NAMUN2015 Specilalized Agency MONGOLIAN INVASIONS

Background Guide DEAR DELEGATES: Welcome to the 30th North American Model United Nations in Toronto! As delegates for the Mongolian Invasion, you will spend the next four days assuming the perspective of an ancient personality for a debate that promises to be instructive, innovative, entertaining, and challenging. Before your topics are detailed, allow me to introduce you to the other staff of this committee.

My name is Korto Zambeli-Tardif and I will serve as your Chair for the Mongolian Invasions Committee. I am a second-year student at the University of Toronto, where I am studying for majors in History and French Language and Literature. As my areas of interest suggest, I spend my free time scouring databases for historical trivia, which makes me thrilled to be participating in university-level Model United Nations for the first time. My esteemed and equally enthusiastic fellow staff members include the Vice-Director Eitan Morris, Moderator Aizhan Zakai, and Crisis Officers Benson Cheung and Ana Gonzalez.

This committee involves a historical role-play in which you will assume the identity and perspective of actual historical figures. The following pages will outline the history of the , as well as significant topics that arose after their unification. As delegates, you will have to confront and address issues of loyalty, governorship, conquest, strategy, and, most of all, historical responsibility. This committee will operate within a defined framework of adherence to Mongolian history. The best delegate is one who can propose effective solutions to problems faced by the Mongols, while respecting the range of cultural practices and likely actions that the historical actors would plausibly take. The following background guide will therefore define the parameters of your actions as delegates in the coming days, as you address and resolve the proposed topics. It is important to note that while this background guide will provide you with basic information and a starting point for your research, it is by no means comprehensive – individual research on these vastly complex topics is expected.

1 I welcome you all once again to NAMUN 2015. I have every confidence that together we can create a realistic, exciting, and fun committee. For any further information on the conference, including rules of procedure, the NAMUN website at www.namun.org is available. If you would like specific information on this committee, feel free to e-mail me at kortozambelitardif@ mail.utoronto.ca. Happy debating!

Sincerely,

Hrayr Tumasyan Aizhan Zakai

Chair, Mongol Invasions Moderator, Mongol Invasions

Ana Gonzalez Bensong Cheng

Crisis Officer, Mongol Invasions Crisis Officer, Mongol Invasions

Eitan Morris

Vice Director, SA

2 History of the Committee The steppe of was home to a variety of nomadic tribes in the decades preceding the birth of Genghis and the unexpected, overwhelming rise of the Mongols as a dominant Asian and European power. Despite sharing a and pursuing the same general lifestyle, the various tribes were hardly united under a common identity.1 The Mongols shared the steppe with several other ethnic groups living a nomadic existence and maintained contentious trade relationships with sedentary and merchant powers.

The two basic units of Mongolian society were the clan and tribe. A clan was known either as the oboq or the uruq. While the latter was a patrilineal kin group descending from a defined, legitimate ancestor, the oboq descended from an ancestor who was mostly, if not entirely, mythical.2 Images of these ancestors were revered and worshipped as part of the constantly developing Mongol religion.3 Membership to a clan was usually determined by blood; anyone born into a clan automatically belonged to it until the eventuality of marriage to someone in another clan. However, direct familial ties were not the only way to enter a clan. An important part of Mongolian society was the institution of anda, or sworn brotherhood. Anda allowed an entire clan to form an alliance with another with a common political goal, thereby tying the clans together as though they were actually related by blood. A similar provision existed for an individual to pledge his services to the leader of his choice. In such a case, the man’s blood loyalty to his own clan would have to be abandoned before he could be welcomed to another. This system was known as nökör.4

Tribes, meanwhile, were conglomerations of clans. The Mongols were ruled by chiefs who were chosen from among the noble families of the tribe. The position of chief did not necessarily remain in a family line, nor did the choice of leader adhere to the wishes of the preceding chief. Instead, chiefs were chosen from among the pool of available noble candidates by the quriltai, a council also composed of nobles. Although all the power for choosing a leader lay in the hands of elites, this system did not easily lend itself to

1 Jack Weatherford, The Secret History of the Mongol Queens (New York: Broadway Paperbacks, 2010), 13. 2 Paul D. Buell, Historical Dictionary of the Mongol World Empire (Oxford: Scarecrow Press Inc., 2003), 5. 3 David Morgan, The Mongols (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 38. 4 Ibid, 34.

3 widespread oppression at the hands of an autocrat. The chief’s powers were mostly invested in his role as a war-wager. Interference in daily life and basic failure to lead effectively resulted in a removal from supremacy.5

As nomads, the Mongols moved with the seasons, spending summers on the plain while seeking shelter in mountain valleys during the winter.6 All members of the society rode horses, although oxen, yaks, and the occasional camel also served as beasts of burden. The people resided in portable tents called yurts, insulated with fabric and sheep’s wool. Every yurt had several doorways, which were tied into an intricate courtesy system demanding that men and women enter from different portals. Courtesy codes also resulted in strangers receiving a hospitable welcome to another clan’s yurts, although this kindness could be hazardous, especially for women. Mongols and the other steppe peoples practiced exogamy, or marriage outside of one’s clan. Therefore, women were often kidnapped to serve as their captor’s wives elsewhere on the steppe.

The Mongols were significant trade partners for more centralized, sedentary societies, but opinions on them tended to emphasize the negative. The insults levelled by neighbouring civilizations ranged from complaints about the bad smell of the horse riders to outright comparisons with demons.7 The Mongolian relationship with was particularly fraught, given that China was very used to dealing with attacks by marauding “barbarians” from the north. Nevertheless, they regularly traded with the Mongols, whose resources were mainly limited to animal products. They therefore depended on trade with sedentary societies for more manufactured products such as metal.8 China, as a dominant regional power, held sway over parts of the steppe. The ability to repel frequent nomadic assaults was honed by centuries of allying with a tribe that bore a rivalry or enmity with the attackers. This alliance would be manipulated to bring about the downfall of the would-be invaders.9

The oldest clans of the steppe claimed their right to the land based on the actions of their worshipped ancestors.10 The claim to primacy was not mutually exclusive with the reality of servitude. The noble Borijin clan, for example, was a mercenary group by the late eleventh century, having lost its independence.11 Often, the line between Mongolian and Turkic tribes was rather unclear, due to the lack of native documentation on the intricacies of

5 Ibid, 35-6. 6 Ibid, 30. 7 Ibid, 11. 8 Morgan, The Mongols, 31. 9 Ibid, 33. 10 Weatherford, Mongol Queens, 10. 11 Ibid, 11.

4 steppe society.12 The tribes sharing the steppe with the Mongols included the Tatars, Keraits, , , and Önggüds. The Tatars were especially hostile towards the Mongols.13

The nations surrounding the steppe historically took advantage of the propensity for intertribal warfare to manipulate the tribes to suit their own interests. However, by the twelfth century, the attention of several of the most powerful nations bordering the Mongolian plains was consumed by internal matters. China in particular was compromised in its ability to dominate vagrant nomads to the west due to the lengthy war between the northern Jin Dynasty and the southern Song.14

The early life of Temüjin, the birth name of , exemplified many pertinent aspects of Mongolian society at the end of the twelfth century. Born in the late 1150s or early 1160s, Temüjin was named after the Tatar Temüjin Uge, slain by his father, .15 Temüjin’s identity was shaped by inter- tribal violence, which would only worsen during the formative years of his life: Yesugei was killed by Tatars when Temüjin was very young. Temujin was promptly enslaved by the Tayichiud clan and made to carry out grueling tasks. He soon escaped, rejoining his mother and siblings in the empty desert of the steppe.16 More hardships followed, including Temüjin’s murder of his half-brother Bekter at the age of twelve. This act of violence was a precursor to the bloody campaigns that would follow as Temüjin emerged onto the political landscape of the steppe.

12 Morgan, The Mongols, 50. 13 Thomas J. Barfield, The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1989), 183. 14 Urgunge Onon, The Secret History of the Mongols: The Life and Times of Chinggis Khan (Abingdon: RoutledgeCurzon Press, 2001), 3. 15 Francis Woodman Cleaves, The Secret History of the Mongols, For the First Time Done into English out of the Original Tongue and Provided with an Exegetical Commentary (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 14. 16 Weatherford, Mongol Queens, 12.

5 PRE-UNIFICATION

History Temüjin and his family re-entered the Mongolian political scene in 1179, when the teenaged Temüjin sought out his wife Börte, daughter of Dei-Secen of the Ongirrad. The marriage of Temüjin and Börte affirmed the political union between their tribes, and Temüjin was now old enough to establish ties by himself. He presented the wedding gift accorded to his mother, a black sable coat, to Toghril, the Ong Khan of the Kereit. In return, Ong Khan presented Temüjin with one of his own retainers, a man named . Dei-Secen, Ong Khan, and Jelme would prove indispensable allies in the years to come.17

Shortly after her marriage, Börte was kidnapped by the , the tribe from which Hoelun had been carried off by Yesugei. The fallout of this event revealed Temüjin’s determination and ruthlessness on the battlefield, as he slaughtered many of the Merkit tribe to rescue Börte. These qualities, as well as a great adaptability to new tactics and situations, proved Temüjin’s natural ability as a general during the months in which he warred against the Merkit. In this campaign, he was assisted by his anda, Jamuqa, as well as his bride’s father Dei-Secen and his adopted father the Ong Khan. The rousing success of Temüjin’s exploits, including the rescue of Börte and the scattering of the Merkit, resulted in his election in his tribe to the position of Genghis Khan in 1189.18 In this capacity, he proved his military shrewdness multiple times over the following years as he led rescue and vengeance missions in the name of his clan’s overlord, Ong Khan.19 One of his most significant campaigns was the successful defeat in 1196 of the Tatars, the historical enemies of the Mongols. During these last years of the twelfth century, Temüjin accepted into his band of followers a number of tribesmen hailing from outlying areas of the Jin Dynasty of northern China. Although his blood brother Jamuqa had more support from the Jürched, they honored Temüjin with the title of ja’ut-quri, again in 1196.20 This reflected broader patterns of support for local chiefs and leaders on the part of the Jürched. The consolidation of Temüjin’s steadily increasing influence would soon prove a danger for him in the fraught world of steppe politics.

17 Buell, Dictionary, 9. 18 Unon, Secret History, 4. 19 Weatherford, Mongol Queens, 15. 20 Buell, Dictionary, 11

6 Although he distinguished himself as a general and a subject, Temüjin overstepped his bounds when he offered two of his children to marry those of Ong Khan.21 The latter’s suspicion that Temüjin was attempting to insinuate his bloodline into the line of succession to become khan resulted in a period of tension that eventually escalated into open conflict. After having assisted Temüjin in the rescue of Börte, Jamuqa was elected the Gür Khan, or “Universal Ruler” of the Kara-Kitan Empire.22 His friendship with Temüjin having been eroded by the latter’s rise to power, Jamuqa allied with Ong Khan against him. In 1203, Temüjin and his followers were driven east and forced to retreat. After yet another failed attempt at a marriage alliance, the outcast Mongols were rescued at the point of death by a Turkic merchant from the Önggüd people. Supplied with fresh horses and mutton, Temüjin rallied and prepared to lead his people back to the steppe.23

In 1203, Temüjin returned to the Central Asian steppe with a small group of loyal followers, ready to retaliate against Ong Khan. Allied with To’oril were Jamqa, who was supported by the tribes previously aggravated by Temüjin, including the Merkit, Tatars, and Naimans. Despite the agreement of these tribes on who would serve as their leader, the tribes were not unified. As Temüjin marched back to the steppe, the various perspectives of the tribes would prove relevant to the outcome of the escalating Mongolian civil war.

Present situation Temüjin has returned to the steppe, seeking to bring all the tribes on the Mongolian steppe under his banner. He employs a variety of strategies to demonstrate his wrathful nature. These included feigning retreat in order to launch a surprise envelopment attack later; showering the enemy with arrows to disorient them just before a cavalry charge; hostage taking; and concerted efforts to capture enemy commanders in order to demoralize his followers.24 The Mongols under Temüjin alternated between sparing towns if they swore their loyalties and obliterating settlements entirely. Temüjin must be regarded as a disruptive influence of steppe life, for better or for worse.

21 Weatherford, Mongol Queens, 16. 22 Christopher L. Beckwith, Empires of the Silk Road: A History of Central Eurasia from the Bronze Age to the Present (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 185. 23 Weatherford, Mongol Queens, 19. 24 Jeffrey Hays, “Mongol Army: Tactics, Weapons, Revenge, and Terror,” Facts and Details, last modified November 2012, http://factsanddetails.com/asian/cat65/ sub423/item2696.html

7 Temüjin seeks to unite the tribes of the steppe. As his opponents fear, he truly desires to make himself the Great Khan: the Universal (Oceanic) Ruler, leader of all the tribes. His subjects are to be united in a confederacy which does away with tribe-based fealty and hereditary power structures. The entire pre- existing society of the steppe tribes is threatened. Any aristocrats who have not caught his attention are facing the prospect of losing their pre-eminence.25 The steppe peoples have never experienced supratribal leadership before this time. Temüjin’s position is therefore tenuous.26

He has chosen an open plain between the Onon and Kherlen rivers as the site for a quriltai. The tribes which present themselves at the quriltai will be seen as supporters of Temüjin.27 The reactions of his family members, followers, and the other tribes will determine the circumstances under which he will pursue his envisioned new age of Mongolian conquest and glory across Eurasia.

Potential future conflict Temüjin seeks to dismantle most elements of the steppe society, aside from the horseback nature of travel and warfare. The establishment of a meritocracy would undo all efforts of the current nobility to maintain their pre-eminency. The class strata would conceivably disappear, enabling anyone with sufficient talent and charisma to ascend the ranks of Mongolian society.

Should Temüjin become the autocratic leader of the Mongols, it is likely that his sons will be positioned to inherit the title of Great Khan. The order of sons is as follows:

, with sons Batu and

• Chagatai, with son Baidar

• Ogodei, with sons Guyuk and Kashin

, with sons Mongke, Kubilai, Hulagu, and Ariq Boke

25 Dan Carlin, Hardcore History 43, podcast audio, Wrath of the Khans I, MP3, accessed November 28, 2014, http://www.dancarlin.com/product/hardcore-history- 43-wrath-of-the-khans-i/ 26 Thomas J. Barfield, The Perilous Empire: Nomadic Empires and China (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1989): 188. 27 Weatherford, Mongol Queens, 24-5.

8 Even if Temüjin does succeed in his attempt to unify the steppe peoples, the disruption of his line might prove hazardous to his planned ventures—or provide room for another strong leader to assume his position of Great Khan. His sons are and shall remain an essential element of Temüjin’s standing, as they symbolize his potential and the future of his ventures.

On the other hand, allying with Genghis Khan’s unified Mongol confederacy has many advantages. Those who prove themselves consistently loyal can ascend the echelons of his meritocracy system and become high-ranking generals and ministers. Some may even marry into his clan and become güregen, or brothers-in-law.28

The most immediate conflict is the ongoing warfare between Temüjin and Jamuqa. Jamuqa commands the Khitans as well as a faction of Mongols who oppose Temüjin’s primacy. He is more loosely allied with the Naimans, Merkits, and Tatars.

Individual stances Tatars: As the ancestral enemies of the Mongols, this association of tribe has the most strenuous objections to the seizure of control by the Mongols. Temüjin has an especial, ferocious hatred of the Tatars due to their murder of his father. He aims to exterminate every Tatar man, in total contrast with his more tolerant dealings with other tribes. The Tatars therefore have little hope of avoiding armed conflict with the Mongols. Unlike the other tribes, they have the advantage of a more structured tribal system, due to their alliances with the Jin Dynasty. Keraits: The tribe currently ruled by Ong Khan. The Keraits are a fickle bunch, ready to side with the strongest leader. They are immediately threatened by Temüjin, as he plans to attack them at their camp, Jer Gorge.29 Naimans: A Christian tribe, and one of the most powerful in northern . In previous years, the Naimans have been so confident about their prospects regarding the lowly Mongols that they have focused the bulk of their attention 28 Barfield, Perilous Empire, 192. 29 Timothy May, The Mongol Conquests in World History (London: Reaktion Books Ltd, 2012): 34.

9 on spats with the Keraits.30 With Temüjin’s return to the political stage, however, the Naimans recognize the threat he poses. They perceive a chance to seize leadership of the steppe. The leader of the Naimans, Tayang Khan, suspects that it would be wisest to lure Temüjin’s party further into Naiman territory before attacking, but his son demands a more direct approach.31 Merkit: Brought to heel by Temüjin due to their kidnapping of Börte. They are now scattered, many of them assimilated into other tribes. The remainder have little institutional power and must carefully consider to whom they should swear their allegiance. Key questions • What action should be taken in response to Temüjin’s violent advances?

• Should Temüjin be merciful or merciless in his battles? Should he pardon those he defeats on the condition of submission, or make an example out of some villages by exterminating them?

• If the other tribes resist Temüjin, would inter-tribal alliances defeat the purpose of rebelling against the offer of confederacy?

• Is it worth abandoning the support of thse Jin Dynaty to join Temüjin? More generally, what are the implications of allowing the Jin to support certain steppe tribes over others?

• Is inter-tribal co-operation tenable, regardless of the choice made by the tribes regarding Temüjin? Suggested external sources The chief primary source from which the early history of the is derived is The Secret History of the Mongols. This background guide uses the translation by Francis Woodman Cleaves, published in 1982. Please be advised that the Secret History is in many respects a myth, as it exists to build up the character of Genghis Khan at the expense of his enemies via such devices as prophecies advertising his conquest of the known world. Suggested scholarly sources on pre-unification history are the Historical Dictionary of the Mongol World Empire (2003) by Paul D. Buell and The Mongol Conquests in World History (2012) by Timothy May.

30 Barfield, Perilous Empire, 191. 31 May, Mongol Conquests, 35.

10 POST-UNIFICATION

History The great quiriltai of 1206 ended with Temüjin being hailed as Genghis Khan by the tribes which he had successfully subjugated. The time had come for the various steppe tribes to coalesce into a unified Mongolian people, in which everyone was defined more by their individual merits and accomplishments than by their hereditary social cachet. However, the aristocrats and generals who had proven themselves to Genghis Khan from the start were allowed to keep their lofty positions in the newly established hierarchy.

Genghis Khan was not the first general hailing from the steppe that was sufficiently shrewd, charismatic, or able to unite an army around himself to embark on campaigns of conquest in the surrounding areas. However, he was the first supreme leader of the steppe tribes to ensure that there was no significant power vacuum left in his wake, which could be subsequently filled by another strong leader who would eventually prove his downfall. To ensure absolute loyalty to his faction, Genghis Khan carefully stymied any lingering resistance from remnants of the steppe tribes.32 His generals and Subutai led the offensive against the remaining Merkits and Naimans.33

The Mongols never depended on a single tactic to win battles. Instead, they demonstrated a remarkable adaptability to obtain leverage in a conflict. One canny tactic was to pass through a town they planned to conquer, luring the residents away from their animals. The Mongols would then double back, slaughtering or capturing the animals, thereby depriving the locals of their food source and forcing their submission in order to survive.34 Another recurring strategy was unique to the Mongols as a nomadic, horse-riding people. Every man would have a train of five or six horses, switching between his steeds as the one he was riding became tired. Sometimes, dummies were mounted on the backs of the auxiliary horses. This made the charging Mongolian army appear much bigger than it actually was, terrorizing and destabilizing their opponents as they charged forward. The Mongols were not only able and ferocious fighters, but they used psychological warfare as well. One prominent weakness was the ability to lay siege to a city, which the Mongols had never needed to perfect due to the largely nomadic nature of most of their enemies prior to the early thirteenth century.

32 Morgan, The Mongols, 57. 33 Buell, Dictionary, 26. 34 Jack Weatherford, Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2004), 86.

11 Once the tribes were united, the first look outward was towards China, the traditional target of ambitious steppe leaders.35 The first assault was made against the Tanguts of Western Xia in 1209. The outcome of the conflict, if in favour of the Mongols, would continue the khan’s methods of dealing with existing power structures that had been evidenced in the unification of the tribes. The local rulers, who were not personal enemies of Genghis Khan, would be allowed to retain their power provided they remain loyal to the invaders. Tribute was to be demanded in the form of cloth, camels, and trained falcons.36 The goal of the Mongols was to create several routes into China and to insinuate themselves into the northern branch of the Silk Road which passed through Western Xia.37 Thus began the move towards governing sedentary societies and profiting from entrenched trade routes that were necessary to sustain a permanent Mongol empire.38

Concurrently to the initial forays into Xixia territory, a significant uprising occurred among the jüyin, steppe allies of the Jin, that resulted in mass defection to the Mongols, who were becoming recognized as perpetual victors whose cause it was advantageous to join.39 This secured the Sino- Mongolian border and paved the way for further acquisition of territory in northern China. Furthermore, the Jin lost their horse-riding nomadic allies in the jüyin, and therefore lacked a fighting force that could compete with the invaders in their preferred form of warfare.40 The Mongols indulged in both booty raids and the pursuit of treaties, cherry-picking which areas to devastate and which to spare in order to establish a domain that was suitably cowed by their might and yet still sustainable.

As the jüyin had done, many people willingly defected to the seemingly unstoppable Mongols rather than remaining loyal to the Jürched, who were themselves foreign invaders who had seized control of northern China barely a century prior.41 This included Ming-Tan, a messenger employed by the Jin who promptly defected to the Mongols and gave them information which enabled them to win the Battle of the Badger Mouth in 1211. Another prominent defector was the deputy commander Liu Bolin, who would remain a prominent military figure in early Mongol China.42 The actual administrative

35 Morgan, The Mongols, 55. 36 Buell, Dictionary, 23. 37 Morgan, The Mongols, 57. 38 Buell, Dictionary, 17. 39 Buell, Dictionary, 24. 40 Buell, Dictionary, 28. 41 Morgan, The Mongols, 59. 42 Buell, Dictionary, 28.

12 structures of the Jin Empire proved tougher to subdue, as local rulers remained stubbornly reluctant to surrender. The prime target for a decisive victory over the administration is the city of Zhongdu.

As if by chance, the Qara-Khitai Empire had much of its territory annexed by the Khwarazm-shah in 1210, preventing that empire from posing a serious threat to the Mongols. The Shah of the Khwarezmid Empire was the next major foe of Genghis Khan. The initial relationship between the two figureheads was marked by contradiction: Genghis Khan said that he respected the Shah as the ruler of the west (“master of the lands of the setting sun”) that equaled his position as ruler of the east, but also addressed the other man with language that was paternalistic and patronizing. On the whole, the Mongols did not make any hostile overtures in this case; it was the Khwarazm-shah who forced the issue.

In 1218, 450 Muslim merchants from Mongol territory arrived at the city of Utrar, on the eastern frontier of the Khwarezmid Empire. Although the Mongols and Khwarezmians shared a border by this point due to the dissolution of the Qara-Khitan Empire, the merchants were suspected of being spies. Inalchuq, the governor of Utar, had every single one of the merchants executed. Genghis responded to this insulting massacre by sending three envoys to discuss the matter with the Shah. The Shah’s response to demands for retribution was sure to have serious consequences: he killed the Muslim envoy and shaved the beards of the two Mongols. The forced removal of a man’s beard was considered one of the most serious insults from a Mongolian perspective, doubly so if that man was an approved messenger. War was therefore ensured by the Shah’s gesture.43 Mercy was not to be expected, due to the magnitude of the insult that the Mongols felt due to the Shah’s actions. The centers of population in the Shah’s domain that were ripe for attack were Harat and Nishapur.44

After facing the Khwarezmians, Genghis Khan was to depart eastwards once more to relieve his general Muqali, who was struggling to make headway against the Jin with limited resources. The Universal Khan was by this point nearing the age of sixty, and could not expect to live for a great deal longer. As Jebe and Subutai continued to wreak havoc on the Khwarezmians in Turkistan and Muqali continued to assimilate native Chinese and other local allies into the ranks of the Mongolian army, they and all the other powerful Mongols had to make decisions regarding the future of their violent, yet glorious achievements.

43 Morgan, The Mongols, 60. 44 Morgan, The Mongols, 65.

13 Present situation By 1223, it has become clear that the Mongols are both formidable and unstoppable. They convince the soldiers of their enemies to defect with ease and seem to be inexhaustible, having launched raids and sieges in a nearly endless sequence for the past two decades. The Mongol Empire has exploded outwards from the steppe in a shockingly short time span. The major campaigns are on Jin and Xixia territory to the east and nearly the entire Khwarezmian Empire to the west. Incursions are also being made into Siberia, Georgia, and Korea. The conquest of Song dynasty of southern China is the ultimate goal, but that endeavor will take many years to accomplish.

The empire founded by the unification of the Mongolian steppe’s tribes is a mighty and extensive dominion. Genghis Khan, as he has proven through the effectiveness of his many campaigns, understands the importance of planning ahead. In a brief search to maintain his position as universal ruler forever, he consulted the Taoist sage Changchun in 1222, asking him for an elixir that would make him immortal.45 He was disappointed in his brief search for immortality, but his legacy does seem likely to live forever through his sons and their descendants.

Genghis Khan has four sons, all of whom have been granted extensive pastures in different parts of the suddenly vast Mongol realm. The eldest son, Jochi, presides over the western lands, where he is leading an offensive into Siberia and . This was in keeping with the tradition of granting the grazing lands that were farthest from the home camp to the khan’s eldest son.46 The second son, Chagatai, occupies Central Asia, including the former Khwarezmid Empire, as expansion continues westwards under Jebe and Subutai. In contrast with Jochi, the fourth and youngest son, Tolui, is in charge of the steppe, the “home base”, in contrast with his eldest brother. As for the third son, Ögodei, he is named by his father as the next Great Khan, a decision with which his brothers are not unanimously pleased with. Tolui in particular is keen to delay his brother’s ascension. There is also the matter of Jochi’s uncertain parentage: No one is positive whether he was conceived by Genghis Khan or an anonymous Merkit involved in Börte’s kidnapping.

Tension thickens between the brothers as they accept that their father’s days are numbered and one of them will soon be heir to his legacy. Meanwhile, the other prominent Mongols examine their options and plan contingencies to safeguard their own futures.

45 Morgan, The Mongols, 62. 46 Morgan, The Mongols, 99.

14 Potential future conflict Now that the Mongols are a bone fide world power, they must be more vigilant than ever in maintaining their defences and keeping the conquered masses docile. On the western front, Jebe and Subutai have plowed through Iran and the mountain range into Russia. As khan’s family contemplates which of them is to become the next leader of the Mongols, the generals are planning a lightning strike attack on the Russians and Polovtsy near the river Kalka.47

As for the eastern front, the slow advance against China is complicated by the rise of a new emperor in Xixia. Emperor Li Dewang has opened negotiations with Emperor Xuanzong of Jin, in the hope of forming a unified alliance against the Mongols. To bolster the depleted ranks of loyal Xixians, Li Dewang has also recruited several Turkistanian groups. Thus, the potential has arisen for three of the Mongols’ enemies to ally against them.48

A major source of conflict among the former tribal khans is the degree to which the Mongols will have to adapt to local traditions. Much of the territory they have conquered is unsuited to the pasture lifestyle they are used to. Although Genghis Khan and his generals are vocal advocates for religious tolerance, the Merkits and Naimans must ask themselves whether the glory and power afforded by the Mongolian campaigns is worth living among those who do not practice Christianity. On the other hand, the shaman is becoming increasingly marginalized as the centers of Mongolian power move away from the heartland which Tolui has been placed in charge of. The tension between the khan’s four sons makes the vast and unwieldy empire somewhat precarious. It is obvious that the empire will fracture at some point, as did that of Alexander of Macedon, whose territory was also acquired astonishingly quickly and divided among his followers. Each Mongol must decide which of the khan’s sons to support, taking into account the advantages of the four areas of the empire based on their religious and economic affiliations.

Key questions • Which of Genghis Khan’s sons is the strongest candidate for receiving their father’s title? What are their strengths and vulnerabilities based on their current locations?

47 Nicholas V. Riasanovsky and Mark D. Steinberg, A History of Russia (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2011), 62. 48 Buell, Dictionary, 36.

15 • Should the other Mongols ally with any one of Genghis Khan’s sons? Should they make other plans of their own?

• What does it mean to be a Mongol? What determines their identity as a people, beyond military strength?

• What role does religion play in daily life? What is its significance?

• To what extent is culture being lost or gained as the Mongols disperse themselves across Eurasia and marry into other ethnic groups?

• Is the maintenance of a single, unbroken empire desirable or even possible? Should the Mongols make preliminary plans for the governing of a sectional empire?

Suggested external sources The standard overview of the Mongol Empire is David Morgan’s The Mongols, currently in its second edition. Buell’s Dictionary of the Mongol World Empire remains an excellent source in all Mongol-related situations. For information on how Genghis Khan and his descendants negotiated and compromised their native ways during the rise of the Mongol Empire, it is best to consult the works of Jack Weatherford, one of Genghis Khan’s biographers. For this topic, Weatherford’s 2004 book Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World is perhaps the most pertinent. Delegates should keep in mind that the spellings of many terms related to the Mongol Empire are not standardized. For example, “Genghis” also appears as “Chinggis” or “Chingiz”, while the placement of accents changes from author to author.

16 BIOGRAPHIES The following are brief sketches of the fifteen roles which will be present at the Mongol Crisis Committee. Delegates are strongly encouraged to use the information below as a basis for further exploration of their assigned role. Temüjin / Genghis Khan: The man who seeks to unify the tribes of the steppe and conquer all the land in the world. He is an extremely capable and adaptable general, a nearly perfect product of centuries of steppe warfare and nomadic life. His immense reserves of charisma can successfully convince many of his opponents to defect to his cause. Regardless of the ultimate outcome of his pursuits, Genghis Khan truly believes himself to be the rightful ruler of the world. Jochi: The eldest son of Temüjin. He was born in 1179, almost exactly nine months after the kidnapping of his mother Börte. The extreme proximity of his conception to his mother’s dishonorable capture has suggested to some that he may not be Temüjin’s biological child. This is very likely a factor in Jochi not being considered for the position of Great Khan, despite leading several successful campaigns of his own. Jochi governs the western part of the Mongol Empire and is grooming his son Batu to continue his work.49 Chagatai: Temüjin’s second son. He presides over the conquered territory of the Khwarzemid Empire, in modern northern Kazakhstan and western Turkistan. He is somewhat more conservative than the rest of his family, perhaps even opposing the tolerant practices which ensure the voluntary defections and surrenders to Genghis Khan.50 Ögodei: Temüjin’s third son. He is chosen by his father as his successor and is positioned to continue the campaign in China through the Jin and Song dynasties. As the man who is tasked with expanding and governing the Mongol Empire, any weaknesses on his part could be damaging to the continuance of his family’s legacy—whether he makes blunders himself or whether they are instigated by others.

49 Buell, Dictionary, 171-2. 50 Buell, Dictionary, 129.

17 Tolui: Temüjin’s fourth son. As the youngest male child, he is tasked with guarding the heartland of the Mongol Empire, namely the steppe on which his father’s campaigns begin. Despite his relative youth, Tolui is particularly displeased with the choice of Ögodei as khan and is eager to delay his formal election by quiriltai.51 Jebe: One of Genghis Khan’s generals. In 1201, Jebe shot his chief in the neck with an arrow, perhaps inadvertently. Having been pardoned for this offense, Jebe is now one the khan’s most loyal and trustworthy servants. He is particularly fond of deep penetration tactics in the battlefield.52 Subutai: Another of Genghis Khan’s generals and Jebe’s partner. He profited from the meritocracy system imposed by the khan, becoming one of his “four hounds.” He also served directly under Jochi during the final sweeps of the steppe in 1208 to eliminate the remnants of belligerent tribes. Subutai distinguishes himself as possibly the most successful general in the Mongol armies after Genghis Khan himself.53 Yelü Chucai: A Confucian scholar of Khitan ancestry. He is the advisor of the Great Khan, contributing suggestions such as leaving a sizable portion of the Chinese population alive would permit the Mongols to extract sizable taxation from their new subjects.54 Chucai’s two areas of expertise are the management of taxation and the pacification of religious discontentment, including the conflict between Buddhists and Taoists in China.55 Teb Tengeri: Genghis Khan’s shaman, the representative of the shamanistic religion that exists in multiple iterations on the Mongolian steppe. Shamans are mainly involved in healing spiritual injuries rather than physical ones. Genghis Khan has little regard or interest in , leaving a major component of former

51 Morgan, The Mongols, 99. 52 Buell, Dictionary, 171. 53 Buell, Dictionary, 255-8. 54 Morgan, The Mongols, 65. 55 Buell, Dictionary, 287-9.

18 steppe life without a place. Teb Tengeri is duplicitous, loudly proclaiming that Genghis Khan is recognized by heaven as the universal ruler while trying to stir up competition between the khan and his brother Khasar.56 “Tatar Khan:” This individual is the representative of the various Tatar tribes on the Mongolian steppe. As the prime enemy of Genghis Khan and his juggernaut following, the Tatar Khan must act carefully if he wishes to avoid utter annihilation. Toghril / Ong Khan: The khan of the Keraits. Initially a benevolent paternal figure towards Temüjin, by the time of the Crisis, Ong Khan feels insulted and threatened by an offered marriage alliance between his children and Temüjin’s. He is set against Temüjin’s party at the time of unification, but his willingness to beat a tactical retreat indicates that he is aware of when withstanding a massive onslaught is pointless. Jamuqa: Formerly Temüjin’s blood brother; now his bitter enemy. Having been elected the Gür Khan by the tribes resisting Mongol domination, he is inherently opposed to his old friend’s ambitions of becoming supreme ruler. Despite their animosity, he and Temüjin still have a great deal of respect for one another and would respect the other’s will at the time of his death. Tayang Khan: The khan of the Christian Naimans. He prefers a cautious approach of luring his enemies into his territory so they can be attacked from the rear, but he receives pressure from his subjects, including his son Guculiik, to brazenly go on the offensive against the Mongols. As the leader of a prominent Christian faction, he would strongly oppose the religious tolerance and syncretism practiced by most of Temüjin’s family. Alaqus-digit-quri: The leader of the Önggüd tribe. Tayang Khan is eager to ally with him against the Mongols, but Alaqus-digit-quri can see the advantages of capitulating to Genghis Khan. Rejecting the Naimans and joining the Mongols would ensure that he maintain a prominent position as head of a military unit in the new meritocracy, where favoritism benefits the pre-existing leaders who agree

56 Jack Weatherford, Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2004), 73-4.

19 to join Genghis Khan’s venture. The Önggüd prince has enemies in the Jin dynasty and could use the protection of the numbers boasted by the Mongols.57 Toqto’a-beki: The chief of the straggling remnants of the Merkit tribes left in the wake of Temüjin and Jamuqa’s furious rout in the early 1180’s. The Merkits are in a bad position, as they must choose between alliances with one of the two men who devastated them. The Merkits are too few in number to safely strike out on their own, but are remarkably tenacious, capable of surviving in small numbers despite overwhelming adversity.

Bibliography Barfield, Thomas J. The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1989.

Beckwith, Christopher L. Empires of the Silk Road: A History of Central Eurasia from the Bronze Age to the Present. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.

Buell, Paul D. Historical Dictionary of the Mongol World Empire. Oxford: Scarecrow Press Inc., 2003.

Carlin, Dan. Hardcore History 43. Podcast audio. Wrath of the Khans I. MP3, 1:49:16. Accessed November 28, 2014. http://www.dancarlin.com/ product/hardcore-history-43-wrath-of-the-khans-i/

Cleaves, Francis Woodman. The Secret History of the Mongols, For the First Time Done into English out of the Original Tongue and Provided with an Exegetical Commentary. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982.

Hays, Jeffrey. “Mongol Army: Tactics, Weapons, Revenge, and Terror.” Facts and Details. Last modified November 2012. http://factsanddetails.com/ asian/cat65/sub423/item2696.html

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Morgan, David. The Mongols. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2007.

57 Buell, Dictionary, 103.

20 Morris, Jonno. “Chinese History: Imperial China – Yuan.” China Expats: Your Bridge Between East and West. Last modified March 2009. http://www. china-expats.com/ChinaHistory_Emp_Yuan.htm

Moses, Larry W. “Epic Themes in the Secret History of the Mongols.” Folklore 99 (1988), 170-173.

Onon, Urgunge. The Secret History of the Mongols: The Life and Times of Chinggis Khan. Abingdon: RoutledgeCurzon Press, 2001.

Riasanovsky, Nicholas V., and Mark D. Steinberg. A History of Russia. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2011.

Spuler, Bertold. History of the Mongols: Based on Eastern and Western Accounts of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries. Translated by Helga and Stuart Drummond. London: William Clowes and Sons, Ltd, 1972.

Weatherford, Jack. Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World. New York: Three Rivers Press, 2004. The Secret History of the Mongol Queens. New York: Broadway Paperbacks, 2010.

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