ROMANIA’S ANTI - TERRORISM CAPABILITIES: TRANSFORMATION, COOPERATION, EFFECTIVENESS

Florina Cristiana MATEI

Lecturer, Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Monterey, CA, USA

Fighting terrorism effectively is not a new security responsibility for the security forces in Romania. Terrorism has been a menace to Romania’s national security before 1989, and for years during the Communist regime, Securitate’s anti-terrorist elite force’s acumen had averted terrorist attacks. Yet, Cold War terrorism is dif- ferent from Twenty-First Century terrorism. What changed after the fall of the Iron Curtain, and chiefl y after the atrocious terrorist attacks in the United States (US) on September 11, 2001 (9/11), was the lethality and virulence of terrorists’ intents and goals. Attacks in the US, Spain, Great Britain, and others urged Romania (as much as other countries) transform its overall security system to be able to fi ght terrorism and terrorist networks, as well as other asymmetric security threats and challenges, effectively and collaboratively. This paper reviews Romania’s security system post-Cold War transformation, in pursuit of effectively averting, countering and combating terrorism.

Key words: Romania’s anti-terrorism, Romania’s anti-terrorism cooperation, Romania’s counter-terrorism reform, South Eastern Europe’s anti-terrorism, South Eastern Europe’s security cooperation.

1. INTRODUCTION (US) on September 11, 2001 (9/11), was the lethality and virulence of Fighting terrorism effectively terrorists’ intents and goals. Attacks is not a new security responsibility in the US, Spain, Great Britain, and for the security forces in Romania. others urged Romania (as much as Terrorism has been a menace to other countries) transform its overall Romania’s national security before security system to be able to fi ght 1989 [1], and for years during the terrorism and terrorist networks, as Communist regime, Securitate’s well as other asymmetric security anti-terrorist elite force’s acumen threats and challenges, effectively [2] had averted terrorist attacks. Yet, and collaboratively. This paper Cold War terrorism is different from reviews Romania’s security system Twenty-First Century terrorism. post-Cold War transformation, What changed after the fall of the Iron in pursuit of effectively averting, Curtain, and chiefl y after the atrocious countering and combating terrorism. terrorist attacks in the United States 2. ROMANIA’S SECURITY 4. REFORM AND INSTITUTIONS TRANSFORMATION TO FIGHT TERRORISM Romania’s security forces include the armed forces (army, navy, air Fighting terrorism effectively force) under the Ministry of Defense calls for a modern, agile, resilient, and (MOD), police forces (gendarmerie, multi-tasking security system. To this border, etc.) under the Ministry of end, especially after 9/11, Romania Administration and Internal Affairs, has channeled its countering and and six [3] intelligence agencies. combating terrorism efforts toward improved terrorism prevention, 3. TERRORIST THREAT counter-terrorism intervention, TO ROMANIA'S SECURITY and consequence management capabilities. These endeavors have Terrorism does not pose a major enveloped, inter alia, the following: threat to Romania’s security. Yet, - a more robust anti-terrorism Romania could become a terrorist (AT) and counter-terrorism (CT) target for a variety of reasons. First is legal framework; Romania’s membership (and Eastern - effective and timely intelligence Border) in Western collective security (organization, structures, personnel institutions such as the North Atlantic [including education and training], Treaty Organization (NATO) and quality of analysis, and equipment); the European Union (EU), whose - more agile security forces, countries have often become terrorist increased information sharing, targets [4]. coordination and cooperation; - improved capabilities of tracking Second is Romania’s unstable down and weeding out any human, geographical surroundings fi nancial, logistic and operational (neighboring the Black Sea and the involvement and/or support for Balkans yet not far from the Caucasus terrorist activities; and Near East) [5]. - strengthened intervention Third is the relatively high capabilities (capturing terrorists, Muslim/Arabic representation in freeing hostages, reinstating order); Romania, which may transform it - better guard and protection into a hub for terrorist traffi c targeting capabilities and activities; civil both Romania and other countries. emergencies, public affairs, and [6] outreach activities. Fourth, even without a “direct” Muslim threat, [7] Romania’s 4.1. STRENGTHENED friendly relations with the US, the ANTI-TERRORISM implementation of the relocation of LEGAL FRAMEWORK US military bases in Romania since As mentioned earlier, terrorism 2007, and its contribution to the has long been a security concern international anti-terrorist efforts for Romania. As a result, its AT/ and peace operations could, as well, CT legal framework started to make Romania a target. develop in the early 1960s, and, as expected, has undergone some 4.2. ROMANIA’S changes after 9/11, as demanded NATIONAL SYSTEM by the new security environment, ON PREVENTING AND Romania’s determination to join COMBATING TERRORISM the international arena in averting, countering, and combating terrorism, Given the multifarious, easily as well as by the requirements of adjustable, network-style nature of NATO/EU membership. Post 9/11 the terrorist groups, it became clear legislation stipulates, besides other to the Romanian security decision provisions, increased anti-terrorism makers that effectively fi ghting powers and responsibilities for the terrorism defi nitely not be the security sector, and heightened job of one agency, but rather, the cooperation. outcome of a concerted action of a A few of the most relevant AT/ variety of security institutions. In CT laws include: all thirteen United this context, in 2001, the National Nations (UN) conventions on Supreme Defense Council (CSAT), as the strategic coordinator of anti- combating terrorism; UN Security terrorism strategies and policies, Council Resolutions 1540 (on arm designated the SRI the nation’s main proliferation and ballistic missiles), authority (technical coordinator) in 1566 (against international terrorism) AT/CT activities. The SRI is hence and 1373 (which set up the Anti- authorized to conduct independently Terrorism Committee); Government or, if needed, in cooperation and Emergency Ordinance 141/2001; coordination with other security Government Emergency Ordinance forces, anti-, counter- and combating 159/2001; Law 51/1991 on National terrorism operations.[8] During the Security; Romanian Penal Code; same year, the SRI had established Law 14/1992 (which assigned SRI a Department for Preventing and the main roles and mission with Combating Terrorism (DPCT), regard to terrorism prevention and featuring a Center of Counter-Terrorist countering); Law on the approval of Operational Coordination (CCOA) the Government Emergency 1/1999 as a permanent technical coordinator on the state of siege and state of of the interacting agencies within the emergency; Law 535/2004 on National System on Preventing and preventing and combating terrorism; Combating Terrorism (SNPCT) – Law 42/2004 on the armed forces’ an integrated structure focusing on participation in missions outside prevention and countering terrorist Romanian territory; Methodology threats, which was, at that time, of the organization and execution pending becoming operational.[9] of counter-terrorism intervention The CCOA is charged with collection, analysis, and fi eld intervention. of 2006; Strategy of information [10] In 2002 a National Strategy on communication on the prevention Preventing and Combating Terrorism and limitation of a terrorist risk and was adopted, which regulates the terrorist crisis situation, of 2007; roles of all security institutions, other strategies, doctrines, and together with a General Protocol rules. on the organization and functioning of the SNPCT.[11] The SNPCT Romanian Intelligence Service became fully [12] operational in (SRI). As previously stated, AT/ 2005 after the CSAT’s adoption of a CT transformation after 9/11 has Regulation on the Organization and started with SRI’s becoming the Functioning of the CCOA. [13] The anti-terrorism leader in the country. SNPCT is tasked with preventing and Its Department for Preventing and combating terrorism via consultative, Combating Terrorism (DPCT) is the cooperative and collaborative efforts coordinator of Romania’s domestic with additional security agencies in AT/CT efforts, charged with the Romania and foreign counterparts integrated planning, organization, abroad.[14] implementation and execution of all Each SNPCT component has as activities involving the prevention, well undergone transformation in detection, and annihilation of terrorist view of better tackling the vagaries activities and actions in the country. of the world’s current security [15] Its intelligence component is landscape. This paper will further charged with collection and analysis dwell upon the transformation of the on all national security risks, security forces’ specifi c anti-terrorism challenges and threats, including roles, missions, and capabilities. terrorism. [16] DGPCT’s operational component, the AT Brigade (BA), elite intervention unit, trained in the created on the ruins of Securitate’s U.S. at Delta bases, and in Great former Special Unit for Fighting Britain at SAS facilities, which Terrorism (USLA), ensures the AT specializes in possible interventions protection of Romanian and foreign outside Romanian territory, including dignitaries, and conducts AT/CT freeing hostages and ensuring the operations in venues under attack or guard and protection of embassies seized by terrorists, being capable abroad. [19] After 9/11, the SIE also to deploy and execute ground, air, underwent a transformation and and maritime missions everywhere reorganization process, following the in Romania within two-and-a-half model of the U.S. Central Intelligence hours.[17] Agency (CIA). Foreign Intelligence Service Guard and Protection Service (SIE): The SIE ensures the collection, (SPP): The SPP is Romania’s agency assessment, and dissemination charged with the guarding and of relevant threat development protection of the life and personal (including terrorism) outside integrity of the President, as well as Romania’s territory, as well as fi eld other Romanian and foreign diplomats intervention. [18] It established an and leaders. It has collection, analysis, and fi eld intervention responsibilities sources, and uses HUMINT, IMINT, and capabilities. Its Anti-Terrorist MASINT, and SIGINT.[23] These Intervention Section (SIAT) is charged capabilities have also been used for with the prevention and countering preventing and combating maritime of terrorist risks, challenges, and terrorism at the Black Sea. [24] attacks aimed at the persons/facilities The DGIA has recently developed the SPP is safeguarding. [20] a functional cyberintelligence Ministry of Defense: Romania’s (CYBERINT) structure, charged Armed Forces are integral part of with the surveillance and collection the SNTP; since the end of the Cold from cyberspace, aimed to prevent War and especially after the terrorist and stop any malicious, hostile and attacks in the US and Europe, its anti- deceptive cyberthreats or cyberattacks terrorist units have embarked upon an to Romania’s security.[25] Its overall systematic transformation, to adjust “INT” capabilities, coupled with to the new security threats effectively, the recently adopted system of and become more interoperable with communications monitoring through NATO/EU similar structures. The satellite (MONSAT) [26] make Armed Forces’ AT/CT contribution the DGIA an effective intelligence involves intelligence, operational, with regard to asymmetrical threats, and combat actions (and adjacent including terrorism. support). Second, various MOD components First, MOD’s General Directorate have developed modern, NATO for Defense Intelligence (DGIA) interoperable AT/CT intervention ensures the military intelligence: the capabilities and task forces. The DGIA collection, processing, assessment, has a Rapid Intervention Detachment analysis, storing and utilization (DIR), charged with: guarding of information and data on all and protection of MOD facilities, security risks, challenges, and assets, leaders, and personnel, both threats (military and non-military, in Romania and abroad (including domestic and international), which those in the theaters of operations); impact Romania’s security from technical AT control and CT actions the perspective of national defense; and intervention (in cooperation counterintelligence activities; the with its SNPCT counterparts); and protection of national, NATO and guarding and protection of all foreign EU classifi ed information within military facilities and personnel the MOD; and combat and fi eld operating on the Romanian territory. interventions and operations. [27] Under DGIA also functions, [21] It contributes with Liaison since 2011, the Special Operation Offi cers (HUMINT) and analysis Force (SOF) Battalion, “Vulturii” for to the various UN, NATO or EU out-of-area operations under NATO operations. [22] The DGIA makes or Multinational Forces command. Romania one of the few NATO [28] The SOF have a land component members to have an Integrated (e.g. the 1st SF Battalion and disparate Multisource Collection Capability assets [reconnaissance, paratroopers, (IMCC), which receives information infantry, mountain troops, NBC, from theaters of operation as well engineers, communications, as from operational and strategic psychological operations, and logistical support]), a supporting air Ministry of Administration and component (e.g. fi ghters, bombers, Internal Affairs: The MIRA has transportation aircraft etc.), as well developed intelligence capabilities as a supporting naval component and AT/CT intervention teams. The (e.g. SEAL-type elements, and General Directorate for Intelligence transportation boats).[29] Its and Internal Security (DGIPI) is combating terrorism operations MIRA’s intelligence unit which encompass hostage rescue, recovery does collection and analysis on or capture of sensitive material, and terrorist threats and organized crime. the targeting of terrorist organization [36] Gendarmerie has a Special infrastructure.[30] The Navy Intervention Brigade, “Vlad Tepes”, has two NATO certifi ed SEALS Detachments, whose main AT/CT charged with countering serious and duties involve defending anchoring violent street crimes and terrorist places and deep water routes, mine activities (hostage rescuing, counter- detection and demining, defending terrorist operations, sensitive oil drilling platforms, and preventing objectives protection, etc.).[37] underwater diversions.[31] The The Brigade was named after the DNFOS conduct sea, air and land notorious king Vlad Tepes, whose missions, any time and in any place, reign was crime-free, due to the and comprise combat incursion strong hand of his rule. “Vlad Tepes” divers and command offi cers, and features, among others, the Special is part of the Special Operations Protection and Intervention Group Force Naval Group (GNFOS). [32] “Acvila”, which handles protection They are multi-tasking, in that, of dignitaries protection (especially besides divers, they are paratroopers, those who received death threats), mountain troops, scouts, and snipers. special police intervention (against [33] The Marines have the Infantry individual or organized criminals), and Battalion, an intervention unit that conducts commando operations, AT/CT intervention (in cooperation reconnaissance actions, and other. with other CT structures). [38] The [34] Border Police has the Security Rapid Third, additional AT/CT efforts Intervention Force (SASI) that fi ghts reside in the following: Air Force organized crime and terrorism at the support to CT intervention (e.g. border area. [39] personnel transportation to the Special Telecommunications immediate proximity of the risk Service (STS): The STS organizes region, combat support, evacuation, and coordinates the lawful etc.); Navy contribution with data telecommunications activities and information, transportation to the for Romania’s public authorities target, and in certain circumstances, and other users. The institution combat support; and, Army performs SIGINT functions. With contribution with infantry battalions regard to combating terrorism, (e.g. paratroopers, mountaineers), military police, NBC, engineers, STS implemented the European EOD, as well as logistic and medical emergency call number 1-1-2 in support. [35] Romania. [40] 4.3. COMBATING TERRORISM (NGOs, media, think tanks, and IS “EVERYONE’S BUSINESS” academia representatives), and even directly with the population (schools, 4.3.1. DOMESTIC EFFORTS high schools, and even kindergartens), The CSAT is the main coordinator aiming, on the one hand, at informing of Romania’s security activity. In line the population on the threats and with CSAT’s directives, policies, and challenges posed by terrorism to protocols, and in compliance with Romania’s security, explaining their a series of interagency cooperation capabilities to protect the citizens, and coordination rules, laws and and, on the other hand, encouraging regulations, all components of the the citizens to alert the security SNPCT have established coordination agencies on potential terrorist threats. and cooperation agreements among Round tables, seminars, meetings, themselves, with other security visits to education facilities are but a institutions, and with international few efforts in this context, undertaken counterparts. In addition, they by the intelligence agencies (and have also established avenues of even their anti-terrorist intervention communication, information and units). [46] These endeavors seem to collaboration with representatives have served their purposes; not only of civil society. All these have have the citizens become more aware paved the way toward information of the terrorist threats to Romania’s and intelligence sharing, common national, regional and international education and training, mutual security, but they have also become support (with regard to personnel, more willing to notify the security education and training), and joint institutions on threats. As former fi eld and combat operations. SIE director Ioan Talpes noted, much The CSAT issued a cooperation of the information that contributed protocol among all security to averting and combating terrorist institutions to enable information threats in Romania came from the and intelligence sharing. [41] The populace. [47] intelligence agencies have additional specifi c protocols on sharing, 4.3.2. INTERNATIONAL protection of classifi ed information, OUTREACH SIGINT, and monitoring satellite AND COOPERATION communications. [42] Anti-terrorist Romania has also been an active brigades and intervention units of supporter of the global efforts aimed the anti-terrorist system are training to deny terrorists and terrorist groups together, [43] exchange personnel the oxygen of evil doing. To this end, [44], and act together [45] under the immediately after 9/11, Romania SRI’s coordination. fully supported NATO’s decision Since “security is everyone’s on the implementation of Article 5 business”, the security organizations of the Washington Treaty, allowed (including intelligence) have also U.S. aircraft to utilize its airspace established communications and for combat actions in Afghanistan, information avenues with the civilian contributed military troops, police and decision makers (executive and intelligence personnel for NATO’s legislative members), civil society missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan, joined the Coalition of the willing collective security organizations, in Iraq, and dynamically engaged have participated in numerous in the myriad global, regional and common training programs and subregional collaborative AT/CT exercises with U.S., French, and U.K. enterprises. [48] counterparts. DIR has been actively Within the UN, NATO, EU, participating in all NATO and the International Criminal Police non-NATO anti-terrorist exercises Organization (INTERPOL), etc., as organized by the Romanian Armed well as within various international Forces, joint exercises with the 1st networks of countering terrorist Battalion/10th Special Forces Group fi nancing (e.g. Egmont Group), (Airborne), U.S. Special Operations Romania’s security agencies have Command Europe, or with Bulgarian been active participants and positive and Serbian counterparts (on border forces in supporting security and and counter-terrorism issues).[52] security cooperation.[49] In South With regard to the armed forces Eastern Europe (SEE), Romania AT/CT cooperation, besides the has been participating in a variety Romania’s military participation in of either bilateral or subregional NATO exercises, relevant, too, are collective security initiatives and the naval operations “NATO Active institutions, including the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative Endeavour” and “Black Sea Harmony”, (SECI) Center for Combating Trans which brought together various Border Crime, European Network South Eastern European countries, and Information Security Agency and the effective counter-terrorism (ENSIA), European Police Offi ce simulations within the South Eastern (EUROPOL), International Bomb Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM). Data Center, Balkan Communication [53] Network, numerous Black Sea On the same note, within the cooperative initiatives, the Brdo framework of EUROPOL, besides Process, the Regional Arms Control cooperation with EU members, Verifi cation and Implementation Romania’s law enforcement agencies Assistance Center (RACVIAC), and cooperate and share information with others.[50] counterparts from various countries and organizations, including As intelligence agencies are fi rst countries from SEE countries that in line of AT/CT defense, and from are not members of the EU (e.g. the premise of 'fi ghting networks with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, networks', Romania’s intelligence Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic agencies have established specifi c of Macedonia, and Turkey).[54] intelligence sharing and exchange Likewise, within the SECI Center’s mechanisms with foreign partners, on Anti-Terrorism Task Force Romania’s information sharing, mutual support law enforcement agencies have been (including fi nancial, acquisitions cooperating with SEE counterparts, and procurement), visits, and joint through regular meetings, as well training.[51] SIE, SRI and SPP as information and experience intervention teams, either based on exchange and sharing.[55] It is bilateral agreements, or under the also worth mentioning Romania’s umbrella of the previously-mentioned MIRA AT/CT brigades joint training and exchange of expertise with also obstructed the modernization international counterparts, especially of some security agencies, including from Germany. AT/CT transformation.[57] Third, resources and resource 4.4. ANALYSIS OF ROMANIA’S allocation are essential in achieving ANTI-TERRORISM effectiveness. [58] Some special EFFECTIVENESS: intervention units are still in need CHALLENGES AND of up-to-date equipment and assets. ACCOMPLISHMENTS For example, parts of the deep sea Romania has implemented diving techniques within the Military dramatic changes in its security Divers Center where DNFOS and system since the end of Communism EOD detachments are trained is thirty and accession to NATO and the EU years old and needed to be replaced to better fi ght current security threats, a while ago; due to limited resources, including terrorism. Yet, these upgrading of the technique has been changes did not happen overnight; incremental.[59] they involved a lot of work, efforts, Fourth, and most important, even and willingness, and had to face a with a rather solid legal framework series of challenges. for cooperation, developing security First is the challenge of time: it cooperation (including in the fi eld takes time to build professionalism of anti-terrorism) in Romania has and expertise. With regard to been cumbersome, due to agencies’ intelligence, for example, the purge rigidifi ed bureaucratic environment of former Securitate personnel (which has delayed and/or (mainly those involved in abuses hindered information sharing and and transgressions during the collaboration), too many intelligence communist regime) from the post- agencies (which fueled dishonest communist agencies left a vacuum competition and rivalry among of expertise in the new structures. agencies, because of redundancy Recruiting, educating and training and overlapping roles and missions), new collection agents, analysts and politicization, and political infi ghting. even intervention personnel has been [60] Security and intelligence an onerous process.[56] In the same cooperation/collaboration is still an context, since expertise requires issue, in that some agencies still prefer time to build, some of the AT/CT bilateral approaches, while others are units have become operational and still reluctant to share information, interoperable after a few years since especially in a multilateral format, establishment, while others are yet to unless a crisis comes up.[61] be fully operational. Fifth, Cooperation at the Second, parts of the legal international level was also diffi cult framework on security are obsolete, at fi rst; Romania remained isolated enacted when Romania was not a from the West, as many NATO and member of any regional collective Western counterparts were reluctant security organization, and was to share information with Romanian surrounded by a different geopolitical intelligence personnel who had context, in which the terrorist threat previously worked for the Securitate was not as high as now; these have and remained employed by the agencies after the regime change in their AT/CT collectors and analysts, December 1989.[62] In addition, AT/ revamped and strengthened the CT cooperation among the countries interoperability of their intervention of South Eastern Europe (including and combat units (especially as a Romania) has been hampered by a result of NATO/EU membership), series of discrepancies in terms of and deployed professional teams in country development, institution- the theaters, capable to effectively building, and European and Euro- predict, avert, and counter concrete Atlantic integration; hence different security risk factors and crises.[65] paces of security sector reform (SSR) At the domestic level stand and transformation, different counter- out the numerous AT/CT cases of terrorism and organized crime effectiveness [66], a direct outcome legislation, resources, capabilities, of the robust security transformation, methods, and equipment.[63] on the one hand, and of improved Sixth, and related to the previous collaborative [67] actions of the point, problematic too, could be the intelligence agencies, police, existence of too many intervention and other security organizations, units, which may, at a minimum, seconded by Romania’s willingness become a bureaucratic burden, due to to contribute to the international potential overlapping and duplication conjugated efforts to stave off of responsibilities and missions. terrorism.[68] At the international Seventh, the security institutions, level (especially in Iraq and in particular intelligence agencies, Afghanistan), stand out Romania’s have been the subjects of various effective HUMINT, IMINT and media scandals due to negligence GEOINT capabilities within hostile (e.g. avoiding to monitor a Romanian operational environments.[69] businessman of Syrian origin, Romania’s professionalism and charged with terrorism, who later expertise has led to the establishment disappeared), malfeasance (using in Romania (as a NATO decision) terrorism prevention to wiretap of a NATO HUMINT Center of innocent people), leak of classifi ed Excellence (COE), which ensures information (e.g. information HUMINT training, participates in involving AT/CT issues), and NATO documents development, politicization; these practices have and other issues related to NATO affected the overall security reform standardization process.[70] In process, which also impacted the AT/ addition, SPP offi cers have proved CT transformation.[64] professionalism when conduction In time, Romania’s security guard and protection missions of agencies have been able to overcome various UN offi cials in Sudan, Iraq these challenges and, through and Afghanistan, which may lead to elaborated transformation endeavors the creation of a center of excellence in terms of personnel, structure, (both training and research and organization, resources, and development) in Romania, in support acquisitions, become more effective of UN activities.[71] and more network-like, both internally On the other hand, to overcome and abroad. Romania’s counter challenges to the democratization of terrorism forces have transformed the security forces (e.g. intelligence), and prevent the use of “terrorism collection, analysis, dissemination of prevention” as a pretext for abuses, relevant and timely information to the the Romanian authorities, whether national and international decision pressured by the civil society and makers; assets and capabilities of international partners, or following effective AT/CT intervention; team their own will to change, have players and professionals in the CT institutionalized processes to support coalitions within various theaters of both the effectiveness of the security operations. Their professionalism agencies, as well transparency and and effectiveness in the joint fi ght democratic control. [72] of terrorism has been repeatedly recognized by foreign counterparts. 5. CONCLUSIONS [74] Based on the principle of Terrorism is omnipresent and no indivisible and cooperative security, country (Romania included) is exempt Romania’s security forces (with from its threats and challenges; as intelligence in the fi rst line) will former SRI Director Radu Timofte continue their involvement in the once stated, “Al-Qaeda does not international and regional efforts to wear a 'visitor' badge when present in stop terrorism. one country or another”. [73] Events In South Eastern Europe, like 9/11 were not isolated, one- Romania is well linked with other time, singular actions, but part of a SEE countries (which share similar progressive chain of vitriolic terrorist security concerns and challenges) in attacks (Madrid, London, Istanbul, the fi ght against terrorism, through Sharm el Sheikh, Mumbai, Bombay, several cooperative mechanisms, and others). Romania has been a ranging from bilateral agreements and vehement opponent of terrorism subregional arrangements, to regional and terrorist attacks, as well as an organizations and alliances. The active participant in the international Romanian security forces’ profuse endeavors to curb it. connection with SEE countries Since the regime change in involves, on the other hand, habitual 1989, and especially after the meetings, experience and information terrorist attacks in the United States sharing avenues, common education, in 2001, Romania has embarked training, and exercises on anti- upon a comprehensive reform and counter- and combating terrorism transformation process aimed on the issues, and, on the other hand, joint one hand at the democratization of AT/CT interventions and missions. its security forces, and, on the other Effective AT/CT responses in SEE are hand, at their effectiveness in fi ghting due, besides others, to the Romanian the post-Cold War security threats security forces’ contribution, too. and challenges, including terrorism. Admittedly, challenges have In time and after having totally or tested and will keep testing partially overcome a number of South Eastern Europe’s security challenges, Romania’s security forces cooperation. Yet, despite any present are now full and effective contributors or future challenges, SEE’s fi ght to the international fi ght against against terrorism will continue to terrorism, at national and international benefi t from Romania’s important levels, as follows: capabilities of geostrategic position, good relations with its neighbors and other ACKNOWLEDGMENT regional partners, and reliable AT/ This article was originally CT capabilities. Romania’s security published in BIlten Slovenske Vojske forces will strengthen their AT/ (SLOVENIA), a prestigious Journal CT contribution to NATO, EU of the Slovenian Armed Forces, in (EUROPOL), and the SECI Center, March 2010. will maintain and improve bilateral Cris Matei is a Lecturer at and trilateral cooperation and the Center for Civil-Military information sharing with those SEE Relations (CCMR), located at the countries that are not (yet) NATO/ Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), EU members (while supporting and Monterey, CA, USA. The views assisting the membership efforts of expressed in this paper do not refl ect SEE NATO/EU aspirant countries), the policy or view of the United and will deepen cooperation at the States’ Government, Department of Black Sea. Defense, or Department of Navy.

ENDNOTES the Fatah Revolutionary Council Kurdistan Workers' Party – PKK), Grey Wolves, [1] Laslau, Andi, 2005. Arabii din Revolutionary People's Liberation Front - Romania, radiografi e completa. Evenimentul (DHKP-C), Al Saika. See: Radu Tudor, Zilei, April 27. Terrorist groups in Romania. Jane's [2] Radu Tudor, Terrorist groups in Intelligence Review, January 01, 2002; Romania. Jane's Intelligence Review, Valentin Bolocan, Sustinatori ai Al-Qaida January 01, 2002. actioneaza in Romania. Curierul National, [3] Three are independent: Romanian September 5, 2005; Florina Cristiana (Cris) Intelligence Service (SRI), Foreign Matei. Romania's Intelligence Community: Intelligence Service (SIE), Guard and From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Protection Service (SPP), and Special Serving Democracy. International Journal Telecommunication Service (STS); and, of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, three ministerial: MIRA General Directorate December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629- for Intelligence and Internal Protection 660; Andi Laslau, Arabii din Romania, (DGIPI), MOD Directorate for General radiografi e completa. Evenimentul Zilei, Information of the Army (DGIA). April 27, 2005. [4] Gheorghe Vaduva, Terorismul [7] The Muslim/Arab population in contemporan – factor de risc la adresa Romania is better integrated than in other securităţii şi apărării naţionale, în condiţiile countries, and, there is a warm relationship statutului României de membru NATO. between Romania and Arab and Muslim Bucharest: Editura Universităţii Naţionale world going back to the Cold War. Florina de Apărare, 2005, pp. 1-47. Cristiana (Cris) Matei, The Challenges [5] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, of Intelligence Sharing in Romania. Romania's Intelligence Community: Intelligence and National Security, no. 24, From an Instrument of Dictatorship to issue 4, August, 2009, pp. 574-585. Serving Democracy. International Journal [8] Marius Dumitru Craciun, Operaţii of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, speciale contrateroriste în Marea Neagră – December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629- posibile obiective, proceduri şi pachete de 660. forţe necesare, in Constantin Mostofl ei, [6] Terrorist organizations have had active Strategii de apărare şi securitate la frontiera cells in Romania since Nicolae Ceausescu's răsăriteană a NATO şi UE, vol. 1. Bucharest: tightly controlled regime: Muslim Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare, Brotherhood, Hamas, Hizbullah, Party of 2006, pp. 159-178; Vasile Bogdan, Grupul de Islamic Freedom; Palestinian Liberation scafandri de incursiune - structură destinată Front; The Abu Nidal Organisation (aka intervenţiei antiteroriste/contrateroriste în zona Mării Negre in Constantin Mostofl ei, of Law 535/2004 that stipulates the roles and Strategii de apărare şi securitate la frontiera institutions in the SNPCT. http://www.sri.ro/ răsăriteană a NATO şi UE, vol. 1. Bucharest: categorii/23/antiterorism--contraterorism. Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare, html;http://www.sri.ro/categorii/23/ 2006, pp. 159-178. antiterorism--contraterorism.html [9] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, [14]http://www.sri.ro/categorii/23/ Romania's Intelligence Community: antiterorism--contraterorism.html; From an Instrument of Dictatorship to “Activitatea Naţională de Prevenire şi Serving Democracy. International Journal Combatere a Terorismului”, Intelligence, of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, no. 11, May 2008, www.sri.ro, (November December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007. pp. 629- 10, 2009). 660. The system comprises the following [15] For details on the wide spectrum agencies: CSAT; all security forces; of roles and missions of the System, see: Prosecutor’s Offi ce attached to the High http://www.sri.ro/categorii/23/antiterorism-- Court of Cassation and Justice; Ministry contraterorism.html; “Activitatea Naţională of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Economy de Prevenire şi Combatere a Terorismului”, and Commerce; Ministry of Agriculture, Intelligence, no. 11, May 2008, www.sri.ro, Forrest and Rural Development; Ministry (November 10, 2009). of Environment and Water Management; [16] Gheorghe Vaduva, Terorismul Ministry of Transport, Building and contemporan – factor de risc la adresa Tourism; Ministry of Health; Ministry of securităţii şi apărării naţionale, în condiţiile Communication and Information; Ministry statutului României de membru NATO. of Technology; Ministry of Public Finance; Bucharest: Editura Universităţii Naţionale Ministry of European Integration; Ministry of de Apărare, 2005, pp. 1-47. Justice; Romania’s National Bank; National [17]http://www.sri.ro/categorii/23/ Agency for Exports Control; National Offi ce antiterorism--contraterorism.html, for Preventing and Countering Money (December 17, 2009). Laundering; National Commission for the [18]http://www.sri.ro/categorii/23/ Control of Nuclear Activities. Profi l, no. 8, antiterorism--contraterorism.html, August 2005, pp. 1-36, www.sri.ro, pp. 1-36 (December 17, 2009); also, see Florina (February 02, 2007). Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Romania's [10] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Intelligence Community: From an Instrument Romania's Intelligence Community: of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy. From an Instrument of Dictatorship to International Journal of Intelligence and Serving Democracy. International Journal CounterIntelligence, December, vol. 20, no. of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 4, 2007, pp. 629-660. December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629- [19] http://www.dci.ro/En/Arhiva/ 660. interviu3.html, (December, 15, 2009). [11]http://www.sri.ro/categorii/23/ [20] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, antiterorism--contraterorism.html; 2008, Romania's Intelligence Community: “Activitatea Naţională de Prevenire şi From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Combatere a Terorismului”, Intelligence, Serving Democracy. International Journal no. 11, May, www.sri.ro; “24 Decembrie. of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Ziua Luptătorului Antiterorist”, Intelligence, December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629- no. 14, December 2008 - February 2009, 660. pp. 43-45, www.sri.ro, (November 10, 2009). [21] “Trupe Speciale la Brasov”, Ziua, [12] The System had been partially http://stiri.kappa.ro/actualitate/03-10-2006/ operational since 2004, with the enactment trupe-speciale-la-brasov-107161.html; of Law 535/2004 that stipulates the roles and http://www.spp.ro/misiuni.htm; http://www. institutions in the SNPCT. http://www.sri. spp.ro/orgchart.htm, (December 20, 2009). ro/categorii/23/antiterorism--contraterorism. [22] Gheorghe Savu, Direcţia Generală de html;http://www.sri.ro/categorii/23/ Informaţii a Apărării - prezent şi perspective. antiterorism--contraterorism.html ; Infosfera, no. 3, 2009, pp. 13-16. [13] The System had been partially [23] DGIA has a HUMINT battalion. operational since 2004, with the enactment “Batalionul HUMINT la 5 ani de la infi intare”, http://www.stirilocale.ro/ Batalionul_Humint_la_5_ani_de_la_ Divers, and, the Special Operation Force infi intare_IDN9878.html, (December 21, Naval Detachment Alpha 1 (DNFOS 1). 2009). Also, on analysis, see Gheorghe Marius Dumitru Craciun, Operaţii speciale Rotaru, Importanţa înfi inţării Direcţiei contrateroriste în Marea Neagră – posibile generale de informaţii a apărării în cadrul obiective, proceduri şi pachete de forţe procesului de transformare a armatei române. necesar’, in Constantin Mostofl ei, Strategii Infosfera, no. 3, 2009, pp. 17-21. de apărare şi securitate la frontiera [24] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, răsăriteană a NATO şi UE, vol. 1. Bucharest: Romania's Intelligence Community: Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare, From an Instrument of Dictatorship to 2006, pp. 159-178; Mihnea Petru Parvu, Serving Democracy. International Journal Marinarii din Adancuri. Romania Libera: of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Editia Online, September 29, 2006; Simona December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629- Rus, Modernizarea Grupelor de Scafandri 660. EOD. Gandirea Militara Romaneasca, May- [25] Gheorghe Rotaru, Importanţa June, 2007, pp. 101-107. înfi inţării direcţiei generale de informaţii a [33] http://www.navy.ro/media/rmr/ apărării în cadrul procesului de transformare rmr119.pdf, (December 20, 2009); Marina a armatei române. Infosfera, no. 3, 2009, Romana, Special Edition, no. 2 (132) 2009; pp. 17-21. Darius Martinescu, SEAL-ul Romanesc [26] Ilie Botos, Direcţia generală de se Antreneaza in Tacere. Romania Libera, informaţii a apărării, principala capabilitate a October 13, 2008; Simona Rus, Modernizarea Ministerului Apărării Naţionale în prevenirea Grupelor de Scafandri EOD. Gandirea şi combaterea ameninţărilor asimetrice. Militara Romaneasca, May-June, 2007, pp. Infosfera, no. 3, 2009, pp. 35-40. 101-107; MIhnea Petru Parvu, Marinarii din [27] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Adancuri. Romania Libera: Editia Online, The Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in September 29, 2006. Romania. Intelligence and National Security, [34] Discussion with Romanian MOD no. 24, issue 4, August, 2009, pp. 574-585. offi cers. [28] Doru Dragomir, Hackerii Armatei. [35] Observatorul Militar, no. 19 (May Ziua, January 23, 2009; Gheorghe Savu, 20–26, 2009); Revista Marina, no. 5 (127) Direcţia Generală de Informaţii a Apărării - 2008, Marina Romana, Special Edition, prezent şi perspective. Infosfera, no. 3, 2009, no. 2 (132) 2009 pp. 13-16; Gheorghe Rotaru, Importanţa [36] Vasile Bogdan, Grupul de scafandri de înfi inţării Direcţiei generale de informaţii a incursiune - structură destinată intervenţiei apărării în cadrul procesului de transformare antiteroriste /contrateroriste în zona mării a armatei române. Infosfera, no. 3, 2009, negre in Constantin Mostofl ei, Strategii de pp. 17-21. apărare şi securitate la frontiera răsăriteană [29] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, a NATO şi UE, vol. 1. Bucharest: Editura Romania's Intelligence Community: Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare, 2006, From an Instrument of Dictatorship to pp. 159-178. Serving Democracy. International Journal [37] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Romania's Intelligence Community: December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629-660. From an Instrument of Dictatorship to The Special Operations were up until 2011 Serving Democracy. International Journal under the command of the General Staff. of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, [30] Dan Cucu, Romanian Special Forces: December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629- Identifying Appropriate Missions and 660. Organizational Structure, Monterey: Naval [38] “Bataie cu jandarmii in Piata Charles Postgraduate School, 2004, pp. 1-125. de Gaulle”, Ziua Online, March 3, 2008, [31] Claudiu O. Dobocan, Decisions http://www.ziua.net/news.php?data=2008- Integration: A Critical Necessity for Special 03-03&id=4119, (December 19, 2009). Operations. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate [39] http://romanianspecialforces.com/ School, 2004, pp. 1-161. acvila.html; “Acvila” va functiona in [32] The Detachments are: Detachment cadrul Brigazii Speciale de Interventie of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) a Jandarmeriei, March 16, 2009, http:// www.frontnews.ro/social-si-economic/ Darius Martinescu, SEAL-ul Romanesc eveniment/luptatorii-acvila-ameninta-cu- se Antreneaza in Tacere. Romania Libera, demisia-o-unitate-de-elita-nu-poate-lucra- October 13, 2008. cu-birocratie-26878; “Luptatorii "Acvila" [46] With regard to AT intervention, for ameninta cu demisia: O unitate de elita example, when MOD targets are involved, nu poate lucra cu birocratie”, http://www. the main units operating are DIR, SOF frontnews.ro/social-si-economic/eveniment/ “Vulturii” Battalion, and (GNFOS), but only luptatorii-acvila-ameninta-cu-demisia- in cooperation with the SRI and, if needed, o-unitate-de-elita-nu-poate-lucra-cu- with other security forces. If the target is birocratie-26878; “Trupe Speciale la Brasov”, a vessel, hijacked by terrorists within the Ziua, http://stiri.kappa.ro/actualitate/03-10- territorial waters, intervention is ensured by 2006/trupe-speciale-la-brasov-107161.html, SRI’ unit and MOD, under SRI’s command, (December 20, 2009). while if the target is outside territorial waters, [40]http://torun.indymedia.org/4564; MOD forces could intervene, but only with http://www.igpr.ro/siias.htm (December 20, CSAT approval. The MOD, MIRA and SRI 2009). have also cooperated in ensuring protection [41] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, and guard activities for rotation the foreign Romania's Intelligence Community: troop in the Balkans theaters. For more From an Instrument of Dictatorship to information, see: Vasile Bogdan, Grupul de Serving Democracy. International Journal scafandri de incursiune - structură destinată of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, intervenţiei antiteroriste /contrateroriste în December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629- zona Mării Negre, in Constantin Mostofl ei, 660. Strategii de apărare şi securitate la frontiera [42] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, răsăriteană a NATO şi UE, vol. 1. Bucharest: Romania's Intelligence Community: Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare, From an Instrument of Dictatorship to 2006, pp. 159-178; Marius Dumitru Crăciun, Serving Democracy. International Journal Operaţii speciale contrateroriste în Marea of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Neagră – posibile obiective, proceduri şi December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629- pachete de forţe necesar”, in Constantin 660; Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, The Mostofl ei, Strategii de apărare şi securitate Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in la frontiera răsăriteană a NATO şi UE, vol. 1. Romania. Intelligence and National Security, Bucharest: Editura Universităţii Naţionale no. 24, issue 4, August, 2009, pp. 574-585. de Apărare, 2006, pp. 159-178; Gheorghe [43] Gheorghe Savu, Direcţia Generală de Savu, Direcţia Generală de Informaţii a Informaţii a Apărării - prezent şi perspective. Apărării - prezent şi perspective. Infosfera, Infosfera, no. 3, 2009, pp. 13-16. no. 3, 2009, pp. 13-16; Doru Dragomir, [44] MIRA, SRI, SPP have common CT Hackerii Armatei. Ziua, January 23, 2008; exercises. They also invite other Romanian Gheorghe Rotaru, Importanţa înfi inţării counterparts and foreign guests; in 2006 they direcţiei generale de informaţii a apărării în invited FBI agents operating in Romania, cadrul procesului de transformare a armatei Israel military attaché in Romania, DIICOT române. Infosfera, no. 3, 2009, pp. 17-21. personnel etc. “Trupe Speciale la Brasov”, [47] Relevant is the campaign “Terrorism Ziua, http://stiri.kappa.ro/actualitate/03-10- … Near Us” of the SRI (which also involves 2006/trupe-speciale-la-brasov-107161.html; its AT Brigade). MIRA’s intervention units Likewise, AT/CT intervention teams of SRI, also go to kindergartens and schools to MOD, MIRA have specifi c common naval explain their capabilities (Source: discussion AT/CT training. http://www.cronicaromana. with Romanian police offi cers, 2009). Also, ro/stiri-58.html, (December 20, 2009) see Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Romania's [45] SRI DA assists SPP with AT protection Intelligence Community: From an Instrument of offi cials, whenever they face terrorist of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy. threats. Some SPP personnel come from the International Journal of Intelligence and Marines’ Infantry Battalion. Radu Tudor, CounterIntelligence, December, vol. 20, no. 4, Romania's Anti-terrorist Brigade extends 2007, pp. 629-660. co-operation in fi ght against terror, Jane’s [48] Marius Diac, În ultimii doi ani, în Intelligence Review, January 01, 2002; România au fost preîntâmpinate patru atentate teroriste. Adevărul, January 13, 2004. [49] Apart from combat troops, Romania’s Savu, Direcţia Generală de Informaţii a contribution encompasses AT/CT and Apărării - prezent şi perspective. Infosfera, intelligence units, as follows: in Bosnia- no. 3, 2009, pp. 13-16. Herzegovina and Kosovo, with National [54] Marius Dumitru Craciun, Operaţii Intelligence Cells (RONIC), police personnel speciale contrateroriste în Marea Neagră – and divers of the Marines’ Infantry Battalion; posibile obiective, proceduri şi pachete de in Afghanistan, with a Detachment of forţe necesare, in Constantin Mostofl ei, Intelligence and Counterintelligence, and Strategii de apărare şi securitate la frontiera SOF; and in Iraq, with a Military Intelligence răsăriteană a NATO şi UE, vol. 1. Bucharest: Detachment. See: Florina Cristiana (Cris) Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare, Matei, The Challenges of Intelligence 2006, pp. 159-178; Iztok Prezelj, Counter- Sharing in Romania. Intelligence and Terrorism Cooperation in South Eastern National Security, no. 24, issue 4, August, Europe: Analysis of an Example of SEDM 2009, pp. 574-585; Mihai Diac, Misiune Regional Initiative. Bilten Slovenske Vojske, “Vulturii” zboară spre est. Armata Română 10/Št. 3, September, 2008, pp. 58-82. a trimis în Afganistan un nou detaşament de [55] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, forţe speciale. Gandul, October 9, 2007. Combating Terrorism and Organized [50] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Crime: South Eastern Europe Collective Romania's Intelligence Community: Approaches. Bilten Slovenske Vojske, 10/ From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Št. 3, September, 2008, pp. 36-58. Serving Democracy. International Journal [56] http://www.secicenter.org/p263/Anti_ of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Terrorism_Task_Force, (January 11, 2010). December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629- [57] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, 660; Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, The Reconciling Intelligence Effectiveness Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in and Transparency: The Case of Romania. Romania. Intelligence and National Security, Strategic Insights, vol. IV, issue 3, May, 2007; no. 24, issue 4, August, 2009, pp. 574-585. Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Romania's [51] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Intelligence Community: From an Instrument Romania's Intelligence Community: of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy. From an Instrument of Dictatorship to International Journal of Intelligence and Serving Democracy. International Journal CounterIntelligence, December, vol. 20, of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, no. 4, pp. 629-660. December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629- [58] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, The Legal Framework for Intelligence in Post- 660; Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, The Communist Romania, International Journal Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, vol. Romania. Intelligence and National Security, 22, issue 4, December, 2009, pp. 667-698. no. 24, issue 4, August, 2009, pp. 574-585; [59] Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Combating Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Toward a New Terrorism and Organized Crime: South Conceptualization of Democratization and Eastern Europe Collective Approaches. Civil-Military Relations. Democratization, Bilten Slovenske Vojske, 10/Št. 3, September, vol. 15, no. 5, December, 2008, pp. 909- 2008, pp. 36-58. 929. [52] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, [60] Darius Martinescu, SEAL-ul Romania's Intelligence Community: Romanesc se Antreneaza in Tacere. Romania From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Libera, October 13, 2008. Serving Democracy. International Journal [61] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, The Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629- Romania. Intelligence and National Security, 660; Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, The no. 24, issue 4, August, 2009, pp. 574-585. Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in [62] Discussions with intelligence, military Romania. Intelligence and National Security, and police personnel. no. 24, issue 4, August, 2009, pp. 574-585. [63] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, [53] Emil Olaru, Aspecte din activitatea The Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in detaşamentului de intervenţie rapidă, Romania. Intelligence and National Security, Infosfera, no. 3, 2009, pp. 50-52; Gheorghe no. 24, issue 4, August, 2009, pp. 574-585. [64] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, [69] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, The Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in Reconciling Intelligence Effectiveness Romania. Intelligence and National Security, and Transparency: The Case of Romania. no. 24, issue 4, August, 2009, pp. 574-585. Strategic Insights, vol. IV, issue 3, May, 2007; [65] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Romania's Reconciling Intelligence Effectiveness Intelligence Community: From an Instrument and Transparency: The Case of Romania. of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy. Strategic Insights, vol. IV, issue 3, May, 2007; International Journal of Intelligence and Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Romania's CounterIntelligence, December, vol. 20, no. Intelligence Community: From an Instrument 4, 2007, pp. 629-660. of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy. [70] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, International Journal of Intelligence and Romania's Intelligence Community: CounterIntelligence, December, vol. 20, From an Instrument of Dictatorship to no. 4, 2007, pp. 629-660; Florina Cristiana Serving Democracy. International Journal (Cris) Matei, The Challenges of Intelligence of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Sharing in Romania. Intelligence and National December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629- Security, no. 24, issue 4, August, 2009, 660. pp. 574-585; Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, [71] Sergiu Medar, Cooperarea dintre The Legal Framework for Intelligence in Post- structurile de informaţii ale armatei române Communist Romania, International Journal şi serviciile străine de informaţii. Infosfera, of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, vol. no. 3, 2009, pp. 22-26; Emil Olaru, Aspecte 22, issue 4, December, 2009, pp. 667-698. din activitatea detaşamentului de intervenţie [66] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, rapidă, Infosfera, no. 3, 2009, pp. 50- Romania's Intelligence Community: 52; Gheorghe Savu, Direcţia Generală de From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Informaţii a Apărării - prezent şi perspective. Serving Democracy. International Journal Infosfera, no. 3, 2009, pp. 13-16. of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, [72] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629- The Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in 660; Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, The Romania. Intelligence and National Security, Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in no. 24, issue 4, August, 2009, pp. 574-585. Romania. Intelligence and National Security, [73] Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina no. 24, issue 4, August, 2009, pp. 574-585. Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Toward a New [67] Cases solved include: in 2005, Conceptualization of Democratization and annihilation of an Islamic radical group Civil-Military Relations. Democratization, of fi ve al-Qaeda members, which had vol. 15, no. 5, December, 2008, pp. 909-929; recruited new followers in Romania and Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana tried to recruit foreign citizens of the (Cris) Matei, Intelligence in the Developing Muslim religion; in 2006, the apprehension Democracies: The Quest for Transparency of a Jordanian suspected of allegiance and Effectiveness, in Loch K. Johnson ed., to the Muslim Brothers group; in 2006, The Oxford Handbook of National Security arresting in Timisoara a bomb plot suspect Intelligence. Oxford: Oxford University suspected of affi liation to several terrorist Press, 2010, pp. 1-912. organizations and planning to stage a [74] “Radu Timofte: “Al-Qaeda nu poarta terror attack in response to the close U.S.– ecuson de “vizitator”’, http://www.phg.ro/ Romania relationship “24 Decembrie. Ziua stire.php?id=4608&cat_id=10, (December Luptatorului Antiterorist’, Intelligence, no. 20, 2009). 14, December 2008 – February 2009, pp. 43- [75] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, 45, www.sri.ro, (November 10, 2009). Romania's Intelligence Community: [68] Notable are the expedite information From an Instrument of Dictatorship to and intelligence sharing via a common data Serving Democracy. International Journal based used by all security institutions, and of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, the CSAT-created National Intelligence December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629- Community (CNI) set up to foster interagency 660. cooperation and coordination.