Democratizing Taiwan

Home , Diane Lee, Eugene Chien, Henry Kao, Henry Liu, History of Taiwan, Josephine Chu

By J. Bruce Jacobs

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2012 This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Jacobs, J. Bruce. Democratizing Taiwan / by J. Bruce Jacobs. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-22154-3 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Democratization—Taiwan—History. 2. Taiwan—Politics and government—1975- I. Title.

JQ1536.J33 2012 320.951249—dc23 2011048134

This publication has been typeset in the multilingual “Brill” typeface. With over 5,100 characters covering Latin, IPA, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the humanities. For more information, please see www.brill.nl/brill-typeface.

ISSN 978 90 04 22154 3 (hardback) ISBN 978 90 04 22590 9 (e-book)

Copyright 2012 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Global Oriental, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. contents v

For Jung-Sim Kim

contents vii

Contents

List of Tables and Figures...... ix Acknowledgements ...... xi Note on Romanization...... xiii

Introduction...... 1

1. How Taiwan Became Democratic...... 5

2. The Japanese and Kuomintang Colonial Regimes...... 19

3. The Lee Teng-hui Presidency to Early 1996...... 69

4. The 1996 Presidential Election and the Taiwan Straits Crisis . . . 106

5. Lee Teng-hui as an Elected President and the 2000 Presidential Election...... 127

6. The Presidency of Chen Shui-bian...... 173

7. The Kuomintang Regains Power ...... 229

Conclusion...... 269

Bibliography...... 275 Index...... 295

list of illustrations ix

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Tables 3.1.. Central parliamentarians, June 21, 1990 ...... 77 3.2.. Seats obtained by parties in December 3, 1994 Provincial . Assembly/City Council Elections ...... 96 3.3.. Ethnicity and party voting, 1995 ...... 99 3.4.. Ethnic self-identification and party voting, 1995 ...... 99 3.5.. Age and party voting, 1995 ...... 100 3.6.. Education and party voting, 1995 ...... 100 3.7.. Employment and party voting, 1995 ...... 101 3.8.. Party voting among professionals and military/civil service/ . education voters, 1995 ...... 101 4.1.. 1996 Presidential election results ...... 115 4.2.. 1996 National Assembly election results ...... 116 5.1.. City Council elections in Taipei and Kaohsiung, December 5, . 1998 ...... 135 5.2.. Major polls as published, March 7, 2000 ...... 147 5.3.. Presidential election results, March 18, 2000 ...... 164 6.1.. Legislative election results, December 1, 2001 ...... 187 6.2.. Support by county/municipality in 2004 presidential election . 199 6.3.. Party vote in 2004 legislative election ...... 201 6.4.. National Assembly election, May 14, 2005 ...... 207 6.5.. Chapter titles of six tenth-grade senior high history textbooks . (Vol. II) ...... 224 6.6.. Premiers under President Chen Shui-bian ...... 227 7.1.. The January 12, 2008 legislative election in Taiwan ...... 231 C.1.. Taiwanese attitudes towards independence and unification . (June 2011) ...... 273

Figures 7.1.. Satisfaction ratings for President Ma Ying-jeou (Global Views . Magazine Survey Center) ...... 256 C.1.. Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese identity of Taiwanese as . tracked in surveys by the Election Study Center, NCCU (1992- . June 2011) ...... 271

contents xi

Acknowledgements

I especially acknowledge a major three-year Discovery Grant from the Australian Research Council, entitled “Democratizing Taiwan,” that facilitated much of the field research that underpins this study as well enabled the purchase of many research materials. A smaller grant from the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, for another project, also assisted in the preparation of this book. I also thank the numerous politicians, officials, journalists and citizens in Taiwan who have spent many hours discussing Taiwan with me in formal interviews as well as in less formal settings. Institutionally, I particularly wish to express my appreciation to the Graduate Institute of Taiwan History at National Chengchi University, which has hosted me on numerous occasions and become my academic home in Taiwan. This book is dedicated to my wife and partner, Jung-Sim Kim, whose support and encouragement has enabled me to finish this project.

contents xiii

Note on Romanization

For scholars of Taiwan, romanization of Chinese words remains a difficult issue. Where known, for personal names I have used the name preferred by the individual. Otherwise, I have used a simplified Wade-Giles romanization. As the final arbiter, I have used the Who’s Who section in various annual editions of Republic of China Yearbook/Taiwan Yearbook. For all place names in Taiwan, I have used the common form used in Taiwan (prior to the introduction of tongyong romanization). For all Chinese-language publications and for the romanization of Chinese terms, I have used pinyin. I have also used pinyin for all Chinese place names and personal names.

introduction 1

Introduction

In late 2011, Asia has only four relatively stable democracies: India, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Possibly, Indonesia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand may eventually become democracies, but their militaries remain too powerful and their democratic roots still lack the power to resist a concerted authoritarian restoration. All of these potential democracies also have substantial ethnic problems and poverty. Mongolia too has taken steps towards democratization, though it too has yet to reach the goal of a stable democracy. Thus, Samuel Huntington’s promise of a “Third Wave” of democratization, beginning in 1974,1 remains largely unfulfilled in Asia and Africa. India became democratic through the participation of the Indian National Congress in British colonial rule during the 1930s and through having many great leaders such as Gandhi and Nehru. Yet, British colonial experience did not create democracies in Pakistan, Burma, Singapore or Malaysia. Japan had Taisho democracy during the 1920s, but its military gained strong authoritarian power. Japan’s current democracy was built by the allied occupation forces following Japan’s surrender on August 15, 1945. Clearly, no simple theory can explain democratization. India demonstrates that a democracy does not require great wealth. It also demonstrates that a multi-ethnic society can be democratic and it demonstrates that democracy can occur with substantial illiteracy. In this book, I will argue that increasing economic prosperity with increasing equality can facilitate democracy, but it is not necessary. Similarly, higher levels of education can also assist, but are not a precondition. In Asia, the two stable “Third Wave” democracies are Taiwan and South Korea. Both share a number of similarities. For example, both had important Japanese colonial periods. Both had repressive authoritarian regimes replace the Japanese colonial government. Both had close alliances with the United States. Both democratized in the late 1980s. In both, the former oppositions came to power at about the same time. And,

1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Cen- tury (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 2 introduction in both, the more conservative forces regained power in late 2007 and early 2008. Both have similar governmental structures with a president and a premier providing dual executive leadership. Yet there are also important differences. South Korea had military coups d’etat while Taiwan has essentially had civilian control over the military. Taiwan’s political parties have a certain stability, unlike South Korea’s. I had originally intended to devote a chapter to comparing Taiwan and South Korea, but this has been published elsewhere.2 However, we will return to this comparison in the Conclusion. This book thus focuses on Taiwan’s democratization, particularly at the central level.3 Chapter 1 begins with a definition of democracy and draws the important distinction between “liberalization” and democratization. It also distinguishes between democratization and Taiwanization. The chapter then analyses ten important factors that have contributed to Taiwan’s democratization. Chapter 2 argues from 1624 with the arrival of a non-aborginal population, the Dutch, until the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988, Taiwan lived under six different colonial regimes. The chapter notes important similarities between the Japanese and the Chinese Kuomintang (also KMT or Chinese Nationalist Party) colonial governments, before beginning a shorter treatment of the Japanese colonial government and then an extended treatment of the Kuomintang colonial governments under Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo. This chapter demonstrates that Chiang Ching-kuo engaged in “liberalization,” but he did not create democracy in Taiwan. Chapter 3 considers the first eight years of Lee Teng-hui’s presidency (1988–1996). It discusses how Lee overcame the power of the Mainlander elite though a series of shifting alliances and how he revised the constitution with the assistance of people in the Kuomintang and the then opposition Democratic Progressive Party. The chapter includes the decision to choose the president by popular election. Chapter 4 analyses the first popular presidential election in 1996 and the simultaneous Taiwan Straits Crisis, which the Chinese instigated in

2 J. Bruce Jacobs, “Taiwan and South Korea: Comparing East Asia’s Two ‘Third-Wave’ Democracies,” Issues & Studies: A Social Science Quarterly on China, Taiwan, and East Asian Affairs, 43, no. 4 (2007), pp. 227–260. 3 For democratization in a rural locality, see J. Bruce Jacobs, Local Politics in Rural Taiwan under Dictatorship and Democracy (Norwalk, CT: Eastbridge, 2008), pp. 258– 317. introduction 3 an effort to influence the election. The analysis demonstrates that these Chinese efforts backfired. Chapter 5 examines Lee Teng-hui’s term as a popularly elected president and concludes with the 2000 presidential election when Chen Shui- bian and the Democratic Progressive Party ended fifty-five years of Kuomintang rule. The KMT defeat led to the development of two new parties, the People First Party (PFP) and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) . Importantly, even though President Chen won only a minority of votes, most of those who voted against Chen still considered his election legitimate. Chapter 6 analyses the Chen Shui-bian presidency (2000–2008) and considers many of the difficulties facing Chen including a legislature controlled by the opposition. The chapter also includes a discussion of the 2004 presidential campaign when Chen Shui-bian won re-election. Chapter 6 also examines the successes and failures of the Chen Shui-bian government in reforming three key ministries that Mainlanders had controlled up to democratization and even up to Chen Shui-bian’s presidency: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense, and Ministry of Education. Chapter 7 analyses the legislative and presidential elections of 2008 that returned the Kuomintang to power. The chapter then examines the domestic and foreign policies of the Ma administration during its first three years. The Conclusion brings the arguments together and includes some comparisons between Taiwan and South Korea. In addition to the numerous cited sources in the footnotes and bibliography, this book relies heavily upon extensive field research and interviews conducted over many years among politicians, officials, journalists, academics and citizens. The political interviewees include past, present and future presidents, vice-presidents, premiers, vice-premiers, ministers and vice-ministers, legislators, local leaders, party officials, faction leaders, and vote captains. I have also interviewed and chatted with many officials in central and local governments, with journalists and others in the media, and with many academics. Most importantly, I have talked with many of Taiwan’s citizens who do not fit into any of the above categories. All of the interviews were conducted on a “use, but don’t cite” basis, so no interviews are cited. However, when important, I have indicated material came from an interview either in the text or in a foot- note. 4 introduction

Since it began publishing on August 31, 1999 the Taipei Times has become a very important source of information for foreign observers of Taiwan. In addition, it has an excellent website that is readily accessible (http://www.taipeitimes.com). Thus, I have often cited the Taipei Times for information after August 31, 1999 even when I had other materials that made the same point. how taiwan became democratic 5

Chapter one

How Taiwan Became Democratic

What is a democracy? In the simplest definition, a democracy is a political system in which the people regularly and freely choose their own leaders. Furthermore, in choosing their leaders, the people have the right and the ability to make the opposition the new government. In a democracy, people also have such civil liberties as freedom of speech and press and all citizens have relative equality before the law. Democracies appear in various shapes and forms. Some are presidential such as the United States, while others are parliamentary such as the United Kingdom and many Commonwealth countries. Some are unitary such as the United Kingdom and France while others are federal such as the United States, Canada, Australia, Germany and India. However, in all these cases the people have and do use their ability to change their rulers freely and peacefully.

Democracy versus “Liberalization”

In looking at the democratization of Taiwan, it is important to make an important distinction between democracy and “liberalization.” Some times authoritarian regimes engage in “liberalization” allowing some increase in freedom of speech and the press. They may allow opposition politicians to win office in elections, though they do not relinquish ultimate control. This is “liberalization,” not democratization. From the early 1970s, Taiwan had at least two waves of liberalization. But under both President Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) and President Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) an opposition political party could never replace the Kuomintang as the ruling party.1 In fact, until September 1986, no one was allowed to establish opposition political parties of any kind and those who did were imprisoned.2 We will argue below that various practices of

1 The present writer started to draw this distinction in 1981, see J. Bruce Jacobs, “Polit- ical Opposition and Taiwan’s Political Future,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 6 (July 1981), p. 21. 2 Before 1986, Taiwan did allow two minority parties, the Youth Party and the Demo- cratic Socialist Party, both of which came to Taiwan from the Mainland. The Kuomintang 6 chapter one

“liberalization” in Taiwan did contribute to the smooth transition to democracy after the death of President Chiang Ching-kuo in January 1988. For readers of Chinese, the term “liberalization” may appear vague. In the United States, “liberalism,” with its emphasis on human rights, is actually to the political left-of center. However, in Europe, “liberalism” is often seen as right-of-center because economic rights are also important. In Chinese, the classic translation of “liberalization” is ziyouhua 自由化, but a more accurate translation might be songbanghua 鬆綁化, literally the process of “loosening restrictions.”

Democracy and “Taiwanization”

Democratization in Taiwan and “Taiwanization” (bentuhua 本土化) have been two very closely linked processes, but they are different and distinct. Taiwanization emphasizes identification with Taiwan, consciousness of Taiwan and even a Taiwan nationalism. As we will argue in the next chapter, the Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT, 國民黨) created a “colonial” society in which the Chinese Mainlanders, who account for less than fifteen per cent of Taiwan’s population, controlled the majority Taiwanese who comprise more than eighty-five per cent of the population. In this context, appeals to Taiwan identity provided an important attraction to and source of strength for the opposition. Clearly, not all of those who promoted democracy in Taiwan favored a separate Taiwan and this led to splits in the movement for democracy. Taiwan identity has become the most important—and most divisive—issue in Taiwan’s democratic politics today. But, despite the close association between the development of Taiwan’s democracy and the development of Taiwan identity, the two processes remain conceptually distinct.3

Important Factors Contributing to Taiwan’s Democratization

Ten inter-related factors assisted Taiwan’s process of democratization. Some of these factors can be traced back to the Japanese colonial period heavily infiltrated both parties and neither attempted to overthrow the Kuomintang. On these two minority parties, see Ibid., pp. 22–23. 3 For an exploration of issues related to Taiwan identity, see John Makeham and A-Chin Hsiau, eds., Cultural, Ethnic, and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan: Bentuhua (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). how taiwan became democratic 7

(1895–1945) as well as the KMT authoritarian period (1945–1988), while others relate only to the KMT authoritarian period.

Administrative, Economic, Social and Educational Development under the Japanese The Japanese attempted to make Taiwan a model colony in an effort to demonstrate to the Western powers their “modernization.” Thus, they built a penetrating administrative system backed by a strong police force. They eliminated many tropical diseases such as malaria and improved public health. They broadened the scope of education (see below). They built an important infrastructure of roads, railroads and harbors as well as telegraph, telephone and postal systems. They developed new seeds for such key crops as rice, sugar cane and pineapple. They constructed some minor industry such as sugar refining. Thus, by the end of the Japanese colonial period, Taiwan had a much higher standard of living than mainland China. The KMT built upon this base, a factor discussed separately below.

Relatively High Educational Levels under Japan and the KMT Japanese statistics from 1917 to 1943 show an increasing proportion of Taiwan’s school age population undertaking education throughout the period. In 1917, only 13.1 per cent of the school age children went to school (21.4 per cent of the boys and only 3.7 per cent of the girls.) By 1932 this had increased to 35.9 per cent (51.0 per cent of the boys and 19.7 per cent of the girls.) In 1943 the figures had risen to 71.3 per cent (80.9 per cent of the boys and 60.9 per cent of the girls.)4 Very few of these students obtained secondary or higher education, but this reasonably widespread primary education did much towards making Taiwan a literate society. In addition, Kerr argues that under the Japanese “common schooling gradually created a sense of Formosan [Taiwanese] identity” among people who spoke different languages at home and lived in “separate community groups.”5 Tsurumi, who has written the key work on Japanese colonial

4 Taiwan sheng wushiyi nian lai tongji tiyao 臺灣省五十一年來統計提要 [Statistical Abstract of Taiwan Province for the Past Fifty-One Years] (Taipei: Statistical Office of the Taiwan Provincial Administration Agency 臺灣省行政長官公署統計室編印, 1946; reprint ed. Taipei: Guting shuwu 古亭書屋, 1969), p. 1241. 5 See George H. Kerr, Formosa: Licensed Revolution and the Home Rule Movement 1895–1945 (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1974), p. 85. Original emphasis in quote. 8 chapter one education in Taiwan, states, “The Taiwanese opposition to Japanese rule which emerged after 1920 was also a product of Japanese education.”6 Despite an “Affinity with China [that] was part of the anti-colonial movement ... the movement contained a local, Taiwanese content too.”7 The KMT also stressed the importance of education and enrolment rates continued to climb. In 1948, 77.14 per cent of primary age children were enrolled in primary schools. Of those graduating, only 33.05 per cent went on to junior secondary school and, of these, 62.89 per cent went on to senior secondary school. (Thus, 20.79 per cent of primary graduates went to senior secondary school.) Of these 79.54 per cent went to higher education.8 In 1968, the KMT government moved from six years of compulsory education to a policy of nine-years of compulsory education. Now, all students were required to complete junior secondary education. The proportion of school age children in primary school reached 97 per cent in 1965, but the proportion of primary graduates attending junior secondary school leapt from 62.29 per cent in 1967 to 74.66 per cent in 1968.9 By 1977 the goal of universal nine-year education had almost been reached. Of primary aged children, 99.57 per cent attended primary school. Of those, 94.21 per cent attended junior secondary (98.30 per cent of boys and 89.90 per cent of girls). Sixty per cent of these went on to senior secondary school (61.53 per cent of boys and 58.14 per cent of girls) while 77.20 per cent of these went on to higher education (67.83 per cent of boys and 89.84 per cent of girls.)10 Clearly, at this time, girls suffered in the transition from primary to secondary school, but their numbers virtually equaled the boys at the higher education level. These high rates of education have continued to the present. For the 2004 school year, 96.03 per cent of junior high school graduates went on to senior high school. And the progression to university is now also very high with a vast expansion of university places. In 1950 Taiwan had six institutions of higher learning with only 6,665 students. By 1974 Taiwan had 13 public and 19 private institutions of higher education. In 2004,

6 E. Patricia Tsurumi, Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895–1945 (Cambridge, Mass and London: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 219. 7 Ibid., p. 218. 8 Zhonghua minguo liushiliu nian tongji tiyao 中華民國六十六年統計提要 [Statisti- cal Abstract of the Republic Of China 1977] (Taipei: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics 行政院主計處, 1978), pp. 724–725. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. how taiwan became democratic 9

Taiwan had 75 universities, 70 independent colleges and 14 junior colleges with 1,228,727 undergraduate students and 160,401 postgraduate students.11 In their important, though flawed, cross-cultural study of democracy, Almond and Verba found that education gives people important skills related to political participation and belief in their ability to influence government.12 Clearly, the relatively high educational standards of Taiwan’s citizenry have contributed to the island’s smooth democratic transition.

Electoral Experience under Japanese and KMT Colonial Rule Both the Japanese and the KMT colonial regimes allowed elections that gave Taiwan’s citizens experience with voting. Although candidates preferred by the regime could lose in both periods, neither system of elections threatened the regime itself. During the mid-1930s, after considerable campaigning by Taiwanese, the Japanese finally allowed the partial election of “advisory councils” on the prefectural, county and township levels. However, the electors— males over twenty-five with sufficient property and with approval from the Japanese police—elected one less than half of the councilors while the Japanese colonial government appointed the majority of members. After the first election in 1935, the Japanese reduced the property qualifications and by the third biennial election in 1939, Taiwan had 286,700 Taiwanese voters who chose some 3,104 Taiwanese for various councils.13 Upon arriving in Taiwan, the KMT almost instantly instituted a system of elections. Within three months of taking control from the Japanese, on January 23, 1946, the KMT conducted popular elections for village head

11 Taiwan Yearbook 2005, CD-ROM ed. (Taipei: Government Information Office, 2005), chap. 18. 12 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 379–387. For the flaws, see the chapters in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., The Civic Culture Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980). 13 Kerr, Formosa: Licensed Revolution, pp. 162, 169–171. Six of the eleven members of the Mazu Township Advisory Council were appointed while five were elected. During the Japanese period, heads of households rather than all citizens elected the village heads, see J. Bruce Jacobs, Local Politics in a Rural Chinese Cultural Setting: A Field Study of Mazu Township, Taiwan (Canberra: Contemporary China Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1980), p. 116n. Alternatively, see Jacobs, Local Politics in Rural Taiwan under Dictatorship and Democracy, p. 140, n. 1. 10 chapter one and vice-head and for township assembly in early March. The township assembly elected the township executive later that year.14 After a 1950 administrative reorganization, which replaced two Japanese levels with the county, Taiwan’s citizens also began voting directly for township executive and county assembly in 1951.15 The first direct election of county executives began in August 1950 and stretched through to May 1951,16 while the first popular election of the provisional provincial assembly took place in 1954.17 These elections were hard fought, though as I have argued elsewhere, the primary gain was “face” and prestige rather than power or profit.18 For the most part, these elections were “free” in that KMT nominees did not always win and skullduggery, though it occurred, was reasonably limited. On several occasions, non-partisan oppositionists won individual local elections, though the KMT was never in danger of losing control because the central government and the executive branch of the provincial government were never chosen electorally. Thus, the central legislature was not popularly elected until 1992, the provincial governor not until 1994 and the president not until 1996.19

Increasing Economic Prosperity with Increasing Equality Many theorists have pointed to the importance of a “strong middle class” for democratization. I would argue that economic growth with good future prospects and equality of opportunity are more important. Taiwan certainly provides such a case study. Per capita national income rose from US$186 in 1952 to US$12,961 in 2000.20 More importantly, until 1980, personal income became more equal. Thus, in 1953 the richest fifth of

14 Jacobs, Local Politics, pp. 115–116; Jacobs, Local Politics in Rural Taiwan under Dica- torship and Democracy, p. 140. 15 Jacobs, Local Politics, pp. 117–120; Jacobs, Local Politics in Rural Taiwan under Dica- torship and Democracy, pp. 142–146. 16 Taiwan sheng difang zizhi zhiyao 臺灣省地方自治誌要 [Record of Local Autonomy in Taiwan Province] (Taichung: Taiwan sheng difang zizhi zhiyao bianji weiyuanhui 臺灣省地方自治誌要編輯委員會, 1965), pp. 407–408. 17 Ibid., p. 254. 18 Jacobs, Local Politics, pp. 64–67; Jacobs, Local Politics in Rural Taiwan under Dicta- torship and Democracy, pp. 81–85. 19 For a useful study of voting in both authoritarian and democratic Taiwan, Shelley Rigger, Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy (London and New York: Routledge, 1999). 20 Taiwan Statistical Data Book 2001 (Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Development, Republic of China, 2001), p. 50. how taiwan became democratic 11

Taiwan’s families had 20.47 times the income of Taiwan’s poorest fifth.21 By 1980, this ratio had declined to 4.17,22 though since the ratio had gradually increased to 5.50 in 1999.23 This growth with increasing equity coincided with substantial social mobility. During the 1970s, many girls left the countryside to work in fac- tories in order to earn dowries and to put their brothers into universities. Later, as indicated above, many of these girls went to universities themselves. In a significant longitudinal study, David Schak deliberately studied two of Taiwan’s poorest communities, a beggar’s den and a welfare community. Ten years later, these communities had essentially disappeared. After finding many of the original subjects, Schak concluded, they had “bettered their socioeconomic position, both absolutely and relative to the wider society.”24 And, certainly, the poorest sector, the countryside, also gained considerable, widespread prosperity during the 1970s and afterwards. To some extent, these policies originated in a KMT fear of social instability that derived from their Mainland experience. Thus, the KMT emphasized policies that contributed to “social stability” such as making certain that people had enough to eat and that arrangements were made to take care of orphans. In spite of its conservative external image, the KMT pursued progressive social policies on the island.25

Some “Liberals” among Top KMT Leadership In some ways, Chiang Ching-kuo had “liberal” or reformist elements in his leadership. Beginning in 1972, when he became premier and the clear successor to his father, Chiang pushed hard for more Taiwanese as well as for younger, more educated persons among his top leadership. And he pushed a variety of reforms.26 Of course, as discussed in the next chapter,

21 See Shirley W.Y. Kuo, The Taiwan Economy in Transition (Boulder, Colorado: West- view Press, 1983), pp. 96–97 (Table 6.1). 22 Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1992 (Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Development, Republic of China, 1992), pp. 62–63. 23 Taiwan Statistical Data Book 2001, pp. 78–79. 24 David C. Schak, “Socioeconomic Mobility and the Urban Poor in Taiwan,” Modern China, 15, no. 3 (1989), pp. 346–373, quote from p. 346. 25 J. Bruce Jacobs, “Chinese Nationalist Politics in Taiwan under the Two Chiangs,” in Modern Taiwan in the 1990s, ed. Gary Klintworth (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Stud- ies Centre, Australian National University, 1991), pp. 18–19. 26 See, for example, J. Bruce Jacobs, “Taiwan 1972: Political Season,” Asian Survey, XIII, no. 1 (January 1973), pp. 102–112. 12 chapter one

Chiang Ching-kuo also sanctioned the arrest of the Kaohsiung Incident demonstrators in December 1979, gave the conservative Wang Sheng 王昇 considerable power from 1979 until 1983 and may have approved the assassination of Henry Liu (also known as Liu Yiliang 劉宜良 and Chiang Nan 江南), a journalist who had written a biography of Chiang Ching-kuo himself, on October 14, 1984. In terms of today, pre-eminent among these early appointments, beginning as a Minister without Portfolio in 1972, was Lee Teng-hui 李登煇, who had a Cornell PhD in agricultural economics. George K.C. Yeh (Yeh Kung-ch’ao 葉公超), another 1972 appointment as Minister without Portfolio, had graduated with a BA from Amherst College and an MA from Cambridge University before beginning a career in foreign affairs. He too had a reputation as a “liberal.” Sun Yun-suan 孫運璿, appointed Minister of Economics in 1972 and Premier from 1978 until struck down by a stroke in 1984, trained in the Tennessee Valley Authority during 1943–1945 and also had a strong reputation as a “liberal.” Chiang Ching- kuo also appointed Kao Yü-shu 高玉樹 (also known as Henry Kao) as Minister of Transport in 1972. Kao, of course, was a Taiwanese non-partisan who had won election as mayor of Taipei in 1954 and 1964. Taipei’s elevation to provincial status in 1967 was, in part, an attempt to derail Kao’s political career. Bringing Kao back into the cabinet in 1972 was an explicit move to reform. Kao was educated at Waseda University. Other “liberal” leaders who held senior political positions under Chiang Ching-kuo include:

–– Chao Shou-po 趙守博, a Taiwanese who received postgraduate education at the University of Illinois and held senior positions within the KMT; –– Chen Chi-lu 陳奇祿, a senior Taiwanese anthropologist, who studied at the University of New Mexico and held cabinet positions during 1977–1988; –– Hsu Shui-teh 許水徳, a Taiwanese with postgraduate education at Tokyo University, who served as mayor of Kaohsiung (1982–1985) and Taipei (1985–1988) before becoming a cabinet member as well as a member of the KMT Central Standing Committee in 1988; –– Kao Yu-jen 高育仁, a Taiwanese who won elected positions as Taiwan provincial assemblyman and county executive of Tainan County before being appointed to a variety of government and party positions and then winning election as Speaker of the Taiwan Provincial Assem- bly in 1981 until 1989; how taiwan became democratic 13

–– Lee Huan 李煥, an important “liberal” advisor to Chiang Ching-kuo, who gained an MA from Columbia University and who held many senior party and government positions in the 1970s and 1980s; –– Lin Chin-sheng 林金生, a Taiwanese politician who was a member of the cabinet from 1972 to 1984 and a member of the KMT’s Central Standing Committee from 1976 to 1987; –– Lin Yang-kang 林洋港, a Taiwanese politician who held senior positions in the KMT and in government including mayor of Taipei (1976– 1978), governor of Taiwan province (1978–1981) and cabinet positions (1981–1987); –– Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九, a lawyer who studied at both New York Univer- sity and Harvard University and who worked in the Office of the Pres- ident during 1981–1988 and as Deputy Secretary-General of the KMT during 1984–1988; –– James C.Y. Soong (Sung Ch’u-yu 宋楚瑜), received MA degrees at the University of California at Berkeley and Catholic University of Amer- ica before a PhD at Georgetown, and later acted as English secretary to President Chiang Ching-kuo, headed the Government Information Office and held senior positions in the KMT;27 –– Tao Pai-chuan 陶百川, an older Mainlander who supported Lei Chen 雷震 as a member of the Control Branch in the 1950s and then left the KMT, but who remained a prestigious figure who had access to Chiang Ching-kuo; and –– Tsiang Yien-si (Chiang Yen-shih 蔣彥士), an agricultural scientist who received his PhD from the University of Minnesota and who held ministerial posts from 1972–1979 and served as Secretary-General of the KMT from 1979–1984.

Clearly, specialists on Taiwan politics could have debates about this list. Some might argue that some of these names do not deserve being here while other names have not been included. This list is not meant to be exhaustive and some people lost their “liberal” credentials after Lee Teng- hui became president in 1988. However, I have reason to believe each of the names on the list was both reasonably influential under Chiang Ching-kuo and was reasonably “liberal” during that period. Their pres- ence symbolizes that “liberal” voices did have some influence during

27 While Soong took many conservative positions as Director of the Government Information Office after the Kaohsiung Incident, his role in supporting President Lee Teng-hui as KMT Party Chairman in 1988 suggests he belongs in this list. 14 chapter one

Chiang Ching-kuo’s leadership. The contrast with South Korea, where very few “liberals” worked for the military regimes of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, is stark.28

A Non-Violent, Democratic Opposition Taiwan has been blessed with an opposition which has used non-violent methods and which supports democratization. This began during the February 28, 1947 Uprising and continued right through to Taiwan’s democratization in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Thus, for example, the dangwai 黨外 (those outside the KMT) used non-violent methods in their demonstrations from 1977 through the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979. In the early 1980s the opposition again used peaceful means of political action. This continued through the demonstrations in the mid and late 1980s and helps account for the many accounts stressing Taiwan’s “peaceful” democratic transition. The armed uprisings during the February 28, 1947 movement (in response to the KMT’s repression), the attempted assassination of Chiang Ching-kuo in New York on April 24, 1970 and the sending of a letter bomb to Provincial Governor Shieh Tung-min (Hsieh Tung-min 謝東閔) on October 10, 1976 were sharp, relatively rare and political insig- nificant exceptions to this general rule of non-violence.

Links between Government and Opposition In a useful discussion in perhaps his best book, Samuel Huntington draws distinctions between “reformers” and “standpatters” in authoritarian governments and between “moderates” and “radicals” among the opposition. He notes that if the “reformers” and the “moderates” have relatively more power among the government and the opposition respectively, the pos- sibilities for democratic transition are greater.29 This situation existed in Taiwan. With the exceptions listed above, Chiang Ching-kuo basically proved a “reformer” and supported “liberals.” As noted in the previous section, the opposition too had many “moderates” and few “radicals” as can be seen by their non-violent approach. In addition, even in the 1970s, Chiang Ching-kuo either personally or through his key subordinates often developed links with moderate opposition leaders such as Kang Ning-hsiang 康寧祥. The KMT established more formal consultation procedures towards the end of Chiang Ching- kuo’s life. Some of these links will be discussed in the next chapter.

28 Jacobs, “Taiwan and South Korea,” pp. 248–249. 29 Huntington, Third Wave, pp. 121–124. how taiwan became democratic 15

Popular Associations and Interest Group Activity In an important discussion, Almond and Verba draw links between interest group membership and increased political competence: “Membership in an organization, political or not, appears therefore to be related to an increase in the political competence and activity of the individual.”30 In Taiwan, under the KMT authoritarian regime, the government set up numerous “popular associations,” which though technically independent, in fact operated under government and party control and supervision. Back in 1978, the author wrote: “The paradox of Taiwan’s interests groups lies in the fact that government and party organisation and control of popular associations has at the same time strengthened and even created groups which may be capable of independent interest articulation.”31 We know, for example, that the Farmers’ Associations led the battle against the government’s rice for fertilizer barter policy, which meant that to get chemical fertilizer farmers had to give the government rice at very unfa- vorable prices. The Provincial Grain Bureau announced the end of this policy on January 9, 1973.32 The change came because Lee Teng-hui, appointed to the cabinet as a Minister without Portfolio in May 1972, worked with the Farmers’ Associations.33 The broad and encompassing nature of the “popular associations” is clear.34 Furthermore, some of these associations have long histories. The Farmers’ Associations, for example, were founded during the Japanese colonial period. The “popular associations” clearly involved a large variety of Taiwan’s citizens during the KMT authoritarian period. Unfortunately, being black-listed from Taiwan, the writer was unable to observe their roles during the democratic transition and no one else has reported on this. Yet, it does appear that the widespread membership of the popular associations did ease Taiwan’s transformation into a democracy.

30 Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, p. 310. 31 J. Bruce Jacobs, “Paradoxes in the Politics of Taiwan: Lessons for Comparative Pol- itics,” Politics, XIII, no. 2 (November 1978), p. 244. 32 Taiwan lishi nianbiao (1966–1978) 台灣歷史年表 [Chronology of Taiwan History], vol. II (Taibei: Guojia zhengce yanjiusuo ziliao zhongxin, 1990), p. 194. 33 For the role of Lee Teng-hui, see Zhang Yanxian et al 張炎憲等, Li Denghui xiansheng yu Taiwan minzhu hua 李登輝先生與台灣民主化 [Mr Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Democratization (Taibei: Yushanshe 玉山社, 2004), pp. 44–45, 101. 34 Jacobs, “Paradoxes,” pp. 243–244. 16 chapter one

American Political Pressure Following the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act on April 10, 1979, Congress began to pay more attention to human rights in Taiwan. These bi-partisan pressures became stronger after the Kaohsiung Incident of December 10, 1979, when many Taiwanese were arrested, and became particularly strong after the murder of Henry Liu (Chiang Nan, Liu Yiliang) on October 14, 1984. The American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) probed this case, which took place in the United States, and discov- ered clear evidence that Taiwan’s security agencies had been involved in the murder, a fact Taiwan admitted in January 1985.35 This distinguished the Henry Liu case from earlier political murders, which had occurred in Taiwan, and created “a severe, self-inflicted crisis” on the island.36 President Reagan, who was “pro-Taiwan,” and Congress also placed pressure on Taiwan on August 17, 1985 by passing the “1986–1987 Foreign Affairs Authorization Action.”37

The Fall of President Marcos The relatively sudden fall of President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines in February 1986 really frightened authoritarian leaders in much of Asia including Taiwan and South Korea. After September 28, 1986 the Taiwan regime allowed the newly created opposition Democratic Progressive Party to exist and to contest explicitly the December 6, 1986 legislative and national assembly elections. In mid-October 1986, Chiang Ching-kuo announced the abolition of martial law effective July 1987. (These and other reforms are discussed in the next chapter.) Similarly, South Korea also made reforms following the fall of President Marcos.

A Non-Factor: Presbyterianism

The Presbyterian Church has a relatively long history in Taiwan dating back to the 1860s. Later, the Japanese gave the Presbyterian Church a vir- tual monopoly as the only Protestant Church in Taiwan from 1895 until

35 For an excellent overview, see Richard C. Bush, At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations Since 1942 (Armonk, NY and London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), pp. 179–218. See also David E. Kaplan, Fires of the Dragon: Politics, Murder, and the Kuomintang (New York: Atheneum, 1992). 36 J. Bruce Jacobs, “Uncurbed security forces threaten Taiwan’s future,” The Age, p. 13. 37 Kiyoshi Ito, History of Taiwan, trans. Walter Chen (Taibei: Qianwei, 2004), pp. 316– 317. how taiwan became democratic 17

1925.38 Thus, the Presbyterian Church has identified with the island and has been a leader in both pushing for democracy and for the island’s Taiwan identity. Peng Ming-min 彭明敏, an early Taiwan Independence leader and the DPP candidate for president in 1996, had early connections with the Presbyterian Church,39 though these influences gain no mention in Peng’s famous “Declaration of Formosans” issued in 1964.40 The Presbyterian Church itself issued its first famous proclamation on December 29, 1971, a few months after Taiwan had withdrawn from the United Nations. 41 The Presbyterian Church also made a “Declaration on Human Rights” on August 16, 1977, which urged “our government to face reality and to take effective measures whereby Taiwan may become a new and independent country.”42 It is also true that President Lee Teng-hui and many members of then opposition DPP were and are members of the Presbyterian Church. However, after discussing this with many political leaders and activists— both church members and not—the writer believes that Church membership is not a factor in Taiwan’s democratization. Many members of the DPP, as well as the KMT and other political parties, are not Church members. A few interviewees suggested that the Church may have instilled democratic values, but many in the democratic movement do not have Christian beliefs while many leaders of the former authoritarian regime, including Chiang Kai-shek and his wife Soong Mayling 宋美嶺, did believe in Christianity. Thus, while the Presbyterian Church, as an organization, did work to enhance democratization in Taiwan, church beliefs have not in themselves made any particular contributions.

38 Murray A. Rubinstein, The Protestant Community on Modern Taiwan: Mission, Sem- inary, and Church (Armonk, N.Y. and London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 1991), pp. 20–21. 39 Peng Ming-min, A Taste of Freedom: Memoirs of a Formosan Independence Leader (New York, Chicago and San Francisco: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), pp. 4–5, 9–10, 123. 40 Victor H. Li, ed., The Future of Taiwan: a Difference of Opinion (White Plains, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1980), pp. 174–185. 41 “Presbyterians Urge Reforms in Taiwan,” New York Times, December 30, 1971, p. 10. The text of this Declaration appears in Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, Statement on our National Fate (December 29, 1971, accessed October 3, 2009); available from http://www. taiwandocuments.org/pct01.htm. 42 Li, ed., Future, pp. 186–187, quote on p. 187. The text is at Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, A Declaration of Human Rights (August 16, 1977, accessed October 3, 2009); available from http://www.taiwandocuments.org/pct04.htm. 18 chapter one

Conclusions

We have drawn an important distinction between “liberalization” and “democratization”, though we have noted that “liberalization” of an authoritarian regime can contribute to its ultimate “democratization.” In addition, we have explored some ten factors from the authoritarian periods that have contributed to Taiwan’s democratization. In the next chapter, we explore the “colonial” dictatorships of both the Japanese and the KMT in order to gain some understanding of these precedents. the japanese and kuomintang colonial regimes 19

Chapter two

The Japanese and Kuomintang Colonial Regimes

Many Taiwanese scholars have come to the view that the history of Taiwan is a history of colonial rule by outsiders. Prior to 1624, the island’s population was overwhelmingly aboriginal. The only Chinese on Taiwan were temporary visitors who came as fishermen, pirates and traders with the aborigines. In the years before 1624, several European powers began to establish their colonial empires. The Portuguese, who sailed through the Taiwan Straits on their way to Japan in 1544,1 called Taiwan “Ilha Formosa” or “Beautiful Island,” and “Formosa” became the most important Western name for the island for many years, while the Chinese translation of Ilha Formosa, Meilidao 美麗島, became a potent force on behalf of those seeking democratization from the late 1970s. At this time, the Dutch were establishing their empire in what is now Indonesia while the Spanish were in the Philippines. In an attempt to open trade with China, the Dutch tried to establish a base in Penghu (a group of islands to the west of Taiwan that now form a county of Taiwan), but the Chinese insisted they leave and they went to what is now Tainan in Taiwan and set up a colonial base there as well as conducted trade. At this time the Dutch imported many Chinese to Taiwan in order to help with both agriculture and trade. In 1626, the Spanish, concerned that the Dutch were gaining too strong a toehold, established a base in northern Taiwan near modern Keelung and then at Tamsui. Only sixteen years later, in 1642, the Dutch attacked the Spanish bases and drove the Spanish out of Taiwan. The Dutch remained in control until 1662. In the meantime, China had undergone the great transition from the Ming Dynasty to the Manchu Qing Dynasty in 1644. In 1661, a force under Zheng Chenggong 鄭成功 (also known as Koxinga, a name derived from Guoxingye 國姓爺 meaning “of the imperial surname”), the son of a Chinese pirate and a Japanese woman, came to Taiwan and besieged the Dutch in their two forts in Tainan. By February 1662, the Dutch surrendered and left Taiwan. Zheng himself died in May 1662.

1 This date comes from Ito, Taiwan, p. 9. 20 chapter two

Chinese have looked back on Zheng Chenggong as loyal patriot of the Ming Dynasty and Zheng did officially support the last Ming “emperor,” who also died in early 1662. At this stage, Zheng and his successors seem to have tried to establish a trading empire rather than restore the Ming Dynasty. Huang Fu-san, for example, argues Zheng established an independent “administration [that] exercised full authority over Taiwan and dealt with foreign countries as a sovereign nation.”2 The Zheng regime fell in 1683 as the Manchus conquered Taiwan as part of their suppression of the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories (san- fan zhi luan 三藩之亂) in southern China. Zheng Chenggong’s son, Zheng Jing 鄭經, had intervened on the side that opposed the Manchus. Originally, the Qing “court had never intended to send forces overseas but, in the aftermath of the rebellion, the Manchu rulers began devising a plan to eliminate” Zheng Jing.3 In 1683, the powerful Manchu Kangxi emperor himself declared Taiwan had never belonged to either the Manchus or China: “Taiwan is a small pellet of land. There is nothing to be gained by taking it, and no losses in not taking it.” 4 His son, the Yongzheng Emperor, stated in 1723: “From ancient times, Taiwan has not been part of China. My holy and invincible father brought it into the territory.”5 Most Chinese who assert that Taiwan is “Chinese” focus on the two centuries of Manchu control from 1683–1895. The Manchu empire was administratively and ideologically very complex. Its rulers were all Manchus as were many of its high officials. Manchus, for example, dominated the Grand Council.6 As Han Chinese accounted for over ninety per cent of the empire’s population, many high officials were naturally Chinese, but the ultimate sources of power rested with the Manchus, not with Chinese.

2 Fu-san Huang, A Brief History of Taiwan: A Sparrow Transformed into a Phoenix (Tai- pei: Government Information Office, 2005), chap. 4, p. 1. 3 Ibid., chap. 4, p. 3. 4 Xue Hua-yuan 薛化元, Dai Baocun 戴寳村, and Zhou Meili 周美里, Taiwan bushi Zhongguo de. Taiwan guomin de lishi 台灣不是中國的。臺灣國民的歷史 [Taiwan is not Chinese: A History of the Taiwanese People] (Danshui: Quncehui, 2005), p. 59. An English translation is Hsueh Hua-yuan, Tai Pao-tsun, and Chow Mei-li, Is Taiwan Chinese? A His- tory of Taiwanese Nationality (Tamsui: Taiwan Advocates, 2005), p. 56. 5 Xue Hua-yuan 薛化元, Dai Baocun 戴寳村, and Zhou Meili 周美里, Taiwan bushi Zhongguo de, p. 135. An English translation is Hsueh, Tai, and Chow, Is Taiwan Chi- nese? , p. 132. 6 Pamela Kyle Crossley, A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1999), p. 14, n. 24. the japanese and kuomintang colonial regimes 21

At the end of the eighteenth century the Qing empire encompassed an area twice the size of Ming China ... The court handled this expansion in a range of fashions without any one model of incorporation and administration. Differentiation and heterogeneity came to be the keys to the division of space within the empire. As a conquest dynasty, Qing political culture and institutions derived as much from the traditions of Inner Asia as they did from traditional Confucian political theory.7 Qing attitudes toward Taiwan remained ambivalent over their two centuries of rule. According to Shepherd, “even after paying a high price to defeat the rebel Cheng [Zheng] regime, the court still had to be convinced that the strategic importance of Taiwan justified retaining the revenue- poor island within the empire.”8 In Taiwan, “the state was saved the expense of initial pacification of the natives ... because it inherited the system of taxation and control created by the Dutch and continued by the Chengs.”9 This substantially reduced the costs of administering Taiwan, yet in its first century of rule, Qing administration remained limited to the western plains of Taiwan.10 The situation did change in the nineteenth century. In the early nineteenth century, Han migration into the isolated Ilan plain in Taiwan’s northeast “began suddenly and on a large scale.” Qing government administration only arrived in 1810 after Han Chinese colonization of the Ilan plain was well underway.11 Yet it appears that the Qing government still did not claim the “uncivilized” parts of Taiwan. This became clearest when the Qing government refused responsibility for protecting foreign seamen whose ships were wrecked in aboriginal areas of Taiwan. In 1867 an American ship ran aground off Pingtung in southern Taiwan and aborigines killed most of the surviving crew. The American consul at Xiamen, General Charles William LeGendre, signed a treaty with the aboriginal Chief Tauketok rather than with the Qing government.12 In late 1871, matters became even more serious when Taiwan aborigines killed fifty-four shipwrecked Ryukyuan sailors. When the Qing said

7 Justin Tighe, Constructing Suiyuan: The Politics of Northwestern Territory and Devel- opment in Early Twentieth-Century China (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2005), p. 21. 8 John Robert Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600–1800 (Taipei: SMC Publishing, 1995), p. 408. 9 Ibid., p. 409. 10 Ibid., pp. 178–214, esp. Maps 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3, pp. 188, 192–193, 196–197. 11 Ibid., pp. 358–359. 12 Huang, A Brief History of Taiwan: A Sparrow Transformed into a Phoenix, chap. 5, p. 6. For Le Gendre’s first person account of this expedition, see James W. Davidson, The Island of Formosa: Past and Present (London: Macmillan & Co., 1903), pp. 117–122. 22 chapter two that “it could not be held responsible for the behavior of [Taiwan] aborigines, because it always allowed them large measures of freedom and never interfered in their internal affairs,” Japan responded, “sovereignty over a territory was evidence[d] by effective control; since China [the Qing] did not control the Formosan aborigines, they were clearly beyond its jurisdiction.”13 Clearly, different people in the Qing government had different perspectives. Li Hongzhang 李鴻章 wanted to accept responsibility for the actions of the Taiwan aborigines, but in July 1873, another group of Qing leaders informed the Japanese foreign minister “that China claimed no control over the savage tribes in the mountainous eastern half of Formosa...”14 In summary, the Qing “record there [Taiwan] since the mid-eighteenth century was one of corrupt but minimal government, punctuated by periodic suppression of uprisings. The shelling of Keelung by British ships during the Opium War and the opening of Tamsui and Ta-kao (the present Kaohsiung) as treaty ports in the early 1860s barely began to awaken Peking to the importance of the island.”15 The ensuing Japanese invasion of 1874–1875, as well as the later French attacks on Taiwan during Sino- French war of 1884–1885, “did ... convince a few statesmen of the urgent need to strengthen its [Taiwan’s] defences.”16 The Qing established new administrative units in 1875 and 188717 and made Taiwan a province in 1885.18 Yet, despite this apparent last minute appreciation of Taiwan by at least some Qing officials, such a view was apparently not unanimous. In the words of Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui, at the end of the Qing- Japanese War in 1895 the first thing the Qing Dynasty negotiators gave the Japanese was Taiwan. According to Lee Teng-hui, Li Hongzhang, the Qing Dynasty lead negotiator, “implied he did not want Taiwan as it was land beyond civilization (huawai zhi di 化外之地)!”19 A Japanese source

13 Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, Third ed. (Hong Kong: Oxford Uni- versity Press, 1983), p. 316. 14 Hosea Ballou Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, vol. II (London, New York, Bombay: Longmans, Green, 1918), p. 271. 15 Kwang-Ching Liu and Richard J. Smith, “The Military Challenge: The North-west and the Coast,” in The Cambridge History of China, ed. John K. Fairbank and Kwang-Ching Liu (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 260. 16 Ibid. 17 Shepherd, Statecraft, p. 360. 18 Yang Bichuan 楊碧川, Taiwan lishi cidian 台灣歷史辭典 [Taiwan Historical Dic- tionary] (Taibei: Qianwei, 1997), p. 259. 19 Lee Teng-hui made this statement in his famous interview with Shiba Ryōtarō, which took place in Japanese. Shiba Ryotoro 司馬遼太郎, Taiwan kiko 台灣紀行 the japanese and kuomintang colonial regimes 23

confirms that Li Hongzhang “surrendered nothing which he was not prepared and glad to get rid of, except the indemnity. He always considered Formosa [Taiwan] a curse to China and was exceedingly pleased to hand it over to Japan, and he shrewdly guessed that Japan would find it a great deal more trouble than it was worth.”20 It should be noted, however, that Morse suggests Li Hongzhang did not give up Taiwan quite so easily.21 This analysis suggests two key points about Qing control of Taiwan. First, Qing control was—at best—loose, “minimal,” and partial. Sub stantial parts of Taiwan remained outside of Qing control throughout the whole period of Qing rule in Taiwan (1683–1895). Second, even this partial Qing control was not Chinese, but Manchu. Thus, in Taiwan the Qing period too was a period of foreign colonial rule.

Similarities between the Japanese and Kuomintang Colonial Governments

In terms of Taiwan’s future democratization, the two key colonial regimes were those of the Japanese (1895–1945) and the Kuomintang (1945–1988). Before examining each regime separately, it is worth noting that the two shared a number of characteristics in terms of their nature and in terms of the timing of their policies. First of all, both regimes considered the Taiwanese natives to be second-class citizens and both systematically discriminated against the Taiwanese. Under the Japanese, for example, Taiwanese never held a

[A Taiwan Journey] (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun 朝日新聞社, 1994), p. 489. Two different Chi- nese translations follow the Japanese text closely: Shiba Ryotoro 司馬遼太郎, Taiwan jixing 台灣紀行 [A Taiwan Journey], trans. Li Jinsong (Taibei: Taiwan Dongfan, 1996), p. 525. See also Li Denghui 李登輝, Jingying da Taiwan 經營大臺灣 [Managing a Great Taiwan] (Taibei: Yuanliu, 1995), p. 472. This latter version, translated by Luo Yi-wen, originally appeared in the Taiwan magazine, Heibai xinwen zhoukan [Black and White Newsweekly], No. 34 (29 May-4 June 1994). 20 Tadasu Hayashi, The Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi (New York: G.P. Put- nam’s Sons, 1915), p. 57 as quoted in S.C.M. Paine, The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 291– 292. 21 Hosea Ballou Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, vol. III (Lon- don, New York, Bombay: Longmans, Green, 1918), pp. 43–56. A stimulating article suggests that the Japanese had focused on Korea rather than Taiwan at the beginning of the Manchu-Japanese War and that the cession of Taiwan only came to the fore in Japan after the war began, see Edward I-te Chen, “Japan’s Decision to Annex Taiwan: A Study of Ito-Mutsu Diplomacy, 1894–95,” The Journal of Asian Studies, XXXVII, no. 1 (1977), pp. 61–72. 24 chapter two position above head of county.22 In October 1934, after almost forty years of colonial rule, the Japanese finally unveiled their “long-awaited reform of local autonomy”, but this “outraged the Formosans ... because what had been granted was, in essence, a rigged system in favor of Japanese residents.”23 Similarly, when the Kuomintang took over from the Japanese in late 1945, Taiwanese were excluded from many jobs in both central and local government. In addition, under both Chiang Kai-shek and his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, Mainlanders, who account for less than fifteen per cent of Taiwan’s population, always had a majority in the Cabinet and in the Kuomintang’s Central Standing Committee.24 Right until the death of Chiang Ching-kuo, no Taiwanese ever held the position of Premier or Minister of Foreign Affairs, National Defense, Economics, Education, Finance, or Justice,25 Director-General of the Government Information Office,26 Chairman of the Council for Economic Planning and Develop ment27 or any senior military or security position. At least until 1983, no Taiwanese had ever such key Kuomintang positions as Secretary-General or Director of the Organization, Youth, Policy, and Culture departments.28 Secondly, both regimes clamped down very hard at first and killed tens of thousands of Taiwanese. Davidson estimates that close to 8,000 died resisting the Japanese in 1895.29 Lamley suggests that the Japanese killed 12,000 Taiwanese “bandit-rebels” during 1898–1902,30 while a Japanese source states that the Japanese colonial regime executed over 32,000

22 See Edward I-te Chen, “Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Formosa: A Compari- son of the Systems of Political Control,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 30 (1970), p. 134. 23 Edward I-te Chen, “Formosan Political Movements Under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1914–1937,” The Journal of Asian Studies, XXXI, no. 3 (1972), pp. 493–494. 24 Jaushieh Joseph Wu, Taiwan’s Democratization: Forces Behind the New Momentum (Hong Kong, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 44, 103. 25 Taiwan lishi nianbiao (Suoyin) 台灣歷史年表 (索引） [Chronology of Taiwan His- tory (Index)], vol. IV (Taibei: Guojia zhengce yanjiu zhongxin 國家政策研究中心, 1994), pp. 231–233. 26 A list of all GIO Directors-General can be found at http://info.gio.gov.tw/lp.asp?ct Node=3473&CtUnit=802&BaseDSD=24&mp=1. 27 A list of all CEPD Chairman (and their predecessors) can be found at http://www. cepd.gov.tw/m1.aspx?sNo=0000119&key=&ex=%20&ic=&cd=. 28 Lan Yiping 籃一平, “Minzhuhua jiu shi Taiwanhua 民主化就是臺灣化 [Democra- tization is Precisely Taiwanization],” Minzhuren 民主人 [The Democrat], no. 8 (May 16, 1983), pp. 11–12. 29 Davidson, Island of Formosa, pp. 365–366. 30 Harry J. Lamley, “Taiwan Under Japanese Rule, 1895–1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism,” in Taiwan: A New History, ed. Murray A. Rubinstein (Armonk, N.Y. and Lon- don: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 207. the japanese and kuomintang colonial regimes 25

“bandits,” more than one per cent of Taiwan’s population, in the same period.31 In March 1947, as a result of the February 28, 1947 Uprising, Kuomintang armies came from the Mainland and slaughtered 10,000 to 28,000 of Taiwan’s leaders and educated youth. Third, both regimes continued to rely on oppression for about twenty- five years. During the Japanese colonial period, this was a period of military governors, strong rule through the police and continued repression. From 1907 to 1915, more than eight hundred Taiwanese were executed. During the White Terror of the 1950s, the Kuomintang executed 1,017 people and during the whole period of martial law from 1950 to 1987 some 3,000 to 4,000 people were executed for political offenses.32 Fourth, owing to both international and domestic circumstances, the two colonial regimes “liberalized” after about a quarter century of rule. Towards the end of World War I, Woodrow Wilson gave his speech about “self-determination” and the Koreans had a major revolt called The March First (1919) Movement. The liberalization under “Taisho democracy” at this time enabled public discussion in Japan of various policies. These discussions began to influence Japan’s colonial policies in Taiwan and led to the appointment of civilian governors from October 1919 until September 1936. While police repression continued, this was also the period when Taiwanese, often in cooperation with liberal Japanese, began their political movements.33 Similarly, under the Kuomintang, in the early 1970s with Taiwan’s defeat in the United Nations, the Diaoyutai movement, the activities of The Intellectual (Daxue) magazine, and the promotion of Chiang Ching-kuo to the premiership in 1972, Taiwan began to liberalize. Finally, as both regimes came under pressure, they both again stepped up repression. Under the Japanese this came with World War II, the appointment of military governors in 1936 and the push towards assimilation (kōminka 皇民化). Under the Kuomintang, repression occurred following the Kaohsiung Incident of December 10, 1979. Ultimately, the Allied Powers defeated the Japanese and forced them to leave Taiwan. The reforms in the last eighteen months of Chiang Chiang-kuo’s life, the accession of Lee Teng-hui to the presidency and cooperation between the moderate elements in the Kuomintang and the moderate elements in the

31 Ito, Taiwan, pp. 138–139. 32 Preface of Qiu Rongju in Chen Yingtai 陳英泰, Huiyi, jianzheng baise kongbu 回憶，見證白色恐怖 [Recollections, Witness to the White Terror], 2 vols., vol. 1 (Taibei: Tangshan, 2005), p. xiii. 33 See, for example, Chen, “Formosan Political Movements,” pp. 477–497. 26 chapter two new opposition Democratic Progessive Party led to the end of the Kuomintang’s colonial dictatorship and to the island’s democratization.

The Japanese Colonial Regime

Although the Japanese had sent their expedition to Taiwan in 1874, when the Western powers forced Japan to withdraw, an excellent analysis suggests that Japan only became interested in Taiwan as a spoil of war well after the start of the Qing-Japan War of 1894–1895. In fact, Japan’s main interest at that time was Korea. Japan’s interest in Taiwan grew from three factors: Japan’s major victories early in the Qing-Japan War, the Japanese navy’s new interest in Taiwan, and the feeling that accession of Taiwan would be the one part of Qing territory least likely to precipitate Western intervention.34 Japan’s decision to annex Taiwan came only on December 4, 1894, three months after the start of the war.35 For Japan, gaining a colonial territory meant it had become equal with the West.36 Despite lacking arms, Taiwanese resisted the Japanese invasion following the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ceded Taiwan to Japan. This was done on two levels. First, the Qing dynasty officials declared a Republic of Taiwan (Taiwan minzhu guo 台灣民主國). Though it had a flag and issued stamps, the Republic of Taiwan was very short-lived, only 148 days.37 Second, Taiwanese resisted the Japanese through armed confrontation and with guerilla warfare. According to a Japanese source, 14,000 Taiwanese died in action or were massacred compared to 278 Japanese killed. Thus, Japanese fatalities in invading and capturing Taiwan were less than one-fiftieth of the number of Taiwanese they killed.38

34 Chen, “Japan’s Decision,” pp. 61–70. 35 Ibid., p. 71. 36 Ibid., pp. 70–71. 37 Li Xiaofeng 李筱峰, Taiwan shi 100 jian da shi 台灣歷史100件大事 [100 Major Events in Taiwan History], II vols., vol. I (Taibei: Yushan, 1999), pp. 97–102. In English, Harry Lamley has written three major pieces on the Republic of Taiwan: (1) Harry J. Lam- ley, “The 1895 Taiwan Republic: A Significant Episode in Modern Chinese History,” The Journal of Asian Studies, 27, no. 4 (August 1968), pp. 739–762, (2) Harry J. Lamley, “The 1895 Taiwan War of Resistance: Local Chinese Efforts against a Foreign Power,” in Tai- wan: Studies in Chinese Local History, ed. Leonard H.D. Gordon (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 23–77 and (3) Harry J. Lamley, “A Short-lived Republic and War, 1895: Taiwan’s Resistance Against Japan,” in Taiwan in Modern Times, ed. Paul K.T. Sih (New York: St. John’s University Press, 1973), pp. 241–316. The duration of the Republic of Taiwan comes from Ito, Taiwan, pp. 118–119. 38 Ito, Taiwan, pp. 116–117. the japanese and kuomintang colonial regimes 27

Originally, many people believed that the Japanese colonial experience on Taiwan was much more benign than in Korea. Taiwan was Japan’s first colony and the Japanese, wishing to impress the West with their colonial capabilities, attempted to establish a “model” colony. Japanese also may have had a view of Taiwanese, being “Chinese,” as more “civilized” than Koreans. In addition, unlike the Koreans, the Taiwanese had never had their own king and their own “nation,” so Korean nationalism and resistance was supposedly much greater. Many Taiwanese, according to interviews, looked back on the Japanese colonial period as a “good” time after the KMT began to rule in late 1945. In fact, Japanese rule was brutal and resistance proved ongoing. As noted earlier, Japanese suppression was great and many Taiwanese were executed. From 1895 until 1919, Taiwan had military governors. And, while colonial rule in Korea was undeniably tough, Korea “gained some sem- blance of self-rule while in Formosa it was strongly bureaucratic.” Koreans held many senior positions in the Japanese colonial government, while Taiwanese held very few.39 This owed in part because Japanese formed only 2.8 per cent of the population in Korea compared to 6.0 per cent in Taiwan.40 Edward I-te Chen argues the Japanese used force in the two places for different reasons. In Taiwan, force was used to “eliminate active resistance,” a goal achieved by 1919. In Korea, which revolted in the very substantial March First (1919) Movement, Japan “decided to relax control somewhat in the hope that the Koreans might be reconciled to ‘autonomy’ and abandon their demand for independence.”41 In 1919, as noted earlier, the Japanese colonial government “liberalized” owing to Woodrow Wilson’s “self-determination” speech, the development of Taisho democracy in Japan and the apparent repression of Taiwanese uprisings.42 The Japanese appointed a civilian governor in October 1919. The heyday of Taiwanese political activity under the Japanese occurred after this time.43 Woodrow Wilson’s “self-determina-

39 Chen, “Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Formosa,” p. 157. 40 Ibid., p. 144, n. 35. 41 Ibid., p. 158. 42 The important Musha aboriginal uprising, which took place in October 1930, killed more than two hundred Japanese including the provincial governor. The Japanese killed thousands in response. See, inter alia, Kerr, Formosa: Licensed Revolution, pp. 151–154. An interesting analysis is Leo T.S. Ching, Become “Japanese”: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 133–173. 43 The Assimilation Society was founded in 1914 and survived for a short time owing to its support from a prominent Japanese, but the police soon closed it down. See, inter alia, Chen, “Formosan Political Movements,” pp. 478–481. 28 chapter two tion speech,” the May Fourth Movement in China and the March First Movement in Korea as well as the new governor’s “expressed intention to carry out a policy of conciliation and his hope to introduce shortly a system of local autonomy” led the two thousand Taiwanese students in Japan at that time to think of “Formosa for Formosans” for the very first time.44 Police repression made life difficult for the Taiwanese, but coercion “had the effect of radicalizing the movement.”45 Many Taiwanese served considerable time in jail. Rivalry among Taiwanese leaders in the late 1920s and early 1930s led to several different organizations being founded. The more radical people formed a labor movement and those even more radical founded the small Taiwan Communist Party, established by the Comintern as a branch of the Japanese Communist Party. The founders of the Taiwan Communist Party included seven Taiwanese and representatives of both the Chinese and the Korean communist parties. The Japanese police arrested all Taiwanese members by June 1931.46 Perhaps the greatest successes of the Taiwanese political movements involved gaining some very moderate elections in the mid-1930s. Yet, this success was limited. In the first election of 1935, because of the minimum tax that a voter had to pay, more Japanese (30,969) qualified to vote than did Taiwanese (28,952) despite Taiwanese being sixteen times as numerous. In addition, the voters chose only one-half of the council memberships as the Japanese governor-general chose the rest. In addition, the councils were merely advisory and could be dismissed by the government at any time.47 Naturally, the announcement of this system “outraged” the Taiwanese.48 As noted above, the Japanese reduced the financial requirement for voters and by the third biennial election in 1939 the number of Taiwanese voters had increased to 286,700 and the number of Taiwanese elected to local posts had risen to 3,014.49 The number of voters was still a minority of Taiwan’s citizens, about ten per cent of the Taiwanese population and perhaps twenty per cent of the adults, but it was still ten times greater than four years previously. By then, with the war in full-swing, the

44 Ibid., p. 481. 45 Ibid., p. 488. 46 Ito, Taiwan, pp. 188–189. See also Frank S.T. Hsiao and Lawrence R. Sullivan, “A Political History of the Taiwanese Communist Party, 1928–1931,” The Journal of Asian Studies, XLII, no. 2 (February 1983), pp. 269–289. 47 Chen, “Formosan Political Movements,” p. 494. 48 Ibid., p. 493. 49 Kerr, Formosa: Licensed Revolution, p. 171. the japanese and kuomintang colonial regimes 29

Japanese were attempting to assimilate the Taiwanese (and the Koreans) with their kōminka 皇民化 policies aimed at changing Taiwanese into “true Japanese” with Japanese ways and Japanese names. In many ways, Taiwanese political activity during the Japanese period was limited and, since none of the Taiwanese organizations achieved its goals, the Taiwanese political movements during the Japanese period may be considered “failures.” Yet, in the words of a Taiwanese scholar written almost forty years ago during the height of the KMT colonial dica- torship, the Taiwanese political movements did help preserve “the cultural identity of Formosans ... and they helped Formosans to learn about the many hitherto totally alien concepts of democracy, such as home rule, popular election, and universal suffrage. Formosan desire for self- determination today [1972] has its deep roots in the days of Japanese rule.”50

The Kuomintang Arrives in Taiwan

During World War II, the Kuomintang viewed Taiwan with considerable ambivalence. On one hand, it looked upon Taiwanese as compatriots to be liberated. Yet some Taiwanese served their Japanese colonial masters as spies or conscripts in the Japanese forces that invaded the mainland. Thus, many Chinese viewed all Taiwanese with some suspicion and some Chinese viewed Taiwan as rich war booty to be seized after Japan’s surrender. In 1944 and 1945, “Half-Mainlander” Taiwanese, who had worked with the Kuomintang during the War, devoted considerable efforts to educate China’s leaders about the realities on Taiwan and the patriotism of Taiwanese. They emphasized the high education levels of Taiwanese, the extensive Taiwanese experience with local self-government, the honesty of Japanese officials as well as the oppression of Japanese colonial rule. Yet some Chinese argued for severe, strong control over Taiwan as Taiwan had the “poison” of Japanese education and had proven difficult to rule with its “small uprising every three years and a great rebellion every five years.” Near the end of the war, one Taiwanese raised several questions for higher levels in the Kuomintang to consider. First, the Taiwanese people have had close to twenty years of experience in self-government. If they

50 Chen, “Formosan Political Movements,” p. 496. 30 chapter two may not participate in self-governing assemblies after Taiwan returns to China, what kind of reactions will occur? Second, many Taiwanese have administrative experience. If they receive unreasonable assignments or dismissal from government work, what kind of responses will result? Third, many Taiwanese have technical capability. If China sends technically backward people to manage them, to what kind of disappointments will this lead? This author also argued that the Taiwanese people should replace the Japanese and that the change from Japanese language to written and spoken Mandarin Chinese must take place gradually; for eight or ten years, the government must recognize “the Taiwanese language, which is the same as the Southern Fujian language,” as a temporary “official language.” The subsequent events in postwar Taiwan revealed the profoundly prophetic nature of the “Half-Mainlander” Taiwanese fears.51 Although Taiwanese welcomed the Chinese who came to Taiwan to accept the Japanese surrender, they were soon disappointed. Taiwanese, who had held positions under the Japanese, were dismissed. Local elections, though held soon after the Kuomintang’s arrival, remained limited. The new government under the control of Chen Yi 陳儀, a fellow native with Chiang Kai-shek of Zhejiang province, basically ran Taiwan as occupied enemy territory. The Taiwan Provincial Executive Commander’s Office (Taiwan sheng xingzheng zhangguan gongshu 臺灣省行政長官公署) differed from all provincial governments on the Chinese mainland. It combined executive, legislative, judicial, and military authority in one office, thus “continuing a colonial structure similar to that of the Japanese period.”52 As noted earlier, the Chinese Nationalist colonial regime systematically discriminated against Taiwanese in political appointments and gave Mainlanders all of the senior appointments. They forced children to speak the colonial language, Mandarin Chinese, and fined and humili- ated students who spoke their own languages, such as Hokkien, Hakka or aboriginal languages, at school. The regime also insisted upon teaching about China and not Taiwan. Thus, Taiwanese children learned about all of the rivers and mountains of China and about Chinese political leaders,

51 The text from the start of this section quotes and paraphrases from J. Bruce Jacobs, “Taiwanese and the Chinese Nationalists, 1937–1945: The Origins of Taiwan’s ‘Half-Moun- tain People’ (Banshan ren),” Modern China, 16, no. 1 (January 1990), pp. 105–107. 52 Li Xiaofeng 李筱峰, Taiwan shi 100 jian da shi 台灣歷史100件大事 [100 Major Events in Taiwan History], II vols., vol. II (Taibei: Yushan, 1999), pp. 6–7. the japanese and kuomintang colonial regimes 31 but they learned virtually nothing about their own history and geography. In addition to the many parallels with the Japanese colonial regime, the Chinese colonial regime also had many similarities with European colonial regimes such as those run by England and France. Because of the large number of Chinese who came to Taiwan in 1949 owing to the Communist victory, perhaps the closest parallel is with the French colonial regime in Algeria where colons (European colonists) or pieds noir (black feet) accounted for ten per cent of the population by 1909.53 This ratio of about ten per cent Europeans continued until Algeria gained independence on July 3, 1962. During 1962–1963, more than 1.4 million European colonists left Algeria and only 30,000 remained.54 After this departure, Algeria had a population 12 million according to the 1966 cen- sus.55 Cultural misunderstandings added to the lack of trust between Chinese and Taiwanese. Most Chinese could not speak Hokkien and most Taiwanese could not speak various mainland Chinese languages and dia- lects. When Chinese, who had never seen bicycles tried to ride, they frequently fell down. Chinese, many of whom had never seen running water, would go to a hardware store and buy a faucet. When they put the faucet up on the wall and turned it on, water did not flow, causing the Taiwanese who saw this to laugh. In addition, in ever-worsening economic conditions, Chinese were very corrupt. Thus, many Taiwanese said that the “dogs” (the Japanese) were bad, but the “pigs” (the Chinese) were worse.

The February 28, 1947 Uprising

This oppression of Taiwanese led to the so-called “February 28 (1947) Incident” (er erba shijian 二二八事件), perhaps the most politically important event during the whole of the Kuomintang colonial regime.56

53 See, inter alia, French rule in Algeria (accessed October 3, 2009); available from http://www.answers.com/topic/french-rule-in-algeria. 54 Algerian National Liberation (1954–1962) (accessed October 3, 2009); available from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/algeria.htm. 55 Population (accessed October 3, 2009); available from http://www.country-studies. com/algeria/population.html. 56 The February 28 (1947) events have been called an “Incident” (shijian 事件), “Uprising” (qiyi 起義) and even a “revolution” (geming 革命). I prefer to use “Uprising.” The literature on the February 28 Uprising has become large. The best book in English remains the eyewitness account of George H. Kerr, Formosa Betrayed (Boston: Houghton 32 chapter two

From early 1946, as the repression of the Taiwan Provincial Executive Commander’s Office became more and more obvious, Taiwanese began to protest and to organize.57 On the evening of February 27, a young widow with her two children sold cigarettes in Taipei. At this time, the Monopoly Bureau controlled the selling of cigarettes and Monopoly Bureau agents came and seized her cigarettes. When she protested, they pistol-whipped her. An angry crowd moved in and, firing their guns, the agents fled to a police station. One person died as a result of the shooting. The crowd surrounded the police station. The next day, February 28, the crowd went to the Monopoly Bureau and demanded a death sentence for the agents who had killed the bystander, the resignation of the Monopoly Bureau’s chief as an admis- sion of responsibility and reform of the government’s monopoly practices. When they realized that the Monopoly Bureau was closed under armed guard, the demonstrators went to Governor Chen Yi’s office. After noon, the Governor’s guard fired on the demonstrators. Broadcast stations alerted the population to the news and demonstrations took place in Taipei and nearby places. It should be noted, “foreign observers in all parts of the island reported later that they saw no Formosans carrying weapons. Mainland Chinese were occasionally stoned or beaten with sticks, but no guns, knives, or swords were seen in the hands of the angry Formosans. Moreover, there was no looting.”58 On March 1, although making some promises to the Taiwanese leaders, Chen Yi also sent military trucks with armed riflemen and machine-guns on the streets of Taipei. These gunmen as well as other security forces killed at least thirty more Taiwanese.59 Later that day, Taiwan’s leadership formally organized as the Settlement or Resolution Committee (chuli weiyuanhui 處理委員會).60 As the Civil War was developing on the Chinese mainland, only relatively few Chinese forces were on Taiwan. On March 2, Governor Chen Yi

Mifflin, 1965). A useful, but flawed book based on early opening of the archives and some interviews is Tse-han Lai, Ramon H. Myers, and Wou Wei, A Tragic Beginning: The Tai- wan Uprising of February 28, 1947 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991). Also useful is a chapter of Steven E. Phillips, Between Assimilation and Independence: The Taiwanese Encounter Nationalist China, 1945–1950 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 64–88. A shorter, useful first-person account is Peng Ming-min, Taste, pp. 65–72. 57 See, for example, Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, pp. 194–253. 58 Quote from Ibid., p. 257. 59 Ibid., p. 260. 60 Li Xiaofeng 李筱峰, Taiwan shi, Vol. II, p. 19. the japanese and kuomintang colonial regimes 33 accepted four demands from the Settlement Committee including his willingness to discuss a schedule of fundamental reforms. Chen Yi, as agreed, broadcast his acceptance and his withdrawal of the armed street patrols. At the same time, however, Chen Yi called for troops from the south and this was averted only because citizens of Hsinchu removed the rails from the railroad.61 On March 3, the Governor and his staff agreed to seven more demands from the Settlement Committee. On March 4 the Settlement Committee began to assume some of the functions of government and by March 5, 1947, “the Formosans were in control throughout the island except within Chen Yi’s office area at Taipei, and within the garrison compounds and camps.” Had they wished to do so, the Taiwanese could have overthrown the Chinese, but the Taiwanese “wanted reform and not civil war.”62 It was at this time, on March 5, that Chiang Kai-shek had already decided to send troops to Taiwan. In addition, the next day, Chen Yi had requested reinforcements.63 The Settlement Committee approved the “Thirty-two Demands” that Wang Tien-teng 王添灯 had prepared and unanimously added an additional Ten Demands, which were presented to Chen Yi on March 7.64 Clearly, these Demands were both reformist and democratic.65 On the evening of March 8, the troops from China reached Keelung, Taiwan’s northern harbor. On March 9, the 21st Army landed, reached Taipei, and continued south. At the same time, troops also landed at Kaohsiung, Taiwan’s southern harbor. Wherever they went, the troops massacred many people. Chen Yi declared the Settlement Committee illegal and proclaimed it disbanded. Those affiliated with the Settlement Committee became special targets of the military and security forces. The killing was horrendous. George Kerr, the US Consul who witnessed the whole uprising wrote: Many mainland Chinese at Taipei were of course shocked by the brutality of this campaign, but few were surprised. One prominent person, visibly moved, told me that he had witnessed the notorious “Rape of Nanking” by

61 Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, pp. 262–266. 62 Ibid., p. 270. 63 Lai, Myers, and Wei, A Tragic Beginning, p. 148. 64 Li Xiaofeng 李筱峰, Taiwan shi, Vol. II, p. 20. 65 For the text of the original Thirty-two Demands, see Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, pp. 475–479. For all forty-two demands, see Lai, Myers, and Wei, A Tragic Beginning, pp. 197–200. I cannot agree with the statement of Lai et al that Kerr’s presentation is “very misleading” (p. 197). 34 chapter two

the Japanese in 1937, but that this surpassed it, for the Nanking rape was a product of war, a wild outburst of wartime passion, whereas this was a coldly calculated revenge, perpetrated by the Nationalist Government upon its own people.66 Many bodies were taken from Keelung Harbor and “For days the dead continued to be washed up...”67 And, under the leadership of General Peng Meng-chi 彭孟緝, “the atrocities perpetrated at Kaohsiung were (if possible) even more revolting than the mass executions and torture used at Taipei...”68 Those killed number at least 10,000 to as many as 28,000. A large proportion of Taiwan’s leadership and its youth, especially its educated youth, lost their lives. The February 28, 1947 Uprising firmly separated native Taiwanese from the Chinese Mainlanders both politically and socially. Furthermore, even though a large proportion of Taiwanese families lost one or more persons to the massacres, no one was allowed to talk about the Uprising publicly in Taiwan and many dared not speak privately either. Taiwanese overseas and Western scholars were very aware of the February 28 Uprising, but it was not until well into the 1990s that Taiwanese on Taiwan began to learn more about this horrible event.

The Kuomintang in Taiwan under Chiang Kai-shek

On December 7, 1949, the President ordered that the Kuomintang government move to Taipei,69 an event that happened the next day.70 Having lost the Civil War against the Chinese Communists, the Kuomintang was on its last legs. Two events saved Chiang Kai-shek’s regime. First, the North Koreans invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950. Consequently, on June 27 President Truman “neutralized” the Taiwan Strait interposing the Seventh Fleet to prevent the Chinese Communists from crossing to “liber- ate” Taiwan and to prevent Chiang Kai-shek from attacking the Communists. This gave Chiang Kai-shek some breathing space and relieved the immediate pressures of the Civil War.

66 Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, p. 300. 67 Ibid., p. 302. 68 Ibid., p. 303. 69 See Zhongyang ribao 中央日報 [Central Daily News], December 8, 1949, p. 1. 70 Ibid., December 9, 1949, p. 1. the japanese and kuomintang colonial regimes 35

Secondly, Chiang Kai-shek implemented the Kuomintang Reform of 1950–1952.71 Chiang took several measures to reduce corruption and explicitly did not permit several factional leaders to go to Taiwan. The Kuomintang became much more viable as a ruling party. The regime remained heavily repressive, however, as it implemented the White Terror.72 A wide variety of prominent and not prominent Chinese and Taiwanese were arrested. In the 1950s the regime officially executed 1,017 persons of whom two-thirds were Taiwanese and one-third were Chinese. Over the whole of the martial law period under both Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, some 140,000 people suffered imprisonment in some 29,000 political cases. The number executed in political cases totaled 3,000 to 4,000.73 For example, Li Yu-pang 李友邦, a “Half-Mainlander” Taiwanese who graduated from the Whampoa Military Academy and fought for the Kuomintang in China during World War II and later became Chairman of the Kuomintang Taiwan Provincial Headquarters, was executed on Chiang Kai-shek’s orders on April 22, 1952.74 General Sun Li-jen 孫立人, the nominal Commander-in-Chief, was controlled because he was seen as too independent.75 On August 20, 1955, Chiang Kai-shek removed Sun Li-jen from his position as Commander-in-Chief and launched an investigation.76 On October 20, 1955, Chiang Kai-shek gave an order which saved Sun from execution owing to his contributions during the War Against Japan,77 but Sun only regained his freedom of movement and speech almost thirty-three years later on March 20, 1988 after Lee Teng-hui became president.78

71 The best source in English on the KMT Reform is Bruce J. Dickson, “The Lessons of Defeat: The Reorganization of the Kuomintang on Taiwan, 1950–52,” The China Quarterly, no. 133 (March 1993), pp. 56–84. 72 One of the best books on this early period is Fred W. Riggs, Formosa under Chinese Nationalist Rule (New York: Macmillan, 1952). 73 Preface of Qiu Rongju in Chen Yingtai 陳英泰, Huiyi, p. xiii. 74 Jacobs, “Taiwanese and the Chinese Nationalists,” p. 111. For a useful, short biography, see Li Xiaofeng 李筱峯, “Banshan zhong de guchen niezi: Li Youbang 半山中的孤臣孽子：李友邦 [The Out-of Favor Banshan: Li Yu-pang]," in Taiwan jindai mingrenzhi 臺灣近代名人誌 [Dictionary of Famous People in Modern Taiwan], ed. Zhang Yanxian 張炎憲, Li Xiaofeng 李筱峯, and Zhuang Yungming 莊永明 (Taibei: Zili wanbao 自立晚報, 1990), vol. V, pp. 277–297 75 Riggs, Formosa under Chinese Nationalist Rule, pp. 22–24. 76 Zhongyang ribao 中央日報, August 21, 1955, p. 1. 77 Ibid., October 21, 1955, p. 1. 78 Taiwan lishi nianbiao (1979–1988) 台灣歷史年表 [Chronology of Taiwan History], vol. III (Taibei: Guojia zhengce yanjiusuo ziliao zhongxin, 1990), p. 318. 36 chapter two

In English we have very few stories of the White Terror. One useful memoir, originally written in Japanese and later translated into both English and Chinese, tells of how one man was ensnared by a false accu- sation. The “logic” of the security agencies was: “You have been arrested, so you must be guilty. Confess!”79 In recent years, since democratization, people have finally begun to speak openly of the White Terror. Similarly, the publication of materials on the White Terror in Chinese has prolifer- ated with numerous memoirs and analyses.80

The Lei Chen and the China Democratic Party Case, 1960

The Lei Chen case brought important Mainlander intellectuals together with local Taiwanese politicians. Lei Chen 雷震 (1897–1979), an important Mainlander intellectual, published the first issue of the famous Free China Fortnightly Magazine (Ziyou Zhongguo banyuekan 自由中國半月刊) on November 20, 1949. The new president of the magazine, Hu Shih 胡適, explained the magazine’s four “aims”: (1) to propagate the true values of freedom and democracy and to press all levels of government to reform government and the economy in order to establish a free, democratic society, (2) to push government to resist the expansion of communism, (3) to help those in the fallen areas to regain freedom and (4) to cause the whole of the Republic of China to become “Free China.”81 A few months later, Lei Chen published his “The Freedom of an Opposition Party and How to Insure It,” though the focus of the article was to reduce government control over the economy.82 By 1955, Lei Chen was expelled

79 Tehpen Tsai, Elegy of Sweet Potatoes: Stories of Taiwan’s White Terror, trans. Grace Hatch (Upland, CA: Taiwan Publishing Co., 2002). This same logic existed in early 1980 when the writer had his own difficulties with Taiwan’s security forces. 80 Two useful books in Chinese are Chen Yingtai 陳英泰, Huiyi, 2 vols. and a collec- tion of oral histories, Baise fengyin: baise kongbu 1950 白色封印: 白色恐怖 1950 [White Seals: The White Terror of 1950] (Taibei: Guojia renquan jinianguan choubeichu 國家人權紀念館籌備處, 2003). Another recent memoir is Guo Zhenchun 郭振純, Geng ganshuyuan de ren 耕甘藷園的人 [A Person Who Tills His Sweet Potato Garden] (Taibei: Yushan 玉山, 2008). 81 Hu Shi 胡適, “‘Ziyou Zhongguo’ de zongzhi ‘自由中國’ 的宗旨 [The Aims of ‘Free China’],” Ziyou Zhongguo 自由中國 [Free China Fortnightly], 1, no. 1 (November 20, 1949), p. 2. 82 Lei Zhen 雷震, “Fandui dang zhi ziyou ji ruhe quebao 反對黨之自由及如何確保 [The Freedom of an Opposition Party and How to Insure It],” Ziyou Zhongguo 自由中國, 2, no. 7 (April 1, 1950), pp. 14–16. the japanese and kuomintang colonial regimes 37 from the Kuomintang.83 On October 31, 1956, an entire issue “Congratulates the President on his 70th Birthday,” but in fact caused President Chiang Kai-shek to lose face. An editorial in this issue, entitled “Long Live President Chiang,” noted that a system of political parties had not been established nor had the ruling Kuomintang or any other party established internal democracy. The editorial also called for the nationalization of the military (rather than Kuomintang party control).84 Lei finally came to grief when he united with local Taiwanese politicians to form the China Democratic Party (Zhongguo minzhu dang 中國民主黨). Six of these Taiwanese were dubbed the “Five Dragons and One Phoenix” (wulong yifeng 五龍一鳳) of the Provincial Assembly.85 They were:

–– Li Wan-chu 李萬居 (1902–1966), a “Half-Mainlander” from Yunlin County who published the relatively independent Tribune (Gonglun bao 公論報) and who served as a Taiwan Provincial Assemblyman from 1946–1966 including a period as Deputy Speaker (1946–1951). He also won election as a National Assemblyman in November 1946 to the National Assembly that adopted the Constitution and became a member of the Youth Party in 1926.86 –– Wu San-lien 吳三連 (1899–1988), who won election as a National Assemblyman in November 1947 with 222,663 votes, the most in all of China, was appointed Mayor of Taipei in 1950, won election as Mayor of Taipei in 1951, served two terms in the Taiwan Provincial Assembly (1954–1960) and became publisher of the Independence Evening News

83 Renquan zhi lu: Taiwan minzhu renquan huigu 人權之路：臺灣民主人權回顧 [The Road to Human Rights: Looking Back on Taiwan’s Democracy and Human Rights] (Taibei: Yushan, 2002), p. 110. An English translation is The Road to Freedom: Taiwan’s Postwar Human Rights Movement (Taipei: Dr Chen Wen-chen Memorial Foundation: 2004), p. 109. 84 “Shou zongtong Jiang gong 壽總統蔣公 [Long Live President Jiang],” Ziyou Zhong- guo 自由中國, 15, no. 9 (October 31, 1956), pp. 3–4. The entire issue consisted of sixteen articles covering thirty-six pages. 85 Sometimes, the five men were also referred to as the “Five Tiger Generals” (wuhu- jiang 五虎將). 86 Inter alia, Jacobs, “Taiwanese and the Chinese Nationalists,” pp. 110–111. See also Xie Dexi 謝德錫, “Banbao lunzheng de ‘Lumang shusheng’: Li Wanju 辦報論政的 ‘魯莽書生’: 李萬居 [The ‘Rash Scholar’ Who Ran a Newspaper and Commented on Politics: Li Wan-chu],” in Taiwan jindai mingrenzhi 臺灣近代名人誌 [Dictionary of Famous People in Modern Taiwan], ed. Zhang Yanxian 張炎憲, Li Xiaofeng 李筱峯, and Zhuang Yungming 莊永明 (Taibei: Zili wanbao 自立晚報, 1987), vol. II, pp. 163–176. 38 chapter two

(Zili wanbao 自立晚報), one of Taiwan’s more independent newspapers, in 1959.87 –– Kuo Yü-hsin 郭雨新 (1908–1985) was appointed to the preliminary provincial assembly in 1950 as a Youth Party nominee and then was elected six times (1951–1968) as a provincial assemblyman from Ilan County where he inspired two younger Ilan natives, Lin I-hsiung 林義雄 and Chen Chu 陳菊. In 1977, after losing elections for the Control Branch in 1973 and the Legislature in 1975, he went to the United States where he died.88 –– Kuo Kuo-chi 郭國基 (1900–1970) gained the reputation of being a “cannon” (dapao 大砲) for his oratorical skills. He was elected to the provincial assembly from Kaohsiung Municipality in 1957, 1960 and 1968 and won election as a Legislator in 1969.89 –– Li Yüan-chan 李源棧 (1910–1969) won three terms in the Provincial Assembly from Kaohsiung Municipality, winning his first term in 1957. –– Hsu Shih-hsien 許世賢 (1908–1983) won four terms to the provincial assembly and served from 1954 until 1968. After losing twice in her efforts to become Chiayi County Executive, in 1968 she ran for Mayor of Chiayi Municipality (then a township-level municipality), thus becoming Taiwan’s first female mayor. She won election as a Legisla- tor in 1972 and again in 1975. In 1982 she won 80 per cent of the vote and 116 of 121 polling booths to be elected mayor of Chiayi. When Chiayi was elevated to a county-level municipality a few months later, she became the first female county executive/mayor.90

87 Inter alia, Jacobs, “Taiwanese and the Chinese Nationalists,” p. 113. See also Xie Dexi 謝德錫, “Congzheng ye congshang de xinwen wenhua ren: Wu Sanlian 從政也從商的新聞文化人：吳三連 [A Cultured Journalist Active in Politics and Business: Wu San-lien],” in Taiwan jindai mingrenzhi 臺灣近代名人誌 [Dictionary of Famous People in Modern Taiwan], ed. Zhang Yanxian 張炎憲, Li Xiaofeng 李筱峯, and Zhuang Yungming 莊永明 (Taibei: Zili wanbao 自立晚報, 1990), vol. V, pp. 137–156. 88 Inter alia, Li Xiaofeng 李筱峯, “Yi tan ‘xiao gang pao’: Guo Yuxin 議壇 ‘小鋼砲’: 郭雨新 [The ‘Small Steel Cannon’ of the Assembly Hall: Kuo Yü-hsin],” in Taiwan jindai mingrenzhi 臺灣近代名人誌 [Dictionary of Famous People in Modern Taiwan], ed. Zhang Yanxian 張炎憲, Li Xiaofeng 李筱峯, and Zhuang Yungming 莊永明 (Taibei: Zili wanbao 自立晚報, 1987), vol. I, pp. 233–252. 89 Inter alia, Xie Dexi 謝德錫, “Yitan dapao: Guo Guoji 議壇大砲：郭國基 [The Great Cannon in the Assembly: Kuo Kuo-chi],” Ibid., vol. IV, pp. 171–189. 90 Inter alia, Xie Dexi 謝德錫, “Jiayi ‘Mazu po’: Xu Shixian 嘉義 ‘媽祖婆’: 許世賢 [The ‘Old Matsu’ of Chiayi: Hsu Shih-hsien],” in Taiwan jindai mingrenzhi 臺灣近代名人誌 [Dictionary of Famous People in Modern Taiwan], ed. Zhang Yanxian 張炎憲, Li Xiaofeng 李筱峯, and Zhuang Yungming 莊永明 (Taibei: Zili wanbao 自立晚報, 1987), vol. II, pp. 227–235. the japanese and kuomintang colonial regimes 39

At least four other important Taiwanese politicians were also involved in founding the opposition political party.

–– Kao Yü-shu 高玉樹 (Henry Kao) (1913–2005) won election as mayor of Taipei in 1954 and again in 1964 as a non-partisan, causing some to believe this was one reason for elevating Taipei Municipality to a province-level unit where the central government made the appointment. He was then appointed the first mayor of the elevated Taipei Municipality in 1968 and then as Minister of Transportation in 1972. –– Yü Teng-fa 余登發 (1904–1989) won election as National Assembly- man in 1947 and later as Kaohsiung County Executive in 1960. In that post he stopped the government subsidy for the Kuomintang and was removed in 1963. In early 1979 Yü became a center of attention of the non-partisan movement when he was accused of being involved with Wu Tai-an 吳泰安 , who had been arrested as a “Communist spy.”91 –– Yang Chin-hu 楊金湖 (1898–1990) became a National Assemblyman in 1947 and joined the Democratic-Socialist Party in 1948. In 1954 Yang ran for Kaohsiung Municipality Mayor the first of four unsuccessful times, but he finally won in 1968 at the age of 70.92 –– Huang Yü-chiao 黃玉嬌 (1919-), a Hakka from Taoyuan County, won three terms as County Assemblywoman beginning in 1951. She failed in several attempts to become County Executive and Provincial Assemblywoman, but then won the first of four terms to the Provincial Assembly in 1977, winning re-election in 1981, 1985 and 1989.

On March 18, 1960 a group of thirty-two Taiwanese and Mainlanders, including the above-named politicians, issued “Fifteen Demands” to the Kuomintang and the government that Free China published two weeks later.93 This document was important for a number of reasons. First, it referred to the two opposition parties, the Youth Party and the

91 Inter alia, Yang Bichuan 楊碧川, Taiwan lishi cidian pp. 367–368. 92 Inter alia, Ibid., p. 356. 93 “Zaiyedang ji wudang wupai renshi duiyu ben jie difang xuanju xiang Guomintang ji zhengfu tichu de shiwudian yaoqiu 在野黨及無黨無派人士對於本屆地方選舉向國民黨及政府提出的十五點要求 [Fifteen Demands from Opposition Parties and from Non-partisans Addressed to the Kuomintang and the government concerning the Cur- rent Local Elections] “ Ziyou Zhongguo 自由中國, 22, no. 7 (April 1, 1960), p. 30. 40 chapter two

Democratic-Socialist Party,94 together with the non-partisans, as the dangwai 黨外, literally those “outside the (ruling Kuomintang) Party.” To the best of the writer’s knowledge, this was the first use of this term, which became very popular in the late 1970s right up until the founding of the Democratic Progressive Party on September 28, 1986. The demands called for opposition representation in various bodies running elections as well as for opposition representatives at each polling booth.95 The statement also noted that the thirty-two opposition politicians had established the “China Democratic Self-Government Research Association” (Zhongguo minzhu zizhi yanjiuhui 中國民主自治研究會). The provincial assembly, county executive and mayoral elections took place on April 24, 1960. The Kuomintang nominated candidates for all twenty-one county executive and mayoral elections and won nineteen. The two non-partisan winners included Yü Teng-fa, one of the founders of the China Democratic Self-Government Research Association, in Kaohsiung County. Fifteen non-partisans won seats in the provincial assembly (six defeating Kuomintang candidates and nine winning seats that the Kuomintang did not contest) including the following founders of the China Democratic Self-Government Research Association: Kuo Kuo- chi, who won the highest votes in Taipei Municipality, Li Yüan-chan, who led the voting in Kaohsiung Municipality, Li Chiu-yuan 李秋遠, who won in Taipei County, Kuo Yü-hsin, who led in Ilan County, Li Wan-chu, who led in Yunlin County and Hsu Shih-hsien, who won in Chiayi County. Among the leaders of the China Democratic Self-Government Research Association the losers in the races for provincial assembly included Li Fu-chun 李福春, Sung Lin-kang 宋霖康 and Li Lien Li-ching 李連麗卿 in Taipei Municipality, Huang Yü-chiao and Wang Hsin-shun 王新順 in Taoyuan County, and Yeh Ping-huang 葉炳煌 in Hsinchu County. In the county executive races, Shih Hsi-hsun 石錫勳 lost in Changhua County and Wang Ti 王地 lost in Taichung County. Su Tung-chi 蘇東啓, who was not on the list of leaders of the China Democratic Self-Government Research Association but would be arrested the next year in a political case, lost his race for county executive in Yunlin County.96 Thus, seven of

94 For an evaluation of these two parties, see Jacobs, “Political Opposition,” pp. 24–25. 95 “Zaiyedang,” p. 30. Opposition politicians made similar demands right up until Taiwan democratized. 96 The election results for the winners with party affililiation are in Zhongyang ribao 中央日報, April 25, 1960, pp. 1–2, all of the election results without party affililiation are the japanese and kuomintang colonial regimes 41 the thirty-two leaders of the China Democratic Self-Government Research Association won positions in 1960, while another eight ran unsuccessful campaigns. On June 1, 1960, Free China, in an editorial entitled “The National Treasury is not the Kuomintang’s Private Purse!,” suggested that party funds should not come from the national government treasury.97 Two weeks later, the Election Improvement Symposium (xuanju gaijin zuotanhui 選舉改進座談會) declared: In fact, the excuse of “anti-Communism” is used to strip away the various rights and freedoms which the constitution has given to the people. The Kuomintang party and government authorities lack even the slightest sincerity in implementing democratic constitutional government. All measures have selfishness as their basis and take dictatorship as their tenet.98 Even more importantly, the Symposium declared it was preparing to establish a new political party: “In order to bring about the emergence of democratic politics, we have decided to unify domestic and overseas democratic, anti-Communist people and to consult with the Youth and Democratic-Socialist Parties in order to plan immediately to establish a new political party.”99 The Declaration also noted they had chosen fifty- five people, without making any distinctions as to provincial origin or party membership, to head the symposium. They planned to try to rem- edy the faults in elections beginning with the November 1960 elections for county and municipal assemblies. On September 1, 1960, Free China, in what became the last issue, published an editorial about the new political party. The editorial ranged widely in content but noted the importance of freedom of the press and that the model of communist rule was “one party, one leader, and one ideology.” It noted that those “supporting freedom, democracy and constitutional government” had worked “under very heavy intimidation and obstacles in an effort bring about the birth of this new political party.”

in Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily], April 25, 1960, pp. 1–2 and details of the Kuomintang candidates are in Difang zizhi zhiyao, pp. 687–688, 690–691. 97 “Guoku bushi Guomindang de sinang! 國庫不是國民黨的私囊！ [The National Treasury is not the Kuomintang’s Private Purse!],” Ziyou Zhongguo 自由中國, 12, no. 11 (June 1, 1960), p. 3. 98 “Xuanju gaijin zuotanhui de shengming 選舉改進座談會的聲明 [Declaration of Election Improvement Symposium],” Ziyou Zhongguo 自由中國, 22, no. 12 (June 16, 1960), pp. 18–19, quote from p. 18. 99 Ibid. 42 chapter two

The editorial concluded, “As everyone awakens and strives, freedom, democracy and human rights will truly become real.”100 The same issue also contained an “urgent declaration” from the spokes- persons of the Election Improvement Symposium, Lei Chen, Li Wan-chu and Kao Yü-shu, which stated: We solemnly announce we are organizing a new political party ... Even though there are many rumors concerning this new political party both at home and abroad, we again solemnly announce: the new political party that we will soon form is absolutely anti-communist, it is national and it firmly opposes any international plot to split the Republic of China. It especially is not a so-called movement of Taiwanese going their own way. With regard to our new political party’s program, policies, party name, and party constitution, we have already prepared the first drafts. We plan to announce the formation of the new party before the end of September...101 Three days later, on September 4, 1960, Lei Chen and three others from Free China were arrested on suspicion of “sedition,” an arrest which made the headline in the United Daily News and the first page of the Central Daily News.102 The United Daily News further elaborated that the arrests had nothing to do with the establishment of an opposition party nor was Free China closed.103 In fact, the opposition political party was crucial to Lei’s arrest and Free China published no more. Two days later, a leader of the Taiwan Garrison Command stated that one of Lei Chen’s sub ordinates, Liu Tzu-ying 劉子英, was a spy and that Lei Chen was involved.104 On September 12, 1960, the “Preparatory Committee of the China Democratic Party” (Zhongguo minzhu dang choubei hui 中國民主黨籌備會) published an announcement under the names of Lei Chen (who was imprisoned), Li Wan-chu and Kao Yü-shu stating that it had been established and that the Election Improvement Symposium no longer

100 “Dajiang dongliu dangbuzhu! 大江東流擋不住 [The Eastward Flow of the Great Yangtze River Cannot be Stopped!],” Ziyou Zhongguo 自由中國, 23, no. 5 (September 1, 1960), pp. 4–6, quotes from pp. 4,6. 101 “Xuanju gaijin zuotanhui jinji shengming 選舉座談會緊急聲明 [Urgent Declara- tion of the Election Improvement Symposium],” Ziyou Zhongguo 自由中國, 23, no. 5 (September 1, 1960), p. 16. 102 Lianhebao 聯合報, September 5, 1960, p. 1 and Zhongyang ribao 中央日報, Sep- tember 5, 1960, p. 1. 103 Lianhebao 聯合報, September 5, 1960, p. 1. 104 Lienhebao 聯合報, September 7, 1960, p. 2 and Zhongyang ribao 中央日報, Sep- tember 7, 1960, p. 4. the japanese and kuomintang colonial regimes 43 existed. The Preparatory Committee also called for the release of Lei Chen and the others as well as for an open trial.105 The same day the provincial government’s information office warned Li Wan-chu’s newspaper, The Tribune (Gonglunbao), for publishing a report on “The Views of Overseas People on the Lei Chen Case.”106 Ten days later, the provincial government closed Free China because it “transgressed national policies” (weifan guoce 違反國策).107 On September 26, 1960, the Taiwan Garrison Command announced that Lei Chen had been indicted and would be tried under military law.108 The trial was swift. On October 8, 1960 Lei was convicted of “the crime of sedition incitement” (panluan shandong zui 叛亂煽動罪) and sentenced to ten years of imprisonment. Liu Tzu-ying was sentenced to twelve years while Ma Chih-su 馬之驌 received five years.109 The Lei Chen case proved a critical challenge to the Kuomintang colonial regime. Lei had been allowed to publish Free China for over ten years. While Lei lost his Kuomintang party membership, the magazine continued to publish. But when Lei allied with local Taiwanese politicians and threatened to start an opposition political party, he had to be stopped. The case thus proved a watershed during Chiang Kai-shek’s rule as Chiang also suppressed a Control Branch report that Tao Pai-chuan 陶百川 and other liberals had prepared. Not until 1979, almost twenty years later, did the Formosa Magazine leaders again attempt to establish an opposition political organization. Lei was released at the end of his ten year prison term on September 4, 1970.110 He had written his memoirs in prison, but the authorities destroyed the manuscript and he rewrote them after his release.111 He died in 1979, aged 82. An important aftermath of the Lei Chen case took place the following year. Su Tung-chi, who had failed in his campaign for Yunlin County

105 See several articles in Lianhebao, September 13, 1960, p. 2. See also Taiwan lishi nianbiao (1945–1965) 台灣歷史年表 [Chronology of Taiwan History], vol. I (Taibei: Guojia zhengce yanjiusuo ziliao zhongxin, 1990), p. 342. 106 Zhongyang ribao 中央日報, September 13, 1960, p. 3. 107 Zhongyang ribao 中央日報, September 23, 1960, p. 3. 108 Lianhebao 聯合報, September 27, 1960, p. 1. The text of the indictments appears in Ibid, p. 3 and Zhongyang ribao中央日報, September 27, 1960, p. 3. 109 Lienhebao 聯合報, October 9, 1960, p. 1 and Zhongyang ribao 中央日報, October 9, 1960, p. 3. 110 Taiwan lishi nianbiao II, p. 122. 111 Lei Chen’s memoirs make a fascinating read, see Lei Zhen 雷震, Lei Zhen huiyi lu 雷震回憶錄 [Memoirs of Lei Chen] (Hong Kong: Qishi niandai, 1978). 44 chapter two

Executive on April 24, 1960, won his fourth consecutive term as county assemblyman later that year. Su was arrested for proposing a motion in the Yunlin County Assembly calling for a special pardon for Lei Chen. Arrested on September 18, 1961, Su was given the death sentence, but after protests from the county assembly and international concern, this was changed to life imprisonment. Su was released before he died in 1992.112 Except for one other major event, the 1960s in Taiwan remained quies- cent politically. Professor Peng Ming-min 彭明敏, together with his two assistants, Hsieh Tsung-min 謝聰敏 and Wei Ting-chao 魏廷朝, issued their “Declaration of Formosans.”113 This called for a democratic Taiwan separate from China. Peng held a privileged position and, though sentenced to eight years, was ultimately placed under house arrest, from where he escaped abroad with the help of foreign missionary friends.114 Hsieh was sentenced to ten years while Wei got eight years.115 On February 23, 1971, Hsieh and Wei got another fifteen and twelve years respectively for “sedition” while Lee Ao 李敖 of the Apollo (Wenxing 文星) magazine got ten years.116

The Diaoyutai Islands Movement and the Pressure for Reform

Towards the end of Chiang Kai-shek’s rule, the “logic” of his one-China policy, in which the Republic of China on Taiwan represented the whole of China, began to crack. Though the Cultural Revolution in China gave Chiang Kai-shek a few years of breathing room, by 1970 the international pressure against Taiwan grew substantially. In turn, this international pressure created cracks in the colonial, dictatorial regime giving space to reform elements. Chiang’s elderly age—he was 87 when he died in 1975— also provided opportunities for new leadership. The first “reform” movement, concerning the Diaoyutai Islands, brought together the government and patriotic youth. From the government perspective, the support of patriotic youth added strength to the government’s legitimacy, but their demonstrations also gave opportunities to the disaffected. The small Diaoyutai Islands, known as the Senkaku

112 Renquan zhi lu, p. 111. Taiwan lishi nianbiao I, p. 364. Road to Freedom, p. 110. 113 The text is available in Li, ed., Future, pp. 174–185. 114 For Peng’s personal account from his arrest until his escape from Taiwan, see Peng Ming-min, Taste, pp. 121–208. 115 Zhongyang ribao中央日報, April 3, 1965, p. 3. 116 Taiwan lishi nianbiao II, p. 136. the japanese and kuomintang colonial regimes 45

Islands in Japanese, consist of five uninhabited small islets and three reefs totaling 6.3 sq. km. that are located about 200 kilometers northeast of Keelung.117 At present, Japan, China and Taiwan all claim the islands. Following World War II, the United States considered the Diaoyutai Islands as part of the Ryukyu chain flowing southwest of Japan and with Okinawa as its largest island. In fact, a deep trench divides the Diaoyutai Islands from the Ryukyu archipelago, but that proved irrelevant to Washington. The islands have been important for fishing as well as for their potential for oil. In a real sense, the Diaoyutai Island problem for Taiwan began on November 21, 1969 when the United States and Japan issued a joint com- muniqué in which the United States stated that it would return Okinawa to Japanese control in 1972.118 Only several months later, in mid-August 1970, did any parts of the Taiwan government make statements on the Diaoyutai Islands.119 The next month, on September 25, 1970, Premier Yen Chia-kan 嚴家淦 told the Legislature: “Our government’s position with regard to our legitimate rights and interests in those Islands remains firm. Furthermore, we are determined to use all our powers to defend them.”120 In fact, Mab Huang argues, “the government’s reaction ... had been modest ... [while] society at large and the press were much more agitated.”121 Pressure came from students demonstrating in Hong Kong as well as in various centers of the United States.122 Finally, a series of statements and demonstrations in Taiwan itself followed in April 1971.123 In perhaps the largest demonstration, 4,000 students from National Taiwan Normal University demonstrated and, afterwards, two thousand signed a petition with their blood.124 The press, too, became hysterical with the normally moderate Independence Evening News (Zili wanbao 自立晚報) editorializing, “This is our oil and this is our blood!”125

117 Taiwan Yearbook 2005, end of Geography chapter. 118 “The Nixon-Sato Communique,” New York Times, November 22, 1969, p. 14. 119 Qiu Hongda 丘宏達, “Diaoyutai lieyu wenti da shiji 釣魚臺列嶼問題大事記 [A Chronology of the Diaoyutai Islands Question],” Daxue zazhi 大學雜誌 [The Intellec- tual], no. 40 (April 1971), pp. 20–21. 120 Zhongyang ribao中央日報, September 26, 1970, p. 1. 121 Mab Huang, Intellectual Ferment for Political Reforms in Taiwan, 1971–1973 (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1976), p. 7. 122 Ibid., pp. 7–8. 123 Ibid., pp. 9–10. 124 Ibid., p. 10. 125 “Women de you! women de xue! 我們的油！我們的血！[Our Oil! Our Blood!],” Zili wanbao 自立晚報 [Independence Evening News], April 15, 1971, p. 1. Cited in Mark 46 chapter two

This patriotic protest movement, perhaps as the government feared, also became a movement for political reform. In its July 1971 issue, The Intellectual (Daxue zazhi 大學雜誌) editorialized: So-called political reforms are not simply the raising of administrative effi- ciency. They involve fundamental reforms of the complete political system. We resolutely believe, from the beginning to the end, that only with a flawless and modernized domestic politics can we establish an international position that cannot be lightly insulted. Only then can we establish a firm foundation for successful diplomacy.126 Although the title of the editorial warned the United States and Japan, at least some of the bold type in the editorial also warned the Chiang Kai-shek government. Ironically, as this issue of the magazine was being published, Henry Kissinger was on the first of his trips to Beijing. This, too, would have serious consequences for the colonial government in Taiwan.

Diplomatic Difficulties, the Republic of China Leaves the United Nations

The greatest international pressure in the last years of Chiang Kai-shek’s rule came from the defeat at the United Nations of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan and the regime’s withdrawal on October 25, 1971.127 With the official end of the Cultural Revolution in China, China began to gain increased diplomatic recognition. At the same time, the United Nations votes that the representation of China was an “Important Question” became closer and closer. As long as the ROC won this ballot, it would require a two-thirds vote to expel the ROC. But, once the ROC lost the “Important Question” ballot, it would lose its place in the world body. In February 1971, the ROC government in some “Extremely Top Secret” documents confirmed that “Taipei’s ‘One China’ policy precluded any

Harrison, Legitimacy, Meaning and Knowledge in the Making of Taiwanese Identity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 119. 126 “Yanli jinggao Mei Ri zhengfu qinlue Diaoyutai shengming 嚴厲警告美日政府侵略釣魚臺聲明 [An Announcement Severely Warning the American and Japanese Gov- ernments about Invading Diaoyutai],” Daxue zazhi 大學雜誌 [The Intellectual], no. 43 (July 1971), pp. 2–3, quote from p. 3. 127 The present author has written more extensively on this issue in research that used the archives of Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See J. Bruce Jacobs, “One China, Diplomatic Isolation and a Separate Taiwan,” in China’s Rise, Taiwan’s Dilemmas and International Peace, ed. Edward Friedman (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 85–109, esp. pp. 89–94. the japanese and kuomintang colonial regimes 47 policy flexibility that might have saved a Taiwan seat in the United Nations.”128 In mid-1971 American Secretary of State William Rogers began to push for “dual representation” in the United Nations. However, the American proposal remained vague about who would sit on the Security Council and Rogers found it difficult to gain support. Finally, when the United States agreed that China would sit in the Security Council, Australia, Japan and New Zealand among others joined as spon- sors of the “dual representation” motion. The ROC government hesitated and found it difficult to push both for “One China” and for “dual representation.” In the end, the ROC government got its numbers wrong and lost the “Important Question” vote. The Albanian resolution, which called for seating China and expelling the ROC, came to a vote. Before the vote, the ROC withdrew from the United Nations. The “dual representation” motion, as Secretary Rogers had warned in a letter of September 8, 1971 to the ROC’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, never even made it to the floor for a vote. Of course, other factors also led to this defeat. Kissinger was actually in Beijing at the time of the vote and this did not strengthen American claims for “dual representation” at the time. But, ultimately, Chiang Kai- shek’s “One China” policy, which meant that the ROC could not be seated in the same venue as the Chinese Communists, made the ROC’s defeat inevitable.

The Intellectual Magazine and Chiang Ching-kuo’s Push for Reform

Beginning in 1969, Chiang Kai-shek, who was then already 81 years old, began a more intensive training of his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, for the succession. Thus, Chiang Ching-kuo became Vice-Premier and was given key roles in economics including being in charge of the new Financial, Economic and Monetary Conference in the Cabinet, Chairman of the reorganized and strengthened Council of International Cooperation and Development, and Chairman of the Cabinet’s Budget Committee. He also traveled abroad on behalf of his father.129 Following the Diaoyutai Movement and the ROC’s withdrawal from the United Nations, The Intellectual (Daxue zazhi 大學雜誌), a magazine with many intellectuals of both Taiwanese and Mainlander background,

128 Ibid., p. 90. 129 J. Bruce Jacobs, “Recent Leadership and Political Trends in Taiwan,” The China Quarterly, no. 45 (January-March 1971), pp. 143–146. 48 chapter two began to call for political reform at home. While mild in the context of modern, democratic Taiwan, the writers in The Intellectual broadened the limits of dissent.130 As Chiang Ching-kuo was seeking support for his succession, he implemented a variety of reforms and began a new wave of “liberalization.” Even before he became Premier in May 1972, Chiang Ching-kuo began to implement modest increases in the numbers of Taiwanese as well as somewhat younger people in central positions. One important liberalizing reform concerned the three central “parliamentary” organs: the Legislative Branch or Legislative Yuan (Lifa yuan 立法院), the Control Branch (Jiancha yuan 監察院) and the National Assembly (Guomin dahui 國民大會). The terms of these bodies had been indefinitely extended owing to “the impracticability of holding an election on the mainland now.”131 In December 1969, Taiwan held limited elections to these three bodies as Taiwan’s population had increased since the late 1940s. These new “parliamentarians” also had indefinite terms. The twenty-six new popularly-elected legislators and national assemblymen were all Taiwanese and had average ages in their fifties, considerably younger than those elected in the late 1940s.132 Several intellectuals, however, pressed for further reforms in these elections. Chen Shao-ting created a huge stir when he called for complete re-election of the central parliamentary organs by popular vote in the “free areas.”133 The issue of The Intellectual with Chen’s article went through five printings. This debate 134 included an important statement from the Presbyterian Church that “every people has the right to determine its own destiny” and thus Taiwan should “hold elections of all representatives to the highest government bodies, to succeed the present representatives, who were elected 25 years ago on the mainland.”135 The debate led to important, but limited, reforms that proved less than antici- pated. However, the new central parliamentarians, elected in December

130 An excellent analysis of The Intellectual and its contents may be found in Huang, Intellectual Ferment 131 Jacobs, “Recent Leadership,” p. 133. 132 Ibid., pp. 135, 142. 133 Chen Shaoting 陳少廷, “Zhongyang minyi daibiao de gaixuan wenti 中央民意代表的改選問題 [The Issue of Electing the Central Parliamentarians],” Daxue zazhi 大學雜誌 [The Intellectual], no. 46 (October 1971), pp. 13–16. 134 For more sources on this debate, see Jacobs, “Taiwan 1972,” p. 106, n. 12. 135 Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, “Public Statement on Our National Fate (Decem- ber 29, 1971),” in Let Taiwan Be Taiwan, ed. Marc J. Cohen and Emma Teng (Washington, D.C.: Center for Taiwan International Relations, 1990), pp. 76–77. This work may be obtained on the internet at http://homepage.usask.ca/~llr130/ctir1/ctir1.pdf. the japanese and kuomintang colonial regimes 49

1972, all had fixed terms of three or six years in accord with the Constitution.136 Over the years the numbers of regularly-elected central parliamentarians increased, but the “old thieves” (lao zei 老賊) elected in the late 1940s still controlled these bodies until an Interpretation of the Council of Grand Justices (Taiwan’s Supreme Court) in mid-1990 finally ended their terms at the end of 1991 (see Chapter 3).137

The Premiership of Chiang Ching-kuo and Reform

The external pressures, the internal demands for reform, Chiang Ching- kuo’s desire for support and possibly his own “reform” agendas led to a new “liberalization.” For example, Chiang Ching-kuo clamped down on corruption and even important officers of the Taiwan Garrison Command, one of Taiwan’s most repressive security agencies, were publicly arrested and sentenced for corruption. At the same time, there were no new political arrests.138 These reforms continued in 1973.139 When Chiang Kai-shek died on April 5, 1975, Vice-President Yen Chia- kan succeeded him in accord with the Constitution, swearing the oath of office the following day. Also on April 6, Chiang Ching-kuo requested the Central Standing Committee of the Kuomintang accept his resignation as Premier, a request that the Central Standing Committee rejected.140 The political reality emerged on April 28 when the Central Committee of the Kuomintang convened and unanimously chose Chiang Ching-kuo as the new Party Chairman.141 The death of Chiang Kai-shek on April 5, 1975 provided some opportunities for liberalization. On April 20, Premier Chiang ordered the Minister of Justice to prepare to shorten the sentences of criminals in accord with the “will” of the late President Chiang to “humanely and virtuously love the people.” On May 30 the legislature passed a law “To shorten the sentences of criminals,” to be implemented on July 14, the hundredth day

136 Jacobs, “Taiwan 1972,” pp. 107, 109–110. 137 The term “old thieves” for Taiwan’s permanent central parliamentarians became especially common prior to their ultimate removal. These central parliamentarians received excellent salaries, housing and other benefits, yet contributed little to Taiwan’s advancement. 138 Ibid., pp. 108, 110. 139 J. Bruce Jacobs, “Taiwan 1973: Consolidation of the Succession,” Asian Survey, XIV, no. 1 (January 1974), pp. 22–24, 26–29. 140 Zhongyang ribao 中央日報, April 7, 1975, p. 1. 141 Zhongyang ribao 中央日報, April 29, 1975, p. 1. 50 chapter two after the passing of President Chiang,142 and preliminary estimates suggested 9,000 criminals would benefit.143 According to a modern source, 7,000 criminals were released as a result of their shortened sentences, but fewer than 200 political prisoners received shorter sentences and less than half of these were released.144 Later, in August 1975, Huang Hsin-chieh 黃信介 and Kang Ning-hsiang 康寧祥, two of the pioneers of the democracy movement, established a new magazine, The Taiwan Political Review (Taiwan zhenglun 台灣政論). Huang (born 1917) had been elected a Taipei City Councilman in 1961 and was re-elected in 1964. In 1969 he was elected as one of the new legislators with a permanent term. Kang (born 1938) was elected a Taipei City Councilman in 1969 after Taipei Municipality was raised to provincial status and in 1972 he won a three-year term to the legislature with the highest number of votes of any candidate in Taipei.145 Taiwan Political Review “was the first opposition magazine to raise the banner of ‘Taiwan’ since the Kuomintang had arrived in Taiwan.”146 As an opposition magazine it followed Free China Fortnightly, Apollo, and The Intellectual. With articles like “Can’t We Criticize the Constitution and National Policy” by Yao Chia-wen 姚嘉文 and “Let’s Remove Martial Law As Soon as Possible” by Chen Ku-ying 陳鼓應, the magazine clearly challenged the ruling party. The magazine published 50,000 copies for its fifth issue in December 1975. However, with the December 1975 legislative election looming, the authorities clearly felt the magazine had gone too far and they closed it.147 The excuse for closing the magazine was an article by Chiou Chui-liang 邱垂亮, an academic at the University of Queensland in Australia.148 Chiou wrote about his discussions with two people from the People’s Republic of China. In fact, the content was mild. Probably the govern-

142 Zhongyang ribao 中央日報, May 31, 1975, p. 1. 143 Zhongyang ribao 中央日報, May 31, 1975, p. 3. This page also has the text of the provisions for shortening prison sentences. 144 Renquan zhi lu, p. 29. Road to Freedom, p. 29. 145 Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai: Taiwan minzhu yundong 25 nian, 1975–1987 綠色年代：台灣民主運動25年, 1975–1987 [The Green Era: Twenty-Five Years of Taiwan’s Democratic Movement, 1975–1987], II vols., vol. I (Taibei: Caituan faren lüxing wenjiao jijinhui 財團法人綠色旅行文教基金會, 2005), p. 26. 146 Ibid. 147 Ibid., pp. 26, 29. 148 Qiu Chuiliang 邱垂亮, “Liangzhong xinxiang 兩種心向 [Two Ways of Thinking],” Taiwan zhenglun 台灣政論 [Taiwan Political Review], no. 5 (1975), pp. 31–34. the japanese and kuomintang colonial regimes 51 ment used Chiou’s article as an excuse to close down Taiwan Political Review because Chiou was overseas and did not need to be arrested.

Party Chairman Chiang Ching-kuo, Party Pressure and New Liberalization

During Chiang Kai-shek’s life, the Kuomintang did not play a strong role in township-level elections. Higher levels controlled funds and thus the actual functioning of government, so the Kuomintang allowed local factions considerable electoral leeway in the township. However, about April 1975, the Kuomintang began to push for greater power at the local level and began to intervene in local elections and decision-making. Party membership also increased substantially during this period.149 At the same time, a number of young people became more active in opposition politics. The December 20, 1975 legislative election created some controversy. Although the key non-partisans who had won in 1972—Kang Ning-hsiang, Hsu Shih-hsien and Huang Shun-hsing 黃順興—all won re-election,150 another prominent non-partisan, Kuo Yü-hsin, lost. Kuo officially obtained over 80,000 votes, but in his home Ilan County an additional 80,000 of his votes were declared invalid and he lost.151 In early 1976, Kuo launched a case against the election results led by two young lawyers, Lin I-hsiung also from Ilan County and Yao Chia-wen, both of whom would lead the opposition movement.152 In addition, several other key people became deeply involved in the opposition movement at this time including Chen Chu (who was Kuo’s secretary) and Tien Chiu-chin 田秋堇, both also from Ilan, as well as Chiou I-jen 邱義仁, Fan Sun-lü 范巽綠, Wu Nai-jen 吳乃仁, Wu Nai-te 吳乃德, Chou Hung-hsien 周弘憲 and Lin Cheng-chieh 林正杰 among many others.153 In 1977, Kuo himself left Taiwan for the United States, where he died in exile in 1985,

149 Jacobs, Local Politics, pp. 25–26, 29–30, 178–179, 182–202. Alternatively, Jacobs, Local Politics in Rural Taiwan under Dictatorship and Democracy, pp. 32–34, 37–39, 216– 217, 222–246. 150 Zhongyang ribao 中央日報, December 21, 1975, p. 3. 151 Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai I, p. 29. 152 Their book provides many details of these battles, see Lin Yixiong 林義雄 and Yao Jiawen 姚嘉文, Huluo pingyang? Xuanzhan guansi Guo Yuxin 虎落平陽？選戰官司郭雨新 [Has the Tiger Descended to Pingyang? Election Battles, Court Battles and Kuo Yu-hsin] (Taibei: Gaoshan 高山, 1977). 153 Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai I, p. 30. 52 chapter two but he left a burgeoning opposition movement that would come together later in 1977. At this same time, the Presbyterian Church re-entered politics declaring on August 16, 1977: We insist that the future of Taiwan be determined by the 17 million people who live there ... In order to achieve our goal of independence and freedom for the people of Taiwan in this critical international situation, we urge our government to face reality and to take effective measures whereby Taiwan may become a new and independent country.154 In many ways, the opposition coalesced during the campaign for the local elections of November 19, 1977, which chose provincial assemblymen and county executives as well as county assemblymen, township executives and Taipei City Councillors.155 Two key non-partisan legislators, Huang Hsin-chieh and Kang Ning-hsiang, travelled up and down the island seeking support. The election proved a “defeat” for the Kuomintang as non-partisans won four of the twenty county executive positions and twenty-one of seventy-seven seats in the provincial assembly. Even more significantly, all four non-partisan county executive winners defeated Kuomintang nominees as did fourteen of the non-partisan candidates for provincial assembly, who defeated 20.3 per cent of the sixty-nine Kuomintang nominees. (The Kuomintang had allocated seven provincial assembly seats to non-partisans.) Although, as noted earlier, the term dangwai 黨外 (outside the Party) was first used in the “Fifteen Demands” of March 18, 1960, “dangwai” became a very popular word around the time of the November 19, 1977 election.156 Not all of the victorious non-partisans could be included as genuine dangwai,157 but such key dangwai leaders as Lin I-hsiung and Chang Chun-hung 張俊宏 won provincial assembly seats from Ilan and Nantou counties respectively, while Hsu Hsin-liang 許信良 won the position of Taoyuan County Executive.158 Fearing that the Kuomintang was

154 Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, “A Declaration on Human Rights,” in The Future of Taiwan: A Difference of Opinion, ed. Victor H Li (White Plains, NY: M.E. Sharpe), pp. 186–187. 155 For analyses of this election, see J. Bruce Jacobs, “Taiwan 1978: Economic Suc- cesses, International Uncertainties,” Asian Survey, XIX, no. 1 (January 1979), pp. 20–23. Also see Jacobs, “Political Opposition,” pp. 27–35. 156 An important source stating incorrectly that the term was first used around the November 19, 1977 election is Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai I, p. 38. 157 Jacobs, “Political Opposition,” p. 34. 158 Other key dangwai provincial assemblymen elected included Su Hung Yüeh-chiao 蘇洪月嬌 of Yunlin County, the wife of Su Tung-chi, who had been released in Septem- the japanese and kuomintang colonial regimes 53 stealing the election from Hsu Hsin-liang, Taoyuan County voters in Chungli City demonstrated vigorously and burned down a police station in the famous Chungli Incident. Fortunately, “liberals” in the Kuomintang held sway and the authorities did not to use repressive measures. It would be easy to claim that the non-partisan success owed entirely to the appeal of the dangwai in the electorate, but the Kuomintang also made mistakes. One of Chiang Ching-kuo’s key “liberal” subordinates, Lee Huan 李煥, headed the Party’s Organization Department and thus had responsibility for the election. Even though Lee Huan was a “liberal,” who contributed to the decision not to use repression in Chungli, he had responsibility for a variety of mistakes that the Kuomintang made and which contributed to the KMT’s defeat. First, the Kuomintang party machine played favorites during the nomination process and alienated many long-term and loyal party members, resulting in many “against party discipline” candidacies. Second, the KMT campaigned so vigorously, creating a resentment against the party that enabled non-partisans to seek “sympathy votes.” Thus, the “defeat” of November 19, 1977 led to many changes within the Kuomintang.159 In 1978, the dangwai movement continued to be active in preparation for the central legislative and national assembly elections scheduled for December 23. Because of the difficulty in getting into the media, the dangwai held numerous demonstrations and published books as well as jour- nals that were often banned. After April 1978, the security agencies let it be known that they would “kill the chickens to scare the monkeys” and would arrest seven dangwai activists—Chen Chu, Shih Ming-teh 施明德, Lin Cheng-chieh, Chang Fu-chung 張富忠, Wang To 王拓, Yao Chia-wen and Li Ching-jung 李慶榮160—none of whom held office at that time. On June 15, the security agencies tried to arrest Chen Chu, who fled to a church, but who was arrested on June 23. Under strong foreign pressure, the authorities decided on July 5 to release Chen Chu the following day, though in fact she was not able to return home until July 24 after being taken on an official tour of the “Ten Great Construction Projects” and Kinmen island.161

ber 1976 after serving fifteen years in prison, Ch’iu Lien-hui 邱連煇 of Pingtung County, and Huang Yü-chiao of Taoyuan County, who had been active in setting up the China Democratic Party in 1960. 159 Jacobs, “Taiwan 1978,” pp. 21–23. 160 Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai I, p. 53. 161 Ibid., pp. 55, 57. 54 chapter two

In preparation for the December 23, 1978 election, Huang Hsin-chieh established a “Taiwan Dangwai Personages Election Assistance Group” (Taiwan dangwai renshi zhuxuantuan 台灣黨外人士助選團) on October 6, which released twelve common political viewpoints for dangwai candidates on October 31 including “respect the Constitution and re-elect all central parliamentarians, directly elect the provincial governor, national- ize the military [instead of having a military loyal to the KMT] ... end martial law ... oppose discrimination on the basis of provincial origin and language ... have a major amnesty for political criminals.”162 On December 5, more than forty candidates and seven hundred people met in the Chung-shan Auditorium in Taipei for a campaign rally and press conference, the first organized meeting in over thirty years of opposition on the island.163 On December 16, 1978 in Taiwan, the American government announced it was establishing formal diplomatic relations with China as of January 1. This naturally raised concern in Taiwan and led to the government post- poning the central parliamentary elections scheduled for December 23. With the indefinite postponement of the December 23, 1978 election, the dangwai continued its activities in an effort to stay in the limelight for the forthcoming election. Because of a conflict between Huang Hsin- chieh and Kang Ning-hsiang, several dangwai leaders went to Kaohsiung County to ask Yü Teng-fa, a founding member of the “China Democratic Self-Government Research Association” who won election as Kaoshiung County Executive in 1960, to become the national “spiritual” dangwai leader. Yü agreed, but divisions soon appeared in the dangwai. Some, like Yü Teng-fa, Huang Shun-hsing (who later went to China), Wang To, Chen Ku-ying and Su Ching-li 蘇慶黎,164 the editor of China Tide (Xia Chao 夏朝) a leftist magazine that began publishing on February 28, 1976,165 advocated unity with China. Others, including Shih Ming-teh, Lin I-hsiung, Hsu Hsin-liang, Yao Chia-wen, and Chang Chun-hung, favored a separate Taiwan.166 On January 21, 1979, the authorities arrested Yü Teng-fa and his son and charged them with “knowing a Communist and not reporting it.” Yü Teng-fa was sentenced to eight years in prison on April 16. Although Yü Teng-fa had played a role in the founding of the China Democratic Party

162 Ibid., pp. 60–62. 163 Ibid., pp. 62, 64, 66. 164 Ibid., pp. 72–74. 165 Ibid., p. 55. 166 Ibid., p. 74. the japanese and kuomintang colonial regimes 55 in 1960 and had become “spiritual” leader of the dangwai in late 1978, he had not played any other role in Taiwan’s democratization. Furthermore, according to his supporters, Yü was a stubborn and not very bright old man who often praised the Chinese Communists at relatively public functions like weddings and who refused the offer of excellent legal counsel for his trial.167 More importantly for Taiwan’s democratization, on January 22, the day after Yü’s arrest, Taoyuan County Executive Hsu Hsin-liang and other prominent dangwai leaders168 went to Yü’s home village and to Kaohsiung City to protest. In April, in order to impeach Hsü, the Control Branch announced an investigation into Hsü’s taking leave without permission, participating in an illegal demonstration and signing leaflets that libeled the government.169 To support Hsu Hsin-liang as well as Yü Teng-fa, on May 26, 1979 the dangwai opposition organized a massive “birthday party” for Hsu Hsin- liang in his hometown of Chungli, the very location of the Chungli Incident eighteen months previously. Naturally, both the government and the opposition felt concern about the sensitive nature of the location. Between ten thousand and thirty thousand people attended to show support for the dangwai and to listen to the speeches, but the uniformed police and military stayed well away from the crowd. As the largest non- government sponsored, non-electoral peaceful political gathering in Taiwan’s history up to that time, Hsu’s birthday party was very important for the development of democracy in Taiwan. Unfortunately, the Com mittee on the Discipline of Public Functionaries suspended Hsu from office for two years. Hsu left for “study” overseas and promised to return to finish the final six months of his term in June 1981.170 On June 1, 1979, key members of the dangwai established Formosa Magazine (Meilidao zazhi 美麗島雜誌). As Shih Ming-teh told this writer in May 1979, the opposition would establish a political party without using the term “political party.” The magazine established county offices around the island, offices which they called “service centers” (fuwu chu 服務處). Ironically, this was exactly the same term used by the Kuomin tang in its external nomenclature for its county party headquarters,

167 J. Bruce Jacobs, “Taiwan 1979: ‘Normalcy’ After ‘Normalization’,” Asian Survey, XX, no. 1 (January 1980), pp. 90–91. 168 A list of about twenty-five other leaders appears in Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai I, p. 79. 169 Jacobs, “Taiwan 1979,” p. 91. 170 More details can be found in Ibid., pp. 91–92. 56 chapter two though interviews several years later indicated the dangwai leaders did not realize this.171 Naturally, this organization, as well as the language, scared the Kuomintang which had consistently prevented the establishment of any organization that could threaten Kuomintang rule. In the meantime, as it could not gain publicity in the Kuomintang- controlled media, the dangwai continued its public demonstrations throughout 1979. The Taichung Incident of July 28, 1979172 and the Chungtai Hotel Incident of September 8, 1979173 are the most famous. The dangwai movement was clearly growing and by the fourth issue, published November 25, 1979, the circulation of Formosa Magazine reached 100,000,174 about one per cent of Taiwan’s population. Worried, the “liberal” Premier Sun Yun-suan 孫運璿 warned the legislature on October 2, “Now is not the time to establish an opposition party.”175 From the perspective of today, the Kaohsiung Incident of December 10, 1979 has great importance in the establishment of democracy in Taiwan.176 At the time, however, the celebration of Human Rights Day in Kaohsiung was only one of a series of demonstrations with a planned culmination in Taipei on December 16, the first anniversary of the United

171 At the township level, the Kuomintang used the external nomenclature of “Service Station” (fuwu fenshe 服務分社) rather than the internal nomenclature of “District Party Office” (qudangbu 區黨部). However, at the county level, the KMT generally used the internal nomenclature of County Party Headquarters (xian dangbu 縣黨部) rather than the external nomenclature of Service Center (fuwuchu 服務處). 172 See, for example, He Wenzhen 何文振, “Qi erba Taizhong shijian zhenxiang 七二八台中事件真相 [The Truth about the Taichung Incident of July 28],” Meilidao 美麗島 [Formosa], no. 1 (August 16, 1979), p. 73. and Fan Zhengyou 范政祐, “Qi erba Taizhong naoju zhi wo guan: gei Taizhong shimin de gongkai xin 七二八台中鬧劇之我觀：給台中市民的公開信 [My Views on the Taizhong Farce of July 28: An Open Letter to Tai- zhong’s Citizens],” Meilidao 美麗島 [Formosa], no. 1 (August 16, 1979), pp. 74–76. 173 The classic account of this incident is Wu Zhengshuo 吳正朔, “Zhongtai binguan shijian shimo 中泰賓館事件始末 [The Chungtai Hotel Incident from the Beginning to the End],” Da shidai 大時代 [Great Epoch], no. 4 (October 5, 1979), pp. 7–19. See also Ben she 本社 [Formosa Magazine], “Dangwai zhenglun: Shaoshu pai yu baoli, ping Zhongtai binguan qian de naoju 黨外政論：少數派與暴力，評中泰賓館前的鬧劇 [Debate among the Dangwai: The Minority Faction and Violence, A Critique of the Farce in Front of the Chungtai Hotel],” Meilidao 美麗島 [Formosa], no. 2 (September 25, 1979), pp. 4–5. and Wen Chaogong 文抄公, “Ni kan de shi shenme bao? ge bao dui Zhongtai shijian de baodao 你看的是什麽報？各報對中泰事件的報導 [What Newspaper Do You read? The Reports of Different Newspapers on the Chungtai Incident],” Meilidao 美麗島 [For- mosa], no. 2 (September 25, 1979), pp. 83–87. 174 Katherine Lee, “Taiwan’s dissidents,” Index on Censorship, 9, no. 6 (December 1980), p. 54. 175 Jacobs, “Taiwan 1979,” p. 93. 176 The writer’s planned next book is an analysis of the role of the Kaohsiung Incident in Taiwan’s democratization. the japanese and kuomintang colonial regimes 57

States announcement of the break in diplomatic relations between Taipei and Washington. Careful interviewing in the month after the demonstration has convinced the writer that the Kaohsiung Incident was a “Tragedy of Errors.” The dangwai demonstrators insisted on marching after they had been told they could have a demonstration that did not move. The authorities used new equipment to approach the demonstrators. In any case, violence broke out when the authorities surrounded the marchers and appeared to use tear gas, which is a crowd dispersant. Taiwan’s newspapers stressed the injuries among the security forces, but demonstrators were also injured. On the other hand, no one was killed.177 In the evening of December 12, the dangwai leaders held a press conference in Taipei and expressed regret for the violence. However, at this very time, the Fourth Plenum of the KMT’s Eleventh Central Committee was meeting at Yangmingshan. After considerable, lengthy debate about how to deal with the dangwai, the conservatives under General Wang Sheng 王昇178 proved victorious and in the early hours of December 13, more than fifty hours after the end of the Kaohsiung demonstration, security forces arrested many key dangwai leaders. This brought to an end the period of liberalization during the late 1970s.

The Conservative Repression

The arrested leaders were kept isolated and some were tortured. The Taiwan Garrison Command issued formal indictments on February 20, 1980 against 37 people including eight who would be tried in a military court. A major new group of lawyers joined the democracy movement to represent the defendants including future President Chen Shui-bian 陳水扁, future Premier Su Tseng-chang 蘇貞昌, future Premier Frank Hsieh (Hsieh Chang-ting) 謝長廷, future Premier Chang Chun-hsiung 張俊雄, future legislator and county executive Yu Ching 尤清, and the late Chiang Peng-chien 江鵬堅, the first chairman of the Democratic Progressive Party.179

177 In contrast, six months later at the Kwangju Massacre the South Korean military killed at least 191 people and injured several thousand more. See Jacobs, “Taiwan and South Korea,” p. 237. 178 For a useful biography of Wang Sheng, see Thomas A. Marks, Counterrevolution in China: Wang Sheng and the Kuomintang (London and Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 1998). 179 Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai I, p. 105. 58 chapter two

Despite the appearance of an open trial and despite the failure of the prosecution to prove its case,180 the military court convicted all of the defendants in accord with the original indictments and on April 18, 1980 sentenced them to long terms in prison ranging from twelve years for six of the defendants to fourteen years for Huang Hsin-chieh and life for Shih Ming-teh.181 Thirty-three other defendants tried before civil courts all received sentences ranging from three to six years. When the elections, postponed from December 23, 1978, were finally held on December 6, 1980, most of the dangwai leadership was in prison. Three relatives of imprisoned leaders won elections including Chou Ching-yü 周清玉, wife of Yao Chia-wen, who became a National As semblywoman; Hsu Jung-shu 許榮淑, wife of Chang Chun-hung, who became a legislator; and Huang Tien-fu 黃天福, younger brother of Huang Hsin-chieh, who also became a legislator. Incumbent Kang Ning- hsiang and Chang Teh-ming 張德銘, a lawyer who defended the Kao hsiung defendants, also won legislative seats. Other successful dangwai candidates for National Assemblyman included Huang Huang-hsiung 黃煌雄, Huang Yü Hsiu-luan 黃余秀鸞, the daughter of Yü Teng-fa, and Wang Chao-chuan 王兆釧.182 Thus, at worst, these candidates received many “sympathy votes” and at best the dangwai received considerable support despite their oppression from the authorities. In the local election of November 14, 1981, the dangwai lawyers joined others to enter politics. Chen Shui-bian, Frank Hsieh (Hsieh Chang-ting), Lin Cheng-chieh and Kang Shui-mu 康水木 won Taipei City Council seats. Chen Ding-nan 陳定南 won the position of Ilan County Executive while Chiu Lien-hui won the county executiveship in Pingtung and Huang Shih-chang 黃石城 won in Changhua County. In the Provincial Assembly race, Su Tseng-chang and Yu Shyi-kun 游錫堃 won seats as did twelve other dangwai candidates.183 Thus, despite the imprisonment of its key leaders, the dangwai movement continued to grow and achieve some electoral success under the conservative, repressive regime.

180 Every morning, the Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times] published a full transcript of the preceding day’s court proceedings. This transcript made it crystal clear that the prosecution failed to prove its case. The newspaper planned to publish the transcript as a book, but the authorities forbad this. 181 The best English-language work on the trial is John Kaplan, The Court-Martial of the Kaohsiung Defendants (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of Califor- nia, Berkeley, 1981). 182 Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai I, pp. 113–114. 183 Ibid., pp. 124–125. the japanese and kuomintang colonial regimes 59

In building the dangwai movement, the publication of monthly magazines proved an important element.184 These magazines advocated a variety of viewpoints and gave many younger dangwai adherents, such as future legislator Lin Cho-shui 林濁水 and Chiou I-jen, later an important DPP leader and key member of President Chen Shui-bian’s office, opportunities to play useful roles at a difficult time. In addition to promoting democracy, these magazines also began to promote a Taiwanese nationalism, especially after mid-1983.185 Towards the end of 1983, the government signaled the end of the ultra-conservative period with the appointment on September 20 of General Wang Sheng as ambassador to Paraguay, a polite de facto exile for the formerly powerful archconservative. In the December 3, 1983 election for legislature, the dangwai did less well than in 1980, winning only nine of 71 seats, three less than in 1980. Most successful was Fang Su-min 方素敏, the wife of Lin I-hsiung, who returned from the United States and won with a huge number of votes. She and Lin had lost their twin daughters and his mother in a brutal slay- ing on February 28, 1980, the only time that innocent family members of political prisoners had been murdered in Taiwan’s history. In addition, other dangwai winners included Hsu Jung-hsu, Yü Chen Yue-ying 余陳月瑛 (who had married into the Yü Teng-fa family), Chiang Peng-chien, Chang Chun-hsiung and Cheng Yü-chen 鄭余鎮. Three incumbent dangwai legislators lost their bids for re-election including Kang Ning-hsiang, Chang Teh-ming and Huang Huang-hsiung. Many other candidates also lost.186

Chiang Ching-kuo’s Final Liberalization

With the exiling of Wang Sheng, who had built another power center within the Kuomintang, Chiang Ching-kuo, who had shifted from the premiership to the presidency during the first half of 1978, moved into his last “liberal” phase. In February 1984, Chiang chose Lee Teng-hui, a Taiwanese technocrat who had become an excellent politician, as his vice-presidential running mate. While Chiang Ching-kuo clearly trusted Lee Teng-hui,

184 Details on the many magazines are available in Ibid., pp. 138–156. 185 Details appear in J. Bruce Jacobs, “‘Taiwanization’ in Taiwan’s Politics,” in Cul- tural, Ethnic, and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan: Bentuhua, ed. John Makeham and A-Chin Hsiau (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 22–33. 186 Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai I, pp. 157–160. 60 chapter two

“their relationship remained fairly formal and Lee did not belong to Chiang’s inner group of Mainlanders.”187 However, President Chiang did give Vice-President Lee several key tasks including aspects of foreign relations and dealing with political prisoners.188 Owing in part to the efforts of Vice-President Lee, Lin I-hsiung as well as Reverend Kao Chün-ming 高俊明 and two other prisoners were released on August 15, 1984.189 Despite the “liberalization,” violence against perceived enemies continued. In addition to the killing of Lin I-hsiung’s mother and twin daughters on February 28, 1980, the regime had also killed Chen Wen-cheng 陳文成, a thirty-one year old Taiwanese professor at Carnegie Mellon University visiting his family in Taiwan on July 2, 1981 during Wang Sheng’s archconservative reign. But now, on October 14, 1984, the regime killed Henry Liu (Liu Yiliang 劉宜良), an American citizen also known as Chiang Nan 江南, a journalist and author with connections to various security agencies including those of China and Taiwan as well as the United States. Liu had penned critical articles and a biography of Chiang Ching-kuo, first published in September 1984.190 In killing Henry Liu in the United States, the Kuomintang regime had overstepped many boundaries. The American FBI proved the Taiwan authorities were involved, a fact the Taiwan government admitted in mid-January 1985.191 Despite admitting its guilt in the Henry Liu murder case, the regime remained far from contrite. General Wang Hsi-ling 汪希苓, the Director of the Intelligence Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense (guofang bu qingbao ju 國防部情報局), was given a life sentence by the Military Court, but he was placed in a specially built house on the grounds of the Chingmei 景美 military prison and was released after a few years. Wang’s luxurious quarters, where he even had a separate small house to receive female visitors, contrasted starkly with the crowded quarters where the

187 J. Bruce Jacobs and I-hao Ben Liu, “Lee Teng-hui and the Idea of ‘Taiwan’,” China Quarterly, no. 190 (June 2007), p. 379. 188 Ibid. 189 For Lee’s role, see Li Denghui 李登輝, Jianzheng Taiwan: Jiang Jingguo zongtong yu wo 見證台灣：蔣經國總統與我 [Witness for Taiwan: President Chiang Ching-kuo and Me] (Taibei: Yunchen wenhua 允晨, 2004), pp. 50–52, 57–60. A year later, in mid-1985, Lü Hsiu-lien (Annette Lu) was released on medical grounds. 190 Jiang Nan 江南, Jiang Jingguo zhuan 蔣經國傳 [A Biography of Chiang Ching- kuo] (Los Angeles: Meiguo luntan bao 美國論壇報, 1984). 191 For a good summary of the Henry Liu case, see Bush, At Cross Purposes, pp. 206– 209. More details appear in Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo’s Son: Chiang Ching-kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 327–328, 385–394. For a useful biography of Henry Liu and a history of his murder case, see Kaplan, Fires. the japanese and kuomintang colonial regimes 61 defendants in the Kaohsiung trial and other political prisoners were held. In addition, while Wang was guilty of organizing a murder, the Kaohsiung prisoners had only sought to exercise peacefully the political rights guaranteed in the ROC Constitution.192 Soon afterwards, in early February 1985, the regime faced another major scandal with the “Tenth Credit Cooperative Incident” (shi xin shijian 十信事件), the bankruptcy of a major financial institution owing to corruption and illegal loans to government figures. Chiang Ching-kuo obtained the resignation of Tsiang Yien-si (Chiang Yen-shih 蔣彥士), the KMT Secretary-General and one of Chiang Ching-kuo’s closest “liberal” advisers. In the provincial assembly election of November 16, 1985, the dangwai elected eleven of the eighteen candidates it had recommended including such people as Yu Shyi-kun, Su Tseng-chang and Huang Yü-chiao. In the Taipei City Council election, all eleven candidates recommended by the dangwai committee won election including Frank Hsieh (Hsieh Chang- ting), Chang Teh-ming, Lin Cheng-chieh and Kang Shui-mu. In the county executive races, only Yü Chen Yue-ying won in Kaohsiung County. Chen Shui-bian lost his last-minute bid in Tainan County. Two days later, on November 18, 1985, Chen’s wife, Wu Shu-chen 吳淑珍, was run over by a truck and became a paraplegic.193 When Vice- President Lee Teng-hui sent a basket of flowers to Wu Shu-chen to express sympathy, he wrote in the diary of his interactions with Chiang Ching- kuo, “Chiang Ching-kuo was not happy. He felt that I should not get involved in the matter.”194 Yet, on December 25, 1985, Chiang Ching-kuo stated clearly, a member of the Chiang family “could not and would not (bu neng ye bu hui 不能也不會) run for president.”195 The year 1986 clearly proved a critical year in reforming the Kuomintang colonial regime. The difficulties of Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos from late 1985, culminating in his resignation of February 26, 1986, shocked dictatorial regimes in Asia including Taiwan and South Korea. Chiang Ching-kuo determined to implement some reforms, though, as argued below, this writer does not believe Chiang made major contributions to Taiwan’s democratization.

192 Visitors to the former Chingmei military prison, which is now open to the public, can see the quarters of both the political prisoners and Wang’s special accommodation as well as the locations of the key political trials. 193 Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai I, pp. 176–178. 194 Li Denghui 李登輝, Jianzheng Taiwan, p. 141. 195 Taiwan lishi nianbiao III, p. 220. 62 chapter two

In the words of then Vice-President Lee Teng-hui, “At the beginning of 1986, the Kuomintang had to change (Guomindang bu bian bu xingle 國民黨不變不行了).”196 The release of Chen Chu, one of the eight main Kaohsiung defendants, on February 4, 1986 was one early sign of good will.197 The Third Plenum of the Twelfth Kuomintang Central Committee opened on March 29, 1986 and chose a Twelve Man Committee (shi’er ren xiaozu 十二人小組) to discuss six reform topics.198 Lee Teng-hui’s analysis of the Twelve Man Committee is worth quoting at length: Actually, the six reform topics did not make any real progress in the committee. Perhaps these people were better than those in the CC Faction, but from my perspective all we did was hold a meeting for each reform topic. At the meetings, everyone just talked superficially, so there was no real reform. When I now think back, I have a deep feeling that although the Third Plenum called for political reform and established the Twelve Man Committee, [the committee] just performed perfunctorily in order to show Chiang Ching-kuo [that it acted] and it certainly did not institute reforms. At that time, Chiang Ching-kuo actually had reform ideas. Actually, he also knew that these people had no methods for reform.199 Another drive for reform involved the “dialogues” (goutong 溝通) with dangwai leaders. Chiang Ching-kuo had never been afraid to speak to members of the dangwai and people like Kang Ning-hsiang had spoken with him on several occasions over the years. Some talks between the Kuomintang and the dangwai had begun at the end of 1984 as well as in late 1985 and in early 1986, as the dangwai began to organize, but these talks did not succeed.200 On April 29, 1986, Chiang Ching-kuo met with Tao Pai-chuan, the great liberal who, as a member of the Control Branch, had criticized the prosecution of the Lei Chen case in 1960. According to a

196 Li Denghui 李登輝, Jianzheng Taiwan, p. 163. 197 Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai I, p. 184. 198 Li Denghui 李登輝, Jianzheng Taiwan, pp. 163, 167 n. 252. The twelve members were Yen Chia-kan 嚴家淦 (Convenor), Shieh Tung-min 謝東閔, Lee Teng-hui 李登煇, Ku Cheng-kang 古正綱, Huang Shao-ku 黃少谷, Yü Kuo-hwa 俞國華, Nieh (Ni) Wen-ya 倪文亞, Yüan Shou-chien 袁守謙, Shen Chang-huan 沈昌煥, Lee Huan 李煥, Chiu Chuang-huan 邱創煥, and Wu Poh-hsiung 吳伯雄. A KMT Deputy Secretary-General states the KMT Central Standing Committee meeting of April 9, 1986, on a motion from Chiang Ching-kuo, actually approved the Twelve Man Committee, Liang Surong 梁肅戎, Dashi dafei: Liang Surong huiyilu 大是大非：梁肅戎回憶錄 [Right and Wrong: The Mem- oirs of Liang Su-jung] (Taibei: Tianxia wenhua, 1995), p. 223. 199 Li Denghui 李登輝, Jianzheng Taiwan, pp. 163–164. 200 Liang Surong 梁肅戎, Dashi dafei, pp. 210–211; C.L. Chiou, Democratizing Oriental Despotism: China from 4 May 1919 to 4 June 1989 and Taiwan from 28 February 1947 to 28 June 1990 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1995), pp. 96–97. the japanese and kuomintang colonial regimes 63

KMT participant in the talks, without Tao Pai-chuan’s participation, the talks would have failed.201 The impetus for the more formal, structured dialogues, which began in May 1986, came from Chiang Ching-kuo himself.202 On May 7, Chiang told the Kuomintang Central Policy Committee to strengthen dialogues with the opposition in order to increase mutual understanding.203 The first of these formal “three-way meetings” took place on May 10. In addition to the four “middle” persons, three deputy secretaries-general of the KMT and some “moderate” dangwai leaders met for five hours and reached a three-point agreement: (1) all agreed the Republic of China Constitution should be implemented, though they still needed further discussion on how to implement democratic constitutional government, (2) all expressed agreement that a public political association (gong zheng hui 公政會), sometimes translated as Public Policy Research Associa- tion, should be established with branches, though they still required further discussion about its “registration” and its “name” and (3) all agreed they would work toward political harmony during future talks. A Kuo mintang participant praises this agreement as a major step in implementing democratic politics,204 but another analyst is much more restrained.205 Both the government and the dangwai were divided. On the same day as the dialogue, the Taiwan Garrison Command closed The Eighties (Bashi niandai 八十年代), a magazine of Kang Ning-hsiang, one of the participants in the dialogue from the dangwai. KMT rightists also attacked the “middle” people in the dialogues, comparing them to the “democratic” intellectuals of the Chinese Civil War in the late 1940s.206 Also on the same day as the dialogue, Chiang Peng-chien, Frank Hsieh (Hsieh Chang- ting), Chen Shui-bian and Huang Tien-fu (who had been invited to the dialogues, but declined) established the Taipei Branch of the Public Policy Research Association.207 Five days later, Kang Ning-hsiang, angry about the closure of his magazine, established a “Capital Branch” of the Public Policy Research Association.208

201 Liang Surong 梁肅戎, Dashi dafei, p. 210. 202 Li Denghui 李登輝, Jianzheng Taiwan, p. 157. 203 Ibid., p. 157 n. 236; Liang Surong 梁肅戎, Dashi dafei, p. 210; Chiou, Democratizing Oriental Despotism, p. 97. 204 Liang Surong 梁肅戎, Dashi dafei, p. 212. 205 Chiou, Democratizing Oriental Despotism, pp. 97–98. 206 Ibid., p. 98. 207 Liang Surong 梁肅戎, Dashi dafei, p. 212 and Chiou, Democratizing Oriental Des- potism, p. 98. 208 Chiou, Democratizing Oriental Despotism, p. 98. 64 chapter two

Then, on May 19, 1986, the thirty-eight anniversary of the implementation of martial law in Taiwan, the dangwai held a “May 19 Green Movement” (wuyijiu lüse xingdong 五一九綠色行動) at the Lungshan Temple in Taipei. The demonstrators had announced they planned to march on the Presidential Office to demand the end of martial law. The security forces surrounded the demonstrators for over twelve hours, but no violence ensued.209 The second “dialogue” meeting on May 24, 1986 proved difficult. Both the KMT and the dangwai told the other that they must stop their actions, which were hurting the dialogues. The three KMT representatives said that the dangwai must not use the term “dangwai” in the name of the Public Policy Research Association, but the dangwai representatives said they had no power to remove the word.210 One of the KMT representatives agreed, “in fact it was not easy” to make the concession to drop the word dangwai from the name.211 The next day, May 25, 1986, the Kuomintang convened a high-level meeting under the chairmanship of Secretary-General Ma Shu-li 馬樹禮. After the three KMT delegates reported on the dialogues, the KMT meeting decided to continue to talk with the dangwai about the issues of the name and the registration of the association. In his memoirs, one KMT representative in the dialogues observes, “It is worth noting, at this high- level [KMT] meeting representatives of the military and the security agencies most definitely did not attend.”212 The third dialogue, planned for either June 6 or 7, never met.213 In the last sixteen months of his life, Chiang Ching-kuo either allowed or promulgated four major reforms that contributed to Taiwan’s future democratization. First, he allowed the formation of the new Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) on September 28, 1986. Political scientists have long noted that authoritarian regimes crush opposition organizations that have the potential to build support against the regime. The Kuomintang’s crushing of the China Democratic Party in 1960 and the Formosa Magazine in 1979 illustrated this very clearly. Interviews later revealed that the new DPP leadership had in fact expected widespread

209 Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai I, pp. 190–193; Liang Surong 梁肅戎, Dashi dafei, p. 213. 210 Chiou, Democratizing Oriental Despotism, p. 98; Liang Surong 梁肅戎, Dashi dafei, pp. 214–215. 211 Liang Surong 梁肅戎, Dashi dafei, p. 215. 212 Ibid., p. 216. 213 Ibid. and Chiou, Democratizing Oriental Despotism, pp. 98–99. the japanese and kuomintang colonial regimes 65 arrests. As part of their preparation, they organized ten leadership groups, each with ten members, so that as each leadership group was arrested, the next group would come forward. Fortunately, the first group was not arrested.214 According to Vice-President Lee Teng-hui’s notes on a meeting with Chiang Ching-kuo two days later, Chiang said: At this time and place, we cannot have an angry attitude and rashly undertake a radical action that would lead to social instability. We must use a moderate attitude in order to solve this matter using stability of the people’s country as our main intention ... As long as it does not violate National Policy or Constitutional regulations, we can research the possibility of establishing a political party. For the time being, we will go forward secretly ... He again stressed that the basic policy and principles of seeking democracy objectively cannot be changed and must be continued. At the same time, the unification of party members is an important matter so that the work of party members can be improved.215 Clearly the Kuomintang leadership was divided on how to respond to this new challenge. Chiang Ching-kuo spoke up more broadly on October 5 at a Central Standing Committee meeting, when he said, “The times are changing, circumstances are changing, and the tide is changing. To meet these changes, the ruling party must push reforms according to new ideas, new methods, and based on constitutional democracy. Only then will our party be able to move with the tide and to be with the people all the time.”216 A very key event occurred two days later on October 7, 1986 when Katherine Graham, owner of The Washington Post and Newsweek, conducted an extensive interview with Chiang Ching-kuo during which Chiang discussed the new DPP.217 On the formation of new political parties, Chiang said,

214 For a useful introduction in English to the founding of the DPP, see Chiou, Democ- ratizing Oriental Despotism, pp. 99–104. More details on the founding of the DPP and its first activities can be found in Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai I, pp. 206–240. 215 Li Denghui 李登輝, Jianzheng Taiwan, p. 188. 216 Chiou, Democratizing Oriental Despotism, p. 93. In order to smooth the English, I have made a few minor changes to the translated quotation. 217 For the two reports of this interview in The Washington Post, see Daniel Souther- land, “Taiwan President to Propose End to Island’s Martial Law: Action Would Mean the Lifting of Restrictions After 37 Years,” The Washington Post, October 8, 1986, p. A18. See also Daniel Southerland, “Chiang Envisions Change for Taiwan: Move Toward ‘Soft Authoritarianism’ Seen,” The Washington Post, October 13, 1986, p. A18. For the Newsweek report, see Jacob Young and others, “Taiwan: The Winds of Change,” Newsweek, October 66 chapter two

We are now studying the issue very vigorously and I expect a conclusion very soon. All along we have recognized the right [of] assembly and the right to form political groups. But they must recognize the constitution and identify themselves with institutions under the constitution. New political parties must be anticommunist. They should not be engaged in any separatist movement—by which I mean the Taiwan independence movement. If they successfully meet these requirements, we will allow new political parties to be formed.218 Chiang clearly did not tell the truth to Katherine Graham about the rights of Taiwan’s citizens to assemble or to form political groups. In fact, one reason for the failure of the recent “dialogues” was the inabililty of the government to accept the right to form political groups. Chiang’s statement also did not give permission for the recently founded DPP to exist. Another statement in the Katherine Graham interview would have given the DPP some additional concerns: They have not made clear what the ideas are in forming their so-called political party, so we have no basis to judge. I learned about the formation of the party from the press. Some people think they had no idea of the concept of our nation [as embodying all of China, not just Taiwan.] They never mentioned the name of the nation in their preamble. They also failed to mention any anticommunist policy in their platform.219 Only after another eight days, on October 15, 1986, did the KMT Central Standing Committee vote to end the ban on opposition political parties.220 Thus, the DPP competed in the December 6, 1986 elections under its own name. In his interview with Katherine Graham, Chiang Ching-kuo also announced his second key reform, the abolition of martial law, though the formal announcement came eight days later on October 15, after a KMT Central Standing Committee vote,221 and the formal end of martial law became effective only in July 1987. Symbolically, this reform was very important as martial law had been used for political repression in many famous cases including the trials of Lei Chen and the Formosa Magazine Eight. In fact, martial law did not affect most people in Taiwan and Taiwan commentators had long called for its abolition, arguing Taiwan’s

21, 1986, pp. 134–138. In Australia at that time Newsweek was published together with an Australian newsweekly, The Bulletin. The pagination reflects the Australian edition. 218 Young and others, “Taiwan,” p. 137. 219 Ibid. 220 Taiwan lishi nianbiao III, p. 250. 221 Ibid. the japanese and kuomintang colonial regimes 67 security did not require martial law. In addition, many foreigners had criticized Taiwan because of its martial law. About a year later, on October 14, 1987 following demonstrations by retired servicemen in Taiwan, the KMT Central Standing Committee voted to allow Taiwan residents to go to Communist China in order “to visit relatives” and the next day the Cabinet approved a document to implement this new policy.222 This was Chiang Ching-kuo’s third key reform. The writer met many of these Taiwan visitors in China during the next several months. Unanimously, they decried China’s poverty, its corruption and the grasping nature of their Mainland relatives. People said, “We thought it would be better than the Kuomintang propaganda, but actually it was worse.” This policy, which China welcomed, actually did much to dampen Taiwan’s interest in “reunification” with China.223 Chiang Ching-kuo’s final reform, effective on January 1, 1988, just two weeks before he died ended the restrictions on newspapers.224 Pre viously, unofficial voices had been limited to magazines which were banned if they broached topics deemed too sensitive by the authorities. The lifting of the restriction on new newspapers led to a great explosion in the daily press after Chiang Ching-kuo’s death on January 13, 1988 as many new voices rushed to gain media access to the people. These final reforms of Chiang Ching-kuo did contribute to Taiwan’s ultimate democratization, but in themselves they were not democratic. Chiang was never prepared to allow an opposition political party to defeat the Kuomintang. Significantly, Chiang was also very wary of giving Taiwanese too much voice. According to Chiang’s biographer, only Mainlanders had access to “the bedroom inner sanctum,” a place Vice- President Lee Teng-hui never entered.225 Lee himself wrote, “But I felt in his use of people, he still used Mainlanders as the core (zhongxin 中心). Taiwanese were only window dressing (dapei 搭配).”226 These tidbits from the last years of Chiang’s life only reinforce the earlier analysis that Mainlanders, who accounted for less than fifteen per cent of Taiwan’s

222 Ibid., p. 296. 223 For background to this reform and a survey of Taiwan visitors to China, see Hu Chang, “Impressions of Mainland China Carried Back by Taiwan Visitors,” in Two Societ- ies in Opposition: The Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China After Forty Years, ed. Ramon H. Myers (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1991), pp. 141–155. As we shall see in succeeding chapters, those supporting unification with China declined precipitously after democratization. 224 Taiwan lishi nianbiao III, p. 310. 225 Taylor, Generalissimo’s Son, p. 398. 226 Li Denghui 李登輝, Jianzheng Taiwan, p. 175. 68 chapter two population, dominated the Kuomintang regime under Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo. For genuine democratization in Taiwan, we must consider the first eight years of Lee Teng-hui’s presidency, the subject of the next chapter. the lee teng-hui presidency to early 1996 69

Chapter three

The Lee Teng-hui Presidency to Early 1996

As shown in the last chapter, during his late presidency, Chiang Ching- kuo pushed liberalization, but not democratization. Chiang clearly did not expect the KMT to lose office to an opposition. He improved Taiwanese participation in political processes, but maintained the firm monopoly of power among Mainlanders. And freedom of speech remained strictly limited. Calling publicly for Taiwan Independence still brought a very fast trip to prison for sedition. For example, on January 16, 1988, three days after Chiang Ching-kuo’s death, the courts imprisoned two defendants for terms of ten and eleven years for “advocating Taiwanese independence and being involved in sedition (zhuzhang Taidu sheji panluan 主張台獨涉及叛亂).”1 Vice-President Lee Teng-hui was sworn in as president precisely four hours and thirteen minutes after Chiang Ching-kuo died on January 13, 1988 at 3:55 pm.2 The Mainlander elite, however, expected to remain in control. For them, the model was the presidency of Yen Chia-kan who succeeded Chiang Kai-shek in April 1975. Yen became a figurehead president, while Chiang Ching-kuo, who was premier, succeeded his father in power and, significantly, as leader of the KMT. Although the Legislative Branch (yuan 院) passed a resolution in support of President Lee Teng-hui on January 14, Lee had much less support for his leadership of the Party. On January 18, thirty-nine KMT legislators—only about thirteen per cent of the legislators3—jointly announced that they supported Lee to be Acting Chairman of the KMT.4 In fact debate raged for two weeks and the regularly scheduled meeting of the Central Standing Committee of January 20 was cancelled. Only on January 27, two weeks after Lee became president, did the Central Standing

1 Taiwan lishi nianbiao III, p. 312. 2 Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai: Taiwan minzhu yundong 25 nian, 1988–2000 綠色年代：台灣民主運動25年，1988–2000 [The Green Era: Twenty-Five Years of Taiwan’s Democratic Movement, 1988–2000], II vols., vol. II (Taibei: Caituan faren lüxing wenjiao jijinhui 財團法人綠色旅行文教基金會, 2005), pp. 10–11. 3 In April 1989, the legislature had 292 members, see Republic of China Yearbook 1989 (Taipei: Kwang Hwa Publishing Company, 1989), p. 129. 4 Taiwan lishi nianbiao III, p. 312. 70 chapter three

Committee agree to make Lee Teng-hui the Acting Chairman of the KMT.5 Lee became formal chairman of the KMT on July 8, 1988, almost six months after becoming president, at the 13th KMT National Congress.6 At this Party Congress Lee did have some success including promoting several Taiwanese to the Central Standing Committee. For the first time, Taiwanese actually formed a majority of the Central Standing Committee.7 In addition, Lee also appointed a number of Taiwanese as cabinet ministers and for the first time Taiwanese constituted a majority of the cabinet.8 Upon becoming president, Lee Teng-hui quickly took several steps that symbolized his desire to move towards democracy. For example, on February 10, 1988 the KMT invited the DPP to discuss several political questions. On March 20, 1988 Sun Li-jen, a prominent general under arrest since 1955, regained his freedom of movement and speech. Similarly, General Chang Hsüeh-liang 張學良, the Young Marshal of Manchuria, under arrest since the Xi’an Incident of December 1936, regained his freedom of speech and movement on March 26, 1988.9 In 1988 and 1989, the mass social movements became even more active. Farmers had major demonstrations on March 16, April 26 and May 20, 1988, the last of which ended in considerable violence.10 Aborigines held a series of protests from August 25 to the end of 1988 including the destruction of a bronze statue of Wu Feng, whom Chinese history had written as benevolent to aborigines. The government made a number of responses in early 1989 including changing the name of Wu Feng Township in Chiayi County to Alishan Township and deleting the story of Wu Feng from school textbooks.11 Hakkas also demonstrated in the latter half of 1988.12 On February 28, 1989 protestors in Keelung demanded an apology for the deaths in the February 28, 1947 Uprising and on August 19, 1989 Taiwan’s first monument memorializing the sacrifices of February 28, 1947 was dedicated.13 On April 7, 1989, Cheng Nan-jung, an opposition journalist of Mainlander background, self-immolated himself in order to

5 Jacobs and Liu, “Lee Teng-hui and ‘Taiwan’,” p. 379 and the citations in n. 27. 6 Jürgen Domes, “The 13th Party Congress of the Kuomintang: Towards Political Com- petition?,” The China Quarterly, no. 118 (June 1989), pp. 345–359. 7 Ibid., p. 358. 8 Wu, Taiwan’s Democratization, p. 44. 9 Taiwan lishi nianbiao III, pp. 314–320. 10 Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai II, pp. 18–22, 28–34. 11 Ibid., pp. 36–37, 48–49. 12 Ibid., pp. 38–39, 46–47. 13 Ibid., pp. 58–59. the lee teng-hui presidency to early 1996 71 prevent his being arrested. Cheng’s death led to numerous demonstrations.14 Thus, while Taiwan was becoming more open, it had not yet become democratic. Within the leadership group, President Lee made alliances with various groups of Mainlanders against other groups. His first important target was Premier Yü Kuo-hwa 俞國華, a conservative with kinship links to the Chiang family who was also close to Mme. Chiang Kai-shek. On May 17, 1989, Yü resigned as Premier. On May 24, the KMT Central Standing Committee approved the appointment of Lee Huan, then Secretary- General of the KMT and a key liberal under Chiang Ching-kuo, an appointment approved overwhelmingly by the Legislative Branch on May 30.15 Lee Huan, however, did not prove a good premier. Public order deteriorated markedly. In addition, Lee Huan proved dilatory in decision-making and unable to control the huge government bureaucracies. Finally, Premier Lee Huan came into open conflict with President Lee Teng-hui. Although on May 1, 1990, Premier Lee Huan privately told members of the legislature that he hoped to continue as premier, the next day President Lee announced that Hau Pei-tsun 郝柏村, the former Chief of the General Staff (1981–1989) and the Minister of National Defense (1989–1990), would become the new premier.16 The appointment of Hau Pei-tsun as premier clearly worried many people. On May 2, both the DPP and a student demonstration opposed his appointment. On May 6, more than 2,000 people marched against having a military man lead the government. The Capital Morning News (Shoudu zaobao 首都早報), run by Kang Ning-hsiang, announced the news with the character “gan 幹” (Fuck) in bright red ink on its front page.17 On May 9 Hau announced he would leave the military and lead the government as a civilian. On May 10 Premier Lee Huan formally resigned. On May 11 Hau said he would be willing to have opposition people in cabinet. On May 19 Hau said he would not return to the military. On May 20 the KMT Central Standing Committee approved Lee Teng-hui’s appointment of Hau as premier. On May 26 President Lee approved Hau’s

14 Ibid., pp. 66–75. 15 Taiwan lishi nianbiao (1989–1994) 台灣歷史年表 [Chronology of Taiwan History], vol. V (Taibei: Guojia zhengce yanjiusuo ziliao zhongxin, 1998), p. 26 16 Ibid., p. 90. 17 The rest of the headline said, “Oppose a military man forming the cabinet! (fandui junren zuge! 反對軍人組閣!),” see Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai II, p. 110. 72 chapter three

retiring from the military. Despite many protests, the Legislative Branch approved Hau’s appointment as premier on May 29.18 In fact, Premier Hau Pei-tsun proved an excellent premier. His appointment proved another example of Lee Teng-hui allying with one group of Mainlanders to oppose another group, and it brought the military leadership into a position supportive of President Lee. Premier Hau’s appointment was the culmination of considerable political struggle both within and without the KMT during the first half of 1990.

The Presidential Election of March 21, 1990

The struggle within the KMT pitted those supportive of Lee Teng-hui, the Taiwanese President and KMT Chairman, who later became known as the Mainstream Faction (zhuliu pai 主流派), and those opposed to him, the Mainlander elite later known as the Anti-Mainstream or Non- Mainstream Faction (feizhuliu pai 非主流派). The immediate struggle concerned the presidential election of March 21, 1990, the last presidential election under the old system in which the National Assembly elected the president. While most accepted that Lee Teng-hui would be the presidential candidate, Premier Lee Huan wanted to be the vice-presidential candidate. President Lee instead nominated Li Yuan-zu 李元簇, the Secretary- General of the Presidential Office. A relatively unknown Mainlander, Li Yuan-zu had previously served as Minister of Education and Minister of Justice. The choice of Li Yuan-zu angered several of the Mainlander elite, who decided to run an alternative ticket, Lin Yang-kang 林洋港 for president and Chiang Wego 蔣緯國—the son of Chiang Kai-shek and the half- brother of Chiang Ching-kuo—for vice-president. On February 13, 1990 a group of National Assembly members proposed Lin Yang-kang for president and the following day Chiang Wego denied that his brother Chiang Ching-kuo had said, “Members of the Chiang family cannot and will not run for president.”19 Chiang Ching-kuo recruited Taiwanese without Mainland experience through two pathways. The first group won office through electoral politics, usually becoming county executives, the highest popularly-elected

18 For chronology, see Taiwan lishi nianbiao V, pp. 90–98. 19 Ibid., p. 68. Chiang Ching-kuo made this statement on December 25, 1985. He made his famous statement that “I am also a Taiwanese” on July 27, 1987. See Jacobs, “‘Taiwan- ization’,” pp. 33, 52 n. 63. the lee teng-hui presidency to early 1996 73 executive office in Taiwan under Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo. Chiang Ching-kuo would then appoint members of this group to higher offices in the provincial and central governments. Lin Yang-kang had come to central politics through this route. After winning election as the Nantou County Executive in 1967, he was appointed Director of the Provincial Government’s Department of Construction (1972–1976), Mayor of Taipei Municipality (1976–1978), Governor of Taiwan (1978–1981), Minister of the Interior (1981–1984), Vice-Premier (1984–1987) and Head of the Judicial Branch (1987–1994).20 The second group achieved eminence as technocrats before Chiang Ching-kuo recruited them to political office. Lee Teng-hui, a specialist in agricultural economics, obtained postgraduate degrees from Iowa State University and Cornell University before gaining renown in the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR). Lee later became Minister without Portfolio (1972–1978), Mayor of Taipei Municipality (1978–1981), Governor of Taiwan (1981–1984) and Vice-President (1984–1988).21 The sequence of dates for Lin Yang-kang and Lee Teng-hui shows that Lin Yang-kang preceded Lee Teng-hui in various positions until 1984 when Chiang Ching-kuo made Lee the vice-president. Clearly both men had a competitive rivalry and probably Lin Yang-kang’s ambition made him run as the candidate of the Mainlander elite as he had no alternative since the premiership at that time was reserved for Mainlanders. Chiang Wego, as the most senior member of the Chiang family, added strength to this ticket of the Mainlander elite. The KMT Central Committee had already formally nominated Lee Teng-hui and Li Yuan-zu as the KMT presidential ticket on February 11, 1990. Two days later, some members of the National Assembly proposed Lin Yang-kang as president. Despite the KMT’s nomination of Lee Teng- hui and Li Yuan-zu, Lin Yang-kang and Chiang Wego remained as candidates until March 9 and March 10 respectively.22 Of course, at this time Mainlanders controlled the National Assembly and, according to a non- partisan Taiwanese National Assemblyman who had been elected in all of the supplementary elections for National Assembly since 1972, Lin

20 J. Bruce Jacobs, “Democratisation in Taiwan,” Asian Studies Review, 17, no. 1 (July 1993), p. 120. The writer had a superb interview with Lin Yang-kang when he was Gover- nor. By the time when Lin ran for president in the popular election of 1996, the lively intellectual had become a ponderous old man. 21 Ibid. On the history of Lee Teng-hui before he became president, see Jacobs and Liu, “Lee Teng-hui and ‘Taiwan’,” pp. 375–380. 22 Taiwan lishi nianbiao V, pp. 66, 76. 74 chapter three

Yang-kang and Chiang Wego could have defeated Lee Teng-hui and Li Yuan-zu by over fifty votes. In the end, however, Lin and Chiang withdrew after mediation from eight KMT elders.23 Lee and Li won the presidency without opposition.24 Concerned with the power of such conservatives as Lee Huan and Hau Pei-tsun, whom President Lee had already announced as his choice as the next premier, as well as the undemocratic indirect election of the president by a National Assembly that had primarily been elected on the Mainland in the late 1940s, students began to organize their “Wild Lily” (yebaihe 野百合) movement following a meeting on March 8.25 Although there was a substantial student demonstration on March 14 at the KMT headquarters, the main demonstrations started at 5 pm on March 16 at the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Park with participants wearing a variety of headbands that attacked the National Assembly: “Dismiss the National Assembly (jiesan guoda 解散國大),” “If the Old Thieves [the permanently elected members of the National Assembly and Legislature from the Mainland] do not fall, Democracy will not Come (laozei bu dao, minzhu bulai 老賊不倒, 民主不來),” “Abolish the Temporary Provisions [of the Constitution] (feichu linshi tiaokuan 廢除臨時條款).” The next day, March 17, following the appearance of military police, more students arrived and they began to organize. On March 19 ten students initiated a hunger strike to increase pressure on the government. By dusk over three thousand students had joined the protest and the number of hunger strikers had grown to thirty-one. On March 20, a delegation of students went to the Presidential Office and presented three demands to the Deputy Secretary-General including that President Lee come to the square and prepare for a televised dialogue with the students. President Lee agreed to meet with the students after being elected president on March 21. That evening fifty-three student movement repre-

23 C.L. Chiou, “The 1990 National Affairs Conference and the Future of Democracy in Taiwan,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 25, no. 1 (January-March 1993), p. 22. 24 Many more details on the 1990 presidential election may be found in Ts’ai Ling and Ramon H. Myers, “Surviving the Rough-and-Tumble of Presidential Politics in an Emerging Democracy: The 1990 Elections in the Republic of China on Taiwan,” China Quarterly, no. 129 (March 1992), pp. 123–148. 25 The best source in English on the student demonstrations in Taiwan is Teresa Wright, The Perils of Protest: State Repression and Student Activism in China and Taiwan (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2001), pp. 95–128. I have also used Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai II, pp. 104–109. the lee teng-hui presidency to early 1996 75 sentatives went to the Presidential Office and conducted a dialogue.26 The Wild Lily demonstrations and the hunger strike ended on the morning of March 22. As seen below, President Lee accepted one key demand of the students—he convened a National Affairs Conference in June-July 1990. In the two months between his election as president on March 21 and his inauguration on May 20, President Lee took a number of steps to open a dialogue with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) opposition. On April 2 President Lee invited DPP Chairman Huang Hsin-chieh to tea at the Presidential Office and “opened a new dialogue channel.” At the end, Huang responded that “the President is wise (zongtong yingming 總統英明).”27 On April 9 the DPP decided to participate in the preparation of the forthcoming National Affairs Conference and the first preparatory committee meeting took place on April 14. On April 24 the Presidential Office appointed a spokesman and announced a press conference would be held every Friday.28 In May 1990, the opposition to the prospective appointment of Hau Pei-tsun as premier grew.29 On May 20, the date of President Lee’s inauguration, tens of thousands of people demonstrated against the appointment of Hau as Premier.30 On his inauguration day, President Lee granted an amnesty to Shih Ming-teh, who had been sentenced to life in the Kaohsiung Incident Trials of 1980, freed Hsu Hsin-liang, who had been arrested upon his return from the United States to Taiwan, and restored the civil rights of Huang Hsin-chieh.31 In his inauguration speech, Lee said, “with… the increasingly ardent desire of the people for democratic rule of law, the political environment of our bastion of national revival is not the same as in the past. Everybody now recognizes that normal development of a system of constitutional democracy is the only path to thoroughly implementing political democracy.”32 Lee expressed the hope to terminate the Temporary Provisions for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion as

26 For a summary of this dialogue, see Wright, Perils of Protest, pp. 121–123. 27 Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai II, p. 120. 28 Taiwan lishi nianbiao V, pp. 86–88. 29 For details, see Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai II, pp. 110–119. 30 Ibid., p. 112. The Chronology states 10,000 demonstrated against Hao’s appointment, Taiwan lishi nianbiao V, p. 96. 31 Taiwan lishi nianbiao V, p. 96. 32 Lee Teng-hui, Creating the Future: Towards a New Era for the Chinese People (Tai- pei: Government Information Office, 1992), p. 4. 76 chapter three well as to implement constitutional revisions within two years.33 Just a few days before the inauguration, but in this very political context, the Anti-Mainstream Faction in the KMT established a formal organization, the New KMT Alliance (xin Guomindang lianxian 新國民黨連線), on May 11.34

Sacking the Old Thieves: Constitutional Interpretation No. 261

The problem of the “Old Thieves” (laozei 老賊 in the central parliamentary organs—the Legislative Branch, the Control Branch and the National Assembly—went back to the heart of the KMT’s Chinese colonial regime following Chiang Kai-shek’s forced retreat from the Mainland to Taiwan in late 1949. Since the regime could not hold elections on the Mainland following the takeover of the Chinese Communists, the regime arranged for the Council of Grand Justices to give Constitutional Interpretation No. 31 on January 29, 1954, which extended the terms of the central parliamentarians initially elected on the Mainland during 1947 and 1948 until they could “be elected and convene according to law…”35 Even by 1969, the numbers of central parliamentarians had declined. The KMT used the excuse of Taiwan’s growing population to have limited supplementary elections in 1969. Taiwan (including Taipei) elected fifteen additional National Assemblyman and eleven additional legislators on December 20, and on December 29 the Taipei City Council elected two members of the Control Branch.36 These additional central parliamentarians, like the “old thieves,” all had indefinite terms. By 1972, only half of the original National Assemblyman and Legislators and only one-third of the Control Branch members remained and their average ages had gone up to 63 in the National Assembly, 67 in the Legislature and 73 in the Control Branch. The twenty-eight new central parliamentarians elected in 1969 only accounted for one-seventieth of the membership. Thus, in 1972, after considerable debate, the KMT agreed to have further supplementary elections for the central parliamentary organs. Most importantly, these new central parliamentarians would

33 Ibid., pp. 4–5. 34 Taiwan lishi nianbiao V, p. 92. 35 The text of Constitutional Interpretation No. 31 can be found in Zhongyang ribao 中央日報 (Central Daily News), January 30, 1954, p. 1 and Lianhebao 聯合報 (United Daily News), January 30, 1954, p. 1. 36 Taiwan Province was not given any new Control Branch members. Jacobs, “Recent Leadership,” p. 133. the lee teng-hui presidency to early 1996 77 have the three and six year terms fixed in the Constitution.37 Thus legislators were elected in 1972, 1975, 1980, 1983, 1986 and 1989, while national assemblymen and control branch members were elected in 1972, 1980 and 1986. (The elections scheduled for 1978 were postponed until 1980 after the United States announced on December 16, 1978 that it would recognize Beijing and break relations with Taipei.) 38

Table 3.1. Central parliamentarians, June 21, 199038 Old Supplementary Total No. % No % National Assembly 612 88% 80 12% 692 Legislative Branch 138 52% 129 48% 267 Control Branch 19 38% 31 62% 50

Total 769 76% 240 24% 1009

Although the supplementary elections did provide some renewal to the central parliamentary organs, the “old thieves” elected in China during 1947 and 1948 still predominated in the National Assembly and the Legislative Branch in 1990 (see Table 3.1). On April 3, twenty-six DPP members of the Legislature asked the Council of Grand Justices for a review of Constitution Interpretation No. 31.39 Even the KMT Central Committee on April 4, 1990 and the KMT Central Standing Committee on April 18 called for reform.40 Then, on April 16, the Legislature asked the Council of Grand Justices for a further explanation of Constitutional Interpretation No. 31.41 The Council of Grand Justices delivered Constitutional Interpretation No. 261 on June 21, 1990 after twenty-eight discussions. By a vote of 13 to 2, the Council stated that all of the central parliamentarians who had been elected in China during 1947 and 1948 had to retire by December 31, 1991.42

37 Jacobs, “Taiwan 1972,” pp. 106–107. 38 Statistics taken from table in Zhongyang ribao guoji ban 中央日報國際版 [Central Daily News International Edition], June 23, 1990, p. 1. 39 Council of Grand Justices, “Constitutional Interpretation No. 261 of June 21, 1990,” Fawubu gongbao 法務部公報 [Bulletin of the Ministry of Justice], no. 121 (July 31, 1990), pp. 72–74. 40 Taiwan lishi nianbiao V, pp. 86–88. 41 Zhongyang ribao guoji ban 中央日報國際版 [Central Daily News International Edi- tion], June 23, 1990, p. 1. 42 The texts of Constitutional Interpretation No. 261 and the dissenting opinion may be found in Council of Grand Justices, “Const. Interp. 261,” pp. 70–72. They can also be 78 chapter three

The Head of the Judicial Branch, Lin Yang-kang, acknowledged some of the politics behind Constitutional Interpretation No. 261: The Constitution is different from civil and criminal law. The Constitution itself is the highest law of a political nature. Interpretations of the Council of Grand Justices naturally have a political nature, but the Interpretation of the Council of Grand Justices regarding the terms of central parliamentarians is also sympathetic (ticha 體察) with the trends of public opinion (minyi quxiang 民意趨向). It rises above partisanship and is an independent, impartial decision.43 More than any other single act, Constitutional Interpretation No. 261 swept away the remnants of the old Mainlander elite.

The National Affairs Conference of June-July 1990

In one of the most important steps in Taiwan’s democratization, President Lee Teng-hui followed up on his promises to the Wild Lily demonstrators and convened a National Affairs Conference (guoshi huiyi 國是會議). This conference, which had no constitutional or legal basis, brought together a wide variety of perspectives from the KMT and also the DPP and non-partisans. The invitation list of 150 persons included six ex-prisoners and five dissidents who had been exiled for political reasons.44 The National Affairs Conference, which was convened from June 28 to July 4, 1990 at the Grand Hotel, discussed many issues. Perhaps unexpectedly, the National Affairs Conference reached a consensus on five issues. First, it agreed that the security and well-being of Taiwan’s residents had priority in formulating policy towards Mainland China. Second, the Temporary Provisions to the Constitution, adopted in 1948 and amended in 1966 and 1972 for “the Period of Communist Rebellion,” should be abolished. Third, most agreed a proportional representation system for “National Representatives at Large” should replace the functional constituencies, overseas Chinese representatives and women’s representatives in the central parliamentary organs. Fourth, all agreed that the found in Zhongyang ribao guoji ban 中央日報國際版 [Central Daily News International Edition], June 23, 1990, p. 1. 43 Zhang Kunshan 張昆山, “Jieshiwen juyou zhengzhixing ... 解釋文具有政治性 ... [The Text of the Interpretation has a Political Nature...],” Zhongyang ribao guojiban 中央日報國際版 [Central Daily News International Edition] reprinted from Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], p. 1. 44 John Higley, Tong-yi Huang, and Tse-min Lin, “Elite Settlements in Taiwan,” Jour- nal of Democracy, 9, no. 2 (1998), p. 150. the lee teng-hui presidency to early 1996 79 provincial governor of Taiwan and the mayors of the two provincial-level municipalities, Taipei and Kaohsiung, should be popularly elected. Fifth, the senior central parliamentarians should retire by December 31, 1991, though this had already been pre-empted by Constitutional Interpretation No. 261 a week before the National Affairs Conference opened. There was disagreement on whether the president should be popularly elected or indirectly elected.45 The Conference did agree, however, to revisit this issue in a couple of years. As discussed below, direct popular election of the president gained an island-wide consensus and this fiercely contentious issue became a non-issue within a couple of years. Of course, the National Affairs Conference could not reach a consensus on every issue. Yao Chia-wen complained that, although the topic of “nation” (guojia 國家) came up at every session, participants could not reach consensus on this question.46 This is not surprising when we consider that this issue is still widely debated even in late 2011. Yet, in the words of another DPP delegate, Chang Chun-hung, “The National Affairs Conference was a milestone in the postwar history of Taiwan… its significance remains.”47 Another participant wrote: When James Soong and Chang Chun-hung, two party secretaries-general [of the KMT and the DPP], sat on the central stage to co-chair the final plenary session, the political image and message broadcast to the people of Taiwan through TV and other news media was certainly more than historical and dramatic… Chang had been court-martialed ten years before, sentenced to a twelve-year term, and had just been released from jail, while Soong was the government information chief who had vilified Chang and his codefendants. The episode must have had a great social and psycho- logical impact on the future political behavior and culture of the people.48 A week after the National Affairs Conference closed, KMT Chairman Lee Teng-hui established a Constitution Reform Planning Committee (xian- zheng gaige cehua xiaozu 憲政改革策劃小組). The next day, President Lee Teng-hui announced that he favored direct popular election of the President.49

45 Jason Hu in Harvey J. Feldman, ed., Constitutional Reform and the Future of the Republic of China (Armonk, New York and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1991), pp. 23–25. Jason Hu actually argued that consensus had been reached on seven points but, on the basis of the discussion by other participants at the seminar, I have deleted two. 46 Ibid., p. 27. 47 Ibid., p. 30. 48 Chiou, “The 1990 NAC,” p. 28. 49 Taiwan lishi nianbiao V, p. 110. 80 chapter three

The First Set of Constitutional Amendments, April 22, 1991

During Lee Teng-hui’s presidency, Taiwan had six sets of constitutional amendments. The National Assembly approved the first set of ten constitutional amendments on April 22, 1991. These amendments established the rules for the new elections to the central parliamentary organs—the National Assembly, the Legislative Branch and the Control Branch— mandated by Constitutional Interpretation No. 261. For the National Assembly and the Legislative Branch, the new constitutional amendments directed that members be elected from each county and muni cipality of the “free areas” according to population, that the plains aborigines and the mountain aborigines would each elect three members to each body, that overseas Chinese abroad would elect members, and that members would be elected by party list in a nationwide constituency. The rules for the Control Branch were similar, but did not include aboriginal electorates. In addition, new constitutional amendment no. 8 mandated that any laws intended to be applicable only during the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion (the so-called Temporary Provisions) and which have not been revised shall no longer be in effect after July 31, 1992.50

The National Assembly Election of December 21, 1991

In accord with Article 5 of the amendments, the National Assembly election was held on December 21, 1991.51 In this election the KMT did surpris- ingly well gaining 67.72 per cent of the vote while the DPP obtained a disappointing 22.78 per cent, well below its results in 1989 and worse than the results the opposition had gained under martial law prior to July 1987. Two different analyses account for this relatively poor DPP showing. A majority of journalistic observers argued that the DPP’s poor electoral support resulted from its declaration of support for Taiwanese Indepen dence, at the time a seditious platform. The KMT effectively responded with a broadcast advertizing campaign that asserted:

50 For the 1991 constitutional amendments, see The Republic of China Yearbook 1993 (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1993), pp. 728–729. 51 For details of this election, see Simon Long, “Taiwan’s National Assembly Elec- tions,” The China Quarterly, no. 129 (March 1999), pp. 216–228. the lee teng-hui presidency to early 1996 81

The Chinese Communists are not China and China is not the Chinese Com- munists. No one among Taiwan’s twenty million people wants to unify with the Chinese Communists. But no one wants to be separated from China forever. The Chinese Communists are the same as the Russian Communists and can disappear at any time. But China will always exist. [emphasis added] DPP leaders in mid-1992 interviews unanimously agreed the declaration of support for Taiwanese Independence was a tactical mistake. The second analysis argues the issue of Taiwanese Independence played a minimal role in the election result and stresses two other key factors. First, the DPP nominated a limited number of second-rank candidates and did not organize its campaign well. Second, interviews and survey research suggest that only a minority of voters voted on the basis of issues or party platform. In the 1986 legislative election, only 25.9 per cent of KMT supporters and only 33.5 per cent of DPP supporters cast their ballots on the basis of “issues.” 52 In the 1989 legislative election, 54.5 per cent cast ballots because “the candidate him/herself was very suitable.” Only 18.4 per cent cast their ballots because they “approved the opinions or views of the candidate,” while only 6.5 per cent cast ballots on the basis of “supporting or disliking a particular political party.”53 These statistics suggest that the DPP declaration of support for Taiwan Independence had little to do with the final National Assembly election results. However, irrespective of its importance in the election results, the DPP’s public advocacy of Taiwan Independence in the campaign broke the last taboo limiting freedom of speech. As discussed below, formal removal of this taboo occurred within six months.

The Second Set of Constitutional Amendments, May 27, 1992

On May 27, 1992, the recently-elected National Assembly approved a further eight constitutional amendments (Amendments 11–18) which

52 Fu Hu, “The Electoral Mechanism and Political Change in Taiwan,” in In the Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949, ed. Steve Tsang (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1993), p. 163. 53 Hu Fu 胡佛 et al., Xuanmin de toupiao xingwei: min’guo qishiba nian zeng’e lifa weiyuan xuanju de fenxi 選民的投票行爲：民國七十八年增額立法委員選舉的分析 [The Voting Behavior of the Electorate: Analyzing the 1989 Additional Election to the Legis- lature] (Taibei 台北: Zhongyang xuanju weiyuanhui 中央選舉委員會 [Central Election Commission], 1993), p. 121 (Table 5.4). 82 chapter three helped in the democratization process.54 Most importantly, Amendment 12 stated that from 1996, “the President and Vice President shall be elected by the entire electorate in the free area of the Republic of China.” However, this amendment still did not made clear whether this vote would be by popular election or by a more indirect means. The National Assembly stated that the decision over the new electoral method would take place in “an extraordinary session of the National Assembly to be convoked by the President before May 20, 1995.” In fact, political leaders in Taiwan very rapidly came to support the popular election of the President and did not wait until 1995 before making the final decision. In addition, beginning in 1996, the terms of the President and Vice-President were shortened from six to four years. Amendments 13–15 revised the procedures for the appointment of members to the Judicial Branch (yuan), the Examination Branch and the Control Branch of government and stated that certain articles in the original Constitution “shall not apply.” The greatest changes took place in the Control Branch, which was no longer elected by provincial-level assemblies, but was chosen by the president with the consent of the National Assembly. In addition, membership of the Control Branch was to be limited to twenty-nine members “who must be beyond party affiliation and independently exercise their powers and discharge their responsibilities in accordance with the law.” Amendment 17 also democratized Taiwan by declaring that the provincial governor (and the equivalent mayors) “shall be elected by the people of the province…” The KMT authoritarian regime had never elected provincial governors, who were called provincial “chairmen” (sheng zhuxi 省主席) rather than provincial governors (sheng zhang 省長) in Chinese, though in English the convention was to call the incumbent a provincial “governor.” On July 1, 1967 the Central Government raised Taipei Municipality from a county-level municipality to a provincial-level municipality precisely in order to eliminate the popular election of the mayor. Amendment 18 inaugurated “universal health insurance coverage,” promoted women’s rights and eliminated sexual discrimination, safe- guarded the rights of the handicapped and disabled, strengthened the rights of aborigines in Taiwan and encouraged the development of

54 For the second set of constitutional amendments, see The Republic of China Year- book 1993 pp. 729–731. the lee teng-hui presidency to early 1996 83

science and technology, the modernization of agriculture and fishing, and the promotion of environmental and ecological protection.

The Amendment of Article 100 and the Diminution of Key Military and Security Agencies

Article 100 of the Criminal Code defined the Crime of Insurrection (nei luanzui 内亂罪).55 Until the Legislature amended Article 100 on May 15, 1992, people could be charged with the Crime of Insurrection simply for advocating an idea or non-violent action. Thus, until Article 100 was amended, advocating Taiwan Independence brought severe penalties. The movement to abolish Article 100 began in early 1990 with the Wild Lily demonstrations as well as the movement opposing Hau Pei-tsun as Premier. The arrest and imprisonment of Huang Hua 黃華 in November 1990 and the founding of the Taiwan Association of University Professors in December 1990 accelerated the movement. On August 30 and September 2, 1991, two Taiwanese advocates of an independent Taiwan were arrested as they returned from the United States. These imprison- ments increased the scale of the demonstrations. Ultimately, the legislature amended rather than abolished Article 100. No longer could one be charged with simply “plotting” (yinmou 陰謀). Now one had to use “violence or coercion” (qiangbao, xiepo 強暴, 脅迫). As a result, with the amendment of Article 100, non-violent advocacy of Taiwan Independence was no longer illegal. Soon, more than ten persons who had been arrested for advocating Taiwan Independence in the past year were released.56 In the middle of 1992 the government took several steps that restricted the power of the security agencies. First, on June 16, 1992 the Legislature terminated the principal functions of the Second Personnel Office (ren er 人二), which the Bureau of Investigation had established in all government offices as well as all government-owned enterprises. The 4,000 agents in the Second Personnel Office kept files on the loyalty of all employees and had a major role in determining promotions. The

55 For the text of Article 100, see Tao Baichuan 陶百川, ed., Zuixin liufa quanshu 最新六法全書 [The Most Recent Complete Six Law Codes] (Taibei: Sanmin shuju 三民書局, 1980), p. 287. 56 Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai II, pp. 144–149. In English, see Julian Baum, “Easing up, somewhat: The KMT government revises sedition law,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 21, May 28, 1992, pp. 18, 20. 84 chapter three

legislation decreed that all such files be destroyed and that the Second Personnel Office “no longer have anything to do with checking on the ideology of others.”57 Then, on July 31, 1992 the government abolished the Taiwan Garrison Command, one of the most powerful and feared of the security agencies under the Kuomintang dictatorship. In addition, President Lee Teng-hui had earlier appointed Admiral Liu Ho-chien 劉和謙 as Chief of the General Staff on November 20, 1991,58 the first time a non-army person had been appointed to this most senior military position. Admiral Liu’s appointment undercut the influence of Premier Hau Pei-tsun, formerly an important Army leader, and announced that the Navy and Air Force had a new priority over the army. All of these measures greatly diminished the authority of the military and security agencies.

The December 19, 1992 Legislative Election and the Subsequent Political Fallout 59

Taiwan’s voters went to the polls on December 19, 1992 and elected the first legislature chosen only by Taiwan’s voters. The electoral process went back at least to July when both parties began their nominating processes. In the KMT there were several conflicts. The most fundamental conflict pitted the Mainstream followers of President and Party Chairman Lee Teng-hui against the Anti-Mainstream that followed Premier Hau Pei-tsun and other Mainlanders. The Mainstream included the Wisdom Club (jisi hui 集思會), which about thirty Taiwan-centric members of the previous legislature had formed. The Wisdom Club, like the DPP, attacked Premier Hau quite vigorously. The Anti-Mainstream consisted primarily of Mainlanders who had a very strong China focus. In the legislature, these included the New KMT Alliance, which had been formed on May 11, 1990. In the KMT itself, the

57 Taiwan lishi nianbiao V, p. 266. See also Alice Lee, “‘Loyalty’ dossiers to be destroyed,” The China News, p. 3. The quote is from the Minister of Justice, ibid. 58 Taiwan lishi nianbiao V, p. 214. Some sources date Liu’s appointment in the first half of 1992. 59 Unfortunately, I did not obtain a visa to observe this election. At the time I took extensive notes from two overseas newspapers, Zili zhoubao (Haiwaiban) 自立周報（海外版）[Independence Weekly Post (Overseas Edition)] and Zhongyang ribao (Guojiban) 中央日報（國際版）[Central Daily News (International Edition)]. I also had several telephone interviews with people in Taiwan during December 1992 and February 1993. the lee teng-hui presidency to early 1996 85 special Huang Fu-hsing 黃復興 Party Branches of retired servicemen also proved very supportive of the Anti-Mainstream. The Huang Fu-hsing party branches had some 240,000 members and controlled perhaps 700,000 votes in the military villages where many military and retired military resided. With military and military dependent votes, the Huang Fu-hsing could control perhaps a million votes. In many ways, with its independent procedures, the Huang Fu-hsing party branches formed a “party within the party.”60 They had sufficient strength to elect at least one legislator in Taipei Municipality, Taipei County, Taoyuan County, Taichung County, Tainan County, Kaohsiung Municipality, and Kao hsiung County.61 In the end, the KMT nominated 98 persons of the 245 who registered with the party. Of these, 46 nominees were incumbents.62 Taiwanese accounted for 77 nominees, while 21 were Mainlanders. In general, the nominating process gave the Huang Fu-hsing party branches a great victory, while the Wisdom Club lost badly. In addition, the KMT nominated many very wealthy “Golden Oxen” (jinniu 金牛).63 One might argue that Lee Teng-hui was happy to nominate these Taiwanese “Golden Oxen” to fight the Anti-Mainstream, but he has never admitted this and the rich “Golden Oxen” gave the KMT a bad odor. In their campaigns, several candidates spent well more than NT$100,000,000 (US$4,000,000),64 much more than the official limit of NT$7,000,000 (US$280,000) imposed by the Central Election Commission.65 The DPP ran party primaries, but in the end tried to resolve some conflicts with different methods. For example, in complicated Taipei County eight candidates wanted to run, so the DPP made no nominations. However, they made all of the candidates sign a statement that anyone who lost would not be allowed to run for any office for five years. Similarly, they had planned to nominate a Hakka in Miaoli County, but a Hokkien

60 Xie Zhongliang 謝忠良, “Liangge lüse da jiazu diyi ci yao nao fenjia 兩個綠色大家族第一次要閙分家 [The First Time the Two Great Khaki Clans Want to Divide the Fam- ily] “ Xin xinwen 新新聞 [The Journalist], 299, November 28-December 4, 1992, p. 35. 61 Ibid., p. 36. 62 Of the 71 incumbents, 64 registered for the KMT nominations and only 46 (72 per cent) received a nomination. 63 Zili zhoubao, August 21, 1992, p. 3; Zili zhoubao, September 25, 1992, p. 13. 64 At the end of 1992, the exchange rate was about US$1=NT$25. 65 “Mujuan maidi bi caili, yi yi er yi mai quanli 募捐賣地比財力，一意二億買權力 [Getting Donations and Selling Land to Compare Financial Strength, Using One or Two Hundred Million to Buy Power],” Xin Xinwen 新新聞 [The Journalist], 299, November 28-December 4, 1992, pp. 66–76. For the NT$7,000,000 official limit, see ibid., p. 73. 86 chapter three member also wanted to run, so they allowed a free election. Thirteen of the candidates had strong links to the Kaohsiung Incident case including ten former prisoners and three lawyers.66 Ultimately, 406 people ran for the 161 legislative positions. Of these the KMT recommended 125 (the 98 nominees and 27 whom it permitted to run), while the DPP recommended 59 candidates. The 125 non-partisans included 45 KMT members and 6 DPP members who ran without party permission.67 In the district campaigns, the KMT obtained about 53 per cent of the vote while the DPP received about 31 per cent. In terms of seats, the KMT obtained 96 seats, the DPP 50 seats and non-partisans 15 seats. At the time, most people saw this result as a DPP “victory” and certainly the DPP did much better than in the 1991 National Assembly election. According to a leading DPP functionary, in 1992 the DPP no longer talked about the abstract formula of Taiwan Independence. Rather the party focused on three public policy issues: direct election of the president, a tax cut, and opposition to money politics. Yet, Taiwan’s future did play a part in the campaign. One cartoon shows Premier Hao looking at a sign that says “Tai Zhong” (台中). Angrily, he shouts, “Tear it down, tear it down! We most definitely will not allow One Taiwan and One China.” The second person says, “I need to report to the Premier: that is the sign for Taichung station.”68 Within the KMT, the Wisdom Club did badly with most of its leaders losing the election. At most, they had about ten adherents after the election. The New KMT Alliance did better. Most of its members won re-election and several KMT nominees who were close to the New KMT Alliance also won election. In addition, the Huang Fu-hsing party branches helped several candidates win. These Anti-Mainstream candidates won perhaps twenty seats. The largest grouping, the local faction members and the “Golden Oxen,” altogether won over forty seats and this group ultimately gave its support to the Mainstream.69 In the words of a KMT leader, most supported President Lee and were happy to have a Taiwanese president after being led by Mainlanders for such a long time.

66 For details, see “Si dalao meili bujian, Meilidao fengyun zaixian 四大老魅力不減，美麗島風雲再現 [The Glamor of the Four Seniors is Not Reduced, the Melidao Winds Reappear],” Xin xinwen 新新聞 [The Journalist], 300, December 6–12, 1992, pp. 56–61. A good table appears in ibid., p. 59 67 Zili zhoubao, November 27, 1992, p. 1; Zhongyang ribao, November 21, 1992, p. 1. 68 Zili zhoubao, December 25, 1992, p. 12. 69 Based on a post-election analysis that the author did with Dr J.J. Chu. the lee teng-hui presidency to early 1996 87

In the aftermath of the Legislative election, two key battles broke out: (1) the election of the Speaker and Deputy Speaker and (2) the question of whether or not Premier Hau Pei-tsun would continue in office or be replaced. Both of these battles pitted the Mainstream against the Anti- Mainstream. In the Speaker election, a “Golden Ox” was elected. DPP sources said that during the legislative election campaign Liu Sung-pan 劉松藩, the incumbent Deputy Speaker, gave NT$600,000 (US$24,000) to each KMT candidate who had a chance of being elected. In addition, in the Speaker election, he paid each legislator NT$10,000,000 (US$400,000) for his or her vote.70 Clearly, his election as Speaker on February 1, 1993 cost many millions of dollars. Wang Jin-pyng 王金平 won election as Deputy Speaker. The Speaker and Deputy Speaker elections suggested that the local factional leaders and the “golden oxen” generally joined the Mainstream, giving the Mainstream some 60 votes compared to the approximately 35 votes of the Anti-Mainstream among the KMT legislators.71 At this time, the legislature had to approve the appointment of the Premier. Premier Hau Pei-tsun clearly wanted to continue in his position. The divisions within the KMT gave him some hope, though he knew that the 50 DPP members would vote against him. Premier Hau and President Lee had repeated meetings. One important issue in their meetings and in the KMT leadership was should the cabinet resign en masse prior to the commencement of the new legislature? At meetings on January 18 and 19, 1993, President Lee told Premier Hau he wanted the issue to go to the KMT Central Standing Committee on January 20. Lee and Hau again met on January 25 and the issue still remained unsolved. The Central Standing Committee still had not discussed the issue at its delayed meeting on January 29.72 Finally, on the morning of January 30, just before the new legislature convened, Premier Hau wrote a letter of resignation to the KMT’s Central Committee. In his letter, Hau stressed both the achievements of his two years and eight months in office as well as the right of the president to nominate and the right of the legislature to approve the new premier. Thus, he would resign following the approval of the KMT’s Central

70 Zili zhoubao, January 29, 1993, p. 3. 71 Zili zhoubao, February 5, 1993, pp. 1–4; Zhongyang ribao, January 30, 1993, pp. 1–2. 72 Zhongyang ribao, January 20, 1993, p. 1; January 21, pp. 1–2; January 28, p. 1, January 30, p. 1. 88 chapter three

Standing Committee,73 which happened at the meeting of February 3.74 A couple of years later, Hau Pei-tsun said that he had been urged to carry out a military coup d’etat, but that he had rejected such advice. Clearly, with Hau’s resignation, Taiwan’s democracy advanced a significant step. Premier Hau clearly emphasized a China perspective for Taiwan’s future. At an earlier National Assembly meeting, Hau was surrounded by DPP National Assemblymen, who shouted, “Hao Pei-tsun, resign!” Hau raised both arms and shouted back, “Long Live the Republic of China! Destroy Taiwan Independence!”75 An excellent cartoon at the time pic- tured President Lee and Premier Hau during one of their meetings. President Lee said to Premier Hau, “In order to have a generational transfer of power, the next premier must be middle-aged.” Premier Hau responded, “I am middle-aged.” President Lee asked, “What year were you born?” Premier Hau responded, “I am middle (zhong 中) aged. I belong to the generation born in China (zhong中).”76 Once Premier Hau had resigned, conflict then arose over who would succeed him. The Mainlanders clearly wanted a Mainlander to continue to hold the premiership, but the tide was turning and ultimately the three final candidates were all Taiwanese, though Chiu Chuang-huan 邱創煥, a former Vice-Premier (1981–1984) and Governor of Taiwan Province (1984–1990), was always a dark horse. The Anti-Mainstream pushed hard for Lin Yang-kang, their candidate for president in 1990. In 1987 President Chiang Ching-kuo had appointed Lin as head of the Judicial Branch and Lin had contributed to Taiwan’s democratization through his leadership in Constitutional Interpretation No. 261, which threw out the “old thieves” from the central parliamentary organs. But Lin Yang-kang and President Lee Teng-hui had a very competitive relationship and President Lee did not trust Lin. The third Taiwanese candidate for the premiership was Lien Chan 連戰. Lien’s grandfather, Lien Heng 連橫 (or Lien Ya-tang 連雅堂), wrote the famous General History of Taiwan (Taiwan tongshi 臺灣通史), originally published in 1920 and 1921.77 Lien’s father, Lien Chen-tung 連震東, was an important “Half-Mainlander” (banshan 半山) Taiwanese who went to work with the Nationalists in China when Taiwan was under

73 Zhongyang ribao, January 31, 1993, p. 1. 74 Zhongyang ribao, February 4, 1993, p. 1 75 Zili zhoubao, February 12, 1993, p. 3. 76 Zili zhoubao, January 29, 1993, p. 18. 77 Shu-hui Wu, “Lien Heng (1878–1936) and the General History of Taiwan,” Journal of Third World Studies, 21, no. 1 (Spring 2004), pp. 17, . the lee teng-hui presidency to early 1996 89

Japanese colonial rule. After World War II, Lien Chen-tung returned to Taiwan and was the only Taiwanese member of the KMT’s Central Reform Committee (1950–1952) and the first Taiwanese cabinet minister (1960).78 With this background and with his tremendous wealth, Lien Chan clearly belonged to the “aristocracy” of Taiwan. After graduating from National Taiwan University, he completed his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees at the University of Chicago. He then taught three years in the United States before returning to National Taiwan University where he became Chairman of the Department of Political Science after one year. In 1975 he became the first Taiwanese ambassador (to El Salvador) and then held a series of important positions in the KMT. After serving as Minister of Communications (1981–1987), Lien became Vice-Premier (1987–1988). In 1988 President Lee Teng-hui appointed him the first Taiwanese Minister of Foreign Affairs. In 1990, he became Governor of Taiwan. At present, many people consider Lien Chan a Chinese. He was born in Xi’an in 1936, had a Chinese mother and a Mainlander Chinese wife, and, most importantly, behaves as a Chinese. But at this time, Lien Chan was considered a Taiwanese and the Mainlander leaders of the Anti-Main stream strongly opposed Lien Chan becoming the first Taiwanese premier. After Premier Hau and his cabinet resigned, President Lee saw eight groups of legislators in order to canvass their opinions about the next premier.79 Then, on the morning of February 8, 1993 President Lee met fifteen members of the Central Standing Committee in two groups at the Presidential Office. President Lee told the members that he intended to nominate his candidate for premier at the meeting of the Central Standing Committee on February 10. The Central Standing Committee members spoke in order of seniority. Lee Huan, who led the charge, said that Lin Yang-kang was the most suitable appointment. Shen Chang-huan 沈昌煥 wanted a secret ballot (which could go against President Lee). Hau Pei- tsun said that he had recommended Lin Yang-kang, but that Lien Chan was also suitable. “But Lien Chan has been Provincial Governor for only two years. Should he not complete another six years! Let Lin Yang-kang be the next Premier and when Lien Chan has finished his term as Provincial Governor, it will not be too late to have him be Premier.” According to the report, the atmosphere was very strange and abnormal. But Lee Huan and Hau Pei-tsun had said that Lien Chan was not suitable

78 Jacobs, “Taiwanese and the Chinese Nationalists,” pp. 87, 91, 105, 109, 111. 79 Zili zhoubao, February 12, 1993, pp. 1, 3. 90 chapter three for the premiership now.80 Lee then nominated Lien and the Central Standing Committee approved his nomination at the meeting of February 10.81 President Lee announced Lien’s appointment on February 23 and the legislature approved the appointment the same day.82 A cartoon nicely summarized the conflict over the premiership. President Lee, a horseback rider, has a choice of four horses. The two large ones are labeled Hau Pei-tsun and Lin Yang-kang, while two smaller horses are labeled Vice-President Li Yuan-zu and Lien Chan. President Lee takes his saddle from Premier Hau and says, “I think riding this mini- horse that I raised myself is safer.”83 The Lien Chan cabinet had six Taiwanese members including the first Taiwanese premier and the first Taiwanese Minister of Education, Kuo Wei-fan 郭為藩, who was committed to the teaching of Taiwan and who helped the development of the Knowing Taiwan (Renshi Taiwan 認識臺灣) series of textbooks.84 In addition, on March 13, 1993 Hsu Shui-teh 許水德 became the first Taiwanese KMT Secretary-General.85 Hsu, a native of Kaohsiung, had served in a variety of posts in Kaohsiung and the Taiwan Provincial Government before being appointed Mayor of Kaohsiung (1982–1985), Mayor of Taipei (1985–1988), Minister of the Interior (1988–1991) and Representative to Japan (1991–1993). As KMT Secretary-General, Hsu brought many Taiwanese into key Central Party Headquarters posts, allowed the use of Hokkien in the Central Party Headquarters, and gave the Central Party Headquarters a new informal- ity that generated a much friendlier atmosphere. However, no Taiwanese had yet held the posts of Minister of National Defense or any key security positions such as Director of the National Security Bureau or the Bureau of Investigation.

80 Zhou Jingwen and Zhang Mingxian, Zili zhoubao, February 12, 1993, p. 3. 81 Taiwan lishi nianbiao V, p. 330. 82 Ibid., p. 332. 83 Zili zhoubao, January 29, 1993, p. 2. 84 On the background and controversy related to these texts, see Fu-chang Wang, "Why Bother about School Textbooks?: An Analysis of the Origin of the Disputes over Renshi Taiwan School Textbooks in 1997,” in Cultural, Ethnic, and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan: Bentuhua, ed. John Makeham and A-Chin Hsiau (New York: Pal- grave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 55–99. 85 Taiwan lishi nianbiao V, p. 336. the lee teng-hui presidency to early 1996 91

The Founding of the New Party

These political decisions clearly indicated that the KMT was beginning to appoint more Taiwanese to senior positions. On February 11, 1993, the Mainlander-dominated New KMT Alliance called a “National Affairs Explanation Meeting (kuoshi shuoming hui 國是説明會) where they attacked Lee Teng-hui and the KMT Center.86 A month later, on March 13, the New KMT Alliance formally announced that they had formed a group, which advocated “Drive Out Taiwan Independence, Overturn Dictatorship, Knock Down the Power of Wealth, Equalize Land Rights (quzhu Taidu, tuifan ducai, dadao jinquan. pingjun diquan 驅逐台獨，推翻獨裁，打倒金權，平均地權).87 At the same time, the New KMT Alliance started a new magazine, the New KMT Review (Xin lianxian tong- sun zazhi 新連線通訊雜誌), that began with a free “trial issue (shikan 試刊) in March and began regular monthly issues in May. On August 10, 1993, the New KMT Alliance formally separated from the KMT and established the New Party (xin dang 新黨). Both the “Declara tion of the New Party”88 and the “New Party Constitution”89 stressed the democratic nature of the New Party. Such statements as “The ‘New Party’ Identifies with the Ideals of the Father of the Nation, Mr Sun Yat-sen”90 came only toward the end of the Declaration. In addition to the stress on democracy, the New Party criticized the KMT as “failed, corrupt and engaged in money politics” while it criticized the DPP as “speaking irre- sponsibly and hatefully engaging in provincialism.”91 Various articles in the monthly magazine, which by Issue No. 6 became known as the New Party Magazine (Xindang tongxun zazhi 新黨通訊雜誌), emphasized the importance of having the New Party prevent both the KMT and the DPP from obtaining a majority in the legislature. Like the KMT and the DPP, the New Party too was factionalized. The older Mainlanders stressed the importance of the Great China idea, while the younger leaders emphasized clean democratic politics and social welfare. The high point of the New Party came with the December 2, 1995

86 Ibid., p. 330. 87 Ibid., p. 336. 88 “Xindang xuanyan 新黨宣言 [Declaration of the New Party],” Xindang 新黨 [New Party], 5 [September] 1993, pp. 26–27. 89 “Xindang dangzhang 新黨黨章 [Constitution of the New Party],” Xindang 新黨 [New Party], 5 [September] 1993, pp. 28–29. 90 “Xindang xuanyan,” p. 27. 91 Ibid., p. 28. 92 chapter three legislative election, when we shall discuss the New Party again, but the New Party then began to deteriorate as personality conflicts among its leaders led to exacerbated internal conflict. A food fight among its legislators at a breakfast meeting on February 25, 1997 signaled its final decline.92

The KMT 14th National Congress and the Local Elections of November 1993

Six days after the secession of the New Party, the KMT convened its 14th National Party Congress. For the first time, the KMT elected its Chairman by a secret ballot at the National Party Congress and Lee Teng-hui obtained 1,686 votes or 82.5 per cent of the ballots cast. Through acclama- tion, the KMT elected four vice-chairmen: Vice-President Li Yuan-zu, former premier Hau Pei-tsun, Judicial Branch Head Lin Yang-kang and Premier Lien Chan. Thus, the Party Congress balanced its four chairmen in two ways: two Mainstream and two Anti-Mainstream, and two Mainlanders and two Taiwanese.93 But in the key Central Committee election of August 19, the Anti-Mainstream obtained only one-fifth of the seats.94 On August 23, the newly-elected Central Standing Committee reappointed Hsu Shui-teh as KMT Secretary-General. In the County Executive and mayoral equivalent elections of November 27, 1993, the DPP won only six county executiveships (down from seven in 1989) compared to the KMT’s 15, but the DPP won 41.03 per cent of the vote compared to the KMT’s 47.47 per cent.95 Clearly, the DPP was gaining in the electorate even as it failed to gain seats. Despite these vote gains, the DPP remained weak organizationally.96 In Changhua County, where Chou Ching-yü (Mrs Yao Chia-wen) ran unsuccessfully for re-election as county executive, the DPP did not hold even one county assembly seat. Chou had won in 1989 because the KMT had nominated a criminal whom even the police opposed. That she lost in 1993 was not surprising.

92 See Taiwan press of February 26, 1997. 93 Yu-Shan Wu, “Taiwan in 1993: Attempting a Diplomatic Breakthrough,” Asian Sur- vey, XXXIV, no. 1 (January 1994), pp. 47–48. 94 Taiwan lishi nianbiao V, p. 364. 95 Ibid., p. 376. For the story from a DPP perspective, see Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai II, p. 194–196. 96 Jacobs, Local Politics in Rural Taiwan under Dictatorship and Democracy, pp. 268– 270. the lee teng-hui presidency to early 1996 93

The DPP “loss” led Party Chairman Hsu Hsin-liang to resign that evening. He was replaced by Shih Ming-teh.97

The Third Set of Constitutional Amendments, July 28, 1994

In the discussion of the 1992 constitutional amendments, we noted that the National Assembly was to be recalled prior to May 20, 1995 to decide whether the president would be directly or indirectly elected. In fact, this happened almost a year earlier as Taiwan’s leaders and public opinion consolidated to support the direct election of the president.98 Thus, one of the most important amendments passed by the National Assembly on July 28, 1994 was the direct election of the president (Amendment 2).99 Amendment 8 made clear that the provincial governor (as well as county executives) would also be directly elected by the people. The amendments also established the new formulas to determine the numbers of National Assemblymen (Amendment 1) and Legislators (Amendment 3). Both bodies would have district members according to population in each special municipality, county or municipality, though aboriginal voters remained in separate constituencies that chose aboriginal representatives. In addition, voters also used proportional representation (i.e. a party list) to choose Overseas Chinese representatives and representatives from a nationwide constituency for both bodies. Amendment 1 also ended the current term of the National Assembly on May 19, 1996 and shortened its terms of office to four years beginning in 1996. Amendment 9 significantly changed the official name of Taiwan’s aborigines from “mountain siblings” (shanbao 山胞) to “original inhabit- ant” or “indigenous people” (yuanzhumin 原住民).100 This amendment, which Taiwan’s aboriginal representatives in the Legislature and the National Assembly had long sought, enabled the use of yuanzhumin in government offices and records. It also brought Taiwan into line with the

97 Taiwan lishi nianbiao V, p. 376. 98 For early 1992 public opinion polls of Taiwan’s population and of the KMT Central Standing Committee members with regard to direct or indirect election, see Shao-chuan Leng and Cheng-yi Lin, “Political Change on Taiwan: Transition to Democracy?,” China Quarterly, no. 136 (December 1993), pp. 814–816 (Tables 3–4). 99 For the 1994 constitutional amendments see The Republic of China Yearbook 1996 (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1996), pp. 678–681. 100 Ibid., p. 25. 94 chapter three language used by international organizations concerned with aboriginal and indigenous peoples around the world.101 Amendment 2 also adjusted the powers of the President while Amendments 4, 5, and 6 refined the roles of the Judicial, Examination and Control branches (yuan 院) respectively. Amendment 7 dealt with the remuneration of the Legislature and National Assembly, while the tenth and final 1994 amendment stated, “Rights and obligations between the people of the mainland China area and those of the free area, and the disposition of other related affairs shall be specially regulated by law.”

The Provincial Governor and the Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Elections, December 3, 1994

A DPP slogan declared that the Taiwan gubernatorial and Taipei and Kaohsiung mayoral election of December 3, 1994 was “the first battle in four hundred years for the whole people to stand up and become masters of their own fate.” This slogan was clearly an exaggeration, but the election did help deepen Taiwan’s democratization. For the first time, Taiwan’s voters could elect the chief executive of Taiwan province and the two provincial-level municipalities.102 The new Lien Chan Cabinet had appointed James Soong (Soong Chu-yu 宋楚瑜), the former KMT Secretary-General, as Taiwan Provincial Governor (Chairman, sheng zhuxi 省主席) on February 27, 1993, the very day the cabinet itself was sworn in.103 The KMT then nominated Soong to be the first popularly-elected provincial governor. The DPP nominated Chen Ding-nan, a legislator from Ilan County who had joined the DPP on July 31, 1993.104 The New Party nominated Ju Gau-jeng 朱高正, a legislator

101 In this book, I have continued to use the word “aboriginal” rather than “indigenous” because sometimes the word “indigenous” is also used to refer to those peoples already in Taiwan when the KMT came in 1945 and it is important to maintain a distinction between Taiwan’s aboriginal peoples and the Hokkien and Hakka Taiwanese who came later. Normally, my personal preference is to use the word “indigenous” for the original inhabitants. 102 For the slogan, see Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai II, p. 211. For the DPP perspective, see Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai II, pp. 207–214. For the provincial governor election statistics, see Central Election Commission websites http://210.69.23.140/cec/vote3.asp?pass1=D1994062000000 00aaa and http://210.69.23.140/cec/%5Cpdf%5CD1994625.pdf. For the Taipei and Kaoh- siung electoral statistics, see http://210.69.23.140/cec/vote3.asp?pass1=D1994063000000 00aaa and http://210.69.23.140/cec/vote3.asp?pass1=D199406400000000aaa. 103 Taiwan lishi nianbiao V, p. 334. 104 Ibid., p. 362. the lee teng-hui presidency to early 1996 95 from Yunlin County who had previously belonged to the DPP in the late 1980s and who had founded the China Social Democratic Party in 1991. Two non-partisans, who had formerly belonged to the KMT but were kicked out of the KMT for “running against party discipline,” also ran.105 In preparing for the election, James Soong learned a fair amount of Hokkien. He also benefited as the incumbent, who had given funds for construction on local projects, and from television stations frequently broadcasting pictures of him in Taiwan temples during the campaign. James Soong won handily with 56.22 per cent of the vote and over fifty per cent of the vote in every county and municipality except Chen Ding- nan’s native Ilan. Chen followed with 38.72 per cent of the vote. Ju obtained only 4.31 per cent, an indication that the New Party would have a difficult time gaining votes outside of Taipei, Kaohsiung and a few centers where Mainlanders had congregated. The two other candidates each obtained less than 0.5 per cent. Interviews suggested that no vote-buying occurred in the gubernatorial election, though it most certainly occurred in the simultaneous provincial assembly election. In the Taipei mayoral election, the incumbent, who had originally been appointed in 1990, Huang Ta-chou 黃大洲, gained the KMT nomination. Chen Shui-bian, a legislator since 1989, won the DPP nomination, while the New Party nominated Jaw Shau-kong 趙少康, who had previously worked in the KMT Party Headquarters, served as Chief of the Environmental Protection Agency, a cabinet-level position in 1991–1992, and had won election to the legislature in 1992. Because of the KMT-New Party split, Chen Shui-bian won the mayoral election with 43.67 per cent of the vote. His success as Taipei mayor launched his successful presidential campaign in 2000, where he also won against divided opposition. Jaw Shau-kong demonstrated New Party strength in Taipei, especially against listless KMT opposition. Jaw won 30.17 per cent of the vote, while Huang obtained only 25.89 per cent. Thus, the KMT suffered a huge defeat in Taipei. In Kaohsiung, Wu Den-yih 吳敦義 had been appointed mayor in 1990 and now ran as the KMT nominee. His opposition included Chang Chun- hsiung, a legislator first elected in 1983, who obtained the DPP nomination; Tang A-ken 湯阿根, the New Party nominee; and two non-partisans. Wu Den-yih won with 54.46 per cent of the vote, while Chang trailed with

105 Ibid., p. 454. One of these, Wu Tzyy 吳梓, a KMT legislator from 1984 until he lost in 1992 and a leader of the Wisdom Club, ultimately supported Chen Ding-nan five days before the election, see Taiwan lishi nianbiao V, p. 464. 96 chapter three

39.29 per cent. The New Party nominee obtained only 3.45 per cent while the remaining two candidates got less than two per cent each. The KMT maintained a majority in the simultaneous Taiwan Provincial Assembly and Kaohsiung City Council elections. Only in Taipei did the new Council meet the New Party’s goal of no party obtaining a majority of seats. (See Table 3.2.) There, the KMT obtained 38 per cent, the DPP 35 per cent and the New Party 21 per cent of the seats. In the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, the New Party won both of its seats in Taipei County, which has areas with heavy concentrations of Mainlander residents. The New Party nominated predominately Mainlanders. For the Taipei City Council, they nominated twelve Mainlanders and only three Taiwanese; ten of the eleven successful candidates were Mainlanders. In Kaohsiung Municipality, all five nominees were Mainlanders. For the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, the New Party nominated one Mainlander and two Taiwanese with the one Mainlander and one of the Taiwanese successful. 106

Table 3.2. Seats obtained by parties in December 3, 1994 Provincial Assembly/ City Council Elections106 KMT DPP New Non- Total Party Partisans Seats Taiwan Provincial Assembly 48 23 2 6 79 Taipei City Council 20 18 11 3 52 Kaohsiung City Council 23 11 2 8 44

The December 2, 1995 Legislative Election and the Structure of the Electorate

In many ways, the December 2, 1995 legislative election was a great loss for the KMT and a huge victory for the New Party. The KMT won 85 of the 164 seats, a narrow majority of less than 52 per cent of the seats, but they only obtained 46.06 per cent of the vote. The DPP won 54 seats with 33.17 per cent of the vote, while the New Party obtained 21 seats with 12.95 per cent of the vote. Non-partisans obtained four seats with 7.82 per cent of the vote.

106 Data from Central Election Commission Websites: http://210.69.23.140/cec/%5C pdf%5CE1994626.pdf, http://210.69.23.140/cec/%5Cpdf%5CE1994636.pdf, and http://210. 69.23.140/cec/%5Cpdf%5CE1994646.pdf. the lee teng-hui presidency to early 1996 97

Compared with the 1992 legislative election, the KMT dropped ten seats and seven per cent in the vote, while the DPP increased three seats and more than two per cent of the vote. The New Party, which had not been established in 1992, originally had seven seats from KMT defectors, but the 1995 election tripled their representation. Non-partisans declined from fifteen seats to four and their vote was halved from almost sixteen per cent to under eight per cent.107 As previously, the New Party won primarily in urban areas and in areas where Mainlanders are concentrated. Thus, it won six of eighteen seats in Taipei Municipality, more than the KMT’s four—though it received fewer votes than the KMT. (In Taipei Municipality, the DPP won eight seats.) In Kaohsiung Municipality the New Party won two of eleven seats and in Taipei County three of fifteen seats. The New Party also won two of eight seats in Taoyuan County, one of seven seats in Taichung County, one of four seats in Taichung Municipality, one of six seats in Kaohsiung County as well as four seats in the party list section and one seat for an Overseas Chinese legislator. For the KMT, one of the important innovations of December 1995 legislative election (and the March 1996 National Assembly election) was the decision to have previously appointed officials run for office. This was to force appointed officials to have to deal with the electorate and to break down the gap between government and citizens. Thus, in the legislative election, Vincent Siew 蕭萬長, who became Minister of Economics in 1990, Chairman of the Council for Economic Planning and Development in 1993, and Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Commission in 1994, ran for the legislature in December 1995. He won, though he resigned from the legislature to become Premier in 1997. Similarly, Frederick Chien (Chien Fu 錢復) and Jason Hu 胡志強, two prominent Mainlander officials, had to run for National Assembly in the March 23, 1996 election, though, as members of the National Assembly, neither had to resign their bureaucratic positions once elected. Frederick Chien became Speaker of the new National Assembly, while Jason Hu became the Taiwan representative in the United States and later Minister of Foreign Affairs. The 1995 legislative election was the highpoint of New Party success. On election eve, the writer had the opportunity to observe a New Party rally. The atmosphere was festive and twenty-three couples had just been married in a joint marriage ceremony (lianhe hunli 聯合婚禮) sponsored

107 For the election results, I have used the Taiwan press, December 3, 1995 and Heibai xinwen zhoukan 黑白新聞周刊 [Taiwan Weekly], December 4–12, 1995. 98 chapter three by the New Party. (The New Party sponsored several joint marriage ceremonies.) Basically the crowd was good natured and friendly. The two comperes, one male and one female, used both Mandarin and Hokkien. Some older women near me complained as they wanted Mandarin spoken and most of the speakers did use mainly Mandarin. People in the crowd stressed that the key New Party platform planks were democracy and honest government. Unification was only a long-term goal and at present the status quo should be maintained. One candidate and New Party leader pointed to the tripods holding up the TV cameras and said they provide stability for the cameras. She also noted that tripods for vessels in front of temples are stable. She compared the stability of tripods with the New Party slogan, “None of the three parties should have a majority” (san dang bu guo ban 三黨不過半), and urged Taiwan’s voters to provide such stability in the new legislature. The rally emphasized the high education levels of the New Party candidates. Most attacks were directed at Lee Teng-hui rather than at the DPP. The New Party supporters were very impressed with their own image. They noted that they did not wear sandals and did not chew betel nuts, unlike many of the Taiwanese who supported the DPP. After a campaign rally they cleaned up the space. Naturally, many DPP supporters took offense at such stereotypical characterizations. One Taiwanese academic friend, who later held a high position in government, compared the New Party with the Whites in apartheid South Africa with the divisions in the New Party similar to the divisions between the Boers and British among South African whites. Carrying on the analogy, he compared the Hakka in Taiwan to the Indians in South Africa. A week after the election, the DPP released several polls that gave important insights into the electorate and some unexpected information on New Party supporters.108 Most importantly, especially in view of the New Party’s policies, 50.4 per cent of New Party voters were Hokkien Taiwanese while another 12.4 per cent were Hakka. Only 37.4 per cent of New Party voters were Mainlanders. (See Table 3.3.) While, the proportion of Mainlanders voting for the New Party was in fact much greater than for the KMT and DPP, the proportion of Taiwanese voting for the New Party was surprising. Because the KMT received 3.5 times the votes

108 These DPP polls are the source for Tables 3.3–3.8 below. The primary speaker was Professor Michael You (You Ying-lung 游盈隆), Professor of Political Science at Soochow University and Director of the Election Policy Committee of the DPP Central Party Head- quarters. It is noteworthy that a KMT member in charge of surveys said that the KMT surveys gave similar results. the lee teng-hui presidency to early 1996 99 of the New Party, in fact marginally more Mainlanders voted for the KMT than voted for the New Party.

Table 3.3. Ethnicity and party voting, 1995 KMT DPP New Party Non-Partisan Hokkien Taiwanese 74.2% 85.8% 50.4% 83.2% Hakka Taiwanese 10.5% 10.5% 12.4% 10.3% Mainlanders 14.0% 3.7% 37.2% 6.6% Total 98.7% 100.0% 100.0% 100.1%

In terms of self-identification, however, more New Party voters saw themselves as Chinese, while fewer saw themselves as Taiwanese. The contrast with the DPP is stark. The KMT was in the middle. (See Table 3.4.)

Table 3.4. Ethnic self-identification and party voting, 1995 KMT DPP New Party Non-Partisan Taiwanese 28.1% 55.2% 8.7% 26.1% Chinese 38.3% 20.3% 55.4% 32.3% Both 29.2% 21.5% 32.4% 28.5% Do not know 4.5% 2.9% 3.6% 13.1% Total 100.1% 99.9% 100.1% 100.0%

The DPP polls showed that the New Party voters were also relatively young, highly educated, professionals and white-collars workers. While the DPP polls did not demonstrate this, New Party voters were also clearly urban. In terms of age, almost seventy per cent of New Party voters were aged from 20–39. In contrast, the KMT has a much more even spread among the various age groups. The DPP voters tended to be young, but not as young as the New Party voters. The poll accords with a New Party interviewee who suggested that first generation Mainlanders tended to vote for the KMT and that many of the Mainlanders who supported the New Party were actually younger second-generation Mainlanders. (See Table 3.5.) In terms of education, 87.5 per cent of New Party voters had achieved a senior secondary or higher level with over half of the voters having a college or university education. In contrast, only about thirty per cent of KMT and DPP voters had college or university educations. At the other end of the scale, 4.5 per cent of New Party voters had only primary school 100 chapter three

Table 3.5. Age and party voting, 1995 Age KMT DPP New Party Non-Partisan 20–29 19.6% 32.2% 32.3% 40.1% 30–39 28.5% 29.4% 37.4% 20.0% 40–49 19.7% 18.8% 18.6% 13.2% 50–59 14.2% 11.1% 4.5% 15.4% 60 and over 18.0% 8.6% 7.2% 11.4% Total 100.0% 100.1% 100.0% 100.1%

Table 3.6. Education and party voting, 1995 Educational Level KMT DPP New Party Non-Partisan Primary or less 27.3% 19.3% 4.5% 14.6% Junior Secondary 13.5% 14.5% 8.0% 15.0% Senior Secondary 31.3% 34.5% 34.2% 33.9% College or University 17.4% 15.7% 27.1% 20.9% Graduate School 10.5% 16.0% 26.2% 15.6% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% educations compared with 27.3 per cent of KMT voters and 19.3 per cent of DPP voters. (See Table 3.6.) This, of course, partially correlates with age as older voters had fewer educational opportunities than younger voters, but the contrasts between the parties are still striking. The proportion of New Party voters from professional and white-collar backgrounds was also very high with over fifty per cent from these two categories, two categories which accounted for only thirty per cent of those surveyed. In contrast, the numbers of farmers and workers who voted for the New Party was lower than for the KMT and the DPP. (See Table 3.7). However, if we work across the tables for each category, we find that a much larger proportion in the military/civil service/education category voted for the KMT than for the New Party, while more professionals voted for the DPP than for either the KMT or the New Party. (See Table 3.8.) the lee teng-hui presidency to early 1996 101

Table 3.7. Employment and party voting, 1995 Employment KMT DPP New Party Non-Partisan Farmers 5.8% 5.6% 1.1% 0.0% Workers 8.9% 12.1% 7.0% 11.6% White-collar workers 19.2% 18.8% 23.8% 24.1% Professionals 9.3% 19.5% 26.3% 13.3% Military/Civil Service/ Education 7.8% 5.5% 9.8% 3.8% Self-employed/entrpreneurs 13.9% 17.9% 13.3% 19.5% Home Management/ Unemployed/Retired 35.1% 20.5% 18.7% 27.8% Total 100.0% 99.9% 100.0% 100.1%

Table 3.8. Party voting among professionals and military/civil service/education voters, 1995 KMT DPP New Non- No Total Party Partisan Answer Professionals 27.2% 36.6% 27.7% 3.7% 4.8% 100.0% Military/Civil Service/Education 43.3% 19.6% 19.6% 2.0% 15.5% 100.0%

As noted earlier, the high point for the New Party came with the December 2, 1995 legislative election. After this, the New Party began to deteriorate as personality conflicts among its leaders led to exacerbated internal conflict. A food fight among its legislators at a breakfast meeting on February 25, 1997 signaled its final decline.109 While the New Party continued to exist, it became very small with very few elected party representatives. When, after the 2000 presidential election, a new political party with substantial Mainlander support emerged from the KMT, it was not the New Party, but the People First Party of James Soong.

109 See Taiwan press of February 26, 1997. 102 chapter three

The Election of the Legislative Speaker and the Establishment of the Cabinet Level Council of Aboriginal Affairs

With the KMT winning a slim majority of 85 seats in the 164 member legislature, the KMT nominee for the post of Speaker should have won easily.110 Yet, the DPP and the New Party had established contact and appeared ready for cooperation. On December 14, 1995, leaders of the DPP and the New Party in the legislature met in the coffee lounge of the Legislature and discussed a “Grand Reconcilation” (da hejie 大和解) and then a “Grand Coalition (da lianhe 大聯合).”111 This type of cross-party discussion was important for it said that political opponents did not have to be mortal enemies, but could be friends who could cooperate despite their differences. On February 1, 1996, the date of the election for Speaker in the new Legislature, the KMT nominee for re-election, Liu Sung-pan, tied with the DPP nominee, Shih Ming-teh. The DPP and the New Party had clearly cooperated. But, together these two parties only had 75 seats and even with all of the non-partisans, they only controlled 79 seats. Something else had happened: the aboriginal legislators had gotten together. At this time, Taiwan had seven aboriginal legislators. The aboriginal electorates chose six legislators, of whom five belonged to the KMT while one was a non-partisan. A DPP aboriginal legislator had won his seat in the party list election. Three of the seven had won re-election, while four were new members. On January 16, 1996, two weeks before the election of the Speaker, the seven aboriginal legislators met and had a preliminary discussion in Taichung. Then, on January 31, 1996, the day before the election of the Speaker, they had an intense (jilie 激烈) discussion in Taipei that resulted in five decisions:

1. They wanted a separate cabinet-level Council of Aboriginal Affairs (yuanzhumin weiyuanhui 原住民委員會) equivalent to a Ministry. (At this time the Constitution limited the number of Ministries [bu 部] to eight specific ministries.)

110 This section is based primarily on interviews with aboriginal legislators and other participants supplemented by a few newspaper reports published at the time. 111 Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai II, p. 217. the lee teng-hui presidency to early 1996 103

2. They decided to support and get passed an Aboriginal Basic Law (yuanzhumin jiben fa 原住民基本法). This had been pushed in the first and second legislatures, but still had not passed. 3. They decided to support and get passed an Aboriginal Land Law (yuanzhumin tudi fa 原住民土地法). This too had received support in the previous legislature, but still had not passed. 4. They agreed to support an Aboriginal Education Law (yuanzhumin jiaoyu fa 原住民教育法), which at the time was in a draft form. 5. And they agreed to support a Credit Union Law (chuxu huzhushe fa 儲蓄互助社法) as credit unions have proven very important in aboriginal economic development in Taiwan.

The most senior aboriginal legislator, Tsay Chung-han 蔡中涵, a member of the KMT who had just been elected to his fourth term, went to see the DPP and New Party leaders. He said he was pleased with their alliance and said that if both parties would support the five objectives of the aboriginal legislators, he would see that they got all seven votes. Both the DPP and the New Party had agreed to support Shih Ming-teh for Speaker. As Wang Chien-shien 王建煊, the senior New Party member had just withdrawn his presidential candidacy, he did not want to run for Deputy Speaker and the New Party had no other candidate. Tsay stated he would be willing to run for Deputy Speaker and would then join either the DPP or the New Party. Both the DPP and the New Party agreed that this plan was good and did not tell anyone as they did not want news to leak. Tsay also did not tell anyone. Just before the election, Tsay told the other aboriginal legislators of his arrangements and said that the aboriginal legislators would get money for voting for Shih, money that would be important to help repay their heavy campaign expenditures. The first vote for Speaker resulted in an 80–80 tie. One of the senior KMT aboriginal legislators disagreed with Tsay’s strategy. He told his fellow KMT aboriginal legislators that they needed KMT votes to pass the five goals of the aboriginal legislators, so these aboriginal votes came back to the KMT and Liu Sung-pan was re-elected. Tsay then went to each aboriginal legislator before the Deputy Speaker election and asked for support. In fact, his election was something that all of the aboriginal legislators wanted, but there were two problems with Tsay’s candidacy. First, he had thrown his hat into the ring at the very last minute rather than registering his candidacy as all parties required. Second, Tsay stated he had a check in his pocket from a Han businessman 104 chapter three and planned to distribute the money to the aboriginal legislators. However, they responded that Tsay would be a puppet and it would not reflect well on the aboriginal legislators. So the KMT nominee for re-election, Wang Jin-pyng also won re-election in a close race. The good news for the aboriginal legislators and their constituents came later. On February 23, the new legislature had to approve President Lee Teng-hui’s nominee for Premier, Lien Chan. Many people in the KMT were unhappy with Lien, so the election would be very close. On February 18, five aboriginal legislators went to see Lien, who promised to establish the ministerial-level Council of Aboriginal Affairs. Before the approval of the premier on February 23, Lien had to make a report and answer questions in open session. One of the aboriginal legislators who had not attended the meeting of February 18 asked Lien if he would support the establishment of the Council for Aboriginal Affairs. Lien said that he would. The Council for Aboriginal Affairs was formally established in the Cabinet on December 10, 1996.112 Three of the four laws have also been passed: the Credit Union Law on May 6, 1997,113 the Aboriginal Education Law on May 28, 1998,114 and, much later, the Aboriginal Basic Law on January 21, 2005.115 The Council of Indigenous Peoples passed an ordinance related to aboriginal lands on January 31, 2007,116 but the legislature has yet to pass an effective Aboriginal Land Law.117

112 The Republic of China Yearbook 1999 (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1999), pp. 86, 336. In the 1997 constitutional amendments, the National Assembly changed the term from yuanzhumin 原住民 to yuanzhu minzu 原住民族, see Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai II, p. 243. On January 4, 2002 the legislature approved changes to the Council’s organizational by-laws. One result was that on March 25, 2002 the Chinese name for the Council was changed to Xingzheng yuan yuanzhu minzu weiyuanhui 行政院原住民族委員會 and the English name became the Council of Indigenous Peoples. For the website, see http://www.apc.gov.tw/chinese/. 113 http://lis.ly.gov.tw/lgcgi/lglaw?@129:1804289383:f:NO%3DC701609*%20OR%20 NO%3DC001609%20OR%20NO%3DC101609$$4$$$NO 114 http://lis.ly.gov.tw/lgcgi/lglaw?@129:1804289383:f:NO%3DC701748*%20OR%20 NO%3DC001748%20OR%20NO%3DC101748$$4$$$NO 115 http://lis.ly.gov.tw/lgcgi/lglaw?@129:1804289383:f:NO%3DC701212*%20OR%20 NO%3DC001212%20OR%20NO%3DC101212$$4$$$NO 116 http://www.abohome.org.tw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id= 1387:laws-1387&catid=79:law2&Itemid=280 117 For a comparison with the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, see http://www.lawtw.com/article.php?template=article_content&area=free_browse&par ent_path=,1,2044,&job_id=72224&article_category_id=1643&article_id=33748. the lee teng-hui presidency to early 1996 105

This little known story has been told at some length because it demonstrates the degree of Taiwan’s democratization by early 1996. Taiwan’s democratization made possible the close legislative election result. Using this close election result, an underprivileged, but united group was able to bargain with government in order to gain significant benefits. Such a process was inconceivable under the old colonial dictatorships of the Japanese and the KMT.

Conclusion

In the first eight years of his presidency, President Lee Teng-hui pushed hard for democratization. At first he had to overcome the Mainlander control of the political system that derived from the KMT colonial dictatorship. This took time and Lee moved step-by-step. He used conflicts within the Mainlander establishment and made temporary alliances. He worked with the opposition Democratic Progressive Party and its leaders. He worked with students and the Wild Lily demonstrators. He released many political prisoners and welcomed political exiles. These actions broke many of the former taboos that had restricted Taiwanese political participation under the colonial regimes of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo. Working with the DPP, President Lee helped pass three sets of constitutional amendments that provided for direct election of the president as well as the governor of Taiwan province and the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung. Using both constitutional processes and extra-constitutional processes like the National Affairs Conference, he created an important momentum. In foreign relations, a topic not discussed here, President Lee made important gains with “vacation diplomacy” and started to create the concept of a Taiwan that was not Chinese.118 Of course, President Lee did not do all this himself. Other members of the KMT as well as many DPP leaders also contributed. Even Hau Pei-tsun contributed to democratization by resigning the premiership peacefully and refusing to conduct a coup. These changes facilitated the successful popular election of the president in March 1996, something the conservatives had dreaded in the early 1990s and the subject of the next chapter.

118 On this see Jacobs and Liu, “Lee Teng-hui and ‘Taiwan’,” pp. 380–385. 106 chapter four

Chapter four

The 1996 Presidential Election and the Taiwan Straits Crisis

In the early 1990s, as noted in the previous chapter, many people doubted that Taiwan was ready for the direct popular election of the president. In 1992, the decision was put off until 1995, but in fact consensus was reached by mid-1994 when the relevant constitutional amendments were approved. Thus, the first direct election of Taiwan’s president took place on March 23, 1996. Because the Chinese attempted to influence Taiwan’s voters through military threats, the simultaneous Taiwan Straits Crisis received huge international attention. The chapter concludes with an analysis of polls that demonstrate Chinese actions proved counter-productive. The direct popular election of the president in Taiwan was a momentous political event. While it is difficult to accept the oft-repeated boast that the election was “the first popular election of a head of state in [the] five thousand years [of Chinese history],” it was the first such election in an area with significant Chinese cultural influence. The Taiwan election also set new standards internationally. In the United States, the presidential election is for an electoral college that sometimes distorts the will of the people. In parliamentary systems, voters choose their own member of parliament, not the national leader. In a Taiwan presidential election, each voter is equal. No special weighting is given to particular sub-units or to ethnicities.

The Party Nominations

The actual electoral process took place over a lengthy period. The main parties had to choose their candidates, a process that extended back into mid-1995. In the end, four tickets ultimately contested the election. The most complicated nomination process took place within the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Four DPP members competed for the presidential nomination: Peng Ming-min 彭明敏, Hsu Hsin-liang 許信良, Lin I-hsiung 林義雄 and Yu Ching 尤清. On June 11, 1995, the DPP the 1996 presidential election 107 implemented the first stage of its nomination process—voting both by party members and by party cadres. All four candidates participated in a televised debate. Hsu Hsin-liang obtained 9,138 votes from the members as well as 59 cadre votes, while Peng Ming-min won 11,006 votes from party members and 39 cadre votes. These two candidates went to the second stage. The second stage allowed all Taiwan voters to participate. Beginning in Taitung on July 10, 1995, Hsu and Peng conducted 49 debates in all of Taiwan’s twenty-three counties and municipalities. After each debate, citizens could vote by just presenting their identity card. On September 24, the DPP announced the Peng Ming-min had obtained the DPP nomination for president. Two days later, Peng announced that Frank Hsieh (Hsieh Chang-ting 謝長廷) would be his vice-presidential running mate.1 The KMT nomination process proved simpler. Party Congress representatives signed a petition for Lee Teng-hui 李登煇 to run. After the KMT party primary in which Lee Teng-hui obtained 1637 votes or 91 per cent, Lee was declared the KMT presidential nominee on August 31, 1995. He then announced that Lien Chan 連戰 would be his vice-presidential running mate.2 The New Party process took longer and was more indirect. Originally, Wang Chien-shien 王建煊, a Mainlander who served as Minister of Finance from 1990 to 1992 and then gained a legislative seat at the end of 1992, wanted to run as nominee of the New Party. However, Lin Yang- kang 林洋港 and Hau Pei-tsun 郝柏村, both Vice-Chairmen of the KMT, had clearly helped New Party candidates in the December 2, 1995 legislative election and were running as a ticket in the presidential election seeking candidacy through a citizens’ petition campaign.3 On December 9, Wang pulled out of the presidential race and the New Party then fully supported the Lin-Hau ticket even though both candidates were still members of the KMT.4 In an open letter to KMT party comrades, Lin and Hau attacked Lee Teng-hui’s emphasis on Taiwan and accused Lee of leading the KMT down the wrong path. They concluded, “We swear that we will unite

1 Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai II, pp. 220–221. 2 Ibid., pp. 216, 232. 3 For an example of an advertisement supporting the petition campaign, see Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], December 7, 1995, p. 12. The petition campaign ran from November 30, 1995 to January 13, 1996. 4 See press of December 10, 1995. 108 chapter four together with those comrades who love our party and those compatriots who love our nation.”5 On December 13, 1995 the KMT expelled Lin Yang-kang and Hau Pei- tsun from the party. About 2,000 demonstrators, divided into “pro-Lee” and “anti-Lee” groups, began battles as “the blue [KMT party] flag smashed the blue flag” and “the national flag smashed the national flag.” This dispute made very clear the division at the top of the KMT.6 The fourth presidential candidate was Chen Li-an 陳履安, the son of Chen Cheng 陳誠 (1898–1965), a key aide of Chiang Kai-shek who served as premier and vice-president and is given credit for Taiwan’s land reform. Chen Li-an had a successful princeling’s career including appointment as Director of the KMT’s Organization Department in 1979, Deputy Secretary-General of the KMT in 1980, Chairman of the National Science Council in 1984, Minister of Economics in 1988 and Minister of National Defense in 1990. In 1993 Chen was appointed head of the Control Branch (yuan 院). Chen, who left the KMT on his own accord, chose Wang Ching- feng 王清峰, a female lawyer who also served in the Control Branch, as his vice-presidential candidate.7 Much of Chen’s campaign emphasized his Buddhist religiosity. Thus, three of the four tickets were headed by Taiwanese, though Lin Yang-kang held a Chinese perspective, worked with prominent conservative Mainlanders, and had a key conservative Mainlander as his running mate. The KMT and the DPP had made party nominations, while the New Party supported the ticket of the two conservative former KMT vice- chairmen. Chen Li-an, a Mainlander from Zhejiang and former KMT leader, headed a non-partisan ticket.

The 1996 Presidential Campaign

A week before the formal campaign began, the Chinese had already initiated their threatening missile tests near Taiwan. Rumors that Taiwan was running out of United States dollars created a small run at the banks, but the conversion of NT dollars into US$4–5 billion did not endanger

5 The complete text of the open letter is in Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], December 10, 1995, p. 2. 6 Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai II, p. 217. 7 Inter alia, Ibid., pp. 216, 232. the 1996 presidential election 109

Taiwan’s foreign reserves of US$84 billion.8 Over 600 hundred foreign reporters came into Taiwan to report on the crisis.9 Domestically, several DPP cadres complained that Peng Ming-min appeared to be poorly prepared and in some cases did not appear where scheduled. DPP people began to murmur that it would have been better if Hsu Hsin-liang had been the DPP nominee. There was also a movement of votes away from Peng Ming-min to “protect” Lee Teng-hui. When the Independence Evening News reported on this vote shift, some people protested and wrote unpleasant slogans on the newspaper’s building.10 On Sunday, March 16, 1996, 50,000 people marched in support of Peng Ming- min’s campaign to “oppose unification and to oppose invasion.” Also on March 16 all of the vice-presidential candidates, except Lien Chan, participated in a television debate.11 There was also an effort to combine the candidacies of Lin Yang-kang and Chen Li-an, but the Chen forces were not interested. Surveys showed that Lin’s votes would go to Chen, but Chen’s vote would not necessarily go to Lin. Some argued that even New Party supporters were divided with the old anti-Mainstream supporting Lin, while the younger New Party supporters, who were more interested in clean politics, backed Chen. On the afternoon of March 17, 1996, the four presidential candidates participated in a televised forum during which each gave a thirty-minute speech.12 The candidates drew lots to determine speaking order and Lin Yang-kang spoke first. Lin, mainly attacked President Lee Teng-hui, argued that he and Hau provided the strongest opposition to Lee and Lien. So he urged those opposed to Lee to vote for him. Lin stressed he was a real Taiwanese. He wanted the three communications (santong 三通) with China and felt unification would take some time. He wanted to sign an agreement with China for peace in the Taiwan Strait. Lin said that

8 A Taiwan source said the decline in Taiwan’s foreign exchange reserves declined from a high point of US$104 billion in June 1995 to US$84.76 billion a the end of May 1996, see Ralph N. Clough, Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait? (Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), p. 6. 9 Clough says 633 reporters came from 29 countries, Ibid., p. 7. 10 China News, March 16, 1996, pp. 1, 3; 11 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 17, 1996, pp. 1, 5 (for texts of speeches); Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 17, 1996, p. 4; China News, March 17, 1996, p. 1. 12 The author watched this forum. The texts of the speeches can be found in Ziyou shibao自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 18, 1996, p. 2; Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 18, 1996, p. 9; and Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 18, 1996, p. 7. 110 chapter four

Taiwan cannot go down the road of Taiwan Independence and said only if he and Hau are elected will there be stability. Lin stressed that he and Hau made a good combination because he had experience in construction, while Hau had military experience. Making a major debating mistake, Lin said that some people say the ticket is actually Hau as presidential candidate and Lin as vice-presidential candidate. This, Lin said, was not true. Lin did not speak well. He appeared to be reading and his mixture of Mandarin and Taiwanese did not seem to have any electoral rationale. Peng Ming-min spoke next. Speaking completely in Hokkien Tai wanese, Peng said that he is a Taiwanese who knows the troubles of the past and who has experience being an exile away from home and unable to return, something Hau Pei-tsun would not understand. He said with the KMT controlling the media, it was very difficult for him to get his views to the electorate. Peng said that the KMT is corrupt and that Taiwan currently had a “bubble economy.” The KMT had been in power for over fifty years. Peng stressed that in democratic politics there must be changes of government and personnel. He noted how well this is working in Taipei Municipality where people are polite and things get done. Peng said that in the past the KMT was the family head, but now Taiwan needs to become a new nation. He attacked the China policy of the Lin-Hau ticket. Peng closed by noting that he was a specialist in international relations and helped to get the Taiwan Relations Act through the US Congress. He stressed that he was a Taiwanese and urged people to vote for their future descendants and for Taiwan’s future. President Lee Teng-hui spoke third. He began reading in Mandarin with quite a stilted style, though he later loosened up. Lee stressed that he was born and raised in Taiwan. He noted that Taiwan’s problems have a history that he understood. In addition, he said that he had the courage to face these problems. Chen Li-an did not read from a prepared text, but spoke the most flu- ently of the four candidates. Chen argued that one must find the cause of the current conflict with China. He said that some argued that the conflict arose because Taiwan had democratized or because of the presidential election, but he said this was not correct as Taiwan had democratized some time ago while the decision for the presidential election had been made only two years previously. Rather, Chen stated, the basic reason for the conflict is that Mr. Lee does not recognize that he is a Chinese. Mr. Lee, according to Chen, believes that being a Chinese is not honor- able. the 1996 presidential election 111

After stating that the Chinese Communists were cruel, he said that they are also nationalistic. They left Taiwan alone because Taiwan stated that it was Chinese. However, the Chinese Communists are now angry because Mr. Lee denies that he is Chinese. Chen must tell the Chinese Communists that not all the people in Taiwan support Mr. Lee. Taiwan can thank the United States for its help, but any war will be on our territory and any losses will be ours while any advantages such as damage to the economies of China and Taiwan will accrue to the United States and Japan. Chen noted that his father was a war hero against Japan and that the Chinese Communists would recognize him as a Chinese. In addition, his father identified with Taiwan as he had conducted the island’s land reform. Chen argued he would be a good bridge between the two sides. He finished by saying he wanted Taiwan to be a Switzerland, he wanted unity of the Chinese people (huaren tuanjie 華人團結) and he wanted world peace. The Chinese threats became a key point in the electoral campaign. A KMT ad said, “The road of democracy is hard, we must be willing to persevere.” A subtitle argued, “March 23 is not only the first direct popular election in five thousand years, even more it is the choice between democratic freedom and communist rule!”13 A DPP ad called the Peng-Hsieh ticket “the best choice for Taiwanese.” Vote for Peng and Hsieh “to save Taiwan.”14 A Lin-Hau ad announced a march for “Peaceful Self-Salvation” and urged people to “use their ballots for self-salvation.” The ad said, “If by any chance Lee Teng-hui should be elected, March 23 will not be the end of threats, it will be the beginning of a disaster…”15 A Chen-Wang ad declared, “Avoiding War is the Highest Knowledge.”16 A Lee Teng-hui ad cried out, “We don’t want war! We also don’t want to surrender!” The ad then criticized the other three tickets. It attacked the independence approaches of Peng and Hsieh saying this would lead to war. It attacked the Hau-Lin ticket (reversing the names) and quoted Hau as saying, “If we want peace in the Taiwan Strait, President Lee must step down!” The ad asked, “If Lin-Hau were elected, does this mean surrender to the Chinese Communists?” The ad quoted Chen Li-an as saying, “Choosing Lee Teng-hui is choosing war” and answered, “In order to live,

13 Taiwan ribao 台灣日報 [Taiwan Daily], March 16, 1996, p. 1. 14 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 16, 1996, p. 20. 15 Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily], March 17, 1996, p. 12. 16 Lianhe wanbao 聯合晚報 [United Evening News], March 16, 1996, p. 1. 112 chapter four must we be like soft-feet shrimp or like turtles? Only if we pull in our heads and tails, then everything will be okay?” The ad concluded, “We must have a dignified existence!”17 The next day, a Lin-Hau ad stated, “To vote for Lin Yang-kang is to choose honesty and prosperity! To vote for Lee Teng-hui is to choose corruption and depression!” It concluded, “To go far from war and to walk towards peace, please support Lin Yang-kang and Hau Pei-tsun.”18 A DPP ad seemingly responded with the headline, “Far from War.” The subtitle said, “We don’t want war, we want our new nation.”19 Another ad from the Lin-Hau ticket, which showed a child and his father playing with toy weapons, said, “War is not child’s play. If we elect the wrong president, war games could become real.” The headline on the ad shouted, “One vote decides whether we live or die.” At the end, the ad stated the Lin-Hau ticket was “New Leadership, New Order and New Hope.”20 An ad from KMT candidates for National Assembly attacked the “Hau-Lin” ticket. It asked, “Is the New Leadership Jiang Zemin? Is the New Order the People’s Liberation Army? Is the New Hope being united? This ad, which had red stars in key places, then asked, “Is voting for Hau-Lin choosing the Chinese Communist Governor-General to Taiwan?”21 Another KMT ad requested, “Silent Masses, Please Stand Up!” It continued, “if you are not willing to receive Chinese Communist threats… please vote for Lee-Lien who will not bow down to Chinese Communist attacks and threats, who dare to say we want a dignified existence and who have the ability to plan a complete relationship between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.”22 On the same day another ad proclaimed, “On election eve, Chen Li-an promises a Great Future for Taiwan.”23 A DPP ad also attacked Lee Teng-hui, “We looked after him, now he has cut us behind our backs!” The ad explained, “Lee Teng-hui has been in the KMT too long, so he has learned the Chinese faction’s merciless absence of emotion!”24 In another ad, the DPP wrote, “Lee Teng-hui says he is a

17 Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily], March 17, 1996, p. 1. 18 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 18, 1996, p. 20. 19 Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily], March 18, 1996, p. 13. 20 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 19, 1996, p. 12. 21 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 19, 1996, p. 20 and Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily], March 19, 1996, p. 13. 22 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報[China Times], March 19, 1996, p. 1 and Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily], March 19, 1996, p. 1. 23 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 19, 1996, p. 15 and Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily], March 19, 1996, p. 1. 24 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 19, 1996, p. 1. the 1996 presidential election 113

Taiwanese as well as a Chinese. We don’t know if he identifies with Taiwan or with China? Does he want independence or unification?”25 Very negative advertisements continued. A Lin-Hau ad emphasizing the economic disaster facing Taiwan, declared, “One vote, save our family property.” It continued, “With the economy so bad, can you bear it any longer?”26 A KMT ad attacked Chen Li-an’s religiosity, “When you take off his religious outer clothes,” you discover that he is guilty of a number of things including that Taiwan is not Chen’s home and that while he abuses the Taiwanese people and Hau-Lin, he never criticizes the Chinese Communists.27 The next day the KMT had an ad calling on the voters “to use the election to uphold the rejection of rumors, opposing the throwing of mud and not wanting tricks.”28 A DPP ad asked, “How can we let go of Lee Teng- hui and change our support to Peng Ming-min and Frank Hsieh?” It answered by comparing the eight years of Lee Teng-hui’s presidency with the one year of Taipei Mayor Chen Shui-bian’s administration.29 Another DPP ad asked, “Will Lee Teng-hui sell out Taiwan!?” It answered, “The only presidential ticket that will not sell out Taiwan is Peng Ming-min and Frank Hsieh.”30 A Chen Li-an ad asked why the three other tickets were attacking him. “Break the siege. Let’s you and I come out to mobilize! Good people will mobilize for Self-Salvation.”31 The nastiest ads, however, continued to come from the Lin-Hau camp. One grisly ad, filled with skulls, said, “Lee Teng-hui belonged to the Communist Party. Did he sell out his friends in order to be an official?”32 On the final day of the campaign, a Lee-Lien ad asked people “to reject rumors.” It asked people “to use their ballot” to choose “national dignity, social stability, happiness for all the people, to show the Communists and to show the whole world.”33 A DPP ad called Peng Ming-min a “brave

25 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 19, 1996, p. 21. 26 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 20, 1996, p. 13. 27 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 20, 1996, p. 13 28 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 21, 1996, p. 1. 29 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 21, 1996, p. 15. 30 Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily], March 21, 1996, p. 18 and Taiwan shibao 台灣時報 [Taiwan Times], March 21, 1996, p. 1. 31 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 21, 1996, p. 13 and Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily], March 21, 1996, p. 13. 32 Taiwan shibao 台灣時報 [Taiwan Times], March 21, 1996, p. 8. 33 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 22, 1996, p. 1 and Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily], March 22, 1996, p. 1. 114 chapter four

Taiwanese. Stand up and protect him!”34 A Chen Li-an ad claimed, “He will let you feel at ease.”35 The Lin-Hau ticket again had the most advertisements. One said, “At the last moment, concentrate your votes.” It said, “Please support the strongest opponent to Lee-Lien—Uncle [Lin Yang-]kang who will protect the land of Taiwan and Uncle Hao who will defend the Republic of China.”36 Another ad, with a picture of Chen Li-an and Lin Yang-kang holding their hands up together, had the headline: “Three Winners—Lin Yang-kang, Chen Li-an and the People of Taiwan.” After reading a very long wordy text, one came to the following: “Please vote to support Mr Lin Yang-kang because that is also support for Mr Chen Li-an…”37 A third ad had the headline, “The Truth about Lee Teng-hui Belonging to the Communist Party.”38 A fourth ad accused Lee Teng-hui of several nasty things and called to “Let Go of Lee Teng-hui, Vote for Lin Yang-kang.”39 In the campaign, several factors seemed to play roles. The DPP campaign was hurt by the DPP’s alliance with the New Party in the legislature at the beginning of February. It was also hurt by the movement of votes from Peng to “protect” Lee Teng-hui. Peng’s inadequacy as a candidate also hurt the DPP. Chen Li-an’s campaign emphasized his religiosity and his Buddhism. But people noted that most of Taiwan’s population are not Buddhists and felt this approach would not bring many votes. One former tenant farmer told the writer that he planned to vote for Chen Li-an in order to thank his father for the land reform. The Hau-Lin campaign gained votes from conservative Mainlanders. In fact, several older Mainlanders told the writer that they planned to vote for Hau Pei-tsun, saying this as if Hau was the presidential candidate. Clearly, the Chinese threats and military exercises played a huge role in the campaign. We will analyze this following a review of the election results.

34 Lianhe wanbao 聯合晚報 [United Evening News], March 22, 1996, p. 16. 35 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 22, 1996, p. 13 and Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily], March 22, 1996, p. 13. 36 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 22, 1996, p. 5. 37 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 22, 1996, p. 18. 38 Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily], March 22, 1996, p. 46. 39 Lianhe wanbao 聯合晚報 [United Evening News], March 22, 1996, p. 11. the 1996 presidential election 115

The Election Results

President Lee Teng-hui won an overwhelming victory with an absolute majority of 54 per cent. See Table 4.1 for the election results.40 Lee won 23 of the 24 counties and municipalities of Taiwan and the islands of Kinmen and Matsu in Fujian province, losing only Nantou County, the native place of Lin Yang-kang. In fact, Lee won absolute majorities in 18 of these counties and municipalities. The places where Lee won majorities included counties and municipalities in the north, central, south and east. They included Hokkien and Hakka areas and they included urban as well as rural areas.41

Table 4.1. 1996 Presidential election results Candidate Votes Per cent Lee Teng-hui 5,813,699 54.00% Peng Ming-min 2,274,586 21.13% Lin Yang-kang 1,603,790 14.90% Chen Li-an 1,074,044 9.98% Total 10,766,119 100.01%

In the simultaneous National Assembly election, the DPP did 8.72 per cent better than the presidential ticket. The KMT in the National Assembly election received 4.32 per cent less than Lee, while the New Party obtained 1.23 per cent less than the Lin Yang-kang. See Table 4.2 for the National Assembly results.42 As we shall see in the next section, the Chinese contributed significantly to Lee’s victory. At this point we consider primarily domestic factors, though some of the results also owe to the Chinese interference in Taiwan’s domestic affairs. One analysis argued that over 800,000 votes “left Peng to protect Lee.” In the six counties where the DPP won the position of county executive in 1993, Peng trailed those winners by margins ranging from almost 24 per cent to almost 39 per cent. In those same six

40 For the election results, see Taiwan press, March 24, 1996. Figures can also be obtained from the Central Election Commission website, http://210.69.23.140/cec/vote3 .asp?pass1=A1996A0000000000aaa. 41 Chen Honghe 陳宏合, “Si kejia xianshi LiLian guo ban 四客家縣市李連過半 [In the Four Hakka Counties and Municipalities, the Lee-Lien Ticket Got a Majority],” Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 25, 1996, p. 6. 42 The remaining 0.21 per cent belonged to very small parties that did not gain any seats. 116 chapter four

Table 4.2. 1996 National Assembly election results Party Vote % Seats KMT 49.68% 183 DPP 29.85% 99 New Party 13.67% 46 Non-Partisans 5.50% 5 Green Party 1.09% 1 Total 99.79% 334 counties plus Taipei Municipality in 1994, Peng trailed the figures of Mayor Chen Shui-bian and DPP gubernatorial nominee Chen Ding-nan by margins of over 15 per cent to over 28 per cent. 43 The DPP candidates for National Assembly did better throughout the entire country than the Peng presidential ticket, while Lee on the other hand did better than the KMT candidates for National Assembly throughout the country. We noted earlier that even though Lin Yang-kang and Hau Pei-tsun did not join the New Party, the New Party “fully supported” their presidential candidacy. Overall, both nationally and in Taiwan Province, where the New Party is weakest, the Lin-Hau ticket did marginally better than the New Party candidates for National Assembly even when we exclude Lin’s native Nantou County. However, the Lin-Hau ticket trailed the New Party candidates for National Assembly in seven counties and municipalities of Taiwan Province—Keelung, Taoyuan, Hsinchu County, Tainan County, Tainan Municipality, Pingtung and Penghu. In addition, the Lin-Hau ticket trailed the New Party candidates for National Assembly in the relative New Party strongholds of Taipei Municipality, Kaohsiung Munici pality and the off-shore islands. These figures suggest that Chen Li-an and Lee Teng-hui gained New Party votes in Taipei and Kaohsiung Munici palities as well as parts of Taiwan Province. A senior New Party leader told me that New Party polling suggested that about 15 to 20 per cent of New Party supporters voted for Chen Li-an. All of these statements

43 He Rongxin 何榮辛, “Qi Peng bao Li xiaoying guazou 80 yu wan piao 棄彭保李效應刮走80餘萬票 [The Leave Peng [to] Protect Lee Effect Scraped Away More than 800,000 Votes,” Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 24, 1966, p. 2. Some of this data is also in Zhang Ruichang 張瑞昌, “Minjindang baigei ‘Li Denghui qingjie’ chongji buxiao 民進黨敗給‘李登煇情結’衝擊不小 [The Pounding of the DPP Loss to the ‘Lee Teng-hui Complex’ was Not Small],” Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 24, 1996, p. 3. the 1996 presidential election 117 received support in a KMT poll taken the day after the election, which has not been published, but which was provided to the writer. This KMT poll gives important insights into how specific proportions of the electorate voted in the 1996 presidential election. Lee Teng-hui won a majority of all age groups, though he did especially well among those aged 40 and over. Peng Ming-min and Chen Li-an did somewhat better among younger voters than older voters, while Lin Yang-kang did his best among those aged 60 and over. Women and men voted very similarly. Lee Teng-hui won a majority of all Taiwanese ethnic groups with about sixty per cent of Hokkien, Hakka and aboriginal votes. Lee also won the Mainlanders with 44.2 per cent, while Lin Yang-kang (and Hau Pei-tsun) won 32.2 per cent and Chen Li-an another 10.7 per cent of the Mainlanders. By religion, Lee Teng-hui again won all groups with absolute majorities. Chen Li-an, who ran specifically looking for support from religious groups, won only 8.6 per cent of Buddhists, less than Lee and Peng, but more than Lin’s 7.5 per cent. Among Taoists and Christians, Chen ran well behind Lee, Peng and Lin. In fact, among Christians and among Catholics, Lin Yang-kang came in second with 17.4 per cent after Lee Teng-hui who obtained 20.0 per cent. Only among Yiguandao 一貫道 believers did Chen Li-an come in second after Lee Teng-hui. Among all other religious groups, Chen ranked either third or fourth among the candidates. By education, Lee again won all groups, but interestingly, voters with college and university educations divided much more evenly. Among those with college educations, Peng, Lin and Chen all got 12–14 percent. Among those with university educations, Lin came second with 18.7 per cent followed by Peng with 16.6 per cent and Chen with 12.8 per cent. Those with post-graduate education still gave Lee 28.1 per cent, but gave Chen 26.3 per cent, Lin 17.5 per cent and Peng only 12.3 per cent. Lee won absolute majorities among all occupation groups except students, who gave Chen and Peng 17–18 per cent of their votes each. Lin won 15 per cent of the voters in the military, civil service, and education as well as professional voters. The survey also asked for whom those surveyed voted in the National Assembly election. Among those that voted for the New Party in the National Assembly election, 18.3 per cent voted for Chen Li-an while 23.7 per cent voted for Lee Teng-hui and only 53.8 per cent voted for Lin Yang- kang. Among those who voted DPP in the National Assembly, only 44.8 per cent voted for Peng Ming-min while 42.1 per cent voted for Lee Teng- hui, 7.5 per cent for Chen Li-an and 2.4 per cent for Lin Yang-kang. These 118 chapter four statistics for DPP voters must be taken cautiously because DPP voters even today have a reputation for hiding their intentions and their actions from those conducting surveys, but as noted earlier, this survey confirms the earlier analyses. As noted in the last chapter, the KMT ran several senior officials for the Legislature and the National Assembly in an effort to force officials to meet the people and to break down the divisions between senior officials and voters. We noted that Vincent Siew won a seat in the Legislature in December 1995. Eight senior KMT officials ran for the National Assembly including Jason Hu and Chang Hsiao-yen 章孝嚴,44 an illegitimate son of Chiang Ching-kuo, who was then head of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission and who would later hold such positions as foreign minister. Seven of the eight KMT candidates including Jason Hu, Frederick Chien and Chang Hsiao-yen won seats in the National Assembly.45

The Counter-Productivity of the Chinese Military Exercises

When President Lee Teng-hui came to office following President Chiang Ching-kuo’s death on January 13, 1988, Taiwan was very isolated diplo- matically owing to the “One China” policy of Chiang Ching-kuo and his father Chiang Kai-shek. President Lee worked to break this isolation with a trip to Singapore in March 1989 and “vacation diplomacy” during February 9–16, 1994 when he met the heads of state of the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand. China’s concern at Lee’s successful foreign affairs ventures became much greater when Lee received a visa from the United States to give a speech at his doctoral alma mater, Cornell University, in mid-1995. The US State Department had told the Chinese that Lee would not receive a visa, but, in view of Lee’s democratization of Taiwan, Con gress voted unanimously in the House of Representatives and with only two dissenting votes in the Senate to give Lee a visa. Many Americans questioned, if a “terrorist” like Gerry Adams of the Irish Republican Army or Yasser Arafat of the Palestine Liberation Organization could receive an American visa, why not a peaceful democratizer like Lee Teng-hui? The Chinese, unfamiliar with the American separation of powers, felt

44 Chang was the surname of his mother. John Chang later changed his surname to Chiang 蔣, thus making it the same as his father. 45 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 24, 1996, p. 11. the 1996 presidential election 119 betrayed. Although Lee’s speech of June 9, 1995 at Cornell was very mild,46 the Chinese press both before and after the Cornell speech published the most vituperative and personal attacks on President Lee.47 After announcing missile tests and warning foreign planes and ships to avoid an area 80 miles (130 km) north of Taiwan, China fired six missiles into the area during July 21–28, 1995. Again, after warning foreign planes and ships, China fired another six missiles into another area slightly further north during August 15–25. In John Garver’s words, “These missile tests were a significant threshold. For the first time China fired its ballistic missiles far out into a sea zone conspicuously adjacent to Taiwan. The purpose was clear: to demonstrate that the PLA could use its missiles to disrupt Taiwan’s sea and air traffic.”48 In mid-October, the Chinese conducted major naval operations including an amphibious landing that Jiang Zemin, Liu Huaqing and six other members of the Central Military Commission personally observed. Then, on November 15, just two weeks before the December 2, 1995 legislative election, the Chinese began ten days of exercises involving sixteen to eighteen thousand military personnel that simulated an invasion of Dongshan island off the coast of southern Fujian.49 These last exercises “were suggestive of an invasion of Taiwan.”50 The Chinese may have believed that these military exercises contributed to the relative success of the New Party in the December 2 legislative election,51 though as we saw in the last chapter, domestic issues dominated the campaign and the New Party obtained less than 13 per cent of the vote, while the DPP obtained one-third of the vote. Following the presidential election, this writer received copies of eighteen surveys conducted by the KMT from October 6, 1995 until the evening of March 22, 1996, the night before the presidential election itself. In

46 For the text, see Lee Teng-hui, “Always in My Heart,” in President Lee Teng-hui’s Selected Addresses and Messages 1995 (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1996), pp. 32–43. 47 This paragraph draws on a number of sources including Jacobs and Liu, “Lee Teng-hui and ‘Taiwan’,” pp. 380–385. For several vituperative quotes, see J. Bruce Jacobs, “China’s Policies Towards Taiwan,” in Uncertain Future: Taiwan-Hong Kong-China relations after Hong Kong’s return to Chinese sovereignty, ed. C.L. Chiou and Leong H. Liew (Aldershot, Brookfield MA, Singapore, Sydney: Ashgate, 2000), pp. 98–99. 48 John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan’s Democratization (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997), p. 74 (see p. 75 for a useful map). 49 Ibid., pp. 92–93. 50 Ibid., p. 93. 51 Ibid., pp. 94–95. 120 chapter four addition, the writer obtained summaries of ten commercial polls, which basically reinforce the validity of the KMT polls. In October 1995, well before the legislative election and even before the New Party had decided to support Lin Yang-kang and Hau Pei-tsun, President Lee would have obtained about 36 per cent of the vote. Lee’s support remained in the high 30s well into January. The Chinese began deployments for their March 1996 exercises on February 4. These preparations concentrated 150,000 troops, ships from three PLA Navy fleets, three hundred aircraft including newly purchased SU-27s and missiles in two areas on the Mainland near Taiwan. These “exercises were nothing less than a simulation of an all-out invasion of Taiwan.”52 The Chinese accused the United States of causing the tension: “We think tensions between the two sides come mainly from… some countries, including the United States, selling huge amounts of advanced weapons to this area [Taiwan].” The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Shen Guofang, continued, “The Taiwan issue is an internal matter.”53 On March 5, the Chinese announced that they would conduct missile tests into two areas near Taiwan’s main ports (and naval bases) from March 8 to March 15. Taiwan Premier Lien Chan said, “I… demand that Chinese communists stop this provocative behavior immediately.” Provincial Governor James Soong “urged China to call off the exercises and said Taiwan is pursuing democracy, not independence.” The Overseas Taiwan Businessmen’s Support Group started putting up pictures of President Lee Teng-hui, dressed in a Superman suit and surrounded by peace doves, flying up to stop Chinese missiles.54 On March 8, China fired three apparently unarmed ballistic missiles into its designated zones close to Taiwan, two near Kaohsiung and one near Keelung. A Taiwan report also stated that villages in a Fujian port had been evacuated to make room for 100,000 troops. And, at the same time, two Taiwan Television (TTV) reporters covering the National People’s Congress were arrested in Fujian. The Taiwan government sent a message to China demanding that China halt such “dangerous behavior [as missile testing near Taiwan]… These kinds of crude threats and provo- cations…seriously damage cross-straits relations and makes [sic] the dis- tance toward national unification longer.”55

52 Ibid., pp. 99–100. 53 China News, March 1, 1996, p. 1. 54 China News, March 6, 1996, p. 1. 55 China News, March 9, 1996, p. 1. the 1996 presidential election 121

On March 9, Beijing announced it would conduct live-fire training in the Taiwan region. In a clear attempt to get Taiwan’s people to vote against Lee Teng-hui, the People’s Daily said, “The real danger is allowing Lee’s attempts to continue with the ‘Taiwan independence’ stances unchecked, so jeopardizing the efforts to reunify the motherland.”56 On March 10, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated the Taiwan presidential election was not democratic. He continued, “It is entirely futile for the Taiwan authorities to take advantage of the change in the way they produce a leader to give a legal cloak to their activities aimed at splitting the motherland.” At the same time, the United States announced it was sending ships to the Taiwan area and Japan summoned a Chinese diplomat in Tokyo and urged that China exercise “self-restraint.” The Chinese also deported the two TTV reporters.57 On March 11, Washington announced it had deployed a second carrier group.58 The two carrier groups, the Nimitz and, ironically, the Inde pendence, also included three nuclear-powered submarines and other support ships.59 Yet, on March 12, China began its second-wave of military exercises to practice seizure of air and sea superiority in the southern end of the Taiwan Strait. These exercises, which lasted a week, included Su-27 fighters and a variety of ships including attack submarines. Chinese military sources, according to Garver, believed “in numbers of service arms and weapon types employed, the degree of difficulty and complex- ity of coordination, and the intensity of difficulty and realism of the operations, the second wave of exercises set a new standard for the PLA.”60 On March 15, mid-way through the second wave of exercises, the Chinese announced a third wave of military exercises that would begin on March 18 and end on March 25, two days after Taiwan’s presidential election. These exercises would be held in the northern end of the Taiwan Strait, supposedly because of the similarity of the topography to that of Taiwan.61 Also on March 15, the Chinese apparently assured the United States that they would not invade Taiwan.62 The next day, however, the Chinese denied making any assurances to the United States.63 The

56 China News, March 10, 1996, p. 1. 57 China News, March 12, 1996, p. 1. 58 Garver, Face Off, p. 105. 59 China News, March 15, 1996, p. 1. 60 Garver, Face Off, p. 105. 61 Ibid., pp. 105–106. 62 See Taiwan press, March 16, 1996. 63 Taiwan press, March 17, 1996. 122 chapter four

following day, Chinese Premier Li Peng warned the United States against sending naval vessels into the Taiwan Strait.64 The crisis continued. The result was that Lee Teng-hui’s support in the electorate increased from the high 30s in January to the mid 40s from late February to March 19, an increase of 7–8 per cent. According to these polls, Lin Yang-kang’s share of the vote declined from 16 per cent to 10 per cent. Then, just a couple of days before the crisis, according to an interview with a KMT leader, the Chinese threat appeared to diminish. The last part of the third wave of exercises apparently did not go forward, possibly because of the weather.65 Wang Zhaoguo, the Director of the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office, told Taiwanese businessmen in Beijing that China could accept any candidate who won the presidential election. In addition, Wang promised that Beijing would do everything it could to protect Taiwan business interests in China.66 The Taiwan navy helped rescue some Chinese, whose cargo ship sank near the military exercises.67 On March 20, the United States approved the sale of arms to Taiwan and Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced he would meet Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in The Hague on April 21.68 In addition the United States naval forces arrived. Thus, as the election approached, according to the KMT analysis, Taiwan felt more secure. The result, according to the KMT leader, was a huge apparent drop in support for Lee Teng-hui. In the KMT polls, the support for Lee dropped from 45.92 per cent on March 19 to 33.36 per cent on the evening of March 21, a decline of 12.5 per cent. This worried the KMT and they repeated the survey the morning of March 22, the day before the poll. Their morning poll showed virtually the same result, 33.22 per cent supported Lee. That night, Lee remained at 35.68 per cent in the final pre-election poll. The polls showed that support for the DPP candidate, Peng Ming-min went up, but in the last three polls, support for Lin Yang-kang also fell. In the end, Lee Teng-hui won 54 per cent of the vote, an amount at least 8 per cent above any of the polls and 15–20 per cent above his support in the polls before the Taiwan Straits crisis began. In talking with voters, it became clear that Taiwanese did not appreciate being threat-

64 China News, March 18, 1996, p. 1. 65 Garver, Face Off, p. 106. 66 China News, March 20, 1996, p. 1. 67 China Post, March 20, 1996, pp. 1, 15. 68 China News, March 21, 1996, p. 1. the 1996 presidential election 123 ened and voted for Lee to send a message to China that threats would not work. Ironically, China claimed victory in the election. The Xinhua news agency noted that supporters of Lin Yang-kang and Chen Li-an outnum- bered those who supported Peng Ming-min. Of course, Lee Teng-hui received more than twice as many votes as Lin and Chen combined. The Chinese noted, “While campaigning for votes, Lee Teng-hui many times said he sought unification with China, would not make ‘Taiwan independent’ and ‘promised’ to improve relations between the two sides after the election.” He did this, according to the report, because of the “severe attacks against the forces of Taiwan independence and separatism” by people on the mainland and overseas.69 Thus, China scripted its claim that the military exercises in the Taiwan Straits during Taiwan’s presidential election in March 1996 proved “completely successful” (yuanman chengkong 圆满成功),70 but in fact its “hardline” policies proved counter-productive in at least six ways.71 First, despite the Chinese attempt to restrict Taiwan’s “international space”— the expansion of which the Chinese claim is tantamount to Taiwan Independence,72 the tension created by the March 1996 military exercises caused over six hundred foreign journalists to visit Taiwan. This gave Taiwan an important “international” voice—a voice which money could not have bought. Taiwan became headline news around the world and, symbolically, CNN broadcast many hours with a Taipei-based anchor. Second, the Chinese military threats created adverse publicity and concern around the world. In a very short time, the Chinese military exercises undercut long-term Chinese efforts to create the image of a peaceful China concerned with economic development and the welfare of its citizens rather than an ambitious great power anxious to restore its national prestige. The Chinese actions did much more to enhance international belief in the “theory of the China threat” (Zhongguo weixie lun 中國威脅論) than any propaganda from conservative American politicians and journalists.

69 China News, March 21, 1996, p. 1. 70 Renmin ribao 人民日報 [People’s Daily], March 21, 1996, p. 1. 71 The next several paragraphs are drawn from Jacobs, “China’s Policies Towards Taiwan,” pp. 101–102. 72 This is stated in many places, including the second of Jiang Zemin’s famous eight points, see Renmin ribao 人民日報 [People’s Daily], January 31, 1995, p. 1. 124 chapter four

Third, the Chinese actions ended any “ambiguity” about a possible American response. The United States policy of “ambiguity” meant that Taiwan could not depend upon American support. Following the Chinese threats, the United States made clear it would support Taiwan, a deed which reduced Chinese leverage and increased Taiwan’s scope for action. And, as noted above, in an ultimate irony which was widely reported in the foreign press, one of the two American aircraft carriers which helped protect Taiwan’s autonomy was named the “Independence”. Fourth, although the Chinese criticised Taiwan’s “fake democracy” (jia minzhu 假民主),73 the foreign journalists confirmed the genuine nature of Taiwan’s democratization and conveyed this evaluation to the world. More than any other factor, Taiwan’s democratization has created sympathy for Taiwan internationally. Thus, for this reason as well, China’s military exercises proved counter-productive. Fifth, China clearly wanted to reduce Lee Teng-hui’s votes. Evidence shown above, however, makes clear China’s actions actually increased his votes perhaps up to twenty per cent. Furthermore, Lee gained votes from all of his competitors. In other words, Lee gained votes from all parts of Taiwan’s political spectrum precisely because Taiwan’s voters wanted to send a message to Beijing that they would not be intimidated by military force. Thus, China’s attempts to use military threats to persuade Taiwan’s voters to oppose Lee backfired. Sixth, ironically, Lee’s increased vote base also enhanced Taiwan’s international status. If Lee had only obtained a minority of Taiwan’s votes, China could have said Lee did not represent Taiwan because more people had voted against him than for him. By substantially increasing his vote, China enhanced Lee’s ability to speak for Taiwan internationally. After an election in Taiwan, candidates return to their electorates to bow and thank voters for their support. Lee would have had much justifi- cation in bowing westward and thanking the Chinese “hardliners” for their single-minded work in vastly increasing his winning margin and enhancing Taiwan’s international status.

73 Renmin ribao 人民日報 [People’s Daily], March 12, 1996, p. 4 and March 14, 1996, p. 4. the 1996 presidential election 125

Political Opponents Are Not Enemies

On election night, March 23, the DPP chairman, Shih Ming-teh, an nounced his resignation as chairman of the party in order to take responsibility for the DPP’s failure in the presidential election.74 The next day, Shih visited the defeated presidential and vice-presidential ticket of Chen Li-an and Wang Ching-feng at their campaign headquarters and expressed his best wishes. Although Shih had led the failed DPP campaign and Chen and Wang had trailed in last place, according to one report, the atmosphere of the conversation was “relaxed and happy.”75 Another report stated that Shih praised the “clean campaign methods” of Chen and Wang.76 On March 25, Shih went to visit Lin Yang-kang and Hau Pei-tsun at their campaign headquarters, news that the Liberty Times reported on the front page with a large picture of Lin Yang-kang walking with and holding the hand of Shih Ming-teh.77 In the course of the conversation, Shih revealed a new piece of information. When President Chiang Ching-kuo died in early 1988, the imprisoned Shih Ming-teh had been afraid that the military would seize power. However, power had been transferred peacefully and Shih wrote a short a letter to Hau Pei-tsun, then Chief of the General Staff, to express his best wishes. During Shih’s post-election visit, Hau responded, “I did receive your letter. At first, I was going to reply, but after thinking about it decided that was inappropriate as I was afraid that you would publicize its contents. Although you, in jail, and I had no relationship, when you went on a hunger strike, I spent a lot of time in the military headquarters protecting you. It was the same for Huang Hsin- chieh.” Shih immediately replied, “We had six rooms which became a special zone.” Hau replied, “Your determination was very strong. We wanted to save your life.”78 Lin responded that this was the first time he had heard this story, which did not even appear in Hau’s memoirs.79 During the discussion, Shih made another important point, “Victory and defeat are only for a limited time. Nothing lasts forever.” Hau also

74 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 24, 1996, p. 2; Zhongguo shibao [China Times], March 24, 1996, p. 3; Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 24, 1996, p. 3. 75 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 24, 1996, p. 3. 76 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 25, 1996, p. 4. 77 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 26, 1996, p.1. 78 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 26, 1996, p. 4. 79 Minzhong ribao 民衆日報 [Commons Daily], March 26, 1996, p. 3. 126 chapter four noted that in his thirty-three months as Premier he had insisted on the principle of not shedding blood. This had enabled Lee Teng-hui’s “peaceful revolution.”80 Then on March 26 and accompanied by DPP Secretary-General Chiou I-jen, Shih paid a visit to the KMT Secretary-General, Hsu Shui-teh, and then went to the New Party Headquarters where he saw the New Party Convenor, Chen Kuei-miao 陳癸淼, and the Secretary-General, Jaw Shau- kong.81 While these visits did not solve all of Taiwan’s political troubles, they did help remove personal antagonisms from political debate and facilitated the reaching of several agreements the next year.

Conclusion

The first direct popular election of Taiwan’s president in 1996 was a momentous event in Taiwan’s political history. Lee Teng-hui won overwhelmingly, winning 54 per cent of the vote in a four-way election. Lee’s popularity as a democratic leader accounts for at least part of this victory. But Chinese threats through their several military exercises near Taiwan and in the Taiwan Strait also clearly increased Lee’s vote totals. Despite what the Chinese argued after the election, the Chinese military threats proved counter-productive in several ways. President Lee thus had enhanced political power for his final term of office, when he truly had a mandate of the people.

80 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 26, 1996, p. 4. Other reports on Shih’s meeting with Lin and Hau appear in Zhongguo shibao [China Times], March 26, 1996, p. 4 and Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 26, 1996, p. 2. 81 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 27, 1996, p. 2; Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 27, 1996, p. 4; Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 27, 1996, p. 2. On March 28, 1996, Taipei Mayor Chen Shui-bian also paid a visit to Lin Yang-kang, see Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 29, 1996, p. 2 and Taiwan shibao 台灣時報 [Taiwan Times], March 29, 1996, p. 3. lee teng-hui as an elected president 127

Chapter five

Lee Teng-hui as an Elected President and the 2000 Presidential Election

Just short of two months after Lee Teng-hui won the first direct, popular election of the president in Taiwan’s history, he gave his inauguration speech. During the first part of this speech, President Lee emphasized democracy,1 but he moved to the topic of cross-Straits relations and made a number of conciliatory statements towards the Chinese. “The reason the Chinese nation (Zhonghua minzu中華民族) has experienced five thousand years without collapsing relies on the maintenance and development of its excellent culture.” But in the mid-19th century, Western civilization attacked Chinese culture and the nation declined. Lee “hoped that the compatriots in the Taiwan region can establish a new living culture ... building on the foundation of our nation’s vast cultural traditions and drawing on the quintessence of Western culture to combine and create a new Chinese culture...”2 Lee noted that the great cultures all began in small places. Taiwan’s culture “has not only maintained its cultural traditions, it also has had wide contact with western democracy, science and contemporary industrial and commercial social culture.” With its high educational standards—much higher than other places in China—it can undertake the heavy responsibility of creating this new culture.3 Lee said, owing to different ideologies, history had created a tragedy of “Chinese fighting Chinese.” He recommended creating a new situation of “Chinese helping Chinese.”4 Because of this, “under the precondition of maintaining the security of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu and maintaining the happiness of all the people, there has been no time in

1 Li Denghui 李登輝, “Qinlin Zhonghua minguo di jiu ren zongtong, fuzongtong qingzhu jiuzhi dianli 親臨中華民國第九任總統，副總統慶祝就職典禮 [Speech Given at the Inauguration Ceremony of the Ninth President and Vice-President of the Republic of China],” in Li zongtong Denghui xiansheng bashiwu nian yanlun xuanji 李總統登煇先生八十五年言論選集 [A Selection of 1996 Speeches by President Lee Teng-hui], ed. Wang Meizhen 王美珍 (Taibei: Xinwenju, 1997), pp. 126–127. 2 Ibid., pp. 130–131. 3 Ibid., p. 131. 4 Ibid., p. 132. 128 chapter five which we have not ... pushed the great enterprise of national unification.” But the Chinese Communists have from beginning to end refused to recognize the Republic of China.5 “Since last year, in order to oppose democracy, the Chinese Communists have launched wave after wave of ‘trumped up’ slander against me, but I have endured this humiliation in order to complete an important task and have not responded ... This [slander] will not solve the historical problems which have accumulated over fifty years.”6 Lee noted that the Chinese Communists had used military exercises to try to influence the first popular presidential election. “We know that peaceful tolerance is the only method to allay the hate of opposites. We will not negotiate when being threatened, but we absolutely do not fear negotiations. We believe that only by having communications between both sides can we truly solve the problems across the Straits.”7 Lee continued: It goes without saying that the Republic of China is a sovereign country. Both sides of the Straits have no nationality (minzu 民族) or cultural identity problems. The only problems are competition between systems and ways of living. Under these circumstances, we have no need and it would be impossible for us to use the line of “Taiwan Independence.” In the past forty years, owing to historical elements, both sides of the Straits have been ruled separately. This is a fact. But both sides of the Straits seek the goal of national unification. That too is a fact.8 Lee expressed his willingness to travel to the Chinese Mainland in a “journey of peace.” He also expressed willingness to meet with China’s highest leaders to exchange opinions.9 In the context of the recent Chinese threats, this speech was extraordinarily conciliatory. However, the Chinese did not respond in a conciliatory manner and Lee’s attitudes towards China eventually became much more hard-line.

5 Ibid., p. 133. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid., pp. 133–134. 9 Ibid., p. 134. lee teng-hui as an elected president 129

The National Development Conference of December 1996 and the Fourth Set of Constitutional Amendments of July 1997

Despite the overwhelming victory of Lee Teng-hui in the presidential election, the KMT was weak with a bare majority in the legislature. At this time a new premier required the approval of the legislature. Lien Chan, who had been premier, had just been elected vice-president. While, under Chiang Kai-shek, both Chen Cheng and Yen Chia-kan had simultaneously served as vice-president and premier, by 1996 most people believed that these two offices should be held by different people.10 Owing to this belief in the separation of the two offices, the legislature did not allow Premier Lien Chan to give the government’s annual report to the legislature. President Lee decided to break through this logjam by holding another extra-constitutional meeting, the National Development Conference (guojia fazhan huiyi 國家發展會議), convened December 23 to December 28, 1996. While on the surface this conference resembled the National Affairs Conference of 1990, another key extra-constitutional meeting, the two conferences also differed in important ways. In 1990, the only party with the prospect of winning government was the KMT. President Lee brought in DPP and non-party voices to influence the then conservative KMT itself. In 1996, there was a possibility that the DPP and possibly the New Party could actually win office. Since Taiwan would face the same problems such as China and the economy, no matter which party held government, the 1996 National Development Conference attempted to establish a common interest among all political parties. In other words, even though academics and other non-political people attended the 1996 National Development Conference, the Conference was essentially an extra-constitutional meeting of political parties where the members of the political parties explicitly participated as party representatives. The topics at the National Development Conference were grouped into three sections: constitutional government and multi-party politics,

10 Chen Cheng was first appointed premier in March 1950. He resigned in May 1954 when chosen vice-president by the National Assembly. However, Chiang Kai-shek appointed Chen Cheng as premier a second time in July 1958 and he then held both the vice-presidency and the premiership until his death in December 1963. Yen Chia-kan was appointed premier upon Chen Cheng’s death in December 1963 and served until May 1972. He became vice-president in May 1966, a position he held until Chiang Kai-shek’s death in April 1975, when Yen became president. 130 chapter five cross-Strait relations, and economic development. All three parties agreed on China, stating that both sides of the Taiwan Strait should be politically equal political entities (zhengzhi duideng zhengzhi shiti 政治對等政治實體). All three parties also agreed on the new constitutional amendments. The New Party did pull out of the National Development Conference before its conclusion over an audit issue, but it pulled out after agreement had been reached on the China issue. Thus, as Taiwan entered 1997, the 1996 National Development Conference had enhanced consensus within Taiwan on the China issue as well as on constitutional issues.11 The National Assembly passed the fourth set of constitutional amendments on July 18, 1997.12 Most importantly, amendments adjusted the relations between the executive and the legislature. The legislature no longer has the right to approve the president’s appointment of the premier, but the legislature gained the right to oust the premier with a vote of no-confidence. Secondly, if the legislature ousts the premier with a vote of no-confidence, the president has the right to dissolve the legislature. Third, in the past it took a two-thirds vote for the legislature to over- ride a request from the executive for reconsideration of a bill, but now it only requires a simple majority. These constitutional changes strengthen the legislature’s ability to force the executive to implement legislation against the executive’s will. (See Amendments 2 and 3.) A second set of changes “froze” the provincial level of government, ending the terms of the Taiwan Provincial Governor and the members of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly on December 20, 1998 and “suspending” future elections for those offices (see Amendment 9). People had long noted the anomaly of having a central government controlling Taiwan and a few offshore islands as well as a provincial government that controlled 98 per cent of the island’s area and 80 per cent of its population. Most people applauded the termination of this wasteful duplication of resources, though the New Party later claimed that the “freezing” of the provincial government was a de facto declaration of Taiwan Independence, an argument which the Chinese repeated.

11 For a summary of the National Development Conference, see National Develop- ment Conference Resolutions (Taipei: National Development Conference Secretariat, 1997). 12 For the text of these amendments, see The Republic of China Yearbook 1999, pp. 690–695. lee teng-hui as an elected president 131

The National Development Conference also called for the suspension of the election of township executives,13 but this reform was not implemented by the constitutional amendments. This would have reduced Taiwan’s administration from four levels (center, province, county, and township) to two levels (center and county). While the DPP has continued to support the abolition of township elections, seeing them as a key source of vote-buying and corruption, the KMT has opposed the appointment of township executives arguing that such a change would be anti- democratic. The appointment of township executives is not a new idea and the writer, who has spent considerable time in a rural township conducting field research,14 argued against the appointment of township executives thirty-five years ago during the authoritarian period.15 The arguments made then are still valid. Then and now an ordinary citizen can see a township executive reasonably easily and put his or her ideas forward, but it is much more difficult to see the county executive, who has responsibilities for a much larger area and population. In addition, the appointment of township executives would simply make such appointments the bailiwick of county faction leaders rather than township voters.16 Other amendments reduced the size of the National Assembly (Amendment 1), increased the size of the Legislature to compensate for the loss of National Assembly and Taiwan Provincial Assembly seats (Amendment 4), and adjusted the operation and memberships of the Judicial Branch (yuan 院) (Amendment 5), the Examination Branch (Amendment 6) and the Control Branch (Amendment 7). The Amendments reconfirmed the direct, popular election of the President and Vice-President and ended the former stipulation that the Premier had to counter-sign his own removal (Amendment 2). Amendment 8 dealt with remuneration of members of the National Assembly and Legislature, while Amendment 10 encouraged a variety of economic activities, environmental protection, the survival of small and medium- sized enterprises, universal health insurance, the dignity of women, provision for the physically and mentally handicapped, cultural pluralism, and safeguarding the status and political participation of aborigines

13 National Development Conference Resolutions, pp. 8–9. 14 Jacobs, Local Politics in Rural Taiwan under Dictatorship and Democracy. 15 Jia Bo 家博 (J. Bruce Jacobs), “Taiwan xiangcun difang zhengzhi de liang ge wenti 臺灣鄉村地方政治的兩個問題 [Two Problems of Local Politics in Rural Taiwan],” Daxue zazhi [The Intellectual] 大學雜誌, no. 100 (September 1976), pp. 53–54. 16 Ibid., p. 53. 132 chapter five

(yuanzhu minzu 原住民族). As in the past Amendment 11 stated that the rights and obligations between the people of the Chinese mainland and those of “the free area” may be specified by law. This period of conflict came to an end with the appointment of Vincent Siew as Premier on August 21, 1997. Although Lien Chan had been proclaimed the first “Taiwanese” premier, Lien in fact was born in Xi’an and in many ways, especially after 2000, behaved more as a Chinese than as a Taiwanese. Siew was the first premier actually born in Taiwan.

The County Executive and Mayoral Elections of 1997

On November 26, 1996, some criminals invaded the residence of the Taoyuan County Executive, Liu Pang-yu (劉邦友), and killed Liu, a county assemblyman and six others. This crime shocked Taiwan and raised issues of the criminalization of local politics on the island. To date, the crime remains unsolved. On March 15, 1997, by-elections were held for the county executives in Taoyuan and Hualien counties. In Taoyuan, the DPP nominee, Annette Lu (Lü Hsiu-lien 呂秀蓮), won overwhelmingly with 55.31 per cent of the vote. In Hualien, the KMT nominee, Yeh Yao-hui 葉燿煇, won.17 Voters chose new county executive and mayoral equivalents on November 29, 1997. In some ways, this was a massive DPP victory. The DPP won twelve county executive and mayoral seats in both north and south Taiwan, a substantial increase from the six positions won in 1993. The KMT only won eight county executiveships (including Kinmen and Matsu) and only six in Taiwan itself. Non-partisans won three positions. In addition, the DPP actually outpolled the KMT by 43.22 per cent to 42.12 per cent of the vote. Non-partisans obtained 12.9 per cent while the New Party only obtained 1.4 per cent.18 Yet, a senior DPP leader advised caution. While the KMT had lost over five per cent of the vote since 1993, the DPP had only gained just over two per cent. Most of the gains came from division within the KMT itself leading to “against party discipline” (weiji 違紀) candidacies. In addition, many voters cast their ballots for a specific candidate rather than for a particular party.

17 Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai II, p. 314. 18 Ibid., pp. 240, 249–252, 315. For official election statistics see, http://210.69.23.140/ cec/vote3.asp?pass1=F1997A0000000000aaa, http://210.69.23.140/cec/%5Cpdf%5CF1997 005.pdf, and http://210.69.23.140/cec/%5Cpdf%5CF1997006.pdf. lee teng-hui as an elected president 133

The Legislative and Mayoral Elections of December 5, 1998

On December 5, 1998, Taiwan’s voters chose the next legislature. Compared with 1995, the KMT did better, but the DPP and the New Party both suffered great losses. The KMT won 123 of 225 seats or 54.67 per cent of the seats with 46.4 per cent of the vote, about the same percentage as 1995. But the DPP lost both in seats, winning 70 of 225 or proportionately almost two per cent fewer, and in votes, just gaining 29.6 per cent, a loss of about 3.5 per cent compared to 1995. The New Party had a calamitous decline winning only 4.9 per cent of the seats compared to 12.8 per cent in 1995. Their vote dropped from about 12.95 per cent to 7.1 per cent. A variety of small parties and non-partisans gained the rest of the vote and twenty seats.19 The new legislature included a large number of former provincial assemblymen who had now run for the legislature. Several prominent politicians lost their runs for legislative seats including Yao Chia-wen, Yu Ching, and Tsai Shih-yuan 蔡式淵 of the DPP, Ju Gau-jeng, Chen Kuei- miao and Yok Mu-ming 郁慕明 of the New Party and Lin Cheng-chieh, a non-partisan Mainlander who had help found the DPP. Some analysts said the New Party had gone from being a “key minority” to a “minority on the margins” and that it was a “bubble political party” that had popped.20 In Taipei and Kaohsiung municipalities, voters also cast their ballots for mayor and city council on the same day.21 In Taipei, incumbent mayor Chen Shui-bian, the DPP candidate, ran against Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九, the KMT nominee. In this election, President Lee Teng-hui supported Ma Ying-jeou, a Mainlander born in Hong Kong, and claimed Ma was a “New Taiwanese.” Ma gave definition to this new term, “I was brought up in Taiwan and raised on the nourishing food of Taiwan. I love Taiwan. I am a new Taiwanese.”22

19 For official election results, see http://210.69.23.140/cec/vote411.asp?pass1=B1998 00000000000aaa and links, http://210.69.23.140/cec/%5Cpdf%5CB1998005.pdf and http:// 210.69.23.140/cec/%5Cpdf%5CB1998006.pdf. See also Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai II, p. 262. 20 Ibid. 21 As directly-administered or provincial-level municipalities (zhixiashi 直轄市), Taipei and Kaohsiung were equivalent to Taiwan Province in status, but they were not “frozen” like Taiwan Province. Although they now became equivalent to a county, they still retained their special preferential funding compared to counties and to county-level municipalities. 22 Lee Teng-hui, The Road to Democracy: Taiwan’s Pursuit of Identity (Tokyo and Kyoto: PHP Institute, 1999), p. 192. 134 chapter five

In 1994, Chen Shui-bian had won against split opposition. In 1998, though the name of Wang Chien-shien, the New Party candidate, appeared on the ballot, Wang did not campaign and only two candidates actually competed. Everyone agreed that Chen Shui-bian had completely reformed the Taipei Municipal Government and he received cross-party praise for his mayoralty, but even though he obtained almost 73,000 more votes in 1998 than in 1994, Chen lost his bid for re-election. Taipei has Taiwan’s largest concentration of Mainlanders and while only ten per cent of Taipei’s Mainlanders voted for Chen,23 many Taiwanese voted for Ma Ying-jeou, who became the new mayor of Taipei.24 In Kaohsiung, the KMT incumbent, Wu Den-yih ran for re-election against Frank Hsieh (Hsieh Chang-ting), the DPP challenger. In 1994, Wu had defeated the DPP nominee by over 111,000 votes, a margin greater than 15 per cent. In addition, the polls in 1998 showed Wu with a lead of more than ten per cent. Thus, when the election began, the Wu Den-yih forces were quite confident.25 The influential Global Views Magazine (Yuanjian zazhi 遠見雜誌) had completed a survey of local mayors and county executives in which Wu Den-yih placed dead last as the worst local leader. Frank Hsieh began to criticize Wu’s record: “In eight years as mayor, he has done badly. One still cannot drink Kaohsiung’s water. People have long shouted about a rapid transport system, but there is still not even a shadow of one. Every day from morning to night, they just speak the ‘Lies of Swindlers.’”26 The campaign descended into the mud with both sides engaging in particularly unsavory tactics. In the end, Frank Hsieh narrowly defeated Wu Den-yih by 4,565 votes out of almost 800,000 ballots cast.27 Although Frank Hsieh won the mayoral election in Kaohsiung, in the simultaneous City Council election, the DPP did badly both in terms of votes and in terms of seats. In Kaohsiung, the KMT dominated and non- partisans also did reasonably well. In the Taipei City Council election,

23 Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai II, p. 260. 24 For the 1998 election statistics, see http://210.69.23.140/cec/vote3.asp?pass1=D1998 06300000000aaa. For the 1994 election results, see http://210.69.23.140/cec/vote3.asp ?pass1=D199406300000000aaa. 25 Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai II, p. 260. For the 1994 election statistics, see http://210.69.23.140/cec/vote3.asp?pass1=D199406400000000 aaa. 26 Ibid., p. 261. The term translated as “Lies of Swindlers” is Hokkien. The Chinese characters are 白賊話. 27 For the 1998 election statistics, see http://210.69.23.140/cec/vote3.asp?pass1=D1998 06400000000aaa. lee teng-hui as an elected president 135 despite Ma Ying-jeou’s mayoral victory, the KMT did quite poorly while the DPP and the New Party did rather well (see Table 5.1 for these election results).28 Thus, in both cities, the mayors faced city councils in which their political party controlled only a minority of seats.

Table 5.1. City Council elections in Taipei and Kaohsiung, December 5, 1998 Taipei Kaohsiung Vote Seats Vote Seats KMT 40.1% 23 45.2% 25 DPP 31.0% 19 26.8% 9 New Party 18.6% 9 3.8% 1 Non-Partisans 6.3% 1 22.3% 9

Total 96.0% 52 98.1% 44

President Lee Moves in a New Direction

When Lee Teng-hui became president in January 1988, he faced the strong Mainlander elite that remained in power following the colonial government of Presidents Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo. Lee then moved cautiously as explained in Chapter 3. Only after the anti-Main- stream lost ground in the first full election of the legislature on December 19, 1992 was Lee able to appoint a “Taiwanese” to the premiership. In a significant March 30, 1994 interview with Shiba Ryōtarō, Lee did call the KMT “a regime that came [to Taiwan] from the outside” (wailai zhengquan 外來政權), sometimes translated an “an alien regime.”29 Yet, Lee remained moderate in his statements about China and about Taiwan’s possible future reunification with the Mainland. In his Inauguration Speech of May 20, 1990, Lee stated, “Taiwan and the mainland are indivisible parts of China’s territory, and all Chinese are compatriots of the same flesh and blood.”30 On October 1, 1990, Lee formally established the National Unification Council (guojia tongyi wei

28 Sources for Table 5.1: http://210.69.23.140/cec/%5Cpdf%5CE1998635.pdf, http:// 210.69.23.140/cec/%5Cpdf%5CE1998636.pdf, http://210.69.23.140/cec/%5Cpdf%5CE1998 645.pdf, and http://210.69.23.140/cec/%5Cpdf%5CE1998646.pdf. 29 Lee’s enemies distorted the contents of this interview in order to attack Lee. For more details on the Shiba interview including original references, see Jacobs and Liu, “Lee Teng-hui and ‘Taiwan’,” p. 383. 30 For original references, see Ibid., p. 381. 136 chapter five yuanhui 國家統一委員會), a body in the Presidential Office that established the National Unification Guidelines (guojia tongyi gangling 國家統一綱領) on February 23, 1991. This document stated, “the mainland and Taiwan are both territories of China,” but “Unification must be gradually reached in phases under the principles of rationality, peace, equality and mutuality.”31 Taiwan also recognized that it did not control the Chinese mainland through three key documents: amendment 10 of the constitutional amendments of 1991, the final clause of the first phase of the National Unification Guidelines, and the termination of the “period of national mobilization for the suppression of the communist rebellion” effective on May 1, 1991. In the words of an official source, “Thus, the ROC government recognized the fact that two equal political entities exist in two independent areas of one country.”32 As noted earlier in this chapter, despite great provocation during the 1996 presidential election campaign, Lee Teng-hui in his inauguration speech of May 20, 1996 remained conciliatory towards China. Even as late as July 22, 1998 in a speech to the National Unification Council, Lee reiterated, “China must be reunified,” though “this reunification must be under a system of democracy, freedom and equitable prosperity that will safeguard the rights and interests of all Chinese, and is in keeping with the global trend.”33 The second Koo- Wang talks took place in Beijing during October 1998. According to participants, while polite, these talks achieved nothing.34 None of these overtures to China received any positive response. This led to a sharp change in President Lee’s overt China policy that was expressed openly in an interview President Lee had with Deutsche Welle on July 7, 1999. The first written question previously submitted by the German broadcaster included the text, “Taiwan is considered by Beijing’s government as a ‘renegade province.’” Lee’s response included the following statement: “The 1991 constitutional amendments have placed cross- strait relations as a state-to-state relationship or at least a special state-to-state relationship, rather than an internal relationship between a legitimate government and a renegade group, or between a central government and a local government.” (The term for state here is guo 國, sometimes translated as “nation.”)35

31 For original references, see Ibid. 32 For original sources, see Ibid., pp. 381–382. 33 For original sources, see Ibid., p. 387. 34 Ibid., pp. 387–388. 35 The last part of this paragraph and the rest of this section come from Ibid., pp. 388–390. See that source for original sources. lee teng-hui as an elected president 137

The response to Lee’s statement was immediate both in Beijing and in Taipei. The Chinese reacted strongly to Lee’s description of cross-Strait relations as “special state-to-state” relations and cancelled Wang Daohan’s planned October 1999 visit to Taiwan. The Lianhe bao (聯合報, United Daily News), the most “pro-China” of Taiwan’s major newspapers, called Lee’s statement “two-states theory” (liangguo lun 兩國論). Although originally an attack on Lee, the term “two-states theory” has now become part of Taiwan’s political lexicon and is used by Lee’s supporters as well as by his enemies. Lee’s “special state-to-state” relations did represent an abrupt change in Taiwan’s policy. The writer has conducted a number of interviews with people involved in the development of this policy. At the time research groups, primarily composed of academics, were examining Taiwan’s legal status, especially in light of international law. Charged with attempting to strengthen Taiwan’s sovereignty, they made many reports. One report contained a small section by one professor which mentioned “special state-to-state” relations, a phrase Lee liked and used in the interview. In an extended group interview on December 14, 2004, Lee gave considerable detail behind his decision to make this statement. He noted that originally Wang Daohan was scheduled to come to Taiwan in April 1999, but that Beijing postponed this to October 1999. Lee feared that Jiang Zemin was going to announce Wang’s trip to Taiwan on the first of October, the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the People’s Republic, as a great victory for the Chinese Revolution. Initially, President Lee would have preferred an interview with Time or Newsweek, but they did not make a request for an interview, so he used the opportunity of the interview with Deutsche Welle. The original questions were in written form and Lee was also presented with draft responses prepared by either the Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Government Information Office. In Chinese, the first question referred to a “province in rebellion” (panluan sheng 叛亂省). Angered, Lee answered that Taiwan is not a province and that relations with China were of a special state-to-state nature. In response to a direct question from the writer, Lee stated that he “deliberately” (guyi 故意) made this statement to prevent Wang Daohan from coming to Taiwan at that time as he did not want Jiang Zemin to exploit Wang’s trip as a breakthrough in the reunification of China on the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic. In 1999 many people in Taiwan were concerned about “Two States Theory.” Later, many people became upset when President Chen Shui- 138 chapter five bian similarly declared on August 3, 2002 that there is “a state on each side” (yibian yiguo 一邊一國) of the Taiwan Strait. However, in just a short period of time, these ideas have now become part of “mainstream” thinking in Taiwan and no longer create controversy.

The Fifth and Sixth Sets of Constitutional Amendments, September 1999 and April 2000

During the early hours of September 4, 1999,36 the National Assembly approved the fifth set of constitutional amendments under Lee Teng- hui’s presidency. President Lee promulgated these amendments on September 15. This fifth set of constitutional amendments mainly changed the size and the method of electing the National Assembly. In accord with the resolution of the 1996 National Development Conference, the size of the National Assembly was reduced to three hundred members. Also, in accord with the National Development Conference resolution, the method of election was changed to “proportional representation.”37 However, the amendments raised two questions. First, why were these amendments not made during the fourth set of constitutional amendments in 1997? Second, why did the National Assembly continue to have terms when the National Development Conference had called for their suspension?38 In fact, the fifth set of constitutional amendments stated that the party and non-party votes received in the Legislative Branch elections should be used to elect the National Assembly members in “proportional representation” elections. In addition, the fifth set of constitutional amendments extended the terms of both the legislature and the National Assembly to June 30, 2002, an extension of the legislative term by five months and the National Assembly term by two years and forty- two days. One hundred twenty legislators thought these constitutional amendments were unconstitutional for several reasons and asked the Council of Grand Justices, Taiwan’s Constitutional Court, for a constitutional interpretation. In Constitutional Interpretation No. 499, dated March 24, 2000, the Grand Justices declared the fifth set of constitutional amendments to

36 The date of September 3, 1999 given in the official yearbook is wrong; see, for example, The Republic of China Yearbook 2000 (Taipei: Government Information Office, 2000), p. 685. 37 National Development Conference Resolutions, p. 9. 38 Ibid. lee teng-hui as an elected president 139 be unconstitutional. Thus, the Constitution went back to the version amended on July 18, 1997 and promulgated on July 21, 1997.39 Constitutional Interpretation No. 499 raised several reasons for ruling the fifth set of constitutional amendments unconstitutional. First, the Second and Third Reading votes took place in the pre-dawn hours of September 4. Although the vote in the Second Reading had failed, the Third Reading went ahead in violation of the National Assembly’s rules of procedure. Second, these Second and Third Reading votes took place by secret ballot. This too went against the National Assembly’s rules of procedure. Third, the Council of Grand Justices ruled that a vote for the Legislature could not also be a vote for National Assembly. In addition, the “proportional representation” formula discriminated against non- partisans. Fourth, the tying of the National Assembly term to that of the Legislature also creates confusion, especially since the president can dismiss the legislature. Thus, Amendment 4, Paragraph 3 which sets the dates for the Fourth and Fifth legislatures contradicts the provision that the president can dismiss a legislature. Fifth, the constitutional amendments arbitrarily extended the terms of the Legislature and National Assembly. In addition, members of both bodies would have received increased remuneration, despite not having been to the polls, another unconstitutional amendment. Sixth, according to representations given to the court, the original terms of the Legislature were to enable it to deal with fiscal matters. The extension of the terms of the Legislature (and the National Assembly) to June 30, 2002 would have upset this routine, though, as noted earlier, since 1997 the president can now dismiss the legislature if the legislature expresses no confidence in the premier.40 Constitutional Interpretation No. 499 ranged widely looking at both Republic of China constitutional precedents and at international cases such as those in Germany, Austria, Italy, Turkey and the United States. But, despite all the legal language, what comes through very clearly is the

39 For Constitutional Interpretation No. 499, see http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/p03_01.asp?expno=499. An English version, also on the website of the Judi- cial Branch, is available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01 .asp?expno=499. This English version lacks the six concurrent and dissenting opinions as well as the original petition of the 120 members of the legislature. The writer has used Constitutional Interpretation No. 499 for the above discussion of the content of the fifth set of constitutional amendments. 40 These six reasons bring together the arguments in Constitutional Interpretation No. 499, but the numbering is the writer’s and does not accord with the numbering in the Interpretation itself. 140 chapter five sense that the fifth set of constitutional amendments were unconstitutional for a whole variety of reasons. The Council of Grand Justices issued Constitutional Interpretation No. 499 on March 24, 2000, just four days after the presidential election of 2000. On April 24, the National Assembly approved a revised sixth set of constitutional amendments and President Lee promulgated them the next day.41 Amendment 1 says that a National Assembly of three hundred members will be elected by proportional representation within nine months of the Legislature announcing a proposal to amend the constitution or alter national territory or within three months of the Legislature calling for the impeachment of the president or vice-president. National Assembly members will convene within ten days of their election and will stay in session for no more than one month. Their term of office will end on the last day of the session. In addition, the terms of the Third National Assembly would end on May 19, 2000. These new procedures were used in 2005, as discussed in the next chapter. Amendment 4 dealt with altering national territory: The territory of the Republic of China, defined by its existing national boundaries, shall not be altered unless initiated upon the proposal of one- fourth of all members of the Legislative Yuan, passed by three-fourths of the members of the Legislative Yuan present at a meeting requiring a quorum of three-fourths of all the members, and approved by three-fourths of the delegates to the National Assembly present at a meeting requiring a quorum of two-thirds of all the delegates.42 Amendment 8, which dealt with remuneration of the Legislature, stated: “Except for general annual adjustments, individual regulations on increase of remuneration or pay shall take effect starting with the subsequent Legislative Yuan.”43 Expenses for convening the National Assembly would be regulated by law. Amendment 9 enabled modifications to the functions, operations and organization of the Taiwan Provincial Government to be regulated by law. Amendment 10, the “motherhood” clause, now also guaranteed a variety of services to the physically and mentally handicapped, empha-

41 For the text of this sixth set of constitutional amendments, see ROC Yearbook 2000, pp. 685–690. 42 Ibid., pp. 687–688. 43 Ibid., p. 689. lee teng-hui as an elected president 141 sized social welfare services for citizens, and respect to members of the military. The other amendments encapsulated earlier amendments.

The September 21, 1999 Earthquake

At 1:47 am on September 21, 1999, Taiwan’s worst recorded earthquake shook the island and shattered central Taiwan. Recorded at between 7.3 and 7.6 on the logarithmic Richter scale,44 the earthquake killed more than 2,400 Taiwanese. Like the great Tangshan earthquake of July 28, 1976 and the Sichuan earthquake of May 12, 2008, the September 21 earthquake in Taiwan had political repercussions. The fastest and most effective groups to begin earthquake relief were a variety of religious organizations that had basically developed since Taiwan had democratized.45 In contrast, governmental relief efforts appeared slow and bureaucratic. Although at least one poll suggested that Lien Chan actually benefited early in the 2000 presidential campaign from his roles in the earthquake,46 most commentators believed that government’s earthquake relief efforts hurt Lien’s candidacy.47

Nominations for the 2000 Presidential Campaign

In both the KMT and the DPP, the contest for nomination as the party’s candidate for president in the March 2000 election was hard-fought. In the KMT both Vice-President Lien Chan and former Provincial Governor James Soong (Sung Chu-yu) desired the position. Both had been close to President (and KMT Party Chairman) Lee Teng-hui. In fact, Soong had been a key supporter of Lee’s in the days following President Chiang

44 Brian Hsu and William Ide, “Quake of the century,” Taipei Times, September 22, 1999, p. 1. On the Richter scale, a magnitude 7 earthquake is ten times more powerful than a magnitude 6 earthquake. Technically, this ten-fold increase is in the earthquake’s amplitude of ground oscillations. In fact, the energy released by the earthquake increases 31 times for each whole number in the Richter scale. See http://earthquake.usgs.gov/ learning/topics/richter.php. 45 Richard Madsen, Democracy’s Dharma: Religious Renaissance and Political Devel- opment in Taiwan (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 2007). 46 Chen Ro-jinn, “Lien’s electoral fortunes rise from earthquake’s ruins,” Taipei Times, October 19, 1999, p. 8. 47 Interviews and Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai II, pp. 269, 280. 142 chapter five

Ching-kuo’s death in January 1988. Soong, under Lee’s patronage, became Secretary-General of the KMT in 1989, was appointed Taiwan Provincial Governor in 1993 and won the first popular election of Governor in 1994. Clearly, however, conflict arose between President Lee and Governor Soong and by mid-1998, this conflict was severe. Soong was very unhappy about the “freezing” of the Taiwan Provincial Government, which he perceived to be an attack on himself. President Lee did in fact support Vice-President Lien Chan for the presidency and the KMT at its Fifteenth National Party Congress formally nominated Lien as its presidential candidate and Premier Vincent Siew as its vice-presidential candidate on August 27, 1999. There are probably two reasons why President Lee supported Lien Chan over James Soong. First, James Soong was a Mainlander and President Lee had worked hard to bring Taiwanese into leadership positions in government. Second, while Lee had worked closely with Soong, Soong was, according to interviews, extremely “political” and thus inherently untrustworthy. Soong always remembered people’s names. As governor, he visited every one of Taiwan’s 309 township-level units several times. And Soong kept records of what he had achieved in each township as well as each county. This record served him well in the presidential election. With the KMT nominating Lien Chan, James Soong decided to run for president as an independent. He chose a Taiwanese academic medical administrator, Professor Chang Chao-hsiung 張昭雄, as his vice-presidential candidate.48 The DPP too was split with two candidates vying for the party’s presidential nomination. Hsu Hsin-liang, who had served as DPP Party Chairman in 1991–1993 and 1996–1998, was very interested in running for president. A Hakka, Hsu’s last elected office has been as Taoyuan County Executive from 1977 to 1979, when the KMT dictatorship impeached and “suspended” him from office and “allowed” him to travel overseas.49 When Hsu returned, he became an important DPP leader, but had held no elected office. The second DPP candidate was Chen Shui-bian. Chen had entered the opposition movement as a lawyer for the defendants in the Kaohsiung Incident trial. He had been a Taipei City Councilman during 1981–1985 and a member of the legislature from 1989–1994, when he was elected mayor of Taipei. In 1986–1987 Chen spent eight months in jail for “libel” in

48 Interviews and Ibid., pp. 268–269. 49 For background, Jacobs, “Taiwan 1979,” pp. 91–92. lee teng-hui as an elected president 143 accusing a right-wing academic, Elmer Fung (Feng Hu-hsiang 馮滬祥), of plagiarism. (Most independent observers agreed that Fung had plag iarized.)50 Although in prison when the DPP was founded, Chen soon became a prominent DPP leader. His loss to Ma Ying-jeou, while running for re-election as mayor in 1998, left him free to run for president in 2000. On February 28 and March 14, 1999, the very senior DPP leader Huang Hsin-chieh held two mediation meetings with Hsu Hsin-liang and Chen Shui-bian, but these failed as the two candidates had quite different approaches. In addition, factional struggles within the DPP contributed to these disputes. As a result of the 1996 debacle when the DPP nominated Peng Ming-min, the DPP now required each candidate to be recommended by forty party officials. Realizing that he would not obtain the DPP nomination, Hsu resolved to leave the DPP. On May 7, 1999, Hsu held a press conference in which he said, “Comrades, at this point, we separate.” In addition to announcing that he was leaving the DPP, Hsu also announced that he would run for president in 2000. On July 10, 1999 (the day after President Lee Teng-hui’s “special state-to-state” interview with Deutsche Welle), the DPP Party Congress unanimously nominated Chen Shui-bian to be its presidential candidate.51 The DPP nominated Annette Lu to be its vice-presidential candidate. Hsu Hsin-liang also chose a woman, Josephine Chu (Chu Hui-liang 朱惠良), a New Party Legislator of Mainlander background, to be his running mate. As he was not nominated by a party, Hsu Hsin-liang had to run a signature drive to get on the ballot. Some observers suggested that the KMT helped Hsu run the signature drive since the KMT hoped that Hsu’s candidacy would attract DPP votes from Chen Shui-bian and Hakka votes from James Soong, thus helping Lien Chan. Thus, so far, the presidential campaign had four candidates: one each nominated by the KMT and the DPP, Lien Chan and Chen Shui-bian, and two independent candidates who had split off from each of the two major

50 During 1979–1986, Fung was a secretary to President Chiang Ching-kuo. After serving as Dean of Humanities at National Central University, Fung won election as a New Party legislator in 1998. In 2000, Fung ran as vice-presidential candidate on the New Party ticket with Lee Ao. In 2005, Fung received a four-year prison sentence for raping his Filipina housemaid in 2003, see Rich Chang, “Elmer Fung guilty of raping Filipina,” Taipei Times, July 9, 2005, p. 1. This sentence was confirmed after Fung’s appeal, Rich Chang, “Elmer Fung sentenced to four years for assault,” Taipei Times, August 10, 2006, p. 2. 51 For the DPP nomination process, see Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai II, pp. 266–268. In English, see Shelley Rigger, From Opposition to Power: Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive party (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2001), pp. 100–102. 144 chapter five parties, James Soong and Hsu Hsin-liang. Lee Ao 李敖, a non-partisan Mainlander intellectual who had published the important opposition journal Wenxing 文星 [Apollo] from 1957 to 1965 and who had spent 1971– 1976 and 1981–1982 in jail as a political prisoner,52 was drafted by the New Party. With Elmer Fung as Lee Ao’s running mate, the New Party ticket was the only one composed solely of Mainlanders.

The 2000 Presidential Election Campaign

The Chinese government again insinuated itself in a Taiwan electoral campaign by releasing its White Paper entitled “The One China Principle and the Taiwan Question” on February 21, 2000.53 In its first paragraph, the White Paper stated that the origin of the issue was in the Chinese Civil War. After “the Chinese people won a great victory in the new democratic revolution and founded the People’s Republic of China (PRC),” the “Kuomintang (KMT) ruling clique retreated from the mainland to entrench in China’s Taiwan Province in confrontation with the Central Government with the support of foreign forces.” The first section of the White Paper asserted, “Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. All the facts and laws about Taiwan prove that Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory.” In addition, the first section of the White Paper made clear that “China” is the “People’s Republic of China”: “Taiwan is a part of China and the government of the PRC is the sole legal government repre- senting the whole of China.” The Conclusion began: China has a long history of 5,000 years ... [U]nity has always been the main trend in the development of Chinese history. After every separation, the country was invariably reunified, only to be followed in its wake by rapid political, economic, cultural, scientific and technological development… The 5,000-year history and culture have been implanted deeply in the minds of the Chinese people, sprouting the strong national consciousness of the need for national unification. Clearly, such opinions had little “market” attraction in Taiwan. The Chung-hsing Bills case (hsing piao’an 興票案), allegedly involving corruption by James Soong, proved a much more important element in the campaign. Soong was the early leader in the campaign and analysts from all camps generally believed Soong would have won if the case had

52 These dates are from Lee Ao, http://bizpoint.org/leeao/modules/xoopsfaq/index. php?cat_id=1#q2. 53 Available from http://english.people.com.cn/features/taiwanpaper/taiwanb.html. lee teng-hui as an elected president 145 not arisen during the campaign. The KMT had given the Chung-hsing Bills material to the DPP, but the DPP did not disclose the material as it feared that many of Soong’s votes would swing to Lien Chan. Thus, on December 9, 1999, the KMT disclosed materials for the Chung-hsing Bills case and the election became much closer.54 The amount of money that Soong allegedly stole was NT$1.1 billion (US$37 million).55 An important poll at the end of February showed that the three main tickets remained very close with Lien at 25.2 per cent, Chen with 24.1 per cent and Soong with 22.1 per cent. But 27 per cent of voters remained undecided.56 In another poll conducted over the next a few days, as many as 37.4 per cent believed Chen Shui-bian was most likely to start a cross- strait war, much higher than Soong’s 18.2 per cent or Lien’s 12.3 per cent. Soong was the most disliked candidate with 21.9 per cent, followed by Chen with 20.4 per cent and Lien with 14.3 per cent. In this poll, the undecided voters had increased slightly to 29.7 per cent.57 A DPP rally in Taipei on Saturday afternoon, March 4, began with a rapper from Los Angeles and lots of people selling campaign items for A-bian (Chen Shui-bian’s nickname) such as jackets, watches and pins. An actress asked the audience rhetorically, “why do so few in the entertainment industry support the DPP ticket?” She replied that the KMT controls entertainment and people fear they would have no work. She said that fortunately she would be able to rely on her husband for support. Chen Shui-bian spoke, noting how Taipei had excelled under his leadership and how much money he would be able to save by cutting waste. Then Annette Lu spoke about peace with China. Emphasizing both the close blood ties between Taiwan and China and their geographi- cal proximity, Lu said peace would be in the interest of the 23 million people of Taiwan, the one billion people of China and the six billion people of the whole world. The next evening, the KMT held a rally at the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Park. Vincent Siew gave an uninspiring talk about how well Taiwan had done economically in Asia and how the KMT ticket could make Taiwan even more prosperous. He asked the audience whether Taiwan needed to change its leaders, an approach that struck this observer as rather negative. Other speakers included Wu Poh-hsiung

54 Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai II, p. 269. 55 At the exchange rate of N$30= US$1. 56 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 3, 2000, p. 12. 57 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 4, 2000, p. 7. 146 chapter five

吳伯雄, who also sang, Mayor Ma Ying-jeou, and lots of business leaders who read from prepared texts. Lien Chan spoke using a lot of “safe” (an 安) words including “stability” (anding 安定), “security” (anquan 安全) and “peace of mind” (anxin 安心). He emphasized that he and Siew each had more than twenty-five years of government service, and thus had lots of experience. The next day, the Chen Shui-bian campaign had an effective full page advertisement responding to the fears that Chen Shui-bian would lead Taiwan into war with China. A picture of a young man doing a one-armed pushup was headlined, “Next year, he will become a soldier. His father is Chen Shui-bian.” The ad further noted, “The two sons and the son-in-law of Lien Chan have never been in the military. The sons of James Soong and Chang Chao-hsiung are all Americans and have also never been in the military.” The ad concluded, “All of A-bian’s relatives are in Taiwan and his only son is going into the military next year. Thus, he is the president… who most does not want Taiwan to go to war!”58 The same day a full-page ad for James Soong had a long list of polls demonstrating that Lien Chan trailed both James Soong and Chen Shui- bian. The headline proclaimed, “Old No. 3 Lien has already struck out. Voting for Lien equals voting for Bian equals Danger. Do you feel safe?” In fact, the polls in the advertisement for early March showed that Lien was closing the gap and that Soong was actually losing support.59 March 7 was the last day that the media could publish polls. Table 5.2 gives a summary of polls as published in two major newspapers.60 Clearly, these polls show that the race was quite tight. It is probably not statisti- cally significant, but five of the seven polls had Soong second, while one had him first and the other third. In the seven polls, Chen came in first in three and last in four, while Lien came in first in three and last in two (and second in the two TV polls).

58 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 6, 2000, p. 16; Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 6, 2000, p. 7; Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 6, 2000, p. 7. 59 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 6, 2000, p. 16; Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 6, 2000, p. 16. 60 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 7, 2000, p. 4; Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 7, 2000, p. 3. lee teng-hui as an elected president 147

Table 5.2. Major polls as published, March 7, 2000 Poll Chen Lien Soong Source China Research 21.3% 24.5% 22.0% Ziyou shibao Chen Election Hq 25.8% 22.4% 25.1% Ziyou shibao Lien Election Hq 29.4% 34.6% 30.9% Ziyou shibao China Times 25% 22% 24% Zhongguo shibao United Daily 22% 27% 26% Zhongguo shibao Global TV 22% 23% 27% Zhongguo shibao TVBS 26% 25% 24% Zhongguo shibao

The closeness of the polls became important for the issue of “strategic voting:” should voters cast their ballots for their second choice if they fear that their most disliked choice might win? This “dump X to save Y” (qibao 棄保) phenomenon became a constant theme in analyses of this three- way race throughout the campaign. One commentary said the “dump- save [phenomenon] is like falling in love… like a triangular love-affair. Everyone has hopes, no one has guarantees. All three expect that they will be the ‘saved’ one… and can gain victory, but they also fear being dumped.”61 The KMT tried to use the idea of rotation of government against Chen Shui-bian. Headlined “Do we want this kind of rotation?”, a KMT ad showed a good gear becoming worn and asked, “do we want to rotate Stability into Chaos? Prosperity into Recession? Peace into War?”62 Again, on the same day, the Chen Shui-bian forces had a very effective advertisement against the Soong-Chang ticket. The main picture showed a hand with an American flag in it. The key headline said, “The two families of James Soong and Chang Chao-hsiung altogether have ten people, and they have six American passports.” The ad noted that in becoming Americans, one must reject one’s original citizenship and loyalty. The ad then asked, “If this time we elect a president and vice-president who always say they will defend our national flag, but whose whole families are almost all Americans, what do you think?”63 Later that day, Chang Chao-hsiung corrected the ad. He noted that in fact his family had one more American, a daughter-in-law, who had not

61 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 12, 2000, p. 6. 62 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 7, 2000, p. 9; Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 7, 2000, p. 12. 63 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 7, 2000, p. 5. 148 chapter five been counted.64 The next day, the Chen Shui-bian camp re-ran the ad with two changes. The headline now said, “The two families of James Soong and Chang Chao-hsiung altogether have eleven people, and they have seven American passports.” The ad added a note, “Thanks to Chang Chao-hsiung for publicly correcting that his family also has an American daughter-in-law.”65 The Chen campaign placed a follow-up advertisement the next day with a headline of “Why are their whole families almost all Americans?” The ad had the family trees of Soong and Chao with the Americans identified with American flags. The ad concluded, “Taiwan does not need this kind of president who has no roots.”66 On March 6, 2000 China’s Liberation Army Daily (Jiefang junbao 解放軍報) attacked Chen Shui-bian in an editorial and warned Taiwan’s voters not to support him: “One minute he is brazenly howling ‘long live Taiwan independence,’ while the next he is using beautiful and pleasant words to lie that he wants ‘goodwill reconciliation, vigorous cooperation and everlasting peace’ with the mainland.” The editorial continued, “Under no circumstances should we be fooled by his sweet talk.”67 Of course, no matter what Chen Shui-bian did, he was condemned by China. A major poll suggested that China’s interventions proved largely counter-productive.68 Of those polled, 24.2 per cent supported Chen Shui- bian, 20.3 per cent supported Lien Chan, and 24.1 per cent supported James Soong, while 28.7 per cent did not express an opinion. These figures are very close to those in Table 5.2 above. But more importantly, 67.7 per cent said they found the Chinese White Paper “completely unacceptable” or “partially unacceptable” and another 20.7 per cent had “no feeling” or “no opinion.” Thus, those with positive or partially positive opinions of the Chinese White Paper accounted for only 11.6 per cent of the population. Furthermore, supporters of all three major candidates had negative opinions about the Chinese White Paper. On the surface, the White Paper appeared to reduce Chen’s vote slightly. In response to a question suggesting that the Chinese Communists

64 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 8, 2000, p. 3. 65 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 8, 2000, p. 5; Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 8, 2000, p. 7. 66 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 9, 2000, p. 5. 67 Quotes from China Post, March 7, 2000, p. 1. Also reported in Taipei Times, March 7, 2000, p. 1 and Taiwan News, March 7, 2000, pp. 1,3. 68 The poll by Rex International PR Consultants was conducted on March 5, the day before the Liberation Army Daily’s editorial, but in the context of the Chinese White Paper. lee teng-hui as an elected president 149 did not want Chen Shui-bian to be elected, 2.4 per cent of voters said, “Yes, I will no longer support him [Chen],” while 0.9 per cent answered, “Originally, I didn’t support him, but now I have decided to support him.” This suggests Chen lost 1.5 per cent of the vote, but in this section of the poll 32.6 per cent said, “I have always supported him.” This suggests that Chinese pressure may in fact have raised Chen’s support from 24.2 per cent to 32.6 per cent, an increase of almost nine per cent. While, another part of the poll suggested that Taiwanese voters are moderate, the poll also clearly indicated they do not like being threatened.69 On March 8, Chen told reporters that he had information from China that the Chinese were prepared to negotiate with him.70 On March 9, Lien Chan had a full-page ad in several newspapers addressed to the families of those who had suffered in the February 28, 1947 Uprising. A headline in Hokkien across a big map of Taiwan said, “In Loving Taiwan, Who can Compare with Me?” The ad claimed Lien’s ancestors had been active in 1895 resisting the Japanese and noted his grandfather had written a General History of Taiwan (Taiwan tongshi 臺灣通史). Lien personally claimed three things. First, in 1968, after teaching in the United States, Lien returned home, thus demonstrating he “truly loves Taiwan.” Second, he claimed while Chairman of the National Taiwan University Department of Political Science in 1971, he had advocated “One Country, Two Seats” so that Taiwan could remain in the UN. He claimed that such a stance was dangerous under the dictatorship of the time and again demonstrated that he “truly loves Taiwan.” Third, when provincial governor in 1990, Lien claimed he had pushed for academic research into the February 28 Uprising as well as for memorials of 228, again evidence that he “truly loves Taiwan.”71 Lien also had an attack ad against Chen Shui-bian, with a headline surrounded by flowers, “When Chen Shui-bian went on a holiday, at the same time in Taipei eleven people died violent deaths!” The much smaller text began, “Has this kind of

69 Details of the poll appear in Hsu Szu-chien 徐斯儉, “Taiwan minyi bu qufu bu jijin 台灣民意不屈服不激進 [Taiwan public opinion does not submit to threats or become radical],” Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 8, 2000, p. 15. For an English translation, see Hsu Szu-chien 徐斯儉, “Poll shows China’s white paper benefits Chen,” Taipei Times, March 12, 2000, p. 8. A news article appears in Taipei Times, March 8, 2000, p. 3. 70 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 9, 2000, p. 2; Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 9, 2000, p. 2. 71 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 9, 2000, p. 11; Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 9, 2000, p. 16; Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 9, 2000, p. 16. 150 chapter five headline caught your attention? It is written in accord with the logic of Mr Chen Shui-bian continually blackening the names of others.”72 The same day, the Chen-Lu ticket had an ad emphasizing Annette Lu. Headlined, “When both genders rule together, everyone is fortunate,” the ad also emphasized “reconciliation, cooperation and peace” across the Taiwan Strait as well as national, social and economic security at home.”73 The Chen campaign also had a negative anti-Lien ad with pictures of three “black society” KMT supporters: Lo Fu-chu 羅福助, Wu Tse-yuan 伍澤元, and Kuo Ting-tsai 郭廷才. The main headline said, “Even [lien, 連 Lien Chan’s surname] if they all even stand on the podium for Lien Chan, how can the KMT not step down!” Criticizing “black” and “gold” politics, the ad said Lo and Wu had stood on the podium with Lien in Pingtung on February 25th.74 A more positive Soong campaign advertisement claimed, “We want peace. We do not want war. We want both stability and reform.”75 But Soong had his attack ads too. One claimed, “Lien, Bian are both ‘one half.’ Only James Soong is the complete thing!” The ad explained, “If you vote for Lien Chan, that will be doing away with reform. If you vote for A-bian, then you choose war!”76 One of the most important events in the campaign occurred on March 10 when Nobel Prize winner and Academia Sinica President Lee Yuan- tseh 李遠哲 came out and supported Chen Shui-bian for president. Lee emphasized Chen’s stance against “black and gold” politics and called Chen a “proper national leader.” Lee said, “Chen advocates the same ideals as I do, to place national interests above personal or political interests.”77 A DPP survey analyst felt that Lee Yuan-tseh’s endorsement increased Chen’s support from five to eight per cent with the increase coming from undecided voters as well as from Lien and Soong supporters. During the afternoon of March 11, each of the five candidates had thirty minutes to address the nation in the third of three televised forums. All but Lee Ao began by saying “hello” in Mandarin, Hokkien, Hakka and an aboriginal language. The three main candidates all wore dark suits with

72 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 9, 2000, p. 9. 73 Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 9, 2000, p. 10. 74 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 9, 2000, p. 16. 75 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 9, 2000, p. 10; Taiwan ribao 台灣日報 [Taiwan Daily], March 9, 2000, p. 16. 76 Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 9, 2000, p. 1. 77 This was the main headline in virtually all of Taiwan’s newspapers, March 11, 2000. Quotes from Taipei Times, March 11, 2000, p. 1. lee teng-hui as an elected president 151 white shirts and red ties, but Lee Ao wore white pants, a black sweater vest over his tie and an informal red jacket, while Hsu Hsin-liang wore a Sun Yat-sen suit.78 Lee Ao began by criticizing Lee Yuan-tseh. He also said that implementing the Chinese Communist “One Nation, Two Systems” policy would (1) save military funds, (2) mean that people would not have to serve in the military, and (3) allow Taiwan to put its nuclear wastes in Xinjiang, which is forty-five times the size of Taiwan, rather than on Orchid Island. He also suggested putting the nuclear wastes in North Korea, but noted that the United States opposed this. Lee concluded that he gives people a way out. He said that no one pays attention to him any- more despite his own [self] Nobel Prize nomination and despite his publishing more characters than Hu Shih! As a result of this speech, Lee Ao’s ratings in the polls continued to be very low.79 James Soong spoke next. Soong asked people to think of March 19, the day after the election, and to consider how they will feel then. Will they fear war? If so, vote for Soong. He said that Lien was doing a poor job and claimed that public order was poor under Vincent Siew’s premiership. His five promises included ending the Leninist party system of the KMT and the DPP, becoming supra-party, not allying with foundations in order to help small and medium-sized business, respecting the civil service system and specialists in policy decision-making, and using Hakkas. Soong went on to say the first thing he would do after being elected would be to invite Wang Daohan 汪道涵 from China to Taiwan to discuss the “three links” (santong 三通). One of the farmers with whom I was watching the broadcast exclaimed that Taiwanese fear this proposal a lot. Soong stated that Taiwan had to discuss the “three links” in order to get into the WTO. He said he would tell Wang that the Republic of China is a sovereign country. He also said he needed to talk with China about public order as ninety per cent of the guns and drugs in Taiwan are from China. He concluded by mentioning the lesson of the Chung-hsing Bills case. He said that he had not taken one cent from government. He said he would remember this lesson forever, but he understood that the people were

78 For a picture, see Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 12, 2000, p. 1. A picture of the forum of February 20, when the candidates wore similar clothes (though Lee Ao was without the vest and Chen Shui-bian had a yellow tie), can be found in Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, Lüse niandai II, p. 283. 79 For the text of Lee Ao’s speech, see Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 12, 2000, p. 2. 152 chapter five not expecting a saint.80 Both Lee and Soong held up documents and charts that were too small and half-hidden by the rostrum, so that the audience could not see them clearly. In a poorly delivered speech read from a script, Hsu Hsin-liang said everyone knows that Taiwan will elect a weak president. He stated the KMT policy of preserving agricultural land is out-of-date and because of a shortage of industrial and commercial land, Taiwan cannot compete. He noted that grain can be bought overseas. Hsu noted Franklin Roosevelt in the United States had implemented bold policies and said Taiwan needed similar boldness.81 In his very “wooden” style, Lien Chan raised issues of national security and of positive defense. He said Taiwan needed a high-tech warfare capability and it needed an anti-missile capability. Lien said he wanted a “Taiwan Seas Peace Region” (Taihai hepingqu 台海和平區) and, after being elected, said he would go to the Mainland for talks on the basis of equality (duideng 對等) in order to eliminate misunderstanding. (This ignored the fact that the Chinese had said they were not interested in talks on the basis of equality.) Soon, he said, both sides will be in the WTO, so they need the “three links” and a special economic and trade district to enhance both sides. Lien stated that Taiwan Independence is growing each day. He stressed his own experience in dealing with the Chinese Communists. And, unlike the other candidates, he did not criticize the past as Taiwan had had good economic results. Lien concluded with three promises. First, he would respect the constitution and human rights. Second, he would bring in bright people to implement his third wave of reform. Third, he would welcome criticism so that society would progress. Finally, he stated that Soong’s idea of a supra-party government would not work, while choosing the DPP was making a cross-strait war more and more likely.82 Chen Shui-bian spoke last. Unlike Soong and Lien, Chen spoke entirely in Mandarin except for his greeting. Chen began by asking that the candidates stop making nasty remarks to each other and stop attempting to scare Taiwan’s citizens. He hoped that the campaign would improve in the last week. However, Chen then too went on the attack. He said the

80 For the text of James Soong’s speech, see Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 12, 2000, p. 3. 81 For the text of Hsu Hsin-liang’s speech, see Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 12, 2000, p. 4. 82 For the text of Lien Chan’s speech, see Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 12, 2000, p. extra 1. (This page is opposite p. 4.) lee teng-hui as an elected president 153

KMT is “rotten” (lan 爛). Since Soong left the KMT only a year ago, how is he not rotten? Neither Soong nor Lien have said how they will solve the “black and gold” problem. Chen emphasized that he had discussed how to solve the “black and gold” problem with Lee Yuan-tseh. Chen then made three promises. First, he would be a president of all the people. As president, he would not consider party, ethnicity or gender. Second, he would always place national interest over party interest or individual interest. Third, he would place the security of the lives and property of the Taiwan people above all else. Then Chen clarified some points that others had confused using “blackening” techniques. First, democracy does require the rotation of political parties. Chen did not invent this. The United States has been able to be strong because it has the rotation of parties in its culture. Second, people say that Chen is too young to be president. Chen noted that he is already 50 years old and that Sun Yat-sen was provisional president at the age of 46. In the United States, Clinton was elected president at 46, Kennedy at 43 and Roosevelt at only 42. In the UK, Blair became prime minister at age 43. Age is not relevant, but competence is the key. When Chen campaigned to be the first elected mayor of Taipei, his opponents noted that he lacked administrative experience as he had only been a legislator. However, he demonstrated that he did have administrative ability. Chen then dealt with the claims that his election would start a war in the Taiwan Strait. He made three key promises for the duration of the period he would be in office. First, he would not put “the theory of two- states” into the constitution. Second, he would not have a referendum on independence or unity. Third, there is no need to change the name of the nation. “Unless the Chinese Communists attempt to use military force to invade Taiwan, we will not declare Taiwan independent.” These statements presaged the “Five No’s” in Chen Shui-bian’s inauguration speech on May 20. Chen concluded by saying Taiwan needed a government with talented people chosen irrespective of party or ethnicity. He argued there should be personnel stability. This speech clearly was the best of the five in the forum. As a result, Chen won many votes that day including some who watched the forum with the writer. People who previously had been concerned about the economy under the DPP now expressed support for Chen.83

83 For the text of Chen Shui-bian’s speech, see Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 12, 2000, p. extra 2. (This page is opposite p. 5.) 154 chapter five

On March 12 the Lien campaign ran attack ads against Soong and Chen. The ad against Soong had Soong as a “thinker” statue sitting on a base labeled honesty. A “letter to James Soong supporters” asked, “But, if you feel that stealing money is acceptable and lying is acceptable, are you willing to have a day when your child says, ‘adults are allowed to steal money and tell lies, why can’t I?’ If you are, then please continue to support James Soong.”84 The ad against Chen Shui-bian claimed that under his leadership Taipei had not counted several hundred fires.85 On March 12, the last Sunday of the campaign, both the KMT and the DPP held major rallies in Kaohsiung with the Lien rally attracting 100,000 supporters and the Chen rally 300,000.86 President Lee Teng-hui clearly supported Lien at his rally.87 At the Chen rally, Shih Ming-teh openly supported Chen for the first time,88 while Soong held a rally in Taichung. Both the Lien and the Soong camps visited Lin Yang-kang and sought his support. Jason Hu visited Lin for the Lien camp, while former Legislative Speaker Liu Sung-pan visited Lin on behalf of Soong.89 As the campaign intensified in the last week, the Lien campaign placed a series of attack advertisements. One said, “Support Lien Chan so Uncle Hui [Lee Teng-hui] can rest assured in handing over the baton.” The ad continued, “Lee Teng-hui says: Lien Chan is the only national leader whom I guarantee” and gave three instances when Lee Teng-hui criticized Chen Shui-bian.90 A second ad had Lien Chan and Vincent Siew flying an airplane labeled “Republic of China”, while Chen Shui-bian, holding a flag labeled “Taiwan Nation,” was outside on the wing trying to get in saying “Let me fly! Let me fly!” The main headline said, “Outwardly it is called rotation of political parties, but in fact it is implementing rapid independence.” The ad concluded, “Chen Shui-bian still does not have

84 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 12, 2000, p. 1; Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 12, 2000, p. 1. 85 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 12, 2000, p. 11; Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 12, 2000, p. 7. 86 Taipei Times, March 13, p. 1. 87 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 13, 2000, p. 2; Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 13, 2000, p. 1. 88 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 13, 2000, p. 3; Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 13, 2000, p. 2. 89 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 13, 2000, p. extra 1 (opposite p. 4); Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 13, 2000, p. 4. 90 Taiwan ribao 台灣日報 [Taiwan Daily], March 14, 2000, p. 16; Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 14, 2000, p. 5. lee teng-hui as an elected president 155 sufficient qualifications.”91 A more positive third ad was entitled “Mr Lien Chan and Taiwan.” Labeled, “Honor the People Chapter,” the ad showed Lien with a series of retired servicemen and their families.92 A James Soong ad, with the candidate in miner’s clothing and hat, showed that the approval ratings of Soong as provincial governor were higher than those of Chen as mayor or Lien as premier.93 Another Soong ad proclaimed, “Electing a president is not electing a mayor! We want reform, not revolution!” The text of the ad attacked both Lien and Chen.94 A small New Party ad, which did not support any particular candidate, said, “Oppose the Taiwan Independence Party Platform, Oppose the Theory of Two States.”95 A Chen Shui-bian ad proclaimed, “The president of Taiwan is decided by the Taiwan people.” A subheading stated, “Be the masters of the nation, support Chen Shui-bian.”96 On Wednesday, March 15, three days before Taiwan’s voters went to the polls, several things occurred. At a press conference in Beijing, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji warned, “Let me advise all these people in Taiwan: do not just act on impulse at this juncture which will decide the future course that China and Taiwan will follow. Otherwise, I’m afraid you won’t get another opportunity to regret.”97 The Chinese headlines on two key newspapers proclaimed, “Zhu Rongji: We will not accept any form of Taiwan Independence.”98 Zhu’s speech and its directness truly shocked Taiwan’s voters and virtually the whole of Taiwan heard Zhu’s comments because they were played over and over again on Taiwan’s many television stations. Some analysts of Beijing believed that Zhu was asked to speak on behalf of Beijing because he was perceived as a moderate and Beijing wished to send a unified message. In any case, all three major candidates rejected Zhu’s threats, and many commentators felt his speech probably helped, rather than hurt, Chen Shui-bian’s candidacy.

91 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 14, 2000, p. 1; Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 14, 2000, p. 1. 92 Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 14, 2000, p. 12. 93 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 14, 2000, p. 12. 94 Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 14, 2000, p. 1. 95 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 14, 2000, p. 1; Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 14, 2000, p. 1. 96 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 14, 2000, p. 5. 97 Paul Eckert, Reuters report in Taiwan News, March 16, 2000, p. 1 and China Post, March 16, 2000, p. 1. 98 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 16, 2000, p. 1; Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 16, 2000, p. 1. 156 chapter five

A poll conducted on the same day as Zhu’s press conference tried to examine the impact of Zhu’s statement on the presidential election. Forty per cent thought the statement would have an influence, while 29 per cent thought it would not and 31 per cent did not know. The poll did not, however, ask what type of influence or which candidate might be helped or hurt. Only nine per cent thought Zhu’s statement was appropriate, while 43 per cent did not and 47 per cent did not know. Asked whether or not they were concerned that a cross-strait war might break out, 19 per cent were very concerned, 23 per cent were concerned, 25 per cent were not very concerned, 26 were completely unconcerned and seven per cent did not know. Asked about the future state of cross-strait relations, 13 per cent said they leaned towards unification, nine per cent towards independence, 60 per cent wanted to maintain the status quo, while 18 per cent did not know and one per cent refused to answer.99 This suggests that Zhu’s comments did not have their desired effect. That evening the writer observed a Soong rally at Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Park. Compared to the earlier rally for Lien Chan, many more people filled the grounds. Everyone stood and there were no stools. Many people had airhorns and lots of orange and purple (the Soong campaign colors) banners and flags were waving. The crowd was both happy and excited with much more enthusiasm than the Lien Chan rally. The writer felt the rally resembled a New Party campaign rally, a feeling that a foreign journalist with much experience in Taiwan confirmed. Soong’s wife wiped some lipstick off his cheek and used a bit of Ami language to say she was “supporting no. 1” (Soong’s number on the ballot). In his speech, Soong referred to Zhu Rongji’s strong talk that afternoon. In English he referred to his interview with CNN and said that Taiwan would not accept any military threat. “We want freedom.” Soong got the crowd to respond to “No!” to “intimidation” and “Yes!” to “Peace” and to “Democracy.” Soong said he was the true heart-felt voice of the Taiwan people. He wants genuine peace and respect. The ROC will exist forever. The ROC is an independent, sovereign country. After a song, Soong asked if Chen Shui-bian could speak English. No, he answered himself. Soong said he was willing to have constructive discussions with the People’s Republic of China, but would not surrender. At the end, people cleaned up their small messes. Soong’s willingness to speak English at a Taiwan campaign rally had two purposes. First, he wished to compare himself favorably to Chen

99 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 16, 2000, p. 4. lee teng-hui as an elected president 157

Shui-bian. Second, over 440 foreign reporters had come to Taiwan to observe the election and Soong expected that some would be at his rally. Of the foreign journalists, 252 had come from the Asia-Pacific region including 104 from Japan, the largest foreign contingent, and 93 from Hong Kong, while 107 had come from Europe and 72 had come from North America. The additional journalists came from Middle Eastern countries such as Jordan.100 On March 15, the KMT also stooped to its lowest in its attack advertisements. A television ad broadcast on all three free-to-air stations portrayed Chen Shui-bian as similar to Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini together with footage of missile attacks.101 In addition, the Lien camp had at least five additional print advertisements that day. The first suggested that voting for the DPP would lead to a pile of blocks collapsing. The ad said, “if we change the party to rule, then we will change stability to chaos, prosperity to depression and peace to war” and closed, “Your vote decides the future of your children and grandchildren.”102 Another Lien ad urged rejecting “tragedy” and “hate,” concluding “Your vote will decide the future of the next generation.”103 A third print ad had a stock market collapsing owing to “Taiwan Independence.”104 Another had a big black character “Fear!” written on the green left half and red right half of the ad. The attack on Chen said his election would lead to war and a collapse of the stock market, while the attack on Soong said his stealing public money would also lead to a stock market collapse.105 The content of the letter of Soong Mei-ling (Mme Chiang Kai-shek) expressing her support for Lien Chan filled another ad.106 In contrast, the much more financially challenged Chen and Soong campaigns had few advertisements. The key Chen ad had a picture of Chen Shui-bian plus a picture of Lee Yuan-tseh in green brackets, pictures

100 Taipei Times, March 15, 2000, p. 3. 101 See the story in Taipei Times, March 16, 2000, p. 1. The ad, which had no print equivalent, was disturbing. 102 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 15, 2000, p. 1; Taiwan ribao 台灣日報 [Taiwan Daily], March 15, 2000, p. 5. 103 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 15, 2000, p. 5; Taiwan ribao 台灣日報 [Taiwan Daily], March 15, 2000, p. 7; Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 15, 2000, p. 10. 104 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 15, 2000, p. 9; Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 15, 2000, p. 16. 105 Taiwan ribao 台灣日報 [Taiwan Daily], March 15, 2000, p. 14. This ad may not have come from Lien’s campaign headquarters. 106 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 15, 2000, p. 5; Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 15, 2000, p. 5. 158 chapter five of Lien Chan with Wu Tse-yuan and Lo Fu-chu (two black society leaders) in blue brackets and pictures of James Soong and Yen Ching-piao (another black society leader) in red square brackets. The ad asked, “To which people are you preparing to give Taiwan’s future?”107 Another ad, by a variety of Chen’s supporters, said, “One Lee Yuan-tseh is not enough! Let us say good-bye to black and gold.”108 The Soong ad showed Soong in miner’s dress and emphasized health plans for workers and for treating women equally.109 Several of the advertisements, especially those of Lien and Soong, raised the issue of strategic voting as clearly the competition between Lien and Soong for similar votes not only endangered Lien and Soong, but also made a Chen victory possible. One Lien ad proclaimed, “Dump Soong to Protect Lien to Defeat A-bian.” “Dumping Soong to Protect Lien “would “Protect Peace, Protect the New Taiwan Dollar [Taiwan’s currency], and Protect the Republic of China.”110 A second Lien ad, placed by the KMT’s Huang Fu-hsing Party of retired servicemen, claimed, “The iron votes of the Huang Fu-hsing most definitely do not support people who revolt against the Party or who engage in Taiwan Independence.” It concluded, “Dump Soong to Save Lien. Only then can we end Taiwan Independence and forever protect the Republic of China.”111 A third Lien ad claimed, “The cooperation of the Taiwan Independence Chen Shui-bian plus the hidden Taiwan Independence Chang Chao-hsiung and James Soong jointly plan to seek bring about a Chen Shui-bian government.” Therefore, “Dump Soong to Protect Lien.”112 A Soong advertisement urged voting for the Soong-Chao ticket. “Dumping Lien to Protect Bian means Chaos, Instability, and War. Dumping Lien to Protect Soong means Stability, Peace and Reform.”113 A second Soong ad proclaimed, “Dump Lien to Protect Soong. Save the

107 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 15, 2000, p. 7; Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 15, 2000, p. 16; Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 15, 2000, p. 16. 108 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 15, 2000, p. 10; Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 15, 2000, p. 7. 109 Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 15, 2000, p. 12; Taiwan ribao 台灣日報 [Taiwan Daily], March 15, 2000, p. 16. 110 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 16, 2000, p. 12; Taiwan ribao 台灣日報 [Taiwan Daily], March 16, 2000, p. 5. 111 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 16, 2000, p. 10. 112 Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 16, 2000, p. 5. 113 Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 16, 2000, p. 1. lee teng-hui as an elected president 159

Party and Save the Nation.”114 That evening the TV news reported many rumors about “Dumping Lien to Save Soong” and Dumping Soong to Save Lien.” The advertisements of March 16 also contained many endorsements. Lien had endorsements from many old KMT leaders including Shieh Tung-min, Sun Yun-suan, Yü Kuo-hwa, Li Kwoh-ting 李國鼎, Lee Huan, Hwang Tzuen-chiou 黃尊秋, Chiu Chuang-huan, Koo Chen-fu 辜振甫 and Soong Chang-chih 宋長志,115 from Chen Li-an,116 from Koo Chen-fu (again, as an individual this time),117 from several academics, doctors, business people and financiers,118 and from the Chinese Religious Association.119 Chen had endorsements from Lee Yuan-tseh, Hsu Wen- lung 許文龍 (also known as W.L. Shi, the head of Chi-mei Foods), Chang Yung-fa 張榮發 (the head of Evergreen Industries), and Nita Ing 殷琪 (also known as Ing Chi, the head of Taiwan’s High Speed Rail.) The ad concluded, “Because [he is] trustworthy, so they have stood up!”120 Two more advertisements for Chen mentioned Lee Yuan-tseh.121 Although Soong had an endorsement from several Kaohsiung-Pingtung lawyers, who claimed he had not stolen money,122 his endorsements were clearly fewer. Soong’s major advertisement had two obscured people walking in the fog, saying “Although we haven’t stood up… don’t forget your crucial vote on March 18” for Soong.123 Friday, March 17 was the last full day of the campaign as the voters went to the polls the next day. Despite the charged rhetoric, a fairly detailed comparison of the policies of the three main candidates showed

114 Taiwan ribao 台灣日報 [Taiwan Daily], March 16, 2000, p. 1. 115 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 16, 2000, p. 1; Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 16, 2000, p. 1; Taiwan ribao 台灣日報 [Taiwan Daily], March 16, 2000, p. 7. 116 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 16, 2000, p. 7; Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 16, 2000, p. 27; Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 16, 2000, p. 16. 117 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 16, 2000, p. 16; Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 16, 2000, p. 16; Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 16, 2000, p. 10. 118 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 16, 2000, p. 9. 119 Taiwan ribao 台灣日報 [Taiwan Daily], March 16, 2000, p. 1. 120 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 16, 2000, p. 11; Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 16, 2000, p. 7; Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 16, 2000, p. 7. 121 Taiwan ribao 台灣日報 [Taiwan Daily], March 16, 2000, pp. 16, 17. 122 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 16, 2000, p. 5. 123 Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 16, 2000, p. 12. 160 chapter five strong similarities.124 One could argue that the three candidates all came from the “broad middle” and that they had ratcheted up the campaign rhetoric in order to attract certain types of voters including those few voters on the extremes. On China, all three candidates had moderate policies, though the Chinese and many supporters of Lien and Soong did not accept the truth of Chen’s statements. Chen clearly advocated more of an independent Taiwan, but he had accepted that he would not declare independence if elected and China did not invade. In any case, all three candidates agreed that the Republic of China was a sovereign nation. All three called for a strong military. All three called for more active foreign relations. Their economic policies also appeared similar, and all three advocated protecting the environment, improving technology, increasing cultural production and participation, and helping aborigines. Perhaps the major difference would be the type of government they would implement. Chen Shui-bian would “rotate” ruling parties and emphasize democracy. James Soong would have a “supra-party” government, though he also had strong links with the ruling KMT. Lien Chan would continue the KMT government in power with the expectation that this would continue both the successes (and failures) of that regime. March 17 was also the last day for advertisements in the daily newspapers. A very nasty attack Lien ad was headlined, “The Dangerous A-bian, Can You Really Vote for Him?” An unpleasant picture of Chen had Chinese characters for “Lack of Morals,” “Cheat,” “Change” (the last two characters had similarities to Chen’s name, Bian), and “Hegemony” point- ing at Chen’s head with exclamation marks.125 A second Lien ad had an endorsement from Mayor Ma Ying-jeou.126 A third Lien ad consisted of an endorsement from doctors.127 A fourth ad was an endorsement from Kang Shui-mu, a former DPP leader.128 A Lien ad from the Hung-men 洪門 Society revealed a “secret code” as meaning “Dump Soong, Dump Chen to Save Lien.”129 A sixth ad urged the “Protecting of the Republic of China” and urged “Quickly Dump Soong to Protect Lien.” A lot of text

124 Taipei Times, March 17, 2000, p. 10. 125 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 17, 2000, p. 1. 126 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 17, 2000, p. 7; Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 17, 2000, p. 10; Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 17, 2000, p. 10. 127 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 17, 2000, p. 27. 128 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 17, 2000, p. 1; Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 17, 2000, p. 1. 129 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 17, 2000, p. 25. lee teng-hui as an elected president 161 stated that “Voting for Soong is Voting for Bian.”130 A seventh Lien ad from military villagers cried, “Danger! Danger! War is Imminent!” The text argued, “Dump the ‘Soong Skin and the Bian Bones’ to Protect ‘the Republic of China.’” It said, “Casting a vote for ‘Soong’ equals voting for A-bian’s advantage equals voting for ‘Taiwan Independence’ equals War.” Another line said, “Casting a vote for ‘Soong’ equals voting for Chang Chao-hsiung equals voting for ‘Taiwan Independence’ equals War.” The text explained that Chang had once served as a leader of a friends of Chen Shui-bian organization.131 An eighth Lien ad had the green half of the ad labeled “Danger” and the blue half “Peace”. The text in the green half said, “Choosing the DPP will give you risk and danger,” while the text in the blue half said “Choosing the KMT will give you peace of mind and stability.”132 These are only some of the ads on behalf of Lien. In addition, those repeated from the previous day are not mentioned. Soong and Chen had fewer advertisements. One Soong ad highlighted the ROC Constitution and emphasized the inauguration oath pledge mandated by Article 48.133 A second Soong ad had Chen with the “Taiwan Independence Party Platform” and Lien with “Two States Theory” around Lee Teng-hui. The headline called, “Dump Lien to Protect Soong!” A rhyming couplet followed: “A Vote for Lien is a Vote for Bian, War then Can’t be Avoided (mian 免).”134 A very crowded Soong ad placed by a businessman said, “Lien Chan has already truly struck out. For Taiwan’s stability and peace…” the ad urged righteous KMT members and neutral people in society to vote for Soong.135 A key Chen advertisement had a huge headline, “We are electing the president,” Above a small picture of Hong Kong Chief Executive Tung Chee-hua, smaller characters stated, “We are not appointing the Chief Executive of a Special Administrative Region.” The ad concluded, “Protect Our Democracy.”136

130 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 17, 2000, p. 33. 131 Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 17, 2000, p. 17. 132 Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 17, 2000, p. 27. 133 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 17, 2000, p. 12. 134 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 17, 2000, p. 32; Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 17, 2000, p. 12. 135 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 17, 2000, p. 17; Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 17, 2000, p. 24. 136 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 17, 2000, p. 16; Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 17, 2000, p. 7; Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 17, 2000, p. 7. 162 chapter five

Commerce also got into the political act. In front of the Presidential Office Building, the advertisement had six flags—the first five numbered with the surnames of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates while the sixth had “A6 Quattro.” The text asked, “Who is the Safest? Drivers Know.”137 During the evening of March 17, the writer attended the election rally for Chen Shui-bian at the Chungshan 中山 Soccer Stadium not far from the Grand Hotel 圓山大飯店 in Yuanshan, Taipei. Outside the stadium there were huge crowds of Chen supporters with many flags and banners. When we arrived about 8:30 pm the stadium was full. Every seat was taken and people had flooded onto the muddy ground, which was also tightly packed, as 100,000 gathered. A genuine enthusiasm, excitement and anticipation filled the air. The two comperes were Chen Chu, a long-time fighter for democracy in Taiwan, and a Mainlander male. Many people, such as a DPP member of the legislature, were introduced, but did not speak. Others gave quite short speeches. The aboriginal athlete C.K. Yang (Yang Chuan-kwang 楊傳廣), who won a silver medal in the decathlon at the 1960 Rome Olympics, spoke of the importance of the DPP for aboriginal people. An aboriginal baseball player also spoke and said he spoke for the whole baseball team. DPP Chairman Lin I-hsiung spoke and lost the audience reading from a list of promises, but his wife, Fang Su-min, soon had the stadium’s total attention as she spoke in Mandarin about how her daughter Lin Huan- chun 林奐均, who had been stabbed six times on February 28, 1980, had given birth to a daughter eleven days before. Fang Su-min had rushed back to Taiwan to cast her vote and urged her fellow citizens to cast their votes too. Three former chairmen of the DPP, Yao Chia-wen, Shih Ming-teh, and Chang Chun-hung—all former political prisoners— came to the podium to join together with Lin I-hsiung and to speak for a few minutes. These four men had many decades of experience as political prisoners. For those of us who had experienced the old dictatorial regime, their pres- ence was very moving. I sensed the many young people at the rally did not really understand where Taiwan had been politically nor the sacrifices these men and many others had made, but the young people too supported political reform and democracy.

137 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 17, 2000, p. 8. lee teng-hui as an elected president 163

Lee Yuan-tseh spoke by TV screen to the audience. He apologized that he could not be present, but clearly endorsed Chen Shui-bian for president. Lee stated that Chen was the only choice to reform Taiwan. To the tune of Beethoven’s “Ode to Joy,” Chen Shui-bian and Annette Lu arrived about 11.20 pm after having participated in campaign rallies in Kaohsiung and Taichung. Chen said that after his inauguration he would resign all his DPP positions and would not participate in party work. It was important to separate the Party and Government. Chen also said he would have a multi-party group including members of the DPP, the KMT, the New Party, the Taiwan Independence Party and non-partisans to deal with the Mainland. He noted that dealing with the Mainland is not the prerogative of only one party. The negotiations with the Mainland, which would be led by Lee Yuan-tseh, would be comprehensive. Chen also pledged to examine the proposals of other presidential candidates and to use those which are good. Chen clearly was seeking a consensus and trying to draw all of the people of Taiwan together. Chen said people should use their votes to rewrite (gaixie 改寫) history and to create history. Annette Lu then spoke about external regimes including the Japanese and the KMT. She said it was time for Taiwanese to rule themselves. Wu Shu-chen (Mrs Chen), who was injured when run over by a truck in 1985, spoke briefly about the importance of voting. At the end, all on the podium including the former chairmen of the DPP bowed to the audience three times. The next day, March 18, from 8 am to 4 pm, 82.69 per cent of Taiwan’s voters went to 13,305 polling booths in schools and temples throughout Taiwan and the off-shore islands to cast their ballots for president. This percentage was very high since it included all citizens aged 20 and above. In addition, in order to vote citizens had to return to their place of house- hold registration. The voter turnout in 2000 was 6.65 per cent higher than the already high 76.04 per cent of the 1996 presidential election.

An Analysis of the 2000 Presidential Election Results

Chen Shui-bian won a close election over a divided opposition (see Table 5.3).138 In some ways, his victory mirrored that of his 1994 mayoral victory

138 The official Central Election Commission results are available at http://210.69. 23.140/cec/vote3.asp?pass1=A2000A0000000000aaa. A wide variety of detailed results can be obtained through http://210.69.23.140/cec/..%5Cmenu_main.asp?titlec=%B2%C4%20 %A4Q%20%A5%F4%20%C1%60%B2%CE(%B0%C6%C1%60%B2%CE)%BF%EF%C1 164 chapter five in Taipei. Chen’s victory—and this is an important point—was widely accepted as legitimate. His victory ended fifty-five years of KMT rule both as a colonial dictatorship under Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo and as a democratizing polity under Lee Teng-hui. With the 2000 presidential election, Taiwan had now begun the true test of a democracy, the peaceful transition of the former opposition to government and the simultaneous transition of government to opposition.

Table 5.3. Presidential election results, March 18, 2000 Candidate Party Votes % Chen Shui-bian DPP 4,977,697 39.30% James Soong Non-partisan 4,664,972 36.84% Lien Chan KMT 2,925,513 23.10% Hsu Hsin-liang Non-partisan 79,429 0.63% Lee Ao New Party 16,782 0.13%

Total 12,664,393 100.00%

The 2000 presidential campaign was complex and unpredictable. One rural KMT vote captain said that this was the first election in over thirty years that he had not been able to predict. The large votes for both Chen Shui-bian and James Soong surprised even insiders in all camps as did the small vote totals for Lien Chan, the KMT candidate. Let us begin with the two minor candidates. Essentially, Lee Ao withdrew from the campaign on March 11 saying that he supported James Soong as the least harmful of the three main contenders.139 Lee Ao did not appear for a post-election press conference, a duty that his vice-presidential candidate Elmer Fung had to fulfill. Hsu Hsin-liang’s candidacy also failed miserably. He rang Chen’s headquarters to offer his congratu- lations, but he did not support a DPP presidential candidate until 2008. For the first time, Taiwan’s voters divided regionally. Chen Shui-bian won his victory in the South winning Changhua, Yunlin, Chiayi, Tainan, Kaohsiung and Pingtung counties and Chiayi, Tainan, and Kaohsiung municipalities. Chen also won Ilan in the northeast, the homeland of many of Taiwan’s early non-partisans. Soong won everywhere else, but the race in North Taiwan, Central Taiwan and Penghu was very close

%7C&pass1=A2000A0000000000aaa%20%20&pdf=A200000. The daily press of March 19, 2000 also has detailed results and analyses. 139 Taipei Times, March 12, 2000, p. 2. lee teng-hui as an elected president 165 except in Nantou, the former location of the provincial government, where Soong had won considerable loyalty. Soong did very well in Taoyuan, Hsinchu County and Municipality and Miaoli, the homes of many Mainlanders as well as Hakka. He did best in the small counties of Hualien and Taitung on the East Coast, and Kinmen and Matsu very close to China. Lien came second to Chen only in Tainan (the native place of both Chen and Lien) and Pingtung counties and second to Soong in Taitung as well as Kinmen and Matsu. Lien placed third everywhere else. Internal polling among the three camps suggested that as many as one- fourth of the voters remained undecided as late as the day before the election; this suggests that in the South voters “dumped Lien to protect Chen,” while in the North they “dumped Lien to protect Soong.”140 Even critics accept that James Soong is an excellent politician. He remembers names. He goes to funerals and weddings. He sends relevant messages. And, as a leader, he gave commands and created action and results. As provincial governor from 1993 to 1998, Soong built up a great bank of support. During this period, he visited every one of Taiwan’s 309 township-level units, usually several times. Through the 2000 election, Soong campaign leaflets in each township would explain what Soong had achieved there. Similarly, county-wide leaflets also explained what he had achieved in each county. For example, a letter dated March 10, 2000 and signed by the former Vice Governor, a native of Chiayi County, stated Soong had visited Chiayi County a total of 158 times and spent NT$81.7 billion (US$2.7 bilion)141 on such projects as sports grounds, activities centers at schools, flood controls, roads and drinking water facilities.142 Unlike Lien and previous governors who tended to stay in their offices or at various meetings, Soong would go out among the people. If people said a bridge would solve a transport problem, Soong would give the people the bridge. If there were floods, Soong would appear and give commands that helped resolve the situation. While there was no formal vote-buying during the presidential election, one could argue that Soong’s term as provincial governor involved using the provincial government treasury to engage in massive vote-buying. When President Lee Teng-hui decided to “freeze” the provincial government, Soong went all out to spend money. In addition to the

140 Bruce Jacobs, “Southern strength saved Chen, elsewhere Soong had the edge,” Taipei Times, March 19, 2000, pp. 17, 19. 141 At the exchange rate of N$30= US$1. 142 Leaflet signed by Wu Jung-ming 吳容明 and inserted in all Chiayi copies of Lian- hebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 12, 2000. 166 chapter five construction funds, which he exhausted, Soong also spent his subsidy from the central government, which totaled about NT$100 billion (US$3.3 billion). This money did not require central government approval since the legislature had already approved the funds. The deficits Soong left were huge. When Lien Chan finished his term as provincial governor, the provincial government owed NT$200 billion (US$6.7 billion). When Soong left the governorship, these deficits had expanded to NT$800 billion (US$26.7 billion), an increase of NT$600 billion (US$20 billion) in five years. To put these figures into perspective, at this time the annual total budget for the Taiwan government was NT$2,400 billion (US$80 billion). In addition, Soong used the provincial banks to lend each provincial assemblyman NT$50 million (US$1.7 million). Each provincial assemblyman could decide how to spend the money, and this gave each provincial assemblyman local support. Of course, they then supported Soong. In aboriginal areas, Soong spent massive funds on construction of roads and the provision of drinking water. Drinking water was important and did not cost much. Many of the roads were in unsuitable areas, but the aborigines living in the mountains had lacked roads and wanted them for their own convenience and to transport goods. Soong provided the roads, and now aborigines could use cars and trucks, not simply motor- cycles. Many of the roads later had landslides, but Soong had obtained support. In the 2000 presidential campaign, Soong obtained 60–70 per cent of the aboriginal vote, though aborigines only accounted for one to two per cent of the electorate. In addition to winning most Mainlander and aboriginal votes, Soong also won support among Hakka voters, who account for about one-eighth of Taiwan’s voters. Hakka in Taiwan fit mid-way between Hokkien Taiwanese and Mainlanders. Historically, they have been subject to prej- udice by Hokkien and both the Japanese and the KMT colonial dictatorships tried to split Hokkien and Hakka in a “divide and rule” tactic. Thus Hakka had particular roles under the Japanese such as working in the rail- ways and in the police, roles that continued after the KMT came to Taiwan. That Soong’s wife was a Mainlander Hakka also helped give him Hakka votes. While it would have been difficult for the DPP to gain Hakka votes in any case, the separate candidacy of Hsu Hsin-liang made any DPP appeal for Hakka votes even more difficult. Commentators in all the camps believed that Soong would have won the election if the Chung-hsing Bills case had not arisen. As noted earlier, the KMT had given the DPP the Chung-hsing Bills case materials, but the lee teng-hui as an elected president 167

DPP did not publicize them wanting to keep Lien and Soong in balance so that Chen would have a chance to win. Thus, the KMT had to raise the case in the campaign. Perhaps most disheartening was repeatedly hear- ing Soong supporters say that in fact Soong had taken the money. But these supporters excused Soong’s behavior by saying that local township leaders stole much more. This did not suggest a very high moral standard of behavior among either Soong or his supporters. Thus, in summary, Soong had two cards to play. First, he “worked hard in government and loved the people” (qinzheng aimin 勤政愛民). This proved successful. But the Chung-hsing Bills case undercut his second card, “honesty” (qinglian 清廉) in government. In contrast to Soong’s campaign, which probably exceeded expectations, Lien’s campaign was a huge disappointment. Lien had the huge KMT behind him, the party which had ruled Taiwan for fifty-five years both under colonial dictatorship and democracy. In addition, Lien had President Lee Teng-hui’s active support. Reports that Lee secretly supported Chen Shui-bian simply were not true. Lee said that Chen had no experience. In addition, Lee called Chen sula (豎仔), a Hokkien term meaning “scum” or “trash.” Lee repeatedly gave many speeches in support of Lien at the latter’s rallies. Lien’s problem was that his campaign was split into two and he could not bring the two strands together. Thus, Lien repeatedly tried to win the Mainlanders, who were going to vote mainly for Soong in any case. In one sense, this was unwise because Mainlanders account for less than 15 per cent of Taiwan’s electorate; thus, even if Lien had won all of the Mainlander vote, this in itself could not win the election. In addition, Mainlanders, more than any other group, tend to vote ethnically and Soong was a Mainlander. A KMT member complained that Lien allowed Mainlanders under Jason Hu to handle his campaign. These people lacked an understanding of the “heart of Taiwan” and they also lacked experience. The DPP campaign, in contrast, had many leaders who had been through five or more campaigns previously. The Lien campaign too failed to gain support among Taiwanese. Taiwanese felt Lien was weak about Taiwan and that he used too many Mainlanders. They wanted a Taiwanese to be president. Thus, the KMT campaign over-emphasized the votes of Mainlanders and forgot to seek Taiwanese votes, which in any case proved reluctant to support Lien. In the process, Lien lost both groups. Another difficulty was that Lien himself was very wealthy. Various estimates suggested his private wealth was worth some NT$20–30 billion 168 chapter five

(US$670 million to US$1 billion). The KMT expected Lien to use some of his own money to run the campaign, but the amount Lien contributed was insufficient. Soong and Chen supporters would spend money to buy campaign jackets and hats. Lien gave them out free. In fact, many of Lien’s jackets were made in Macao and Vietnam and only arrived three days before the end of the campaign. Even though they were given out for free, very few supporters wore them. Lien also had campaign dinners, just as Soong and Chen did. For Soong and Chen, such dinners brought in substantial contributions. Lien was happy that lots of people came to his dinners, but contributions were few. These same people went to Soong dinners and did contribute. Lien was “wooden” both in his campaign speeches and in meeting people during the campaign. In addition, he gave people the impression that he was arrogant. To be kind, this may have resulted from Lien being shy. Lien, with his family background and wealth, clearly was an aristocrat in Taiwan terms. He had had a very smooth career. In the words of one KMT leader, both Lien and Soong were aristocrats, though Lien was a civil aristocrat and Soong was a military aristocrat. Lien’s campaign suffered from apparent supporters who were “Lien skin and Soong bones” (Lian pi Song gu 連皮宋骨). In other words, these people, most of whom were KMT leaders, pretended to support Lien, but actually supported Soong. The assumption that these people actually supported Lien cost the Lien campaign considerably. It did not take much investigation to find many such people all around Taiwan. The success of the Chen campaign also surprised people on all sides of politics. Clearly, the endorsement of Lee Yuan-tseh played a vital role. Lee Yuan-tseh’s emphasis on opposing “black and gold” politics also hurt both the Soong and Lien camps and assisted Chen. Chen also emphasized Taiwan, an appeal that had particular attraction among the Taiwanese, who had suffered under the KMT colonial dictatorship. The Chinese White Paper of February 21, 2000 and Premier Zhu Rongji’s statement of March 15 also helped the Chen Shui-bian campaign. Chen defeated Soong by less than 2.5 per cent, so the Chinese interventions did not have to swing many votes to elect Chen and make the Chinese actions totally counter-productive. The Chinese never understood that Taiwanese do not surrender under pressure. When Lien and Soong said that a vote for Chen would be a vote for war, they suggested that the Chinese threats were working. This was a type of “surrenderism” (touxiang zhuyi 投降主義). In addition, according to a KMT leader, Lien’s lee teng-hui as an elected president 169 response to Zhu’s statement was weak and it appeared that Lien was afraid. This too undercut Lien’s support. The 2000 presidential campaign had two characteristics that charac- terize almost all election campaigns in Taiwan. First, as in the United States and Japan, the campaigns of the three main candidates were extraordinarily expensive. In an ideal democracy, those who have the right to elect should also have the right to be elected. In the United States, Japan and Taiwan, running for office requires great financial resources. In addition, candidates seeking further funds often become beholden to wealthy interests that do not necessarily coincide with the interests of the nation as a whole. In searching for political models, Taiwan must look beyond just the United States and Japan. Secondly, the campaign became extremely personal and filthy. In this, the campaigns resembled American Right campaigns such as the campaign of George Bush against John McCain for the Republican nomination in 2000. The most common element in the advertisements of Lien Chan and James Soong was to equate a vote for Chen Shui-bian with a vote for war. This was particularly ingenuous since all three candidates had declared Taiwan/Republic of China “an independent sovereign country.” Logically, if a vote for Chen was a vote for war, so was a vote for Lien or a vote for Soong. The KMT television advertisement comparing Chen Shui-bian to Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini was the height of irrespon- sibility and demonstrated how desperate the KMT had become in the last days of the campaign. The claim by Soong supporters that Soong had stolen less money than local township leaders and therefore was qualified to run for president was also disturbing. In the end, the electorate did not swallow the negative advertising and gave Chen an unexpectedly large victory. Many voters participated in campaign rallies. In fact, 82 per cent of the adult population went to the polls and cast their ballots. This suggests that Taiwan’s democracy is basically healthy.143

Demonstrations, Political Legitimacy and Two New Political Parties

At night, just hours after the polls had closed, Soong supporters gathered in front of the KMT Headquarters to demand the resignation of Lee Teng-

143 The preceding three paragraphs are drawn from Bruce Jacobs, “The good, the bad and the ugly,” Taipei Times, March 20,2000, p. 6. 170 chapter five hui as KMT Party Chairman. These demonstrators, who stayed for several days, basically remained peaceful. The main complaint was that the noise disturbed patients in the nearby National Taiwan University Hospital. Most significantly, virtually all the demonstrators accepted the legitimacy of Chen Shui-bian’s victory.144 On March 21, a major advertisement appeared in the United Daily News calling for “Lee Teng-hui to step down immediately and for the KMT to reform thoroughly.” The ad, signed by Wei Yung 魏鏞 and twenty others, called for examining how to return to the Three People’s Principles and national reunification among other items.145 The same ad, though now with 91 signatures and a claimed several hundred more KMT comrades whose names would not fit in the ad, was reprinted two days later in the China Times.146 On March 23, Lee Teng-hui announced that he would resign the next day as KMT Chairman at a special Central Standing Committee meeting. At the meeting, Lee took responsibility for the KMT’s disastrous presidential campaign. The first vice-chairman, Lien Chan, replaced Lee as interim chairman until a special KMT National Congress could convene. Lien Chan’s appointment as Chairman of the KMT was, of course, ironic since he, more than any single other individual, had led the KMT to its nadir. Soong established a new political party, the People First Party (qinmin dang 親民黨), on March 31, 2000.147 As shall be seen in the next chapter, the People First Party (PFP) became Taiwan’s third major party. But the PFP basically relied on Soong as its leader and on Mainlander support in the electorate. Thus, it could never hope to gain majority support. In addition, its Chinese name, which properly translates as “Close to the People Party,” was essentially undemocratic as a democratic party should be “of the people,” not “close to [but separate from] the people.” Furthermore, in Hokkien, its name sounded like “blind people’s party.” Over a year later, Lee Teng-hui became the “spiritual leader” of another new small political party, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (Taiwan tuanjie lianmeng 台灣團結聯盟) or TSU, which was formally founded on August

144 These comments are based on observations of and discussions with the demonstrators over several evenings. 145 Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 21, 2000, p. 1. Wei Yung, an Ameri- can-trained political scientist, served as Chairman of the Cabinet’s Research, Develop- ment and Evaluation Commission from 1976 to 1988 and as a legislator from 1992 to 1995. 146 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 23, 2000, p. 1. 147 http://www.pfp.org.tw/about.php. lee teng-hui as an elected president 171

12, 2001, in time to run for the December 2001 legislative elections.148 The TSU pushed a strongly Taiwan-centric view that on occasion forced the DPP to seek to regain its more fundamentalist Taiwan-centric supporters.

Evaluating Lee Teng-hui

Lee Teng-hui has proved to be a controversial figure in Taiwan politics. Many scholars of Mainlander “blue” background and their foreign coun- terparts have condemned him for being dictatorial and for betraying the KMT.149 A more generous view credits Lee with greatly contributing to Taiwan’s democratization and ending the KMT colonial dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo. While Lee also used “black” and “gold” elements to defeat the Mainlander power-holders, overall his achievements deserve great praise. A survey conducted in early May 2000, just at the end of his presidency tells us that Taiwan’s citizens gave President Lee overwhelmingly passing marks in all areas except “reforming corrupt politics.” Of those polled, 88 per cent gave Lee passing marks in “promotion of democratic reform,” 86 per cent gave him passing marks in “maintaining Taiwan’s sovereignty,” and 74 per cent gave him passing marks in “handling cross-strait relations.”150 Furthermore, in “promoting democracy,” Lee received overwhelming passes from members of all parties, from all groups who identified as “Chinese,” “Taiwanese,” or both, from all ethnic groups, and from

148 No one involved with the TSU realized that its abbreviated Chinese name, Tailian 台聯, was the same as the Chinese Taiwan Compatriots Association (Zhonghua quanguo Taiwan tongbao lianyihui 中華全國臺灣同胞聯誼會). This organization, founded in Bei- jing in December 1981, is affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party. For the date of December 27, 1981, see Tongyi zhanxian gongzuo shouce 统一战线工作手册 [Handbook for United Front Work] (Nanjing: Nanjing daxue chubanshe, 1986), p. 280. For the date of December 29, 1981, see Ma Ziruo 馬子若, “Taiwan tongbao lianyihui dongtai 台灣同胞聯誼會動態 [The Development of the Taiwan Compatriots Association],” Taisheng 台聲 [Voice of Taiwan], no. 1 (1983), p. 23. 149 See many, but not all, of the chapters in Bruce J. Dickson and Chien-min Chao, eds., Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy in Taiwan’s Politics: Democratic Consolidation and External Relations (Armonk, N.Y. and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2002). For the writer’s review of this book, see J. Bruce Jacobs, “Review of Bruce J. Dickson and Chien-min Chao (eds), Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy in Taiwan’s Politics: Democratic Consolidation and External Relations,” Asian Studies Review, 28, no. 1 (March 2004), pp. 83–85. 150 Chia-lung Lin and Bo Tedards, “Lee Teng-hui: Transformational Leadership in Tai- wan’s Transition,” in Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui Era: Politics in Taiwan, 1988–2000, ed. Wei-chin Lee and T.W. Wang (Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: University Press of America, 2003), p. 46 (Table 2.2). I have recalculated the figures to exclude the “Don’t Know/No Answer” responses. 172 chapter five all sectors of the economy.151 These very high pass rates from all sectors of society, particularly in promoting democracy, show that the Taiwan electorate has affirmed Lee’s presidency and its contribution to Taiwan’s development. This writer believes that Taiwan’s electorate has judged President Lee correctly.

151 Ibid., pp. 47–48 (Table 2.3). Aboriginal participants gave Lee the highest rate of failure in “promoting democracy, 36 per cent. The next highest failure rates came from members of the New Party (25 per cent) and Mainlanders (24 per cent). These rates have been recalculated to exclude the “Don’t Know/No Answer” responses. The “professional” category has an obvious error in the original table. the presidency of chen shui-bian 173

Chapter six

The Presidency of Chen Shui-bian

The eight years of Chen Shui-bian’s presidency (2000–2008) played an important role in consolidating Taiwan’s democracy. President Chen worked hard to promote a bureaucracy and a military loyal to the nation rather than to the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT). And he continued to promote a Taiwan-centric view of the island. Yet Chen’s election also demonstrated the clear divisions in Taiwan’s body-politic. The KMT and its “blue” allies always controlled the legislature during his entire presidency and they consistently worked to prevent the Chen administration from having any political success. Thus, for example, the KMT tried to impeach President Chen very early in his first term and later they refused to pass the budget for the purchase of arms from the United States.

President Chen Shui bian’s Inauguration Speech

People in Taiwan and around the world awaited President Chen Shui- bian’s inauguration speech on May 20, 2000. President Chen began by emphasizing Taiwan’s democracy, which, he said, “did not come out of the blue.”1 He praised the past contributions of those who had fought for democracy, which “was realized by going through many perils and dan- gers, and by experiencing countless hardships. If not for the fearless sacrifice of our democratic forebears, if not for the unswerving faith of the tens of millions of Taiwanese people in freedom and democracy, we could not possibly be standing on our beloved land today and celebrate a glorious occasion that belongs to all the people.” President Chen then further stated: [T]he significance of the alternation of political parties and the peaceful transition of power lies not in that it is a change of personnel or political

1 The text of President Chen Shui-bian’s inauguration speech, Chen Shui-bian, “Dawn of a rising era,” is available from the Taipei Times, May 21, 2000, p. 20, http://www. taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2000/05/21/36938. All quotes in this section are from this source. 174 chapter six

parties. Nor that it is a dynastic change. Rather, it is the return of state and government power to the people through a democratic procedure. The people are the true masters of the country, which no individual or political party can possess. From the head of state to the rank-and-file civil ser- vant—the government exists for all the people and serves all the people. The alternation of political parties does not mean an all-out negation of the past. We should be fair in evaluating the contributions made by those in power throughout the ages. Mr Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) deserves our highest praise and heartfelt honor for his promotion of democratic reforms and for his excellent performance during his 12 years of leadership. Despite being proud of his Democratic Progressive Party membership, President Chen pledged to be a “president for all people.” He pledged to “employ people according to their talents and not to discriminate on the basis of ethnicity, gender or party affiliation.” Later in his speech, President Chen turned to international issues. He vowed to “bring the Republic of China back into the international human rights system.” President Chen then moved to the issue of China: The people across the Taiwan Strait share the same ancestral, cultural, and historical background. While upholding the principles of democracy and parity, building upon the existing foundations, and constructing conditions for cooperation through goodwill, we believe that the leaders on both sides possess enough wisdom and creativity to jointly deal with the question of a future "one China." President Chen then pledged what became known as his “five noes policy”: [A]s the popularly elected 10th-term president of the Republic of China, I must abide by the Constitution, maintain the sovereignty, dignity and security of our country, and ensure the well-being of all citizens. Therefore, as long as the CCP regime has no intention to use military force against Taiwan, I pledge that during my term in office, I will not declare independence, I will not change the national title, I will not push forth the inclu- sion of the so-called "state-to-state" description in the Constitution, and I will not promote a referendum to change the status quo in regards to the question of independence or unification. Furthermore, the abolition of the National Reunification Council or the National Reunification Guidelines will not be an issue. Most people believed President Chen’s speech was quite moderate. However, the Chinese response was uncompromising: Anybody who dares insist on splitting Taiwan from China, in spite of the warning from the Chinese government and people, must bear responsibility for all the serious consequences arising therefrom… However, on the the presidency of chen shui-bian 175

key issue of accepting the one-China principle, the new leader adopted an evasive and vague attitude, saying that one-China is an issue that will be dealt with “in the future.” Evidently, his so-called goodwill reconciliation lacks sincerity… The Taiwan leader’s straying from the one-China principle will put the Chinese people on guard against further promotion of Taiwan independence. 2 President Chen could only respond, “I’ve already expressed our goodwill and sincerity, if [Beijing] still cannot understand, then what can I do?”3

The Cabinets of Premiers Tang Fei and Chang Chun-hsiung and the Fourth Nuclear Plant Imbroglio

According to Antonio Chiang (江春男), a senior journalist who worked with the dangwai and later the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), in the early days of the new Chen administration there were “constant rumors of a coup d’etat and of possible military defections to China. Some high-level officers in the navy and air force allegedly wanted to defect to China to resist the DPP government.”4 Partly because of this concern and partly to try to unite the body-politic, on March 29, 2000 President-elect Chen nominated Tang Fei 唐飛, a sixty-eight year old former general and the last Minister of National Defense under President Lee Teng-hui as well as a member of the Kuomintang, as his first premier. In an editorial, the Taipei Times argued Tang Fei’s appointment had four advantages. First, it calmed “jitters in the military.” Second, Tang’s KMT membership would insure his approval by the legislature where the KMT still retained a huge majority. Third, Tang’s being a Mainlander would send an olive branch to the Mainlander community and promote inter-ethnic harmony. Finally, Tang’s appointment as premier would allow the new Chen administration to hold relations with China in a “steady state” and permit the new administration to concentrate on domestic matters.5 On April 10, after considerable intra-party debate, the KMT decided to allow Tang to

2 “One-China Principle Allows for No Evasion or Ambiguity: Commentary”, Bejing, May 21, 2000, available at http://ken_davies.tripod.com/response.html. 3 Lin Chieh-yu, “Chen deflects flak on the front line,” Taipei Times, May 22, 2000, p. 1 4 See Rick Chu, “Chen Shui-bian’s baptism by fire,” Taipei Times, May 19, 2001, p. 8. 5 “Editorial: And the winner is …” Taipei Times, March 30, 2000, p. 8. See also Ho Jung- hsing, “Tang Fei: a risk the DPP just had to take,” Taipei Times, April 26, 2000, p. 8. 176 chapter six accept the appointment, but noted that Tang’s service as premier would be as an individual rather than as a member of the KMT.6 With fifteen members in the new cabinet, the KMT accounted for just over one-third of the entire cabinet membership.7 Yet this pretense of bi- partisan cooperation soon disappeared with a dispute over the future of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant. The former administration had decided to build the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant and by the time the Chen Shui- bian administration had come to power, the plant, which had cost NT$40 billion to date, was about thirty per cent completed. The cabinet under Tang Fei wanted to complete the plant arguing Taiwan needed the power and would waste substantial funds if the project were suspended.8 This put the cabinet at odds with the long-standing DPP policy of opposing nuclear energy on environmental grounds. Three months after having supported the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant, Minister of Economics Lin Hsin-i 林信義, a KMT member, suggested scrapping the plant and using alternative forms of energy.9 Two days later, Premier Tang Fei maintained his support for continued construction of the plant,10 and one day later he resigned, thus bringing to an end the shortest premiership in Taiwan’s history.11 Premier Tang had clearly been in poor health even before he became premier,12 and his support of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant also led to his resignation. But prescient observer Antonio Chiang offered another reason: “Tang realized that his mission to maintain political stability [during the transfer of power] was complete, and therefore it was time to step down. The main reason he resigned was because he was aware that he lacked financial and economic expertise—the Cabinet’s top administrative priorities.”13 President Chen Shui-bian appointed Vice-Premier Chang Chun-hsiung 張俊雄 as the new premier. A lawyer, Chang had originally served on the

6 Staff writer with Reuters, “KMT endorses Tang’s move,” Taipei Times, April 11, 2000, p. 1. 7 Hung Chen-ling, “KMT lays down rules for members,” Taipei Times, May 4, 2000, p. 3. Sources vary on who exactly is a member of the cabinet. For an official list of the first Tang Fei cabinet, which had 42 members, see ROC Yearbook 2000, pp. 691–695. 8 Staff Writer, “Lin backs 4th nuke plant,” Taipei Times, June 21, 2000, p. 1. 9 Cheryl Lai, “Lin recommends scrapping plant,” Taipei Times, October 1, 2000, p. 1. 10 Joyce Huang and Lin Chieh-yu, “Tang steadfast on nuclear plant plan,” Taipei Times, October 3, 2000, p. 1. 11 Joyce Huang and Lin Chieh-yu, “Tang bows out with president’s blessing,” Taipei Times, October 4, 2000, p. 1. 12 Brian Hsu, “Tang Fei to have tumor removed,” Taipei Times, April 12, 2000, p. 1. 13 Joyce Huang and Lin Chieh-yu, “Tang bows out with president’s blessing,” Taipei Times, October 4, 2000, p. 1. the presidency of chen shui-bian 177 defense team during the trial of the eight defendants from Kaohsiung Incident. He also was a founding member of the DPP and had served seventeen years in the legislature.14 At this juncture, the KMT became less cooperative. It expelled Minister of Economics Lin Hsin-i from the KMT ten days after warning him that he faced KMT disciplinary action if he continued to oppose the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant.15 The conflict between the DPP and the KMT deepened. President Chen held a meeting with KMT Party Chairman Lien Chan on October 27, 2000 at which the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant was discussed. Lien proposed that the government continue with the construction of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant, but that the First, Second and Third nuclear power plants be closed as soon as possible.16 However, one-half hour after the conclusion of the meeting between Chen and Lien, Premier Chang announced the construction of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant would cease. Premier Chang listed several reasons for ending the project including the difficulty of disposing of nuclear waste and Taiwan’s surplus of electricity.17 Three days later the KMT began procedures to impeach President Chen.18 A week later, President Chen reiterated his support for Premier Chang’s decision, though he also publically apologized to Lien Chan: “I understand that Chairman Lien Chan is not concerned about ‘saving face,’ but I must sincerely express my apology to Lien Chan and to the rest of the nation… I’ve overlooked the feelings of some people.”19 The KMT attempt to impeach President Chen backfired. A series of polls suggested that only 20 to 25 per cent of the population supported the impeachment of President Chen, while about 60 to 70 per cent opposed it.20 When many KMT politicians returned to their homes, constituents criticized their decision to impeach the president. This voter response created hesitancy among many KMT legislators and even led

14 Lin Chieh-yu, “Chang comes to rescue, again,” Taipei Times, October 5, 2000, p. 3. 15 Lin Chieh-yu, “KMT tosses out Lin Hsin-yi for nuclear stance,” Taipei Times, Octo- ber 20, 2000, p. 3. 16 Joyce Huang, “Cabinet pulls plug on power plant,” Taipei Times, October 28, 2000, p. 1. 17 Ibid. 18 Lin Mei-chun, “KMT moves to recall the president,” Taipei Times, October 31, 2000, p. 1. 19 Staff Writer, “President offers apology to Lien Chan,” Taipei Times, November 6, 2000, p. 1. 20 The results of four polls appear in Taipei Times, November 6, 2000, p. 3, but they do not appear in the online edition. 178 chapter six some KMT legislators to leave the KMT and join the DPP over the next year. The Fourth Nuclear Power Plant conflict finally reached a denouement when Premier Chang asked the Council of Grand Justices for a constitutional interpretation to decide whether or not the executive could terminate the project.21 The executive branch argued that it had the right to terminate the plant, while the legislature argued that the executive must respect a budget bill and build the power station. Officially, the Council of Grand Justices began deliberations on December 21, 200022 and they rapidly reached their decision on January 15, 2001 when they issued Con stitutional Interpretation No. 520.23 The Council of Grand Justices ruled that under democracy governments change and have mandates to implement new policies. However, the Grand Justices also ruled that the executive needed to report back to the legislature and gain its consent for the changed policy. Clearly, this decision was heatedly debated in the Council of Grand Justices. The fifteen Grand Justices had six concurring opinions as well as three dissenting opinions. An interview with a source close to the decision suggested the Council of Grand Justices worked very hard. They held some eighty meetings and read a huge number of books and articles as well as documents including campaign platforms and literature of the various parties. Despite the arguments of legal scholars that the Grand Justices voted on ideological lines,24 this source suggested that the Grand Justices put aside their personal opinions about the Fourth Nuclear Plant and voted on the basis of the constitutional issues in front of them. The role of the Council of Grand Justices clearly increased with democratization. Under the authoritarian dictatorships, the Council gave from zero to eight constitutional interpretations per year from 1961 to 1985. In

21 Stephanie Low, “Grand Justices to rule on nuclear plant,” Taipei Times, November 9, 2000, p. 1. 22 Joyce Huang and Stephanie Low, “Justices review nuclear decision,” Taipei Times, December 22, 2000, p. 2. 23 For the text of Constitutional Interpretation No. 520, see Council of Grand Jus- tices, Jiezi di 520 hao 釋字第 520 號 [Constitutional Interpretation No. 520] (January 15, 2001, accessed October 28, 2008); available from http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitu tionalcourt/p03_01.asp?expno=520. An official English translation is available at Coun- cil of Grand Justices, J.Y Interpretation No. 520 (January 15, 2001, accessed October 28, 2008); available from http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?ex pno=520. 24 Irene Lin, “Decision offers possible solution for deadlock,” Taipei Times, January 16, 2001, p. 3. the presidency of chen shui-bian 179

1986 and 1987, the last two years of Chiang Ching-kuo’s life, the Council gave eleven and nine constitutional interpretations respectively. Under Lee Teng-hui’s presidency (1988–2000), the numbers of constitutional interpretations ranged from sixteen to thirty-seven (in 1994). Since 2000, presumably as constitutional government has become more regularized, the annual number of constitution interpretations has declined from twenty-one a year to thirteen in 2007, though this increased to eighteen in 2008, an election year.25 The resolution of the imbroglio involved considerable negotiation between and within both sides as well as a spirit of compromise. The process is worth considering in some detail as it had the potential to set a precedent to solve issues across the political divide. At first, both sides appeared to harden their positions. Premier Chang claimed the decision to stop building the plant was neither illegal nor unconstitutional. The legislature then passed a motion by a vote of 135–70 objecting “to the decision made by the Executive Yuan [cabinet] to discontinue construction of the power plant.” In addition, Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng rejected Premier Chang’s offer to negotiate, though he said he would attend a meeting organized by President Chen Shui-bian.26 President Chen hosted a Chinese New Year dinner of the heads of the five branches of government including both Premier Chang and Speaker Wang. As a result, Premier Chang and Speaker Wang both agreed to negotiations. Wang obtained approval from opposition caucus leaders to negotiate and Premier Chang went to the legislature to “extend his goodwill” and to observe the handover ceremony for the KMT’s legislative caucus leaders. Both Premier Chang and Speaker Wang made remarks indicating a willingness to compromise.27 On February 2, 2001, after two meetings between Premier Chang and Speaker Wang, President Chen invited both men to his residence to discuss a compromise. While details of the meeting with the president remained secret, both the premier and the speaker made conciliatory statements.28 On the other hand, President Chen clearly needed to bring

25 Calculated from data at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/p03.asp. 26 Lin Mei-chun, “Uncertainty hangs in the air after vote,” Taipei Times, February 1, 2001, p. 1. 27 Lin Mei-chun, Lin Chieh-yu, and Joyce Huang, “New energy law mooted to solve crisis,” Taipei Times, February 2, 2001, p. 1. 28 Lin Chieh-yu and Stephanie Low, “Chen tries to heal nuclear plant rift,” Taipei Times, February 3, 2001, p. 1. 180 chapter six the anti-nuclear activists in the DPP behind any agreement.29 In addition, before calling a meeting of the cabinet, Premier Chang met with DPP leaders opposed to building a nuclear plant.30 Negotiations between the two sides and within the DPP continued for another week before a resolution was reached on February 13, 2001. Premier Chang and Speaker Wang signed an agreement for immediate resumption of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant’s construction. But anti-nuclear activists within the DPP immediately announced major protest rallies,31 though the turnout was considerably less than expected.32 Ironically, a fire on March 18, forced the shutdown of two power gen- erators at the Third Nuclear Power Plant.33 Two months later, an inspection revealed that over one-third of the control rods at the Second Nuclear Power Plant had cracks, forcing the Atomic Energy Commission to shut down the plant immediately.34 Thus, the safety of Taiwan’s nuclear power plants remained in question.

The KMT Attempts Reform

Simultaneously with the conflict between the executive and legislative branches of government, the Kuomintang was attempting some internal renovations. In the aftermath of the loss of the presidency and in an effort to get rid of careerists and to focus on devoted party members, the KMT decided to re-register all members beginning in January 2001.35 According to a newspaper report, the KMT originally had 2.5 million members,36 but a KMT source said many of these members had already died. By September 2001, about 940,000 members had re-registered. Many KMT leaders wanted to blame Lee Teng-hui for the KMT’s failure in 2000, but

29 Lin Chieh-yu and Stephanie Low, “Chen hints at renewed construction,” Taipei Times, February 4, 2001, p. 1. 30 Joyce Huang, “Cabinet cave-in over nuclear plant likely,” Taipei Times, February 6, 2001, p. 1. 31 Joyce Huang and Lin Chieh-yu, “Government gives in on power plant,” Taipei Times, February 14, 2001, p. 1. 32 Chiu Yu-Tzu, “Protest march fails to draw big crowds,” Taipei Times, February 25, 2001, p. 1. 33 Chiu Yu-Tzu, “Chang lashes out at Taipower,” Taipei Times, March 23, 2001, p. 2. 34 Staff Writer, “Rod faults plague nuclear plant,” Taipei Times, May 16, 2001, p. 2. 35 Jacobs, Local Politics in Rural Taiwan under Dictatorship and Democracy, p. 267. 36 Lin Chieh-yu, “Division in KMT ranks looms large,” Taipei Times, January 8, 2001, p. 1. the presidency of chen shui-bian 181 other members blamed the culture of “black [and] gold” corruption in the party.37 In this context, on March 24, 2001 Lien Chan ran unopposed for re- election as Chairman of the KMT in the first direct election for Party Chairman in the KMT’s 106 year history. Some 537,370 of 928,175 eligible party members turned out to vote for Lien. One notable absentee was Lee Teng-hui who played golf with business leaders and Japanese friends. When asked why he did not vote in the KMT election, Lee, while sitting on his golf buggy, replied, “I have no time.”38 As noted in the previous chapter, Lee Teng-hui resigned as Chairman of the KMT a few days after the 2000 presidential election. However, Lee’s responsibility for the KMT’s electoral loss remained the source of considerable debate within the KMT. Many of the more conservative pro-China members blamed Lee for the KMT’s loss, while others praised both his Taiwanization of the KMT and his presidency. These debates accelerated after the founding of the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) on August 12, 2001. Although Lee did not formally join the TSU, he became its “spiritual leader” and he spoke at its founding ceremony.39 Some critics within the KMT such as KMT legislator Hung Hsiu-chu 洪秀柱 argued Lee should be penalized for “betraying” (beipan 背叛) the KMT, while others such as Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng urged caution and restraint in dealing with the issue.40 Lee Teng-hui defended himself in an interview: “I haven’t done anything wrong. Spiritually, I support the Taiwan Solidarity Union. Doesn’t Taiwan need solidarity? I am not a member of the TSU, I have not participated in any electioneering and I haven’t transgressed any party [KMT] regulations.”41 But the next day the KMT announced that its Evaluation and Discipline Committee would hold an informal meeting the following week to discuss the issue of Lee

37 Ibid. 38 Lin Chieh-yu, “No surprise as Lien wins election,” Taipei Times, March 25, 2001, p. 1. 39 Lin Chieh-yu, “Lee says public is fed up with bickering,” Taipei Times, August 13, 2001, p. 1. 40 Huang Weizhu 黃維助 and Zhang Shixin 張世欣, “Kaichu Li Denghui fou ... 開初李登煇否 ... [Expel Lee Teng-hui or not...],” Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], August 22, 2001, p. 2. See also Stephanie Low, “Anti-Lee voices reach crescendo in KMT,” Taipei Times, August 22, 2001, p. 1. 41 Zou Jingwen 鄒景雯, “Li Denghui: Lian Song hekao quanmou ... 李登煇：連宋合靠權謀 ... [Lee Teng-hui: Lien and Soong together rely on political tricks...],” Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], August 27, 2001, p. 6. 182 chapter six

Teng-hui.42 An excellent political cartoon portrayed the KMT’s dilemma: while Lee Teng-hui leans against the trunk of a tree labeled “Taiwanization vote bank,” the KMT’s Evaluation and Discipline Committee sits on a tree branch sawing so that the branch (and the Committee) will fall.43 On September 1, 2001, Lee Teng-hui spoke at a TSU rally in southern Taiwan and supported the TSU candidates in the forthcoming legislative election, saying “Each candidate is my avatar”44 and urging each person attending the rally to get ten further votes for the TSU.45 On being told that Lee Teng-hui would stand on the podium at a TSU rally, KMT Chairman Lien Chan replied, “I’m not interested.”46 Lee’s standing on the TSU rally stage and publically supporting TSU candidates increased pressure on the KMT to expel him.47 The KMT’s Director-General of the Evaluation and Discipline Committee, Chen Kang-chin 陳庚金, said, “We were good together, but now it’s appropriate that we separate in an amicable fashion.”48 At its meeting of September 5, 2001, the KMT’s Evaluation and Discipline Committee agreed that Lee’s support of the TSU had hurt the KMT, but the Committee could not reach a decision on how to deal with the matter.49 On September 10 the KMT announced that the five KMT vice-chairmen intended to visit Lee’s house on September 15, but it turned out that no one had notified the five vice-chairmen of this.50 Clearly the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States and destructive Typhoon Nari demanded greater attention than KMT efforts to discipline a former Chairman, and it turned out that Lee had not responded to the

42 Huang Weizhu 黃維助, “Li Denghui dangji wenti ... 李登煇黨紀問題 ... [Lee Teng- hui’s Party Discipline Problem...] “ Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], August 28, 2001, p. 2. 43 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], September 4, 2001, p. 13. 44 Lin Chieh-yu and William Ide, “Lee on the offensive at first TSU rallies,” Taipei Times, September 2, 2001, p. 1. 45 Lin Kaiying 林凱盈, “Li Denghui zhantai ... 李登煇站台 ... [Lee Teng-hui stands on the platform...],” Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], September 2, 2001, p. 4. 46 Zhang Shixin 張世欣, “Li Denghui wei Tailian zhantai ... 李登煇為台聯站台 ... [Lee Teng-hui gets on the platform for TSU...],” Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], September 1, 2001, p. 3. 47 Lin Mei-chun, “Tentative KMT breaks its silence,” Taipei Times, September 3, 2001, p. 3. 48 Lin Mei-chun, “KMT asks for Lee Teng-hui’s resignation,” Taipei Times, September 4, 2001, p. 1. 49 Stephanie Low, “KMT to seek meeting with Lee Teng-hui,” Taipei Times, Septem- ber 6, 2001, p. 1. 50 Stephanie Low, “KMT delegation plans to visit Lee Saturday,” Taipei Times, Sep- tember 11, 2001, p. 3. the presidency of chen shui-bian 183 proposed visit of the five KMT vice-chairmen. The KMT Central Committee then sent a letter to Lee’s home outlining Lee’s violations of KMT party discipline51 and reminding him that no KMT member is exempt from the party charter and regulations.52 The KMT Evaluation and Discipline Committee met formally on September 21 and decided to “revoke” Lee Teng-hui’s membership, a pun- ishment less severe than “expelling” him. It took this action because of Lee’s “severe violations” of the party’s charter. Chen Kang-chin said, “the situation has proven to be irreversible despite all the efforts that have been made.”53 Lee responded that it was KMT Chairman Lien Chan who had deviated from the “Taiwan first” line and the KMT’s anti-communist platform, and he urged people to spend their time and energy helping the victims of Typhoon Nari.54

President Chen Convenes an Extra-Constitutional Meeting

As noted in previous chapters, President Lee Teng-hui used extra-constitutional meetings to bring Taiwan’s diverse body-politic together. Such meetings included the National Affairs Conference of June-July 1990 and the National Development Conference of December 1996, both of which led to important constitutional revisions. President Chen Shui-bian made a similar attempt by convening the Economic Development Advisory Committee (EDAC, jingji fazhan zixun weiyuanhui 經濟發展咨詢委員會) during August 24–26, 2001. EDAC was supposed to find ways to accelerate Taiwan’s sluggish economy including the elimination of Lee Teng-hui’s “no haste, be patient” (jieji yongren 戒急用忍) China policy.55 Even before EDAC convened, KMT Party Chairman Lien Chan proposed a post-EDAC conference of parties bizarrely named the Political Consultative Conference (PCC, zhengdang xieshang huiyi

51 Stephanie Low, “KMT pleads with Lee to stop hurting interests of party,” Taipei Times, September 15, 2001, p. 2. 52 CNA, “KMT committee to meet over Lee’s situation on Friday,” Taipei Times, Sep- tember 19, 2001, p. 3. 53 Stephanie Low, “KMT breaks it off with Lee Teng-hui,” Taipei Times, September 22, 2001, p. 1. 54 Lin Chieh-yu, “TSU claims KMT has betrayed itself,” Taipei Times, p. 1. 55 Stephanie Low, “Lien pushes for meeting on economy,” Taipei Times, August 22, 2001. p. 1. 184 chapter six

政黨協商會議),56 almost the exact same name used for the KMT and Chinese Communist Party meetings in January 1946.57 When asked whether or not people from the executive branch would be welcome to the PCC, Lien said, we “will not rule out any possibility.”58 The EDAC convened against the background of two important news items. First, unemployment rose for the tenth consecutive month hitting a record high of 4.92 per cent.59 Second, five months of negotiations between the KMT and the PFP for cooperation in the year-end elections appeared to have foundered.60 EDAC itself had 120 members who met in five panels on cross-strait relations, finance, investment, unemployment and industrial issues.61 EDAC operated on the principle that proposals approved by consensus would be implemented by government as soon as possible, while policies approved by a majority would only be considered by the government. The first day of EDAC approved over 200 proposals from two of the five panels, mostly by consensus.62 The second day EDAC passed another seventeen proposals, though the proposal for tax cuts received only majority support.63 On the last day, EDAC approved replacing Lee Teng-hui’s “no haste, be patient” (jieji yongren 戒急用忍) policy toward investment in China with “active opening, effective management” (jiji kaifang, youxiao guanli 積極開放,有效管理). Altogether, the cross-strait panel approved

56 Yin Naijing 尹乃菁, “Guomindang jiang zhaoji ... 國民黨將召集 ... [The Kuomin tang will convene...],” Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], August 22, 2001, p. 1. 57 The 1946 meeting was called the zhengzhi xieshang huiyi 政治協商會議. In Sep- tember 1949 in preparation for the founding of the People’s Republic, the Chinese Com- munist Party established the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi 中國人民政治協商會議), a “patriotic, united front organization” that deliberately referred back to the 1946 meeting and which continues to the present day. See Tongyi zhanxian gongzuo shouce 统一战线工作手册 [Hand- book for United Front Work], pp. 202–203. 58 Stephanie Low, “Lien pushes for meeting on economy,” Taipei Times, August 22, 2001, p. 1. See also Yin Naijing 尹乃菁, “Guomindang jiang zhaoji ... 國民黨將召集 ... [The Kuomintang will convene...],” p. 1. 59 Richard Dobson, “Unemployment continues to rise,” Taipei Times, August 24, 2001, p. 1. 60 Stephanie Low, “KMT-PFP plans for pact founder,” Taipei Times, August 24, 2001, p. 1. 61 Joyce Huang, Crystal Hsu, and Stanley Chou, “Economic meeting faces uphill battle,” Taipei Times, August 24, 2001, pp. 1, 3. 62 Kevin Chen and Stanley Chou, “Easy sailing for economic symposium,” Taipei Times, August 25, 2001, p. 1. 63 Stanley Chou, “Taxes hotly contested at forum,” Taipei Times, August 26, 2001, p. 1. the presidency of chen shui-bian 185

36 recommendations, all of which EDAC approved by consensus.64 Over the three days, EDAC approved 322 proposals by consensus and 36 by a majority, while rejecting 12 items.65 The main dissent came from labor groups who believed EDAC proposals would hurt workers.66 President Chen was clearly happy with the consensus achieved by EDAC, while the KMT announced that its PCC would be held in two weeks.67 KMT vice- chairman and former premier Vincent Siew, one of the five deputy conve- nors of EDAC, praised EDAC’s achievements, though he also noted that Lee Teng-hui’s policy of “no haste, be patient” was correct when it was implemented in 1996.68 Siew also said that the PCC would decide whether or not Taiwan should have a coalition government.69 In the context of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States and the forthcoming legislative elections, the PCC meeting proved low-key. At a meeting on September 12, 2001, representatives of parties in the legislature agreed to support 34 measures, twenty to implement EDAC measures and fourteen to prepare for Taiwan’s entry into the World Trade Organization.70 The party leaders, including KMT Party Chairman Lien Chan and DPP Party Chairman Frank Hsieh, ratified these agreements. Premier Chang Chun-hsiung and Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, who were invited to the final meeting, also promised to implement the agreements.71 Thus, the use of an extra-constitutional meeting once again brought Taiwan’s divided body-politic together. But this cooperation would soon be lost as Taiwan entered the final stages of the important legislative and county executive electoral campaigns.

64 Richard Dobson, “Forum proposes easing of China policy,” Taipei Times, August 27, 2001, p. 1. 65 See table in Li Xinfang 李欣芳, “Jingfahui shuilo shichu ... 經發會水落石出 ... [EDAC the truth comes to light...],” Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], August 27, 2001, p. 2. 66 Chuang Chi-ting, “Labor rights groups condemn proposals made at conference,” Taipei Times, August 27, 2001, p. 3. 67 Yin Naijing 尹乃菁, “Zhengdang xieshang huiyi ... 政黨協商會議 ... [The Political Consultative Conference...],” Zhongguo shibao 中國時報, August 27, 2001, p. 4. 68 Central News Agency, “Ex-premier Siew praises EDAC achievements,” Taiwan News, August 28, 2001, p. 2. 69 Huang Weizhu 黃維助, “Lianhe zhengfu Xiao wanchang ... 聯合政府蕭萬長 ... [Coalition Government, Vincent Siew...],” Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], August 28, 2001, p. 2. 70 Stephanie Low, “Inter-party talks yield 34 pieces of priority legislation,” Taipei Times, September 13, 2001, p. 6. 71 Stephanie Low, “Party leaders vow to cooperate,” Taipei Times, September 16, 2001, p. 3. 186 chapter six

The Legislative and County Executive Elections of December 1, 2001

The legislative and county executive elections of December 1, 2001 took place against two key backdrops. First, the economy was in recession with contractions over two quarters. The third quarter GDP in 2001 was 4.21 per cent less than the same quarter in 2000. With Singapore, Taiwan had the worst performing economy in Asia.72 In addition, Taiwan had had almost a year of ever-increasing unemployment. In July 2001, the unemployment rate had risen for the tenth consecutive month to a record high of 4.92 per cent. This compared to 3.06 per cent a year earlier.73 A week before the election, the October unemployment rate, which had increased to 5.33 per cent, was announced.74 This poor economic performance prior to the election clearly worried DPP leaders. Secondly, despite months of trying, the KMT and the PFP proved unable to reach any electoral alliance. This divided the “blue” forces. In addition, the DPP and the TSU also did not reach any agreements. Thus, all four parties campaigned independently. The leadership of KMT Party Chairman Lien Chan clearly created difficulties for the KMT. Only a few days before the election, Lien gave a major press conference on the top floor of the new marble KMT headquarters opposite the presidential office during which he made three key arguments. First, Lien stated that whatever started dialogue with the Chinese Communists was good. He seemed to fail to realize that it was the Chinese rather than the Chen Shui-bian government who refused to talk. Nor did he realize that accepting China’s “One Nation, Two Systems” policy would start negotiations, but would not be good for Taiwan. Secondly, Lien blamed the Chen Shui-bian government for the economic difficulties. When asked what the KMT would do, Lien replied that the KMT had given its proposals to the EDAC. Lien failed to acknowledge that President Chen Shui-bian had accepted all of the EDAC proposals and he himself did not put up any new ideas. Finally, although Lien claimed that the KMT was the most “localized” (bentu 本土) of Taiwan’s

72 Bloomberg, “Taiwan falls deeper into a recession,” Taipei Times, November 17, 2001, p. 17. 73 Richard Dobson, “Unemployment continues to rise,” Taipei Times, August 24, 2001, p. 1. 74 Zhou Huiru 周慧如, “Shiyue shiyelü 5.33% ... 十月事業率 5.33% ... [October Unemployment Rate 5.33%...],” Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], November 24, 2001, p. 9. the presidency of chen shui-bian 187 political parties, the four senior aides that Lien had next to him on the dais were all Mainlanders. Lien had failed to bring even one Taiwanese to the press conference.75 Considering the poor economic situation, the DPP did well in the legislative elections, becoming the largest party in the legislature (see Table 6.1).76 The KMT failed to reach its goal of 85 seats, winning only 68 seats, less than five-eighths of the seats it won in 1998. The PFP did well, gaining 46 seats, while the TSU gained 13 seats and easily exceeded the five per cent necessary to win at-large seats. In contrast, the New Party won only one seat, in Kinmen, and gained only half of the vote necessary to win at- large seats.

Table 6.1. Legislative election results, December 1, 2001 Party Seats % vote DPP 87 33.4 KMT 68 28.6 PFP 46 18.6 TSU 13 7.8 New 1 2.6 Others 10 9.0

Total 225 100.0

In the simultaneous county executive election, the DPP did less well, gaining only nine seats compared to the twelve won in 1997. The KMT increased one seat to nine seats as well. The PFP won Taitung and Lienchang (Matsu) counties, the New Party won Kinmen, while non-partisans won two county executiveships.77 Despite losing three county executiveships, the DPP actually won 45.3 per cent of the vote in the county executive election, a substantially higher proportion than in the legislative election.78 In addition, the DPP county executives controlled larger counties, administering 57.40 per cent of the population and 53.24

75 Bruce Jacobs, “KMT leadership largely to blame for drop in votes,” Taipei Times, November 29, 2001, p. 3. 76 For official results for seats won, see http://210.69.23.140/cec/%5Cpdf%5CB2001 006.pdf. For party proportions, see http://210.69.23.140/cec/%5Cpdf%5CB2001005.pdf. 77 For official results for seats won, see http://210.69.23.140/cec/%5Cpdf%5CF2001 006.pdf. 78 http://210.69.23.140/cec/%5Cpdf%5CF2001005.pdf. 188 chapter six per cent of the territory compared to the KMT’s 36.36 per cent of the population and 31.17 per cent of the territory.79 One reason that the KMT under Lien Chan did poorly was that Lien went after the Mainlander vote that was going to the PFP and the New Party rather than the much larger Taiwanese vote. This alienated at least some of the Taiwanese voters and repeated the same mistake Lien had made in the 2000 presidential election. Lien should have resigned to take responsibility for the KMT’s loss, but he did not.

The New Cabinet and the Legislative Speaker Election

Following the legislative election, there was considerable speculation about two matters, the possibility of a new cabinet and the election of the legislative speaker. On January 18, 2002, Premier Chang Chun-hsiung announced that the whole cabinet would resign on January 21 to show respect to the newly elected legislature.80 On January 21 President Chen Shui-bian appointed Yu Shyi-kun 游錫堃 as the third premier in the twenty months of his presidency. Like Premier Chang, Premier Yu had a long history in the DPP and its predecessors. He had served as a non-partisan in the Taiwan Provincial Assembly (1981–1989), served as Secretary- General in the dangwai election campaign of 1983, been a member of the first DPP Central Standing Committee (1986–1990), and won two terms as Ilan County Executive (1989–1997). He was appointed vice-premier in the first Chen Shui-bian cabinet, but resigned to take responsibility for four deaths in the Pachang Creek 八掌溪 accident of July 2000. Then he served as secretary-general of the presidential office from 2000 until his appointment as premier. On the same day that Premier Yu’s appointment was announced, some leaders in the KMT threatened to discipline any KMT member who entered the new Cabinet, though others did speak more softly.81 In fact, the new cabinet had several KMT members including Minister of Foreign Affairs Eugene Chien (Chien Yu-hsin 簡又新), Minister of National Defense Tang Yiau-ming 湯曜明, and Chairman of the Council of

79 Ziyou shibao 自由時報, December 2, 2001, p. 4. 80 Ko Shu-ling, “Premier tight-lipped on new Cabinet,” Taipei Times, January 19, 2002, p. 3. This news was the lead article in the January 19, 2002 edition of the three main Chinese-language dailies, the Liberty Times, the China Times, and the United Daily News. 81 Xiao Xucen 蕭旭岑, “Guomindang chufen ruge dangyuan ... 國民黨處分入閣黨員 ... [The KMT will punish party members who enter the cabinet...],” Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], January 22, 2002, p. 4. the presidency of chen shui-bian 189

Indigenous Peoples Chen Chien-nien 陳建年. Hau Lung-bin 郝龍斌, then of the New Party, served in the Environment portfolio.82 Prior to swearing the oath of office on February 1, newly designated Premier Yu visited many members of the opposition including former premier and KMT vice-chairman Vincent Siew, PFP chairman James Soong, TSU chairman Huang Chu-wen 黃主文 and Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng. Only KMT chairman Lien Chan rebuffed Premier Yu.83 While most people expected incumbent Wang Jin-pyng to win the position of Legislative Speaker, considerable speculation concerned who would become Deputy Speaker. In the press, virtually every alliance possibility was canvassed. The DPP held out some hope that Hong Chi-chang 洪奇昌, its candidate for Deputy Speaker could be elected by an alliance between the KMT and the DPP, but this did not occur. Instead, the KMT united with the PFP and elected Chiang Pin-kung 江炳坤 as Deputy Speaker. Chiang had just been elected to the legislature for the first time, but he was Taiwanese as well as a former Minister of Economics (1993– 1996) and Chairman of the Council for Economic Planning and Develop ment (1996–2000) during Lee Teng-hui’s presidency. Wang won easily with 218 votes, while Chiang won in the second round of the Deputy Speaker election with 115 votes, defeating Hong’s 106 votes.84 This “pan- blue” alliance between the KMT and the PFP set the stage for strong partisan conflict between the executive branch of government and the legislature for the next several years.

One Country on Each Side and the Mayoral Elections in late 2002

On Saturday, August 3, 2002, President Chen Shui-bian gave a speech by video telecast to the World Federation of Taiwanese Associations meeting in Tokyo. In his twenty minute speech, President Chen stressed that Taiwan did not belong to anyone else, nor was it anyone else’s local government. President Chen’s speech included the phrase “one nation on

82 The full cabinet can be found in The Republic of China Yearbook Taiwan 2002 (Taipei: Government Information Office, 2002), pp. 541–545. 83 Ko Shu-ling, “Lien ‘too busy’ to meet new premier,” Taipei Times, January 26, 2002, p. 1. 84 Ko Shu-ling, “Anger greets KMT’s clean sweep,” Taipei Times, February 2, 2002, p. 1. See also Crystal Hsu, “Contest reveals coalition battle,” Taipei Times, February 2, 2002, p. 3. 190 chapter six each side [of the Taiwan Strait] (yibian yiguo 一邊一國).”85 This statement caused some weekend controversy in Taiwan and in Beijing. On the Monday, Tsai Ing-wen 蔡英文, Chairwoman of the Mainland Affairs Commission, held a press conference and stated that Taiwan’s policy had not changed. That evening, Tsai and Premier Yu Shyi-kun went to New York to explain this to the Americans, who were satisfied with the clarifi- cations. While President Lee Teng-hui’s July 7, 1999 declaration about China and Taiwan having a “state-to-state relationship” created great discussion in Taiwan and overseas, President Chen’s statement was quickly accepted. This demonstrated the widespread acceptance of a de facto independent Taiwan that had developed on the island during the three previous years. On December 7, 2002 voters in Taipei and Kaohsiung went to the polls to choose their mayors and city councils. These elections took place against polls which showed the levels of satisfaction with the Chen Shui- bian presidency at record low levels.86 In the Taipei mayoral election, the KMT nominated popular incumbent mayor Ma Ying-jeou while the DPP recruited Lee Ying-yuan 李應元, a Taiwanese who had spent many years in the United States unable to return to Taiwan as he was on the blacklist. President Lee Teng-hui had supported Ma as a “New Taiwanese” in the 1998 mayoral election, but this time Lee Teng-hui supported Lee Ying- yuan.87 In a landslide, Mayor Ma won over 64 per cent of the vote. In the Taipei City Council race, the KMT with 20 seats, the PFP with eight seats and the New Party with five seats greatly outpolled the DPP’s 17 seats and the two seats won by independents. In Taipei, the TSU received no seats. This strong victory by the KMT and its “Blue” allies derived in part from Taipei’s status as the principal residence of Mainlanders on Taiwan.

85 Lin Chieh-yu, “Chen raises pitch of anti-China rhetoric,” Taipei Times, August 4, 2002, p. 1. 86 On November 19, 2002, the China Times had a rate of 38 per cent satisfied and 45 per cent dissatisfied, see “Bian shengwang chongcuo zhi sanchengba 扁聲望重挫三成八 [Chen Shui-bian’s popularity falls again to 38%],” Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], November 20, 2002, p. 2. The United Daily News poll for the same day had a satisfaction rate of 36 per cent and a dissatisfaction rate of 50 per cent, see “Bian shengwang diedao 36% zui di dian 扁聲望跌到 36% 最低點 [Chen Shui-bian falls to 36%, its lowest point],” Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], November 20, 2002, p. 2. For the writer’s analysis at this time, see Bruce Jacobs, “An open letter to President Chen,” Taipei Times, November 30, 2002, p. 8. 87 Sandy Huang, “Lee Teng-hui comes out for DPP,” Taipei Times, December 1, 2002, p. 1. the presidency of chen shui-bian 191

The Kaohsiung election proved much tighter. The DPP nominated incumbent Frank Hsieh who had won a very close election in 1998. The “Blue” forces were more confused. The KMT had nominated Mayor Ma in Taipei, so they were prepared to allow the PFP to nominate the “Blue” candidate in Kaohsiung. James Soong originally supported a non-partisan, Chang Po-ya 張博雅, a doctor from Chiayi Municipality, who had held several positions including legislator, mayor of Chiayi Muncipality, Minister of Health and Minister of the Interior.88 Eventually, however, both the PFP and the KMT supported Huang Jun-ying 黃俊英, a Taiwanese academic who had served briefly as Vice-Mayor under former mayor Wu Den-yih. In addition to Chang, Shih Ming-teh 施明德, a former political prisoner and DPP leader who had served many years in the legislature, but had ran unsuccessfully for the legislature as a non-partisan in 2001, ran for mayor as did a local politician, Huang Tien-sheng 黃天生. In the end, Mayor Frank Hsieh won re-election with just over 50 per cent of the votes. Huang Jun-ying followed with almost 47 per cent. The three non-partisans together obtained only a bit more than three per cent. In the Kaohsiung City Council race, the DPP won 14 seats to the KMT’s 12 seats, despite the KMT polling marginally more votes. The PFP obtained seven seats, the TSU two seats and independents nine seats. In Kaohsiung, the New Party received no seats and less than five thousand votes. Thus, Mayor Hsieh had the potential to win support from a majority of the City Council.89 Kaohsiung is in the DPP’s southern heartland, but it also has Taiwan’s second largest population of Mainlanders. Thus, the mayoral elections of 1998, 2002 and later in 2006 were all very close.

88 Chang Po-ya was the daughter of Hsu Shih-hsien, the great female non-partisan from Chiayi, who had been the “Phoenix along with the five non-partisan male “Dragons” of the Provincial Assembly during the 1950s. 89 On these elections, see J. Bruce Jacobs, “A Tale of Two Cities,” Taiwan Review, vol. 53, no. 3 (March 2003), pp. 24–29. For election statistics, see Taiwan’s press of December 8, 2002. For official Taipei mayoral election statistics, see http://210.69.23.140/cec/vote3. asp?pass1=D200206300000000aaa. Various official Taipei City Council election results can be obtained at http://210.69.23.140/cec/..%5Cmenu_mainB.asp?titlec=%B2%C4%2009 %20%A9%A1%20%A5x%A5_%A5%AB%C4%B3%AD%FB%BF%EF%C1%7C&pass1= E200206300000000aaa%20%20&pdf=E200263. For the Kaohsiung mayoral statistics, see http://210.69.23.140/cec/vote3.asp?pass1=D200206400000000aaa. The Kaohsiung City Council results can be obtained at http://210.69.23.140/cec/..%5Cmenu_mainB.asp?titlec =%B2%C4%2006%20%A9%A1%20%B0%AA%B6%AF%A5%AB%C4%B3%AD%FB%B F%EF%C1%7C&pass1=E200206400000000aaa%20%20&pdf=E200264. 192 chapter six

The Presidential Election of March 20, 2004

The Chen Shui-bian government did not make any particular gains during the next year and in September 2003, six months before the presidential election, any prospects that President Chen would be re-elected appeared bleak. Many believed that the “Blue” team of Lien Chan as presidential candidate and James Soong as vice-presidential candidate would easily defeat the DPP team of President Chen Shui-bian and Vice- President Annette Lu. At that time, the writer had an interview in the Presidential Office with a DPP political operative who proved prescient. The starting point for most analyses was the 2000 presidential election when the combined vote of Lien Chan and James Soong totaled about 60 per cent, while the vote for Chen Shui-bian was about 40 per cent. Of course, in 2000 President Lee Teng-hui had supported Lien Chan. Now, according to the interviewee, on the basis of the TSU success in the 2001 legislative election, it was clear that Lee Teng-hui had the support of some 7.8 per cent of the population. Most of this support, at least five per cent of the voters, would have come across from the KMT, while another two per cent would have come from DPP voters who supported Lee Teng-hui. Thus, instead of a 60 to 40 per cent difference, the Lien-Soong lead would have dropped to 55 per cent to 45 per cent. With a ten per cent difference, Chen Shui- bian had to make up just over five per cent to win. The DPP political operative argued that KMT voters, unlike PFP voters, were not too ideological. Since the DPP government had been doing things to help KMT voters as well, the DPP had a good chance in getting sufficient KMT votes. Thus, six months before the presidential poll, this political operative believed that President Chen had a good chance to win re-election. Two other factors also influenced the election of March 20, 2004 and may have reduced the vote for Lien Chan and James Soong. First, younger voters, many of whom would vote for the first time in 2004, tended to vote for the DPP. Second, many believed that those who felt they “owed” James Soong in 2000 for his work as Provincial Governor would now feel that they had paid the debt and would not vote for Soong in 2004. On March 9, 2004, nine days before the election, both sides were publishing political advertisements. The DPP ticket had a slogan of “Yes! Taiwan. Believe in Taiwan, Persist in Reform (Yes! Taiwan xiangxin Taiwan jianchi gaige, Yes! Taiwan 相信台灣堅持改革).” Above pictures the presidency of chen shui-bian 193 and short text about John F. Kennedy, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Woodrow Wilson and Chen Shui-bian, their key advertisement stated, “Only with a genuine leader can you know what peace is.”90 The KMT ad, which declared, “Change the president, Save Taiwan,” advertised a huge rally on March 13. The KMT campaign literature had a tandem bicycle with the front rider clad in blue and the second rider in orange, the colors of the KMT and PFP, the respective parties of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates.91 On the same day, the United Daily News had an extensive last poll.92 According to this poll, the Lien-Soong ticket led the Chen-Lu ticket by three per cent, 41 to 38, but 21 per cent still remained undecided. According to the United Daily News, the Lien-Soong ticket had maintained a similar lead since the beginning of the year. The poll suggested that males marginally supported Chen-Lu 43 to 41 per cent, while females supported Lien-Soong 41 to 34 per cent, though females, with one in four undecided, also remained less certain. By age group, Chen-Lu led substantially among the 20–29 year olds by 58 to 32 per cent, while Lien-Soong clearly won the 30–39 and 40–49 age groups by 48 to 34 per cent and 50 to 29 per cent. The 50–59 age group and those over 60 were very closely divided with Lien-Soong ahead by one per cent in each case. By education, Chen-Lu won the primary education group by 16 per cent and narrowly won the junior high school group and the senior high school groups by three and two per cent respectively. Lien-Soong won the post-secondary vocational and the university educated groups by 24 and 14 per cent respectively. By ethnicity, Chen-Lu won the Hokkien group by eight per cent, while Lien-Soong won the Hakka by 16 per cent and the Mainlanders by a whop- ping 63 per cent (74 to 11). By region, Lien-Soong led in Greater Taipei by eight per cent, in Taoyuan-Hsinchu-Miaoli by 26 per cent, in Taichung- Changhua-Nantou by six per cent and on the East Coast by three per cent. Conversely, Chen-Lu led in Yunlin-Chiayi-Tainan by twenty per cent and in Kaohsiung-Pingtung-Penghu by nine per cent. On the basis of data from previous elections, these poll results do not surprise. On March 12 the campaign turned nasty. The Lien-Soong forces had a full-page ad with a picture of Adolf Hitler in his Nazi uniform and huge

90 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 9, 2004, p. 1. 91 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 9, 2004, p. 9. 92 Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 9, 2004, p. A3. Taiwan’s laws do not permit the media to publish public opinion polls within ten days of an election. 194 chapter six characters that said, “Change the President, End A-bian’s Dictatorship.” 93 The same day, the KMT apologized to the Jewish community, but not to President Chen.94 The next day, a slightly modified ad with a picture of an angry Taiwanese god declared, “Change the President, End A-bian’s Evil Curses (mozhou 魔咒).”95 The key DPP campaign rally took place on February 28, 2004, fifty- seven years after the original February 28 Uprising and twenty-four years after the murder of Lin I-hsiung’s mother and twin daughters. At 2.28 pm on that day in 2004, more than two million people lined up over 487 kilometers from Taiwan’s northern port of Keelung to its southern tip in Pingtung “holding hands to protect Taiwan.”96 This demonstration sparked several musical compositions including a song by Chen Ming- chang 陳明章 that has become an unofficial anthem, “This is our Precious Land.” The chorus goes: Hand holding Hand Heart united with Heart Let us stand together This is our precious [land].97 The huge, successful rally of February 28 gave the DPP campaign needed momentum. Now the KMT needed to respond. Originally, the KMT had planned a rally for March 13 to be held only in Taipei. With one week to go, the campaign leadership notified lower levels that the rally would be held simultaneously around the country. According to a local KMT campaign official interviewed before March 13, the February 28 rally ironically also mobilized Lien-Soong voters.

93 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 12, 2004, p. 8 and Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 12, 2004, p. A14. 94 Agencies, “KMT apologizes about Hitler ad -- but not to Chen,” Taipei Times, March 13, 2004, p. 1. 95 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 13, 2004, p. 9 and Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times] March 13, 2004, p. A7. 96 Chang Yun-ping, “Two million rally for peace,” Taipei Times, February 29, 2004, p. 1. An excellent DVD of this demonstration is 2004 228 qianshou hu Taiwan de gandong 2004 228 牽手護台灣的感動 [Being Moved by Holding Hands to Protect Taiwan, February 28, 2004] (Taibei: Shouhu Taiwan dalianmeng 手護台灣大聯盟 [DVD], 2004). 97 For a CD recording of this song, see Chen Mingzhang 陳明章, Yi shi can de baobei 伊是咱的寶貝 [This is our Precious (Land)] (Taibei: Shouhu Taiwan dalianmeng 手護台灣大聯盟 [CD], 2004). The word “land” (tudi 土地) is used in an earlier line in the song and understood in this context. Although the citation is given with Mandarin romanization, in fact the song was written and sung in Hokkien. the presidency of chen shui-bian 195

In the end, the KMT claimed a total of 3,200,000 people attended their rallies of March 13 held in all twenty-five counties and municipalities including Kinmen and Matsu.98 Most notably, Lien Chan together with his wife and KMT Secretary-General Lin Fong-cheng 林豐正 prostrated themselves at the rally in front of the Presidential Office and kissed the ground in order to “demonstrate his [Lien’s] love for Taiwan.”99 In Taichung, James Soong and his wife also knelt and kissed the ground. The writer observed the March 13 KMT rally in Kaohsiung where from 200,000 to 500,000100 people converged from five different points wearing red headbands with the black character “Huan 換” meaning “Change” and carrying signs which said such things as, “We must change the unemployment president (shiye zongtong yao huandiao 失業總統要換掉)” and “We must change the mudslinging president (mohei zongtong yao huandiao 摸黑總統要換掉).” A KMT ad the following day exclaimed, “The silent volcano has exploded! We have stood up, we want to find the ‘real Taiwan’.”101 Also on March 13, in order to compete, the DPP held a rally in Kaohsiung where 500,000 participated.102 Clearly the 2004 presidential election campaign had mobilized Taiwan’s electorate in an extraordinary manner. In addition to the presidential election, the ballot had two referenda on it. This issue became secondary when the KMT urged boycott of the referenda, thus making it virtually impossible for either referendum to gain the minimum support of fifty per cent of the entire electorate voting in favor. A CoCo cartoon made clear the irrelevance of the referenda with two boxers beating each other up in a ring labeled “referendum debates,” but all of the audience watching another ring where the two presidential candidates competed.103 An analysis in the China Times on March 15 suggested that the division of Taiwan four years previously into “northern blue skies, southern green

98 See KMT ad in Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 14, 2004, p. 1, Zhong- guo shibao 中國時報 [China Times] March 14, 2004, p. A1 and Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 14, 2004, p. A1. 99 Huang Tai-lin, “Lien, Soong hold dramatic rally,” Taipei Times, March 14, 2004, p. 1. 100 The KMT claimed 500,000 while the police put the number at 200,000, see Jewel Huang, “Wang says pan-blues are already election winners,” Taipei Times, March 14, 2001, p. 4. 101 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 14, 2004, p. 1, Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 14, 2004, p. A1 and Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 14, 2004, p. A1. 102 Lin Chieh-yu, “Pan-greens hold huge rally in Kaohsiung, blast Soong,” Taipei Times, March 14, 2004, p. 1. 103 CoCo, “[Cartoon],” Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 15, 2004, p. 14. 196 chapter six lands (bei lantian, nan lüdi 北藍天，南綠地) would continue and that the election would be decided by a crucial three per cent of the voters.104 The campaign drew in 600 journalists from overseas and, by March 16, 300 had already arrived from 29 countries. On that day, Chiou I-jen 邱義仁, an important DPP campaign leader, and Hsiao Bi-khim 蕭美琴, a DPP legislator, held a major news conference on behalf of the DPP ticket. Most of the questions dealt with foreign relations and China. Chiou stated that Taiwan and China had made progress in a number of small areas, but that China’s insistence on its “one-China” policy made further progress difficult. Chiou said the election would be very close. The next day, Lien Chan and James Soong also held a press conference. James Soong emphasized that both Lien and Soong had PhDs with two slogans: Postpone Head-on Disputes and Promote Healthy Development. Asked about “black and gold” (heijin 黑金), Lien replied that one cannot conduct “black and gold” politics if one is out of power.105 Lien blamed “black and gold” politics—such as vote-buying—on Chen Shui-bian. James Soong told the press that official DPP campaign material made certain statements, though after he gave the material to his aide, who was sitting next to the writer, it was clear that the material came from the Presbyterian Church and not the DPP campaign. Later, in a “domestic” press conference after the international press conference, Soong spoke in Chinese and explicitly stated that he had not wanted to make a particular statement to foreign reporters. A fugitive businessman holed up in China and the United States, named Chen Yu-hao 陳由豪, had stated that he had given Chen Shui- bian campaign funds. On March 18, a DPP ad asked, “Who will you elect to be President? Enough!! The Taiwanese people are not idiots, the Taiwanese people also can get angry.” The ad’s mock ballot stated Chen Shui-bian and Annette Lu “unwaveringly defend Taiwan’s sovereignty” and “resolutely oppose the restoration of black and gold.” A picture of Chen Yu-hao labeled “criminal in flight” partially covered Lien and Soong’s pictures. Nearby another picture of a People’s Republic of China passport carried the claim that Chen Yu-hao held a PRC passport.106

104 Zhang Ruichang 張瑞昌, “Nanbei zhanzheng juezhan guanjian 3% 南北戰爭決戰關鍵 3% [In the war between North and South, a crucial 3% will decide the battle],” Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 15, 2004, p. 8. 105 Of course, one does not need to be in office to buy votes. 106 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 18, 2004, p. 11 and Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times] March 18, 2004, p. A16. the presidency of chen shui-bian 197

A KMT ad on the same day had a large ROC flag with the characters, “Urgently Rescue Taiwan, [Use the last] Precious 48 Hours!” This ad admitted, “Research shows that 90% of Green voters go to the polls, more than the 70% of Blue voters.” The ad urged Blue supporters “in these two days to seek votes at any time and any place. Your actions will decide Taiwan’s future!”107 The next day, the same ad appeared with some minor changes, “The key difference between losing and winning is only 1%. Tomorrow, we cannot do without your one vote!”108 On March 19, the day before the election, at 1.45 pm President Chen Shui-bian and Vice-President Annette Lu were shot while standing in a moving jeep as they campaigned in Tainan Municipality. This assassination attempt, of course, almost fully occupied the major newspapers on election day.109 A few facts that later came out need to be noted. First, with the loud firecrackers that accompany any presidential campaign in Taiwan, it would have been very difficult to hear the shots. Secondly, the shots were fired with home-made bullets. The various bullets used different metals and their power seemed to have varied considerably. The Lien-Soong campaign stopped campaigning and Lien made an attempt to visit President Chen later that night. Taiwanese voters went to the polls in shock. On election day several advertisements appeared. The DPP had a simple, “Thank everybody. The president thanks you for your concern.”110 The DPP also published a prayer by Lin I-hsiung, “Taiwan, My Mother,” that concluded, “Please accept our devout prayer.”111 The KMT continued with its ROC flag motif, declaring “Absolutely do not allow this flag to disappear from the Earth! Great People, today you must make the decision between right and wrong!”112 On election night, the results came in very quickly on the various television stations. At first it appeared that Lien Chan was winning convinc- ingly according to several television stations, and my initial impression was that the television stations had people stationed on every poll and were phoning in the results. Then, towards the end, the incoming Lien votes slowed dramatically and Chen Shui-bian pulled ahead. Some pro-

107 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times] March 18, 2004, p. A1. 108 Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 19, 2004, p. A1. 109 See press, March 20, 2004. 110 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 20, 2004, p. 1. 111 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 20, 2004, p. 7. 112 Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times] March 20, 2004, p. A1 and Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 20, 2004, p. A1. 198 chapter six

Blue stations had apparently accelerated Lien’s votes ahead of the reality and had to pull back at the end. This naturally disappointed Lien-Soong supporters. In the end, 80.28 per cent of Taiwan’s voters went to the polls and cast 12,914,422 valid votes.113 The Chen-Lu ticket defeated the Lien-Soong ticket by only 29,518 votes, a difference of only 0.228 per cent of the vote. As former premier (and future vice-president) Vincent Siew remarked, the number “228” keeps coming up in Taiwan’s history. That there were 337,297 invalid votes, more than ten times the margin, only created more controversy. Unlike the Electoral College in the United States or parliamentary systems, where candidates need to win pluralities in a variety of localities, Taiwan’s presidential system counts every vote as equal to every other. To some extent, the pattern of “northern blue skies, southern green lands” continued with the Chen-Lu ticket winning the whole west coast from Changhua south as well as Taichung and Ilan counties. The Lien-Soong ticket won the northwest of Taiwan plus Taichung and Keelung municipalities, Nantou, Hualien, Taitung and Penghu counties as well as the offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu. Table 6.2 shows support for each candidate by county or municipality.114 Table 6.2 shows that the southern heartland, especially the rural areas, as well as Ilan County on the East Coast remained the strongest areas of support for the DPP ticket. Lien and Soong gained their strongest support in the small offshore islands, the East Coast and the rural areas of northwest Taiwan. The central areas of Taichung Municipality, Taichung, Changhua and Nantou counties as well as Penghu county all divided much more evenly. Lien Chan and James Soong believed that the DPP had concocted the assassination attempt of March 19 to gain sympathy and had thus won the election illegitimately. They refused to concede the election and demanded that it be invalidated. Both candidates sat outside the KMT headquarters in protest as many of their supporters gathered. Several KMT leaders such as Ma Ying-jeou suggested that Lien and Soong concede the election, but they did not. Others suggested having a recount, but at first Lien and Soong also rejected this advice.

113 http://210.69.23.140/cec/vote421.asp?pass1=A2004A0000000000aaa. 114 Table 6.2 rearranges the official Central Election Commission table at http://210.69.23.140/cec/%5Cpdf%5CA2004005.pdf. the presidency of chen shui-bian 199

Table 6.2. Support by county/municipality in 2004 presidential election County/Municipality Chen-Lu Support % Lien-Soong Support % Tainan County 64.79 35.21 Chiayi County 62.79 37.21 Yunlin County 60.32 39.68 Kaohsiung County 58.40 41.60 Pingtung County 58.11 41.89 Tainan Municipality 57.77 42.23 Ilan County 57.71 42.29 Chiayi Municipality 56.06 43.94 Kaohsiung Municipality 55.65 44.35 Changhua County 52.26 47.74 Taichung County 51.79 48.21 Penghu County 49.47 50.53 Nantou County 48.75 51.25 Taichung Municipality 47.34 52.66 Taipei County 46.94 53.06 Hsinchu Municipality 44.88 55.12 Taoyuan County 44.68 55.32 Taipei Municipality 43.47 56.53 Keelung Municipality 40.56 59.44 Miaoli County 39.25 60.75 Hsinchu County 35.94 64.06 Taitung County 34.48 65.52 Hualien County 29.80 70.20 Kinmen County 6.05 93.95 Lienchiang (Matsu) Co 5.76 94.24

On March 21, the Chen-Lu Campaign Headquarters had an advertisement with Chen and Lu bowing and the words, “The New Era has Started. Go Taiwan! The road of reform is always difficult.”115 The next day, the Lien- Soong campaign headquarters responded with an ad that asked, “A-bian, what are you afraid of? We strongly demand an immediate, open, com-

115 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 21, 2004, p. 9 and Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times] March 21, 2004, p. A9. 200 chapter six plete and centralized examination of the ballots!!”116 The Liberty Times led with the news that several religious leaders urged the Taiwanese people to be rational and to cherish Taiwan.117 In the end, the High Court granted the demand for a recount, but the recount’s minor changes did not alter the results of the election. Several commissions also examined the March 19 assassination attempt. None published any evidence that suggested that the DPP had concocted the assassination attempt, though several KMT leaders remained convinced that the DPP had in fact done so. And, despite KMT-PFP complaints that the assassination attempt had “stolen” the election, the KMT ads in the days before the election as well as private unpublished polls all showed that the election results would be within one per cent. The behavior of Lien Chan on election night suggested he believed he was somehow “owed” the presidency. His speeches and actions most definitely did not contribute to Taiwan’s democratization. Though Lien Chan continued as KMT Party Chairman until 2005 and James Soong ran for Taipei mayor in 2006, the 2004 presidential election essentially ended their political careers.

The Legislative Election of December 11, 2004

With an absolute majority of the March 2004 presidential vote, the DPP hoped, together with the TSU, to win a small majority in the legislature for the first time in the December 11, 2004 election. Previous pan-blue control of the legislature had made it difficult for the administration of President Chen Shui-bian to implement key reforms as the legislature repeatedly failed to pass key budget and other bills. Thus, the legislative election of December 11, 2004 offered the DPP administration a key opportunity to gain political power and to implement reform. While remaining the largest political party in the legislature, the DPP failed in the December 11, 2004 election to gain a majority of seats. In summary, the DPP gained 89 seats, which together with the 12 seats of the TSU, gave the pan-green forces only 101 seats out of 225. The KMT won 79

116 Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 22, 2004, p. 9, Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times] March 22, 2004, p. A5 and Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], March 22, 2004, p. A5. 117 Zhong Lihua 鍾麗華 and You Xiuhua 游繡華, “Zongjiaojie yu quanmin lixing aihu Taiwan 宗教界籲全民理性愛護台灣 [Religious Circles Appeal to All the People to be Rational and Cherish Taiwan],” Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 22, 2004, p. 1. the presidency of chen shui-bian 201 seats, the PFP 34 seats and the New Party one seat—a total of 114 seats, an absolute majority in the legislature. The Non-Partisan Solidarity Union, which generally supported the KMT and PFP, won six seats while non- partisans won four.118 Pan-blue forces also won a plurality of the votes cast (see Table 6.3). Clearly, the pan-blue forces had won a clear-cut victory both in votes and in terms of seats.

Table 6.3. Party vote in 2004 legislative election Party % % Seats Seats Pan-Blue KMT 32.83 79 PFP 13.90 34 New 0.12 1 Total 46.85 114

Pan-Green DPP 35.72 89 TSU 7.79 12 Total 43.51 101

Other NPSU 3.63 6 Non-Partisans 5.94 4 Others 0.06 Total 9.63 10 Grand Total 99.99 99.99 225 225 Source: Calculated from http://210.69.23.140/cec/%5Cpdf%5CB2004005.pdf (includes aboriginal votes)

Two main reasons account for the DPP-TSU loss and the KMT-PFP victory in this election. First, the DPP nominated poorly, while the KMT nominated well in choosing its candidates. For example, in Taoyuan County, with thirteen seats, the largest and most complex electorate, the DPP nominated seven candidates, but only four won. This was because the DPP used a primary system that nominated mostly Hokkien candidates in Taoyuan’s predominately Hakka south. The KMT, on the other hand, made certain that it nominated only one candidate from particular

118 For the official Central Election Commission results, see http://210.69.23.140/ cec/%5Cpdf%5CB2004006.pdf. See also Taiwan’s press, December 12, 2004. 202 chapter six regions within Taoyuan. Thus, six of its seven nominees won. In addition, the PFP won two seats in Taoyuan, while the TSU won only one. Overall, the pan-blue forces gained eight of Taoyuan County’s thirteen seats, while the pan-green forces obtained only five.119 Secondly, voters tended to view the legislative elections as local rather than national; thus, they cast ballots on such local issues as schools, roads and hospitals. In addition, candidates for the legislature too often had local backgrounds rather than national reputations, a feature which solidified the local nature of the election. Thus, when Chen Shui-bian emphasized issues of Taiwan identity, these failed to gain much sympathy among the electorate.120 These two strategic errors contributed greatly to the DPP’s failure to gain control of the government for the remainder of President Chen’s term. The legislature would henceforth repeatedly block the government’s attempts to implement new policies. For example, for its own partisan political purposes the pan-blue majority in the legislature repeatedly refused to pass the budget to buy military weapons from the United States. The hard-line political conflict between the executive and the legislature in many ways symbolized Taiwan’s deeply divided polity.

Lien Chan and James Soong go to China, April-May 2005

Less than fourteen months after their failed presidential and vice-presidential election bid and less than two months after the Chinese National People’s Congress passed its Anti-Secession Law on March 14, 2005, Lien Chan and James Soong set off on separate “journeys of peace” to China. Lien left Taiwan on April 26, 2005 for Nanjing where he was met by Chen Yunlin, the head of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Taiwan Office, visited Sun Yat-sen’s Mausoleum and talked with Jiangsu political leaders.121 Politically, however, Lien’s key visit was to Beijing where on April 29 he held a meeting with CCP Party Chairman Hu Jintao and spoke to students at Beijing University.

119 For official results by seats, see http://210.69.23.140/cec/%5Cpdf%5CB2004006. pdf. For an analysis of the Taoyuan County election, see Bruce Jacobs, “Taoyuan’s overcrowded but key race,” Taipei Times, December 6, 2004, p. 4. 120 For an example, see Jewel Huang, “Say ‘Taiwan’ aloud, Chen urges people,” Taipei Times, December 9, 2004, p. 1. 121 Agencies, “Lien Chan arrives in Nanjing, gets a warm welcome from Commu- nists,” Taipei Times, April 27, 2005, p. 1. the presidency of chen shui-bian 203

Lien Chan and Hu Jintao reached a five point “vision for cross-strait peace.” In the first point, both the CCP and the KMT agreed to support the “1992 consensus” and to support the resumption of peaceful cross- strait negotiations. Debate during the 2001 legislative election campaign suggested that a “1992 consensus” had never existed, but the CCP and KMT now brought this formula out.122 In the second point, the KMT and CCP agreed on the need to have a peace agreement. In the third point, both the KMT and the CCP agreed to promote cross-strait economic interaction such as direct flights and to strengthen investment and agricultural cooperation. Fourth, both parties agreed to push for negotiations on Taiwanese participation in international organizations and events including Taiwanese membership in the World Health Organization. Finally, both sides agreed to establish a system of party-to-party talks.123 In his speech to the Beijing University students, Lien Chan never used the term “Republic of China.” Even when directly questioned by a Taiwan reporter, Lien never used the term. Lien also did not particularly praise Taiwan’s democracy, though he did praise China’s political reforms. Lien paid tribute to Chiang Ching-kuo’s role in Taiwan political development, but he never mentioned the roles of Lee Teng-hui or Chen Shui-bian. He also never mentioned Taiwan’s 23 million people and never said that the 23 million people in Taiwan should have a say about any change in Taiwan’s status. And Lien did not state that government-to-government talks should replace party-to-party talks between Taiwan and China.124 Discussions with Lien’s aides at KMT headquarters in Taipei revealed that the Chinese did not force Lien to make any of these concessions. Rather, his aides suggested that Lien made such concessions in an effort to be friendly.

122 In the so-called 1992 Consensus, both Taiwan and China supposedly agreed that there is “One China, each side having its own interpretation” (yiZhong gebiao 一中各表). At the time, China refused to acknowledge any such agreement and efforts in 2001 and afterwards in Taiwan to find paperwork supporting such a 1992 consensus failed. 123 Caroline Hong, “Lien, Hu share ‘vision’ for peace,” Taipei Times, April 30 2005, p. 1. 124 For a news report, see Caroline Hong, “KMT, communists should work together, Lien tells Peking University students,” Taipei Times, April 30, 2005, p. 3. For a Taiwan transcript of Lien’s Beijing University speech, see http://sulanteach.msps.tp.edu.tw./% E5%9C%8B%E9%9A%9B%E8%8F%AF%E8%AA%9E%E6%95%99%E5%AD%B8/%E 5%85%A9%E5%B2%B8%E4%BA%A4%E6%B5%81/%E5%85%A9%E5%B2%B8%E4% BA%A4%E6%B5%81-%E5%BB%B6%E4%BC%B8%E9%96%B1%E8%AE%80/%E9%80 %A3%E6%88%B0%E5%9C%A8%E5%8C%97%E4%BA%AC%E5%A4%A7%E5%AD% B8%E6%BC%94%E8%AC%9Bhtm. A Chinese transcript can be found at http://news. xinhuanet.com/misc/2005–04/29/content_2892817.htm. 204 chapter six

Lien concluded his trip in Xi’an, where he was born in 1936 and where he swept his grandmother’s grave for the first time in sixty years.125 He concluded his visit with a stay in Shanghai where he met Wang Daohan, the Chinese negotiator in the original 1993 Koo-Wang talks between China and Taiwan in Singapore.126 Three days after Lien Chan returned to Taiwan, James Soong began his journey to China with a visit to Xi’an, where Chen Yunlin greeted Soong, as he had Lien, on his first stop. Soong, like the Chinese leadership, played on the common bloodline of the Chinese and Taiwanese people, saying Hoklo, Hakka and Mainlanders all trace their bloodlines to China. 127 Of course, in this statement, Soong appeared to forget Taiwan’s aborigines, many of whom had supported him politically in the past. Soong then went to Nanjing where he visited Sun Yat-sen’s mausoleum and stressed his and his PFP party’s belief in Sun’s Three Principles of the People. He said, Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait must work together to “hope for the sons of China to unite.”128 Soong next went to Shanghai, where he met with Wang Daohan and emphasized his support of the so-called “1992 consensus” as well as spoke to Taiwanese businessmen in China.129 After visiting his ancestors’ tomb in Hunan,130 Soong went to Beijing where he met with Hu Jintao and delivered a speech at Qinghua University. After their talk Hu Jintao and Soong issued a six-point com- muniqué. In the first point, both parties agreed on the importance of the “1992 consensus” as the basis for resuming cross-strait negotiations. Second, both sides agreed to oppose Taiwan independence. Third, they agreed to end the standoff between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and to facilitate a peace agreement and a mechanism to address military affairs across the Taiwan Strait. Fourth, they called for strengthened business ties and such cooperation as cross-strait flights and the establishment of a free trade area for Taiwan and China. Fifth, they agreed to seek

125 Caroline Hong, “Amid fanfare, Lien visits his home town,” Taipei Times, May 1, 2005, p. 3. See also Caroline Hong, “Lien visits the grave of his grandmother,” Taipei Times, May 2, 2005, p. 3. 126 Caroline Hong, “Lien plugs FTA, promises closer ties with Beijing,” Taipei Times, May 3, 2005, p. 3. 127 Caroline Hong, “Soong seeks spirits in Xian,” Taipei Times, May 6, 2005, p. 1. 128 Caroline Hong, “Soong urges unity among Chinese the world over,” Taipei Times, May 8, 2005, p. 2. 129 Caroline Hong, “1992 consensus a reality: Soong,” Taipei Times, May 9, 2005, p. 2. 130 Staff writer with CNA, “Soong visits his ancestors’ tomb,” Taipei Times, May 10, 2005, p. 2. the presidency of chen shui-bian 205 a resolution to the problems facing Taiwan’s participation in international organizations and specifically mentioned the World Health Organization. Lastly, they agreed to facilitate the establishment of a forum for experts and leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Afterwards, when meeting the press, Soong said, “This is the first time that China has said clearly in a communique that it supports the ‘one China’ principle with different interpretations.”131 In his speech to Qinghua University, Soong emphasized his opposition to Taiwan Independence and drew a sharp distinction between “Taiwan consciousness” (Taiwan yishi 台灣意識), which Soong and his PFP supported, and “Taiwan Independence” (Taidu 台獨), which they opposed. He stressed, the PFP “is a political party that was born and has grown in Taiwan, and we have extremely strong ‘Taiwan consciousness’ feelings of loving [Taiwan] as our home and loving the earth [of Taiwan].”132 Soong had spoken repeatedly of the “Republic of China” early in his trip,133 but the words “Republic of China” (Zhonghua minguo 中華民國) did not appear in his Qinghua speech. According to interviews, the Chinese told Soong that the words “Republic of China” could not be used in his speech. If he wanted to give the speech, he had to delete the words. Faced with this decision, Soong felt it was better to give the speech without the words. After Lien and Soong returned to Taiwan, Taiwan experienced a short period of “China enthusiasm” (Zhongguo re 中國熱). However, this passion soon cooled. As noted earlier, both Lien and Soong had lost their political importance with their defeat in the 2004 presidential election.

The Seventh Set of Constitutional Amendments, June 2005

The procedures for the 2005 constitutional amendments, which substantially reorganized the legislature and its elections, took place in accord with the 2000 constitutional amendments. The process began with the legislature proposing and passing the proposed amendments on August 23, 2004. Clearly, all parties supported the proposed amendments as 200

131 Caroline Hong, “Soong makes pact with Hu in Beijing,” Taipei Times, May 13, 2005, p. 1. 132 The text of Soong’s speech may be found at http://huang.cc.ntu.edu.tw/pdf/01–02. pdf. The quote is from p. 5. A newspaper report on the speech may be found at Caroline Hong, “Soong denounces independence,” Taipei Times, May 12, 2005, p. 3. 133 Agencies, “Soong stresses his Chinese roots, blood,” Taipei Times, May 7, 2005, p. 3. 206 chapter six of 201 legislators present voted in favor. The proposed amendments had the following provisions:

–– The number of legislators would be cut in half from 225 to 113 beginning in 2008. –– The 73 district legislators would be elected from single-member constituencies. –– Aboriginal voters would elect six legislators, three in “plains” aboriginal electorates and three in “mountains” aboriginal electorates. –– Voters would cast a second ballot for a party list. Provided a party received five per cent of the vote, it would receive seats in proportion to its votes in the party list election. In order to insure women’s participation in the legislature, at least half of the party list candidates had to be women. –– The amendments extended the legislative term from three to four years.134

On May 14, 2005, Taiwan’s voters went to the polls to elect a three-hundred member temporary National Assembly to enact formally the Constitutional amendments. The DPP had a modest victory, though only 23.35 per cent of voters went to the polls. In this election, the TSU also gained more votes than the PFP. Most importantly, however, the DPP and the KMT combined for over 81 per cent of the vote and seats. The election results are shown in Table 6.4.135 Besides halving the size of the legislature and thus supposedly improving the quality of its members, the most radical constitutional reform changed the electoral system from single-vote, multi-member constituencies to single-member constituencies. As each victor would now require a plurality of votes rather than a small minority of the electorate, this reform in theory would force candidates to appeal to the broad center of the electorate rather than to a small fringe, which previously could elect an “extremist” legislator with only five or six per cent of the vote in a large electorate.

134 Debby Wu, “Constitutional amendment bill passes,” Taipei Times, August 24, 2004, p. 1. 135 This table is calculated from Central Election Commission data available at http://210.69.23.140/downLoad/dowmLoads.asp and supplemented by Ko Shu-ling, “DPP wins surprise victory in election,” Taipei Times, May 15, 2005, p. 1. See also Caroline Hong, “Blue camp gets mediocre support at the ballot box,” Taipei Times, May 15, 2005, p. 3. the presidency of chen shui-bian 207

Table 6.4. National Assembly election, May 14, 2005 Party % vote Seats DPP 42.52 127 KMT 38.92 117 TSU 7.05 21 PFP 6.11 18 Civic Alliance 1.68 5 Chinese People’s Party 1.08 3 New Party 0.88 3 Non-Partisan Solidarity Union 0.65 2 Farmers’ Party 0.40 1 Taiwan Independence Party 0.30 1 Citizens Party 0.22 1 Wang Ting Alliance 0.19 1

Totals 100.00 300

Only at the last minute did the TSU and the PFP seem to realize that single-member constituencies could harm them fatally. Thus, they shifted from supporting the constitutional amendments to opposing them. However, the KMT and DPP held firm and the National Assembly voted for the new constitutional amendments on June 7, 2005 by a vote of 249 in favor and only 48 against.136 President Chen promulgated these amendments on June 10. In addition to these legislative reforms, the seventh constitutional amendments also implemented several other changes. Amendment 1 mandated that the electors would vote for any proposed amendment to the Constitution or change to national territory within six months of the Legislature passing such a proposal. This gave the people increased power. Amendment 2 also brought the people into the recall of the president or vice-president. To recall the president or vice-president, one- fourth of all legislators had to make such a proposal; this had to be followed by a vote of two-thirds of all the legislators supporting recall. Then, over one-half of the voters had to cast ballots in a recall election during which over one-half of those voting had to vote for recall.

136 Ko Shu-ling, “National Assembly approves reforms,” Taipei Times, June 8, 2005, p. 1. 208 chapter six

Amendment 4 contained the changes to the legislative electoral system outlined above. Amendment 5 stated that the president would nominate the fifteen grand justices, who would then require approval from the legislature. Grand Justices would be appointed for eight-year terms and would not be eligible for re-appointment. Amendment 12, a completely new provision, provided that a constitutional amendment would be initiated by a vote of three-fourths of legislators present out of a quorum of at least three-fourths of the legislators. Then, the voters would have to approve the constitutional amendment in a vote in which at least half of the total electorate went to the polls. This provision, together with Amendments 1 and 2, consigned to history the National Assembly, which was originally designed to represent the people under the authoritarian regime of Chiang Kai-shek on the Mainland.137

The KMT Election for Party Chairman, July 16, 2005

In procedure, the KMT underwent a major reform in mid-2005 when, for the first time since it had come to Taiwan, the party had a choice of leader. In addition, like in 2001, the entire party membership—rather than the Central Standing Committee—elected the party chairman. As noted earlier, Lien Chan, the defeated KMT presidential candidate, succeeded Lee Teng-hui as party chairman on March 24, 2000, a position he held until mid-2005. Lien announced he would retire as party chairman in mid-2005 and, despite repeated calls from a variety of KMT leaders and legislators, he did not change this decision. Two candidates—both KMT vice-chairmen—emerged to replace Lien. Ma Ying-jeou, a Mainlander apparently conceived in Taiwan, but born in Hong Kong in 1950 of Mainlander parents (his father was a general), was then mayor of Taipei. Ma had studied law at National Taiwan University, New York University and Harvard University. He returned to Taiwan to serve as English secretary to Chiang Ching-kuo and during 1984–1988 also served as Deputy Secretary-General of the KMT. Under President Lee Teng-hui, Ma held a series of cabinet positions including Minister of Justice from 1993 to 1996, when he was dismissed for prosecut- ing vote-buying cases too vigorously. In 1998, he won his first elective

137 For the amendments in English, see Republic of China Yearbook 2008 (Taipei: Gov- ernment Information Office, 2009), appendix 3. Available at http://www.gio.gov.tw/ taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/appendix-3.html. For the Chinese text, see http://info.gio. gov.tw/fp.asp?xITEM=12495&ctNode=904&mp=1. the presidency of chen shui-bian 209 office as mayor of Taipei, defeating incumbent Chen Shui-bian. Ma easily won re-election in 2002 and became vice-chairman of the KMT in 2003. The second candidate, Wang Jin-pyng, had a very different political history. A Taiwanese born in 1941, Wang emerged as a powerful factional politician in Kaohsiung County. He first won election to the legislature in 1975 and became deputy speaker of the legislature in 1993, after the “old thieves” lost their permanent legislative seats. In 1999, Wang became speaker of the legislature, a position he continued to hold at the time of this writing. He became a vice-chairman of the KMT in 2000. The election centered around two key issues: ethnicity and party reform. At this time, the KMT had about 1.1 million members, seventy per cent of whom were Taiwanese.138 Wang, as a Taiwanese, assumed he would obtain the Taiwanese vote, so he campaigned heavily for the Mainlander vote. He concentrated his campaign on trying to gain support from the old KMT generals and campaigned extensively in military villages of retired Mainlander servicemen. On the surface, this strategy appeared successful. Wang appeared to obtain the support of Lien Chan and gained endorsements from John Chiang (Chiang Hsiao-yen 蔣孝嚴), the illegitimate son of Chiang Ching-kuo, Lee Huan, Chen Jien-chung 陳建中, Sung Shih-hsuan 宋時選, Yu Chung-ji 余鍾驥 and Lee Huan’s son, Lee Ching-hua 李慶華, a legislator. In addition, 130 retired generals attended a tea party organized by Wang.139 James Soong, the PFP leader, also endorsed Wang.140 On the other hand, Ma appeared to gain key endorsements from such Mainlander retired generals as Hau Pei-tsun, Hsu Li-nung 許歷農, and Chiang Chung-ling 蔣仲苓 and from former New Party politician Wang Chien-shien.141 The second critical issue was “reform.” Ma had a strong reputation for incorruptibility, while Wang had won repeated legislative elections— where vote-buying is common—and he thrived in the legislative environment where he bestowed many favors as legislative speaker. On July 16, 2005, more than half of the KMT’s members went to the polls. Ma won in a landslide with 72.4 per cent of the vote against Wang’s

138 For this section, I have relied heavily on a wide variety of interviews both within and outside the KMT. 139 Ko Shu-ling, “Wang courts the support of old KMT,” Taipei Times, July 15, 2005, p. 3. 140 Caroline Hong, “Wang should lead the KMT: Soong,” Taipei Times, July 16, 2005, p. 1. 141 Chin Heng-wei, “Wang works to shore up unification credentials,” Taipei Times, July 15, 2005, p. 8. 210 chapter six

27.6 per cent.142 Ma won everywhere, even defeating Wang in Wang’s home Kaohsiung County. Both issues contributed to Ma’s decisive victory. Despite some endorsements from senior Mainlanders, Wang could not win the Mainlander vote. With democratization, “it is utterly rational for mainlanders in Taiwan to undertake calculated collective actions if only to avoid being marginalized in a new political game. Playing ethnic politics is simply smart politics.” 143 Thus, Mainlanders vote as a bloc for Mainlanders, while Taiwanese have shown a willingness to vote for Mainlanders as well as Taiwanese. This pattern continued in the 2005 KMT party chairman election.144 Thus, despite his efforts to stress his “unification” ideas, Wang’s appeal to Mainlanders failed. His attempt to use his strength in the legislature also failed to deliver votes. KMT internal polling showed that provincial identity is strongest among members aged fifty and above. The KMT has had a shortage of younger members, but they are less concerned about the issue of provincial origin. Rather, the issue of reform proved very strong among them. Ma was on record opposing vote-buying. He also made a few statements about the need to deal with party assets that the KMT had gained illegally during the authoritarian period. Wang failed to deal with this issue, so Ma gained votes on this issue as well. After the election, Ma implicitly criticized Wang when he said, let us “say goodbye to ‘the old politics’ of host- ing banquets and giving out gifts in exchange for votes during” party elections.145 Soon after the KMT party chairman election, the KMT’s Central Standing Committee approved a resolution to make Lien Chan an “hon- orary chairman.”146 Wang Jin-pyng, however, refused to continue as a KMT vice-chairman. Ma resigned as party chairman in mid-February 2007 after being indicted for corruption, though he maintained his inno-

142 Ko Shu-ling, “Ma gallops to victory over rival Wang,” Taipei Times, July 17, 2005, p. 1. 143 Quote from Tun-jen Cheng and Yung-ming Hsu, “The March 2000 Election in His- torical and Comparative Perspectives: Strategic Voting, the Third Party, and Non-Duver- gerian Outcome,” in Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy in Taiwan’s Politics: Democratic Consolidation and External Relations, ed. Bruce J. Dickson and Chien-min Chao (Armonk, N.Y. and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), p. 152. 144 Chen Mao-hsiung, “Ethnicity is key to who takes reins of the KMT,” Taipei Times, July 8, 2005, p. 8. 145 CNA, “Ma urges KMT members to get rid of banquet politics,” Taipei Times, July 25, 2005, p. 3. 146 Caroline Hong, “Ma seeks to mend fences among KMT’s top brass,” Taipei Times, July 21, 2005, p. 1. the presidency of chen shui-bian 211 cence and simultaneously launched his bid for the presidency in 2008.147 His resignation may have hindered efforts at party reform, but even after he became president Ma appeared unwilling to undertake this difficult task,148 a topic that we will discuss later.

The Local “Three-in-One” Elections of December 3, 2005

The Central Election Commission combined the three elections for county executive/mayor, township executive and county assembly on December 3, 2005. In the previous 2001 county executive elections, the DPP had won nine seats, the KMT nine seats, the PFP two seats, the New Party one seat and non-partisans two seats. In 2005, the KMT increased its seats by five to fourteen, winning three seats from the DPP and one seat each from the PFP and a non-partisan. In terms of vote share, the KMT increased from 44.93 per cent to 50.96 per cent, while the DPP vote declined from 45.27 per cent to 41.95 per cent. The PFP, New Party and non-partisan victories in 2005 were in Lienchiang (Matsu), Kinmen and Taitung, the first, second and fourth smallest constituencies respectively. The DPP won only the six southwestern counties, losing all counties north of Yunlin.149 This election was clearly a disaster for the DPP and a great victory for the KMT. The township executive and county assembly elections were also a victory for the KMT, though these elections are much less partisan. In the township executive election, the KMT won 173 positions, while the DPP won only 35. Non-partisans won 108 seats and the PFP won three.150 In the county assembly elections, the KMT won 409 seats compared to the 192 seats won by the DPP. Non-partisans won 256 seats, the PFP 31 seats, the TSU 11 seats and the New Party two seats.151 In “Mazu Township,” where the DPP won victories in these elections, its candidate for town-

147 Rich Chang and Mo Yan-chih, “Ma starts 2008 bid after indictment,” Taipei Times, February 13, 2007, p. 1. 148 Bruce Jacobs, “President Ma must reform the KMT,” Taipei Times, September 10, 2008, p. 8. 149 For election statistics on the 2005 county executive elections, see http://210. 69.23.140/cec/%5Cpdf%5CF2005005.pdf and http://210.69.23.140/cec/%5Cpdf%5CF2005 006.pdf. See also Taiwan press of December 4, 2005. 150 http://210.69.23.140/cec/%5Cpdf%5CH2005006.pdf. 151 http://210.69.23.140/cec/%5Cpdf%5CG2005006.pdf. 212 chapter six ship executive bought votes and in fact had substantial support from KMT and pro-KMT factional leaders.152

The Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Elections of December 9, 2006

The 2006 Taipei mayoral election had important resonances for Taiwan’s past as well as its future. The KMT nominated Hau Lung-bin, the son of former Premier Hau Pei-tsun. Born in 1952, Hau Lung-bin graduated in agricultural chemistry from National Taiwan University in 1975 and gained his PhD from the University of Massachusetts in 1983. After that he became a professor at National Taiwan University. In 1995, he was elected to the legislature as a New Party candidate, winning re-election in 1998. From 2001 to 2003 he served in the cabinet, under the DPP, in charge of the Environmental Protection Agency. Former Premier Frank Hsieh, who had earlier served successfully as mayor of Kaohsiung, agreed to run as the DPP candidate, even though virtually no one believed he—or any DPP candidate—could win. Former presidential and vice-presidential candidate James Soong, although still chairman of the PFP, ran as an independent. Two other independents and a TSU member completed the six candidates. Even though all analysts expected Hau to win, many wanted to see the ability of Hsieh and Soong to pull votes in Taipei. As expected, Hau won with 53.81 per cent of the vote, a clear majority though much less than the 64 per cent that Ma Ying-jeou had gained in 2002. Hsieh followed with 40.89 per cent, five per cent more than the DPP candidate received in 2002, a credible result which enhanced his prospects for the DPP nomination for president in 2008. James Soong surprised most analysts with a very poor 4.14 per cent, a result that reinforced the analysis that his losing effort for the vice-presidency in 2004 had effectively ended his political career. The other three candidates together received only 1.16 per cent of the vote.153 The simultaneous Kaohsiung mayoral election proved much closer. The DPP nominated Chen Chu, a former dangwai activist who became Director of the Bureau of Social Affairs in Taipei under Mayor Chen Shui- bian and then held the same position in Kaohsiung under Mayor Frank Hsieh. With the election of the Chen Shui-bian to the presidency in 2000,

152 Jacobs, Local Politics in Rural Taiwan under Dictatorship and Democracy, pp. 308– 313. 153 http://210.69.23.140/cec/vote3.asp?pass1=D200606300000000aaa. the presidency of chen shui-bian 213 she became the cabinet minister in charge of labor affairs for five years. The KMT nominated Huang Jun-ying, a former deputy mayor under Mayor Wu Den-yih and later a senior academic administrator who had run for mayor against Frank Hsieh in 2002. In addition, three other candidates, including a TSU member, also ran. Out of 767,868 votes cast, Chen Chu won by 1,114 votes, a margin of 0.13 per cent. The TSU candidate captured 6,599 votes, thus narrowing her margin.154 But, in the context of the KMT improving electorally, this victory gave some heart to the DPP. In the Taipei City Council election, compared with 2002, the KMT increased its seats by four to 24, while the DPP increased its seats by one to 18 and the TSU gained two seats. The PFP lost six of its eight seats while the New Party lost one of five seats and the non-partisans maintained their two seats.155 In the Kaohsiung City Council, the KMT gained five seats to 17 and the DPP gained one seat to 15, while the PFP lost three of seven seats, the TSU lost one of two seats and non-partisans lost two of nine seats.156

Encouraging Bureaucratic Reform under the DPP

When the DPP government came to power in 2000, it ousted the KMT, which had been in power for fifty-five years. In those fifty-five years, the KMT came to dominate all aspects of Taiwan’s government including its central bureaucracies. During President Chen Shui-bian’s first term, many KMT people in the bureaucracy believed the KMT would win the 2004 presidential election, so they implemented reforms slowly. In addition, the new DPP government lacked important armaments to bring about reform. The new government could appoint the minister, the political vice-minister and perhaps one or two other people. How could three or four people, even the “bosses,” push several hundred officials to implement their will? In fact, especially after the DPP won the presidency for a second term, many members of the bureaucracy began to take on a “civil service”

154 http://210.69.23.140/cec/vote3.asp?pass1=D200606400000000aaa. 155 http://210.69.23.140/cec/vote3.asp?pass1=E2006A6300000000aaa and http://210.69. 23.140/cec/vote3.asp?pass1=E2006B6300000000aaa. 156 http://210.69.23.140/cec/vote3.asp?pass1=E2006A6400000000aaa and http://210.69. 23.140/cec/vote3.asp?pass1=E2006B6400000000aaa. For these 2006 elections in Taipei and Kaohsiung, see also Taiwan’s press, December 10, 2006. 214 chapter six mindset of serving whomever was the political master. In attempting to understand bureaucratic resistance and reform, the writer concentrated on three ministries, all of which had reputations as having been controlled by Mainlanders under the KMT: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense, and the Ministry of Education. In each ministry, the author interviewed several senior people including ministers and vice-ministers over a period of several years.

Reforming the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

During the Kuomintang colonial dictatorship, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remained an almost exclusively Mainlander ministry. The Ministry’s purpose was to represent the whole of China to the outside world and to do this the colonial dictatorship relied on “Chinese” Mainlanders. Thus, even after President Lee Teng-hui came to office, the opportunities for Taiwanese in the Ministry remained limited. The first Taiwanese Minister of Foreign Affairs was Lien Chan, who ran the Ministry from July 20, 1988 to June 1, 1990, though of course Lien was born in Xi’an, China, had a Chinese mother, married a Mainlander and, according to interviews, behaved like a Chinese. The first genuinely Taiwanese Minister of Foreign Affairs was Tien Hung-mao 田弘茂, who came to office on May 20, 2000, the same day that President Chen Shui-bian was inaugurated.157 Tien was a former academic who headed the Evergreen Foundation’s Institute for National Policy Research. He was not a member of the DPP and had been very close to Lee Teng-hui rather than Chen Shui-bian. Following Tien’s departure as Minister on February 1, 2002, Michael Kau 高英茂, another former academic, become Political Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs. Only then did the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gain a senior leader with strong connections to the DPP. With this background, it is clear that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was intrinsically conservative. Many permanent staffers spent considerable time overseas and did not realize that substantial changes were taking place in Taiwan. Thus, many senior leaders of the Ministry, who in the early 1990s were very “liberal,” became supporters of the PFP after Chen Shui-bian won the presidency.

157 For a list of past Ministers of Foreign Affairs, see http://www.mofa.gov.tw/ webapp/ct.asp?xItem=11390&CtNode=1413&mp=1. the presidency of chen shui-bian 215

One insider suggested that the reform process actually began during the presidency of Lee Teng-hui, when discussions within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs became more open. No longer did Ministry staff have to tip-toe around “sacred cows.” Rather, they could now discuss “unity” or “independence,” or whether Taiwan should become nuclear or not. When President Lee Teng-hui began to talk about so-called “Two Nations Theory” on July 7, 1999 or President Chen Shui-bian mentioned “One Nation on Each Side” of the Strait on August 3, 2002, discussions took place in Taiwan and also in the Ministry. When the English word “Taiwan” was placed on the Republic of China passport beginning on September 1, 2003, this followed substantial disagreements in both the Ministry and in the legislature. Although some people wanted to put “Taiwan” on the passport for Taiwan-centric reasons, the official arguments emphasized “clarification” and “convenience” for travelers, who were often mistaken for Chinese from the People’s Republic when overseas. During Chen Shui-bian’s first term (2000–2004), more than ninety-five per cent of overseas appointments were “career” and less than five per cent of overseas appointments were “political.” While the writer does not have statistics for Chen Shui-bian’s second term, it appears that political appointments became more prominent for ambassadors and consuls- general. Greater numbers of Taiwanese were appointed to senior positions overseas, but even among Mainlanders, who still predominated, many now emphasized a Taiwan-centric mission. This would lead to oddly schizophrenic occasions such as Double Ten national day celebra- tions overseas when some in the audience would be old Cantonese who emphasized their loyalty to the October 10, 1911 Revolution and the Republic of China, while the other part of the audience would be overseas Taiwanese who expressed loyalty to their home country, Taiwan. Clearly, even if progress was slow, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did start to represent democratic Taiwan. The DPP government also implemented bureaucratic reform in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thus, it created “inspection teams [that] regularly visited the nation’s overseas representative offices to evaluate the performance and behavior of officials.”158 The KMT government abol-

158 Chen Hui-ping, “Ministry mulls the reinstatement of DDP-era system,” Taipei Times, August 19, 2011, p. 3. 216 chapter six ished this system when it came into office in 2008,159 but, in the wake of several scandals, seemed ready to introduce a new system in 2011.160

Reforming the Ministry of National Defense

Under the colonial dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching- kuo, the KMT Party leader—usually, but not always, the president— directly controlled the military. Thus, the military was loyal to the Chinese Nationalist Party rather than to the nation. This clearly presented difficulties for a democratizing nation, especially when the former opposition came into power in 2000. Under democratization, military reform had two important key components. First, the military had to be loyal to the entire nation rather than to the Chinese Nationalist Party. Second, the civilian government needed to gain control over the military. Some key steps took place under the presidency of Lee Teng-hui. First, Lee appointed the first two genuine civilian ministers of national defense. Chen Li-an 陳履安, whose father was General Chen Cheng, one of Chiang Kai-shek’s key subordinates, became Minister of National Defense from 1990 to 1993. His successor, Sun Chen 孫震, the Minister from 1993 to 1994, was an economist who served for about a decade as president of National Taiwan University before becoming Minister. Evidence suggests neither had much success in either exerting civilian leadership over the military or in instituting reform.161 After this failed experiment, ministers of national defense again came from the ranks of recently retired generals. A second key attempt at reform came late in Lee Teng-hui’s presidency, when the legislature passed the Defense Law (guofang fa 國防法), which provided that the Minister of National Defense would be a civilian. The Defense Law also provided that the Minister of National Defense now had the power to give orders to the Chief of the General Staff. Previously, the Chief of the General Staff had outranked the Minister of National Defense.162 At the same time, the legislature also downgraded

159 Ibid. 160 Shih Hsiu-chuan, “Diplomatic office audits to be ‘enhanced’,” Taipei Times, August 23, 2011, p. 3. 161 Brian Hsu, “Civilian-led defense hard to realize,” Taipei Times, January 25, 2000, p. 4. 162 Brian Hsu, “Status of military finally settled,” Taipei Times, January 16, 2000, p. 2. the presidency of chen shui-bian 217 the role of the political warfare system,163 which the military had developed in an effort to fight the Chinese Communists. This last reform also facilitated the transformation of the military from a party-military into a national military. The reforms should have been implemented by February 2001. However, military obstructionism together with assistance from legislators friendly to the military postponed these reforms by at least a year.164 The government of Chen Shui-bian made many more efforts at military reform and, to some degree, had a number of successes, though the government faced considerable difficulties. First, the military is a huge organization in Taiwan. Shaking up such a giant, especially with a limited number of political appointees, is very difficult. Second, soldiers tend to be both conservative and inward-looking. In addition, their education has also tended to be conservative. Furthermore, the isolation of Taiwan in international affairs tended to cut Taiwan’s military off from new ideas being developed elsewhere. Thus, Taiwan’s soldiers lived in physical and intellectual isolation separated from the rest of the society both in Taiwan and internationally. Third, soldiers have a convention of listening to and obeying their superiors. This too makes the implementation of reform difficult. Finally, although Taiwanese dominated the enlisted ranks, the officers were preponderantly Mainlander. In 2003, only one of some ten or eleven three-star generals was Taiwanese. Since it takes about twenty- five years to become a general, virtually all of the generals then had joined the military during the late Chiang Kai-shek or early Chiang Ching-kuo leadership periods. Thus, even though these generals had been born in Taiwan, they still had strong feelings of being Chinese. My understanding, however, is that virtually none would have identified with the People’s Republic. The Chen Shui-bian government appointed the first Taiwanese Minister of National Defense, Tang Yiau-ming 湯曜明, a former general who was appointed Minister from February 1, 2002 to March 19, 2004. The two next ministers were both Mainlanders, a former admiral and a former Air Force General. Then, for three weeks at the end of President Chen Shui-bian’s second term, from February 25 to March 19, 2008, Michael Tsai (Tsai Ming-hsien 蔡明憲), who had previously served as both a legis-

163 Brian Hsu, “Defense Law paves way for military reform,” Taipei Times, January 17, 2000, p. 3. 164 Brian Hsu, “Contentious armed forces laws stalled in legislature,” Taipei Times, June 3, 2001, p. 3. 218 chapter six lator and as Vice-Minister of National Defense, became the first Minister of National Defense who was both Taiwanese and a civilian.165 Another successful reform has been de-politicization of the military. Military leaders can no longer participate in a political party, they can no longer tell soldiers how to vote and there can be no party organization in the military. As of December 2005, “All levels of military personnel [are] forbidden from taking part in political activities without first obtaining permission.”166 A partially successful reform has been the incorporation of civilian positions within the Ministry. The 282 civilians are supposed to be one- third of officials within the ministry.167 This reform involved bringing in the Examination Branch (yuan 院) to give civil service examinations in new areas of specialization. Yet, many of the leadership positions over these new civilians remain in military hands as the law requires that these division leadership positions be held by military people. Those involved expect the introduction of civilians into the Ministry will bring about gradual reforms, but progress will be slow. Cooperation with the United States has also improved. The ROC military did not want the United States to know things, while the United States also did not trust the ROC military. In late 2002, a senior American Pentagon leader told a senior Taiwan Ministry of National Defense official that Taiwan had failed to do many things which it had promised. At the request of the Taiwan official, the Americans sent a long list and the Ministry of National Defense, under the Minister’s leadership, implemented many of these previous promises. The Ministry of National Defense also began to implement a Planning Project Budget System to evaluate proposed procurements and to control expenditures. In fact, some would argue, the new Planning Project Budget System has made the procurement of arms from overseas more difficult. At the same time, the whole military budget has become more transparent. Prior to these early 21st century reforms, over eighty per cent of the military budget was secret, but now only twenty to thirty per cent remains secret and this part of the budget pertains to weapons development. And,

165 For past Ministers of National Defense, see http://museum.mnd.gov.tw/Publish. aspx?cnid=1450&p=12177&Level=2. One can easily access information about these ministers from this website. 166 Republic of China Yearbook 2008 ch. 8. On-line version, see http://www.gio.gov.tw/ taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/ch8.html#Nationalizationof theMilitary. 167 Ibid. the presidency of chen shui-bian 219 in a system similar to that of the American Congress, legislators can look at the secret part of the budget provided they do not reveal confidential matters. The military has become more agile and politically responsive. By March 2003, it was ready for the SARS outbreak the following month. The legislature now asks questions of the military leadership during its inter- pellation sessions. And, in mid-2004, the military finally abolished the daily shouting of slogans as well as the shouting of slogans at the end of meetings. Now slogans are only shouted at Chinese New Year and at grad- uation ceremonies. Thus, despite having very few political appointments in the huge Ministry of National Defense, the DPP government did achieve some reforms there.

Reforming the Ministry of Education

The Chinese Nationalist colonial regime of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo closely controlled the educational system. Schools were allowed to teach only Chinese Nationalist orthodoxy, they taught primarily about China rather than Taiwan and they insisted that children speak Mandarin rather than Hokkien, Hakka or aboriginal languages. As KMT membership was an unofficial requirement for appointment as a school principal, during the 1970s in a rural township as many as sixty per cent of teachers belonged to the KMT.168 In another indication of the importance of education, under Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo only Mainlanders were appointed as Ministers of Education. The first Taiwanese Minister of Education, Kuo Wei-fan 郭為藩, was only appointed in February 1993 as part of Premier Lien Chan’s cabinet. In June 1996, a Mainlander succeeded Kuo, but since February 1998 all Ministers of Education have been Taiwanese.169 When the Chinese Nationalists first came to Taiwan after World War II, they immediately began to alter Taiwan’s education in two key ways implementing both “de-Nipponization” and “Sinicization.” Thus, the curriculum emphasized Chinese history, geography and literature, while Taiwan barely received a mention as a minor part of China. History books emphasized that Taiwan had been part of China for centuries and stated that both the rule of Koxinga 國姓爺 (Zheng Chenggong 鄭成功) and the

168 Jacobs, Local Politics in Rural Taiwan under Dictatorship and Democracy, p. 38. 169 For a list of all Ministers of Education since 1949, see http://history.moe.gov.tw/ minister_list.asp?type=0. 220 chapter six

Manchu Qing empire had been Chinese, while the Dutch, Spanish and Japanese regimes had been foreign conquests.170 Despite these difficulties, reform of education has proven easier than reform of the foreign affairs establishment or the military. Education has historically had many Taiwanese teachers because poorer people obtained a government-funded teacher’s education and then were committed to teach in the educational system. In this way, the numbers of Taiwanese at basic levels were considerable. When democratization began, the school principals lost their power to control hiring and were replaced by committees with broader membership bases. Principals began to complain that they continued to have responsibility, but now lacked power. Party membership in the KMT was no longer a prerequisite to become a school principal. By the 2001 legislative election, the education system was no longer effectively used for partisan campaigning. In 1989, during the second year of Lee Teng-hui’s presidency, the Minister of Education decided to add a new course to the seventh grade curriculum entitled “Knowing Taiwan” (renshi Taiwan 認識台灣). This decision was accepted without controversy.171 Efforts to develop the “Knowing Taiwan” curriculum began in earnest in 1993–1994 so that the new course could be taught in 1997. At the same time, other education reform activities got underway. On April 10, 1994, over twenty thousand marched to demand education reform.172 In response, on September 21, 1994, the cabinet established a committee to examine the issue of education reform headed by Lee Yuan-tseh 李遠哲, Taiwan’s Nobel Laureate and then President of the Academia Sinica, Taiwan’s most prestigious academic research institution. Two years later, on December 2, 1996, this committee issued its Report with five key recommendations. Most important for Taiwan’s democratization were the recommendations to loosen control over education and to unblock the paths to higher levels of education.173

170 Interviews and Wang, “Why Bother,” p. 75 (Table 2.4). 171 Ibid., p. 56. 172 Taiwan lishi nianbiao V, p. 409. This march was mentioned on two separate occasions by two very senior officials in the Ministry of Education. 173 The committee had some thirty-one members drawn from a variety of sectors including higher education and local government. The other three key recommendations called for being concerned with every student, increasing the quality of education and establishing life-long education. For the report, see Li Yuanzhe 李遠哲 et al., Jiaoyu gaige zong ziyi baogao shu 教育改革縂諮議報告書 [Consultants’ Report on Educational Reform] (Xingzhengyuan jiaoyu gaige shenyi weiyuanhui 行政院教育改革審議委員會 [Executive Branch Deliberative Committee on Education Reform], December 2, 1996). the presidency of chen shui-bian 221

Even though the new junior high school curriculum called for teaching about Taiwan in seventh grade, China in eighth grade and the world in ninth grade, a huge protest met the new textbooks in 1997 led by Lee Ching-hua 李慶華, then a New Party legislator (and the son of former premier Lee Huan). Lee charged that the new texts “intended to cut… the umbilical cord connecting China and Taiwan” and “glorified [Japanese] colonizers.”174 However, despite these protests, the reforms went ahead. The reforms at the senior high school level took longer and have faced considerable difficulty as many teachers and administrators at that level have “Great China” identity. Yet, schools can now choose textbooks. As part of this process, in October 1995 the Ministry of Education announced its new Senior High School History Curriculum Standards (gaoji zhongxue lishi kecheng biaozhun 高級中學歷史課程標準). Late in 2006, the Ministry gave me six two-volume sets of history texts for tenth grade students, all of which the Ministry has approved. The first volume in each set, for the first semester of grade ten, considers Chinese history from its archaeological beginnings until the mid-Qing contact with the West, though the approaches taken by each of the texts varies considerably. The second volume in five of the six sets begins with China before the Opium War and considers the histories of both China and Taiwan from the mid-19 century to the present. As shown in Table 6.5, with the one exception edited by Li Hsiao-ti 李孝悌, the chapter titles of each book closely follow a standard outline. In some volumes the chapter on “Taiwan’s Development and Management” precedes the chapter on “Foreign Invasion and the Late Qing Crisis,” while in other volumes this order is reversed. Some put the term “the Taiwan Experience” in quotation marks while others do not. But, despite this overall surface similarity, the books vary considerably. In order to compare the books, I examined the Chinese Nationalist takeover from the Japanese and the first years of Chinese rule including the February 28 (1947) Uprising, which each book mentions. However, the treatment of this period varies considerably between the texts even though all of the texts are approximately the same length. From a Taiwan- centric perspective, perhaps the best text is by Professor Hsu Hsueh-chi 許雪姬, who is currently Director of the Taiwan History Research Institute at Academia Sinica, and Liu Ni-ling 劉妮玲, a history teacher in Taipei. They note how the Taiwanese expected freedom and equality after fifty years as second-class citizens under Japanese rule. But Chen Yi

174 Wang, “Why Bother,” pp. 72–76 (quotes from pp. 75, 76). 222 chapter six

陳儀, the head of the Taiwan Provincial Executive Commander’s Office, held military, executive, legislative and judicial power in his hands and was the commander of the Taiwan Garrison Headquarters. For this reason, the Taiwan Provincial Executive Commander’s Office was called the “new [colonial] Governor-General’s Office” after the Japanese colonial structure. Hsu and Liu write about Mainlander dominance of the government and about inflation and poverty of the Taiwanese. Concisely, they explain the February 28 Uprising with many facts including the name of the woman beaten for selling illegal cigarettes, details about the actions of the Settlement Committee including the 42 demands, and the more than 10,000 Taiwanese killed.175 Lin Neng-shih 林能士, a professor of history at National Chengchi University, and a team of scholars from a variety of Taiwan universities, have written another mainly Taiwan-centric text. They note that Chen Yi’s Taiwan Provincial Executive Commander’s Office in all aspects failed to meet the hopes of the people. They also note that Mainlanders dominated the government and that the economy worsened. They mention the Settlement Committee and note that after the troops landed on March 8, 1947 Keelung, Chiayi and Kaohsiung suffered the heaviest casualties. Then the Taiwan Garrison Command began to “clean the countryside” (qing xiang 清鄉) creating an atmosphere of terror. They conclude with General Pai Chung-hsi’s 白崇禧 three principles to solve the Taiwan difficulties, but do not give the total number of people killed.176 The book edited by Chen Feng-hsiang 陳豐祥 and Lin Li-yueh 林麗月, while not as Taiwan-centric as the previous two texts, still has some useful material. It refers to “Japanese ruled” (rizhi 日治) rather than “Japanese-occupied” (riju 日據) Taiwan (though it later uses the latter phrase as well) and provides details on the establishment of the Taiwan Provincial Executive Commander’s Office. It gives three reasons for the explosion of the February 28, 1947 Uprising. First, it notes the concentration of power in Chen Yi’s hands and says it was similar to the Governor- General’s system under Japanese occupation. Second, economically it notes that the Taiwan Provincial Executive Commander’s Office bought materials from Taiwan to support the civil war on the Mainland, thus causing inflation and poverty. Third, Taiwan and the Chinese Mainland

175 Xu Xueji 許雪姬 and Liu Niling 劉妮玲, Lishi 歷史 [History] (Taibei: Sanmin 三民, 2005), pp. 166–172. 176 Lin Nengshi 林能士 et al., Lishi 歷史 [History] (Tainan: Nanyi 南一, 2005), pp. 166–169. the presidency of chen shui-bian 223 had been separated for a long time. Thus the government and the people had extreme differences in cultural psychology. Under Japanese colonial rule, although Taiwan could not avoid suffering enslavement and exploi- tation, their educational standards and modernization were considerably higher than on the Chinese Mainland. The discussion of the events following February 28 is very short, but the book does mention “serious human injury and death and financial losses.” It also says that the events “left historical scars that are difficult to remove.”177 The book of which Professor Hu Chun-hui 胡春惠 is editor-in-chief offers four reasons for the February 28 Uprising. First, cultural conflicts including the inability of those accepting Japanese surrender and the Taiwanese to communicate, the hate of the soldiers for Japan and their unhappiness with remnants of Japanese culture in Taiwan, and the Taiwanese appreciation of civil order and their anger at those who were disorderly. Second, the Chinese Communist Party and others incited and enlarged the violence in an attempt to overthrow the government. Third, lack of grain caused inflation. Fourth, administrative corruption caused people to lose confidence in the government. They divide the events after February 27 into three stages and note that “the number of injured and dead total around 10,000.” They refer to the Uprising as a “historically unfortunate incident” (lishi buxing shijian 歷史不幸事件) and seem reluctant to attribute any blame.178 The short treatment in the book edited by Wang Chung-fu 王仲孚 is even less satisfactory. It actually praises Chen Yi’s early work, but then notes that the Taiwan Provincial Executive Commander’s Office was different from China’s other provinces and its actions laid the seeds for the tragedy of the February 28 Incident. The Taiwan Provincial Executive Commander’s Office unified power in its hands and it implemented economic controls and monopolies that destroyed the local economy. The emphasis is on repression of the disorder. The section concludes, “with respect to Taiwan’s political development and social cohesion, [it] pro- duced significant harmful influences.”179 The most China-centric treatment appears in the book edited by Li Hsiao-ti, but even this book makes a few subtle comments. It states that

177 Chen Fengxiang 陳豐祥 and Lin Liyue 林麗月, Lishi 歷史 [History] (Taibei: Jian- hong 建宏, 2003), pp. 151–155. 178 Hu Chunhui 胡春惠 chief ed., Lishi 歷史 [History] (Taibei: Zhengzhong 正中, 2004), pp. 170–174. 179 Wang Zhongfu 王仲孚, Lishi 歷史 [History] (Taizhong: Kangxi 康熙, 2004), pp. 149–153. 224 chapter six Xu Xueji China Before the Opium War Foreign Invasion and the Late Qing Crisis *Taiwan ’s Development and Management *Taiwan ’s Establishment as a Province and the 1895 Cession Political Evolution and Both Domestic Strife and Foreign Aggression in the Early Years of the Republic Economy, Society and Culture in the Early Years of the Republic The Anti-Japanese War and the Establishment of the Chinese Communist Regime Li Nengshi China Before the Opium War *Taiwan ’s Development and Management Foreign Invasion and the Late Qing Crisis *Taiwan ’s Establishment as a Province and the 1895 Cession Domestic Strife, Foreign Aggression, and Political Evolution in the Early Years of the Republic Economy, Society and Culture in the Early Years of the Republic The Anti-Japanese War and the Establishment of the Chinese Communist Regime Hu Chunhui China Before the Opium War Foreign Invasion and the Late Qing Crisis *Taiwan ’s Development and Management *Taiwan ’s Establishment as a Province and the 1895 Cession Domestic Strife, Foreign Aggression, and Evolution of the Political Situation in the Early Years of Republic Economy, Society and Culture since the Republic The Anti-Japanese War and the Establishment of the Chinese Communist Regime Chen Fengxiang China Before the Opium War *Taiwan ’s Development and Management Foreign Invasion and the Late Qing Crisis *Taiwan ’s Establishment as a Province and the 1895 Cession Domestic Strife and Foreign Aggression in the Early Years of Republic Economy, Society and Culture in the Early Years of the Republic The Anti-Japanese War and the Establishment of the Chinese Communist Regime Wang Zhongfu China and the West War Opium the Before Foreign Invasion and the Late Qing Crisis *Taiwan ’s Development and Management *Taiwan ’s Establishment as a Province and the 1895 Cession Domestic Strife, Foreign Aggression, and Political Evolution in the Early Years of the Republic Society, Economy and Culture in the Early Years of the Republic The Anti-Japanese War and the Establishment of the Chinese Communist Regime Li Xiaoti Society and Culture of Late Ming and Early Qing *The Beautiful Island in the Whirling Ocean The Conquering Dynasty from Manchuria The Crumbling of the Empire Protecting the Nation or Protecting Education *Taiwan ’s Development and Management From Empire to Republic Chief Editor Chap. 1 Chap. 2 Chap. 3 Chap. 4 Chap. 5 Chap. 6 Chap. 7 Table 6.5. Chapter titles of six tenth-grade senior high history textbooks (Vol. II) the presidency of chen shui-bian 225 Xu Xueji *The Establishment of the Taiwan Experience *Changes in Taiwan ’s Society and Culture 4/9 Li Nengshi *The Establishment of “the Taiwan Experience” *Changes in Taiwan ’s Society and Culture 4/9 Hu Chunhui *The Establishment of “the Taiwan Experience” *Changes in Taiwan ’s Society and Culture and Future Prospects 4/9 Chen Fengxiang *The Establishment of “the Taiwan Experience” *Changes in Taiwan ’s Society and Culture *Looking to the Future: Analyzing the Past, Encouraging the Future 5/10 Wang Zhongfu *The Establishment of the Taiwan Experience 5/10 *Changes in Taiwan ’s Society and Culture *The Development of Relations Across the Straits Li Xiaoti Modernization of Society and Culture On the Road to Totalitarianism *Japanese Occupied Taiwan *The Kuomintang Rules Taiwan *The Experience of Taiwan 5/14 The Transformation of Cities and the Masses A Chaotic Nation and Society Chief Editor Chap. 8 Chap. 11 Chap. 12 Chap. 13 Chap. 14 *Chapters with Taiwan Focus Chap. 9 Chap. 10 Table 6.5. Cont. 226 chapter six such officials as Chen Yi, Ko Yuan-fen 柯遠芬 and Peng Meng-chi 彭孟緝 “punished inappropriately” (chuzhi shidang 處置失當). Chen Yi used Mainlanders for high positions and Taiwanese only held lower positions. Very quickly, the inflation on the Mainland came to Taiwan and people’s lives quickly worsened as grain became insufficient. The book quotes a rhyming ditty from the time: “When Taiwan was restored, it really lost out. A large number of compatriots have starved to death. Every day prices increase. Every day Mainlanders get fatter.” The text emphasizes how the February 28 Incident led to a division between Mainlanders and Taiwanese.180 These texts make clear that Taiwan has gained a new status in Taiwan’s curriculum, though as Table 6.5 shows, less than half of the second semester tenth grade history text is devoted to Taiwan. China still dominates the first semester and half of the second semester. All of the texts do make reference to the formerly forbidden February 28, 1947 Uprising, though the explanations vary considerably and only two of the six reflect modern scholarship on the period. The other four texts appear to soften their analyses to reduce the blame on the Chinese Nationalist government.

Some Success for DPP Bureaucratic Reform

This analysis suggests that the DPP government only partially succeeded in reforming the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, National Defense and Education. In early 2008 the Chinese Nationalist Party won a vastly increased majority in the legislature and its candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, won the presidency in a landslide. With this restoration of power to the Nationalist Party, the efforts to reform the bureaucracy have waned considerably.

The Chen Shui-bian Presidency: Some Conclusions

Chen Shui-bian’s narrow presidential election win in 2000 filled Taiwan with great optimism. The DPP smoothly and peacefully went from being the opposition and became the ruling party. Such a smooth and peaceful transfer of power is perhaps the most significant indicator of a democracy. Though it did not win a majority, the DPP became the largest party in the legislature in late 2001 despite Taiwan’s poor economic perfor-

180 Li Xiaoti 李孝悌, Lishi 歷史 [History] (Taibei: Longteng 龍騰, n.d.), pp. 185–188. the presidency of chen shui-bian 227 mance. Chen Shui-bian won a narrow absolute majority as he ran for re- election in the March 2004 presidential election. However, the DPP’s electoral fortunes then began to decline. President Chen’s emphasis on Taiwan rather than local issues and poor DPP nominations led to the “pan-blue” forces defeating the “pan-green” forces in the December 2004 legislative election. After that the DPP continued to decline electorally. DPP appeals to pass various referenda and for constitutional reform gained little support. In some ways, the Chen Shui-bian presidency repeatedly shot itself in the foot. The office of the president closed itself off from outsiders. Seeing the president became difficult and even the vice-president, whose office was just down the hall, could not see the president. Nor could she give him papers. Thus, President Chen lacked information from a wide variety of sources. In addition, President Chen made many appointments on the basis of who could help him electorally rather than who had competence. Perhaps most significantly, President Chen frequently changed the premiers and the cabinet. In eight years, President Chen appointed six premiers, including Chang Chun-hsiung who served twice (see Table 6.6). Only the term of Yu Shyi-kun, who served three years, exceeded eighteen months.181 As a result, as soon as premiers or cabinet ministers would start to understand and be in command of their positions, they were removed and new novices came into office. This frequent changing of ministers also made officials in the ministries realize that they did not have to obey their minister because the minister would soon be changed.

Table 6.6. Premiers under President Chen Shui-bian Tang Fei 唐飛 May 20-October 4, 2000 Chang Chun-hsiung 張俊雄 October 4, 2000-January 21, 2002 Yu Shyi-kun 游錫堃 February 1, 2002-February 1, 2005 Frank Hsieh 謝長廷 February 1, 2005-January 25, 2006 Su Tseng-chang 蘇貞昌 January 25, 2006-May 21, 2007 Chang Chun-hsiung 張俊雄 May 21, 2007-May 20, 2008

181 The tradition of a premier resigning to coincide with a new legislative term explains the resignations of Chang Chun-hsiung and Yu Shyi-kun in 2002 and 2005 respectively. However, President Chen could have re-appointed these premiers if he desired. Su Tseng-chang’s resignation came after he failed to win the DPP party primary for the 2008 presidential election. 228 chapter six

Former cabinet ministers and others suggest two reasons for President Chen Shui-bian’s constant changing of the premiers and cabinets. First, he felt a need to give all of the DPP’s political factions a fair share of the spoils. As part of this, President Chen also felt the need to give all of the DPP’s prospective 2008 presidential candidates an equal chance, despite repeated advice in 2004 that he needed to choose a successor and let his successor start to develop some strength. Second, President Chen may have feared the rise of a powerful premier who might overshadow the president. He did not seem to realize that a strong DPP government required a president and a premier working together as a team. For both of these reasons, President Chen frequently changed the premiers and their cabinets. Thus, not until January 2006, almost six years into his presidency, did President Chen finally pick Su Tseng-chang, the man most insiders as well as objective observers consider by far his best premier. By then it was too late. President Chen left a record that led to the KMT landslide victories in both the legislative and the presidential elections of January and March 2008. These elections and the presidency of Ma Ying- jeou are the subject of next chapter. the kuomintang regains power 229

Chapter seven

The Kuomintang Regains Power

In early 2008, Taiwan’s democracy underwent its second peaceful transfer of executive power with the Kuomintang winning landslide victories in both the legislative and presidential elections.1 For some in the Kuomintang, these victories amounted to a restoration of the policies of the former colonial regime, which emphasized Taiwan’s Chinese identity. Yet, Taiwan’s emergence as a democracy made such viewpoints problem- atic and Taiwan identity actually continued to increase to its highest historical records during President Ma Ying-jeou’s administration.2 Thus, although many members of the Ma administration wished to promote close ties with China, popular sentiment, as well as the difficulty of working with the Chinese, made this difficult. In addition, President Ma continued his previous habit of saying mutually contradictory things to different audiences and at different times. The result was that within eighteen months of his presidency, President Ma’s approval ratings had dipped to new lows, lows that improved only marginally over the following year. This chapter analyses the legislative and presidential elections and then considers the performance of the Ma administration in both foreign and domestic policy areas.

The January 12, 2008 Legislative Election in Taiwan

Previously Taiwan’s legislature was elected under the single-vote, multi- member constituency system. In this system, each voter can only vote for

1 Parts of this chapter draw upon J. Bruce Jacobs, “Taiwan: Changes and Challenges,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, 62, no. 4 (December 2008), pp. 460–477. The chapter also draws upon some research published in J. Bruce Jacobs, “A Longitudinal Examination toward Understanding What Constitutes a Healthy Approach to Balance in the Taiwan Strait,” Asia Policy, no. 8 (July 2009), pp. 16–24. 2 Those who identified solely as “Taiwanese” increased to a record-breaking 50.8 per cent in December 2008 and continued to rise to 54.2 per cent in June 2011. See Elec- tion Study Center National Chengchi University, Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese ... http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/english/modules/tinyd2/content/Taiwan- ChineseID.htm (accessed August 30, 2011). This chart is available as Figure C.1 in the Con- clusion. 230 chapter seven a single candidate, but almost all constituencies elect several members of the legislature. While under the authoritarian system this helped the opposition elect a few members, but under democracy it led to extremist candidates winning elections. Thus, for example, Taipei Municipality had two constituencies each electing ten members. Since a candidate only needed about six per cent of the vote to win, candidates with extremist platforms that attracted attention often won legislative seats. In addition, political parties found it difficult, though not impossible, to prevent competition between nominees of the same party seeking election in the same constituency. Some political scientists have argued that this electoral system also leads to factionalism,3 though the present writer believes that strong parties can and have overcome this impedi- ment.4 For example, the New Party was able to distribute votes successfully in the 1995 legislative election and the Democratic Progressive Party did the same in the 2004 legislative election. In a complaint familiar to Australians, many Taiwanese also believed that the legislature had become too large. Part of this increase occurred with the constitutional amendments of 1997 when the provincial assembly was “frozen” and politicians wanted to provide opportunities for those who had lost their provincial assembly positions. Later, however, many believed that this expansion of the legislature lowered the quality of legislators. In an attempt to solve these various problems, Taiwan’s political parties amended the constitution in 2005 (see Chapter 6). Henceforth, the new legislature would have only 113 members, half the number of the previous legislature. In addition, the electoral system was changed. Beginning in 2008, voters would cast two ballots. They elected one candidate with their first ballot, who would be the sole representative of their local constituency. Altogether, Taiwan had 73 local constituencies. (Aboriginal voters separately chose six legislators from two aboriginal constituencies.) Second, they voted for a party list electing 34 legislators-at-large. The elimination of the multi-member constituencies and the requirement that a party have at least five per cent of the vote in the party list election in order to gain a party list seat meant that the small parties, which had prospered under the old system, would have considerable dif-

3 Gerald L. Curtis, Election Campaigning Japanese Style (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 10. 4 Jacobs, Local Politics in Rural Taiwan under Dictatorship and Democracy, pp. 142– 143. the kuomintang regains power 231 ficulty under the new system. However, as noted in Chapter 6, the smaller People First Party (PFP), the New Party and the Taiwan Solidarity Union did not realize this until it was too late. The Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party had more than three-fourths of the delegates at the temporary National Assembly and easily passed the constitutional amendments. In the legislative election of January 12, 2008, the KMT won an overwhelming victory obtaining 81 of the 113 seats, or 71.7 per cent. With an additional three seats from the Non-Partisan Solidarity Union (NPSU), one from the PFP, and one independent, all of whom had previously supported the KMT, the KMT possessed the required three-fourths of the seats necessary for constitutional amendments. The KMT won 57 of the 73 local constituencies, 4 of the 6 aboriginal seats and 20 of the 34 party list seats. In contrast, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won only 13 of the 73 local constituencies and only 14 of the 34 party list seats. Details of the election results appear in Table 7.1.

Table 7.1. The January 12, 2008 legislative election in Taiwan KMT DPP NPSU Other Constituencies Seats Vote % Seats Vote % Seats Vote % Seats Vote % Local 57 53.48 13 38.65 2 2.25 1 5.62 Aboriginal 4 54.89 0 6.76 1 20.47 1 17.88 Party List 20 51.23 14 36.91 0 3.53 0 8.33

Total 81 27 3 2 Source: Central Election Commission, see http://210.69.23.140/cec/..%5Cmenu_ main2008B.asp?titlec=%B2%C4%2007%20%A9%A1%20%A5%DF%AAk%A 9e%AD%FB%BF%EF%C1%7C&pass1=B200800000000000aaa%20%20 &pdf=B200800

The results were the worst for the DPP since democratisation began in 1988. There are at least six inter-related explanations. First, there was widespread voter alienation from Taiwan’s political leadership. The voter turnout was less than 59 per cent, the lowest for a legislative election since regular periodic elections began in 1972 during the authoritarian period. The numbers attending campaign rallies were also low. In the past, those attending rallies would respond to a candidate’s question of “Right or Wrong?” with an enthusiastic “Right!!” This time, the few attending barely responded. Many vote captains on both sides of politics, who 232 chapter seven this writer has known for decades and who help get the voters to the polls, sat out this election. Large numbers of voters on both sides of politics, but especially on the DPP side, could not bring themselves to vote for the candidates on offer. Second, there was been a loss of idealism in the DPP. Locally, many former KMT members had moved into the DPP. Some of these new local leaders lacked the original idealism of the DPP and, for example, buy votes.5 This is especially important since the legislative elections were very local. Very few candidates campaigned on China policy or foreign affairs. The focus of the campaigns was on local schools, roads, hospitals and flood prevention. Third, in democracies prolonged incumbency often leads voters to blame the incumbents and choose the opposition. Thus, in Australia, the Labor Party won a major victory in the November 24, 2007 election after more than eleven years of the conservative Howard government, and the Koreans turned out the progressives after ten years in their presidential and legislative elections of December 19, 2007 and April 9, 2008. In the United States, Democrats regained both the White House and control over both houses of Congress in the November 2008 elections. In Taiwan, even though the DPP never controlled a majority of the legislature, the DPP’s victories in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections made it the governing party. Thus, voters blamed the DPP for failures even when it was not responsible. For example, one friend blamed the DPP for the high oil and gasoline prices. When I questioned this, the friend replied, “Well, at least the government should have made me feel better.” But the DPP sometimes also did a poor job of explaining its policies. Fourth, several commentators blamed the DPP’s poor results on the new electoral system of single-member constituencies, but this analysis was not accurate. The DPP failed to win a single seat in Taipei Munici pality’s eight constituencies, where, on the basis of previous election results, it should have won at least three seats, and only won two of five seats in Kaohsiung Municipality, where it normally should have won a majority. The DPP won only 2 of 12 seats in Taipei County, no seats of six in Taoyuan County, and one of four seats in Kaohsiung County, all places where the DPP would normally have done much better. It is true that an electoral system with single-member constituencies can give a much higher proportion of seats than votes, but if the DPP had performed better, the result would have been much closer. As noted above, the DPP’s

5 Ibid., pp. 308–313. the kuomintang regains power 233 percentage of the vote was the lowest in a legislative election since 1988 when democratization began. Fifth, many analysts including the present writer had argued that the single-member constituencies would create more moderate legislators as candidates would be forced to move to the center to gain sufficient votes. But too many analysts ignored the party primary processes that nominated the candidates. In both major parties the successful nominees tended to have strong local organizations and often rather unsavoury reputations. This contributed to the voter alienation and low turnout. Both parties, especially the KMT, nominated party “hacks” for their party lists. The most obvious case was the KMT nomination of Chiu Yi 邱毅, who spent time in prison for literally attacking the Kaohsiung District Court with a truck after the 2004 presidential election. Chiu has also been known to promote “revelations” that almost always prove to have no factual basis. But, in the words of one KMT leader, Chiu had “sac- rificed himself for the party” and was rewarded with his nomination high on the party list. The KMT also tended to nominate men for the local constituency seats since half of the party list nominees had to be women. Finally, the new electoral system did reduce the role of minor parties. In the previous parliament, the PFP of James Soong had 34 seats and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) of former President Lee Teng-hui had 12. In 2008, the PFP gained one seat in an aboriginal constituency and the TSU won none. In the party list election, no minor party reached the cut- off of five per cent and only the KMT and DPP won seats in this part of the legislative election. Ironically, in spite of their overwhelming victory, when the results had become clear on election night, the KMT leaders faced the press with grim faces.6 They knew that they could no longer escape responsibility for governmental failures and they realized that an appearance of pride or arrogance could prove costly in the forthcoming presidential election.7

6 CNA, “Chinese Nationalist Party...” Taipei Times, January 13, 2008, p. 1. 7 This analysis of the legislative election draws upon Bruce Jacobs, “Can the DPP overcome a drubbing?,” Taipei Times, January 14, 2008, p. 8. Election results can be found in Central Election Commission, Legislative Election 2008 (2008, accessed October 3, 2009); available from http://210.69.23.140/cec/..%5Cmenu_main2008B.asp?titlec=%B2% C4%2007%20%A9%A1%20%A5%DF%AAk%A9e%AD%FB%BF%EF%C1%7C&pass1=B 200800000000000aaa%20%20&pdf=B200800. See also the Taiwan press of January 13, 2008. 234 chapter seven

The March 22, 2008 Presidential Election in Taiwan

The presidential election had two tickets. Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九, the KMT candidate, had conducted postgraduate studies in law at New York University and Harvard and returned to Taiwan to work for President Chiang Ching-kuo. Under President Lee Teng-hui, Ma served as Minister of Justice (1993–1996), when he ran foul of important politicians for pros- ecuting cases of vote-buying. He won two terms as mayor of Taipei Municipality (1998–2006) and served as Chairman of the KMT from 2005 to 2007 when he resigned after being indicted for corruption. (The courts later found Ma not guilty.)8 For several years, Ma had clearly been the KMT’s single main candidate. For his vice-presidential running mate, Ma chose Vincent Siew (Hsiao Wan-chang 蕭萬長), a Taiwanese economist who held several senior positions before being appointed the first Taiwan- born premier in 1997, a position he held until the election of President Chen Shui-bian in 2000. With four key candidates for president, the DPP had a much wider choice. Frank Hsieh (Hsieh Chang-ting 謝長廷) won the primary and the number two candidate Su Tseng-chang 蘇貞昌 withdrew. Hsieh, a lawyer who had studied in Japan, became active in the opposition movement in 1980 as a member of the legal defence team during the Kaohsiung Incident trial. He served as a member of the DPP’s Central Standing Committee from the party’s founding in 1986, won election as a Taipei City Council man (1981–1988) and later as a member of the Legislature (1989–1995). He ran as the vice-presidential candidate on the DPP ticket headed by Peng Ming-min in the first popular election of president in Taiwan in 1996. In 1998 he won the first of two terms as mayor of Kaohsiung, before being appointed Premier in 2005, a post he held for a year. DPP polls showed that a Hsieh-Su ticket would prove the strongest electorally, so the DPP pressured both Hsieh and Su to accept this ticket, despite their rivalry. Like Hsieh, Su Tseng-chang, also a lawyer, joined the opposition movement as a defence counsel in the Kaohsiung Incident Trial. He was elected to a term as Pingtung County Executive (1989–1993),

8 Ma was indicted on February 13, 2007 and charged with embezzling NT$11 million (US$338,000) during his tenure as Mayor of Taipei. The Taipei District Court cleared Ma on August 14, 2007, but the prosecution appealed to the Taiwan High Court on August 27. On December 28, 2007 the High Court confirmed the ruling of the lower court. See Rich Chang, Mo Yan-chih, and Jenny W. Hsu, “Court ruling keeps Ma in election race,” Taipei Times, December 27, 2007, p. 1. For further details, see Ko Shu-ling, “‘Not guilty’ not same as ‘ethical’: Hsieh,” Taipei Times, December 30, 2007, p. 3. the kuomintang regains power 235 won election to the Legislature in 1995 and won two terms as Taipei County Executive beginning in 1997, after which he served as Secretary- General in the Office of the President (2004), Chairman of the DPP (2005– 2006) and Premier (2006–2007). The other two DPP candidates, Vice- President Annette Lu 呂秀蓮 and former premier Yu Shyi-kun 游錫堃, trailed badly in the DPP primary election.9 One of the difficulties facing Ma Ying-jeou in his campaign was an apparent inconsistency in his statements. Thus, when running for re-election as mayor of Taipei in 2002, he told me personally and then said in a major press conference that Taiwan’s future should be decided by the 23 million people of Taiwan. Later, on February 12, 2006 and at other times, he said the future of Taiwan should be decided by the peoples on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.10 Interestingly, during the election campaign, Ma Ying-jeou moved closer to Frank Hsieh’s positions on China. Thus, on March 14, one week before the presidential election and exactly three years after China had passed its “Anti-Secession Law,” Ma came out firmly in favor of Taiwan as a sovereign nation: “Taiwan enjoys sovereignty, and Taiwan’s future should only be decided by Taiwanese people.”11 Perhaps Frank Hsieh’s most successful campaign plank was his attack on the KMT’s “One China Common Market.” In 2005, Vincent Siew had advocated a “Cross-Straits Common Market,” which he had declared was a “One China Common Market.” Hsieh emphasized that a Common Market on the European Model involved a loss of sovereignty and suggested unification with China. Even though the “Cross-Straits Common Market” was official KMT policy, Ma began to pull away from the concept during the campaign. In any case, as several Taiwan farmers pointed out, the barriers to many Chinese goods coming to Taiwan had already been lifted during the presidency of Chen Shui-bian. On the other hand, in the absence of proof, Frank Hsieh’s claim that Ma Ying-jeou had a Green Card for permanent residency in the United States did not gain traction. Hsieh wasted considerable campaign time on this question including a substantial portion of his speech at his election eve campaign rally. The emphasis on Ma’s supposed Green Card and the

9 Material used in these three paragraphs includes the biographies in Taiwan Year- book 2007, CD-ROM ed. (Taipei: Government Information Office, 2007). 10 Bruce Jacobs, “Some suggestions for Ma Ying-jeou,” Taipei Times, March 24, 2008, p. 8. 11 Mo Yan-chih and Shih Hsiu-chuan, “Defend Taiwan’s sovereignty, says Ma,” Taipei Times, March 15, 2008, p. 1. 236 chapter seven failure to pursue other issues resulted from a minor stroke that Frank Hsieh had on September 27, 2007. Although called an “ankle sprain” at the time, Hsieh’s stroke clearly inhibited his campaign, which lacked both energy and direction.12 The presidential campaign took place while the Chinese brutally crushed the widespread demonstrations in Tibet. Both candidates strongly condemned the Chinese repression. On March 18, only a few days before voters went to the polls, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao intervened in the Taiwan election, saying “Both Tibet and Taiwan are parts of China’s territory that cannot be divided. Only under the pre-condition of One China can both sides of the Taiwan Straits discuss any topic including ending the hostile situation.”13 In the election of March 22, 2008, Ma Ying-jeou and Vincent Siew won a landslide victory with 58.45 per cent of the vote. Hsieh and Su won only five southern counties. Ma and Siew won everywhere else including the three southern municipalities.14 In the context of the concern for cross- Straits relations as well as the foreign policy implications, it needs to be remembered that Taiwan’s voters cast their ballots against the DPP and for Ma because of the perceived inefficiencies of the DPP government and the alleged slowing of the economy. Many voters, who had voted for Chen Shui-bian in 2000 and 2004, voted for Ma this time. In addition, many voters said they would vote for the DPP in 2012 if the Ma government did not fix the problems. Most voters did not perceive great differences between the candidates on cross-Straits relations or international affairs. Like voters in many countries, Taiwan’s voters cast their ballots on the basis of domestic issues.15

12 From his prison cell, former President Chen Shui-bian wrote about Hsieh’s “health” during the campaign, see Chen Shui-bian 陳水扁, Taiwan de shizijia 台灣的十字架 [The Cross of Taiwan] (Taibei: Ketagalan Foundation 凱達格蘭基金會, 2009), p. 155. His daughter also mentioned Hsieh’s illness, see Ko Shu-ling, “Hsieh hid stroke before election: Chen Hsing-yu,” Taipei Times, January 22, 2009, p. 3. A very senior member of the Hsieh campaign confirmed to the writer that the statements of Chen and his daughter were true. 13 Reuters, “Wen Jiabao qiangsheng: ... 溫家寳嗆聲: ... [Wen Jiabao Shouts: ...],” Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 19, 2008, p. 1. 14 The election results can be found in Central Election Commission, Presidential Election 2008 (2008, accessed October 3,2009); available from http://210.69.23.140/cec/ vote3.asp?pass1=A2008A0000000000aaa; Central Election Commission, Presidential Elec- tion 2008. See also the Taiwan press of March 23, 2008. 15 Jacobs, “Some suggestions for Ma Ying-jeou,” p. 8. the kuomintang regains power 237

Ma’s Inauguration Address

Ma Ying-jeou’s inauguration speech of May 20, 2008 received considerable attention both within Taiwan and overseas. Ma’s first audience was domestic and he attempted to bring together the very diverse strands within Taiwan’s body-politic, both within the now ruling KMT and also outside it. Such an attempt at synthesis was doomed to failure and left many listeners dissatisfied, but the speech at least made an effort in this direction.16 In beginning his discussion of international relations, Ma stated: Taiwan has to be a respectable [better translated as “respected”] member of the global village. Dignity, autonomy, pragmatism and flexibility should be Taiwan’s guiding principles when developing foreign relations. As a world citizen, the Republic of China will accept its responsibilities in promoting free trade, non-proliferation, anti-global warming measures, counter-terrorism, humanitarian aid, and other global commons. Taiwan must play a greater role in regional cooperation. By strengthening economic relations with its major trading partners, Taiwan can better integrate itself in East Asia and contribute more to the region’s peace and prosperity. [The Chinese for the last sentence actually says, “We want to participate actively in Asia-Pacific regional cooperation, progress a step in strengthening economic and trade relationships with our main trading partners, completely blend into the East Asian economic order, and make a positive contribution to the peace and prosperity of East Asia.”] Ma then turned to the United States. The English translation stated, “We will strengthen bilateral relations with the United States,” but the Chinese states “we will strengthen the cooperative relationship with the United States.” In the official English translation, the United States is referred to as “our foremost security ally and trading partner,” but the Chinese text can better be translated as “this security alliance friend and trading partner.” Other than China, the speech mentioned no other foreign nation. This was particularly important in the case of Japan, which had appeared in drafts of the speech and with which both the Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian administrations had developed close relations. The speech then moved to China. Ma began, “I sincerely hope that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait can seize this historic opportunity to achieve peace and co-prosperity. Under the principle of ‘no unification, no independence and no use of force,’ as Taiwan’s mainstream public

16 J. Bruce Jacobs, “Inauguration of the new President,” Taiwan Communiqué, no. 119 (June/July 2008), pp. 5–8. 238 chapter seven opinion holds it, and under the framework of the ROC Constitution, we will maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.” Ma then referred to the “92 Consensus” of “One China, each side having its own interpretation” and to the Boao Forum where Vice-President-elect Vincent Siew met with China’s leaders on April 12. In trying to express some agreement with the Chinese, Ma referred to three statements of Chinese Communist Party Chairman Hu Jintao. He also mentioned, in the official English translation, “our common Chinese heritage,” though the original Chinese was much stronger, “people on both sides [of the Taiwan Strait] belonging to the Chinese race (liang’an renmin tongshu Zhonghua minzu 兩岸人民同屬中華民族).” The next sentence in Chinese, omitted in the English translation, also referred to the “high intelligence of the Chinese race (Zhonghua minzu zhihui zhi gao 中華民族智慧之高).” These statements did not read well among Taiwan’s aborigines, who have no Chinese background, nor among the many Taiwanese who consider themselves Taiwanese and not Chinese. Finally, Ma appeared to pull back on his March 14, 2008 statement that Taiwan was a sovereign nation.17 In his inauguration speech Ma said, “In resolving cross-strait issues, what matters is not sovereignty but core values and way of life (liang’an wenti zuizhong jiejue de guanjian bu zai zhuquan zhengyi, er zai shenghuo fangshi yu hexin jiazhi 兩岸問題最終解決的關鍵不在主權爭議，而在生活方式與核心價值).” While urging democracy in China, this sentence raised questions about Ma’s commitment to Taiwan’s sovereignty. The speech also made no mention of Ma’s requirement that the Chinese remove their 1,400 missiles aimed at Taiwan.18

17 Mo Yan-chih and Shih Hsiu-chuan, “Defend Taiwan’s sovereignty, says Ma,” Taipei Times, March 15, 2008, p. 1. 18 For the Chinese text of the inaugural speech, see Ma Ying-jeou, Zhonghua minguo di 12 ren zongtong Ma Yingjiu xiansheng jiuzhi yanshuo 中華民國第12任馬英九先生就職演說 [The Inauguration Speech of Mr Ma Ying-jeou as Twelfth Term President of the Repub- lic of China] (2008, accessed October 3, 2009); available from http://www.president.gov. tw/1_president/97speak/97speak1.pdf. For the English text, see Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan’s Renaissance (2008, accessed October 3, 2009); available from http://www.president.gov. tw/en/prog/news_release/document_content.php?id=1105499687&pre_id=1105499 687&g_category_number=145&category_number_2=145. the kuomintang regains power 239

Squabbles with Japan

Relations with Japan have always hit nerves within Taiwan. The Chinese Nationalist colonial regime under Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching- kuo was quite anti-Japan as Japan had invaded China with great loss of life during World War II. On the other hand, Taiwanese had looked back on their fifty years of Japanese colonial rule rather positively, despite the violence of the early Japanese colonial regime, especially after the Chinese Nationalist colonial regime proved particularly brutal during the late 1940s and the White Terror of 1950s.19 Under the presidencies of Lee Teng- hui (1988–2000) and Chen Shui-bian (2000–2008), both Taiwanese, relations with Japan had improved considerably. As mentioned above, President Ma’s inauguration address omitted mention of Japan. Not long afterwards, relations with Japan hit a crisis. The focus of the crisis was five small inhabited islands and three reefs totalling 6.3 sq. km. and located about 200 km. northeast of Taiwan, known in Chinese as the Diaoyutai Islands and in Japanese as the Senkaku Islands. During the Japanese colonial period these islands were administered as part of Taiwan. However, in the joint communiqué issued by the United States and Japan on November 21, 1969, the United States included the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands in the Ryukyu chain being returned to Japan. This led to a great anti-Japanese “patriotic” movement in Taiwan in 1971.20 Ma Ying-jeou, who had participated in these demonstrations as a student, also wrote on the relevant issues of international law in his substantial Harvard JSD thesis, which was later published as a 308 page book.21 The crisis began in the very early morning of June 10, 2008, less than three weeks after Ma’s inauguration. A Taiwanese recreational fishing boat, named the “Unity” (lianhe 聯合) had approached the Diaoyutai/ Senkaku Islands and, after zigzagging to avoid apprehension, sank when rammed by a Japanese patrol vessel some 11 km. southwest of the islands. The Japanese vessel rescued the sixteen Taiwanese fishermen and three crew. No one was hurt.

19 J. Bruce Jacobs, “Taiwan’s Colonial History and Postcolonial Nationalism,” in The “One China” Dilemma, ed. Peter C.Y. Chow (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), esp. pp. 41–47. 20 Ibid., pp. 47–48. 21 Ma Ying-jeou, Legal Problems of Seabed Boundary Delimitation in the East China Sea (Baltimore, MD.: Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, School of Law, University of Maryland, 1984). 240 chapter seven

Many of Taiwan’s KMT legislators made inflammatory comments. Taiwan’s new premier, Liu Chao-shiuan 劉兆玄, and its new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Francisco Ou (Ou Hung-lien 歐鴻錬), failed to calm the issue. Ou also recalled Taiwan’s representative in Japan, Koh Se-kai 許世楷, for consultations. Ou asked Koh to go to the legislative for inter- pellation (question time), but Koh, an appointee of the Chen Shui-bian government, refused and resigned on June 16. KMT legislators announced a trip to the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands to assert Taiwan’s sovereignty over the islands, apparently with support from the Taiwan Coast Guard, but these plans were dropped by June 17. Normalcy gradually returned. On June 20, the Japanese deputy representative in Taiwan hand-delivered a note of apology to the Taiwanese fishing boat captain and, on the same day, Foreign Minister Ou met with the Japanese representative in Taiwan, Tadashi Ikeda.22 However, not until August 20 did Taiwan appoint a new representative to Tokyo, John Feng (Feng Chi-tai 馮寄台), a long-term aide of Ma Ying-jeou who received his primary and secondary education in Japan.23 In addition, a few days later, Ma sent Chiang Pin-kung 江丙坤, his Japanese-speaking Chairman of the Straits Exchange Foundation, Taiwan’s officially non- governmental body for dealing with China, to Japan for three days of talks.24 In December, he also sent KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung 吳伯雄 on a week’s trip to Japan in a further effort to bolster ties.25 In late February 2009, Taiwan and Japan met for talks on fishing rights, the first such talks since July 2005. These talks made a breakthrough because the Taiwan side proposed putting aside the issue of sovereignty.26 In April 2009 the Interchange Association, Japan’s office in Taipei, published an extensive survey of Taiwan attitudes towards Japan. In answer to a question, “Which country do you like the most?,” Japan received by far the most support with 38 per cent. Next came the United States with five per cent, Switzerland with three percent and all of the

22 This section is based on the Taiwan press, June 11–21, 2008. 23 Jenny W. Hsu, “Foreign minister approves envoy to Japan,” Taipei Times, August 21, 2008, p. 3. 24 Ko Shu-ling and Flora Wang, “SEF’s Chiang reassures Tokyo over cross-strait detente,” Taipei Times, August 27, 2008, p. 3. 25 Mo Yan-chih, “Wu Poh-hsiung on trip to strengthen Taiwan-Japan ties,” Taipei Times, December 7, 2008, p. 3. 26 Editorial, “Ma nets harvest in Taiwan-Japan ties,” Taiwan News, March 5, 2009, p. 6. the kuomintang regains power 241 others including China with only two per cent.27 In answer to a second question, “To which country do you believe Taiwan should become close in the future?,” 34 per cent of respondents answered China, while 31 per cent said Japan and 20 per cent said the United States.28 In answer to a third question, “If you were to travel, to which country (or region) would most like to go?,” Japan again led with 44 per cent while Europe followed with 32 per cent. China, with eight per cent, came third followed by the United States (six per cent), Southeast Asia (four per cent) and Korea (two per cent).29 As many as 44 per cent of respondents felt Japan was a country on which one could rely, while only 12 per cent felt that Japan was not reliable.30 Eighty-one per cent of those who felt Japan was reliable mentioned “past historical relationship” as a reason.31 Yet, despite this, 64 per cent of respondents—almost two-thirds believed that Taiwan’s relations with Japan “were neither good nor bad,”32 though 55 per cent felt the relationship would improve in the future.33 Despite the improvements and this favorable outlook, relations again deteriorated in May 2009. As a result of its loss in World War II, Japan gave up its right to Taiwan in the Treaty of Peace with Japan, signed in San Francisco on September 8, 1951 by Japan and forty-eight other countries, though neither the Republic of China nor the People’s Republic of China was invited to San Francisco and neither signed the Treaty. Under Article 2(b), “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores”, but nowhere does the Treaty indicate the status of Taiwan following the treaty.34 The Government of the Republic of China and Japan subsequently signed a “Treaty of Peace” in Taipei on April 28, 1952.35 In the reading of this writer and many other scholars, this Treaty does not mention Taiwan’s future status. However, Lin Man-houng 林滿紅, then President

27 “Taiwan minzhong dui Riben guan’gan zhi yanjiu 台灣民衆對日本觀感之研究 [Research on Taiwanese Impressions of Japan],” (Taibei: Jiaoliu xiehui 交流協會 [Inter- change Association], April 2009), p. 3. 28 Ibid., p. 4. 29 Ibid., p. 8. 30 Ibid., p. 14. 31 Ibid., p. 16. 32 Ibid., p. 13. 33 Ibid., p. 17. 34 Treaty of Peace with Japan (September 8, 1951, accessed October 3, 2009); available from http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm. 35 Treaty of Peace (April 28, 1952, accessed October 3, 2009); available from http:// www.taiwandocuments.org/taipei01.htm. 242 chapter seven of Academia Historica, a key Taiwan government archive, claimed in an unpublished paper, “According to Article 10 of the Taipei Treaty, all inhabitants, including the natural persons and legal persons on Taiwan and Penghu constitutes [sic] the nationals of the ROC through its legal process.”36 The writer believes Lin’s argument quite stretches the actual contents of Article 10: For the purposes of the present Treaty, nationals of the Republic of China shall be deemed to include all the inhabitants and former inhabitants of Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) and their descendents who are of the Chinese nationality in accordance with the laws and regulations which have been or may hereafter be enforced by the Republic of China in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores); and juridical persons of the Republic of China shall be deemed to include all those registered under the laws and regulations which have been or may hereafter be enforced by the Republic of China in Taiwan (Formosa) and Pen- ghu (the Pescadores).37 The writer reads this as applying only to those inhabitants of Taiwan and their descendants who actually held “Chinese nationality” before the arrival of the Japanese in 1895 or to those Mainlanders who immigrated to Taiwan from China after 1945. As we discussed in Chapter 2, other than the Mainland immigrants who arrived in Taiwan after 1945, the numbers of people in Taiwan who previously held Chinese nationality would be very few. On April 28, 2009, the 57th anniversary of the signing of the Taipei Treaty, President Ma Ying-jeou argued: “While the 1952 treaty does not specify the legal successor government [of Taiwan], it was clear between the lines…Japan would not have signed the accord with the ROC if it did not intend to concede the territories to the ROC.” In addition, President Ma claimed, the Taipei Treaty reasserted the “de jure transfer of Taiwan’s sovereignty to the ROC.”38 Of course, this arcane debate had important implications for the role of Taiwan in the modern world. On May 1, at a conference at National Chung Cheng University in Chiayi County, Japan’s de facto ambassador to Taiwan, Mr Saito Masaki, stated that Taiwan’s status is “still unresolved.” Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested. Saito apologized, stated that his comment was personal and did not reflect the Japanese govern-

36 Man-houng Lin, “The Neglected Taipei Treaty: Asia-Pacific Powers and Taiwan,” (2009?), p. 4. 37 Treaty of Peace. 38 Ko Shu-ling, “Treaty confirmed sovereignty: Ma,” Taipei Times, April 29, 2009, p. 3. the kuomintang regains power 243 ment position, and he withdrew the statement. Several KMT legislators including John Chiang, the illegitimate son of Chiang Ching-kuo and foreign minister during 1996–1997, criticized Saito while others defended him.39 Reports suggested that President Ma refused to have any dealings with Ambassador Saito. Japan apparently refused to recall Saito and in turn gave Taiwan Ambassador John Feng a “cold shoulder.”40 On August 11, after Typhoon Morakot, Ambassador Saito accompanied a delegation of Japanese parliamentarians to deliver a donation of ¥10 million (US$103,000) to President Ma. According to a report, “The interaction between Ma and Saito was lukewarm. The two men shook hands, but Ma hugged other guests and patted them on the arm. While welcoming Yamamoto and the delegation, Ma did not mention Saito by name.”41 Clearly, under President Ma, relations with Japan have proven rather rocky despite the very positive feelings about Japan among Taiwan’s population.42

The China Roller Coaster and the “Diplomatic Truce”

As indicated in President Ma’s inauguration address, China was to become a central focus of his administration. A major question asked of Ma was, “Could Taiwan have closer links with China without sacrificing its sovereignty?” A subsidiary question raised by many Taiwanese commentators was, “Was President Ma interested in preserving Taiwan’s sovereignty?” In mid-2011, these questions remained unanswered. Even before Ma’s inauguration, Wu Poh-hsiung, the KMT Party Chair man, accepted an invitation from Chinese Communist Party Chairman Hu Jintao to visit China for party-to-party talks after the inauguration. This visit was the first visit to China by a ruling KMT Party Chairman.43 In addition to meeting with Hu Jintao, Wu’s delegation visited the tomb of Sun Yat-sen in Nanjing, spoke to Taiwanese businessmen in Shanghai and prayed for the victims of the Sichuan earthquake during its May 26–31, 2008 trip. Wu promised that his visit would lay the foundation for

39 Jenny W. Hsu and Shih Hsiu-chuan, “Japanese representative scolded over remark on Taiwan’s ‘unresolved’ status,” Taipei Times, May 3, 2009, p. 1. 40 Ko Shu-ling, “Ma hasn’t shut out Saito: official,” Taipei Times, June 28, 2009, p. 1. 41 Ko Shu-ling, “Ma cool in meeting with envoy,” Taipei Times, August 12, 2009, p. 4. 42 It is noteworthy that the Ma government said and did very little during the Sep- tember 2010 crisis between Japan and China over the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands. 43 Mo Yan-chih, “KMT chairman Wu accepts invitation to travel to China,” Taipei Times, May 18, 2008, p. 1. 244 chapter seven talks between the two quasi-governmental organizations, Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), but promised that his party-to-party negotiations would not replace the SEF and ARATS talks. Wu declared, “I will not sign any documents with Chinese officials. The Chinese Communist Party represents the Chinese government, but a single political party does not represent the government in Taiwan.”44 After returning to Taiwan, Wu said that he had received a “positive response” from Hu Jintao when he said that Taiwanese want safety, dignity and international space. How ever, according to Wu, Beijing had emphasized “the importance of mutual trust and asked Taiwan to make good on its words” before both sides could put aside differences and create a “win-win situation.”45 During Wu’s visit, the Chinese accepted the request of the SEF for talks with ARATS and Chiang Pin-kung, the newly appointed Chairman of SEF (and KMT vice-chairman), went to China for talks during June 11–14, 2008 to discuss regularly scheduled direct charter flights between Taiwan and China and to make arrangements for Chinese tourists to visit Taiwan. Chiang and ARATS chairman Chen Yunlin signed agreements governing the charter flights beginning on July 4 and the Chinese tourists who began visiting Taiwan on July 18.46 Clearly, the new Ma administration had made rapid progress with the Chinese. However, there were numerous questions. While the willingness of the Ma administration to reach agreements with the Chinese was important, the key factor was the willingness of the Chinese to negotiate. In fact, many of the agreements had been reached under the Chen Shui- bian government, but the Chinese were not prepared to sign as they did not want to give the Chen Shui-bian government any credit. The Ma administration also hoped that the Chinese would give Taiwan more international space, but Wang Yi, the director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, told visiting Japanese parliamentarians on June 23 that China would not officially allow Taiwan to join the World Health Organization.47 In an important interview a week later, Legislative

44 Mo Yan-chih, “Wu says China trip will lay groundwork for cross-strait talks,” Tai- pei Times, May 22, 2008, p. 3. 45 Ko Shu-ling, “Wu upbeat about visit to China,” Taipei Times, June 1, 2008, p. 3. 46 Agencies Beijing, “Cross-strait charter flight deal inked,” Taipei Times, June 14, 2008, p. 1. 47 CNA, “Guotaiban zhuren: dalu bu jieshou Taiwan ru shiwei 國台辦主任：大陸不接受台灣入世界衛 [Director, Taiwan Affairs Office: Mainland will not accept Taiwan entering the WHO],” Lianhe wanbao 聯合晚報 [United Evening News], June 25, 2008. Also the kuomintang regains power 245

Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, an important KMT leader, warned that Taiwan must pay attention to three matters: “one is guaranteeing national sovereignty, two is safeguarding national security, three is we must consider the rights of the 23 million people” of Taiwan.48 In addition, despite Ma’s repeated statements that removal of the 1,400 Chinese missiles aimed at Taiwan was a prerequisite for talks or a peace treaty, by mid-2011 the Chinese had not removed a single missile. The direct charter flights and the promise of economic riches from Chinese tourists also proved less than successful. Most of the passengers on the charter flights were Taiwan citizens going to China. In addition, the number of Chinese visitors was only ten per cent of the 3,000 maximum per day permitted in the June 13, 2008 agreement. Thus, Ma’s hoped for annual earnings of NT$60 billion ($2 billion) from Chinese tourism appeared far too optimistic.49 The government had expected that Chinese tourists would contribute 0.2 per cent to GDP growth. The lower than expected numbers of Chinese tourists, among other factors, forced the government to lower the expected GDP growth for 2008 from the 4.78 per cent announced in May to 4.32 per cent in late August.50 It soon became clear that these low numbers of tourists resulted from Chinese regulations.51 These tourist numbers improved over time, but still remained below the maximum quota of 3,000 visitors per day. The numbers of Chinese tourists to Taiwan in the first half of 2009 totalled 365,500, an average of 2,008 per day.52 The numbers also varied considerably with a daily average of 3,280 in April 2009, 1,500 per day in May and only 950 per day in June.53 China did not allow its tourists to travel independently to Taiwan or other countries and imposed a minimum tour size of five persons. It see Jenny W. Hsu, “Bid to observe at WHA necessary: MOFA,” Taipei Times, June 26, 2008, p. 3. 48 Zou Jingwen 鄒景雯, “Xingqi zhuanfang 星期專訪 [Interview of the Week],” Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], June 30, 2008. 49 Taiwan News Staff Writer, “Most cross-strait fliers are from Taiwan, says CAA,” Taiwan News, August 6, 2008, p. 2. See also CNA, “Number of Chinese tourist arrivals far from satisfactory: DPP,” Taiwan News, August 6, 2008. 50 Crystal Hsu, “DGBAS lowers its GDP predictions,” Taipei Times, August 23, 2008, p. 1. 51 Staff Writer with CNA, “County official says Beijing to blame for low tourist numbers,” Taipei Times, September 7, 2008, p. 3. 52 Central News Agency, “Chinese tourist arrivals may fall short of estimates, says official,” Taiwan News, July 4, 2009, p. 1. 53 Staff Writer with CNA, “Hoteliers hoping restrictions on PRC tourists will ease,” Taipei Times, July 17, 2009, p. 2. 246 chapter seven also insisted that a Chinese guide accompany each group in addition to a Taiwan tourist guide.54 Taiwan also hoped to switch the status of cross- strait airline flights from “charter flights” to regularly scheduled flights. Taiwan treated these flights as international, but China wanted a special law to regulate flights that they saw as neither international nor domestic, a demand that delayed the start of regular cross-strait flights,55 which began only on August 31, 2009. The numbers of Chinese tourists increased substantially in 2010 when 1.6 million Chinese visited Taiwan, an increase of close to 70 per cent over 2009. According to government sources, these tourists contributed $3 billion to Taiwan’s economy, an amount equal to 0.72 per cent of Taiwan’s GDP.56 Interestingly, many Chinese abstain from such tourist delights as night markets in order to stay in their hotel rooms and watch political programs on television. One Chinese told a New York Times reporter, “They can throw their leaders out if they aren’t doing their job… Our leaders would never allow that.”57 Beginning on June 28, 2011, Taiwan and China agreed that free, independent travelers (FIT) could come from China to Taiwan. However, these FIT were restricted to people from Beijing, Shanghai and Fujian and limited to a maximum of five hundred FITs per day. After one month, the total number of visitors was only 587.58 Another important issue arose over what Taiwan should be called in international settings. The Lee Teng-hui government had used the term “Republic of China on Taiwan” while the Chen Shui-bian government emphasized the use of “Taiwan.” The Ma Ying-jeou government suggested more flexibility and even suggested the use of “Chinese Taipei (Zhonghua Taibei 中華台北),” the term used in the Olympics. Although China and Taiwan had signed an agreement on April 6, 1989 that the official Chinese translation of “Chinese Taipei” would be “Zhonghua Taibei 中華台北,”59

54 Shelley Shan, “PRC in no hurry to allow smaller tour groups,” Taipei Times, July 24, 2009, p. 3. 55 Shelley Shan, “Start date still not clear for regular cross-strait flights,” Taipei Times, July 10, 2009, p. 4. 56 Andrew Jacobs, “As Chinese Visit Taiwan, the Cultural Influence Is Subdued,” The New York Times, August 10, 2011. 57 Ibid. 58 Shelley Shan, “First FITs touch down in Taiwan,” Taipei Times, June 29, 2011, p. 2; Staff Writer with CNA, “Fitful start to FIT program as quotas not met,” Taipei Times, July 29, 2011, p. 2. 59 Junwei Yu, “China’s Foreign Policy in Sport: The Primacy of National Security and Territorial Integrity Concerning the Taiwan Question,” China Quarterly, no. 194 (2008), p. 299. the kuomintang regains power 247 the Chinese media including China Central Television and the Xinhua Newsagency continued to use “Taipei, China (Zhongguo Taibei 中國台北),” implying that Taiwan belonged to China.60 On July 18, KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung said he would boycott the Olympic Games if China continued to belittle Taiwan through using “Taipei, China.”61 The arguments continued, but the issue ameliorated when China promised to use “Chinese Taipei” in official Olympic contexts, apparently after private KMT-CCP talks.62 This Olympic use of “Chinese Taipei” led to several misunderstandings overseas. Apparently American Airlines issued instructions to its staff to require a Chinese visa for travellers to Taiwan because Taiwan had changed its name to “Chinese Taipei” and become a part of China.63 The Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship also began to refer to Taiwan as “Chinese, Taipei” in early August, but changed back to “Taiwan” after protests from Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At that time, the Ministry emphasized that “Chinese, Taipei” was only to be used during the Olympics.64 It soon became clearer that many more institutions in several countries had also (mis)used the term “Chinese Taipei.”65 From August 12 to 19, 2008, President Ma Ying-jeou made state visits to attend presidential inaugurations in Paraguay and the Dominican Republic, visited Panama and transited through the United States in Los Angeles and San Francisco. This trip raised at least three issues. First, Ma had called for a “diplomatic truce (waijiao xiubing 外交休兵)” in which “Mainland China and Taiwan should not court and win over recognition of the other sides’ allies”.66 We analyse this below. Second, how would Ma succeed as a diplomat? Ma reported, “In the six days I spent in the region, I met six presidents and had deep and far-

60 Mo Yan-chih and Shih Hsiu-chuan, “President commends China’s ‘goodwill’,” Tai- pei Times, July 26, 2008, p. 3. 61 Mo Yan-chih, “Wu to skip Games if team name changed,” Taipei Times, July 19, 2008, p. 1. 62 Mo Yan-chih and Su Yung-Yao, “Wu thanks Beijing, confirms trip to Olympic Games,” Taipei Times, July 27, 2008, p.1. 63 Wang Qiaorong 王巧蓉, “Taiwan yaoqiu gaiming? 台灣要求改名? [Has Taiwan requested changing its name?],” Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], August 6, 2008. 64 Taiwan News Staff Writer, “Australia changes Web site name at MOFA’s request,” Taiwan News, August 20, 2008, p. 2. 65 Jenny W. Hsu, “MOFA issues warning on ‘Chinese Taipei’,” Taipei Times, August 30, 2008, p. 3. 66 Zoher Abdoolcarim and Michael Schuman, “Talking to Taiwan’s New President,” Time, August 11, 2008. 248 chapter seven reaching exchanges with them.” In addition, “They all agreed with the idea [of a diplomatic truce with China], because it is pragmatic and would not hurt their interests.”67 Finally, Ma stressed that his transit visits to the United States would be very low-key and would not embarrass the United States. This may have been successful,68 but it remained unclear whether or not this low-key approach would improve Taiwan’s status in Washington. Would, for example, Washington sell arms to Taiwan? In late January 2010, the Obama administration agreed to sell US$6.4 billion worth of arms to Taiwan including Blackhawk helicopters and defensive missiles, but refused to sell Taiwan F-16 jet fighters or diesel submarines.69 Was this an end to negative changes in the United States treatment of Taiwan despite Ma’s “good behavior”?70 Ma’s “diplomatic truce” with China has raised considerable discussion in Taiwan and concerned both the United States and Japan. More than three years after Ma’s inauguration, this tactic appears to be working. In campaigning for the presidency, new Paraguayan President Lugo had said he would recognize Beijing. However, President Lugo has maintained relations with Taiwan.71 Similarly, the new Panamanian president has also maintained ties with Taiwan despite promising to recognize China. It appears that China has refused overtures from Paraguay and Panama. Initially, Ma’s hope that China would provide Taiwan with opportunities to participate in such international organizations as the United Nations and the World Health Organization appeared unfulfilled. In a letter of August 18, 2008 to the UN Secretary-General, Chinese Ambassador to the UN Wang Guangya completely rejected Ma’s much reduced request for “Taiwan’s participation in the activities of United Nations specialized

67 Shih Hsiu-Chuan, “Taipei to resume FTA talks with Dominican Republic,” Taipei Times, August 18, 2008, p. 3. 68 Shih Hsiu-Chuan, “Bilateral ties improving: Burghardt,” Taipei Times, August 14, 2008, p. 3. 69 Jenny W. Hsu, “ANALYSIS: ‘China factor’ still plays part in arms sales,” Taipei Times, January 31, 2010, p. 3. 70 Charles Snyder, “State Department tightens curbs on official contacts,” Taipei Times, September 10, 2008, p. 1. See also Charles Snyder, “AIT denies tougher guidelines,” Taipei Times, September 12, 2008, p. 3. 71 Shih Hsiu-Chuan, “Lugo says Paraguay to maintain ties,” Taipei Times, August 15, 2008, p. 3. the kuomintang regains power 249 activities.”72 Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded, “This is not a goodwill gesture on Beijing’s part.”73 In addition, although no formal Chinese translation exists for Taiwan’s “Chinese Taipei” participation in APEC, China announced in September 2008 that it would use “Taipei, China (Zhongguo Taibei).” Taiwan’s Min istry of Foreign Affairs stated it would insist on Chinese Taipei (Zhonghua Taibei) for its participation in APEC as well as the Olympics.74 Clearly, China was indicating that it would continue to push on this issue as well. Taiwan Foreign Minister Ou emphasized that Taiwan would focus on participation in the WHO. At the time, discussions with senior Chinese diplomats in Australia suggested that these hopes would remain forlorn. How could China give in to Taiwan, the Chinese diplomats asked, especially since Ma would remain in office for only four or eight years? Late in 2008, many senior officials in Taiwan stated that they would know if Ma’s diplomatic truce had worked only in May 2009 when they would see how China had treated Taiwan’s application to become an observer in the World Health Organization (WHO). In fact, the WHO invitation to Taiwan appears to overcome Taiwan’s fears. In inviting Chinese Taipei to be an observer at the WHO’s World Health Assembly, Dr. Margaret Chan, WHO director-general, addressed her letter to “Dr. Ching-Chuan Yeh, Minister, Department of Health, Chinese Taipei.”75 Although Taiwan would have preferred to have been called the Republic of China (ROC) or Taiwan, the government had made clear that Chinese Taipei—the term used in the Olympics and APEC—would be acceptable. Initially, there was some concern when the Taiwan cases of swine flu were listed under China, but on May 23, 2009 the WHO changed its website to remove the Taiwan statistics from China’s total. The new note beneath the tabulation of swine flu by country stated, “Chinese Taipei has reported 1 confirmed case of influenza A(H1N1) with 0 deaths. Cases from Chinese Taipei are included in the cumulative totals provided in the table above.”76 The related WHO map, also dated May 23, did not have a pointer

72 Wang Guangya, Letter dated 18 August 2008 from the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, ed. United Nations Gen- eral Assembly (August 22, 2008), pp. 1–3. 73 Jenny W. Hsu, “No goodwill from PRC: MOFA,” Taipei Times, September 10, 2008, p. 3. 74 Jenny W. Hsu and Ko Shu-ling, “MOFA is firm on Taiwan designation,” Taipei Times, September 12, 2008, p. 4. 75 Author’s copy of this letter. 76 World Health Organization (WHO), “Influenza A(H1N1) – update 37,” Epidemic and 250 chapter seven to Taiwan, but included a similar note about Chinese Taipei being included in the cumulative totals.77 Critics say that the WHO still has a secret memorandum with China from 2005 that greatly restricts potential Taiwan participation in the WHO. In addition, the Global Health Atlas of the WHO still lists Taiwan as “China (Province of Taiwan),” though one cannot obtain any statistics for this place.78 But others argue, now that Taiwan is already an observer, countries such as the United States, Japan, and Australia will no longer allow China to obstruct Taiwan’s participation in WHO, as international boundaries are irrelevant to the spread of disease. In fact, Taiwan con tinued to participate as an observer at the World Health Assembly in 2010 and 2011. Overall, it appears that President Ma’s diplomatic truce has proved reasonably successful. President Ma’s second key policy toward China has been to enhance economic ties between China and Taiwan. This has led to a series of agreements between the two sides culminating in an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA, Haixia liang’an jingji hezuo jiagou xieyi 海峽兩岸經濟合作架構協議), which the two sides finally signed on June 29, 2010 in Chongqing. As promised by President Ma, the ECFA was clearly economic without political implications. Signed by the heads of SEF and ARATS, the ECFA agreement only referred to “both sides” (shuang fang 雙方), the “Taiwan side” (Taiwan fangmian 台灣方面) and the “Mainland side” (dalu fangmian 大陸方面). There was no mention, for example, of such politically charged terms like “Taiwan region” (Taiwan diqu 台灣地區) or “Mainland region” (dalu diqu 大陸地區).79

Pandemic Alert and Response (May 23, 2009, accessed October 3, 2009); available from http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_05_23/en/index.html. 77 WHO, New Influenza A(H1N1) – Number of Laboratory Cases Reported to the WHO (May 23, 2009, accessed October 3, 2009); available from http://www.who.int/csr/don/ ah1n1_20090523_8AM.jpg. 78 WHO, Global Health Atlas database (accessed October 3, 2009); available from http://apps.who.int/globalatlas/DataQuery/default.asp. 79 The 73 pages of the official Chinese text of the ECFA agreement and its annexes may be found in traditional Chinese characters at the SEF website at http://www.sef.org. tw/ct.asp?xItem=131821&ctNode=4519&mp=1. The texts can also be found in simplified characters at the ARATS website, http://news.163.com/10/0629/15/6ABSN7O3000146BC. html. An unofficial English translation of the ECFA agreement can be found at http:// www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article18166, while an English translation of the annexes can found at http://www.moea.gov.tw/Mns/populace/news/News.aspx?kind=1&menu_id=40 &news_id=19723. the kuomintang regains power 251

The signing of the ECFA agreement did not, however, reduce debate in Taiwan. Even Taiwan government officials could not agree on whether ECFA was a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) or not. In addition, the Chinese side seemed to assume that ECFA was a step towards unification between China and Taiwan, an interpretation that the Taiwan side did not accept. Some people noted that ECFA was signed on the seventh anniversary of the signing of Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) with Hong Kong,80 a parallel which they argued put Taiwan in a subordinate position to China. Another difficulty is that at least some of Taipei’s bargaining with China has been on a party-to-party (i.e., KMT-CCP) basis rather than on a government-to-government basis. Many Taiwanese fear that the Ma administration has secretly ceded key political factors such as Taiwan’s sovereignty in order to reach the economic agreements. These fears are heightened when, in dealing with China, Taiwan’s negotiators fail to use key terms such as “Republic of China,” “Taiwan,” or even “president” when referring to Ma. President Ma’s supporters say that such an approach helps reduce the conflict with China, but on a May 2009 visit to China, Chen Chu, the DPP Mayor of Kaohsiung, mentioned “President Ma Ying- jeou of the central government” and “Taiwan”81 without suffering any dis- abilities, raising questions about whether or not the Ma administration’s approach is too cautious. As noted earlier, during his presidential campaign, Ma Ying-jeou actually moved considerably toward the position of DPP candidate Frank Hsieh in emphasizing the sovereignty of Taiwan and identification with Taiwan while ignoring the cross-strait “common market” idea of his vice- presidential candidate, Vincent Siew. Yet, since becoming president, President Ma has moved away from his campaign rhetoric and toward China. A key concern is the issue of Taiwan’s sovereignty. According to international law established as a result of the Convention on Rights and Duties of States, signed at Montevideo on December 26, 1933, Taiwan clearly meets the four criteria of sovereignty: a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. In addition, Article 3 of the Convention makes clear

80 The text of the China-Hong Kong CEPA can be found at http://wits.worldbank. org/GPTAD/PDF/archive/China-HongKong.pdf. 81 Flora Wang and Mo Yan-chih, “Chen Chu praised for saying president,” Taipei Times, May 23, 2009, p. 1. 252 chapter seven that “the political existence of the state is independent of recognition by other states. Even before recognition the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence.”82 Over the years and during his presidency Ma seems to have shifted ground several times on the issue of Taiwan’s sovereignty. During his presidential campaign, as noted earlier, Ma stated clearly that Taiwan, which he sometimes called the ROC, is a sovereign country. In his inauguration speech, however, he stated, “the keystone for a final solution to the cross-strait problem is not in a conflict over sovereignty, but in ways of life and core values.”83 A year later, in a press conference on May 19, 2009, President Ma stated that the sovereignty of the ROC belongs to the people. Ma further said, “Taiwan is the ROC…We should clear this up from a historical and constitutional viewpoint. The public must not be confused into thinking Taiwan’s sovereignty is undefined.”84 Unfortunately, his presidential spokesman then modified this statement by adding a Chinese character that changed the meaning to “Taiwan is part of the Republic of China.”85 Perhaps the greatest threats to Taiwan’s sovereignty took place during the November 3–7, 2008 visit to Taiwan of Chen Yunlin, the Chairman of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) and the most senior Chinese official to visit the island.86 The Taiwan government removed Republic of China flags and it prohibited peaceful demonstrations. Taiwan’s police injured many demonstrators and closed Sunrise Records, a music store playing Taiwan songs not too far from where Chen Yunlin was being hosted for a banquet. The senior police in charge of controlling the demonstrations received promotions. The Taipei Times editorialized: Nov. 3 was a day that saw both the nation’s dignity and human rights trampled.

82 Convention on Rights and Duties of States (December 26, 1933, accessed October 3, 2009); available from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp. 83 See Ma Ying-jeou, Ma Yingjiu xiansheng jiuzhi yanshuo (p. 8). The official English translation was less clear and pointed. 84 Ko Shu-ling and Rich Chang, “Ma defends his administration,” Taipei Times, May 20, 2009, p. 1. 85 Wang Yuzhong 王寓中, “Ma qiang lüying: nali shi zhuquan nandao yao daotui banian 馬嗆綠營：哪裡失主權難道要倒退八年 [Ma Roars at the Green Camp: Where have we lost sovereignty? It’s not surprising we went backward for eight years.],” Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], May 20, 2009. 86 This paragraph is based on wide reading of the press as well as television reports and interviews. the kuomintang regains power 253

No national symbol of the ROC was allowed where Chen and his delegation might see it. National flags, a representation of national sovereignty, were seized by police from protesters and passers-by alike. People waving the five-starred PRC flag, however, were left alone. Freedom of speech was suppressed. Police broke into hotel rooms without cause or warrant, as in the case of four Democratic Progressive Party Taichung City councilors whose room on the sixth floor of the Grand Hotel was raided after the councilors exercised their freedom of speech by unfurling banners from the balcony. Individual human rights were suppressed. Police seized property without legitimate reason, a motorcyclist was stopped by police simply because the scooter was decorated with Tibetan flags and individuals having afternoon tea at hotels that Chen visited were dragged away. People were stopped and questioned on the street for wearing T-shirts reading “Taiwan is my country.” A music store was ordered to turn off its sound system and close its doors because it was playing Song of Taiwan. The list goes on.87 In this context, it is not surprising that Chinese Communist Party Chairman Hu Jintao declared on August 19, 2009: In the past year, the relationship between both sides of the Strait has realized an historic change and has achieved a series of important results. This accords with the basic interests of compatriots on both sides of the Strait… I wholeheartedly hope that compatriots on both sides will even more closely join hands and jointly strive and struggle in order to restore the greatness of the Chinese race (zhonghua minzu 中华民族).88 Clearly, however, Hu Jintao’s call did not receive universal acceptance in Taiwan or even in its government. The next day, for example, the Department of Health decided not to attend a conference on swine flu being held in Beijing because the Chinese insisted on calling Taiwan “Taiwan, China” [sic] instead of “Chinese Taipei.”89 Many “green” commentators believe that President Ma does not care about Taiwan’s sovereignty and would be happy to have Taiwan eventually become part of the People’s Republic. While such a judgement might apply to a Lien Chan, it is perhaps too harsh to apply it to Ma. Yet, aspects of President Ma’s “diplomatic truce” appear naïve. During the negotia-

87 “EDITORIALS[sic]: The trampling of Taiwan’s rights,” Taipei Times, November 6, 2008, p. 8. 88 Sheng Ruowei 盛若蔚 and Du Rong 杜榕, “Hu Jintao huijian Taiwan shaoshu minzu daibiao tuan 胡錦濤會見台灣少數民族代表團 [Hu Jintao Meets a Representative Group of Taiwan Minority People],” Renmin ribao 人民日報 [People’s Daily], August 20, 2009, p. 1. 89 Staff Writer with CNA, “Taiwan declines to join Beijing swine flu conference,” Tai- pei Times, August 21, 2009, p. 2. 254 chapter seven tions for ECFA, Ma expressed his urgent desire to sign ECFA, thus reduc- ing his bargaining strength. As noted earlier, China has not removed a single missile aimed at Taiwan and is still increasing their number by 100 per year. On July 31, 2009, Ma said, “It’s only when Taiwan is properly armed and defended that we have the confidence to make a deal with the mainland.”90 This statement contrasts greatly with his statement made a few days later after Typhoon Morakot that “nature” rather than China was the enemy and that Taiwan’s purchase of arms would be reduced so that Taiwan could purchase more rescue equipment.91 In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs initially rejected offers of foreign aid from the United States, Japan and other countries to help with Typhoon Morakot.92 Taiwan also has apparently decided not to apply for any sort of status with the United Nations in 2009. In this context, it is not surprising to find that Taiwan’s relations with the United States and Japan have also apparently suffered during Ma’s presidency as these countries see Taiwan becoming closer to China and thus more distant from themselves. In addition, they fear China will learn of any secrets shared with Taiwan. As we shall see in the next section, confidence in the Ma administration has also fallen sharply within Taiwan.

Popular Evaluations of the Ma Ying-jeou Administration

The Ma Ying-jeou presidential campaign had presented the KMT as ready to run a government efficiently as soon as it was elected.93 However, various crises including the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands, the possibly credu- lous approach to China, and inflation including higher oil and gasoline prices have raised many concerns among Taiwan’s voters. A detailed poll by TVBS, one of Taiwan’s most pro-KMT television stations, conducted one month after Ma’s inauguration revealed a huge drop in satisfaction with the Ma administration. In this poll, 66 per cent stated that the Ma

90 Stuart Biggs and Stephen Engle, “PRC must remove missiles, Ma says,” Taipei Times, August 1, 2009, p. 3. 91 “EDITORIAL: Ma has China in mind, not Taiwan,” Taipei Times, August 21, 2009, p. 8. 92 Jenny W. Hsu and Flora Wang, “MORAKOT: THE AFTERMATH : MOFA sorry, but denies mistake over refusing aid,” Taipei Times, August 15, 2009, p. 1. 93 The Ma campaign used a slogan that punned on Ma’s surname, Mashang hao 馬上好, “We are instantly ready.” the kuomintang regains power 255 administration had not prepared adequately, while only 21 per cent felt that it had.94 Ma Ying-jeou won over 58 per cent of the votes and during the two months between his election and inauguration, 52 per cent of those polled were satisfied with his performance. However, one month after his inauguration, satisfaction with Ma had dropped to 41 per cent. In comparison, one month after Chen Shui-bian’s inauguration, 77 per cent were satisfied even though he had only won 39 per cent of the vote.95 The figures were even worse for Premier Liu Chao-shiuan. After one month in office, his satisfaction ratings were only 38 per cent, less than those of Premier Tang Fei in 2000, who had a 65 per cent satisfaction rating. In fact, the dissatisfied (43 per cent) exceeded the satisfied in Premier Liu’s case.96 Only 35 per cent were satisfied with the cabinet, while 47 per cent were dissatisfied, figures much below the 59 per cent satisfaction in 2000 with the cabinet of Premier Tang Fei.97 On the issue of handling inflation 58 per cent were dissatisfied and only 31 per cent satisfied while on the handling of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands crisis 45 per cent were dissatisfied while only 38 per cent were satisfied. Only on the handling of cross- Straits relations did the government do better as 60 per cent were satisfied and only 26 per cent dissatisfied. But, in summary, only 36 per cent believed the Ma government had the capability to handle crises while over half (51 per cent) believed the government lacked such a capability.98 According to the well-regarded Global Views Magazine Survey Center (Yuanjian mindiao 遠見民調), with two brief exceptions in June 2009 and January 2011, President Ma’s approval or satisfaction (manyi 滿意) ratings have remained in the low 30s or less through to April 2011. (See Figure 7.1.)99 Satisfaction remained low in July 2011 at 32.3 per cent 100 and 33.9

94 TVBS Poll Center, Ma Yingjiu jiuzhi yi ge yue manyidu mindiao 馬英九就職一個月滿意度民調 [Poll on Degree of Satisfaction with Ma Ying-jeou One Month after Inaugu- ration] (Conducted June 16–17, 2008, accessed October 3, 2009); available from http:// www.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/DL_DB/rickliu/200806/rickliu-20080619214943.pdf. See pp. 2, 5, 15. 95 Ibid., pp. 2, 7. 96 Ibid., pp. 3, 10. 97 Ibid., pp. 3, 12 98 Ibid., pp. 3, 14, 16, 17. 99 http://www.gvsrc.net.tw/dispPageBox/GVSRCCP.aspx?ddsPageID=POLITICS& view=2011&dbid=3975312539. 100 http://www.gvsrc.net.tw/dispPageBox/GVSRCCP.aspx?ddsPageID=POLITICS& view=2011&dbid=3357912896. 256 chapter seven per cent in August 2011.101 For a president elected with over 58 per cent of the vote, with a huge KMT majority in the legislature and with the successful signing of ECFA, one of his key planks for Taiwan’s economic future, these continuing very low approval ratings must be of considerable concern.

Figure 7.1. Satisfaction ratings for President Ma Ying-jeou (Global Views Magazine Survey Center)

(Note to Figure 7.1: The represents “confidence” while the represents “lack of confidence. ” The represents approval or “satisfaction,” while represents “dissatisfaction.”)

On July 10, 2008 a very pro-KMT newspaper published an editorial entitled “Discussing President Ma’s Leadership Style.”102 Four days later, the Kuomintang News Network, an official KMT website, published an excellent full translation103 that deserves quoting at length:

101 http://www.gvsrc.net.tw/dispPageBox/GVSRCCP.aspx?ddsPageID=POLITICS&vi ew=2011&dbid=3975312939. 102 China Times Editorial, “Tantan Ma zongtong de lingdao fengge 談談馬總統的領導風格 [Discussing President Ma’s Leadership Style],” Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], July 10, 2008. 103 China Times Editorial, On President Ma’s Leadership Style (Kuomintang News Network, 2008, accessed July 20, 2008); available from http://www.kmtnews.net/client/ eng/NewsArtical.php?REFDOCID=00auyazpurrodbxu&TYPIDJump=00aire4d9ydh2d8u (In October 2009, this URL no longer worked.). the kuomintang regains power 257

President Ma Ying-jeou probably never imagined in his entire life that his popularity would decline so much in such a short period of time. That it would resemble the Taiwan stock market insofar as the bottom is still nowhere in sight. One of the main reasons for this is his character and background… Unfortunately politics is everybody’s business. It is hardly something one can engage in alone. Ma Ying-jeou is not good at it. He attaches little importance to interaction with others. His braintrust is too small and too inbred. Most of them are ivory-tower intellectuals, politically unsophisti- cated, fearful of outsiders, isolated, and out of touch with the outside world. This leads to a lack of dissonance during the decision-making process. This undermines the quality and responsiveness of decision-making, and eventually leads to a backlash… President Ma Ying-jeou is not without responsibility… He failed to acknowledge his responsibility to ensure cooperation between his administration and his party. Ma Ying-jeou is like a little white rabbit who has been elected King of the Jungle, who only wants to sit on his throne and remain pure as the driven snow, shielded by his confidants, willing to do what is needed to polish his public image, but unwilling to dirty his paws by coming in contact with the jackals and hyenas. Lacking the necessary ruthlessness and calculation, he delegates the dirty work to others. Yes, the office is elective, but power must be won. If this continues, the weak and pusillanimous little rabbit will soon be exposed for what he is, and the situation will only get worse… Unfortunately, upon being elected, Ma Ying-jeou has been treating the KMT as an instrument in his service. He feels no obligation to contribute to its political survival. He doesn’t consider the reform of this creaky old political party as something he must achieve in order to enhance the quality of Taiwan’s political culture. He champions no political philosophy, and offers no national vision. It seems that he doesn’t know too much what the Executive Yuan [cabinet] has been doing. Isn’t such a presidency just a little too carefree? When you are the President, many things are your responsibility. Being virtuous is not enough. If the President were merely a figurehead, then there would be no need to fight tooth and nail over Presidential elections. In fact, people do not want Ma Ying-jeou to become another Machievellian political schemer. But for Taiwan’s democratic politics to progress, we need a leader who is more aggressive and more willing to sacrifice. So far, we are still waiting for Ma Ying-jeou to show greater concern for the nation than for himself. This damning editorial has been quoted at length because it comes from a major newspaper that has stood whole-heartedly behind the KMT and Ma Ying-jeou. Such criticisms are a clear indication that during the first year of Ma’s presidency the greatest opposition in Taiwan to the Ma government came from within Ma’s own KMT and not from the official 258 chapter seven opposition DPP. The Ma government’s weakness as well as DPP reform have strengthened the DPP and it now poses a strong challenge to President Ma’s hopes for re-election in 2012. In order to solve these problems, President Ma must thoroughly reform the KMT.104 His assumption of the Chairmanship of the KMT in October 2009 should have made this task easier. In addition, on December 9, 2009, Ma appointed King Pu-tsung 金溥聰, a very close former aide of Manchu background, as KMT Secretary-General. But Secretary-General King resigned his party post on January 18, 2011 and shifted to head President Ma’s re-election campaign. The general feeling was that King had poor relations with local Taiwanese leaders in the KMT, whose cooperation was necessary for the KMT to run a successful campaign. Typhoon Morakot, which dropped up to three meters of rain in places on Taiwan during August 7–9, 2009 created a severe crisis for the Ma administration. Landslides literally destroyed many aboriginal villages in the mountains and the death toll exceeded 700. The government response was very slow and several government leaders appeared not to care. The government initially refused foreign assistance. In the context of a diplo- matically isolated country, one would have expected Taiwan to accept any offers of foreign aid even if they were not required. In the end, the government did accept foreign assistance and the use of American heavy- lift helicopters proved very helpful when they finally arrived. Even though the government had earlier said that Premier Liu Chao- shiuan would be retained and any cabinet change would be small, President Ma finally accepted Premier Liu’s resignation on September 7, 2009 and appointed a new premier and vice-premier as well as several new cabinet members. Unlike Premier Liu, who is a Mainlander and cannot speak Taiwanese, the new Premier, Wu Den-yih 吳敦義, is a Taiwanese. Born in 1948, Wu was a journalist who entered the Taipei City Council in the 1970s, won two terms as County Executive of Nantou County during the 1980s, and was appointed mayor of Kaohsiung, Taiwan’s second largest city, in 1990. When Kaohsiung was allowed to elect its mayor in 1994, Wu won, but he lost his attempt at re-election to the Democratic Progressive Party candidate, Frank Hsieh, in 1998. Prior to being appointed premier, Wu was Secretary-General of the ruling Kuomintang. The new vice-premier was Eric Chu (Chu Li-luan 朱立倫), an urbane reformer who had nearly finished two terms as county executive of

104 Bruce Jacobs, “President Ma must reform the KMT,” Taipei Times, September 10, 2008, p. 8. the kuomintang regains power 259

Taoyuan County, one of Taiwan’s largest local units. Born in 1961 of a Mainlander father and a Taiwanese mother, he married the daughter of one of Taiwan’s most prominent local politicians, Kao Yu-jen 高育仁. Now just fifty years old and very young by Kuomintang standards, Chu was asked to resign as Vice-Premier in early 2010 and to run as the KMT candidate for mayor in Sinbei Municipality (the former Taipei County) in the November 2010 election (discussed below). The Liu Chao-shiun cabinet had proved a disaster. President Ma had chosen Liu Chao-shiun, who was President Lee Teng-hui’s last vice-premier, as premier and many vice-ministers in 2000 became ministers in Premier Liu’s 2008 cabinet. This cabinet, primarily of Mainlanders, had very little experience outside of Taipei and failed badly. The Ma government’s assumption that past experience would lead to good government proved badly flawed. The Wu Den-yih cabinet, at least, had some legislative and local experience outside of Taipei. Typhoon Morakot also created another crisis for the Ma administration when the five southern DPP county executives and mayors invited the Dalai Lama to visit Taiwan in order to help the grieving typhoon victims. The Ma administration realized it could not deny the Dalai Lama entry to Taiwan, but all members of the Ma administration arranged their schedules so they would not meet the Dalai Lama during his August 30-September 4, 2009 visit. Chinese criticism of the Dalai Lama’s visit to Taiwan focused on the DPP rather than the Ma administration. On September 25, 2009, in response to presumed Chinese pressure, Taiwan’s Minister of the Interior said the Ma government would reject any application for a visa from exiled Uyghur leader Rebiya Kadeer, saying her World Uyghur Congress was related to a terrorist organization, despite her permission to reside in the United States and her successful recent visits to Germany, Australia, Japan and the Czech Republic.105 These events brought about a serious fall in the polls for the Ma administration. In mid-August, according to the pro-KMT TVBS poll, those satisfied with President Ma’s performance had fallen to only 16 per cent while those dissatisfied has risen to 65 per cent. For Premier Liu, the figures were worse with a satisfaction of only 13 per cent and a dissatisfaction of 70 per cent.106

105 Flora Wang and Loa Iok-sin, “Government prevents visit by Kadeer,” Taipei Times, September 26, 2009, p. 1. 106 TVBS Poll Center, Molakezai hou shitian ji jiuzai renxuan mindiao 莫拉克災後十天及救災人選民調 [Poll Ten Days after the Disaster of Morakot and Those Involved in Disaster Relief ] (Conducted August 17–18, 2008 pp. 2,5, accessed October 3, 2009); 260 chapter seven

A series of elections beginning on September 26, 2009 deepened the crisis for the Ma administration. In a by-election in Yunlin County caused by the removal for vote-buying of the KMT legislator who won in January 2008, the DPP candidate obtained 58.8 per cent of the vote,107 truly a huge reversal of the January 2008 vote when the same DPP candidate obtained less than 38.3 per cent of the vote.108 In a referendum on the same date, over 56.4 per cent voted against a proposition to have a gambling casino in Penghu County,109 a proposal strongly supported by the KMT-con trolled county government, but opposed by the DPP. On December 5, 2009, about forty per cent of Taiwan’s citizens cast ballots for county executive. Although the KMT won 12 seats and the DPP only four, the KMT lost Ilan County to the DPP and Hualien to an independent, two counties where President Ma campaigned quite strongly for the KMT candidates. In addition, the votes cast were much closer, 47.88 per cent to the KMT and 45.32 per cent to the DPP. After its great electoral losses in 2008, this improvement was a morale booster for the DPP.110 On February 27, 2010, the DPP won three of four legislative by-elections in Taoyuan, Hsinchu and Chiayi counties and came very close in the fourth seat in Hualien.111 Previously, the DPP had won only the seat in Chiayi. The other sixty per cent of the population voted on November 27, 2010. Since 1979, Taiwan had just two special (or provincial-level) municipalities, Taipei and Kaohsiung. Other, more urban areas, gained this status effective at the end of 2010. Taipei County was elevated to become Sinbei Municipality. Kaohsiung Municipality and Kaohsiung County were combined to make a larger special municipality. Taichung Muncipality and Taichung County were combined as were Tainan Municipality and Tainan County to make two additional special municipalities. The elections for the five special municipality mayors took place on November 27, 2010. The results were quite mixed. While the KMT won Taipei, Sinbei and Taichung municipalities, the DPP won the two southern municipalities of Kaohsiung and Tainan with landslide victories. available from http://www.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/DL_DB/doshouldo/200908/doshouldo -20090819205240.pdf. 107 Ko Shu-ling, “DPP’s Liu wins by landslide in Yunlin,” Taipei Times, September 27, 2009, p. 1. 108 See http://210.69.23.140/cec/vote3.asp?pass1=B2008A0000000000aaa. 109 Loa Iok-sin, “Residents of Penghu reject casino resort plan,” Taipei Times, Septem- ber 27, 2009, p. 1. 110 For the percentage of vote obtained in this election, see http://210.69.23.140/ cec/%5Cpdf%5CF2009005.pdf. 111 Details of these elections can be found at http://www.cec.gov.tw/files/Z100301102 548/990227.htm. the kuomintang regains power 261

Thus, in total, the DPP mayoral vote was more than 400,000 voters or five per cent greater than the KMT in these 2010 special mayoral elections. Since all votes are equal in presidential elections, this election result was also optimistic for the future of the DPP. In the five city council races, the DPP equaled the KMT’s number of seats, though they trailed the KMT by three per cent in this less partisan and more locally oriented race.112

The Trial of Former President Chen Shui-bian

The morale of the DPP, which had been destroyed as a result of the legislative and presidential elections of 2008, suffered even further with the indictment of former president Chen Shui-bian on corruption charges on December 12, 2008. In fact, with the exception of one period of seventeen days, former president Chen Shui-bian has been continuously held in detention since November 12, 2008.113 The conditions of former president Chen’s pre-conviction detention were extreme, especially in the context of treatment of corruption cases in the past. He was allowed one thirty-minute visit, with a maximum of two visitors per visit, five times a week. In addition, on the first Sunday of each month, he was allowed have another visit with the same conditions. Visitors could not bring anything, such as a pen or piece of paper, to record their discussion with former president Chen. Visitors who went to see former president Chen at the Taipei Detention Center in Tucheng entered a room entitled “Serious Crimes Reception Center” (zhongxing jiejian shi 重型接見室), which the prison using Chinglish have entitled “Felonry Reception Room.” This room was used even before former president Chen was convicted of any crime. Visitors had to see former president Chen through two very thick panes of glass separated by insulating air as well as substantial vertical steel bars. No sound could penetrate this barrier and visitors had to talk with Chen through phones that are old and have a scratchy sound quality. As visitors could easily see, guards monitored the conversation.114 Former president Chen’s detention and indictment closely followed the arrest and detention of several key DPP leaders including former

112 Bruce Jacobs, “Election pointers for the future,” Taipei Times, November 30, 2010, p. 8. 113 Former president Chen was released on December 13, 2008, following his indictment, but re-incarcerated on December 30, following the decision of the court to change his judges on December 25. 114 These two paragraphs are based on the author’s visit to former president Chen at the Taipei Detention Center on August 31, 2009. 262 chapter seven

Minister of the Interior Yü Cheng-hsien 余政憲 on October 15, 2008, former Hsinchu Science Park Director and Vice-Minister for Environmental Protection Dr James Lee 李界木 on October 27, Chiayi County Executive Chen Ming-wen 陳明文 on October 29, former National Security Council Secretary-General and former Vice-Premier Chiou I-jen 邱義仁 on October 31, and Yunlin County Executive Su Chih-fen 蘇治芬 on November 4.115 This apparent use of the judicial system to persecute former and present DPP office-holders troubled some twenty scholars and former diplomats from the United States, Canada, Australia and Europe (including the writer), who then wrote a series of open letters to express their concerns. The first letter, written to Minister of Justice Wang Ching-feng 王清峰 and dated November 4, 2008, expressed concerns about the widespread detention and the holding of detainees incommunicado. The letter stressed the importance of the judicial system remaining politically neutral and considering people innocent until proven guilty in a court of law.116 The Minister responded in less than three weeks claiming that the statements in the Open Letter were incorrect.117 Minister Wang’s reply did not satisfy the overseas scholars and former diplomats, who responded on November 28 with considerably more detail.118 Her response to the second open letter included such apparently contradictory information as “Our laws protect the privilege of confidential communication between a lawyer and his client,” but “it is required that communications between the detained and his lawyer be recorded.”119 Believing that writing to the Minister of Justice did not solve the difficulties, the overseas scholars and former diplomats wrote their third letter to President Ma Ying-jeou on January 17, 2009. Among several issues, this letter raised concerns about removing the three-judge panel that had released Chen Shui-bian and replacing it with another panel that detained him again. It also raised concerns about a Law Day “skit” that prosecutors had performed satirizing the former president, which the Minister of

115 Data from http://www.taiwandc.org/Statement%20arrests%20Nov%202008.htm. 116 See “Open letter on erosion of justice in Taiwan,” Taipei Times, November 6, 2008, p. 8. 117 Wang Ching-feng, “‘Open letter’ inaccurate,” Taipei Times, November 25, 2008, p. 8. 118 “Eroding justice: Open letter No. 2,” Taipei Times, December 2, 2008, p. 8. Also available from Political arrests and detentions in Taiwan (November 28, 2008, accessed October 3, 2009); available from http://www.taiwandc.org/statement%2028%20Nov%20 2008.htm. 119 Wang Ching-feng, “Response No. 2 on justice,” Taipei Times, January 8, 2009, p. 8. the kuomintang regains power 263

Justice defended as “just for fun.”120 In his response on behalf of the president, Su Jun-pin 蘇俊賓, the Director-General of the Government Information Office, stated that the change of judges occurred because former president Chen’s case was combined with other cases and because the new panel had expertise in the area of corruption. He also tried to explain, but did not defend, the Law Day skit.121 The overseas scholars and foreign diplomats again wrote to President Ma on the anniversary of his inauguration raising not only issues of the justice system, but also issues of human rights in Taiwan.122 On September 11, 2009, the panel of judges handed down their verdict for former president Chen and others. The former president was found guilty and received a life term. This too went against all precedents for corruption cases in Taiwan. Because former president Chen received a life sentence, his case was automatically appealed. The new panel of appeal judges, chosen by lot, denied his request to be released pending the appeal, apparently by a vote of 2–1. Professor Jerome Cohen, an expert on Chinese law who had earlier taught future President Ma Ying-jeou at Harvard, wrote a pungent column in which he argued that the case against Chen Shui-bian had many “shortcomings” including his continued detention, persistent leaks to the press and the Law Day “skit.” Cohen also severely criticized the attempts of the justice system to discipline lawyers for publically questioning the fairness of the judicial process. He called the Taipei District Court’s early handling of the case “bizarre.” Cohen noted, “The district court’s unusual transfer of the case to Tsai and his repeated denials of pre-trial release to Chen raised substantial constitutional questions.”123 The scholars and former diplomats wrote a fifth open letter on November 13, 2009 to President Ma” applauding some of Taiwan’s achievements, but expressing concern about other issues including the “apparent lack of neutrality” in the judicial proceedings against former president Chen Shui-bian and other former DPP office-holders.124 On behalf of President Ma, Su Jun-pin, the Director-General of the

120 “Eroding justice: Open letter No. 3,” Taipei Times, January 21, 2009, p. 8. 121 Su Jun-pin, “Response to ‘Open Letter to President Ma Ying-jeou’,” Taiwan News, January 24, 2009, p. 6. 122 “Open letter to Taiwan’s president,” Taipei Times, May 21, 2009, p. 8. We never received a reply to this letter. 123 Jerome A. Cohen, “A work in progress,” South China Morning Post, September 17, 2009. 124 “An open letter to Taiwan’s president,” Taipei Times, November 13, 2009, p. 8. 264 chapter seven

Government Information Office, wrote, “According to the latest Asian Intelligence report issued on Nov. 4 by the widely respected Hong Kong firm Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, Ltd (PERC), it is generally believed that in the Chen Shui-bian case, the court proceedings have been transparent, the evidence against him is convincing and the judiciary has operated independently—not as a political tool of the Kuomintang (KMT).”125 This use of a Hong Kong firm, with no special expertise in Taiwan’s judicial system, suggested the government lacked any genuine response to the issues raised. On appeal, the High Court reduced former president Chen’s sentence from life imprisonment to twenty years on June 11, 2010. His case is still being appealed. On August 26, 2011, Taiwan’s High Court found Chen Shui-bian not guilty of some offenses, but bizarrely added to his sentences for other convictions.126 Ironically, two of Taiwan’s most pro-blue newspapers also criticized the court. The United Daily News editorialized, “If judges are allowed to abuse their power to such an extent and issue such an arbitrary ruling, judicial trials will become nothing more than a gamble.”127 The China Times echoed, “With constant flip-flopping on many prominent cases, why should the people trust the judicial system any more?”128 The arbitrary indictment of high “green” former officials continued in 2011. On March 29, 2011 the government announced that it was investigat- ing seventeen former DPP officials for “failing to return” 36,000 documents during President Chen Shui-bian’s presidency. Again, some thirty-five foreign observers (including the writer) wrote to President Ma expressing concern about the political nature of this move noting, for example, that this announcement came three years after the Ma government came to power, but only one day before Su Tseng-chang was to announce his campaign for the presidency.129 Of even more concern, on June 30, 2011, former president Lee Teng-hui, then aged 88, was indicted

125 Su Jun-pin, “GIO response to Nov. 13 open letter,” Taipei Times, December 18, 2009, p. 8. 126 Chris Wand, “Retrial finds A-bian not guilty of graft,” Taipei Times, August 27, 2011, p. 1. 127 “United Daily News: An outrageous ruling” (August 27, 2011), http://focustaiwan. tw/ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?Type=aOPN&TNo=&ID=201108270021. 128 “China Times: How can the judicial system be trusted?” (August 28, 2011), http:// focustaiwan.tw/ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?Type=aOPN&ID=201108280003. 129 “Open Letter to Ma Ying-jeou’s KMT government,” Taipei Times, April 11, 2011, p. 8. The writer was later told that most of these documents consisted of wedding invitations, Christmas greeting cards and so on. the kuomintang regains power 265 on charges stemming back some sixteen years. This time some forty foreign observers (including the writer) raised questions about both the timing of the indictment and about the impartiality of the judicial system.130 In late August 2011, the Taipei District Court found two key DPP leaders, former National Security Council Secretary-General Chiou I-jen 邱義仁 and former Deputy Foreign Minister Michael Kau 高英茂, not guilty of embezzlement. Chiou had been detained for fifty days131 and both personally found the pressure from judicial indictment very stress- ful. A few days later, five former officials of the National Palace Museum were found not guilty of embezzlement by the Shihlin District Court. At least one of these officials had been repeatedly incarcerated.132 On the other hand, former Minister of the Interior Yü Cheng-hsien 余政憲 was found guilty of corruption and sentenced to two and a half years in late August 2011 despite the district court stating in November 2009 that Yu had not accepted any bribes and had cooperated with investigators.133 Another case, that of former KMT Municipal Council woman and legislator Diane Lee 李慶安, caused a Taiwan law professor to compare Taiwan’s legal system with that of the Weimar Republic. Diane Lee had been found guilty of having dual citizenship while holding public office, a crime in Taiwan. In fact, Diane Lee clearly understood this law since she had attacked others for holding public office with dual citizenship. Yet, an appeal court had found her not guilty. According to Professor Lin, Weimar judges “did not apply them [constitutional protections] equally to allies and opponents… In Taiwan today, we see judges who depart from people’s basic understanding of justice and do all they can to absolve those who break the law.”134 In addition to having peaceful transfers of power between government and opposition, a democratic government cannot arbitrarily arrest and imprison its political foes. The Taiwan case raises several issues, though it remains unclear whether or not the judicial system is taking orders from the government. Under President Chen Shui-bian, former mayor and future president Ma Ying-jeou was found not guilty of corruption charges

130 “Open Letter to President Ma,” Taipei Times, August 2, 2011, p. 8. 131 Rich Chang and Chris Wang, “DPP officials found not guilty of embezzlement,” Taipei Times, August 31, 2011, p. 1. 132 Chang Wen-chuan and Lin Chun-hung, “NPM staff not guilty,” Taipei Times, Sep- tember 3, 2011, p. 3. 133 Staff writer with CNA, “Former minister of the interior sentenced to jail,” Taipei Times, August 31, 2011, p. 3. 134 Lin Chia-ho, “What has gone wrong with justice in Taiwan?,” Taipei Times, Sep- tember 3, 2011, p. 8. 266 chapter seven in 2007. Ma was not detained during the investigation of his case, following his indictment or during his court hearings. In Taiwan and in South Korea, both the judicial system and the media have been slow to reform. Many commentators in both countries see the media as extraordinarily partisan and most newspapers or television stations fail to divide their news from opinions. The source of this is that much of the press had its origins in the authoritarian regimes and newer newspapers and television stations, which often support the old former oppositions, have operated in a similar manner. Such relatively non-partisan newspapers as The Apple Daily (Pingguo ribao 蘋果日報) in Taiwan, based on its Hong Kong cousin, are rare. The judicial system too is very politicized. Under the authoritarian government, Taiwan’s judiciary took orders from the Kuomintang. While some judges have different perspectives, old Kuomintang views certainly dominate. In addition, interviews suggest that “child” judges and prosecutors, who get their positions by passing examinations right out of law school, have little experience of life. These challenges to Taiwan’s young democracy must be met if Taiwan’s democracy is to continue and mature.

Conclusion

President Ma Ying-jeou came to office with the hopes and expectations of many millions of Taiwanese upon his shoulders. But he also came to office with a reputation of often saying different things to different people. And, as Mayor of Taipei, he appeared to build primarily on the reforms of his predecessor, Chen Shui-bian. Three years into his presidency, Ma’s administration is in trouble. He has failed to reform the worst aspects of the KMT. He has not built bridges with the opposition and, in fact, deepened the divisions between the ruling KMT and the opposition DPP through petty partisanship. The administration that was supposed to move into government already prepared has demonstrated an inability to deal with crises. The contretemps with Japan over the Diaoyutai/ Senkaku Islands and the ineffective disaster relief for Typhoon Morakot are two examples. In addition, the results from Ma’s policies towards China appear mixed. Yes, Taiwan was an observer at the World Health Assembly in 2009, 2010 and 2011 and, as of mid-2011, there have been no changes in diplomatic recognition of China and Taiwan, but repeated attempts to label Taiwan as “Taipei, China” rather than “Chinese Taipei” raise doubts about China’s sincerity. The signing of Economic Cooperation the kuomintang regains power 267

Framework Agreement (ECFA) with China in mid-2010 has yet to show benefits for Taiwan or for the Ma administration. During the 2008 presidential campaign, many voters who had supported Chen Shui-bian in 2000 and 2004 said that they would vote for Ma Ying-jeou. However, many also said, “If Ma does not do a good job, we will vote for someone else in 2012.” The combined presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 14, 2012. The KMT has nominated Pre sident Ma Ying-jeou for re-election with Premer Wu Den-yih as his running mate. For president, the DPP has nominated Tsai Ing-wen 蔡英文, the DPP Party Chairwoman who revivified the DPP after its morale-crushing electoral defeats in 2008. Born in 1956 and with a PhD from the London School of Economics, Tsai served as Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Commis sion (MAC) from 2000 to 2004 and Vice-Premier during 2006–2007. Her running mate is Su Jia-chyuan 蘇嘉全, also born in 1956, who won two terms as a legislator (1992–1997), two terms as County Executive of Ping tung County (1997–2004), served as Minister of the Interior (2004–2006) and as Minister of Agriculture (2006–2008). Su also won an unexpected “moral victory” gaining 48.88 per cent of the vote in the Greater Taichung mayoral election of November 27, 2010 As of September 2011, the election remains very close. Will President Ma win re-election? Will Tsai Ing-wen become the first female president of Taiwan? If she does win, Taiwan will have its third peaceful transfer of power. In any case, democracy will have shown in Taiwan as elsewhere that, despite its many flaws, it is the best system of government yet invented by mankind.

conclusion 269

Conclusion

Chapter 1 began by stating that “a democracy is a political system in which people regularly and freely choose their own leaders.” It also noted that in a democracy the government and opposition may freely change places and that democracies have civil liberties and relative equality before the law. In Chapter 1 and elsewhere, the book has drawn an important distinction between democratization and “liberalization,” where a regime may allow an increase in freedom of speech and the press, but will not relinquish ultimate control to the opposition. Under Chiang Ching-kuo’s leadership, Taiwan had two periods of liberalization during the 1970s and during the late 1980s. Of the ten inter-related factors that have assisted Taiwan’s process of democratization discussed in Chapter 1, seven were also present in South Korea:

1. Administrative, economic, social and educational development under the Japanese, 2. Relatively high educational levels under Japan and the postwar authoritarian governments, 3. Electoral experience under the Japanese and postwar colonial authoritarian regimes, 4. Increasing economic prosperity with increasing equality, 5. Links between government and opposition, 6. American political pressure, and 7. The fall of President Marcos.

Taiwan had an additional three factors that were largely absent in South Korea:

1. Some “liberals” among the top leadership, 2. A nonviolent, democratic opposition, and 3. Popular associations and group activity.1

1 Jacobs, “Taiwan and South Korea: Comparing East Asia’s Two ‘Third-Wave’ Democracies,” pp. 242–251. 270 conclusion

Clearly, all of these factors have facilitated the establishment of democracy in Taiwan, but none is a precondition to the democratization process. Real democratization in Taiwan took place only with the accession of Lee Teng-hui as president. President Lee allied in turn with various groups of colonial Mainlander power-holders to defeat other colonial Mainlander power-holders. In addition, he worked closely with the more democratic members of the Kuomintang and with the opposition Democratic Progressive Party. Through these alliances President Lee gained the power to implement a series of important constitutional and other reforms that democratized Taiwan. One result of Lee’s reforms was the election of Chen Shui-bian as president in 2000. Chen’s election ended fifty-five years of KMT rule, both authoritarian (1945–1987) and democratic (1988–2000). Although Chen won against a divided opposition and received less than forty per cent of the vote, Taiwan’s voters agreed that his election was legitimate. Chen won re-election in 2004 with a bare absolute majority. Chen’s DPP administration implemented important reforms, but was hindered by never obtaining a majority in the legislature. In addition, his government failed to implement an efficient administration. Because of this, the KMT returned to power in the legislative and presidential elections of early 2008. It should be very clear to readers of this book that Taiwan today has a deeply divided polity. This derives mainly from the KMT Chinese colonial regime (1945–1988) that pushed a “Great China” identity on Taiwan at the very same time that it systematically discriminated against the native Taiwanese who comprise more than eighty-five per cent of the population. Thus, as Taiwan has democratized, it has also Taiwanized. Surveys demonstrate very clearly that with democratization Taiwan identity has grown strongly, while Chinese identity has declined precipitously. This extraordinary change in national identity in less than twenty years is an important result of democratization and it has continued since President Ma Ying-jeou came to office in 2008. (See Figure C.1)2

2 See Election Study Center National Chengchi University, Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese..., (accessed August 20, 2011), available from http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/english/modules/tinyd2/content/TaiwanChineseID.htm. conclusion 271 Center, NCCU identity of Taiwanese as tracked in surveys by the Election Study /Chinese (1992-June 2011) Figure C.1. Changes in the Taiwanese 272 conclusion

We have noted that Taiwan has had little political violence since the early 1970s through the period of democratization. Critically, even though there were minor injuries, no one was killed in the important Kaohsiung Incident of December 10, 1979. In the equivalent South Korean demonstration in Kwangju during May 18–27, 1980, the South Korean military government fired on its own citizens, officially killing 191 people and injuring several thousand, though some estimates of casualties go considerably higher.3 Most people would applaud Taiwan’s relative lack of violence during its democratization. The one drawback is that the old Mainlander elite still have considerable power within Taiwan, something that has become very clear since the overwhelming victories of the KMT in the legislative and presidential elections of 2008. Yet, these old Mainlanders and their “Great China” policies are one reason that has led to the great decline in the approval ratings of the Ma Ying-jeou administration. One could argue that a proper Truth and Reconciliation Commission such as in South Africa, Chile, Peru and East Timor would benefit Taiwan. Such a Commisson can investigate the crimes of the authoritarian past and bring people to justice. In South Africa, criminals from the apartheid regime are forgiven provided they make frank apologies for their former misdeeds. Taiwan has never established such a commission. Thus, for example, Wang Hsi-ling, who ordered the murder of Henry Liu in 1984, was “imprisoned” in extremely comfortable circumstances, released early and then honored at his eightieth birthday by many others who had been involved in oppressing the Taiwanese under the Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo regimes. Another important factor in Taiwan politics that receives insufficient attention from commentators on Taiwan is the disjuncture between politicians and voters. The reasons voters cast their ballots for particular candidates are often very different from what the politicians themselves believe. Thus, in 2008 the voters cast their ballots against what they perceived as DPP government corruption and inefficiency and for an improved economy. They did not vote for closer relations with China, nor did they vote for unity with China. As Table C.1 shows, over 83 per cent of Taiwan’s population prefers maintenance of the status quo or independence, while only ten per cent lean towards unification.4 If we exclude

3 Jacobs, “Taiwan and South Korea: Comparing East Asia’s Two ‘Third-Wave’ Democracies,” p. 237. 4 Data for Table C.1, dated June 2011, is from Election Study Center National Chengchi University, Changes in the Unification-Independence Stances of Taiwanese ... (accessed conclusion 273 the non-response group from the sample, almost 90 per cent support maintenance of the status quo or independence. Clearly, “unification” lacks a market among Taiwan’s electorate. Taiwan’s voters lack strong party identification and “swing voters” play an important role in elections. Thus, many of those who voted for KMT legislative candidates in January 2008 and for Ma Ying-jeou in the March 2008 presidential election had voted for the DPP in the previous legislative and presidential elections. In the next elections in 2012, they could switch their votes again. These voters clearly want to maintain the status quo (a type of independence) or become formally independent, but by and large they vote on government performance and not on the ideologically divided identity issue. These swing voters, accounting for 15–20 per cent of Taiwan’s electorate, give Taiwan’s democracy great strength. They vote on how they see the issues and on how they see the incumbents per- form. By and large, they are not strongly ideological, but they value their democracy and, as shown in 1996 and 2000 presidential elections, will not bow to external threats.

Table C.1. Taiwanese attitudes towards independence and unification (June 2011) Status Combined Status % Total % Independence as soon as possible 5.8 Maintain status quo, move toward 17.4 independence Toward 23.2 Independence Maintain status quo indefinitely 26.8 Maintain status quo, decide at 33.3 later date Toward Status 60.1 Maintain status quo, move toward Quo 8.7 unification Unification as soon as possible 1.4 Toward Unification 10.1 Non-response 6.6 6.6

Total 100.0 100.0

August 30, 2011); available from http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/english/modules/tinyd2/content/ tonduID.htm. The “Status” column is from this source. The “Combined Status” column has been calculated by the writer. 274 conclusion

The current Chinese government led by the Chinese Communist Party will not make life easy for Taiwan’s leaders. Internationally, China will continue to close down Taiwan’s “international space.” Militarily, the Chinese regime will continue to threaten Taiwan with missiles and other weapons in its rapidly growing armaments. In addition, China will use its administrative control over its economy to manipulate potential economic benefits to Taiwan like tourism. The task facing Taiwan’s political leaders in both major parties is to remember that although Taiwan’s citizens may prefer “cordial” relations with China, they do not want to be part of China. In addition, Taiwan’s citizens want efficient and honest government. Potential leaders who remember this have the best opportunity to win future elections in Taiwan’s democracy. bibliography 275

Bibliography

Newspapers and Magazines (cited without reference to a specific article)

China News/Taiwan News China Post Heibai xinwen zhoukan 黑白新聞周刊 [Taiwan Weekly] Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News] Lianhe wanbao 聯合晚報 [United Evening News] Minzhong ribao 民衆日報 [Commons Daily] Renmin ribao 人民日報 [People’s Daily] Taipei Times Taiwan ribao 台灣日報 [Taiwan Daily] Taiwan shibao 台灣時報 [Taiwan Times] Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times] Zhongyang ribao 中央日報 [Central Daily News] Zhongyang ribao guojiban 中央日報(國際版) [Central Daily News (International Edition)] Zili zhoubao (Haiwaiban) 自立周報 (海外版) [Independence Weekly Post (Overseas Edition)] Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times]

Websites (cited without reference to a specific article or webpage)

Central Election Commission, http://www.cec.gov.tw/ Council for Economic Planning and Development, http://www.cepd.gov.tw/ Council of Indigenous Peoples, http://www.apc.gov.tw/chinese/. Government Information Office, http://info.gio.gov.tw/ Judicial Branch (yuan), Constitutional Interpretations, http://www.judicial.gov.tw/con stitutionalcourt/p03.asp Legislative Branch (yuan) Laws, http://lis.ly.gov.tw/lgcgi/lglaw Ministry of Education, http://www.moe.gov.tw/ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/mp?mp=1 Ministry of National Defense, http://www.mnd.gov.tw/ Taipei Times, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/ Taiwan News, http://etaiwannews.com/etn/index_en.php

Cited Sources

2004 228 qianshou hu Taiwan de gandong 2004 228 牽手護台灣的感動 [Being Moved by Holding Hands to Protect Taiwan, February 28, 2004]. Taibei: Shouhu Taiwan dalianmeng 手護台灣大聯盟 [DVD], 2004. Abdoolcarim, Zoher and Michael Schuman. “Talking to Taiwan’s New President.” Time, August 11, 2008. Agencies. “KMT apologizes about Hitler ad -- but not to Chen.” Taipei Times, March 13, 2004, 1. 276 bibliography

———. “Lien Chan arrives in Nanjing, gets a warm welcome from Communists.” Taipei Times, April 27, 2005, 1. ———. “Soong stresses his Chinese roots, blood.” Taipei Times, May 7, 2005, 3. Agencies Beijing. “Cross-strait charter flight deal inked.” Taipei Times, June 14, 2008, 1. Algerian National Liberation (1954–1962). In http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ world/war/algeria.htm. (Accessed October 3, 2009). Almond, Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963. ———, eds. The Civic Culture Revisited. Boston: Little, Brown, 1980. Baise fengyin: baise kongbu 1950 白色封印: 白色恐怖 1950 [White Seals: The White Terror of 1950]. Taibei: Guojia renquan jinianguan choubeichu 國家人權紀念館籌備處, 2003. Baum, Julian. “Easing up, somewhat: The KMT government revises sedition law.” Far Eastern Economic Review, 21, May 28, 1992, 18,20. Ben she 本社 [Formosa Magazine]. “Dangwai zhenglun: Shaoshu pai yu baoli, ping Zhongtai binguan qian de naoju 黨外政論：少數派與暴力，評中泰賓館前的鬧劇 [Debate among the Dangwai: The Minority Faction and Violence, A Critique of the Farce in Front of the Chungtai Hotel].” Meilidao 美麗島 [Formosa], no. 2 (September 25, 1979), 4–5. “Bian shengwang chongcuo zhi sanchengba 扁聲望重挫三成八 [Chen Shui-bian’s popularity falls again to 38%].” Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], November 20, 2002, 2. “Bian shengwang diedao 36% zui di dian 扁聲望跌到36%最低點 [Chen Shui-bian falls to 36%, its lowest point].” Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], November 20, 2002, 2. Biggs, Stuart and Stephen Engle. “PRC must remove missiles, Ma says.” Taipei Times, August 1, 2009, 3. Bloomberg. “Taiwan falls deeper into a recession.” Taipei Times, November 17, 2001, 17. Bush, Richard C. At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations Since 1942. Armonk, NY and London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 2004. Central Election Commission. 2008. Legislative Election 2008. In http://210.69.23.140/ cec/..%5Cmenu_main2008B.asp?titlec=%B2%C4%2007%20%A9%A1%20%A5%DF %AAk%A9e%AD%FB%BF%EF%C1%7C&pass1=B200800000000000aaa%20%20 &pdf=B200800. (Accessed October 3,2009). ———. 2008. Presidential Election 2008. In http://210.69.23.140/cec/vote3. asp?pass1=A2008A0000000000aaa. (Accessed October 3,2009). Central News Agency. “Chinese tourist arrivals may fall short of estimates, says official.” Taiwan News, July 4, 2009, 1. ———. “Ex-premier Siew praises EDAC achievements.” Taiwan News, August 28, 2001, 2. Chang, Hu. “Impressions of Mainland China Carried Back by Taiwan Visitors.” In Two Societies in Opposition: The Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China After Forty Years, Vol., edited by Ramon H. Myers. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1991, 141–155. Chang, Rich. “Elmer Fung guilty of raping Filipina.” Taipei Times, July 9, 2005, 1. ———. “Elmer Fung sentenced to four years for assault.” Taipei Times, August 10, 2006, 2. Chang, Rich and Mo Yan-chih. “Ma starts 2008 bid after indictment.” Taipei Times, February 13, 2007, 1. Chang, Rich, Mo Yan-chih and Jenny W. Hsu. “Court ruling keeps Ma in election race.” Taipei Times, December 27, 2007, 1. bibliography 277

Chang, Rich and Chris Wang. “DPP officials found not guilty of embezzlement.” Taipei Times, August 31, 2011, p. 1. Chang Wen-chuan and Lin Chun-hung. “NPM staff not guilty.” Taipei Times, September 3, 2011, p. 3. Chang Yun-ping. “Two million rally for peace.” Taipei Times, February 29, 2004, 1. Chen, Edward I-te. “Formosan Political Movements Under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1914– 1937.” The Journal of Asian Studies, XXXI, no. 3 (1972), 477–497. ———. “Japan’s Decision to Annex Taiwan: A Study of Ito-Mutsu Diplomacy, 1894–95.” The Journal of Asian Studies, XXXVII, no. 1 (1977), 61–72. ———. “Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Formosa: A Comparison of the Systems of Political Control.” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 30 (1970), 126–158. Chen Fengxiang 陳豐祥 and Lin Liyue 林麗月. Lishi 歷史 [History]. Taibei: Jianhong 建宏, 2003. Chen Honghe 陳宏合. “Si kejia xianshi LiLian guo ban 四客家縣市李連過半 [In the Four Hakka Counties and Municipalities, the Lee-Lien Ticket Got a Majority].” Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 25, 1996, 6. Chen Hui-ping. “Ministry mulls the reinstatement of DDP-era system.” Taipei Times, August 19, 2011, 3. Chen, Kevin and Stanley Chou. “Easy sailing for economic symposium.” Taipei Times, August 25, 2001, 1. Chen Mao-hsiung. “Ethnicity is key to who takes reins of the KMT.” Taipei Times, July 8, 2005, 8. Chen Mingzhang 陳明章. Yi shi can de baobei 伊是咱的寶貝 [This is our Precious (Land)] Taibei: Shouhu Taiwan dalianmeng 手護台灣大聯盟 [CD], 2004. Chen Ro-jinn. “Lien’s electoral fortunes rise from earthquake’s ruins.” Taipei Times, October 19, 1999, 8. Chen Shaoting 陳少廷. “Zhongyang minyi daibiao de gaixuan wenti 中央民意代表的改選問題 [The Issue of Electing the Central Parliamentarians].” Daxue zazhi 大學雜誌 [The Intellectual], no. 46 (October 1971), 13–16. Chen Shui-bian. “Dawn of a rising era.” Taipei Times, May 21, 2000, 20, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2000/05/21/36938 Chen Shui-bian 陳水扁. Taiwan de shizijia 台灣的十字架 [The Cross of Taiwan]. Taibei: Ketagalan Foundation 凱達格蘭基金會, 2009. Chen Yingtai 陳英泰. Huiyi, jianzheng baise kongbu 回憶，見證白色恐怖 [Recollections, Witness to the White Terror]. 2 vols. Vol. 1. Taibei: Tangshan, 2005. Cheng, Tun-jen and Yung-ming Hsu. “The March 2000 Election in Historical and Comparative Perspectives: Strategic Voting, the Third Party, and Non-Duvergerian Outcome.” In Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy in Taiwan’s Politics: Democratic Consolidation and External Relations, Vol., edited by Bruce J. Dickson and Chien-min Chao. Armonk, N.Y. and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2002, 148–174. Chin Heng-wei. “Wang works to shore up unification credentials.” Taipei Times, July 15, 2005, 8. China Times Editorial. 2008.On President Ma’s Leadership Style. In http://www.kmtnews.net/client/eng/NewsArtical.php?REFDOCID=00auyazpurrodbxu&TYPIDJump =00aire4d9ydh2d8u. (Accessed July 20, 2008). ———. “Tantan Ma zongtong de lingdao fengge 談談馬總統的領導風格 [Discussing President Ma’s Leadership Style].” Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], July 10, 2008. “China Times: How can the judicial system be trusted?” (August 28, 2011). http:// focustaiwan.tw/ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?Type=aOPN&ID=201108280003. Ching, Leo T.S. Become “Japanese”: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 2001. 278 bibliography

Chiou, C.L. “The 1990 National Affairs Conference and the Future of Democracy in Taiwan.” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 25, no. 1 (January-March 1993), 17–32. ———. Democratizing Oriental Despotism: China from 4 May 1919 to 4 June 1989 and Taiwan from 28 February 1947 to 28 June 1990. New York: St Martin’s Press, 1995. Chiu Yu-Tzu. “Chang lashes out at Taipower.” Taipei Times, March 23, 2001, 2. ———. “Protest march fails to draw big crowds.” Taipei Times, February 25, 2001, 1. Chou, Stanley. “Taxes hotly contested at forum.” Taipei Times, August 26, 2001, 1. Chu, Rick. “Chen Shui-bian’s baptism by fire.” Taipei Times, May 19, 2001, 8. Chuang Chi-ting. “Labor rights groups condemn proposals made at conference.” Taipei Times, August 27, 2001, 3. Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) between China and Hong Kong, http://wits.worldbank.org/GPTAD/PDF/archive/China-HongKong.pdf Clough, Ralph N. Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait? Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999. CNA. “Chinese Nationalist Party...” Taipei Times, January 13, 2008, 1. ———. “Guotaiban zhuren: dalu bu jieshou Taiwan ru shiwei 國台辦主任：大陸不接受台灣入世界衛 [Director, Taiwan Affairs Office: Mainland will not accept Taiwan entering the WHO].” Lianhe wanbao 聯合晚報 [United Evening News], June 25, 2008. ———. “KMT committee to meet over Lee’s situation on Friday.” Taipei Times, September 19, 2001, 3. ———. “Ma urges KMT members to get rid of banquet politics.” Taipei Times, July 25, 2005, 3. ———. “Number of Chinese tourist arrivals far from satisfactory: DPP.” Taiwan News, August 6, 2008. CoCo. “[Cartoon].” Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 15, 2004, 14. Cohen, Jerome A. “A work in progress.” South China Morning Post, September 17, 2009. Convention on Rights and Duties of States. December 26, 1933. In http://avalon.law.yale. edu/20th_century/intam03.asp. (Accessed October 3, 2009). Council of Grand Justices. “Constitutional Interpretation No. 261 of June 21, 1990.” Fawubu gongbao 法務部公報 [Bulletin of the Ministry of Justice], no. 121 (July 31, 1990), 70–74. ———. January 15, 2001. J.Y Interpretation No. 520. In http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=520. (Accessed October 28, 2008). ———. January 15, 2001. Jiezi di 520 hao 釋字第 520 號 [Constitutional Interpretation No. 520]. In http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/p03_01.asp?expno=520. (Accessed October 28, 2008). Crossley, Pamela Kyle. A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1999. Curtis, Gerald L. Election Campaigning Japanese Style New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1971. “Dajiang dongliu dangbuzhu! 大江東流擋不住 [The Eastward Flow of the Great Yangtze River Cannot be Stopped!].” Ziyou Zhongguo 自由中國, 23, no. 5 (September 1, 1960), 4–6. Davidson, James W. The Island of Formosa: Past and Present. London: Macmillan & Co., 1903. Dickson, Bruce J. “The Lessons of Defeat: The Reorganization of the Kuomintang on Taiwan, 1950–52.” The China Quarterly, no. 133 (March 1993), 56–84. Dickson, Bruce J. and Chien-min Chao, eds. Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy in Taiwan’s Politics: Democratic Consolidation and External Relations. Armonk, N.Y. and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2002. Dobson, Richard. “Forum proposes easing of China policy.” Taipei Times, August 27, 2001, 1. ———. “Unemployment continues to rise.” Taipei Times, August 24, 2001, 1. bibliography 279

Domes, Jürgen. “The 13th Party Congress of the Kuomintang: Towards Political Com petition?” China Quarterly, no. 118 (June 1989), 345–359. Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) Texts (Haixia liang’an jingji hezuo jiagou xieyi 海峽兩岸經濟合作架構協議). For traditional Chinese: http://www.sef. org.tw/ct.asp?xItem=131821&ctNode=4519&mp=1. For simplified Chinese: http:// news.163.com/10/0629/15/6ABSN7O3000146BC.html. For English text of agreement: http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article18166. For English text of annexes: http:// www.moea.gov.tw/Mns/populace/news/News.aspx?kind=1&menu_id=40&news_id= 19723. Editorial. “Ma nets harvest in Taiwan-Japan ties.” Taiwan News, March 5, 2009, 6. “Editorial: And the winner is ...... ” Taipei Times, March 30, 2000, 8. “EDITORIAL: Ma has China in mind, not Taiwan.” Taipei Times, August 21, 2009, 8. “EDITORIALS[sic]: The trampling of Taiwan’s rights.” Taipei Times, November 6, 2008, 8. Election Study Center National Chengchi University. Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese ... In http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/english/modules/tinyd2/content/ TaiwanChineseID.htm. (Accessed August 30, 2011). ———. Changes in the Unification-Independence Stances of Taiwanese ... In http://esc. nccu.edu.tw/english/modules/tinyd2/content/tonduID.htm. (Accessed August 30, 2011). “Eroding justice: Open letter No. 2.” Taipei Times, December 2, 2008, 8. “Eroding justice: Open letter No. 3.” Taipei Times, January 21, 2009, 8. Fan Zhengyou 范政祐. “Qi erba Taizhong naoju zhi wo guan: gei Taizhong shimin de gongkai xin 七二八台中鬧劇之我觀：給台中市民的公開信 [My Views on the Taizhong Farce of July 28: An Open Letter to Taizhong’s Citizens].” Meilidao 美麗島 [Formosa], no. 1 (August 16, 1979), 74–76. Feldman, Harvey J., ed. Constitutional Reform and the Future of the Republic of China. Armonk, New York and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1991. French rule in Algeria. In http://www.answers.com/topic/french-rule-in-algeria. (Accessed October 3, 2009). Garver, John W. Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan’s Democratization. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997. GIO. Taiwan Yearbook 2007. Taipei: Government Information Office [CD-ROM Version], 2007. Global Views Survey Research Center. “Satisfaction Ratings for President Ma Ying-jeou through April 2011,” http://www.gvsrc.net.tw/dispPageBox/GVSRCCP.aspx?ddsPageI D=POLITICS&view=2011&dbid=3975312539. ———. “Satisfaction Ratings for President Ma Ying-jeou, July 2011” http://www.gvsrc.net. tw/dispPageBox/GVSRCCP.aspx?ddsPageID=POLITICS&view=2011&dbid=335 7912896. ———. “Satisfaction Ratings for President Ma Ying-jeou, August 2011,” http://www.gvsrc. net.tw/dispPageBox/GVSRCCP.aspx?ddsPageID=POLITICS&view=2011&dbid=397 5312939. Guo Zhenchun 郭振純. Geng ganshuyuan de ren 耕甘藷園的人 [A Person Who Tills His Sweet Potato Garden]. Taibei: Yushan 玉山, 2008. “Guoku bushi Guomindang de sinang! 國庫不是國民黨的私囊！ [The National Treasury is not the Kuomintang’s Private Purse!].” Ziyou Zhongguo 自由中國, 12, no. 11 (June 1, 1960), 3. Harrison, Mark. Legitimacy, Meaning and Knowledge in the Making of Taiwanese Identity. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. Hayashi, Tadasu. The Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1915. 280 bibliography

He Rongxin 何榮辛. “Qi Peng bao Li xiaoying guazou 80 yu wan piao 棄彭保李效應刮走 80 餘萬票 [The Leave Peng [to] Protect Lee Effect Scraped Away More than 800,000 Votes.” Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 24, 1966, 2. He Wenzhen 何文振. “Qi erba Taizhong shijian zhenxiang 七二八台中事件真相 [The Truth about the Taichung Incident of July 28].” Meilidao 美麗島 [Formosa], no. 1 (August 16, 1979), 73. Higley, John, Tong-yi Huang and Tse-min Lin. “Elite Settlements in Taiwan.” Journal of Democracy, 9, no. 2 (1998), 148–163. Ho Jung-hsing. “Tang Fei: a risk the DPP just had to take.” Taipei Times, April 26, 2000, 8. Hong, Caroline. “1992 consensus a reality: Soong.” Taipei Times, May 9, 2005, 2. ———. “Amid fanfare, Lien visits his home town.” Taipei Times, May 1, 2005, 3. ———. “Blue camp gets mediocre support at the ballot box.” Taipei Times, May 15, 2005, 3. ———. “KMT, communists should work together, Lien tells Peking University students.” Taipei Times, April 30, 2005, 3. ———. “Lien plugs FTA, promises closer ties with Beijing.” Taipei Times, May 3, 2005, 3. ———. “Lien visits the grave of his grandmother.” Taipei Times, May 2, 2005, 3. ———. “Lien, Hu share ‘vision’ for peace.” Taipei Times, April 30 2005, 1. ———. “Ma seeks to mend fences among KMT’s top brass.” Taipei Times, July 21, 2005, 1. ———. “Soong denounces independence.” Taipei Times, May 12, 2005, 3. ———. “Soong makes pact with Hu in Beijing.” Taipei Times, May 13, 2005, 1. ———. “Soong seeks spirits in Xian.” Taipei Times, May 6, 2005, 1. ———. “Soong urges unity among Chinese the world over.” Taipei Times, May 8, 2005, 2. ———. “Wang should lead the KMT: Soong.” Taipei Times, July 16, 2005, 1. Hsiao, Frank S.T. and Lawrence R. Sullivan. “A Political History of the Taiwanese Communist Party, 1928–1931.” The Journal of Asian Studies, XLII, no. 2 (February 1983), 269–289. Hsu, Brian. “Civilian-led defense hard to realize.” Taipei Times, January 25, 2000, 4. ———. “Contentious armed forces laws stalled in legislature.” Taipei Times, June 3, 2001, 3. ———. “Defense Law paves way for military reform.” Taipei Times, January 17, 2000, 3. ———. “Status of military finally settled.” Taipei Times, January 16, 2000, 2. ———. “Tang Fei to have tumor removed.” Taipei Times, April 12, 2000, 1. Hsu, Brian and William Ide. “Quake of the century.” Taipei Times, September 22, 1999, 1. Hsu, Crystal. “Contest reveals coalition battle.” Taipei Times, February 2, 2002, 3. ———. “DGBAS lowers its GDP predictions.” Taipei Times, August 23, 2008, 1. Hsu, Immanuel C.Y. The Rise of Modern China. Third ed. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1983. Hsu, Jenny W. “ANALYSIS: ‘China factor’ still plays part in arms sales.” Taipei Times, January 31, 2010, 3. ———. ”Bid to observe at WHA necessary: MOFA.” Taipei Times, June 26, 2008, 3. ———. “Foreign minister approves envoy to Japan.” Taipei Times, August 21, 2008, 3. ———. “MOFA issues warning on ‘Chinese Taipei’.” Taipei Times, August 30, 2008, 3. ———. “No goodwill from PRC: MOFA.” Taipei Times, September 10, 2008, 3. Hsu, Jenny W. and Ko Shu-ling. “MOFA is firm on Taiwan designation.” Taipei Times, September 12, 2008, 4. Hsu, Jenny W. and Shih Hsiu-chuan. “Japanese representative scolded over remark on Taiwan’s ‘unresolved’ status.” Taipei Times, May 3, 2009, 1. bibliography 281

Hsu, Jenny W. and Flora Wang. “MORAKOT: THE AFTERMATH : MOFA sorry, but denies mistake over refusing aid.” Taipei Times, August 15, 2009, 1. Hsu Szu-chien 徐斯儉. “Poll shows China’s white paper benefits Chen.” Taipei Times, March 12, 2000, 8. ———. “Taiwan minyi bu qufu bu jijin 台灣民意不屈服不激進 [Taiwan public opinion does not submit to threats or become radical].” Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 8, 2000, 15. Hsueh, Hua-yuan, Tai Pao-tsun and Chow Mei-li. Is Taiwan Chinese? A History of Taiwanese Nationality. Tamsui: Taiwan Advocates, 2005. Hu Chunhui 胡春惠 chief ed. Lishi 歷史 [History]. Taibei: Zhengzhong 正中, 2004. Hu, Fu. “The Electoral Mechanism and Political Change in Taiwan.” In In the Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949, Vol., edited by Steve Tsang. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1993, 134–168. Hu Fu 胡佛 et al. Xuanmin de toupiao xingwei: min’guo qishiba nian zeng’e lifa weiyuan xuanju de fenxi 選民的投票行爲：民國七十八年增額立法委員選舉的分析 [The Voting Behavior of the Electorate: Analyzing the 1989 Additional Election to the Legislature]. Taibei 台北: Zhongyang xuanju weiyuanhui 中央選舉委員會 [Central Election Commission], 1993. Hu Shi 胡適. “‘Ziyou Zhongguo’ de zongzhi ‘自由中國’ 的宗旨 [The Aims of ‘Free China’].” Ziyou Zhongguo 自由中國 [Free China Fortnightly], 1, no. 1 (November 20, 1949), 2. Huang, Fu-san. A Brief History of Taiwan: A Sparrow Transformed into a Phoenix. Taipei: Government Information Office, 2005. Huang, Jewel. “Say ‘Taiwan’ aloud, Chen urges people.” Taipei Times, December 9, 2004, 1. ———. “Wang says pan-blues are already election winners.” Taipei Times, March 14, 2004, 4. Huang, Joyce. “Cabinet cave-in over nuclear plant likely.” Taipei Times, February 6, 2001, 1. ———. “Cabinet pulls plug on power plant.” Taipei Times, October 28, 2000, 1. Huang, Joyce, Crystal Hsu and Stanley Chou. “Economic meeting faces uphill battle.” Taipei Times, August 24, 2001, 1, 3. Huang, Joyce and Lin Chieh-yu. “Government gives in on power plant.” Taipei Times, February 14, 2001, 1. ———. “Tang steadfast on nuclear plant plan.” Taipei Times, October 3, 2000, 1. ———. “Tang bows out with president’s blessing.” Taipei Times, October 4, 2000, 1. Huang, Joyce and Stephanie Low. “Justices review nuclear decision.” Taipei Times, December 22, 2000, 2. Huang, Mab. Intellectual Ferment for Political Reforms in Taiwan, 1971–1973. Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1976. Huang, Sandy. “Lee Teng-hui comes out for DPP.” Taipei Times, December 1, 2002, 1. Huang Tai-lin. “Lien, Soong hold dramatic rally.” Taipei Times, March 14, 2004, 1. Huang Weizhu 黃維助. “Li Denghui dangji wenti ... 李登煇黨紀問題 ... [Lee Teng-hui’s Party Discipline Problem...] “ Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], August 28, 2001, 2. ———. “Lianhe zhengfu Xiao wanchang ... 聯合政府蕭萬長 ... [Coalition Government, Vincent Siew...].” Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], August 28, 2001, 2. Huang Weizhu 黃維助 and Zhang Shixin 張世欣. “Kaichu Li Denghui fou ... 開初李登煇否 ... [Expel Lee Teng-hui or not...].” Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], August 22, 2001, 2. Hung Chen-ling. “KMT lays down rules for members.” Taipei Times, May 4, 2000, 3. 282 bibliography

Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. Ito, Kiyoshi. History of Taiwan. Translated by Walter Chen. Taibei: Qianwei, 2004. Jacobs, Andrew. “As Chinese Visit Taiwan, the Cultural Influence Is Subdued.” The New York Times, August 10, 2011. Jacobs, Bruce. “Can the DPP overcome a drubbing?” Taipei Times, January 14, 2008, 8. ———. “Election pointers for the future.” Taipei Times, November 30, 2010, 8. ———. “The good, the bad and the ugly.” Taipei Times, March 20,2000, 6. ———. “KMT leadership largely to blame for drop in votes.” Taipei Times, November 29, 2001, 3. ———. “An open letter to President Chen.” Taipei Times, November 30, 2002, 8. ———. “President Ma must reform the KMT.” Taipei Times, September 10, 2008, 8. ———. “Some suggestions for Ma Ying-jeou.” Taipei Times, March 24, 2008, 8. ———. “Southern strength saved Chen, elsewhere Soong had the edge.” Taipei Times, March 19, 2000, 17, 19. ———. “Taoyuan’s overcrowded but key race.” Taipei Times, December 6, 2004, 4. Jacobs, J. Bruce. “China’s Policies Towards Taiwan.” In Uncertain Future: Taiwan-Hong Kong-China relations after Hong Kong’s return to Chinese sovereignty, Vol., edited by C.L. Chiou and Leong H. Liew. Aldershot, Brookfield MA, Singapore, Sydney: Ashgate, 2000, 87–110. ———. “Chinese Nationalist Politics in Taiwan under the Two Chiangs.” In Modern Taiwan in the 1990s, Vol., edited by Gary Klintworth. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1991, 12–22. ———. “Democratisation in Taiwan.” Asian Studies Review, 17, no. 1 (July 1993), 116–126. ———. “Inauguration of the new President.” Taiwan Communiqué, no. 119 (June/July 2008), 5–8. ———. Local Politics in a Rural Chinese Cultural Setting: A Field Study of Mazu Township, Taiwan. Canberra: Contemporary China Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1980. ———. Local Politics in Rural Taiwan under Dictatorship and Democracy. Norwalk, CT: EastBridge, 2008. ———. “A Longitudinal Examination toward Understanding What Constitutes a Healthy Approach to Balance in the Taiwan Strait.” Asia Policy, no. 8 (July 2009), 16–24. ———. “One China, Diplomatic Isolation and a Separate Taiwan.” In China’s Rise, Taiwan’s Dilemmas and International Peace, Vol., edited by Edward Friedman. London and New York: Routledge, 2006, 85–109. ———. “Paradoxes in the Politics of Taiwan: Lessons for Comparative Politics.” Politics, XIII, no. 2 (November 1978), 239–247. ———. “Political Opposition and Taiwan’s Political Future.” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 6 (July 1981), 21–44. ———. “Recent Leadership and Political Trends in Taiwan.” The China Quarterly, no. 45 (January-March 1971), 129–154. ———. “Review of Bruce J. Dickson and Chien-min Chao (eds), Assessing the Lee Teng- hui Legacy in Taiwan’s Politics: Democratic Consolidation and External Relations.” Asian Studies Review, 28, no. 1 (March 2004), 83–85. ———. “Taiwan’s Colonial History and Postcolonial Nationalism.” In The “One China” Dilemma, Vol., edited by Peter C.Y. Chow. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, 37–56. ———. “Taiwan 1972: Political Season.” Asian Survey, XIII, no. 1 (January 1973), 102–112. ———. “Taiwan 1973: Consolidation of the Succession.” Asian Survey, XIV, no. 1 (January 1974), 22–29. bibliography 283

———. “Taiwan 1978: Economic Successes, International Uncertainties.” Asian Survey, XIX, no. 1 (January 1979), 20–29. ———. “Taiwan 1979: ‘Normalcy’ After ‘Normalization’.” Asian Survey, XX, no. 1 (January 1980), 84–93. ———. “Taiwan and South Korea: Comparing East Asia’s Two ‘Third-Wave’ Democracies.” Issues & Studies: A Social Science Quarterly on China, Taiwan, and East Asian Affairs, 43, no. 4 (2007), 227–260. ———. “Taiwan: Changes and Challenges.” Australian Journal of International Affairs, 62, no. 4 (December 2008), 460–477. ———. “Taiwanese and the Chinese Nationalists, 1937–1945: The Origins of Taiwan’s “Half-Mountain People” (Banshan ren).” Modern China, 16, no. 1 (January 1990), 84–118. ———. “‘Taiwanization’ in Taiwan’s Politics.” In Cultural, Ethnic, and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan: Bentuhua, Vol., edited by John Makeham and A-Chin Hsiau. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, 17–54. ———. “A Tale of Two Cities.” Taiwan Review, 53, no. 3 (March 2003), 24–29. ———. “Uncurbed security forces threaten Taiwan’s future.” The Age, 13. Jacobs, J. Bruce and I-hao Ben Liu. “Lee Teng-hui and the Idea of ‘Taiwan’.” China Quarterly, no. 190 (June 2007), 375–393. Jia Bo 家博 (J. Bruce Jacobs). “Taiwan xiangcun difang zhengzhi de liang ge wenti 臺灣鄉村地方政治的兩個問題 [Two Problems of Local Politics in Rural Taiwan].” Daxue zazhi [The Intellectual] 大學雜誌, no. 100 (September 1976), 53–54. Jiang Nan 江南. Jiang Jingguo zhuan 蔣經國傳[A Biography of Chiang Ching-kuo]. Los Angeles: Meiguo luntan bao 美國論壇報, 1984. Kaplan, David E. Fires of the Dragon: Politics, Murder, and the Kuomintang. New York: Atheneum, 1992. Kaplan, John. The Court-Martial of the Kaohsiung Defendants. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1981. Kerr, George H. Formosa Betrayed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965. ———. Formosa: Licensed Revolution and the Home Rule Movement 1895–1945. Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1974. Ko Shu-ling. “Anger greets KMT’s clean sweep.” Taipei Times, February 2, 2002, 1. ———. “DPP wins surprise victory in election.” Taipei Times, May 15, 2005, 1. ———. “DPP’s Liu wins by landslide in Yunlin.” Taipei Times, September 27, 2009, 1. ———. “Hsieh hid stroke before election: Chen Hsing-yu.” Taipei Times, January 22, 2009, 3. ———. “Lien ‘too busy’ to meet new premier.” Taipei Times, January 26, 2002, 1. ———. “Ma cool in meeting with envoy.” Taipei Times, August 12, 2009, 4. ———. “Ma gallops to victory over rival Wang.” Taipei Times, July 17, 2005, 1. ———. “Ma hasn’t shut out Saito: official.” Taipei Times, Jun 28, 2009, 1. ———. “National Assembly approves reforms.” Taipei Times, June 8, 2005, 1. ———. “‘Not guilty’ not same as ‘ethical’: Hsieh.” Taipei Times, December 30, 2007, 3. ———. “Premier tight-lipped on new Cabinet.” Taipei Times, January 19, 2002, 3. ———. “Treaty confirmed sovereignty: Ma.” Taipei Times, April 29, 2009, 3. ———. “Wang courts the support of old KMT.” Taipei Times, July 15, 2005, 3. ———. “Wu upbeat about visit to China.” Taipei Times, June 1, 2008, 3. Ko Shu-ling and Rich Chang. “Ma defends his administration.” Taipei Times, May 20, 2009, 1. Ko Shu-ling and Flora Wang. “SEF’s Chiang reassures Tokyo over cross-strait detente.” Taipei Times, August 27, 2008, 3. Kuo, Shirley W.Y. The Taiwan Economy in Transition. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983. Lai, Cheryl. “Lin recommends scrapping plant.” Taipei Times, October 1, 2000, 1. 284 bibliography

Lai, Tse-han, Ramon H. Myers and Wou Wei. A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991. Lamley, Harry J. “The 1895 Taiwan Republic: A Significant Episode in Modern Chinese History.” The Journal of Asian Studies, 27, no. 4 (August 1968), 739–762. ———. “The 1895 Taiwan War of Resistance: Local Chinese Efforts against a Foreign Power.” In Taiwan: Studies in Chinese Local History, Vol., edited by Leonard H.D. Gordon. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1970, 23–77. ———. “A Short-lived Republic and War, 1895: Taiwan’s Resistance Against Japan.” In Taiwan in Modern Times, Vol., edited by Paul K.T. Sih. New York: St. John’s University Press, 1973, 241–316. ———. “Taiwan Under Japanese Rule, 1895–1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism.” In Taiwan: A New History, Vol., edited by Murray A. Rubinstein. Armonk, N.Y. and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1999, 201–260. Lan Yiping 籃一平. “Minzhuhua jiu shi Taiwanhua 民主化就是臺灣化 [Democratization is Precisely Taiwanization].” Minzhuren 民主人 [The Democrat], no. 8 (May 16, 1983), 11–12. Lee, Alice. “‘Loyalty’ dossiers to be destroyed.” The China News, 3. Lee, Katherine. “Taiwan’s dissidents.” Index on Censorship, 9, no. 6 (December 1980), 54. Lee Teng-hui. “Always in My Heart.” In President Lee Teng-hui’s Selected Addresses and Messages 1995, Vol. Taipei: Government Information Office, 1996, 32–43. ———. Creating the Future: Towards a New Era for the Chinese People. Taipei: Government Information Office, 1992. ———. The Road to Democracy: Taiwan’s Pursuit of Identity. Tokyo and Kyoto: PHP Institute, 1999. Lei Zhen 雷震. “Fandui dang zhi ziyou ji ruhe quebao 反對黨之自由及如何確保 [The Freedom of an Opposition Party and How to Insure It].” Ziyou Zhongguo 自由中國, 2, no. 7 (April 1, 1950), 14–16. ———. Lei Zhen huiyi lu 雷震回憶錄 [Memoirs of Lei Chen]. Hong Kong: Qishi niandai, 1978. Leng, Shao-chuan and Cheng-yi Lin. “Political Change on Taiwan: Transition to Democracy?” China Quarterly, no. 136 (December 1993), 805–839. Li Denghui 李登輝. Jianzheng Taiwan: Jiang Jingguo zongtong yu wo 見證台灣：蔣經國總統與我 [Witness for Taiwan: President Chiang Ching-kuo and Me]. Taibei: Yunchen wenhua 允晨, 2004. ———. Jingying da Taiwan 經營大臺灣 [Managing a Great Taiwan]. Taibei: Yuanliu, 1995. ———. “Qinlin Zhonghua minguo di jiu ren zongtong, fuzongtong qingzhu jiuzhi dianli 親臨中華民國第九任總統，副總統慶祝就職典禮 [Speech Given at the Inauguration Ceremony of the Ninth President and Vice-President of the Republic of China].” In Li zongtong Denghui xiansheng bashiwu nian yanlun xuanji 李總統登煇先生八十五年言論選集 [A Selection of 1996 Speeches by President Lee Teng-hui], Vol., edited by Wang Meizhen 王美珍. Taibei: Xinwenju, 1997, 126–135. Li, Victor H, ed. The Future of Taiwan: a Difference of Opinion. White Plains, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1980. Li Xiaofeng 李筱峯. “Banshan zhong de guchen niezi: Li Youbang 半山中的孤臣孽子：李友邦 [The Out-of Favor Banshan: Li Yu-pang]." In Taiwan jindai mingrenzhi 臺灣近代名人誌 [Dictionary of Famous People in Modern Taiwan], Vol. V, edited by Zhang Yanxian 張炎憲, Li Xiaofeng 李筱峯 and Zhuang Yungming 莊永明. Taibei: Zili wanbao 自立晚報, 1990, 277–297. ———. Taiwan shi 100 jian da shi 台灣歷史 100 件大事 [100 Major Events in Taiwan History]. II vols. Vol. I. Taibei: Yushan, 1999. bibliography 285

———. Taiwan shi 100 jian da shi 台灣歷史 100 件大事 [100 Major Events in Taiwan History]. II vols. Vol. II. Taibei: Yushan, 1999. ———. “Yi tan ‘xiao gang pao’: Guo Yuxin 議壇 ‘小鋼砲’: 郭雨新 [The ‘Small Steel Cannon’ of the Assembly Hall: Kuo Yü-hsin].” In Taiwan jindai mingrenzhi 臺灣近代名人誌 [Dictionary of Famous People in Modern Taiwan], Vol. I, edited by Zhang Yanxian 張炎憲, Li Xiaofeng 李筱峯 and Zhuang Yungming 莊永明. Taibei: Zili wanbao 自立晚報, 1987, 233–252. Li Xiaoti 李孝悌. Lishi 歷史 [History]. Taibei: Longteng 龍騰, n.d. Li Xinfang 李欣芳. “Jingfahui shuilo shichu ... 經發會水落石出 ... [EDAC the truth comes to light...].” Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], August 27, 2001, 2. Li Yuanzhe 李遠哲 et al. Jiaoyu gaige zong ziyi baogao shu 教育改革縂諮議報告書 [Consultants’ Report on Educational Reform] Xingzhengyuan jiaoyu gaige shenyi weiyuanhui 行政院教育改革審議委員會 [Executive Branch Deliberative Committee on Education Reform], December 2, 1996. Liang Surong 梁肅戎. Dashi dafei: Liang Surong huiyilu 大是大非：梁肅戎回憶錄 [Right and Wrong: The Memoirs of Liang Su-jung]. Taibei: Tianxia wenhua, 1995. Lin Chia-ho. “What has gone wrong with justice in Taiwan?” Taipei Times, September 3, 2011, p. 8. Lin, Chia-lung and Bo Tedards. “Lee Teng-hui: Transformational Leadership in Taiwan’s Transition.” In Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui Era: Politics in Taiwan, 1988–2000, Vol., edited by Wei-chin Lee and T.W. Wang. Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: University Press of America, 2003, 25–62. Lin Chieh-yu. “Chang comes to rescue, again.” Taipei Times, October 5, 2000, 3. ———. “Chen deflects flak on the front line.” Taipei Times, May 22, 2000, 1 ———. “Chen raises pitch of anti-China rhetoric.” Taipei Times, August 4, 2002, 1. ———. “Division in KMT ranks looms large.” Taipei Times, January 8, 2001, 1. ———. “KMT tosses out Lin Hsin-yi for nuclear stance.” Taipei Times, October 20, 2000, 3. ———. “Lee says public is fed up with bickering.” Taipei Times, August 13, 2001, 1. ———. “No surprise as Lien wins election.” Taipei Times, March 25, 2001, 1. ———. “Pan-greens hold huge rally in Kaohsiung, blast Soong.” Taipei Times, March 14, 2004, 1. ———. “TSU claims KMT has betrayed itself.” Taipei Times, September 22, 2001, 1. Lin Chieh-yu and William Ide. “Lee on the offensive at first TSU rallies.” Taipei Times, September 2, 2001, 1. Lin Chieh-yu and Stephanie Low. “Chen hints at renewed construction.” Taipei Times, February 4, 2001, 1. ———. “Chen tries to heal nuclear plant rift.” Taipei Times, February 3, 2001, 1. Lin, Irene. “Decision offers possible solution for deadlock.” Taipei Times, January 16, 2001, 3. Lin Kaiying 林凱盈. “Li Denghui zhantai ... 李登煇站台 ... [Lee Teng-hui stands on the platform...].” Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], September 2, 2001, 4. Lin, Man-houng. “The Neglected Taipei Treaty: Asia-Pacific Powers and Taiwan.” 2009? Lin Mei-chun. “KMT asks for Lee Teng-hui’s resignation.” Taipei Times, September 4, 2001, 1. ———. “KMT moves to recall the president.” Taipei Times, October 31, 2000, 1. ———. “Tentative KMT breaks its silence.” Taipei Times, September 3, 2001, 3. ———. “Uncertainty hangs in the air after vote.” Taipei Times, February 1, 2001, 1. Lin Mei-chun, Lin Chieh-yu and Joyce Huang. “New energy law mooted to solve crisis.” Taipei Times, February 2, 2001, 1. Lin Nengshi 林能士 et al. Lishi 歷史 [History]. Tainan: Nanyi 南一, 2005. 286 bibliography

Lin Yixiong 林義雄 and Yao Jiawen 姚嘉文. Huluo pingyang? Xuanzhan guansi Guo Yuxin 虎落平陽？選戰官司郭雨新 [Has the Tiger Descended to Pingyang? Election Battles, Court Battles and Kuo Yu-hsin]. Taibei: Gaoshan 高山, 1977. Liu, Kwang-Ching and Richard J. Smith. “The Military Challenge: The North-west and the Coast.” In The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 11, edited by John K. Fairbank and Kwang-Ching Liu. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, 202–273. Loa Iok-sin. „Residents of Penghu reject casino resort plan.“ Taipei Times, September 27, 2009, 1. Long, Simon. “Taiwan’s National Assembly Elections.” The China Quarterly, no. 129 (March 1999), 216–228. Low, Stephanie. “Anti-Lee voices reach crescendo in KMT.” Taipei Times, August 22, 2001, 1. ———. “Grand Justices to rule on nuclear plant.” Taipei Times, November 9, 2000, 1. ———. “Inter-party talks yield 34 pieces of priority legislation.” Taipei Times, September 13, 2001, 6. ———. “KMT-PFP plans for pact founder.” Taipei Times, August 24, 2001, 1. ———. “KMT breaks it off with Lee Teng-hui.” Taipei Times, September 22, 2001, 1. ———. “KMT delegation plans to visit Lee Saturday.” Taipei Times, September 11, 2001, 3. ———. “KMT pleads with Lee to stop hurting interests of party.” Taipei Times, September 15, 2001, 2. ———. “KMT to seek meeting with Lee Teng-hui.” Taipei Times, September 6, 2001, 1. ———. “Lien pushes for meeting on economy.” Taipei Times, August 22, 2001, 1. ———. “Party leaders vow to cooperate.” Taipei Times, September 16, 2001, 3. Ma Ying-jeou. Legal Problems of Seabed Boundary Delimitation in the East China Sea. Baltimore, MD.: Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, School of Law, University of Maryland, 1984. ———. 2008. Taiwan’s Renaissance. In http://www.president.gov.tw/en/prog/news_ release/document_content.php?id=1105499687&pre_id=1105499687&g_category_ number=145&category_number_2=145. (Accessed October 3, 2009). ———. 2008. Zhonghua minguo di 12 ren zongtong Ma Yingjiu xiansheng jiuzhi yanshuo 中華民國第12任馬英九先生就職演說 [The Inauguration Speech of Mr Ma Ying-jeou as Twelfth Term President of the Republic of China]. In http://www.president.gov. tw/1_president/97speak/97speak1.pdf. (Accessed October 3, 2009). Ma Ziruo 馬子若. “Taiwan tongbao lianyihui dongtai 台灣同胞聯誼會動態 [The Development of the Taiwan Compatriots Association].” Taisheng 台聲 [Voice of Taiwan], no. 1 (1983), 23–26. Madsen, Richard. Democracy’s Dharma: Religious Renaissance and Political Development in Taiwan. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 2007. Makeham, John and A-Chin Hsiau, eds. Cultural, Ethnic, and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan: Bentuhua. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Marks, Thomas A. Counterrevolution in China: Wang Sheng and the Kuomintang. London and Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 1998. Mo Yan-chih. “KMT chairman Wu accepts invitation to travel to China.” Taipei Times, May 18, 2008, 1. ———. “Wu Poh-hsiung on trip to strengthen Taiwan-Japan ties.” Taipei Times, December 7, 2008, 3. ———. “Wu says China trip will lay groundwork for cross-strait talks.” Taipei Times, May 22, 2008, 3. ———. “Wu to skip Games if team name changed.” Taipei Times, July 19, 2008, 1. Mo Yan-chih and Shih Hsiu-chuan. “Defend Taiwan’s sovereignty, says Ma.” Taipei Times, March 15, 2008, 1. bibliography 287

———. “President commends China’s ‘goodwill’.” Taipei Times, July 26, 2008, 3. Mo Yan-chih and Su Yung-Yao. “Wu thanks Beijing, confirms trip to Olympic Games.” Taipei Times, July 27, 2008, 1. Morse, Hosea Ballou. The International Relations of the Chines Empire. Vol. II. London, New York, Bombay: Longmans, Green, 1918. ———. The International Relations of the Chinese Empire. Vol. III. London, New York, Bombay: Longmans, Green, 1918. “Mujuan maidi bi caili, yi yi er yi mai quanli 募捐賣地比財力，一意二億買權力 [Getting Donations and Selling Land to Compare Financial Strength, Using One or Two Hundred Million to Buy Power].” Xin Xinwen 新新聞 [The Journalist], 299, November 28-December 4, 1992, 66–76. National Development Conference Resolutions. Taipei: National Development Conference Secretariat, 1997. “The Nixon-Sato Communique.” New York Times, November 22, 1969, 14. “One-China Principle Allows for No Evasion or Ambiguity: Commentary.” Bejing, May 21, 2000, available at http://ken_davies.tripod.com/response.html. “Open letter on erosion of justice in Taiwan.” Taipei Times, November 6, 2008, 8. “Open Letter to Ma Ying-jeou’s KMT government.” Taipei Times, April 11, 2011, 8. “Open Letter to President Ma.” Taipei Times, August 2, 2011, 8. “Open letter to Taiwan’s president.” Taipei Times, May 21, 2009, 8. “Open letter to Taiwan’s president,” Taipei Times, November 13, 2009, 8. Paine, S.C.M. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Peng Ming-min. A Taste of Freedom: Memoirs of a Formosan Independence Leader. New York, Chicago and San Francisco: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972. Phillips, Steven E. Between Assimilation and Independence: The Taiwanese Encounter Nationalist China, 1945–1950. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003. Political arrests and detentions in Taiwan. November 28, 2005. In http://www.taiwandc. org/statement%2028%20Nov%202008.htm. (Accessed October 3, 2009). Population. In http://www.country-studies.com/algeria/population.html. (Accessed October 3, 2009). Presbyterian Church in Taiwan. August 16, 1977. A Declaration of Human Rights. In http://www.taiwandocuments.org/pct04.htm. (Accessed October 3, 2009). ———. “A Declaration on Human Rights.” In The Future of Taiwan: A Difference of Opinion, Vol., edited by Victor H Li. White Plains, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 186–187. ———. “Public Statement on Our National Fate (December 29, 1971).” In Let Taiwan Be Taiwan, Vol., edited by Marc J. Cohen and Emma Teng. Washington, D.C.: Center for Taiwan International Relations, 1990, 76–77. ———. December 29, 1971. Statement on our National Fate. In http://www.taiwandocuments.org/pct01.htm. (Accessed October 3, 2009). “Presbyterians Urge Reforms in Taiwan.” New York Times, December 30, 1971, 10. Qiu Chuiliang 邱垂亮. “Liangzhong xinxiang 兩種心向 [Two Ways of Thinking].” Taiwan zhenglun 台灣政論 [Taiwan Political Review], no. 5 (1975), 31–34. Qiu Hongda 丘宏達. “Diaoyutai lieyu wenti da shiji 釣魚臺列嶼問題大事記 [A Chronology of the Diaoyutai Islands Question].” Daxue zazhi 大學雜誌 [The Intellectua], no. 40 (April 1971), 18–24. Renquan zhi lu: Taiwan minzhu renquan huigu 人權之路：臺灣民主人權回顧 [The Road to Human Rights: Looking Back on Taiwan’s Democracy and Human Rights]. Taibei: Yushan, 2002. Republic of China Yearbook 1989. Taipei: Kwang Hwa Publishing Company, 1989. The Republic of China Yearbook 1993. Taipei: Government Information Office, 1993. The Republic of China Yearbook 1996. Taipei: Government Information Office, 1996. 288 bibliography

The Republic of China Yearbook 1999. Taipei: Government Information Office, 1999. The Republic of China Yearbook 2000. Taipei: Government Information Office, 2000. Republic of China Yearbook 2008. Taipei: Government Information Office, 2009. The Republic of China Yearbook Taiwan 2002. Taipei: Government Information Office, 2002. Reuters. “Wen Jiabao qiangsheng: ... 溫家寳嗆聲: ... [Wen Jiabao Shouts:...].” Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 19, 2008, 1. Rigger, Shelley. From Opposition to Power: Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive party. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2001. ———. Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy. London and New York: Routledge, 1999. Riggs, Fred W. Formosa under Chinese Nationalist Rule. New York: Macmillan, 1952. The Road to Freedom: Taiwan’s Postwar Human Rights Movement. Taipei: Dr Chen Wen- chen Memorial Foundation, 2004. Rubinstein, Murray A. The Protestant Community on Modern Taiwan: Mission, Seminary, and Church. Armonk, N.Y. and London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 1991. Schak, David C. “Socioeconomic Mobility and the Urban Poor in Taiwan.” Modern China, 15, no. 3 (1989), 346–373. Shan, Shelley. “First FITs touch down in Taiwan.” Taipei Times, June 29, 2011, 2. ———. “PRC in no hurry to allow smaller tour groups.” Taipei Times, July 24, 2009, 3. ———. “Start date still not clear for regular cross-strait flights.” Taipei Times, July 10, 2009, 4. Sheng Ruowei 盛若蔚 and Du Rong 杜榕. “Hu Jintao huijian Taiwan shaoshu minzu daibiao tuan 胡錦濤會見台灣少數民族代表團 [Hu Jintao Meets a Representative Group of Taiwan Minority People].” Renmin ribao 人民日報 [People’s Daily], August 20, 2009, 1. Shepherd, John Robert. Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600–1800. Taipei: SMC Publishing, 1995. Shiba Ryotoro 司馬遼太郎. Taiwan jixing 台灣紀行 [A Taiwan Journey]. Translated by Li Jinsong. Taibei: Taiwan Dongfan, 1996. ———. Taiwan kiko 台灣紀行 [A Taiwan Journey]. Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun 朝日新聞社, 1994. Shih Hsiu-Chuan. “Bilateral ties improving: Burghardt.” Taipei Times, August 14, 2008, 3. ———. “Diplomatic office audits to be ‘enhanced’.” Taipei Times, August 23, 2011, 3. ———. “Lugo says Paraguay to maintain ties.” Taipei Times, August 15, 2008, 3. ———. “Taipei to resume FTA talks with Dominican Republic.” Taipei Times, August 18, 2008, 3. “Shou zongtong Jiang gong 壽總統蔣公 [Long Live President Jiang].” Ziyou Zhongguo 自由中國, 15, no. 9 (October 31, 1956), 3–4. “Si dalao meili bujian, Meilidao fengyun zaixian 四大老魅力不減，美麗島風雲再現 [The Glamor of the Four Seniors is Not Reduced, the Melidao Winds Reappear].” Xin xinwen 新新聞 [The Journalist], 300, December 6–12, 1992, 56–61. Snyder, Charles. “AIT denies tougher guidelines.” Taipei Times, September 12, 2008, 3. ———. “State Department tightens curbs on official contacts.” Taipei Times, September 10, 2008, 1. Southerland, Daniel. “Chiang Envisions Change for Taiwan: Move Toward ‘Soft Authoritarianism’ Seen.” The Washington Post, October 13, 1986, A18. ———. “Taiwan President to Propose End to Island’s Martial Law: Action Would Mean the Lifting of Restrictions After 37 Years.” The Washington Post, October 8, 1986, A18. Staff Writer. “Lin backs 4th nuke plant.” Taipei Times, June 21, 2000, 1. ———. “President offers apology to Lien Chan.” Taipei Times, November 6, 2000, 1. ———. “Rod faults plague nuclear plant.” Taipei Times, May 16, 2001, 2. bibliography 289

Staff Writer with CNA. “County official says Beijing to blame for low tourist numbers.” Taipei Times, September 7, 2008, 3. ———. “Fitful start to FIT program as quotas not met.” Taipei Times, July 29, 2011, 2. ———. “Former minister of the interior sentenced to jail.” Taipei Times, August 31, 2011, p. 3. ———. “Hoteliers hoping restrictions on PRC tourists will ease.” Taipei Times, July 17, 2009, 2. ———. “Soong visits his ancestors’ tomb.” Taipei Times, May 10, 2005, 2. ———. “Taiwan declines to join Beijing swine flu conference.” Taipei Times, August 21, 2009, 2. Staff Writer with Reuters. “KMT endorses Tang’s move.” Taipei Times, April 11, 2000, 1. Su Jun-pin, “GIO response to Nov. 13 open letter.” Taipei Times, December 18, 2009, 8. ———. “Response to ‘Open Letter to President Ma Ying-jeou’.” Taiwan News, January 24, 2009, 6. Taiwan lishi nianbiao (1945–1965) 台灣歷史年表 [Chronology of Taiwan History]. Vol. I. Taibei: Guojia zhengce yanjiusuo ziliao zhongxin, 1990. Taiwan lishi nianbiao (1966–1978) 台灣歷史年表 [Chronology of Taiwan History]. Vol. II. Taibei: Guojia zhengce yanjiusuo ziliao zhongxin, 1990. Taiwan lishi nianbiao (1979–1988) 台灣歷史年表 [Chronology of Taiwan History]. Vol. III. Taibei: Guojia zhengce yanjiusuo ziliao zhongxin, 1990. Taiwan lishi nianbiao (1989–1994) 台灣歷史年表 [Chronology of Taiwan History]. Vol. V. Taibei: Guojia zhengce yanjiusuo ziliao zhongxin, 1998. Taiwan lishi nianbiao (Suoyin) 台灣歷史年表 (索引） [Chronology of Taiwan History (Index)]. Vol. IV. Taibei: Guojia zhengce yanjiu zhongxin 國家政策研究中心, 1994. “Taiwan minzhong dui Riben guan’gan zhi yanjiu 台灣民衆對日本觀感之研究 [Research on Taiwanese Impressions of Japan].” Taibei: Jiaoliu xiehui 交流協會 [Interchange Association], April 2009. Taiwan News Staff Writer. “Australia changes Web site name at MOFA’s request.” Taiwan News, August 20, 2008, 2. ———. “Most cross-strait fliers are from Taiwan, says CAA.” Taiwan News, August 6, 2008, 2. Taiwan sheng difang zizhi zhiyao 臺灣省地方自治誌要 [Record of Local Autonomy in Taiwan Province.] Taichung: Taiwan sheng difang zizhi zhiyao bianji weiyuanhui 臺灣省地方自治誌要編輯委員會, 1965. Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1992. Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Development, Republic of China, 1992. Taiwan Statistical Data Book 2001. Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Development, Republic of China, 2001. Taiwan Yearbook 2005. CD-ROM ed. Taipei: Government Information Office, 2005. Taiwan Yearbook 2007. CD-ROM ed. Taipei: Government Information Office, 2007. Tao Baichuan 陶百川, ed. Zuixin liufa quanshu 最新六法全書 [The Most Recent Complete Six Law Codes]. Taibei: Sanmin shuju 三民書局, 1980. Taylor, Jay. The Generalissimo’s Son: Chiang Ching-kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2000. Tighe, Justin. Constructing Suiyuan: The Politics of Northwestern Territory and Development in Early Twentieth-Century China. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2005. Tongyi zhanxian gongzuo shouce 统一战线工作手册 [Handbook for United Front Work]. Nanjing: Nanjing daxue chubanshe, 1986. Treaty of Peace. April 28, 1952. In http://www.taiwandocuments.org/taipei01.htm. (Accessed October 3, 2009). Treaty of Peace with Japan. September 8, 1951. In http://www.taiwandocuments.org/ sanfrancisco01.htm. (Accessed October 3, 2009). 290 bibliography

Ts’ai Ling and Ramon H. Myers. “Surviving the Rough-and-Tumble of Presidential Politics in an Emerging Democracy: The 1990 Elections in the Republic of China on Taiwan.” China Quarterly, no. 129 (March 1992), 123–148. Tsai, Tehpen. Elegy of Sweet Potatoes: Stories of Taiwan’s White Terror. Translated by Grace Hatch. Upland, CA: Taiwan Publishing Co., 2002. Tsurumi, E. Patricia. Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895–1945. Cambridge, Mass and London: Harvard University Press, 1977. TVBS Poll Center. Conducted June 16–17, 2008. Ma Yingjiu jiuzhi yi ge yue manyidu mindiao 馬英九就職一個月滿意度民調 [Poll on Degree of Satisfaction with Ma Ying-jeou One Month after Inauguration]. In http://www.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/ DL_DB/rickliu/200806/rickliu-20080619214943.pdf. (Accessed October 3, 2009). ———. Conducted August 17–18, 2008. Molakezai hou shitian ji jiuzai renxuan mindiao 莫拉克災後十天及救災人選民調 [Poll Ten Days after the Disaster of Morakot and Those Involved in Disaster Relief ]. In http://www.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/DL_DB/ doshouldo/200908/doshouldo-20090819205240.pdf. (Accessed October 3, 2009). “United Daily News: An outrageous ruling” (August 27, 2011). http://focustaiwan.tw/ ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?Type=aOPN&TNo=&ID=201108270021. Wand, Chris. “Retrial finds A-bian not guilty of graft.” Taipei Times, August 27, 2011, 1. Wang Ching-feng. “‘Open letter’ inaccurate.” Taipei Times, November 25, 2008, 8. ———. “Response No. 2 on justice.” Taipei Times, January 8, 2009, 8. Wang, Flora and Loa Iok-sin. “Government prevents visit by Kadeer.” Taipei Times, September 26, 2009, 1. Wang, Flora and Mo Yan-chih. “Chen Chu praised for saying president.” Taipei Times, May 23, 2009, 1. Wang, Fu-chang. “Why Bother about School Textbooks?: An Analysis of the Origin of the Disputes over Renshi Taiwan School Textbooks in 1997.” In Cultural, Ethnic, and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan: Bentuhua, Vol., edited by John Makeham and A-Chin Hsiau. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, 55–99. Wang Guangya. Letter dated 18 August 2008 from the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. United Nations General Assembly, August 22, 2008. Wang Qiaorong 王巧蓉. “Taiwan yaoqiu gaiming? 台灣要求改名? [Has Taiwan requested changing its name?].” Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], August 6, 2008. Wang Yuzhong 王寓中. “Ma qiang lüying: nali shi zhuquan nandao yao daotui banian 馬嗆綠營：哪裡失主權難道要倒退八年 [Ma Roars at the Green Camp: Where have we lost sovereignty? It’s not surprising we went backward for eight years.].” Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], May 20, 2009. Wang Zhongfu 王仲孚. Lishi 歷史 [History]. Taizhong: Kangxi 康熙, 2004. Wen Chaogong 文抄公. “Ni kan de shi shenme bao? ge bao dui Zhongtai shijian de baodao 你看的是什麽報？各報對中泰事件的報導 [What Newspaper Do You read? The Reports of Different Newspapers on the Chungtai Incident].” Meilidao 美麗島 [Formosa], no. 2 (September 25, 1979), 83–87. “Women de you! women de xue! 我們的油！我們的血！[Our Oil! Our Blood!].” Zili wanbao 自立晚報 [Independence Evening News], April 15, 1971, 1. World Health Organization (WHO). Global Health Atlas database. In http://apps.who. int/globalatlas/DataQuery/default.asp. (Accessed October 3, 2009). ———. May 23, 2009. “Influenza A(H1N1) – update 37,” Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response In http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_05_23/en/index.html. (Accessed October 3, 2009). ———. May 23, 2009. New Influenza A(H1N1) – Number of Laboratory Cases Reported to the WHO. In http://www.who.int/csr/don/ah1n1_20090523_8AM.jpg. (Accessed October 3, 2009). bibliography 291

Wright, Teresa. The Perils of Protest: State Repression and Student Activism in China and Taiwan. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2001. Wu, Debby. “Constitutional amendment bill passes.” Taipei Times, August 24, 2004, 1. Wu, Jaushieh Joseph. Taiwan’s Democratization: Forces Behind the New Momentum. Hong Kong, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Wu, Shu-hui. “Lien Heng (1878–1936) and the General History of Taiwan.” Journal of Third World Studies, 21, no. 1 (Spring 2004), 17–56. Wu, Yu-Shan. “Taiwan in 1993: Attempting a Diplomatic Breakthrough.” Asian Survey, XXXIV, no. 1 (January 1994), 46–54. Wu Zhengshuo 吳正朔. “Zhongtai binguan shijian shimo 中泰賓館事件始末 [The Chungtai Hotel Incident from the Beginning to the End].” Da shidai 大時代 [Great Epoch], no. 4 (October 5, 1979), 7–19. Xiao Xucen 蕭旭岑. “Guomindang chufen ruge dangyuan ... 國民黨處分入閣黨員 ... [The KMT will punish party members who enter the cabinet...].” Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], January 22, 2002, 4. Xie Dexi 謝德錫. “Banbao lunzheng de ‘Lumang shusheng’: Li Wanju 辦報論政的 ‘魯莽書生’: 李萬居 [The ‘Rash Scholar’ Who Ran a Newspaper and Commented on Politics: Li Wan-chu].” In Taiwan jindai mingrenzhi 臺灣近代名人誌 [Dictionary of Famous People in Modern Taiwan], Vol. II, edited by Zhang Yanxian 張炎憲, Li Xiaofeng 李筱峯 and Zhuang Yungming 莊永明. Taibei: Zili wanbao 自立晚報, 1987, 163–176. ———. “Jiayi ‘Mazu po’: Xu Shixian 嘉義 ‘媽祖婆’: 許世賢 [The ‘Old Matsu’ of Chiayi: Hsu Shih-hsien].” In Taiwan jindai mingrenzhi 臺灣近代名人誌 [Dictionary of Famous People in Modern Taiwan], Vol. II, edited by Zhang Yanxian 張炎憲, Li Xiaofeng 李筱峯 and Zhuang Yungming 莊永明. Taibei: Zili wanbao 自立晚報, 1987, 227–235. ———. “Yitan dapao: Guo Guoji 議壇大砲：郭國基 [The Great Cannon in the Assembly: Kuo Kuo-chi].” In Taiwan jindai mingrenzhi 臺灣近代名人誌 [Dictionary of Famous People in Modern Taiwan], Vol. IV, edited by Zhang Yanxian 張炎憲, Li Xiaofeng 李筱峯 and Zhuang Yungming 莊永明. Taibei: Zili wanbao 自立晚報, 1987, 171–189. Xie Zhongliang 謝忠良. “Liangge lüse da jiazu diyi ci yao nao fenjia 兩個綠色大家族第一次要閙分家 [The First Time the Two Great Khaki Clans Want to Divide the Family] “ Xin xinwen 新新聞 [The Journalist], 299, November 28-December 4, 1992, 35–36. “Xindang dangzhang 新黨黨章 [Constitution of the New Party].” Xindang 新黨 [New Party], 5, [September] 1993, 28–29. “Xindang xuanyan 新黨宣言 [Declaration of the New Party].” Xindang 新黨 [New Party], 5, [September] 1993, 26–27. Xu Xueji 許雪姬 and Liu Niling 劉妮玲. Lishi 歷史 [History]. Taibei: Sanmin 三民, 2005. “Xuanju gaijin zuotanhui de shengming 選舉改進座談會的聲明 [Declaration of Election Improvement Symposium].” Ziyou Zhongguo 自由中國, 22, no. 12 (June 16, 1960), 18–19. “Xuanju gaijin zuotanhui jinji shengming 選舉座談會緊急聲明 [Urgent Declaration of the Election Improvement Symposium].” Ziyou Zhongguo 自由中國, 23, no. 5 (September 1, 1960), 16. Xue Hua-yuan 薛化元, Dai Baocun 戴寳村 and Zhou Meili 周美里. Taiwan bushi Zhongguo de. Taiwan guomin de lishi 台灣不是中國的。臺灣國民的歷史 [Taiwan is not Chinese: A History of the Taiwanese People]. Danshui: Quncehui, 2005. Yang Bichuan 楊碧川. Taiwan lishi cidian 台灣歷史辭典 [Taiwan Historical Dictionary]. Taibei: Qianwei, 1997. “Yanli jinggao Mei Ri zhengfu qinlue Diaoyutai shengming 嚴厲警告美日政府侵略釣魚臺聲明 [An Announcement Severely Warning the American and Japanese 292 bibliography

Governments about Invading Diaoyutai].” Daxue zazhi 大學雜誌 [The Intellectual], no. 43 (July 1971), 2–3. Yin Naijing 尹乃菁. “Guomindang jiang zhaoji ... 國民黨將召集 ... [The Kuomintang will convene...].” Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], August 22, 2001, 1. ———. “Zhengdang xieshang huiyi ... 政黨協商會議 ... [The Political Consultative Conference...].” Zhongguo shibao 中國時報, August 27, 2001, 4. Young, Jacob and others. “Taiwan: The Winds of Change.” Newsweek, October 21, 1986, 134–138. Yu, Junwei. “China’s Foreign Policy in Sport: The Primacy of National Security and Territorial Integrity Concerning the Taiwan Question.” China Quarterly, no. 194 (2008), 294–308. “Zaiyedang ji wudang wupai renshi duiyu ben jie difang xuanju xiang Guomintang ji zhengfu tichu de shiwudian yaoqiu 在野黨及無黨無派人士對於本屆地方選舉向國民黨及政府提出的十五點要求 [Fifteen Demands from Opposition Parties and from Non-partisans Addressed to the Kuomintang and the government concerning the Current Local Elections] “ Ziyou Zhongguo 自由中國, 22, no. 7 (April 1, 1960), 30. Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興. Lüse niandai: Taiwan minzhu yundong 25 nian, 1975–1987 綠色年代：台灣民主運動25年，1975–1987 [The Green Era: Twenty- Five Years of Taiwan’s Democratic Movement, 1975–1987]. II vols. Vol. I. Taibei: Caituan faren lüxing wenjiao jijinhui 財團法人綠色旅行文教基金會, 2005. ———. Lüse niandai: Taiwan minzhu yundong 25 nian, 1988–2000 綠色年代：台灣民主運動 25 年, 1988–2000 [The Green Era: Twenty-Five Years of Taiwan’s Democratic Movement, 1988–2000]. II vols. Vol. II. Taibei: Caituan faren lüxing wenjiao jijinhui 財團法人綠色旅行文教基金會, 2005. Zhang Kunshan 張昆山. “Jieshiwen juyou zhengzhixing ... 解釋文具有政治性 ... [The Text of the Interpretation has a Political Nature...].” Zhongyang ribao guojiban 中央日報國際版 [Central Daily News International Edition] reprinted from Lianhebao 聯合報 [United Daily News], 1. Zhang Ruichang 張瑞昌. “Minjindang baigei ‘Li Denghui qingjie’ chongji buxiao 民進黨敗給‘李登煇情結’衝擊不小 [The Pounding of the DPP Loss to the ‘Lee Teng- hui Complex’ was Not Small].” Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 24, 1996, 3. ———. “Nanbei zhanzheng juezhan guanjian 3% 南北戰爭決戰關鍵 3% [In the war between North and South, a crucial 3% will decide the battle].” Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], March 15, 2004, 8. Zhang Shixin 張世欣. “Li Denghui wei Tailian zhantai ... 李登煇為台聯站台 ... [Lee Teng-hui gets on the platform for TSU...].” Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], September 1, 2001, 3. Zhang Yanxian et al 張炎憲等. Li Denghui xiansheng yu Taiwan minzhu hua 李登輝先生與台灣民主化 [Mr Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Democratization. Taibei: Yushanshe 玉山社, 2004. Zhong Lihua 鍾麗華 and You Xiuhua 游繡華. “Zongjiaojie yu quanmin lixing aihu Taiwan 宗教界籲全民理性愛護台灣 [Religious Circles Appeal to All the People to be Rational and Cherish Taiwan].” Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], March 22, 2004, 1. Zhonghua minguo liushiliu nian tongji tiyao 中華民國六十六年統計提要 [Statistical Abstract of the Republic Of China 1977]. Taipei: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics 行政院主計處, 1978. Zhou Huiru 周慧如. “Shiyue shiyelü 5.33% ... 十月事業率5.33% ... [October Unemployment Rate 5.33%...].” Zhongguo shibao 中國時報 [China Times], November 24, 2001, 9. bibliography 293

Zou Jingwen 鄒景雯. “Li Denghui: Lian Song hekao quanmou ... 李登煇：連宋合靠權謀 ... [Lee Teng-hui: Lien and Soong together rely on political tricks...].” Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], August 27, 2001, 6. ———. “Xingqi zhuanfang 星期專訪 [Interview of the Week].” Ziyou shibao 自由時報 [Liberty Times], June 30, 2008.

index 295

Index

aboriginal 19, 21, 27, 30, 80, 93, 94, 102, 103, cabinet 12, 13, 15, 70, 71, 87, 89, 90, 94, 95, 104, 117, 150, 166, 201, 206, 219, 230, 231, 102, 176, 179, 180, 188, 189, 208, 212, 213, 233, 258 219, 220, 227, 228, 255, 257, 258, 259 Aboriginal Basic Law 103, 104 Canada 5, 104, 262 Aboriginal Education Law 103, 104 Capital Morning News 71 Aboriginal Land Law 103, 104 cartoon 86, 88, 90, 182, 195 aborigines 19, 21, 70, 80, 82, 93, 131, 160, 166, Catholic 13 204, 238 Central Committee 49, 57, 62, 73, 77, 87, 92, Academia Sinica 150, 220, 221 183 Adams, Gerry 118 Central Daily News 34, 42 against party discipline 53, 95, 132 Central Election Commission 85, 94, 96, age 7, 8, 39, 44, 99, 100, 117, 153, 193 115, 163, 198, 201, 206, 211, 231 Algeria 31 central parliamentarians 48, 54, 76, 77, 78, Almond, Gabriel and Verba, Sidney 9, 15 79 Anti-Mainstream 72, 76, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, Central Party Headquarters 90, 98 89, 92 Central Standing Committee 12, 13, 24, 49, Anti-Secession Law 202, 235 62, 65, 66, 67, 69, 71, 77, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93, Apollo 44, 50, 144 170, 188, 208, 210, 234 Arafat, Yasser 118 Chairman 24, 35, 47, 57, 69, 70, 72, 75, 79, Article 100 83 89, 92, 94, 97, 108, 125, 149, 162, 170, 177, assassination 12, 14, 197, 198, 200 181, 182, 183, 185, 188, 189, 208, 210, 212, Association for Relations Across the Tai- 234, 235, 240, 243, 244, 247, 252 wan Strait 244, 252 Chang Chao-hsiung 142, 146, 147, 158, 161 a state on each side 138 Chang Chun-hsiung 57, 59, 95, 175, 176, 185, Atomic Energy Commission 180 188, 227 Australia 5, 47, 50, 66, 104, 232, 249, 250, Chang Chun-hung 52, 54, 58, 79, 162 259, 262 Chang Fu-chung 53 Austria 139 Chang Hsiao-yen 118 authoritarian 1, 5, 7, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 64, Chang Hsüeh-liang 70 82, 131, 178, 208, 210, 230, 231, 266, 269, Changhua 40, 58, 92, 164, 193, 198, 199 270, 272 Chang Po-ya 191 Chang Teh-ming 58, 59, 61 Beijing 46, 47, 77, 121, 122, 124, 136, 137, 155, Chang Yung-fa 159 171, 175, 190, 202, 203, 204, 244, 246, 248, Chao Shou-po 12 249, 253 Chen Cheng 108, 129, 216 blood ties 135, 145, 204 Chen Chien-nien 189 blue 108, 158, 161, 171, 173, 186, 189, 193, 195, Chen Chi-lu 12 198, 200, 201, 202, 227, 264 Chen Chu 38, 51, 53, 62, 162, 212, 213, 251 British 1, 22, 98 Chen Ding-nan 58, 94, 95, 116 Buddhist 108 Chen Feng-hsiang 222 bureaucracy 173, 213, 224 Cheng Nan-jung 70 bureaucratic resistance 214 Cheng Yü-chen 59 Bureau of Investigation 83, 90 Chen Jien-chung 209 Burma 1 Chen Kang-chin 182, 183 Chen Kuei-miao 126, 133 296 index

Chen Ku-ying 50, 54 China Democratic Party 36, 37, 42, 53, 54, Chen Li-an 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 64 116, 117, 123, 125, 159, 216 China Democratic Self-Government Chen Ming-chang 194 Research Association 40, 54 Chen Ming-wen 262 China Tide 54 Chen Shao-ting 48 China Times 264 Chen Shui-bian 3, 57, 58, 59, 61, 63, 95, 113, Chinese 2, 3, 6, 19, 20, 21, 23, 27, 28, 29, 30, 116, 126, 133, 134, 138, 142, 143, 145, 146, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 47, 55, 63, 70, 76, 78, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 80, 81, 82, 89, 93, 97, 99, 105, 106, 108, 110, 156, 157, 158, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 167, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 168, 169, 170, 173, 176, 179, 183, 186, 188, 123, 124, 126, 127, 128, 130, 132, 134, 135, 189, 190, 192, 193, 194, 196, 197, 199, 200, 136, 137, 144, 148, 149, 151, 152, 153, 155, 202, 203, 209, 212, 213, 214, 215, 217, 224, 159, 160, 168, 170, 171, 174, 175, 179, 184, 227, 228, 234, 235, 236, 237, 239, 240, 244, 186, 196, 202, 203, 204, 205, 207, 214, 215, 246, 255, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 217, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 229, 267, 270 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 242, 243, 244, 245, Chen Wen-cheng 60 246, 247, 248, 249, 251, 252, 253, 259, 263, Chen Yi 30, 32, 33, 221, 222, 223, 224 270, 271, 274 Chen Yu-hao 196 Chinese Foreign Minister 121, 122 Chen Yunlin 202, 204, 244, 252 Chinese Taipei 246, 247, 249, 253, 266 Chiang, Antonio 175, 176 Chinese, Taipei 247 Chiang Ching-kuo 2, 5, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 24, Chiou Chui-liang 50 Chiou I-jen 51, 59, 126, 196, 262, 265 25, 35, 47, 48, 49, 51, 53, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, Chiu Chuang-huan 62, 88, 159 65, 66, 67, 69, 71, 72, 73, 88, 105, 118, 125, Chiu Lien-hui 58 135, 142, 143, 164, 171, 179, 203, 208, 209, Chiu Yi 233 216, 217, 219, 234, 239, 243, 269, 272 Chou Ching-yü 58, 92 Chiang Chung-ling 209 Chou Hung-hsien 51 Chiang, John 118, 209, 243 Christian 17 Chiang Kai-shek 2, 5, 17, 24, 30, 33, 34, 35, Chu, Eric 258 37, 43, 44, 46, 47, 49, 51, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, Chu, Josephine 143 74, 76, 105, 108, 118, 129, 135, 145, 156, 157, Chun Doo-hwan 14 164, 171, 208, 216, 217, 219, 239, 272 Chung-hsing Bills case 144, 145, 151, 166, 167 Chiang Peng-chien 57, 59, 63 Chungli 53, 55 Chiang Pin-kung 189, 240, 244 Churchill, Winston 193 Chiang Wego 72, 73 City Council 58, 61, 76, 96, 134, 135, 190, 191, Chiayi 38, 40, 70, 164, 165, 191, 193, 199, 222, 213, 258 242, 260, 262 civilian governor 25, 27 Chief of the General Staff 71, 84, 125, 216 civil liberties 5, 269 Chien, Eugene 188 civil service 117, 151, 213, 218 Chien, Frederick 97, 118 Civil War 32, 34, 63, 144 Chile 272 CNN 123, 156 China 7, 8, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 28, 29, 30, 33, Coalition 102 35, 36, 37, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 50, 54, Cohen, Jerome 263 60, 64, 66, 67, 77, 78, 81, 84, 86, 88, 91, 94, colonial 1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 15, 18, 19, 23, 24, 25, 26, 109, 110, 111, 113, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 27, 29, 30, 31, 43, 44, 46, 61, 76, 89, 105, 124, 127, 128, 129, 130, 135, 136, 137, 144, 135, 164, 166, 167, 168, 171, 214, 216, 219, 145, 146, 148, 149, 151, 155, 160, 165, 169, 222, 223, 229, 239, 269, 270 170, 174, 175, 181, 183, 184, 186, 190, 195, colonial dictatorship 214 196, 202, 203, 204, 205, 214, 219, 221, 223, Comintern 28 224, 225, 229, 232, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, Commonwealth countries 5 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, Communist Party 28, 113, 114, 171, 184, 202, 249, 250, 251, 254, 266, 270, 272, 274 223, 238, 243, 253, 274 index 297

Congress 1, 16, 70, 92, 110, 118, 120, 170, 202, 120, 124, 127, 128, 136, 153, 160, 162, 164, 219, 232 167, 169, 171, 172, 173, 174, 178, 203, 224, Constitution 37, 49, 50, 54, 61, 63, 74, 77, 78, 229, 230, 238, 266, 267, 269, 270, 273, 274 79, 82, 102, 139, 161, 174, 207, 238 Democratic Progressive Party (see also Constitutional Amendments 80, 81, 93, 129, DPP) 2, 3, 16, 40, 57, 64, 75, 105, 106, 174, 138, 205 175, 230, 231, 253, 258, 270 Constitutional Interpretation 76, 77, 78, 80, Democratic-Socialist Party 39, 40 88, 138, 139, 140, 178 democratization 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 14, 17, 18, 19, Constitutional Interpretation No. 31 76, 77 23, 26, 36, 55, 61, 64, 67, 69, 78, 82, 88, 94, Constitutional Interpretation No. 261 76, 105, 118, 124, 171, 178, 200, 210, 216, 220, 77, 78, 79, 80, 88 233, 269, 270, 272 Constitutional Interpretation No. 499 138, Deputy Secretary-General 13, 62, 74, 108, 139 208 Constitutional Interpretation No. 520 178 Deputy Speaker 37, 87, 103, 189 Control Branch 13, 38, 43, 48, 55, 62, 76, 77, Deutsche Welle 136, 137, 143 80, 82, 108, 131 dialogues 62, 63, 64, 66, 74, 75, 186 Convention on Rights and Duties of States Diaoyutai/Senkaku 25, 44, 45, 47, 239, 240, 251 254, 255, 266 Cornell University 73, 118 diplomatic truce 247, 248, 249, 250, 253 Council for Economic Planning and Devel- DPP (see also Democratic Progressive opment 24, 97, 189 Party) 17, 59, 64, 65, 66, 70, 71, 75, 77, 78, Council of Aboriginal Affairs 102, 104 79, 80, 81, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 91, 92, 93, 94, Council of Grand Justices 49, 76, 77, 78, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 138, 139, 140, 178 117, 118, 119, 122, 125, 126, 129, 131, 132, 133, Council of Indigenous Peoples 104, 189 134, 135, 141, 142, 143, 145, 150, 151, 152, 153, Council of International Cooperation and 154, 157, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 166, 167, Development 47 171, 175, 176, 177, 178, 180, 185, 186, 187, county 9, 10, 12, 19, 24, 38, 40, 41, 44, 52, 55, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 195, 196, 197, 56, 57, 58, 61, 72, 80, 82, 92, 93, 95, 115, 198, 200, 201, 202, 206, 207, 211, 212, 213, 131, 132, 133, 134, 142, 165, 185, 186, 187, 214, 215, 219, 224, 227, 228, 231, 232, 233, 198, 211, 258, 259, 260 234, 235, 236, 251, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, county assembly 10, 44, 92, 211 263, 264, 266, 267, 270, 272, 273 county executive 38, 39, 40, 44, 52, 54, 55, dump-save 147, 158, 159, 160, 161, 165 58, 73, 92, 131, 132, 142, 186, 187, 188, 211, Dutch 2, 19, 21, 220 234, 258, 262, 267 coup d’etat 88, 175 earthquake 141, 243 Credit Union Law 103, 104 East Asia 237 cross-Straits relations 127, 236, 255 East Coast 165, 193, 198 Cultural Revolution 44, 46 East Timor 272 Czech Republic 259 Economic Cooperation Framework Agree- ment 267 Dalai Lama 259 Economic Development Advisory Commit- dangwai 14, 40, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, tee 183, 184, 185, 186 61, 62, 63, 64, 175, 188, 212 education 1, 7, 8, 9, 12, 24, 29, 98, 99, 100, Dangwai Personages Election Assistance 101, 103, 104, 117, 193, 217, 219, 220, 225, Group 54 240 Davidson, James 24 Eighties, The 63 Declaration of Formosans 17, 44 Election Improvement Symposium 41, 42 Declaration on Human Rights 17 El Salvador 89 democracy 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 15, 17, 29, 36, 41, 50, England 16, 17, 31 55, 56, 57, 59, 65, 70, 75, 88, 91, 98, 111, Environmental Protection Agency 95, 212 298 index ethnicity 153, 174, 193, 209 Hong Kong 45, 133, 157, 161, 208, 251, 264, Ethnicity 99 266 European 19, 31, 235 House of Representatives 118 Examination Branch 82, 131, 218 Hsiao Bi-khim 196 Hsieh, Frank 57, 58, 61, 63, 107, 113, 134, 185, Fang Su-min 59, 162 191, 212, 227, 234, 235, 251, 258 Fan Sun-lü 51 Hsieh Tsung-min 44 Farmers’ Associations 15 Hsinchu 33, 40, 116, 165, 193, 199, 260, 262 February 28, 1947 Uprising 14, 25, 31, 34, 70, Hsu Hsin-liang 52, 54, 55, 75, 93, 106, 109, 149, 194, 221, 222, 223, 224 142, 143, 144, 151, 152, 164, 166 Federal Bureau of Investigation 16, 60 Hsu Hsueh-chi 221 Feng, John 240, 243 Hsu Jung-shu 58, 59 Fifteen Demands 39, 52 Hsu Li-nung 209 Five Dragons and One Phoenix 37 Hsu Shih-hsien 38, 40, 51, 191 Five Tiger Generals 37 Hsu Shui-teh 12, 90, 92, 126 Formosa 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 43, 55, 56, Hsu Wen-lung 159 64, 66, 241, 242 Hualien 132, 165, 198, 199, 260 Formosans (see Taiwanese) 24 Huang Chu-wen 189 France 5, 31 Huang Fu-hsing 85, 86, 158 Free China 36, 39, 41, 42, 43 Huang Fu-san 20 freezing of the provincial government 130 Huang Hsin-chieh 50, 52, 54, 58, 75, 125, 143 French 22, 31 Huang Hua 83 Fujian 30, 115, 119, 120, 246 Huang Huang-hsiung 58, 59 Fung, Elmer 143, 144, 164 Huang Jun-ying 191, 213 Huang, Mab 45 Gandhi, Mohandas 1 Huang Shih-chang 58 gender 153, 174 Huang Shun-hsing 51, 54 general 70, 175, 208, 217 Huang Ta-chou 95 Germany 5, 139, 259 Huang Tien-fu 58, 63 Global Views Magazine 134, 255, 256 Huang Tien-sheng 191 Golden Oxen 86 Huang Yü-chiao 39, 40, 53, 61 Government Information Office 9, 13, 20, Huang Yü Hsiu-luan 58 24, 80, 137, 263, 264 Hu Chun-hui 223 Governor 28, 32, 33, 73, 112 Hu, Jason 79, 97, 118, 154, 167 Governor-General 222 Hu Jintao 202, 203, 204, 238, 243, 253 Graham, Katherine 65, 66 human rights 6, 16, 42, 152, 174, 252, 253, Grand Council 20 263 green 157, 161, 195, 198, 200, 202, 227, 253, Huntington, Samuel 1, 14 264 Hu Shih 36, 151 Hwang Tzuen-chiou 159 Hakka 30, 39, 70, 85, 94, 98, 99, 115, 117, 142, 143, 150, 151, 165, 166, 193, 201, 204, 219 identity 6, 7, 17, 29, 107, 128, 202, 210, 221, Hau Lung-bin 189, 212 229, 270, 273 Hau Pei-tsun 71, 72, 74, 75, 83, 84, 87, 88, Ilan 21, 38, 40, 51, 52, 58, 94, 95, 164, 188, 198, 89, 90, 92, 105, 107, 108, 110, 112, 114, 116, 199, 260 117, 120, 125, 209, 212 impeach 55, 173, 177 Head of the Judicial Branch 73, 78 inauguration speech 75, 127, 136, 153, 173, Hitler, Adolf 157, 169, 193, 194 237, 238, 252 Hokkien 30, 31, 85, 90, 94, 95, 98, 99, 110, increasing equity 11 115, 117, 134, 149, 150, 166, 167, 170, 193, Independence Evening News 37, 45, 109 194, 201, 219 India 1, 5 Hong Chi-chang 189 Indonesia 1, 19, 118 index 299

Ing, Nita 159 112, 113, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 122, 126, Insurrection 83 129, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 141, 142, 143, 144, Intellectual, The 25, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50 145, 147, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 157, 158, Interchange Association 240 159, 160, 161, 163, 164, 166, 167, 168, 169, Italy 139 170, 171, 173, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, Japan 1, 7, 19, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 29, 35, 45, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198, 200, 201, 46, 47, 90, 111, 121, 157, 169, 223, 234, 237, 203, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 248, 250, 254, 259, 214, 215, 216, 219, 220, 228, 231, 232, 233, 266, 269 234, 235, 237, 240, 243, 244, 245, 247, 251, Japanese 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 16, 18, 19, 22, 254, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 264, 266, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 36, 45, 267, 270, 272, 273 89, 105, 149, 163, 166, 181, 220, 221, 222, Knowing Taiwan 90, 220 223, 225, 226, 239, 240, 242, 243, 244, 269 Koh Se-kai 240 Jaw Shau-kong 95, 126 kōminka 25, 29 Jiangsu 202 Koo Chen-fu 159 Jiang Zemin 112, 119, 123, 137 Koo-Wang Talks 136, 204 Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction Korea 2, 16, 23, 26, 27, 28, 151, 241 (JCRR) 73 Koreans 25, 27, 29, 34, 232 Judicial Branch 82, 88, 92, 131, 139 Koxinga 19, 219 Ju Gau-jeng 94, 133 Ko Yuan-fen 224 Kuo Kuo-chi 38, 40 Kadeer, Rebiya 259 Kuomintang (see also KMT) 2, 3, 5, 6, 19, Kang Ning-hsiang 14, 50, 51, 52, 54, 58, 59, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 37, 39, 40, 62, 63, 71 41, 43, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 59, 60, 61, Kang Shui-mu 58, 61, 160 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 84, 144, 173, 175, Kangxi 20 180, 214, 226, 229, 231, 256, 258, 259, 264, Kao Chün-ming 60 266, 270 Kaohsiung 12, 13, 14, 16, 22, 25, 33, 34, 38, 39, Kuo Ting-tsai 150 40, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 61, 62, 75, 79, 85, 86, Kuo Wei-fan 90, 219 90, 94, 95, 96, 97, 105, 116, 120, 133, 134, Kuo Yü-hsin 38, 40, 51 135, 142, 154, 159, 163, 164, 177, 190, 191, Kwangju 57, 272 193, 195, 199, 209, 210, 212, 213, 222, 232, 233, 234, 251, 258, 260, 272 Lamley, Harry 24 Kaohsiung Incident 12, 13, 14, 16, 25, 56, 57, Lee Ao 44, 143, 144, 150, 151, 164 75, 86, 142, 177, 234, 272 Lee Ching-hua 209, 221 Kao Yu-jen 12, 259 Lee, Diane 265 Kao Yü-shu 12, 39, 42 Lee Huan 13, 53, 62, 71, 72, 74, 89, 159, 209, Kau, Michael 214, 265 221 Keelung 19, 22, 33, 34, 45, 70, 116, 120, 194, Lee, James 262 198, 199, 222 Lee Teng-hui 2, 3, 12, 13, 15, 17, 22, 25, 35, 59, Kennedy, John F. 153, 193 60, 61, 62, 65, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 78, 79, Kerr 7, 33 80, 84, 85, 88, 89, 91, 92, 98, 104, 105, 107, King Pu-tsung 258 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, Kinmen 53, 115, 127, 132, 165, 187, 195, 198, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 126, 127, 129, 133, 199, 211 135, 136, 138, 141, 143, 154, 161, 164, 165, Kissinger, Henry 46, 47 167, 170, 171, 174, 175, 179, 180, 181, 182, KMT (see also Kuomintang) 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 183, 184, 189, 190, 192, 203, 208, 214, 215, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 27, 29, 53, 54, 56, 216, 220, 233, 234, 237, 239, 246, 259, 264, 57, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 270, 285 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, Lee Ying-yuan 190 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, Lee Yuan-tseh 150, 151, 153, 157, 159, 163, 168, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 220 300 index

LeGendre, Charles 21 Liu, Henry 12, 16, 60, 272 Legislative Branch 48, 69, 71, 72, 76, 77, 80, Liu Ho-chien 84 138 Liu Huaqing 119 legislators 3, 38, 48, 50, 52, 59, 69, 76, 77, 87, Liu Ni-ling 221 89, 92, 93, 101, 102, 103, 104, 138, 143, 177, Liu Sung-pan 87, 102, 103, 154 206, 207, 208, 217, 219, 230, 233, 240, 243, Liu Tzu-ying 42, 43 265, 267 Li Wan-chu 37, 40, 42, 43 legislature 3, 10, 38, 45, 49, 50, 56, 59, 69, 71, Li Yüan-chan 38, 40 74, 76, 77, 83, 84, 87, 90, 91, 93, 94, 95, 97, Li Yuan-zu 72, 73, 90, 92 98, 102, 103, 104, 114, 118, 129, 130, 131, 133, Li Yu-pang 35 135, 138, 139, 140, 142, 162, 166, 173, 175, Lo Fu-chu 150, 158 177, 178, 179, 185, 187, 188, 189, 191, 200, Los Angeles 145, 247 201, 202, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 212, Lu, Annette 60, 132, 143, 145, 150, 163, 192, 215, 216, 219, 224, 229, 230, 232, 234, 235, 196, 197, 235 256, 270 Lungshan Temple 64 Lei Chen 13, 36, 42, 43, 62, 66 liberal 11, 12, 13, 25, 53, 56, 59, 61, 62, 71, 214 mainland 7, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 48, 94, 123, liberalization 2, 5, 6, 18, 25, 48, 49, 57, 60, 132, 135, 144, 148, 254 69, 269 Mainland Affairs Commission 97, 190 Liberation Army Daily 148 Mainlander 2, 13, 29, 30, 35, 36, 37, 47, 69, Liberty Times 125, 200 70, 72, 73, 78, 88, 89, 91, 96, 97, 101, 105, Li Ching-jung 53 107, 108, 133, 135, 142, 143, 144, 162, 166, 167, 170, 171, 175, 188, 208, 209, 210, 214, Li Chiu-yuan 40 217, 219, 222, 258, 259, 270, 272 Lien Chan 88, 89, 90, 92, 94, 104, 107, 109, Mainlanders 3, 6, 24, 30, 34, 39, 60, 67, 69, 120, 129, 132, 141, 142, 143, 145, 146, 148, 71, 72, 73, 84, 85, 86, 88, 91, 92, 95, 96, 97, 149, 150, 152, 154, 156, 157, 158, 160, 161, 98, 99, 108, 114, 117, 134, 144, 165, 166, 167, 164, 166, 169, 170, 177, 181, 182, 183, 185, 172, 187, 190, 191, 193, 204, 210, 214, 215, 186, 188, 189, 192, 195, 196, 197, 198, 200, 217, 219, 222, 224, 242, 259, 272 202, 203, 204, 208, 209, 210, 214, 219, 253 Mainstream 72, 84, 85, 86, 87, 92, 109, 135 Lien Chen-tung 88 Mainstream Faction 72, 76 Lien Heng 88 malaria 7 Li Fu-chun 40 Manchu 19, 20, 23, 220, 258 Li Hongzhang 22 Mandarin 30, 98, 110, 150, 152, 162, 194, 219 Li Hsiao-ti 221, 223 March First (1919) Movement 25, 27, 28 Li Kwoh-ting 159 Marcos, Ferdinand 16, 61, 269 Li Lien Li-ching 40 martial law 16, 25, 35, 54, 64, 66, 80 Lin Cheng-chieh 51, 53, 58, 61, 133 Ma Shu-li 64 Lin Chin-sheng 13 Matsu 115, 127, 132, 165, 187, 195, 198, 199, 211 Lin Cho-shui 59 May 19 Green Movement 64 Lin Fong-cheng 195 May Fourth Movement 28 Lin Hsin-i 176, 177 Ma Ying-jeou 13, 133, 134, 135, 143, 146, 160, Lin Huan-chun 162 198, 208, 212, 224, 228, 229, 234, 235, 236, Lin I-hsiung 38, 51, 52, 54, 59, 60, 106, 162, 237, 239, 240, 242, 246, 247, 251, 254, 255, 194, 197 256, 257, 262, 263, 265, 266, 267, 270, Lin Li-yueh 222 272, 273 Lin Man-houng 241 mayor 12, 13, 37, 38, 39, 73, 82, 90, 95, 113, Lin Neng-shih 222 116, 126, 133, 134, 142, 146, 153, 155, 160, Lin Yang-kang 13, 72, 73, 78, 88, 89, 90, 92, 190, 191, 200, 208, 211, 212, 213, 234, 235, 107, 108, 109, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 120, 122, 251, 258, 259, 265, 266 123, 125, 126, 154 Mayoral 94, 132, 133, 189, 212 Li Peng 122 mayors 79, 82, 105, 134, 135, 190, 259, 260 Liu Chao-shiuan 240, 255, 258 Miaoli 85, 165, 193, 199 index 301 middle class 10 119, 120, 126, 129, 130, 132, 133, 134, 135, military 1, 2, 14, 24, 25, 27, 30, 32, 33, 37, 43, 143, 144, 155, 156, 163, 164, 172, 187, 188, 54, 55, 57, 58, 60, 61, 64, 71, 72, 74, 84, 85, 189, 190, 191, 201, 207, 209, 211, 212, 213, 88, 100, 106, 110, 114, 117, 119, 121, 122, 123, 221, 230, 231 124, 125, 126, 128, 141, 146, 151, 153, 156, New Party Constitution 91 160, 161, 168, 173, 174, 175, 202, 204, 209, Newsweek 65, 137 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 222, 272 New Zealand 47, 104 military governors 25, 27 Nobel Prize 150, 151 Ming Dynasty 19, 20 non-partisan 10, 12, 39, 40, 51, 52, 53, 73, 102, Minister of Agriculture 267 108, 133, 144, 188, 191, 211, 266 Minister of Economics 12, 97, 176, 177, 189 Non-Partisan Solidarity Union 201, 207, 231 Minister of Education 72, 219, 220 non-violent 14, 83 Minister of Foreign Affairs 24, 47, 89, 97, Nuclear Plant 175, 178 188, 214, 240, 249 Nuclear Power 176, 177, 178, 180 Minister of Justice 49, 72, 84, 208, 234, 262 Minister of National Defense 71, 90, 108, Okinawa 45 175, 188, 216, 217 old thieves 49, 74, 76, 77, 88, 209 Minister of the Interior 73, 90, 191, 259, 262, one nation on each side 190 267 Opium War 22, 221, 225 Minister of Transport 12 opposition 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 14, 16, 17, 26, 39, 42, Minister of Transportation 39 43, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 63, 64, 66, 67, 69, Minister without Portfolio 12, 15, 73 70, 71, 74, 75, 80, 86, 95, 105, 109, 134, 142, Ministry of Education 3, 214, 219, 220, 221 144, 163, 179, 189, 205, 216, 224, 230, 232, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 3, 137, 214, 215, 234, 257, 265, 266, 269, 270 242, 247, 249, 254 Organization Department 53, 108 Ministry of National Defense 3, 60, 214, 216, Ou, Francisco 240 218, 219 missiles 119, 120, 238, 245, 248, 274 Mongolia 1 Pai Chung-hsi 222 Monopoly Bureau 32 Pakistan 1 Morse, Hosea 22, 23 Park Chung-hee 14 Mussolini, Benito 157, 169 Party Chairman 13, 49, 51, 84, 93, 141, 142, 170, 177, 181, 183, 185, 186, 200, 202, 208, Nanjing 202, 204, 243 238, 243, 253 Nantou 52, 73, 115, 116, 165, 193, 198, 199, 258 Party Congress 70, 92, 107, 142, 143 National Affairs Conference 75, 78, 79, 105, Party Nominations 106 129, 183 Peking 22 National Assembly 37, 48, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, Penghu 19, 116, 127, 164, 193, 198, 199, 242, 80, 81, 82, 86, 88, 93, 94, 97, 104, 112, 115, 260 116, 117, 118, 129, 130, 131, 138, 139, 140, 206, Peng Meng-chi 34, 224 207, 208, 231 Peng Ming-min 17, 44, 106, 107, 109, 110, 113, National Assemblyman 37, 39, 58, 73, 76 115, 117, 122, 123, 143, 234 National Development Conference 129, People First Party (see also PFP) 3, 101, 170, 130, 131, 138, 183 231 nationalism 6, 27, 59 People’s Daily 121 Nationalist Party 2, 6, 173, 216, 224, 231 People’s Republic of China 50, 137, 144, 156, National Security Bureau 90 184, 196, 215, 217, 241, 253 National Taiwan Normal University 45 Peru 272 navy 26, 122, 175 PFP (see also People First Party) 3, 170, 184, Nehru, Jawaharlal 1 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 200, New KMT Alliance 76, 86, 91 201, 202, 204, 205, 206, 207, 209, 211, 212, New Party 91, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 213, 214, 231, 233 101, 102, 103, 107, 108, 109, 114, 115, 116, 117, Philippines 1, 16, 19, 118 302 index

Pingtung 21, 53, 58, 116, 150, 159, 164, 193, referendum 153, 174, 195, 227, 260 194, 199, 234 reforms 11, 16, 25, 33, 46, 48, 49, 61, 62, 64, PLA 119, 120, 121 65, 67, 174, 200, 203, 207, 213, 217, 218, Planning Project Budget System 218 219, 221, 266, 270 police 7, 9, 25, 27, 28, 32, 53, 55, 74, 92, 166, Republic of China (see also ROC) 36, 42, 195, 252, 253 44, 46, 63, 67, 82, 88, 114, 128, 139, 140, 151, Political Consultative Conference 183, 184 154, 158, 160, 161, 174, 203, 205, 215, 237, political warfare 217 241, 242, 246, 249, 251, 252 popular associations 15 Republic of Taiwan 26 PRC 144 Research, Development and Evaluation Premier 2, 11, 12, 24, 25, 45, 48, 49, 56, 57, Commission 170 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, ROC (see also Republic of China) 46, 47, 90, 92, 97, 104, 108, 120, 122, 126, 129, 130, 61, 136, 156, 161, 197, 218, 238, 242, 249, 131, 132, 139, 142, 155, 168, 175, 176, 177, 252, 253 178, 179, 180, 185, 188, 189, 190, 198, 212, Rogers, William 47 219, 221, 227, 228, 234, 235, 236, 240, 255, Roosevelt, Franklin D. 152, 153, 193 258, 259 rotation of political parties 147, 153, 154 Presbyterian Church 16, 17, 48, 52, 196 Ryukyu 21, 45, 239 President 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 13, 16, 17, 22, 34, 35, 36, 37, 49, 50, 59, 60, 61, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, Saito Masaki 242 74, 75, 78, 79, 82, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, San Francisco 17, 241, 247 93, 94, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 112, SARS 219 115, 118, 119, 120, 125, 126, 127, 129, 130, 131, Schak, David 11 133, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, second-class citizens 23, 221 143, 146, 147, 148, 150, 152, 153, 154, 155, Second Personnel Office 83 161, 162, 163, 165, 167, 169, 171, 172, 173, Secretary-General 13, 24, 61, 64, 71, 72, 90, 174, 175, 176, 177, 179, 183, 185, 186, 188, 92, 94, 126, 142, 188, 195, 235, 248, 258, 189, 190, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 200, 262 202, 207, 208, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, secretary-general of the presidential office 217, 220, 227, 228, 229, 233, 234, 235, 239, 188 241, 242, 243, 247, 248, 250, 251, 252, 253, sedition 42, 43, 44, 69 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, Senate 118 264, 265, 266, 267, 269, 270 Senior High School History Curriculum Presidential Office 64, 72, 74, 75, 89, 136, Standards 221 162, 192, 195 September 21 earthquake 141 province 13, 22, 30, 39, 82, 94, 105, 115, 131, Settlement Committee 33, 222 136, 137 Seventh Fleet 34 Provincial Assembly 12, 37, 38, 39, 58, 96, Shanghai 204, 243, 246 130, 131, 188, 191 Shen Chang-huan 62, 89 Provincial Assemblyman 37 Shen Guofang 120 provincial governor 10, 14, 54, 73, 79, 82, 88, Shiba Ryōtarō 22, 135 89, 93, 94, 105, 120, 130, 141, 142, 149, 155, Shieh Tung-min 14, 62, 159 165, 166, 192 Shih Hsi-hsun 40 Provincial Grain Bureau 15 Shih Ming-teh 53, 54, 55, 58, 75, 93, 102, 103, public health 7 125, 154, 162, 191 public political association 63 Sichuan 141, 243 Siew, Vincent 97, 118, 132, 142, 145, 151, 154, Qian Qichen 121, 122 185, 189, 198, 234, 235, 236, 238, 251 Qing Dynasty 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 220, 221, Singapore 1, 118, 186, 204 225 social mobility 11 Soong Chang-chih 159 Reagan, Ronald 16 Soong, James 13, 79, 94, 95, 101, 120, 141, 142, Rebellion of the Three Feudatories 20 143, 144, 146, 147, 148, 150, 151, 152, 154, index 303

155, 158, 160, 164, 165, 169, 189, 191, 192, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 195, 196, 198, 200, 202, 204, 209, 212, 233 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 126, South Africa 98, 272 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, South Korea 1, 3, 14, 16, 34, 61, 266, 269 136, 137, 138, 140, 141, 142, 144, 145, 146, Spanish 19, 220 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, Speaker 12, 87, 97, 102, 103, 154, 179, 181, 185, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 188, 189, 209, 245 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 173, 174, 176, special state-to-state relations 136, 137, 143 177, 180, 181, 182, 183, 185, 186, 188, 189, Sri Lanka 1 190, 191, 192, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, State Department 118 200, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 210, state-to-state relationship 136, 174, 190 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, Straits Exchange Foundation 240, 244 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 229, 230, Strategic voting 147, 158, 159, 160, 161, 165 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, Su Chih-fen 262 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, Su Ching-li 54 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 256, 257, 258, Su Jia-chyuan 267 259, 260, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 269, Su Jun-pin 263 270, 272, 273, 274, 291 Su Tseng-chang 57, 58, 61, 227, 228, 234, Taiwan Association of University Profes- 264 sors 83 Su Tung-chi 40, 43, 52 Taiwan, China 253 Sun Chen 216 Taiwan Communist Party 28 Sung Lin-kang 40 Taiwan consciousness 205 Sung Shih-hsuan 209 Taiwanese 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 19, 23, 24, 25, Sun Li-jen 35, 70 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, Sun Yat-sen 91, 151, 153, 202, 204, 243 39, 42, 43, 47, 48, 59, 60, 67, 69, 70, 72, Sun Yun-suan 12, 56, 159 73, 80, 81, 83, 85, 86, 88, 89, 90, 92, 94, survey 67, 81, 117, 122, 134, 150, 171, 240 96, 98, 99, 105, 108, 109, 110, 111, 113, 114, 117, 122, 132, 133, 134, 135, 141, 142, 149, 151, Tadashi Ikeda 240 163, 166, 167, 168, 171, 173, 187, 188, 189, Taichung 40, 56, 85, 86, 97, 102, 154, 163, 190, 191, 194, 196, 197, 200, 203, 204, 209, 193, 195, 198, 199, 253, 260 210, 214, 215, 217, 219, 220, 221, 223, 224, Tainan 12, 19, 61, 85, 116, 164, 193, 197, 199, 230, 234, 235, 238, 239, 240, 243, 251, 258, 260 259, 266, 270, 271, 272, 273 Taipei 12, 13, 32, 33, 34, 37, 39, 40, 46, 50, 52, Taiwan Garrison Command 42, 43, 49, 57, 54, 56, 57, 58, 61, 63, 64, 73, 76, 77, 79, 82, 63, 84 85, 90, 94, 95, 96, 97, 102, 105, 110, 113, 116, Taiwan identity 6, 229, 270 123, 126, 133, 134, 135, 137, 142, 145, 149, Taiwan Independence 17, 81, 83, 88, 110, 153, 154, 162, 164, 175, 190, 191, 193, 194, 123, 130, 152, 155, 158, 161, 205 199, 200, 203, 208, 212, 213, 221, 230, 232, Taiwanization 2, 6, 181, 182 234, 235, 240, 241, 242, 251, 258, 259, 260, Taiwan Political Review 50, 51 261, 263, 266, 285 Taiwan Provincial Executive Commander’s Taipei, China 247, 249, 266 Office 30, 32, 222, 223 Taipei Treaty 242 Taiwan Relations Act 110 Taisho democracy 1, 25, 27 Taiwan Solidarity Union (see also TSU) 3, Taitung 107, 165, 187, 198, 199, 211 170, 181, 231, 233 Taiwan 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, Taiwan Strait 121, 126, 138, 190, 204, 235, 238 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, Taiwan Straits Crisis 106 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 42, Ta-kao 22 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, Tamsui 19, 20, 22 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 67, 69, Tang A-ken 95 70, 73, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, Tang Fei 175, 176, 227, 255 88, 89, 90, 91, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 102, 103, Tangshan 141 304 index

Tang Yiau-ming 188, 217 vice-premier 47, 73, 88, 89, 176, 188, 258, Tao Pai-chuan 13, 43, 62, 63 259, 262, 267 Taoyuan 39, 40, 52, 53, 55, 85, 97, 116, 132, vice-president 49, 60, 61, 62, 65, 67, 69, 72, 142, 165, 193, 199, 201, 202, 232, 259, 260 73, 82, 90, 92, 108, 129, 131, 140, 141, 142, Tauketok, Chief 21 147, 192, 197, 198, 207, 227, 235, 238 Temporary Provisions 74, 75, 78, 80 Tennessee Valley Authority 12 Wang Chao-chuan 58 Tenth Credit Cooperative Incident 61 Wang Chien-shien 103, 107, 134, 209 Thailand 1, 118 Wang Ching-feng 108, 125, 262 three links 151, 152 Wang Chung-fu 223 Tien Chiu-chin 51 Wang Daohan 137, 204 Tien Hung-mao 214 Wang Guangya 248 Time 137 Wang Hsi-ling 60, 272 Tokyo 12, 121, 189, 240 Wang Hsin-shun 40 township executive 10, 52, 131, 211 Wang Jin-pyng 87, 104, 179, 181, 185, 189, Treaty of Peace 241 209, 210, 245 Tsai Ing-wen 190, 267 Wang Sheng 12, 57, 59, 60 Tsai, Michael 217 Wang Ti 40 Tsai Shih-yuan 133 Wang To 53, 54 Tsay Chung-han 103 Wang Yi 244 Tsiang Yien-si 13, 61 Wang Zhaoguo 122 TSU (see also Taiwan Solidarity Union) 3, Washington 45, 48, 57, 121, 248 170, 171, 181, 182, 186, 187, 189, 190, 191, Washington Post 65 192, 200, 201, 202, 206, 207, 211, 212, 213, Wei Ting-chao 44 Wei Yung 170 233 Wen Jiabao 236 Tsurumi, Patricia 7 west coast 198 Turkey 139 Whampoa Military Academy 35 Twelve Man Committee 62 White Paper 144, 148, 168 two-states theory 137, 153 White Terror 25, 35, 36, 239 Typhoon Morakot 243, 254, 258, 259, 266 Wild Lily 74, 75, 78, 83, 105 Typhoon Nari 182, 183 Wilson, Woodrow 25, 27, 193 Wisdom Club 84, 85, 86, 95 United Daily News 42, 137, 170, 193, 264 World Health Organization 203, 205, 244, United Kingdom 5 248, 249 United Nations 17, 25, 46, 47, 248, 254 World Uyghur Congress 259 United States 1, 5, 6, 16, 38, 45, 46, 47, 51, 57, World War II 25, 29, 35, 45, 89, 219, 239, 241 59, 60, 75, 77, 83, 89, 97, 104, 106, 108, 111, Wu Den-yih 95, 134, 191, 213, 258, 259, 267 118, 120, 121, 122, 124, 139, 149, 151, 152, 153, Wu Feng 70 169, 173, 182, 185, 190, 196, 198, 202, 218, Wu Nai-jen 51 232, 235, 237, 239, 240, 247, 248, 250, 254, Wu Nai-te 51 259, 262 Wu Poh-hsiung 62, 145, 240, 243, 247 Uyghur 259 Wu San-lien 37, 38 Wu Shu-chen 61, 163 vice-chairman 92, 108, 170, 182, 183, 185, 189, Wu Tai-an 39 208, 209, 210, 244 Wu Tse-yuan 150, 158 vice-governor 165 Vice-Minister for Environmental Protec- Xiamen 21 tion 262 Xi’an 70 Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs 214 Xi’an 89, 132, 204, 214 Vice-Minister of National Defense 218 Xinhua 123, 247 index 305

Yang Chin-hu 39 Yü Cheng-hsien 262, 265 Yang, C.K. 162 Yü Chen Yue-ying 59, 61 Yao Chia-wen 50, 51, 53, 54, 58, 79, 92, 133, Yu Ching 57, 106, 133 162 Yu Chung-ji 209 Yeh, George K.C. 12 Yü Kuo-hwa 62, 71, 159 Yeh Ping-huang 40 Yunlin 37, 40, 43, 52, 95, 164, 193, 199, 211, Yen Chia-kan 45, 49, 62, 69, 129 260, 262 Yiguandao 117 Yu Shyi-kun 58, 61, 188, 190, 227, 235 Yok Mu-ming 133 Yü Teng-fa 39, 40, 54, 55, 58, 59 Yongzheng 20 You, Michael 98 Zhejiang 30, 108 Youth Party 5, 37, 38, 39 Zheng Chenggong 19, 20, 219 Zheng Jing 20 Zhu Rongji 155, 156, 168