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Typologies Report on Laundering the Proceeds of Organised Crime Prems 105815 TYPOLOGIES REPORT ON LAUNDERING THE PROCEEDS OF ORGANISED CRIME PREMS 105815 ENG The Council of Europe is the continent’s MONEYVAL leading human rights organisation. It comprises 47 member states, 28 of which Committee of Experts are members of the European Union. on the Evaluation www.coe.int All Council of Europe member states have signed up to the European Convention on Human Rights, a treaty designed of Anti-Money Laundering to protect human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Measures and the Financing The European Court of Human Rights oversees of Terrorism the implementation of the Convention in the member states. COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON THE EVALUATION OF ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING MEASURES AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM (MONEYVAL) MONEYVAL (2015)20 Typologies Report on Laundering the Proceeds of Organised Crime 17 April 2015 Ref. MONEYVAL(2015)20, dated 17 April 2015, adopted by MONEYVAL at its 47th plenary meeting (14-17 April 2015) MONEYVAL Typologies Report – April 2015 The Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL) is a monitoring body of the Council of Europe entrusted with the task of assessing compliance with the principal international standards to counter money laundering and the financing of terrorism and the effectiveness of their implementation, as well as with the task of making recommendations to national authorities in respect of necessary improvements to their systems. For more information on MONEYVAL, please visit our website: www.coe.int/moneyval © Council of Europe, 2015. All rights reserved. Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, save where otherwise stated. For any use for commercial purposes, no part of this publication may be translated, reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic (CD-Rom, Internet, etc.) or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage or retrieval system without prior permission in writing from the MONEYVAL Secretariat. Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law, Council of Europe, F-67075 Strasbourg (fax: +33(0)3.88.41.30.17 or email: [email protected]) 2 MONEYVAL Typologies Report – April 2015 Contents List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................... 5 I. Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................ 6 II. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 11 II.1 Methodology ...................................................................................................................................... 11 II.2 Background situation .......................................................................................................................... 12 II.3 Scope of the Paper ............................................................................................................................. 16 II.4 Objectives of the Study ...................................................................................................................... 17 III. Emerging findings from the survey .................................................................................................... 18 III.1 Principal findings ............................................................................................................................... 18 III.2 Challenges and vulnerabilities of organised crime generated ML cases........................................... 20 III.3 Recommendations............................................................................................................................. 25 III.4 Trends ................................................................................................................................................ 32 IV. Techniques for investigating and prosecuting the laundering of the proceeds of organised crime ..................................................................................................................................................... 35 IV.1 The risk assessment .......................................................................................................................... 35 IV.2 Detecting ML cases related to OC assets .......................................................................................... 37 IV.3 Analysing, investigating and prosecuting ML derived from OC activity ........................................... 40 IV.3.1 Analysis ........................................................................................................................................... 40 IV.3.2 Financial investigations .................................................................................................................. 41 IV.3.3 Financial profiling ........................................................................................................................... 43 IV.3.4 Confiscation and reverse burden of proof ..................................................................................... 44 IV.3.5 Joint investigation teams (JITs) ...................................................................................................... 46 IV.3.6 Prosecution .................................................................................................................................... 47 IV.3.7 Other useful practices .................................................................................................................... 50 V. Obstacles and challenges .................................................................................................................... 53 V.1 Obstacles ............................................................................................................................................ 53 V.2 Organised crime infiltrating financial institutions .............................................................................. 54 VI. Typologies of laundering the proceeds of the OC ............................................................................. 57 3 MONEYVAL Typologies Report – April 2015 VI.1 General .............................................................................................................................................. 57 VI.2 Red flags and indicators .................................................................................................................... 61 VI.3 Complex transactions ........................................................................................................................ 62 VI.4 Obscure ownership of the funds and corporate vehicles ................................................................. 66 VI.5 Significant amounts involved in the transactions ............................................................................. 69 VI.6 Use of corporate vehicles acting in the legitimate economy ............................................................ 72 VI.7 Use of MBSs and exchange offices .................................................................................................... 75 VI.8 The use of professionals .................................................................................................................... 78 Annexes .................................................................................................................................................... 83 Annex 1. Cases involving organised crime groups, number of indictments and convictions .................. 83 Annex 2. Organised crime groups, number of indictments and convictions (persons) ........................... 84 Annex 3. Organised crime and money laundering asset seizures and freezing (value of assets in EURO) .................................................................................................................................................................. 85 Annex 4: Organised crime and money laundering asset confiscation (value of assets in Euro) .............. 87 Annex 5: ML investigations, prosecutions and convictions ..................................................................... 88 4 MONEYVAL Typologies Report – April 2015 List of Abbreviations AML/CFT Anti -Money Laundering/Combatting the Financing of Terrorism CDD Customer Due Diligence CETS Coun cil of Europe Treaty System CTR Cash transaction report DNFBP Designated Non-Financial Professions and Business EU European Union FIU Financial Intelligence Unit FATF Financial Action Task Force IMF International Monetary Fund JIT Joint Investigation Team LEA Law Enforcement Agencies Macau SAR Macau Special Administrative Region ML/TF Money Laundering/Terrorist Financing MONEYVAL Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures OC Organised Crime OCG Organised Crime Group RE Reporting Entity ST Suspicious Transaction STR Suspicious Transaction Report Warsaw Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Convention Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism 5 MONEYVAL Typologies Report – April 2015 I. Executive Summary 1. The project to examine the laundering methods used by organised crime (OC) was approved by the 41st MONEYVAL Plenary in April 2013. It was agreed that the project team should examine the methods used by organised criminal
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