision. This dissertation focuses on how two specific aspects of ethnicity, rigidity of ethnic boundaries and internal ethnic social organization, affect preferences for public goods provision. Fearon (1999) argues that nonporous ethnic boundaries facilitate forming minimum winning coalitions based on ethnic identity as they more easily exclude others from sharing benefits. Hence, I argue that this lowers trust between ethnic groups as they fear that whoever comes into power will hoard government resources. It is thus not inherent antipathy as posited in many works on ethnic politics but political competition that drives preferences for private over public goods in diverse polities. Using Pakistan’s recent devolution as a natural experiment, I show using in-depth surveys that introducing political competition at the union council level of local government led to a perceived increase in political significance of local kinship identities. Comparing a homogeneous union council in southern Punjab with an ethnically diverse union council I find that the homogeneous polity is more likely to vote by ethnicity, prefer private goods over public goods, and prefer public goods provision in the regime before the local government system. Yet, when asked who should benefit from a hypothetical public goods project, they were as ii likely to stipulate the entire community irrespective of identity as was the homogeneous polity, illustrating that it is not inherent antipathy that leads to politicization of ethnicity, but the fear of being locked out of politics. While studying the effect of social organization of ethnic groups on public goods outcomes, I compare districts that vary in tribalism, and hence internal hierarchy, in Balochistan. I find that though public goods such as health are not strongly correlated with tribalism, there is emerging evidence that education outcomes are better in less tribal districts. This is consistent with theories that suggest that education politicizes individuals and is more threatening to asymmetric power structures. Using in-depth surveys in three districts in Balochistan that vary by internal hierarchy, I find that though preferences for public goods did not vary by tribalism among respondents, the most tribal district was also the most vulnerable to elite capture by the tribal leaders. Moreover, the disparity in education outcomes between rural areas in tribal and non-tribal polities is greater than the disparity in urban areas. This suggests that where internal ethnic structure is hierarchical and unchecked by competition, such as in rural areas, greater elite capture is more likely to result in under provision of public goods like education that can potentially disrupt extant power structures. iii Dedication Dedicated to my father, Dr. M.S. Shafique. iv Acknowledgements This dissertation would not have been possible without the help of my advisor, Sarah Brooks. Not only did she provide me with detailed comments to focus and direct my work, but through the long delays in the completion of this project, she has proven that patience can indeed be infinite. I am in turn infinitely grateful to her for providing the support that allowed me to persist until the end. I absolutely cannot imagine a better dissertation advisor. For my field research, first I would like to thank Yousuf Esakhail Khan who opened the doors to Balochistan for me and went above and beyond to facilitate my gathering data and interviewing bureaucrats in the province, as well as providing an insider’s guide to the tribal systems there. I cannot express the depth of gratitude I have for his help. I am also very grateful to Abdul Waheed Baloch’s help in granting us access to the Gwadar district government. Though I cannot individually name everyone at the Gwadar district government who helped me, I am very appreciative of how transparent and willing they were in providing access to their district accounts. I am also grateful to Manzoor Ahmad Jatala for coordinating my trip in D.G. Khan and facilitating meeting and interviewing bureaucrats at the district offices there. The three NGOs responsible for conducting the surveys used extensively in this research are AwazCDS (AWAZ Foundation Pakistan: Centre for Development Services), Mahec Trust, and RCDC (Rural v Community Development Council) Gwadar. Though all three conducted the research in a professional manner and were supportive in getting it done within the limited resources available, I would like to extend a more personal thank you to Dr. Rashida Panezai of Mahec Trust for helping me choose the most appropriate survey method, Nasir Sohrabi from RCDC Gwadar for promptly responding to all queries before, during, and much after the surveys were conducted and to Surayya Faiz from AwazCDS, for her invaluable aid in translating the surveys and guiding me through my first session training surveyors. I owe Haider Zaidi for providing me direction in both designing surveys and recommending NGOs to conduct them in Quetta. I am also grateful to Q.M. Ahmed and A. Lodhi for so willingly sharing their data on the Provincial Finanace Commission Awards. My father I would like to thank for his help in research for this dissertation, the logistical support required in conducting this research and of course for his unfailing optimism on my being able to complete this project despite all the obstacles involved in conducting research in a third world country with limited data and limited access. My husband, Ahmed, I would like to thank for giving me the support to complete this without undue pressure and doing anything necessary to help me complete the project. Finally, I would like to thank my little daughter Amaya who let me know that it was time to overcome the research obstacles and tie up the loose ends. vi Vita May 1998………………………Lahore American School 1998-2001……………………...Faculty Scholarship Recipient, Ohio Wesleyan University 2001…………………………….B.A., University Honors, Magna Cum Laude, Ohio Wesleyan University 2002…………………………….Phi Beta Kappa 2002-2003………………………Teacher’s Assistant, Department of Economics, Lahore University of Management and Sciences 2003…………………………….M.Sc. Economics, Lahore University of Management and Sciences 2004…………………………….Teacher’s Associate, Professor Anjum Nasim, Department of Economics, Lahore University of Management and Sciences 2004……………………………..Ohio State University Graduate Fellowship 2005-2007……………………….Graduate Research Assistant, Ohio State University 2006……………………………..M.A. Political Science, Ohio State University 2007-2008……………………….Student Instructor, Department of Political Science, Ohio State University vii 2008……………………………..James C. Cotting Grant, Ohio State University 2009…………………………… Mershon Grant, Ohio State University Fields of Study Major Field: Political Science viii Table of Contents Abstract ............................................................................................................................... ii Dedication .......................................................................................................................... iv Acknowledgements ..............................................................................................................v Vita .................................................................................................................................... vii List of Tables .......................................................................................................................x List of Figures ................................................................................................................... xii Chapter 1: Introduction ........................................................................................................1 Chapter 2: Research Design and Methodology .................................................................30 Chapter 3: Public Goods Provision Before Devolution .....................................................59 Chapter 4: Ethnic Politics and Public Goods .....................................................................97 Chapter 5: Ethnic Diversity in the District Council .........................................................170 Chapter 6: Social Organization and Public Goods ..........................................................200 Chapter 7: Conclusion......................................................................................................265 References ........................................................................................................................278 Appendix A: Glossary of Terms and Acronyms..............................................................299 Appendix B: Chapter 3 Variables ....................................................................................300 Appendix C: Sample